Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

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Show simple item record Güth, Werner Pull, Kerstin Stadler, Manfred Zaby, Alexandra 2016-05-03T11:34:09Z 2016-05-03T11:34:09Z 2016-04
dc.identifier.other 469269049 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri de_DE
dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes blindfolded versus informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Analyzing the transition from one information setting to the other suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargain- ing due to task-independent strategies such as ‘equal sharing’ or the ‘golden mean.’ The probability of successful bargaining is lower in case of blindfolded than informed ultimatum bargaining. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri de_DE
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.classification Economics de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other Ultimatum bargaining en
dc.subject.other information structure en
dc.subject.other experimental economics en
dc.title Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis en
dc.type Article de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
utue.publikation.source University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 90 de_DE


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