Market Structure, Common Ownership and Coordinated Manager Compensation

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Show simple item record Neus, Werner Stadler, Manfred Unsorg, Maximiliane 2020-03-18T11:11:05Z 2020-03-18T11:11:05Z 2020-03-18
dc.identifier.other 1692891944 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri de_DE
dc.description.abstract We study oligopolistic competition in product markets where the firms’ quantity decisions are delegated to managers. Some firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds whereas the other firms are owned by independent shareholders. Under such an asymmetric ownership structure, the common owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing the manager compensation schemes. This implicit collusion induces a less aggressive output behavior by the coordinated firms and a more aggressive behavior by the noncoordinated firms. The profits of the noncoordinated firms are increasing in the number of coordinated firms. The profits of the coordinated firms exceed the profits without coordination if at least 80 % of the firms are commonly owned - an astonishing resemblance to the merger literature. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri de_DE
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.classification Eigentum , Indexfonds de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other Common ownership en
dc.subject.other index funds en
dc.subject.other shareholder coordination en
dc.subject.other manager compensation en
dc.title Market Structure, Common Ownership and Coordinated Manager Compensation en
dc.type Article de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
utue.opus.portal utwpbusinesseco de_DE
utue.publikation.source University of Tübingen Working Papers in Business and Economics ; No. 133 de_DE


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