Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10900/69470
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-694705
http://dx.doi.org/10.15496/publikation-10884
Dokumentart: Aufsatz
Date: 2016-04
Source: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 90
Language: English
Faculty: 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Department: Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
DDC Classifikation: 330 - Economics
Keywords: Economics
Other Keywords:
Ultimatum bargaining
information structure
experimental economics
License: Publishing license excluding print on demand
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Abstract:

This paper analyzes blindfolded versus informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Analyzing the transition from one information setting to the other suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargain- ing due to task-independent strategies such as ‘equal sharing’ or the ‘golden mean.’ The probability of successful bargaining is lower in case of blindfolded than informed ultimatum bargaining.

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