Compatibility and product design in software markets

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Show simple item record Woeckener, Bernd de_DE 2005-12-07 de_DE 2014-03-18T10:02:22Z 2005-12-07 de_DE 2014-03-18T10:02:22Z 1999 de_DE
dc.identifier.other 251788865 de_DE
dc.identifier.uri de_DE
dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes the interplay between compatibility and product design decisions in a symmetric software duopoly with network effects. We show that suppliers do not always offer differentiated product designs and compete within the market. Rather, when ever both the significance of the network effects and the costs of compatibility are high, they offer homogeneous and incompatible variants and compete for the market, although this leads to Bertrand competition with zero profits. Moreover, we show that given our symmetric setting, antitrust authorities should never intervene against incompatibility, whereas compatibility arrangements should always be under their scrutiny. en
dc.language.iso en de_DE
dc.publisher Universität Tübingen de_DE
dc.rights ubt-podno de_DE
dc.rights.uri de_DE
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.classification Software de_DE
dc.subject.ddc 330 de_DE
dc.title Compatibility and product design in software markets en
dc.type WorkingPaper de_DE
utue.publikation.fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften de_DE
utue.publikation.fakultaet 6 Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät de_DE
dcterms.DCMIType Text de_DE
utue.publikation.typ workingPaper de_DE 2101 de_DE
utue.opus.portal wiwidisk de_DE
utue.opus.portalzaehlung 173.00000 de_DE
utue.publikation.source Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät ; 173 de_DE
utue.publikation.reihenname Tübinger Diskussionsbeitrag de_DE
utue.publikation.zsausgabe 173
utue.publikation.erstkatid 2136475-8


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