Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

dc.contributor.author	Pull, Kerstin
dc.contributor.author	Stadler, Manfred
dc.contributor.author	Zaby, Alexandra
dc.date.accessioned	2019-03-28T13:42:32Z
dc.date.available	2019-03-28T13:42:32Z
dc.date.issued	2017
dc.identifier.issn	1468-0475
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10900/87328
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.publisher	Wiley	de_DE
dc.relation.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12112
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject.ddc	330	de_DE
dc.title	Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis	de_DE
dc.type	Article	de_DE
utue.kommentar.intern	vgl auch: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 90 http://hdl.handle.net/10900/69470	de_DE
utue.quellen.id	20190131163842_00638
utue.publikation.seiten	444-467	de_DE
utue.personen.roh	Gueth, Werner
utue.personen.roh	Pull, Kerstin
utue.personen.roh	Stadler, Manfred
utue.personen.roh	Zaby, Alexandra K.
dcterms.isPartOf.ZSTitelID	German Economic Review	de_DE
dcterms.isPartOf.ZS-Issue	4	de_DE
dcterms.isPartOf.ZS-Volume	18	de_DE
utue.fakultaet	06 Wirtschafts- und sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät