Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

DSpace Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Pull, Kerstin
dc.contributor.author Stadler, Manfred
dc.contributor.author Zaby, Alexandra
dc.date.accessioned 2019-03-28T13:42:32Z
dc.date.available 2019-03-28T13:42:32Z
dc.date.issued 2017
dc.identifier.issn 1468-0475
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10900/87328
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher Wiley de_DE
dc.relation.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12112
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.title Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis de_DE
dc.type Article de_DE
utue.kommentar.intern vgl auch: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 90 http://hdl.handle.net/10900/69470 de_DE
utue.quellen.id 20190131163842_00638
utue.publikation.seiten 444-467 de_DE
utue.personen.roh Gueth, Werner
utue.personen.roh Pull, Kerstin
utue.personen.roh Stadler, Manfred
utue.personen.roh Zaby, Alexandra K.
dcterms.isPartOf.ZSTitelID German Economic Review de_DE
dcterms.isPartOf.ZS-Issue 4 de_DE
dcterms.isPartOf.ZS-Volume 18 de_DE
utue.fakultaet 06 Wirtschafts- und sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät


Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record