IMF's Assistance : Devil's Kiss or Guardian Angel?

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Show simple item record Brandes, Julia de_DE Schüle, Tobias de_DE 2007-04-02 de_DE 2014-03-18T10:02:40Z 2007-04-02 de_DE 2014-03-18T10:02:40Z 2007 de_DE
dc.identifier.other 284938327 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri de_DE
dc.description.abstract This paper contributes to the debate on the efficacy of IMF's catalytic finance in preventing financial crises. Extending Morris and Shin (2006), we consider that the IMF's intervention policy usually exerts a signaling effect on private creditors and that several interventions in sequence may be necessary to avert an impending crisis. Absent of the IMF's signaling ability, our results state that repeated intervention is required to bail out a country, whereby additional assistance may induce moral hazard on the debtor side. Contrarily, if the IMF exerts a strong signaling effect, one single intervention suffices to avoid liquidity crises. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri de_DE
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.classification Internationaler Währungsfonds , Krise , Intervention de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.subject.other catalytic finance , debtor moral hazard , global games en
dc.title IMF's Assistance : Devil's Kiss or Guardian Angel? de_DE
dc.type ResearchPaper de_DE 2007-04-02 de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
dcterms.DCMIType Text de_DE
utue.publikation.typ workingPaper de_DE 2796 de_DE
utue.opus.portal wiwidisk de_DE
utue.opus.portalzaehlung 310.00000 de_DE
utue.publikation.source Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät ; 310 de_DE
utue.publikation.reihenname Tübinger Diskussionsbeitrag de_DE
utue.publikation.zsausgabe 310
utue.publikation.erstkatid 2136475-8


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