Delegation, Worker Compensation, and Strategic Competition

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Show simple item record Güth, Werner de_DE Pull, Kerstin de_DE Stadler, Manfred de_DE 2014-01-24 de_DE 2014-03-18T10:04:19Z 2014-01-24 de_DE 2014-03-18T10:04:19Z 2014 de_DE
dc.identifier.other 400097362 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri de_DE
dc.description.abstract We study interfirm competition on a product market where effort decisions are delegated to the firms’ workers. Intrafirm organization is captured by a principal-multiagent framework where firm owners implement alternative compensation schemes for the workers. We show that the value of delegation as well as the optimal design of the compensation scheme crucially depend on the intensity of competition. In particular, our model explains why piece rates and performance-based revenue sharing may be observed in different markets at the same time. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri de_DE
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.classification Delegation de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other agency theory , compensation schemes en
dc.title Delegation, Worker Compensation, and Strategic Competition en
dc.type ResearchPaper de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
dcterms.DCMIType Text de_DE
utue.publikation.typ workingPaper de_DE 7206 de_DE
utue.publikation.source University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 67 de_DE


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