Common Holdings and Strategic Manager Compensation. The Case of an Asymmetric Triopoly

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Show simple item record Stadler, Manfred Neus, Werner 2018-07-31T06:20:12Z 2018-07-31T06:20:12Z 2018-07-26
dc.identifier.other 508079470
dc.identifier.uri de_DE
dc.description.abstract We study an asymmetric triopoly in a heterogeneous product market where quantity decisions are delegated to managers. The two biggest firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds while the smallest firm is owned by independent shareholders. Under such a common holding owner structure, the owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing their manager compensation schemes. This coordination leads to a reallocation of production and induces a redistribution of profits. The trade volume in the market is reduced so that shareholder coordination is detrimental to consumer surplus as well as welfare. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri de_DE
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.classification Economics de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other Common holdings en
dc.subject.other index funds en
dc.subject.other shareholder coordination en
dc.subject.other manager compensation en
dc.title Common Holdings and Strategic Manager Compensation. The Case of an Asymmetric Triopoly en
dc.type Article de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
utue.publikation.source University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 109 de_DE


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