Intrafirm Conflicts and Interfirm Competition

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dc.contributor.author Güth, Werner de_DE
dc.contributor.author Pull, Kerstin de_DE
dc.contributor.author Stadler, Manfred de_DE
dc.date.accessioned 2011-07-26 de_DE
dc.date.accessioned 2014-03-18T10:03:45Z
dc.date.available 2011-07-26 de_DE
dc.date.available 2014-03-18T10:03:45Z
dc.date.issued 2011 de_DE
dc.identifier.other 34780666X de_DE
dc.identifier.uri http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-57360 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10900/47864
dc.description.abstract We study strategic interfirm competition allowing for internal conflicts in each seller firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a multi-agent framework with principals implementing a revenue sharing scheme. For a given number of agents, interfirm competition leads to a higher revenue share for the agents, higher equilibrium effort levels and higher agent utility, but lower profits for the firms. The winners from antitrust policy are thus not only the consumers but also the agents employed by the competing firms. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=de de_DE
dc.rights.uri http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/doku/lic_ohne_pod.php?la=en en
dc.subject.classification Interner Wettbewerb de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other Agency theory , Strategic interfirm competition , Revenue sharing en
dc.title Intrafirm Conflicts and Interfirm Competition en
dc.type ResearchPaper de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
dcterms.DCMIType Text de_DE
utue.publikation.typ workingPaper de_DE
utue.opus.id 5736 de_DE
utue.publikation.source University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; 14 de_DE

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