

Sicherheitsinstitutionen, Vertrauensbildung und zwischenstaatlicher Frieden

Beiträge zur Konzeptualisierung, Theoretisierung und empirischen Analyse

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Lukas Kasten

aus Ludwigsburg

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Dekan:	Prof. Dr. rer. soc. Josef Schmid
1. Gutachter:	Prof. Dr. rer. soc. Andreas Hasenclever
2. Gutachter:	Prof. Dr. phil. Thomas Diez

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Abkürzungs- und Akronymverzeichnis

APSA	American Political Science Association
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
bspw.	beispielsweise
CBD	calculus-based distrust
CBM	confidence-building measure
CBT	calculus-based trust
COW	Correlates of War
DTIRP	Defense Treaty Ready Inspection Readiness Program
e.g.	exempli gratia/for example
etc.	et cetera
EU	European Union
GRIT	Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IB	Internationale Beziehungen
IBD	identification-based distrust
IBT	identification-based trust
IBV	Identifikations-basiertes Vertrauen
ICB	International Crisis Behavior
IGO	international governmental organization
IIA	institutionalized interstate alliance
IR	International Relations
ISA	International Studies Association
KBV	Kalkül-basiertes Vertrauen
KGD	Klein, Goertz, Diehl
MID	militarized interstate dispute
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA	National Security Agency
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PTA	preferential trade agreement
SALT	strategic arms limitation talks
SMI	security management institution
SO	security organization
UNO	United Nations Organization
US/USA	United States
VCC	Verification Coordination Committee
WEU	Western European Union
z.B.	zum Beispiel
ZIB	Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen

Hinweise

In der Dissertationsschrift wurde eine durchgängig einheitliche Textformatierung und ein einheitliches Layout angewendet. Testformatierung und Layout weichen teilweise von publizierten Artikelfassungen ab (bspw. Fußnoten anstatt Endnoten, Nummerierungen, einheitliche Zitationsweise, Platzierung von Tabellen).

Für Englisch verfasste Manuskripte wurde für diese Dissertationsschrift einheitlich die amerikanische Rechtschreibung verwendet, auch wenn in den publizierten Artikelfassungen teilweise die britische Rechtschreibung Anwendung fand.

Wenn in Kapitel 1 (Thematische Rahmung) auf Inhalte der Manuskripte verwiesen wird, beziehen sich die angegebenen Seitenzahlen auf jene in dieser Dissertationsschrift.

Wenn in den Manuskripten auf bereits veröffentlichte Manuskripte verwiesen wird, werden die Seitenzahlen der publizierten Zeitschriftenartikel verwendet.

Wenn in den Manuskripten auf unveröffentlichte Manuskripte verwiesen wird, beziehen sich die angegebenen Seitenzahlen auf jene in dieser Dissertationsschrift.

Aus Gründen der besseren Lesbarkeit wird in deutschen Texten durchgängig das generische Maskulinum verwendet, welches männliche und weibliche Personen einschließt.

Teil I

Thematische Rahmung der Manuskripte

1 Sicherheitsinstitutionen, Vertrauen, Frieden. Darlegung von Forschungslücken, Zusammenfassung der Manuskripte, Erörterung ihrer gegenseitigen Bezüge und ihrer thematischen und inhaltlichen Konsistenz

1.1 Einleitung

Die vorliegende, kumulativ verfasste Dissertationsschrift beschäftigt sich mit der Konzeptualisierung, Theoretisierung und quantitativ-empirischen Analyse von zwischenstaatlichen Friedensbildungsprozessen. Konzeptionell wird Frieden dabei nicht als die bloße Abwesenheit von Gewaltkonflikten verstanden, sondern im Sinne eines positiven Friedensbegriffs definiert. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird Friedensbildung als tiefgehender Transformationsprozess konzipiert, der die Beendigung gewaltträchtiger und von Misstrauen geprägter Rivalitäten und die Etablierung eines stabilen, von Kooperation und Vertrauen geprägten Friedens beinhaltet.¹ Theoretisch und empirisch-analytisch liegt das Hauptaugenmerk der Dissertationsschrift auf der Rolle von internationalen Sicherheitsinstitutionen in Friedensbildungsprozessen und insbesondere darauf, ob, warum und auf welche Weise sie einen Effekt auf die Bildung zwischenstaatlichen Vertrauens ausüben.

Die einzelnen Forschungsbeiträge beinhalten eine Konzeptualisierung und Operationalisierung eines mehrstufigen Konzepts zur Erfassung zwischenstaatlicher Friedensqualitäten; sie formulieren theoretische Überlegungen darüber, inwiefern internationale Sicherheitsinstitutionen zur Bildung zwischenstaatlichen Vertrauens und auf diesem Wege zur Entwicklung eines stabilen und robusten zwischenstaatlichen Friedens beitragen oder solche Prozesse eher behindern; und sie präsentieren eine quantitativ-empirische Überprüfung dieser Überlegungen anhand eines eigens generierten Datensatzes.

¹ Der in der Dissertationsschrift verwendete positive Friedensbegriff knüpft an eine positive Friedensdefinition an, wie sie in der konstruktivistischen Literatur zu Sicherheitsgemeinschaften, zwischenstaatlicher Freundschaft, und stabilem Frieden entwickelt wurde (Adler und Barnett 1998a; Kupchan 2010; Koschut und Oelsner 2014; Kacowicz et al. 2000; Boulding 1978). Diese Definitionen haben eher wenig gemeinsam mit dem ebenfalls populären Galtungsschen positiven Friedensbegriff, der Gerechtigkeit als zentrale Eigenschaftsdimension ansieht und dabei eine kritisch-theoretische Perspektive einnimmt (Galtung 1969). Dem Gerechtigkeitsbegriff wird in dieser Dissertationsschrift keine bedeutsamere Rolle zugesprochen, wenn auch freilich betont werden muss, dass Gerechtigkeit ein zentrales und wichtiges normatives Konzept in den Internationalen Beziehungen darstellt (Brock 2010). Zudem erscheint es möglich, Gerechtigkeit als unabhängige Variable zu verstehen, die eine Transformation hin zu positivem Frieden, wie er in dieser Dissertation definiert ist, wahrscheinlicher lassen werden könnte.

Die Forschungsarbeit besteht aus insgesamt fünf Manuskripten. Drei dieser Manuskripte sind bereits in hochrangigen Fachzeitschriften publiziert worden, eine davon in Ko-Autorenschaft mit Philipp Brugger und Andreas Hasenclever. Zwei Manuskripte befinden sich derzeit noch in Begutachtungsverfahren. Die einzelnen Manuskripte leisten jeweils einen spezifischen Beitrag zur Bearbeitung der übergeordneten Thematik der Dissertationsschrift.

Dieses Rahmenpapier skizziert die Relevanz der Forschungsarbeit, diskutiert die spezifischen Inhalte der einzelnen Manuskripte und erläutert, wie die einzelnen Manuskripte zueinander und zu der übergeordneten Thematik der Forschungsarbeit in Bezug stehen. Hierfür werden zunächst die polit-praktische und wissenschaftliche Relevanz der Dissertationsschrift erörtert. Dann wird ein erster grober Überblick über die Inhalte der einzelnen Manuskripte geboten, indem sie den einzelnen Arbeitsschritten sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschungsprozesse zugeordnet werden. Anschließend werden die Inhalte der einzelnen Manuskripte detaillierter diskutiert. Dabei soll vor allem herausgearbeitet werden, dass die Manuskripte aufeinander starken Bezug nehmen und thematische wie inhaltliche Konsistenz aufweisen. Die Konklusion nennt mögliche zukünftige Schritte innerhalb der Forschung im Themenfeld Sicherheitsinstitutionen, zwischenstaatliche Vertrauensbildung und Friedensbildungsprozesse.

1.2 Relevanz der Forschungsarbeit

Zwischenstaatliche militärische Konflikte gehören leider noch nicht auf den Scheiterhaufen der Geschichte, auch wenn dies nach Ende des Kalten Krieges optimistisch proklamiert wurde (Fukuyama 2006). Zum Beispiel offenbart der jüngste Konflikt zwischen Russland und den NATO-Mitgliedsländern, der in der russischen Annexion der Krim gipfelte, dass die Ost-West Beziehungen fragiler sind als bislang angenommen. Es zeigt sich außerdem, dass die existierende Sicherheitsarchitektur, die zur Verregelung der Ost-West-Beziehungen beitragen sollte, nicht im Stande war, signifikant deeskalierend zu wirken bzw. in den Jahren zuvor, also seit 1990, eine Transformation hin zu positiveren, stabileren und vertrauensbasierten Friedensbeziehungen zu fördern.

Eine Vielzahl weiterer zwischenstaatlicher Konfliktherde sind auf der aktuellen tagespolitischen Agenda – man denke nur an die Territorialkonflikte im südchinesischen Meer, den Konflikt um das nordkoreanische Atomprogramm oder die Konkurrenzkämpfe

um die regionale Vormachtstellung im Nahen und Mittleren Osten. Empirische Daten zeigen, dass im Jahr 2010 noch mehr als 40 „strategische Rivalitäten“ existierten, also Staatenpaare, die sich gegenseitig als militärische Bedrohung und Konkurrenten wahrnehmen (Thompson und Dreyer 2011). Es ist davon auszugehen, dass diese Zahl bis heute nicht signifikant abgenommen hat, wenn sie nicht sogar angestiegen ist.

Kurzfristig sollte es freilich immer zunächst das Ziel sein, die militärische Eskalation von Konflikten zu vermeiden. Statistische Studien haben dabei wiederholt einen deeskalierenden Effekt internationaler Sicherheitsinstitutionen nachweisen können (Boehmer et al. 2004; Shannon et al. 2010). Aus einer langfristigeren Perspektive stellt sich jedoch die Frage, ob Sicherheitsinstitutionen Konfliktdynamiken lediglich mildern können, oder aber, wie Booth und Wheeler es formulieren, auch dabei helfen können, diese zu „transzendieren“ (Booth und Wheeler 2008). Diese Frage kann nicht leichtfertig positiv beantwortet werden, denn vor allem aus einer vertrauenstheoretischen Perspektive können wohlbegründete Gegenargumente angebracht werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund kann die Dissertationsschrift signifikante polit-praktische Relevanz aufweisen. Denn sie beschäftigt sich theoretisch wie empirisch mit den Effekten von Sicherheitsinstitutionen auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit erfolgreicher Friedensbildung, im Sinne einer Transformation hin zu positiven, stabilen und vertrauensbasierten Friedensbeziehungen. Dabei wird der Effekt von Sicherheitsinstitutionen auf diese Transformationsprozesse unter die theoretische und empirische Lupe genommen.

Neben ihrer polit-praktischen Relevanz leistet die Forschungsarbeit innerhalb der wissenschaftlichen Disziplin der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung und hier im Speziellen der Ursachenforschung zu zwischenstaatlichem Frieden drei zentrale Beiträge. Erstens trägt sie zur quantitativen Erforschung zwischenstaatlicher Friedensbildungsprozesse bei, indem Sie ein Konzept und eine quantitative Operationalisierung für die Erfassung unterschiedlicher Friedensqualitäten vorschlägt. Dabei muss zunächst betont werden, dass Forschung zu positivem zwischenstaatlichem Frieden bislang ausschließlich im Rahmen von (vergleichenden) Einzelfallstudien stattfand. Forschungen zu Sicherheitsgemeinschaften, zwischenstaatlicher Freundschaft und stabilem Frieden haben dabei wertvolle konzeptionelle, theoretische und empirische Grundlagen und Ergebnisse liefern können (Adler und Barnett 1998b; Kupchan 2010; Koschut und Oelsner 2014; Kacowicz et al. 2000). Generalisierbare Aussagen können auf der Basis dieser *small-n*-Studien jedoch freilich nicht getroffen werden. Innerhalb der quantitativ angelegten Forschung hat sich die dominante

Mehrheit von Studien ausschließlich mit den Ursachen von Krieg und Gewalt bzw. deren Vermeidung beschäftigt. Studien verwendeten bislang fast ausschließlich einen negativen Friedensbegriff für die Konzeptualisierung und Operationalisierung ihrer abhängigen, zu erklärenden Variablen. Sie fokussieren dabei auf militarisierte zwischenstaatliche Dispute oder Rivalitäten und deren Beendigung (Maoz 2005; Thompson und Dreyer 2011; Klein et al. 2006). Dementsprechend können diese Studien lediglich darüber aufklären, warum militarisierte Dispute auftreten und wie sie vermieden werden können, bzw. unter welchen Umständen Rivalitäten andauern und wann diese beendet werden. Damit übereinstimmend haben Gleditsch und Kollegen (2014, S. 155) die inhaltliche Ausrichtung der Artikel aus 50 Jahrgängen des *Journal of Peace Research* und des *Journal of Conflict Resolution* untersucht und kommen zu dem Ergebnis das „(n)egative peace, in the sense of reducing war, has always been the main focus in peace research“. Umfassendere Transformationen zwischenstaatlicher Beziehungen hin zu positiven Friedensbeziehungen bleiben bislang unerklärt innerhalb der quantitativen Forschung. Deshalb muss schlichtweg konstatiert werden, dass „less research has been done on peace than on war“ (Vasquez 2000, S. 329). Statistische und generalisierbare Erkenntnisse zu zwischenstaatlichem Frieden sind Mangelware.

Vor diesem Hintergrund haben Friedens- und Konfliktforscher begonnen, die Notwendigkeit eines quantitativ angelegten Forschungsprogramms zu betonen, welchem ein positiver Friedensbegriff zugrunde liegt, den mehr als die bloße Abwesenheit von Gewalt ausmacht. Wallensteen etwa fordert die Gründung eines „Correlates of Peace“-Projektes (Wallensteen 2000, 270) und Regan argumentiert, dass „members of the Peace Science community should study peace directly rather than through war“ (Regan 2014, 345–48). Als Präsident der *International Studies Association* gab Diehl (2016) eine *Presidential Address* zum Thema *Exploring Peace: Looking Beyond War and Negative Peace*, und demensprechend wurde *Exploring Peace* auch zum übergreifenden Konferenzthema der *ISA Annual Convention 2016* gewählt. Es wird somit deutlich, dass es bislang an einem systematischen Forschungsprogramm zu positivem Frieden fehlt, welches quantitativ-statistisch angelegt ist und im Stande ist, generalisierbare Erkenntnisse zu erzeugen. Hauptgrund für das Fehlen substantieller quantitativ angelegter Studien stellt dabei die Tatsache dar, dass lange Zeit die dafür notwendigen Messinstrumente und Daten nicht entwickelt und verfügbar waren.

Die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit leistet einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Schließung dieser Forschungslücke, da sie ein Konzept-, Mess- und Datenfundament liefert, welches quantitative Forschungen zu zwischenstaatlichem Frieden ermöglicht und das mit dem Label P^* versehen wurde. P^* stellt eine ordinal skalierte und mehrstufige Konzeptualisierung und Operationalisierung zwischenstaatlichen Friedens dar, die sowohl Kriegszustände, Rivalitätsbeziehungen, neutrale Beziehungen als auch positive Friedensbeziehungen umfasst. Für seine Spezifizierung wurden eigens mehrere methodologische Regeln der Konzeptspezifikation entwickelt und angewendet, die allesamt auf die Idee basieren, dass Konzepte sparsam spezifiziert sein müssen, um sowohl das Risiko fehlender Resonanz mit etablierten Konzeptualisierungen als auch die Gefahr tautologischer Fehlschlüsse im Rahmen kausaler Analysen zu reduzieren. Vor diesem Hintergrund zeigen Konzeptualisierung und Operationalisierung von P^* bedeutsame Vorteile gegenüber zwei weiteren, jüngst entwickelten Messansätzen von Bayer (2010) und Goertz et al. (2016).

P^* unterscheidet zwischen sechs Stufen: *war*, *hot rivalry*, *cold rivalry*, *neutral peace*, *advanced peace* und *strong peace*. Die sechs ordinalen Stufen werden auf der Basis dreier konstitutiver Eigenschaftsdimensionen definiert. Erstens das dominante Interaktionsmuster (gewaltsame Auseinandersetzungen, keine Interaktionen, dichte bilaterale Kooperation), zweitens die Erwartungen von Entscheidungsträgern (Misstrauen, keine Erwartungen, Vertrauen), und drittens, die Dauer und Stabilität der resultierenden Verhaltens- und Perzeptionsmuster. Dabei soll bereits an dieser Stelle darauf hingewiesen werden, dass dem Konzept ein extra-rationalistisches Verständnis, oftmals als identifikations-basiertes Vertrauen (IBV) benannt, zugrunde liegt, welches sich klar von rationalistischen Konzepten abgrenzen lässt und welchem neben vergangenen Positiverfahrenungen auch eine sozio-emotionale Grundlage als Basis für besonders starke und robuste vertrauensvolle Erwartungen dient (Lewis und Weigert 1985; Lewicki et al. 2006; Adler und Barnett 1998a).

Der zweite zentrale wissenschaftliche Beitrag der vorliegenden Forschungsarbeit fokussiert das Forschungsprogramm zur friedensfördernden Wirkung internationaler Institutionen und identifiziert hierbei ein Forschungsdesiderat hinsichtlich der vertrauensbildenden Wirkung von internationalen Institutionen generell, und von internationalen Sicherheitsinstitutionen im Speziellen. Dies ist insofern problematisch, da IBV eine zentrale konstitutive Dimension von positiven Friedensbeziehungen darstellt. Möchte man eine umfassende Theorie über die friedensbildende Wirkung von Sicherheitsinstitutionen

formulieren, so muss man sich demnach zwangsläufig mit ihrer Rolle in zwischenstaatlichen Vertrauensbildungsprozessen beschäftigen.

Rationalistische Ansätze haben gezeigt, dass und auf welche Weise Sicherheitsinstitutionen als Krisenmanagement-Instrumente dienen und das Risiko militärischer Konflikteskalation reduzieren können, indem sie Staaten dabei helfen, akzeptable Verhandlungslösungen zu treffen (Fearon 1995; Shannon et al. 2010; Boehmer et al. 2004). Konstruktivistische Arbeiten betonen hingegen, wie Institutionen die Internalisierung von Normen gewaltfreier Konfliktaustragung und die Herausbildung einer kollektiven Identität stimulieren können (Checkel 2005; Johnston 2001; Adler und Barnett 1998a; Diez et al. 2006). Inwiefern Sicherheitsinstitutionen zur Bildung von identifikations-basiertem Vertrauen beitragen können, bleibt eine theoretisch und empirisch vernachlässigte Forschungsfrage, sei es in der Forschung zu Sicherheitsgemeinschaften, Freundschaft und stabilem Frieden (Adler und Barnett 1998b; Kupchan 2010; Koschut und Oelsner 2014; Kacowicz et al. 2000), in der Institutionenforschung (Hasenclever et al. 1997; Martin und Simmons 1998) oder aber in der Forschung zu Vertrauen in den internationalen Beziehungen (Ruzicka und Keating 2015; Booth und Wheeler 2008). Generell kann festgestellt werden, dass die vertrauensbildende Rolle internationaler Institutionen zwar thematisiert wird, die theoretischen Ausführungen jedoch als oberflächlich und einseitig optimistisch kritisiert werden müssen. Zum einen wird versäumt, jene theoretischen Mechanismen explizit zu spezifizieren, die eine kausale Verbindung zwischen Sicherheitsinstitutionen und Vertrauensbildung etablieren könnten. Zum anderen zeigt sich, dass existierende Theorien oftmals unterkomplex sind. So argumentieren Ruzicka und Keating (2015, S. 21), dass „[a]ll too frequently, such processes [of trust-building] are merely equated with increased cooperation“. Studien aus der Sozialpsychologie und zu Vertrauen zwischen Wirtschaftsunternehmen zeigen, dass das Design kooperativer Austauschbeziehungen maßgeblich einen Einfluss darauf hat, ob Vertrauen wächst oder Vertrauensbildung gar verhindert wird (Lumineau 2017; Molm et al. 2009; Bijlsma-Frankema und Costa 2005). Die Forschung zu internationalen Institutionen und Vertrauen hat es bislang verfehlt, sich von solchen Studien aus Nachbardisziplinen theoretisch inspirieren zu lassen.

Die vorliegende Dissertationsschrift entwickelt einen differenzierten theoretischen Rahmen, der mögliche positive und negative Effekte von internationalen Sicherheitsinstitutionen auf zwischenstaatliche Vertrauensbildung – und somit auf Friedensbildungsprozesse – benennt und theoretisch unterfüttert. Dabei wird auch argumentiert, dass

Sicherheitsinstitutionen in unterschiedlichen Phasen von Friedensbildungsprozessen unterschiedliche Effekte ausüben können. Aus dieser Perspektive können für Rivalitäten und neutrale Beziehungen negative Effekte erwartet werden (Sicherheitsorganisationen verringern die Wahrscheinlichkeit, eine höhere Friedensstufe zu erreichen), während für höherstufige Beziehungen positive Effekte wahrscheinlich sind (Sicherheitsorganisationen erhöhen die Wahrscheinlichkeit, eine höhere Friedensstufe zu erreichen). Für die Ableitung der theoretischen Argumente werden zum einen Erkenntnisse aus den internationalen Beziehungen selbst, aber auch aus Nachbardisziplinen herangezogen. Zudem wird auf einen eigens verfassten Theoriebeitrag Bezug genommen. Der entwickelte theoretische Rahmen spezifiziert dabei explizit kausale und konstitutive Mechanismen, durch die Sicherheitsinstitutionen die Aussichten auf erfolgreiche Vertrauensbildung erhöhen oder aber verringern können.

Der dritte als zentrale erachtete wissenschaftliche Beitrag dieser Dissertationsschrift besteht aus einer quantitativ-empirischen Analyse des Zusammenhangs zwischen internationalen Sicherheitsinstitutionen und zwischenstaatlicher Friedensbildung. Dabei liegt der empirische Fokus auf hoch institutionalisierten Sicherheitsorganisationen und deren Effekten. Quantitative Studien haben bereits gezeigt, dass eben diese Organisationen besonders wahrscheinlich und besonders stark das Risiko militarisierter Dispute und deren Eskalation reduzieren (Shannon et al. 2010; Boehmer et al. 2004). In dieser Dissertation werden die Effekte dieser Organisationen auf Transformationsprozesse von Rivalitäten hin zu positiven Friedensbeziehungen untersucht. Dabei wird auf das entwickelte Konzept P^* und dessen Operationalisierung sowie den entwickelten vertrauenstheoretischen Rahmen zurückgegriffen. Es ist dabei vor allem die theoretisch festgestellte Ambivalenz, welche die Notwendigkeit einer quantitativ-statistisch angelegten Studie begründet – also die Tatsache, dass theoretische Erwartungen sowohl über positive als negative Zusammenhänge zwischen Sicherheitsinstitutionen und Vertrauens- und Friedensbildung wohlbegründet herleitbar sind, und diese zudem phasenabhängig mehr oder weniger wahrscheinlich sind. Es ist deshalb von primärem und grundlegendem Interesse, mehr über die generellen „Netto-Effekte“ von Sicherheitsinstitutionen auf Friedensbildungsprozesse zu erlangen. Qualitative Studien können keine Aufschlüsse dieser Art geben. Die durchgeführten quantitativen Analysen zeigen, dass hoch institutionalisierte Sicherheitsorganisationen keinen Effekt auf die Beendigung von Rivalitäten und die Erreichung eines neutralen Friedens ausüben. Außerdem zeigt sich, dass sie Transformationen von

neutralen Beziehungen hin zu positiverem Frieden eher behindern. Wenn Staatenpaare jedoch bereits eine höhere, positive Friedensstufe erreicht haben, dann helfen Sicherheitsorganisationen, diesen Frieden weiter zu festigen und in seiner Qualität zu steigern.

Diese Ergebnisse bestätigen somit teilweise die theoretisch postulierten Erwartungen. Sie haben zudem starke Implikationen für theoretische Ansätze, die generell von einem *virtuous cycle*, also positiv reziproken Effekten zwischen Institutionalisierungsdichte und Frieden ausgehen (Russett und Oneal 2001). Diese Ansätze berufen sich auf empirische Studien, die unter Verwendung eines negativen Friedenskonzepts signifikante Feedback-Effekte zwischen Institutionalisierungsdichte und dem Ausbleiben von militarisierter Gewalt aufzeigen. Die vorliegende Analyse zeigt unter Verwendung eines anspruchsvolleren Friedenskonzepts eine differenzierte Ergebnislage auf. Ein *virtuous cycle* zwischen Institutionalisierungsdichte und Frieden kann nicht generell angenommen werden.

Die Forschungsarbeit leistet somit einen Beitrag zur systematischen Wissensakkumulation über zwischenstaatliche Friedensbildungsprozesse, die so und auf diese Weise bislang nicht stattgefunden hat. Die in dieser Dissertationsschrift enthaltene quantitative Analyse versteht sich somit als ein erster Beitrag zu dem noch jungen quantitativen Forschungsprogramm zu zwischenstaatlichem Frieden, bei dem davon auszugehen ist, dass es sich zu einem festen und etablierten Bestandteil der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung entwickeln wird.

Zusammenfassend soll nochmals betont werden, dass die vorliegende Dissertationsschrift sowohl polit-pragmatisch als auch wissenschaftlich relevante Forschungsergebnisse bereithält (siehe Tabelle 1.1). Sie identifiziert offensichtliche und eklatante Forschungslücken, und leistet substantielle Beiträge zu deren Bearbeitung. Sie knüpft dabei an drei etablierte Forschungsfelder an: erstens die Forschungen zu zwischenstaatlichem positivem Frieden, und hier insbesondere die sich jüngst entwickelnde quantitative Spielart; zweitens Forschungen zu internationalen Institutionen; und drittens Forschungen zu Vertrauen und Vertrauensbildung zwischen Staaten.

Tabelle 1.1: Forschungslücken und Beiträge zu ihrer Bearbeitung

Forschungslücke		Beitrag
Es fehlte bislang an quantitativen Konzepten, Messinstrumenten und Daten zu positivem zwischenstaatlichem Frieden	→	Entwicklung von P^*
Es fehlte bislang an einer spezifischen und differenzierten Theorie über den Zusammenhang zwischen Sicherheitsinstitutionen und der Bildung von starkem, identifikations-basiertem Vertrauen	→	Formulierung einer Theorie über die Rolle von Sicherheitsinstitutionen im Friedensbildungsprozessen, die auf deren vertrauensbildende Wirkung fokussiert
Es fehlte bislang an quantitativ-statistischen Analysen zu den Ursachen von positiven zwischenstaatlichen Friedensbeziehungen	→	Durchführung einer quantitativ-statistischen Studie über den Zusammenhang zwischen Sicherheitsinstitutionen und Transformationen hin zu positivem Frieden

1.3 Bestandteile der kumulierten Dissertation

Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus insgesamt fünf Manuskripten, die allesamt einen direkten Bezug zur übergeordneten Thematik der Forschungsarbeit haben. In diesem Kapitel soll die Rolle bzw. die „Funktion“ der einzelnen Manuskripte innerhalb des Gesamtwerks spezifiziert und ein erster Überblick über ihre Beziehung zu- und untereinander aufgezeigt werden. Hierfür ist ein Schema hilfreich, das den Ablauf sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung idealtypisch in fünf Arbeitsschritte untergliedert. Diese sind, in Anlehnung an Schnell et al. (2005) zunächst die Auswahl des Forschungsproblems/Identifizierung der Forschungslücke, gefolgt von Theoriebildung, Konzeptspezifikation und Operationalisierung, Datenerhebung, und schlussendlich der Datenanalyse und ihrer kausaltheoretischen Interpretation. Die Inhalte der einzelnen Manuskripte können relativ eindeutig einem oder mehreren dieser fünf Arbeitsschritte zugewiesen werden.

Das Manuskript „Vertrauen lohnt sich: über Gegenstand und Potential eines vernachlässigten Konzepts in den Internationalen Beziehungen“, das 2013 in Ko-Autorenschaft mit Philipp Brugger und Andreas Hasenclever in der *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* publiziert wurde, stellt eine Mischung aus konzeptionellem Theorieartikel,

Literaturüberblick, und messtheoretischer Diskussion dar. Für die vorliegende Dissertation sind zwei Inhalte maßgebend. Erstens leistet das Manuskript einen zentralen Beitrag zur Konzeptspezifizierung des für die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit zentralen Konzepts des zwischenstaatlichen Vertrauens. Es stellt dabei den ontologischen Unterschied zwischen rationalistischen und soziologischen bzw. sozial-psychologischen Vertrauenskonzepten, also zwischen kalkülbasiertem und identifikationsbasiertem Vertrauen (KBV und IBV) heraus. Zudem klärt es über die Schwächen des ersteren und den Mehrwert des letzteren Konzepts auf. Zweitens trägt das Manuskript zur Auswahl und Identifizierung des Forschungsproblems und der Forschungslücke bei, indem es einen Mangel an Analysen zur Bildung von IBV innerhalb der Forschung zu zwischenstaatlichem Frieden diagnostiziert.

Das Manuskript mit dem Titel „When less is More: Constructing a Parsimonious Concept of Interstate Peace for Quantitative Analysis“ ist 2017 in *International Studies Review* veröffentlicht worden, und zwar im *Special Issue* zum Thema *Exploring Peace*, welches als thematische Ausgabe zur *ISA Annual Convention 2016* erschienen ist. Das Manuskript enthält eine Diskussion existierender Forschungslücken im Bereich zwischenstaatlicher Friedensbildung, insbesondere in Bezug auf existierende Konzeptualisierungen, Operationalisierungen und Daten. Hieran anknüpfend werden methodologischen Erörterungen über den Mehrwert parsimonier Konzepte angebracht, die dann die Spezifikation und Operationalisierung von P^* anleiten. Außerdem erfolgte im Rahmen der Anfertigung des Manuskripts die Datenerhebung für P^* . Es enthält deshalb auch eine Deskription des Datensatzes sowie eine Diskussion seiner Validität und Reliabilität.

Zwei Manuskripte tragen insbesondere zur Theorieformulierung bei, indem sie sich theoretisch mit der Frage nach Bedingungen erfolgreicher Bildung und Pflege identifikationsbasierter Vertrauensbeziehungen beschäftigen, und auf diese Weise auch zur theoretischen Forschung über zwischenstaatliche Friedensbildungsprozesse beitragen. In dem Manuskript mit dem Titel „Trustful Behavior is Meaningful Behavior: Implications for Theory on Identification-based Trusting Relations“, der 2018 im *Journal of Trust Research* erschienen ist, wird eine Perspektive auf Vertrauenshandlungen als bedeutungsvolle Handlungen ins Zentrum gestellt. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden theoretische Überlegungen abgeleitet, die Faktoren erfolgreicher Bildung und Pflege von IBV identifizieren. Das Manuskript bleibt in seiner vertrauenstheoretischen Argumentation und sei-

nem Anwendungsbereich abstrakt und generell und bezieht sich nicht direkt auf den Bereich zwischenstaatlichen Vertrauens. Er liefert aber substantielle theoretische Erkenntnisse und Implikationen, die in einem weiteren Manuskript dann auf den Bereich der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen transferiert werden. Dieses bislang unveröffentlichte Manuskript trägt den Titel „Trust Constitutes Identity: Implications for Concepts and Theories of Interstate Peace, Community, and Friendship“. Im Manuskript wird zum einen die konstitutive Perspektive auf Vertrauenshandlungen und soziale Identität diskutiert, zum anderen wird vor diesem Hintergrund gefragt, wann und unter welchen Umständen Sicherheitsinstitutionen zu Transformationsprozessen und der Bildung positiver Friedensbeziehungen beitragen können, und wann sie diese eher behindern.

Das fünfte, ebenfalls bislang unveröffentlichte Manuskript mit dem Titel „Security Organizations and Transitions from Rivalry towards Positive Interstate Peace: Theory Formulation and Quantitative Empirical Analysis“ stellt eine typische quantitativ-empirische Studie dar und kann den folgenden drei Forschungsschritten zugeordnet werden: Erstens identifiziert das Manuskript eine Forschungslücke hinsichtlich der differenzierten Theoretisierung der friedensbildenden Wirkung von Sicherheitsorganisationen und der quantitativen Analyse ihrer Effekte. Zweitens beinhaltet es ausführliche Theorieformulierungen über die friedensbildende Wirkung von Sicherheitsinstitutionen, wobei das Hauptaugenmerk auf deren vertrauensbildendem Potential liegt. Dabei werden phasenabhängig sowohl positive als auch negative Zusammenhänge postuliert, auch unter Verwendung der in „Trust Constitutes Identity“ formulierten theoretischen Argumente. Drittens werden die theoretisch abgeleiteten Hypothesen einer quantitativ-empirischen Datenanalyse unterzogen, wobei hier von dem in „When less is more“ vorgestellten Konzept von P^* und dessen Operationalisierung Gebrauch gemacht wird.

Insgesamt zeigt sich, dass die Manuskripte dieser kumulativen Dissertationsschrift inhaltlich so konzipiert sind, dass sie im Zusammenspiel sämtliche Arbeitsschritte eines sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungsprozesses abdecken. Somit kann die Dissertationsschrift als eine vollständige Forschungsarbeit bewertet werden, die sich umfänglich und auf konsistente Weise mit der zugrunde liegenden Forschungsfrage auseinandersetzt und dabei alle Phasen sozialwissenschaftlichen Arbeitens beinhaltet: Forschungsfelder werden analysiert und Forschungslücken werden identifiziert; Konzepte werden metho-

disch versiert spezifiziert und operationalisiert; Theorien werden formuliert und Hypothesen abgeleitet; Daten werden erhoben und unter Verwendung quantitativ-statistischer Analysemethoden ausgewertet und interpretiert (siehe Tabelle 1.2).

Tabelle 1.2: Zuordnung der Manuskripte zu Phasen sozialwissenschaftlichen Arbeitens

	Forschungs- problem/ -lücke	Theorie- formulierung	Konzept und Operatio- nalisierung	Daten- erhebung	Datenanalyse und Inter- pretation
Vertrauen lohnt sich	X		X		
When Less is More	X		X	X	
Trustful Behavior		X			
Trust Consti- tutes Identity		X			
Security Organizations	X	X			X

1.4 Skizzierung und Diskussion der einzelnen Manuskripte

1.4.1 Vertrauen lohnt sich: über Gegenstand und Potential eines vernachlässigten Konzepts in den Internationalen Beziehungen

Das Manuskript „Vertrauen lohnt sich“ steht nicht nur in dieser Dissertationsschrift an erster Stelle, sondern stellt auch zeitlich das erste im Rahmen der Projekt- und Promotionsstätigkeiten des Autors publizierte Manuskript dar. Es liefert somit wichtige Grundlagen, die für die weitere inhaltliche Festlegung und Ausgestaltung des Dissertationsprojekts eine zentrale Rolle spielen.

Erstens enthält es eine ausgiebige grundlegende ontologische Diskussion des Vertrauensphänomens. Es wird herausgestellt, dass Vertrauen als Mechanismus verstanden werden kann, der soziale Komplexität und Unsicherheit über das zukünftige Verhalten von Interaktionspartnern reduziert (Luhmann 2009; Möllering 2006c; Ripperger 1998). Vertrauen kann unterteilt werden in Vertrauensersparung – eine Erwartung kooperativer

Erwiderung –, und vertrauensvolle Handlung – eine riskante kooperative Handlung, die durch die Vertrauenserwartung ermöglicht wird. Dabei wird Vertrauen von Kontrolle und Misstrauen als zwei weiteren Mechanismen der Erwartungsbildung analytisch abgegrenzt. Im Fall von Kontrolle basieren Erwartungen „auf dem Wissen über die kooperationsfördernde Wirkung struktureller Rahmenbedingungen“ (Möllering 2005a). Misstrauen hingegen entspricht einer Negativerwartung ausbeuterischen Verhaltens und wird soweit möglich zu Maßnahmen führen, die die eigene Verletzlichkeit minimieren („Vertrauen lohnt sich“, S. 39 - 40).

Zweitens wird die wichtige ontologische Unterscheidung zwischen rationalistischen und extra-rationalistischen Vertrauenskonzepten herausgearbeitet. Rationalistische Konzepte verstehen die vertrauensvolle Erwartung als Ergebnis von Informationen über kooperationsfördernde situationale Strukturen und dem egoistischem Interesse des Gegenübers an kooperativem Austausch (Hardin 2002; Kydd 2005). Wichtig ist auch zu erwähnen, dass rationalistisches Vertrauen auf aufwendige kontinuierliche Informations-einholung und -verarbeitung angewiesen ist, der Vertrauensgeber also ständig eine Art Überwachungsverhalten an den Tag legen muss. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird als zentrale Schwäche rationalistischen Vertrauens seine offensichtliche ontologische Überlap-pung mit Kontrollkonzepten konstatiert.

Ein im Manuskript diskutiertes und für die vorliegende Dissertation zentrales extra-rationalistische Vertrauenskonzept stellt identifikations-basiertes Vertrauen (IBV) dar. Hier wird die vertrauensvolle Erwartung auf der Grundlage einer kognitiven und so-zio-emotionalen Basis gebildet (Lewis und Weigert 1985; Lewicki et al. 2006). Der Ver-trauensnehmer, also dem, dem der Vertrauensgeber Vertrauen entgegenbringt, wird „als sozial eingebetteter Akteur wahrgenommen, der eine starke Disposition zur Regelein-haltung hat und in seinem Handeln denselben sozialen Normen folgt wie der Vertrauensge-ber (...). Sozialisations- und Selbstkategorisierungsprozesse, wahrgenommene morali-sche Integrität und situationsunabhängige Zuverlässigkeit werden somit zur Basis von Vertrauen“ („Vertrauen lohnt sich“, S. 46). Unsicherheit und Komplexität werden aus dieser Perspektive nicht mehr kalkuliert bzw. restrukturiert, sondern schlichtweg „aufge-hoben“, „ausgeblendet“, oder „ausgeklammert“, was eine kognitiv unaufwendige Bil-dung robuster und stabiler Vertrauenserwartungen ermöglicht.

Drittens wird in Anlehnung an Booth und Wheeler die Bedeutung und die Funktion von Vertrauen in zwischenstaatlichen Sicherheitsbeziehungen skizziert: Vertrauen kann das Risiko der militärischen Eskalation von Konflikten mindern, die in Unsicherheit über die „wahren“ Absichten der jeweils anderen Seite gründen. Es dient der Bearbeitung destruktiver Dynamiken, die sich aus Logiken des Sicherheitsdilemmas oder der *Commitment*-Problematik ergeben, und die zu eigentlich vermeidbaren Präventiv- und Preemptivkriegen führen können. Booth und Wheeler (2008) betonen dabei, dass nur extrarationalistisches Vertrauen eine „Transzendenz“ dieser Dynamiken ermöglicht (*transcendence*), während rationalistisches Vertrauen diese lediglich temporär mildert (*mitigation*) („Vertrauen lohnt sich“, S. 57).

Viertens werden existierende Lücken in der Forschung zu zwischenstaatlichem Vertrauen beleuchtet (Ruzicka und Keating 2015). Wichtig für die Dissertationsschrift ist dabei die Feststellung, dass rationalistisches Vertrauen bereits theoretisch wie empirisch stark erforscht worden ist, da es – oftmals implizit – integraler Bestandteil neorealistischer und neoliberal-institutionalistischer Ansätze darstellt (Rathbun 2009). In diesem Sinne ist rationalistisches Vertrauen alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen da es „in allen Ansätzen mitgedacht werden muss, in denen auf der Basis von Informationen Unsicherheit minimiert und Kooperation ermöglicht wird“ („Vertrauen lohnt sich“, S. 55). Eine tatsächliche Forschungslücke besteht hingegen hinsichtlich der Frage, wie Staaten bzw. deren Repräsentanten extra-rationalistisches Vertrauen, und insbesondere IBV herstellen können. Das Manuskript stellt heraus, dass Forschungen zu zwischenstaatlicher Friedensbildung, also zu Gemeinschaftsbildung, zu Sicherheitsgemeinschaften, zu zwischenstaatlicher Freundschaft und stabilem Frieden extra-rationalistisches Vertrauen als konstitutiven Faktor stabiler Friedens- und Sicherheitsbeziehungen zwar identifiziert haben (Adler und Barnett 1998a; Kupchan 2010; Oelsner und Vion 2011; Koschut und Oelsner 2014; Kacowicz et al. 2000; Boulding 1978; Wendt 1999). Es betont jedoch auch das Fehlen theoretischer und empirischer Studien zur Bildung zwischenstaatlichen IBV in diesem Forschungsfeld.²

² Das Manuskript beinhaltet auch einen Vorschlag für einen Indikator für die Vertrauensmessung im Rahmen qualitativer Fallstudien. Hierfür liefert das Manuskript auch eine Diskussion der Frage, auf welcher Handlungs- bzw. Akteursebene (kollektive und/oder individuelle Akteure) Vertrauensforschung zu zwischenstaatlichem Vertrauen ansetzen kann bzw. soll.

Das Manuskript beinhaltet somit zwei zentrale Erkenntnisse, die für die übrigen in der Dissertation enthaltenen Manuskripte wegweisend sind, und anschließende konzeptionelle, theoretische, und empirische Schritte maßgeblich beeinflusst haben. Erstens ist dies die Erkenntnis, dass es an theoretisch fundierter und empirischer Forschung zu Vertrauensbildungsprozessen im Kontext zwischenstaatlicher Friedensbildung mangelt. Diese Erkenntnis stellt eine Hauptmotivation für die Formulierung und empirische Überprüfung einer Theorie über den Zusammenhang zwischen internationalen Sicherheitsinstitutionen und Friedensbildung dar, die ihr Hauptaugenmerk auf die Bildung zwischenstaatlichen IBV legt.

Zweitens liefert das Manuskript grundlegenden Erkenntnisse über die Ontologie von IBV und seiner Funktion innerhalb zwischenstaatlicher Sicherheitsbeziehungen: sie fließen explizit in die konzeptionellen und theoretischen Beiträge der Manuskripte „When less is More“, „Trust Constitutes Identity“, und „Security Organizations“ ein. Denn dort wird ausgiebiger erläutert, warum und auf welche Weise IBV konstitutiver Bestandteil positiver Friedensbeziehungen darstellt und wie es gebildet werden kann.

1.4.2 When Less is More: Constructing a Parsimonious Concept of Interstate Peace for Quantitative Analysis

Im Manuskript „Vertrauen lohnt sich“ wurde betont, dass es bislang an theoretisch fundierter und empirischer Forschung zu Vertrauensbildungsprozessen im Kontext zwischenstaatlicher Friedensbildung fehlt. Diese Erkenntnis stellt eine zentrale Motivation für die Erstellung der vorliegenden Dissertation dar. Das Manuskript „When Less is More“ trägt einen gewichtigen Teil zur Schließung der beanstandeten Forschungslücke bei, in dem es ein Konzept samt Operationalisierung und Datensatz anbietet, welches die Erforschung von Vertrauensbildungsprozessen im Kontext zwischenstaatlicher Friedensbildung erlaubt.

Erstens beinhaltet das Manuskript hierfür eine Diskussion der existierenden quantitativen Forschung zu zwischenstaatlichem Frieden und fokussiert dabei hauptsächlich existierende Konzeptualisierungen und Operationalisierungen. Es wird deutlich gemacht, dass die überragende Mehrheit der quantitativen Forschung zu zwischenstaatlichem Frieden aufgrund der Verwendung einer negativen Definition von Frieden eher als Kriegs- und Gewaltursachenforschung verstanden werden muss: „quantitative peace research presents a science of war and violent conflict“ („When Less is More“, S. 74). Gleichzeitig

wird darauf verwiesen, dass mit Bayer (2010) und Goertz et al. (2016) zwei jüngere Ansätze existieren, die ein mehrstufiges Friedenskonzept für quantitative Studien operationalisieren („When Less is More“, S. 80 - 84).

Zweitens wird herausgearbeitet, dass die Ansätze von Bayer (2010) und Goertz et al. (2016) aus metatheoretischer Perspektive konzeptionelle Mängel aufweisen. Hierfür setzt sich das Papier zunächst ausgiebig mit der methodologischen Literatur im Bereich Konzeptspezifikation auseinander, um auf dieser Basis drei Regeln für die Konzeptualisierung sozialwissenschaftlicher Phänomene herzuleiten. Sie fokussieren auf die Frage, wie und anhand welcher Kriterien aus einer Vielzahl möglicher konstitutiver Eigenschaftsdimensionen die konkreten Dimensionen für ein gegebenes Konzept ausgewählt werden können. Zunächst wird argumentiert, dass Konzepte nicht unterspezifiziert sein und wichtige Eigenschaftsdimensionen auslassen dürfen, da sie sonst eine unzureichende Resonanz mit gängigen Verständnissen des zu konzeptualisierenden Phänomens aufzeigen und eine zu geringe interne Trennschärfe aufweisen (als eigentlich unterschiedlich betrachtete Fälle werden ein und derselben Kategorie zugeordnet). Anschließend wird betont, dass Konzepte nicht überspezifiziert sein sollen, was der Fall ist, wenn sie Eigenschaftsdimensionen inkludieren, zwischen denen sie eine kausale Beziehung modellieren. Kausale Beziehungen sollen nicht *ex ante* als wahr angenommen werden, sondern immer einem empirischen Test unterzogen werden. Außerdem verringert eine Überspezifikation den praktischen Nutzen eines Konzepts, da kausale Analysen über den Effekt von bereits inkludierten Dimensionen zu tautologischen Analysen führen würden. Wenn kausale Beziehungen zwischen Dimensionen essentieller Bestandteil eines Konzepts sind, sollten sie expliziert und so sparsam wie möglich integriert werden. Für die Ansätze von Bayer (2010) und Goertz et al. (2016) wird anschließend gezeigt, dass sie Probleme konzeptioneller Unter- und Überspezifikation aufweisen („When Less is More“, S. 80 - 84). Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Notwendigkeit einer alternativen Konzeptualisierung bzw. Operationalisierung abgeleitet, die beide Risiken minimiert.

Drittens, wird deshalb im Rahmen eines methodologisch fundierten Spezifikationsprozesses das Konzept *P** eingeführt, welches zwischen sechs Friedensstufen unterscheidet (*war*, *hot rivalry*, *cold rivalry*, *neutral peace*, *advanced peace* und *strong peace*) auf dabei auf drei Eigenschaftsdimensionen zurückgreift: Erstens das dominante Interaktionsmuster (gewaltsame Auseinandersetzungen, keine Interaktionen, dichte bilaterale Kooperation), zweitens die Erwartungen von Entscheidungsträgern (Misstrauen, keine

Erwartungen, Vertrauen), und drittens, die Dauer und Stabilität der resultierenden Verhaltens- und Perzeptionsmuster („When Less is More“, S. 85 ff.). Wichtig ist an dieser Stelle zu erwähnen, dass Konzepte immer auch die Frage der angemessenen Akteurs-ebene beantworten sollten, denn Staaten an sich können weder handeln, noch einander misstrauen oder vertrauen. Für P^* wird diese Frage pragmatisch und in Anlehnung an Adler und Barnett's Sicherheitsgemeinschaftskonzept beantwortet (Adler und Barnett 1998a). Der Fokus liegt auf der Ebene politischer Eliten. Wenn also in dieser Dissertation von zwischenstaatlichem Misstrauen und Vertrauen gesprochen wird, dann sind damit die Perzeptionen und Erwartungen eines relativ begrenzten Kreises politischer Entscheidungsträger gemeint.

Wie bereits oben betont, wird unter Rückgriff auf die konzeptionellen Vorüberlegungen aus „Vertrauen lohnt sich“ dem Konzept P^* ein starkes, extra-rationales Vertrauensverständnis zugrunde gelegt.³ Hierfür wird auf extra-rationalistische Definitionen aus der Literatur zu Sicherheitsgemeinschaften, Freundschaft und stabilem Frieden verwiesen und betont, dass Vertrauen situationsunabhängige Erwartungen zulässt und es deshalb erlaubt, *Commitment*-Problematiken und Sicherheitsdilemma-Dynamiken zu „transzendieren“ (Booth und Wheeler 2008; Wendt 1999; Adler und Barnett 1998a; Kupchan 2010; Koschut und Oelsner 2014; Kacowicz et al. 2000).⁴

Viertens beinhaltet das Manuskript Anweisungen für die Operationalisierung von P^* deren direkte Implementierung einen Datensatz produziert, der jährliche Daten für 126 Dyaden für den Zeitraum von 1945-2001 bereithält. Das Sample umfasst sämtliche strategische Rivalitäten nach Thompson und Dreyer (2011), die zwischen 1939 und 2001 beendet wurden oder noch weiter andauerten. Diese Auswahl beinhaltet somit all jene Dyaden, die von großer Relevanz für die Befriedung des internationalen Systems nach 1945 sind. Zur Operationalisierung der Kriegs- und Rivalitätsbeziehungen werden Daten zu militärischen Auseinandersetzungen (Maoz 2005), zwischenstaatlichen Krisen (Hewitt 2005), diplomatischer Anerkennung, und bestehende Datensätze zu Rivalitäten

³ Das Manuskript zu „Vertrauen lohnt sich“ wird dabei nicht direkt zitiert, weil *International Studies Review* keine fremdsprachigen Literaturquellen erlaubt. Es wurde deshalb auf einen anderweitigen Artikel verwiesen, der in Ko-Autorenschaft publiziert wurde, ebenso auf „Vertrauen lohnt sich“ aufbaut, jedoch nicht Bestandteil dieser Dissertation darstellt (Brugger et al. 2013a).

⁴ Aufgrund von Platzmangel wurde in „When Less is More“ der Unterschied zwischen rationalistischem und identifikations-basiertem Vertrauen nicht explizit erläutert. Auch die Beschreibung von starkem Vertrauen als identifikations-basiertem Vertrauen blieb aus, um den Text leserlich und nicht überkomplex werden zu lassen.

(Thompson und Dreyer 2011; Klein et al. 2006) verwendet. Zur Erfassung positiver Beziehungen wird von einem eigens entwickelten *treaty-density*-Ansatz Gebrauch gemacht. Er ist angelehnt an den in der Rivalitätsforschung etablierten *dispute-density*-Ansatz, der davon ausgeht, dass eine hohe Dichte an zwischenstaatlichen Disputen nicht nur ein behaviorales, sondern auch ein perzeptionelles, misstrauensvolles Muster anzeigt. Der *treaty-density* Ansatz analysiert im Gegensatz dazu die Dichte an bilateralen Vertragsunterzeichnungen und unterscheidet auf diese Weise die Stufen *neutral peace*, *advanced peace* und *strong peace*.

Die Deskription und Diskussion des Datensatzes zeigt, dass dieser ein hinreichend hohes Maß an Reliabilität und Validität aufweist, und damit die zentralen Gütekriterien empirischer Messtheorie erfüllt (Adcock und Collier 2001). Gleichzeitig wird betont, dass Korrelationen zwischen P^* und den Daten von Goertz et al. und Bayer niedrig genug sind, um die Eigenständigkeit und den Mehrwert von P^* herausstellen zu können.

Zwar kann auch P^* nicht gänzlich auf die Integration und Modellierung kausaler Interaktionen zwischen seinen konstitutiven Dimensionen verzichten – allerdings ist es sparsam genug spezifiziert, um eine Vielzahl an empirischen Forschungsfragen zu ermöglichen, ohne dabei tautologische Schlussfolgerungen zu riskieren.

Die Bestandteile des Manuskripts „When Less is More“ werden wie folgt in weiteren Manuskripten aufgenommen und verwertet: Zum einen liefert das Manuskript konzeptionelle Ausführungen, die als Grundlage für anschließende theoretische Auseinandersetzungen dienen. Indem das Manuskript die integrale und konstitutive Rolle von Vertrauen innerhalb bereits bestehender und des selbst entwickelten mehrstufigen Friedenskonzepts betont, verdeutlicht es, dass umfassende Theorien über die Ursachen erfolgreicher zwischenstaatlicher Friedensbildung immer auch Erklärungen über erfolgreiche Vertrauensbildung beinhalten müssen. Zum anderen liefert das Manuskript die Datenbasis für anschließende empirische Analysen.

1.4.3 Trustful Behavior is Meaningful Behavior: Implications for Theory on Identification-based Trusting Relations

Das Manuskript „Trustful Behavior is Meaningful Behavior“ stellt ein ausschließlich theoretisches Papier dar. Es beschäftigt sich mit der Ontologie und der Bildung von IBV

bzw. von identifikations-basierten Vertrauensbeziehungen, ohne dabei spezifischen Bezug zum Bereich zwischenstaatlicher Beziehungen zu nehmen. Folgende Bestandteile des Manuskripts sind jedoch von besonderer Bedeutung für eine in den Manuskripten „Trust Constitutes Identity“ und „Security Organizations“ formulierte theoretische Argumentation über das vertrauensbildende Potential von Sicherheitsinstitutionen.

Erstens werden vier grundlegende ontologische Annahmen über identifikations-basierte Vertrauensbeziehungen formuliert. Dabei wird zunächst eine innerhalb der bestehenden Vertrauensforschung innovative Perspektive auf Vertrauenshandlungen als bedeutungsvolle Handlungen propagiert. Vertrauensvolle Handlungen kommunizieren, dass der Vertrauensgeber den Vertrauensnehmer als vertrauenswürdig und integer betrachtet. Darauf aufbauend wird argumentiert, dass vertrauensvolle Handlungen soziale in-group Identitäten auf konstitutive Weise (re-)produzieren (Möllering 2013). Dafür wird auf Theorien aus der konstruktivistischen Soziologie, dem symbolischen Interaktionismus, und praxeologischen Ansätzen zurückgegriffen (Jenkins 2008; Eisenstadt und Giesen 1995; Mead 1934; Wendt 1999; Adler und Pouliot 2011). Das Manuskript nimmt also die ontologischen Erläuterungen aus „Vertrauen lohnt sich“ über das sozio-emotionale kausale Fundament besonders stabiler und robuster Vertrauenserwartungen auf und erweitert diese: Vertrauenserwartungen basieren nicht nur kausal auf sozialer Identifikation, vielmehr (re-)produziert vertrauensvolles Handeln soziale Identifikation auf konstitutive Weise selbst: „trustful behavior constitutively produces and reproduces perceptions of we-ness, that is, a shared social identity“ („Trustful Behavior“, S. 132). Hieran anschließend wird argumentiert, dass vertrauensvolle Handlungen sozio-emotionale Bedürfnisse seitens des Vertrauensnehmers befriedigen und es eine soziale Gruppennorm werden kann, sich vertrauensvoll einander zu begegnen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund werden, zweitens, für diese Dissertation zentrale Schlussfolgerungen formuliert. Zunächst wird betont, dass vertrauensvolles Handeln selbst für den Erhalt von IBV notwendig ist, da „[n]ot only trustworthy responses, but also trustful behavior itself is necessary for the reproduction of a shared social identity and social affect and hence, of the socio-emotional foundation of both identification-based trustfulness and trustworthiness (...)“. Zweitens wird gefolgert, dass erfolgreiche Bildung von IBV voraussetzt, dass Akteure vertrauensvoll handeln, obwohl ihre Vertrauenserwartung noch nicht voll ausgebildet ist – sie müssen sich in „pseudo-vertrauensvollem Verhalten“ üben (*as-if trustful behavior*) (Hardin 1993). Akteure müssen also auf

eine Art und Weise miteinander kooperieren, die einen vertrauensvollen Anschein macht, um IBV bilden und erhalten zu können. Wenn Akteure sich einander gegenüber offen misstrauisch verhalten, können sich identifikations-basierte Vertrauensbeziehungen nicht entwickeln bzw. können diese nicht stabil erhalten werden, da dadurch negative in-group-out-group Dynamiken reproduziert werden und sozio-emotionale Bedürfnisse und eine soziale Norm verletzt werden. Denn Akteure, so die Argumentation, haben ein Bedürfnis danach, als vertrauenswürdige Interaktionspartner behandelt zu werden. Deshalb kann ein vertrauensvoller Umgang und die Zelebrierung von Vertrauen zu einer sozialen Norm werden, die gemäß einer Logik der Angemessenheit handlungsanleitend wird, und deren Nichtbeachtung zu sozialen Sanktionen und der Verschlechterung von Beziehungen führen kann.⁵

Die Argumentation über die zentrale Bedeutung von vertrauens-symbolisierenden Handlungen für die Bildung und Stabilisierung von identifikations-basierten Vertrauensbeziehungen wird in nachfolgenden Manuskripten aufgenommen, also in „Trust Constitutes Identity“ und „Security Organizations“, und im Rahmen einer theoretischen Auseinandersetzung über die Rolle von Sicherheitsinstitutionen in zwischenstaatlichen Friedensbildungsprozessen angewendet.

1.4.4 Trust Constitutes Identity: Implications for Concepts and Theories of Interstate Peace, Community, and Friendship

Im Manuskript „Trust Constitutes Identity“ werden zentrale konzeptionelle und theoretische Erkenntnisse aus „Trustful Behavior“ aufgenommen und erweitert. Es wird argumentiert, dass ein Fokus auf die konstitutive Beziehung zwischen Vertrauenshandlungen und Identität eine neue, innovative und bereichernde Perspektive auf zwischenstaatliche Friedensbeziehungen und deren Bildung ermöglicht. Dabei wird auch ein theoretisches Argument über das friedensbildende Potential von Sicherheitsinstitutionen entwickelt.

Das grundlegende Argument des Manuskripts setzt an einer konzeptionellen Festlegung an, die innerhalb der existierenden konstruktivistischen Forschung zu zwischenstaatlicher Friedensbildung, also der Forschung zu Sicherheitsgemeinschaften, Freundschaft und stabilem Frieden, formuliert wird (Adler und Barnett 1998a; Kupchan 2010;

⁵ Das Manuskript enthält zudem Ausführungen über die Bedingungen für erfolgreiches Vertrauenskrisenmanagement. Da diese Inhalte jedoch nicht von zentraler Relevanz für weitere theoretische Argumentationen im Rahmen dieser Dissertationsschrift sind, werden sie nicht ausgiebiger erläutert.

Kacowicz et al. 2000). Hier werden, erstens, starkes Vertrauen und eine gemeinsame Identität als konstitutive Eigenschaftsdimension stabiler und robuster Friedensbeziehungen verstanden. Zweitens werden dabei eine geteilte soziale Identität und Vertrauen in einer wechselseitigen Beziehung zueinander modelliert. Am eindeutigsten wird dies von Adler und Barnett expliziert, wenn sie argumentieren, dass Vertrauen und Identität „are reciprocal and reinforcing: the development of trust can strengthen mutual identification, and there is a general tendency to trust on the basis of mutual identification“ (Adler und Barnett 1998a, S. 45). Ob dabei von einer kausalen oder konstitutiven Wechselbeziehung ausgegangen wird, bleibt jedoch oftmals unklar.

Im Manuskript wird nun argumentiert, dass einer konstitutiven Konzeptualisierung der Beziehung zwischen Vertrauen und Identität mehr Beachtung geschenkt werden sollte, da dadurch innovative theoretische Perspektiven entwickelt werden können.⁶ Hierfür wird die Argumentation aus „Trustful Behavior“ aufgenommen und betont, dass vertrauensvolle Handlungen gemeinsame Identität konstitutiv (re-)produzieren, dass sie sozio-emotionale Bedürfnisse des Vertrauensnehmers befriedigen und dass sie zur sozialen Norm werden können („Trust Constitutes Identity“, S. 151 ff.). Vor diesem Hintergrund werden zwischenstaatliche friedliche Gemeinschaften, wie sie das Konzept der Sicherheitsgemeinschaft beschreibt, als Vertrauensgemeinschaften („*communities of trust*“) verstanden. Innerhalb dieser Gemeinschaften haben Akteure nicht nur vertrauensvolle Erwartungen gegenüber einander entwickelt. Vielmehr ist gegenseitiges Vertrauen auch konstitutiv für das Wir-Gefühl der Gemeinschaft. Zudem ist vertrauensvolles bzw. pseudo-vertrauensvolles Verhalten auch notwendig, um ein Wir-Gefühl und auf dieser Basis auch IBV innerhalb dieser Gemeinschaften zu erhalten und zu bilden („Trust Constitutes Identity“, S. 155 ff.).

⁶ Im Rahmen dieses Manuskripts wird somit nicht das in „Less is More“ entwickelte Konzept P^* als Spezifizierung zwischenstaatlichen Friedens verwendet – denn für P^* stellt eine gemeinsame Identität keine direkte konstitutive Dimension dar. Die Entscheidung, direkt an der Konzeption von Sicherheitsgemeinschaften von Adler und Barnett (1998) anzuknüpfen, geschieht vornehmlich aus publikations-strategischen Gründen. Dementsprechend schien es erfolgversprechend, an etablierte Konzepte anzuknüpfen, um den GutachterInnen die Einordnung des Manuskripts in bestehende Forschungsprogramme und dessen inhaltlichen Mehrwert besser verdeutlichen zu können. Die entwickelten theoretischen Argumente können jedoch auch unter Verwendung von P^* empirisch getestet werden, da identifikationsbasiertes Vertrauen konstitutiver Bestandteil von P^* darstellt – und dabei gemeinsame Identität als eine kausale Basis von Vertrauen verstanden wird.

Im zweiten Teil des Manuskripts wird vor dem Hintergrund der *communities of trust*-Perspektive ein theoretisches Argument entwickelt, dass das friedensbildende Potential von Sicherheitsinstitutionen analysiert. Dabei wird zunächst erläutert, dass die entwickelte Perspektive bestehende Ansätze zur identitäts-transformierenden Kraft von Institutionen ergänzt, indem sie betont, dass Institutionen nur dann zur Bildung eines Wir-Gefühls beitragen, und somit auch zur Bildung von IBV, wenn sie vertrauens-symbolisierende Praktiken fördern. Institutionen, die gegenseitiges Misstrauen widerspiegeln, werden zur Reproduzierung negativer Identitätsdynamiken beitragen.

Daran anschließend wird erstens argumentiert, dass unter Bedingungen gegenseitigen Misstrauens oder Unsicherheit Sicherheitsinstitutionen wahrscheinlicher als Symbole fehlenden Vertrauens betrachtet werden. Sie werden von Staaten eingerichtet, um eben trotz fehlenden Vertrauens Sicherheitsbeziehungen zu stabilisieren (Koremenos et al. 2001). Deshalb, so die Argumentation, können sie zur Reproduzierung negativer Identitätsdynamiken beitragen. Unter Bedingungen wachsenden Vertrauens hingegen werden Institutionen eher als Ausdruck positiver Beziehungen wahrgenommen und somit sollten sie zur weiteren Festigung einer positiven kollektiven Identität beitragen („Trust Constitutes Identity“, S. 162 ff.).

Zweitens wird zwischen Sicherheitsmanagementinstitutionen (SMI) und institutionalisierten internationalen Allianzen (IIA) unterschieden (Wallander und Keohane 1999). Erstere dienen alleinig der Erhöhung der Sicherheit zwischen ihren Mitgliedstaaten. Allianzen werden primär zum Zwecke der Abschreckung gemeinsamer Feinde gegründet, können aber auch Regeln zur Sicherung des Friedens zwischen den Alliierten selbst beinhalten. Außerdem können auch Mechanismen, die eigentlich der Koordination und Integration nationaler Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitiken dienen, eine stabilisierende Wirkung auf die Beziehungen zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten einer Allianz ausüben (Wallander und Keohane 1999). Im Manuskript werden dann Argumente dafür angeführt, dass SMI stärker dazu tendieren, negative Identitäten zu reproduzieren, während IIA sehr wahrscheinlich zur Konstruktion einer kollektiven Identität beitragen können („Trust Constitutes Identity“, S. 164).

Darauf aufbauend werden Friedensbildungsprozesse als pfadabhängige Prozesse geschildert (Krasner 1983; Wendt 1999): Wenn Staaten in einer frühen Phase der Annäherung misstrauens-symbolisierende Institutionen errichten, riskieren sie, dass die damit

einhergehenden von Misstrauen und Differenz geprägten Wahrnehmungsmuster festgetreten und perpetuiert werden und die Chance auf eine Transformation hin zu einem positiven Frieden bereits in dieser frühen Phase entscheidend gemindert wird. („Trust Constitutes Identity“, S. 167).

Das Manuskript liefert zwei zentrale Beiträge. Erstens kann der *communities of trust*-Ansatz als wichtige Ergänzung zu traditionellen und neueren Konzeptionen zwischenstaatlicher Sicherheitsgemeinschaften bewertet werden. Während traditionelle Ansätze Sicherheitsgemeinschaften als Wertegemeinschaften verstehen (Adler und Barnett 1998a), betonen neuere Ansätze die emotionale, praxeologische und habituelle Basis (Koschut 2014; Adler 2008; Pouliot 2010; Hopf 2010). Der *communities of trust*-Ansatz stellt hingegen die konstitutive Rolle von Vertrauen und die Notwendigkeit von vertrauensvollem Handeln für die Bildung und Kontinuität von friedlichen Gemeinschaften ins konzeptionelle und analytische Zentrum. Zweitens hinterfragen die Ausführungen zur Rolle von Sicherheitsinstitutionen jene bislang etablierten theoretischen Modelle zwischenstaatlicher Friedensbildung, die davon ausgehen, dass Sicherheitsinstitutionen eine ausschließlich positive Rolle in Annäherungsprozessen und Gemeinschaftsbildungsprozessen spielen (Adler und Barnett 1998a; Oelsner 2007) („Trust Constitutes Identity“, S. 167).

Im Manuskript „Security Organizations“ werden die in diesem Manuskript formulierten Mechanismen zur Unterfütterung und Ableitung über mögliche positive und negative Effekte von Sicherheitsorganisationen verwendet. Dabei wird vor allem auf die Argumentation zurückgegriffen, dass Sicherheitsorganisationen unter Bedingungen gegenseitigen Misstrauens und Unsicherheit reproduzierend auf die zugrunde liegenden Wahrnehmungs- und Identitätsmuster wirken, unter positiveren Kontextbedingungen jedoch zur Stärkung positiver gegenseitiger Identifikation und somit auch zur Bildung von IBV beitragen können.

1.4.5 Security Organizations and Transitions towards Positive Interstate Peace: Theory Formulation and Quantitative Empirical Analysis

Das Manuskript „Security Organizations“ greift sämtliche konzeptionelle und theoretische Vorarbeiten aus anderen Manuskripten auf und wendet diese im Rahmen einer quantitativ-statistischen Analyse der Effekte internationaler Sicherheitsorganisationen auf zwischenstaatliche Friedensbildungsprozesse an. Die existierende quantitativ-empirische

Literatur hat gezeigt, dass nicht internationale Organisationen generell, sondern insbesondere Sicherheitsorganisationen zur Vermeidung und Bewältigung militarisierter Krisen beitragen können (Boehmer et al. 2004). Hieran knüpft dieses Manuskript an, indem es analysiert, ob diese Organisationen auch Transformationsprozesse von Rivalität hin zu positiven Friedensbeziehungen befördern können.

Das Manuskript bietet einen ausführlichen Literaturüberblick, der folgende Schwächen existierender Forschung hervorhebt: Erstens erscheinen existierende Theorien über die vertrauensbildende Rolle von Institutionen oberflächlich, da sie nur selten bis gar nicht kausale und konstitutive Mechanismen der Vertrauensbildung explizieren. Zweitens erscheinen Theorien über die friedensbildende Wirkung von Institutionen einseitig optimistisch, obwohl theoretisch gute Gründe für eine negative Wirkung von Institutionen geliefert werden können. Drittens zeigt sich, dass existierende Theorien zu generell formuliert sind und nicht in Erwägung ziehen, dass Institutionen in unterschiedlichen Phasen des Friedensbildungsprozesses unterschiedliche Wirkungen entfachen können. Viertens existiert bislang keine quantitative Analyse, die die Wirkung von Sicherheitsinstitutionen auf Transformationsprozesse von Rivalität hin zu positivem Frieden anhand statistischer Methoden beleuchtet („Security Organizations“, S. 174 ff.).

Der im Manuskript entwickelte theoretische Rahmen basiert auf der Annahme, dass Sicherheitsinstitutionen zwei Funktionen innerhalb von Friedensbildungsprozessen erfüllen können: Sie können als Krisenmanagement-Tools zur Deeskalation von Krisen beitragen, und sie können zur Bildung von IBV beitragen (Adler 1998). Daran anschließend wird anhand einer Vielzahl an theoretischen Argumenten dargelegt, warum und auf welche Weise Sicherheitsorganisationen, und vor allem hoch institutionalisierte Sicherheitsorganisationen, positive wie auch negativ auf beide Prozesse wirken könnten. Dabei wird auch das Argument stark gemacht, dass Sicherheitsorganisationen in unterschiedlichen Phasen unterschiedliche Effekte auf den weiteren Fortgang von Transformationsprozessen ausüben. Hierfür werden sowohl etablierte Argumente aus der bestehenden Forschung zu internationalen Organisationen übernommen als auch Erkenntnisse aus der Sozialpsychologie und Vertrauensforschung zu Wirtschaftsunternehmen eingebracht (Lumineau 2017; Molm et al. 2009). Ebenso dienen die theoretischen Argumente aus „Trust Constitutes Identity“ zur theoretischen Unterfütterung der formulierten Hypothesen („Security Organizations“, S. 180 ff.).

Der entwickelte theoretische Rahmen produziert im Gesamtbild eine ambivalente theoretische Gemengelage. Er liefert unterschiedliche Mechanismen, durch die Sicherheitsinstitutionen auf unterschiedliche Weise – also sowohl positiv als auch negativ – auf Friedensbildungsprozesse wirken können. Prinzipiell muss davon ausgegangen werden, dass sich diese Mechanismen und kausalen Wirkungen gegenseitig verstärken oder neutralisieren können. Vor diesem Hintergrund erscheint eine statistische Analyse, die es erlaubt, den kausalen „Netto-Effekt“ von Sicherheitsinstitutionen zu identifizieren, von zentralem wissenschaftlichem Interesse.

Für die statistische Analyse werden Logit-Analysen gerechnet. P^* dient der Konzeptualisierung und Operationalisierung der abhängigen Variable (siehe „When Less is More“). Daten zu Sicherheitsorganisationen stammen von Bernauer et al. (2010), Shannon et al. (2010), Lundgren (2014) und Boehmer et al. (2004). Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Sicherheitsinstitutionen innerhalb von zwischenstaatlichen Rivalitäten keinen Effekt auf Transformationsprozesse ausüben. Entgegen den formulierten theoretischen Erwartungen scheint sich die anderweitig in der Literatur formulierte Annahme zu bestätigen, dass es hauptsächlich real-politische Faktoren sind, die die Beendigung von Rivalitäten erklären können und liberal-institutionalistische und konstruktivistische Faktoren hier keine Rolle spielen (Cornwell und Colaresi 2002; Rasler 2000; Goertz und Diehl 1995). Die Analysen zeigen jedoch auch, dass hochinstitutionalisierte Sicherheitsorganisationen hinderlich auf Transformationen von neutralen hin zu positiveren Friedensbeziehungen wirken, jedoch die Wahrscheinlichkeit erhöhen, noch höhere Friedensstufen zu erreichen. Im Gesamtbild zeigen sich also stark phasenabhängige Effekte. Das dabei identifizierte empirische Muster entspricht teilweise den formulierten Hypothesen. Unter Bedingungen starken Misstrauens haben die analysierten Organisationen keinen Effekt, unter neutralen Kontextbedingungen wirken sie behindernd, unter positiveren Gegebenheiten wirken sie förderlich auf den weiteren Fortgang von Friedensbildungsprozessen („Security Organizations“, S. 191 ff.).

Um einen detaillierteren und umfassenderen Einblick zu verschaffen, enthält das Manuskript zudem eine Analyse der umgekehrten Effekte, also inwiefern die Qualität dyadischen Friedens auf die Anzahl neuer dyadischer Mitgliedschaften in Sicherheitsinstitutionen wirkt. Dabei lässt sich eine positive Korrelation anzeigen. Im Gesamtbild haben die empirischen Ergebnisse starke Implikationen für jene Theorien, die Annahmen

über einen *virtuous cycle*, also positiv reziproke Effekte zwischen Institutionalisierungs-
dichte und Frieden formulieren (Russett und Oneal 2001). Bislang wurden solche Posi-
tivkreisläufe unter Verwendung eines negativen Friedenskonzepts nachgewiesen: Orga-
nisationen verringern das Risiko militarisierter Konflikte und deren Ausbleiben erhöht
die Anzahl gemeiner Organisationsmitgliedschaften. Unter Verwendung eines differen-
zierteren Friedenskonzepts kann die Wirkung eines solchen Kreislaufs nicht bestätigt
werden. Zwar erhöht sich die Zahl gemeinsamer Organisationen mit ansteigender Frie-
densstufe. Allerdings tragen Sicherheitsorganisationen nicht zur Befriedung von Rivali-
täten bei. Auf der Stufe von neutralem Frieden verringern neue Mitgliedschaften tragi-
scherweise eher die Aussicht auf weitere Transformationsprozesse. Nur wenn Staaten
noch höhere Friedensstufen erreicht haben, kann tatsächlich von einem Positivkreislauf
gesprochen werden („Security Organizations“, S. 201 ff.).

1.5 Konklusion: zukünftige Forschungen zu Frieden, Vertrauen und Sicherheitsinstitutionen

In der folgenden, den Rahmenteil abschließenden Konklusion soll erläutert werden, wel-
che zukünftigen Forschungen notwendig sind, um weitere spezifische und tiefgehende
Erkenntnisse über zwischenstaatliche Friedensbildung, Vertrauensbildungsprozesse und
die Rolle von Sicherheitsinstitutionen zu produzieren. Dabei soll auch skizziert werden
welche Rolle die vorliegende Dissertationsschrift für eben jene zukünftigen Forschungs-
vorhaben spielen kann.

Zunächst sollten sich auch zukünftige Forschungen mit der Frage beschäftigen,
wie unterschiedliche Friedensstufen für quantitative Analysen am besten konzeptualisiert
und operationalisiert werden können. Konzepte und deren Operationalisierung müssen
als *moving targets* begriffen werden. Sie sind weder in Stein gemeißelt, noch sind sie
formvollendet und perfekt. Die drei derzeit existierenden Ansätze (P^* , Bayer (2010) und
Goertz (2016)) stellen somit mit Sicherheit nicht das Ende quantitativ-orientierter kon-
zeptioneller Arbeiten zu zwischenstaatlichem Frieden dar. Raum für Verbesserung und
Weiterentwicklung besteht immer. ForscherInnen sollten Vor- und Nachteile existieren-
der Spezifikations- und Messtrategien abwägen, einander inspirieren, neue Ideen und An-
sätze einbringen und auf diese Weise die konzeptionelle Forschung vorantreiben. Das

quantitative Forschungsprogramm zu zwischenstaatlichen Rivalitäten zeigt exemplarisch, wie in einer Frühphase mehrere Konzeptionen und Messinstrumente entwickelt und publiziert wurden, die miteinander konkurrierten, sich aber auch gegenseitig inspirierten (Diehl und Goertz 2000; Thompson 2001; Bennett 1997; Hensel 1999; Gibler et al. 2011; Hewitt 2005). Langfristig haben sich zwei Ansätze herauskristallisiert, die heute als etablierter und weit akzeptierter Goldstandard für die Messung von zwischenstaatlichen Rivalitäten betrachtet werden können (Thompson und Dreyer 2011; Klein et al. 2006) Ähnliche Entwicklungen können für das Forschungsprogramm zwischenstaatlichen Friedens erwartet werden. Forscher werden sich auch zukünftig mit der grundlegenden Frage beschäftigen, welche Dimensionen als konstitutive Bestandteile in ein mehrstufiges Konzept zwischenstaatlichen Friedens integriert werden sollten, wie diese aggregiert und wie sie gemessen werden sollen. Das in dieser Dissertation entwickelte Konzept P^* kann dafür wertvolle Grundlagen anbieten. Es beleuchtet die Vorteile sparsam spezifizierter Konzepte und zeigt, dass der *treaty-density-Ansatz*, also die Analyse empirischer Muster bilateraler Vertragsunterzeichnungen, als Datengrundlage für die Erfassung vertrauensvoller Erwartungen und dichter Kooperationsvernetzung dienen kann. Der *treaty-density-Ansatz* bietet dabei auch Raum für seine eigene Spezifizierung und Erweiterung. Zum Beispiel ist es vorstellbar, nicht nur Verträge an sich, sondern auch deren Inhalte zur Grundlage eines Konzepts und seiner Operationalisierung zu machen (siehe auch „Vertrauen lohnt sich“). Zudem bietet die Erfassung und Analyse großer Datenmengen (Stichwort *big data*) zu zwischenstaatlichen Interaktionsmustern weitere Möglichkeiten für die Erfassung positiver Interaktionen und Perzeptionen. In diesem Zusammenhang soll auch noch auf qualitative Ansätze hingewiesen werden, die Vertrauensperzeptionen von Entscheidungsträgern durch die diskurstheoretische Analyse ihrer getätigten Aussagen erfassen (Brugger 2015). Techniken computer-gestützten *text-minings* könnten hier eine zukünftige Übertragung und Anwendung solcher Ansätze für die Erstellung von large-N-Datensätzen ermöglichen.

Zukünftige Forschungen sollten auch zur Verfeinerung und Erweiterung der theoretischen Literatur beitragen, die sich mit der friedensfördernden und insbesondere mit der vertrauensbildenden Wirkung von internationalen Institutionen beschäftigt. Denn es sollte klar sein, dass der theoretische Rahmen, der in dieser Dissertation entwickelt wird, zwar ein differenziertes und detailliertes Fundament legt, aber nicht erschöpfend ist. Zukünftige Beiträge sollten dabei die in den Manuskripten formulierte Kritik an bestehenden

Ansätzen ernst nehmen. Es fehlt an Theorien, die mögliche kausale und konstitutive Mechanismen explizit benennen und diese an bestimmte Designelemente institutionalisierter Kooperation knüpfen. Die Literatur zu *bargaining*-theoretischen Modellen sowie zu Normdiffusions- und Sozialisierungsprozessen hat bereits gezeigt, wie die dezidierte Analyse institutioneller Designelemente und deren Effekte tiefgehende Erkenntnisse hinsichtlich der Wirkungsweise von Institutionen liefern kann (Checkel 2005; Johnston 2001; Boehmer et al. 2004; Bearce und Bondanella 2007). Auf ähnliche Weise sollten vertrauenstheoretische Ansätze stets bedenken, dass das Design kooperativen Austauschs einen Einfluss darauf ausübt, ob aus Kooperation tatsächlich auch Vertrauen wächst. Die Literatur zu Vertrauen innerhalb und zwischen Wirtschaftsorganisationen bietet zahlreiche Ansatzpunkte, die als Quelle für theoretische Inspirationen dienen können, indem sie auf unterschiedliche vertrauensbildende Mechanismen und Designelemente institutionalisierter Kooperation hinweisen (Six et al. 2010; Lumineau 2017).

Zukünftige theoretische Arbeiten können zudem die Idee aufgreifen, dass Institutionen unterschiedliche Effekte in unterschiedlichen Phasen des Friedensbildungsprozesses ausüben. Es scheint dabei nicht nur von Interesse, ob Institutionen in unterschiedlichen Phasen auf unterschiedliche Weise wirken (positive vs. negative Effekte), sondern auch wie und auf welche Art und Weise sie in unterschiedlichen Phasen wirken (unterschiedliche und phasenabhängige kausale und konstitutive Mechanismen). So könnte angenommen werden, dass beispielsweise *bargaining*-theoretische und vertrauenstheoretische Mechanismen phasenabhängig unterschiedlich stark zum Tragen kommen. Daran anknüpfend erscheint auch die Theoretisierung möglicher zeitabhängiger Effekte von Interesse: Welche Effekte und Mechanismen im Rahmen internationaler Institutionen operieren kurzfristig und welche eher langfristig? Oder in anderen Worten: Welche Mechanismen entfalten sich erst mit anhaltender Dauer einer gemeinsamen Mitgliedschaft eines Staatenpaares in einer internationalen Institution, und welche Mechanismen wirken bereits nach kurzer Zeit?

Neben dem Design von Institutionen, der aktuellen Phase im Friedensbildungsprozess und der Dauer gemeinsamer Mitgliedschaften könnte zudem gewinnbringend theoretisiert werden, wie Eigenschaftsmerkmale der Staatenpaare und der sie vertretenden Entscheidungsträger und Diplomaten die friedensfördernde und vertrauensbildende Wirkung internationaler Institutionen beeinflussen. Beispielsweise ist bekannt, dass demokratische Staatenpaare internationale Institutionen besonders intensiv und effektiv für

die Bearbeitung ihrer Konflikte nutzen können (Hasenclever und Weiffen 2006). Dementsprechend könnte gefragt werden, ob der vertrauensbildende Effekt von internationalen Institutionen unterschiedlich für demokratische und nicht-demokratische Staatenpaare ausfällt. Gleichermaßen könnte auf die Ebene individueller Entscheidungsträger und Diplomaten hineingezoomt werden, und, im Sinne der psychologisch fundierten Außenpolitikforschung gefragt werden, ob und wie deren individualpsychologische Eigenschaften Merkmale Vertrauensbildung im Kontext internationaler Institutionen entweder erschwert oder erleichtert (Wheeler 2018). So könnte etwa im Sinne Rathbun's argumentiert werden, dass ein hohes Maß an „generalisiertem Vertrauen“ weitere Vertrauensbildung erleichtert.

An letzten Punkt anschließend soll an dieser Stelle noch für eine verstärkte Theoretisierung unterschiedlicher Akteursebenen und ihrer Kombination im Kontext von Institutionen, Vertrauens- und Friedensbildungsprozessen plädiert werden. Individuen und Gruppen von Diplomaten und Entscheidungsträger, die im Rahmen internationaler Institutionen mit Vertretern anderer Staaten interagieren, spielen für die Analyse zwischenstaatlicher Vertrauensbildungsprozesse sicherlich eine bedeutsame Rolle, können aber nicht erklären, wie und auf welche Weise Vertrauen auf der Mikroebene von Individuen zu kollektivem Vertrauen auf der Makroebene kollektiver Akteure transformiert wird. Eine vollständige und umfängliche Theorie über die vertrauens- und friedensbildende Wirkung internationaler Institutionen muss diesen Brückenschlag zwischen Mikro- und Makroebene leisten können. Bestehende Modelle aus der Organisationsforschung bieten vielversprechende Ansätze, die in zukünftigen Arbeiten weiter spezifiziert und ausdifferenziert werden sollten (Brugger et al. 2017; Schilke und Cook 2013)

Diese theoretischen Verfeinerungen sollten freilich in zukünftigen empirischen Studien auch getestet werden. Die vorliegende Dissertation hat generell gezeigt, wie Hypothesen über die Effekte von Institutionen auf Friedensbildungsprozesse anhand quantitativer Analysetechniken empirisch überprüft werden können. Zukünftige quantitative Studien sollten ihre Datenbasis sowohl verbreitern als auch vertiefen. Sie sollten das zu untersuchende Sample erweitern, um die Aussagekraft und Generalisierbarkeit der statistischen Ergebnisse zu erhöhen. Außerdem könnte die Wahl einer Analyseeinheit, die vom etablierten Dyadenjahr-Ansatz abweicht, weitere Erkenntnisse liefern. Zum Beispiel könnte die Wahl des IGO-Dyadenjahrs als Analyseeinheit Erkenntnisse über die Wirkung einzelner spezifischer IGOs aufdecken (Gartzke et al. 2012). Zudem sollten zukünftige

empirische Studien versuchen, ihre unabhängigen Variablen, die die Wirkung internationaler Institutionen erfassen, stärker zu disaggregieren, um auf diese Weise die Effekte einzelner Designelemente isoliert zu identifizieren. Dabei empfiehlt es sich auch, nicht nur Organisationen, sondern auch „bloße“ Verträge unter die theoretische und empirische Lupe zu nehmen.

Gleichzeitig sollten auch qualitative Fallstudien, aber auch experimentelle Designs verwendet werden, um die empirische Validität der theoretisch postulierten Mechanismen zu analysieren (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2008). In diesem Zusammenhang soll auch die Notwendigkeit betont werden, die in dieser Dissertation postulierten theoretischen Argumente durch qualitative Fallstudien zu überprüfen. Nur so kann ihre generelle Validität bestätigt werden.

Zusammenfassend und abschließend kann festgestellt werden, dass die vorliegende Dissertation einen substantiellen Beitrag zur Erforschung zwischenstaatlicher Friedensbildungsprozessen leistet. Sie liefert dabei wertvolle und verwertbare Erkenntnisse konzeptioneller, theoretischer und empirischer Art. Vor diesem Hintergrund legt sie auch Fundamente für zukünftige Entwicklungen in dem noch jungen, quantitativen Forschungsprogramm zu den Ursachen zwischenstaatlicher Friedensbildung (Diehl 2016). Leider ist dieses Forschungsprogramm höchst zukunftssträchtig – denn es zeigt sich bis heute, dass Frieden nie als selbstverständlich genommen werden sollte.

„Der Friede muss gestiftet werden, er kommt nicht von selber“
Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804)

Teil II

Manuskripte

2 Vertrauen lohnt sich. Über Gegenstand und Potential eines vernachlässigten Konzepts in den Internationalen Beziehungen

Philipp Brugger

Andreas Hasenclever

Lukas Kasten

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Dieser Beitrag bietet einen Überblick zu zwischenstaatlichem Vertrauen als theoretischem und empirischem Konzept in den IB. Hierzu kontrastieren wir zunächst informationsbasiertes Vertrauen mit einem Vertrauensverständnis, das bei der Aufhebung von Ungewissheit ansetzt. Wir unterstreichen den ontologischen Mehrwert der aufhebungs-basierten Variante, da sich Vertrauen nur aus dieser Perspektive als eigenständiges und abgrenzbares Phänomen verstehen lässt. Anschließend zeigen wir, dass informationsbasiertes Vertrauen auch in den IB wenig Neues mit sich bringt, während aufhebungs-basiertes Vertrauen Innovationspotential besitzt. Allerdings ist aufhebungs-basiertes Vertrauen ein bislang untertheoretisiertes und empirisch nur wenig analysiertes Phänomen. Da Letzteres auch auf fehlende Vertrauensindikatoren zurückzuführen ist, diskutieren wir im letzten Teil des Artikels akteurstheoretische Zugänge zu Vertrauen zwischen Staaten und skizzieren eine mögliche Operationalisierung von zwischenstaatlichem Vertrauen.

Keywords: interstate trust, belief formation, cooperation, suspension, ignorance.

2.1 Einleitung

Komplexität und Ungewissheit prägen internationale Politik (Barnett und Adler 1998, S. 414; Booth und Wheeler 2008, Kap. 1).¹ Weil sich keine objektiven Erwartungen hinsichtlich des Verhaltens von Staaten bilden lassen, müssen Regierungen immer mit Überraschungen rechnen. Damit sie unter diesen Bedingungen kooperieren, sind Mechanismen notwendig, die Komplexität und Ungewissheit reduzieren. Vertrauen gilt neben Kontrolle als ein solcher Mechanismus. Während Kontrolle darauf abzielt, die Menge unerwünschter Handlungsoptionen künstlich zu beschränken, setzt Vertrauen auf die Integrität und Zuverlässigkeit von Kooperationspartnern. Kontrolle geschieht durch die Manipulation von Umweltbedingungen und Nutzenfunktionen, so dass Akteure² unter den gegebenen Bedingungen starke Gründe haben, sich auf wechselseitige Kooperation einzulassen. Vertrauen ist demgegenüber et was qualitativ anderes. Es steht und fällt mit der Erwartung, dass sich Kooperationspartner auch dann an ihre Zusagen halten, wenn sie Ausbeutungschancen gefahrlos nutzen könnten.

Mit Ken Booth und Nicholas J. Wheeler (2008, S. 252) meinen wir, dass Vertrauen in den IB ein stark vernachlässigter, aber höchst lohnenswerter Untersuchungsgegenstand ist. Denn mit fortschreitender Globalisierung nimmt der Bedarf an zwischenstaatlicher Kooperation permanent zu. Wie die Wirtschafts- und Organisationssoziologie zeigt, kann Vertrauen in einem so hoch dynamischen Umfeld zu einem komparativen Vorteil werden. Vertrauen gilt als Schmiermittel sozialer Interaktionen. In der Form von Sozialkapital ermöglicht es robuste Absprachen, fördert offene Kommunikation, erhöht den Glauben in externe Informationen und schafft Raum für gemeinsames soziales Lernen. Darüber hinaus erzeugt Vertrauen ein Gefühl individueller Sicherheit (Bijlsma-Frankema und Costa 2005, S. 263). Zwar ist bekannt, dass Kontrollmechanismen ähnlich wirken, und zudem lässt sich kaum bestreiten, dass mit der Technologisierung moderner Industriegesellschaften auch deren Überwachungsfähigkeiten gestiegen sind. Ob diese die zunehmende Komplexität effektiv bearbeiten können, darf allerdings bezweifelt werden.

¹ Dieser Beitrag entstand im Rahmen eines durch die DFG finanzierten Forschungsprojekts zur Konzeptualisierung von Vertrauen in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Für kritische Rückmeldungen und anregende Kommentare zu früheren Textversionen bedanken wir uns herzlich bei unseren Tübinger Kollegen Thomas Diez, Max Mutschler und Thomas Nielebock, beim Tübinger Institutskolloquium und bei den drei anonymen GutacherInnen der ZIB.

² Aus Gründen der besseren Lesbarkeit wird durchgängig das generische Maskulinum verwendet, welches männliche und weibliche Personen einschließt.

Schließlich sind hierfür die Spezifikation und Kodifizierung zulässiger Handlungen, effektives Monitoring und konsequente Sanktionierung notwendig. Es ist jedoch eine Binsenweisheit, dass diese Bedingungen in der Staatenwelt nur schwer herzustellen sind und mit erheblichen Kosten einhergehen. Kontrollbasierte Ansätze der zwischenstaatlichen Kooperation stoßen somit hinsichtlich ihrer Effektivität und Effizienz schnell an ihre Grenzen. Ein Mehr an Vertrauen ist deshalb wünschenswert: denn „Vertrauen ist gut, Kontrolle ist teuer“ (Fiedler 2001, S. 576).

In der einschlägigen Literatur finden wir starke theoretische Argumente und erste empirische Hinweise auf die Wirksamkeit von Vertrauen in der internationalen Politik. Es fehlen uns allerdings noch die passende analytische Brille sowie die notwendigen Instrumente, um Vertrauen als solches sichtbar zu machen und bei Bedarf in verantwortbarer Weise zu stärken. Dieser Literaturüberblick möchte deshalb über unterschiedliche Vertrauenskonzeptionen, über den aktuellen Forschungsstand in den IB und über mögliche empirische Zugänge zu zwischenstaatlichem Vertrauen informieren. Hierzu greifen wir in unserem Beitrag auf ein breites Spektrum an Literatur aus der Philosophie, der Soziologie, der Organisationssoziologie, den Betriebswissenschaften und freilich den Politikwissenschaften selbst zurück.

Nach einer ersten formalen Klärung des Vertrauensbegriffs setzen wir uns im dritten Abschnitt mit der Vertrauensontologie rationalistischer Ansätze auseinander. Auch wenn ein Großteil der allgemeineren Literatur Vertrauen aus dieser metatheoretischen Perspektive thematisiert, sieht sich die rationalistische Vertrauensontologie substantieller Kritik ausgesetzt. So wird zum einen argumentiert, dass sich Vertrauen im Sinne eines informationsbasierten Kalküls kaum noch von Kontrolle unterscheiden lässt. Zum anderen wird bezweifelt, dass Vertrauen – wenn es denn mehr ist als informationsbasiertes Kalkül – überhaupt rationalen Ursprungs sein kann.³ Wie wir im vierten Abschnitt ausführen werden, beanspruchen nicht-rationalistische Ansätze dem Vertrauensphänomen

³ Wir bewerten rationalistische Vertrauenskonzepte unter Verwendung eines anspruchsvollen Rationalitätsbegriffs. Wir gehen davon aus, dass die Rationalität der Akteure *common knowledge* darstellt: Der Vertrauensgeber weiß, dass der Vertrauensnehmer kalkülbasiert handelt und deshalb seine kooperativen Präferenzen umweltabhängig variieren werden. Ebenso gehen wir von einem strengen Konzept subjektiver Wahrscheinlichkeiten aus: Die Wahrscheinlichkeit als subjektiver *degree of belief* muss auf Informationen und/oder empirischen Erfahrungen basieren (im Sinne eines *rational belief*), und soll nicht als bloße psychologische Variable verstanden werden. An dieser Stelle wollen wir auch klarstellen, dass wir rationalistische Ansätze nicht allgemein in ihrem normativen Charakter oder ihrer empirisch bewährten Prognose- und Erklärungsfähigkeit hinterfragen. Vielmehr kritisieren wir ihren deskriptiven bzw. ontologischen Anspruch in der konkreten Vertrauensforschung. Wir meinen, dass die rationalistische Konzeptualisierung

besser gerecht werden zu können. Sie betonen die Aufhebung von Ungewissheit und unterscheiden strikt zwischen Vertrauen und Kontrolle. Wir halten die Kritik am rationalistischen Vertrauensverständnis für berechtigt. Entsprechend zeigen wir in Auseinandersetzung mit der einschlägigen Literatur, dass dem als Aufhebung begriffenen Vertrauen nicht nur ontologische Eigenständigkeit zugesprochen werden kann, sondern dass ihm ein extra-rationales Moment innewohnt, welches es für rationalistische Modelle schwer zugänglich macht.

Im fünften Abschnitt fassen wir den einschlägigen Forschungsstand zu Vertrauen und Vertrauensbildung in den IB zusammen. Dabei konzentrieren wir uns vornehmlich auf die Themenbereiche der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. Es wird sichtbar, dass rationalistische Perspektiven zwar vergleichsweise weitverbreitet sind, aber wenig innovatives Potential besitzen. Demgegenüber zeigen Arbeiten zur Bildung internationaler Identitätsgemeinschaften, zur Außenpolitikanalyse, zu Versöhnung und zu Respekt und Freundschaft zwischen Staaten, dass die alternative, aufhebungsbasierte Konzeption von Vertrauen als eigenständiges Phänomen durchaus in den IB angekommen ist. Allerdings fehlen noch die theoretischen wie empirischen Instrumente, um seine faktische Relevanz angemessen diskutieren zu können.

In den beiden letzten Teilen unseres Forschungsüberblicks gehen wir deshalb auf zwei zentrale Herausforderungen der aktuellen Vertrauensforschung ein. Zum einen diskutieren wir die Frage der akteurstheoretischen Verortung von Vertrauen in den IB. Hier geht es um die Frage, wer wem vertraut, wenn wir von Vertrauen zwischen Staaten sprechen. Zum anderen skizzieren wir einen Versuch, Vertrauen in der internationalen Politik sichtbar zu machen. Ohne valide Messverfahren kann selbst ein hochplausibles Konzept für die Forschung kaum analytischen Mehrwert erbringen. Theoretische Konstrukte müssen empirisch zugänglich sein, wenn sie helfen sollen, internationale Politik besser zu verstehen und zu erklären.

von Vertrauen zu einer verminderten Erklärungs- und Prognosefähigkeit über Ursachen und Wirkungen von Vertrauen in sozialen Kontexten führen kann.

2.2 Vertrauen allgemein

Das *Vertrauensproblem* ergibt sich aus der zeitlichen Verzögerung (Reaktionszeit) zwischen einer Vorleistung zum Zeitpunkt t_0 und der möglichen Erwiderung durch den Nehmer zum Zeitpunkt t_1 (siehe Abbildung 2.1) (Barbalet 1996, S. 77–79; Luhmann 2009, S. 8; Möllering 2006c, S. 105–126). Die soziale Realität ist hochgradig komplex und die Zukunft generell unsicher. Wenn überhaupt, ist sie nur sehr beschränkt prognostizierbar. Folglich kann der Vertrauensgeber die Reaktion seines Kooperationspartners nicht sicher vorhersagen. Aufgrund der inhärenten Unsicherheit⁴ und des Schadens, der sich aus enttäuschem Vertrauen ergibt, ist Vertrauen immer ein Wagnis.⁵ Eine positive Vertrauens-erwartung jedoch ermöglicht es den Akteuren, dieses Wagnis einzugehen. Denn Vertrauen funktioniert im Sinne von Niklas Luhmann als „Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexität“ (Luhmann 2009). Es bewirkt auf diesem Weg die Festigung einer Erwartung kooperativen Verhaltens durch den Vertrauensnehmer.




Abbildung 2.1: Die Reaktionszeit als Dimension des Vertrauensproblems

Vertrauen ist von zwei anderen komplexitätsreduzierenden Mechanismen abzugrenzen: Misstrauen und Kontrolle. *Misstrauen* ist das Gegenteil von Vertrauen: Es erzeugt negative Erwartungen vertrauensunwürdigen Verhaltens. Dabei wird diese Erwartung auf die inhärent unkooperativen Präferenzen des Interaktionspartners zurückgeführt. Wir begreifen starkes Misstrauen und starkes Vertrauen als zwei Enden eines Kontinuums, dessen

⁴ Booth und Wheeler (2008, S. 40) betonen, dass sich Unsicherheit im Rahmen des Vertrauensproblems auf die zukünftigen, und nicht auf aktuelle Handlungsabsichten des Interaktionspartners bezieht (*future uncertainty*).

⁵ Wir vermeiden ausdrücklich die Verwendung des Risiko-Begriffs aufgrund seiner Bedeutung in der rationalistischen Theorie.

Zentrum am besten durch „Neutralität“ beschrieben werden kann: Wenn ein Akteur seinen Interaktionspartner (noch) nicht kennt, hat er sich schlichtweg (noch) keine Meinung über seine Zuverlässigkeit gebildet und kann ihm somit weder vertrauen noch misstrauen. Demensprechend ist die Komplexität der Entscheidungssituation im Neutralitätszustand maximal, während Misstrauen und Vertrauen sie reduzieren und (starke) Erwartungen erlauben.

So wie Vertrauen dient auch Kontrolle der Bildung positiver Kooperationserwartungen: Während sich allerdings Vertrauen auf die Einschätzung eines Akteurs als vertrauenswürdig bezieht, basieren Erwartungen im Fall von Kontrolle auf dem Wissen über die kooperationsfördernde Wirkung struktureller Rahmenbedingungen (Möllering 2005a, S. 287–288). Unter das Konzept solcher Kontrollstrukturen kann eine Reihe bekannter Konzepte aus der Kooperationstheorie subsumiert werden, wie etwa (Inter-)dependenz, Reputationssorgen, Abschreckung, Sanktionen und *hostage-taking*. Uns ist wichtig, auch Überwachung in Form kontinuierlicher Informationseinholung und -verarbeitung als Form der Kontrolle zu begreifen (siehe auch Blum 2003, S. 365–369): Denn wer nicht genug vertraut, wird sich ständig rückversichern müssen, um im Fall antizipierten, unkooperativen Verhaltens präventive Gegenmaßnahmen ergreifen zu können, die solches Verhalten unrentabel werden lassen.

Mit Hilfe dieser sehr allgemein gehaltenen Annäherung an den Vertrauensbegriff lassen sich unterschiedliche in der Literatur etablierte Vertrauenskonstellationen erfassen (Uslaner 2002, S. 26–29): Bringt Akteur A eine positive Vertrauenserwartung nicht näher spezifizierten Akteuren entgegen, so handelt es sich um *generalisiertes* Vertrauen bzw. eine generalisierte Vertrauenserwartung. Vertraut A hingegen einem konkreten Akteur B, haben wir es mit *spezifischem Vertrauen*, bzw. einer spezifischen Vertrauenserwartung zu tun. Spezifisches Vertrauen kann dabei sowohl eine Interaktionsbeziehung als solche kennzeichnen (A vertraut B) als auch eine Interaktionsbeziehung mit Bezug auf ein konkretes Objekt X der Interaktion (A vertraut B in Bezug auf X).

Nach welcher Logik Vertrauen im Sinne der Bereitschaft zu riskanten Vorleistungen funktioniert, ist umstritten. Dabei verläuft eine der zentralen Konfliktlinien innerhalb der Vertrauensliteratur zwischen rationalistischen und nicht-rationalistischen Ansätzen, die wir so übernehmen und auf die wir uns im Folgenden konzentrieren wollen. In diesem Zusammenhang setzen wir uns hauptsächlich mit Konzepten spezifischen Vertrauens auseinander und streifen das Phänomen generalisierten Vertrauens nur am Rande.

2.3 Vertrauen als Kalkül

2.3.1 Vertrauen als Kalkül in den Sozialwissenschaften

Aus rationalistischer Perspektive erscheint Vertrauen als subjektives Kalkül, das der Vertrauensgeber auf der Basis von Erfahrungen und aktuellen Informationen bildet (Hardin 2002, Kap. 1; Ripperger 1998, Kap. 4). Dies setzt voraus, dass der Vertrauensgeber zukünftige Handlungspräferenzen seines Kooperationspartners hinreichend präzise abschätzen kann, um die Vertrauenserwartung in Form einer subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeit p zu bilden. Sie gleicht dem *degree of belief* des Vertrauensgebers über vertrauenswürdigen Handeln des Nehmers. Gemäß der gängigen rationalistischen Entscheidungstheorie erbringen Akteure dann riskante Vorleistungen, wenn ihr Erwartungsnutzen positiv ist.⁶ Dementsprechend kann Vertrauen als Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit modelliert werden.⁷

Das Vertrauensproblem kann nach rationalistischer Überzeugung als typisches Informationsproblem durch Bayes'sche Lernprozesse gelöst werden (Hardin 2002, S. 113; Kydd 2000b, S. 333). Dabei gewinnt der Vertrauensgeber auf Basis von Informationseinholung und -verarbeitung fortlaufend Erkenntnis über die Präferenzen des Vertrauensnehmers. Die subjektive Wahrscheinlichkeit p wird dann im Lichte dieser Erkenntnisse ständig neu justiert. Vergangene Erfahrungen werden zur Voraussetzung gegenwärtiger Erwartungen und bilden die Grundlage für mehr oder weniger starkes Vertrauen in die zukünftigen Handlungsabsichten des Kooperationspartners. Die Bildung der Vertrauenserwartung gleicht somit der Formulierung einer probabilistischen Theorie über die Vertrauenswürdigkeit des Vertrauensnehmers. Dabei macht die Möglichkeit umweltabhängig variierender Präferenzen seitens des Nehmers eine solche Theorieformulierung zu einem komplexen Unterfangen. Wie Tanja Ripperger (Ripperger 1998, S. 114–115) zeigt, sieht sich der Geber zweier Unsicherheitsquellen gegenüber und bildet die Wahrscheinlichkeit p als Aggregat aus mehreren subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilungen (siehe Abbildung 2.2): zum einen aus den Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeiten möglicher Um-

⁶ Teilweise wird für die Hinzunahme der Bedingung von $p > 0.5$ plädiert, um Vertrauensentscheidungen von purem Gambling unterscheiden zu können (Deutsch 1958, 1962; Ripperger 1998, S. 88–90).

⁷ Bei Entscheidungen unter Ungewissheit (*ignorance/hard/fundamental uncertainty*) sind mögliche Zukunftsszenarien und Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeiten nicht antizipier und kalkulierbar. Unter Unsicherheit (*uncertainty*) können Wahrscheinlichkeiten subjektiv geschätzt werden und unter Risiko (*risk*) sind objektive Wahrscheinlichkeiten gegeben. Unter Sicherheit ist die Zukunft eindeutig vorhersagbar (Davidson 1991, 130, 131; Morrow 1994, 28, 29).

weltzustände $p(U_n)$, zum anderen aus den Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeiten vertrauenswürdiger Reaktionen unter den jeweils möglichen Umweltzuständen $p(K/U_n)$.

Seitens des Vertrauensnehmers ist in der rationalistischen Vertrauensontologie vertrauenswürdigen Verhalten immer dann begründet, wenn die Ausbeutung der Vorleistung soweit erkennbar nicht im wohlverstandenen Eigeninteresse des Vertrauensnehmers liegt. Oder anders formuliert: Das Interesse des Vertrauensgebers muss mit hinreichend großer Wahrscheinlichkeit im Interesse des Vertrauensnehmers eingeschlossen sein. Russell Hardin (2002, S. 3) nennt dies auch „*encapsulated interest*“. Dieser Zugang erlaubt es, unterschiedliche Motive für vertrauenswürdigen Verhalten zu benennen. Eine Situation von Interessenverschränkung besteht etwa, wenn dem Vertrauensnehmer aufgrund eines langen Schattens der Zukunft an einer Aufrechterhaltung kooperativer Beziehung gelegen ist, wenn Reputationsorgen Akteure zu kooperativem Verhalten bewegen, oder aber wenn drohende Sanktionen kooperative Reaktionen hervorrufen. Bezüglich der Rolle von moralischen und altruistischen Präferenzen, wie sie teilweise auch in rationalistischen Modellen modelliert werden (Braun 1992, S. 180–184), argumentiert Hardin, dass diese zwar auch unter den *encapsulated interest*-Begriff subsumiert werden können, die realweltliche Relevanz solcher Präferenzen vor dem Hintergrund des dem rationalistischen Paradigma zugrunde liegenden Menschenbildes jedoch eher marginal zu sein scheint (Hardin 2002, Kap. 2).




Abbildung 2.2: Die Bildung der Vertrauenserwartung gemäß rationalistischer Modellannahmen

2.3.2 Kritik am rationalistischen Konzept

Auch wenn die rationalistische Vertrauensontologie die einschlägige Literatur bislang dominiert, ist sie nicht unumstritten. Ein genereller Kritikpunkt lautet, dass sie Vertrauensverhältnisse auf Interessenkonvergenz zwischen Egoisten reduziere, Vertrauen aber eine andere Qualität von Beziehung bezeichne. Etwas spezifischer formuliert beanstanden Kritiker die Konfusion von Vertrauen und Kontrolle und rekurrieren dabei auf drei Argumente: Erstens ist die ontologische Überschneidung von Vertrauen und Kontrolle für jene Vertrauenskonzepte offensichtlich, in denen die Wirkung handlungseinschränkender Abschreckungs- oder Sanktionsmechanismen als Ursache von Vertrauenserwartungen begriffen werden (siehe bspw. *deterrence-based trust* (Rousseau et al. 1998, S. 398). Zweitens ist eine solche Überschneidung evident in Modellen, die auf der Annahme allgemeingültiger und fixer Präferenzen basieren. Die Reaktion des Nehmers wird hier maßgeblich durch die situationsspezifische Struktur beeinflusst. Deshalb bedarf es zur Bildung einer positiven Vertrauenserwartung lediglich der Antizipation einer kooperationsfreundlichen Spielstruktur. Vertrauen wird zur bloßen „Situationsvariable“ (Lahno 2001, S. 313): Sobald sich die kooperationsfördernde Situationsstruktur auflöst, wird dem Vertrauen die Grundlage entzogen. Akteursspezifische Eigenschaften spielen allenfalls eine marginale Rolle. Drittens gehen Kontrolle und Vertrauen in der rationalistischen Ontologie ineinander über, weil ein Vertrauensnehmer unter realweltlichen Bedingungen nicht von Unsicherheit und fixen Präferenzen beim Vertrauensnehmer ausgehen kann. Dies entspricht einem Standardeinwand gegen einfache, rationalistische Modelle:

„As soon as we seek to predict the behavior of other human beings, we should begin to be suspicious of discussions that take the Bayesian decision theory for granted. After all, if Bob is as complex as Alice, it is impossible for her to create a model of the world that incorporates a model of Bob that is adequate for all purposes“ (Binmore 2009, S. 146).

Vielmehr findet Vertrauen unter Ungewissheit statt (Möllering 2006c, S. 8).⁸ Denn der Raum möglicher Umweltzustände und damit einhergehender Nehmerreaktionen ist letztendlich auf der Grundlage des verfügbaren Wissens nicht kalkulierbar. Immer wieder können unvorhergesehene Situationen zu neuen Interessenkonstellationen führen und Kooperation fraglich werden lassen. Folglich lässt sich zukünftiges Verhalten auf der Ba-

⁸ Booth und Wheeler (2008, 4, 23) sprechen auch von „unresolvable uncertainty“.

sis selektiver Erfahrungen nicht sinnvoll prognostizieren.⁹ Darüber hinaus können sich Nehmerpräferenzen über Zeit hinweg verändern. Nach John J. Mearsheimer gilt beispielsweise, dass „a state’s intention can be benign one day and hostile the next“ (Mearsheimer 2001, S. 31). Auch deshalb reichen noch so detaillierte Informationen über vergangenes und aktuelles Verhalten nicht aus, um zukünftiges Handeln zu prognostizieren: „Knowledge of a state’s present motivation, while valuable, will not suffice to perfectly predict future behavior“ (Kydd 2005, S. 202). Aufgrund der räumlichen und zeitlichen Kontingenzen wird das dem Vertrauen zugrunde liegende Informationsproblem somit zum Humeschen Inferenzproblem, welches durch die bloße Ansammlung von Informationen nicht gelöst werden kann, da der Vertrauensgeber sich unabwendbar mit dem Problem von *unkown unknowns* konfrontiert sieht. Dem rationalistisch Vertrauenden ist es schlichtweg nicht möglich, stabile Erwartungen zu bilden: Vielmehr muss er seinen Interaktionspartner fortwährend überwachen, um unkooperatives Verhalten zu antizipieren und präventiv einzuschreiten. Zu dieser Schlussfolgerung kommt auch Andrew H. Kydd: Im Fall variabler Präferenzen könne eine Vertrauenserwartung nur durch fortwährende Informationseinholung und -verarbeitung gebildet und aufrechterhalten werden (Kydd 2005, S. 202–203). Für Kydd stellt ein solches Verhalten zwar kein Problem dar, da es im Einklang mit seinem Vertrauensverständnis steht. In der Literatur wird es jedoch mehrheitlich als Kontrollverhalten und als Gegensatz zu vertrauensvollem Verhalten interpretiert (Blum 2003, S. 365–369).¹⁰

Insgesamt stimmen wir mit der rationalismuskritischen Literatur darin überein, dass eine vom Kontrollmechanismus klar unterscheidbare Vertrauenserwartung auf Basis rationalistischer Modellannahmen weder konzeptualisierbar noch erklärbar ist. Dies gilt vor allem, wenn man akzeptiert, dass das eigentliche Vertrauensproblem durch einen Zustand unabwendbarer Ungewissheit gekennzeichnet ist. Demensprechend muss gefragt werden, ob das Vertrauensphänomen in seiner Gesamtheit durch eine rationalistische Ontologie überhaupt erfasst werden kann.¹¹ Dies scheint allenfalls dann möglich zu sein,

⁹ Eine solche Verallgemeinerung steht auch im Kontrast zu den Modellannahmen einer anspruchsvollen rationalistischen Theorie (Davidson 1991).

¹⁰ Kydd selbst entgeht dem Problem der konzeptionellen Überschneidung von Kontrolle und Vertrauen, indem er von stabilen Präferenzen ausgeht – eine für uns zu einfache und realweltlich nicht plausible Annahme.

¹¹ Inwieweit komplexere rationalistische Modelle existieren, die eine Modellierung stabiler und wenig informationsabhängiger Erwartungen unter Ungewissheit erlauben, lassen wir bewusst offen. Fakt ist, dass solche Modelle in der vorliegenden Vertrauensliteratur nicht benannt werden. Vielmehr wird das oben skizzierte rationalistische Modell mit alternativen Konzepten kontrastiert, die den vermeintlich extra-rationalen

wenn Wahrscheinlichkeitsschätzungen als rein psychologische Disposition begriffen und an den Prozess der Erwartungsbildung keine strengeren Modellanforderungen gestellt werden. Wir meinen, dass die Bildung der Vertrauenserwartung dann allerdings nicht mehr einer *rational belief formation* gleicht, weshalb wir auch eher von einer psychologischen Spielart des Rationalismus sprechen möchten.¹² Generell sollte jedenfalls deutlich geworden sein, dass eine strenge rationalistische Perspektive es nicht schafft, den Kern des Vertrauensphänomens zu explizieren. Wenn Vertrauen und Kontrolle nicht mehr trennbar sind und Vertrauen auf einen komplexen Prozess der kontinuierlichen Informationseinholung und -verarbeitung angewiesen ist, dann dient Vertrauen nicht der Luhmannschen Reduktion von Komplexität. Vielmehr würde versucht, der Komplexität der sozialen Welt durch ihre mentale Ordnung und Strukturierung Herr zu werden. Wir meinen aber, dass Vertrauen erst dann relevant wird, wenn es um die Reduktion einer unüberschaubaren Welt geht, die sich mental überhaupt nicht angemessen ordnen und strukturieren lässt. Nach den Worten von Hansjörg Siegenthaler (Siegenthaler 1993, S. 92) wird Vertrauen notwendig, da „gegen die residuale Unsicherheit¹³[...] kein Informationskraut gewachsen“ ist.

2.4 Vertrauen als Aufhebung von Ungewissheit

2.4.1 Vertrauen als Aufhebung in den Sozialwissenschaften

Ein grundlegendes Merkmal der rationalismuskritischen Literatur ist es, dass durch die Betonung extra-rationalistischer Grundannahmen Vertrauen strikt von Kontrolle abgegrenzt wird. Allerdings wird auch von den Vertretern und Vertreterinnen des alternativen Konzepts eine Superrationalität der Akteure unterstellt: Der Vertrauensgeber nimmt nur dann eine Vertrauenshandlung vor, wenn er eine vertrauenswürdige Reaktion erwarten kann. Gleichzeitig wird aber die extra-rationale Konzeption der Vertrauenserwartung

Kern des Vertrauensphänomens herausstellen und Vertrauen eindeutig von Kontrolle unterscheidbar machen.

¹² Auch Leonard Savage (1954, S. 15–20), Mitbegründer der subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, argumentiert, dass seine Theorie hauptsächlich der Deskription von Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit in *small worlds* dienen kann. In *large worlds*, also unter Ungewissheit wäre dies nur eingeschränkt möglich. Tatsächlich existiert eine lebhaft diskutierte Diskussion zu dieser Thematik, weshalb wir uns eine endgültige Meinung nicht anmaßen wollen (exemplarisch Davidson 1991; Gilboa et al. 2012). Siehe auch Jens Beckert (1996) Plädoyer für eine stärkere Beschäftigung mit dem Konzept der Ungewissheit.

¹³ In unserer Terminologie meint Siegenthaler damit Ungewissheit.

selbst betont. Während im rationalistischen Modell Eigeninteresse und ein informationsbasiertes Kalkül den konzeptionellen Kern ausmachen, werden jetzt die (moralische) Integrität und Zuverlässigkeit der Akteure und die Aufhebung von Ungewissheit als zentrale Besonderheiten von Vertrauen markiert (Tabelle 2.1 fasst die Kritik am rationalistischen Modell zusammen und grenzt sie von Vertrauen im Sinne der Aufhebung von Ungewissheit ab).¹⁴

Gemäß der ersten Besonderheit gründet die Vertrauenserwartung des Vertrauensgebers ausschließlich in akteursspezifischen Eigenschaften des Vertrauensnehmers. In diesem Sinne erwartet der Geber, dass der Nehmer sich nicht aus egoistischen Eigeninteressen heraus, sondern aufgrund seiner moralischen Integrität als zuverlässig erweisen wird, und zwar konstant und weitgehend¹⁵ unempfindlich gegenüber äußeren Umständen.¹⁶ Dementsprechend sieht der Geber den vertrauenswürdigen Nehmer in einem „normatively positive light as ›upright‹, ›honorable‹, ›truthful‹, ›loyal‹ and ›scrupulous‹“ (Hoffman 2002, S. 381). Der Nehmer wird als sozial eingebetteter Akteur wahrgenommen, der eine starke Disposition zur Regeleinhaltung hat und in seinem Handeln denselben sozialen Normen folgt wie der Vertrauensgeber.¹⁷ Diese Erwartung ist für einen vertrauenden Akteur primär handlungsleitend: Selbst wenn strukturelle Gegebenheiten den Nehmer ohnehin zu kooperativem Handeln bewegen würden, wird dessen kooperatives Verhalten letztlich auf seinen Charakter zurückgeführt. Diese Modellannahmen werden durch experimentelle Studien unterstützt. Sie zeigen, dass für eine Kooperationsentscheidung des Vertrauensgebers weniger die objektiv gegebenen Pay-Off-Strukturen ausschlaggebend sind als die subjektiv zugeschriebenen Persönlichkeitsmerkmale des potentiellen Kooperationspartners.¹⁸ Offenkundig rechnen viele Vertrauensgeber mit einer stabilen persönlichen Disposition des Vertrauensnehmers, die ihn auch dann noch kooperieren lässt, wenn es sich für ihn streng genommen nicht mehr lohnt.

¹⁴ Natürlich existiert nicht das eine alternative Vertrauenskonzept. Existierende Konzepte betonen die von uns diskutierten Eigenschaften unterschiedlich stark.

¹⁵ Die Qualifizierung „weitgehend“ ist an dieser Stelle wichtig, da es auch aus moralischer Sicht Zumutbarkeitsgrenzen gibt. Hierzu zählt beispielsweise, wenn der Kooperationspartner von seiner Seite her Vereinbarungen bricht.

¹⁶ Ripperger (1998, S. 116–117) formalisiert die Idee umweltunabhängiger Vertrauenswürdigkeit. Allerdings handelt der Nehmer immer noch nutzenorientiert, integrires Handeln spielt keine Rolle.

¹⁷ Dieser Gedanke wurde auch in den Arbeiten von Morton Deutsch (1958) erörtert.

¹⁸ Siehe Cook et al. (2005a), Hayashi et al. (1999), Kuhlman und Marshello (1975), McClintock und Liebrand (1988), Preisendörfer (1995), Rotter (1967, 1980), Yamagishi et al. (2005), Yamagishi et al. (1999). Für einen Überblick siehe auch Cook und Cooper (2003).

Nach Maßgabe der zweiten Besonderheit erlaubt es Vertrauen gerade unter Ungewissheit und unabhängig von fortwährendem Informationsupdating stabile Erwartungen über die Reaktionen des Interaktionspartners zu bilden. Obwohl diese Erwartungen nicht überprüfbar sind, sind sie beim Vertrauensgeber hinreichend stark ausgeprägt, um ihn zu kooperativem Handeln zu bewegen „als ob“ ihr Wahrheitsgehalt sicher sei (Messick und Kramer 2001, S. 91). Dementsprechend bezeichnet Georg Simmel (Simmel 1983, S. 263) eine Vertrauenserwartung auch als „Zustand zwischen Wissen und Nichtwissen“. Nach Guido Möllering (2006a, S. 4) ist es die Fähigkeit zur Aufhebung oder auch Ausblendung von Ungewissheit (Suspension), die dazu befähigt, eine Welt zu imaginieren, in der die vertrauenswürdige Reaktion des Partners nicht in Frage steht.¹⁹ Aufhebung oder Ausblendung klammert die Möglichkeit des Vertrauensbruchs schlichtweg aus und transformiert objektiv bestehende Ungewissheit in subjektive Sicherheit.²⁰ Sie erlaubt die unaufwändige Bearbeitung räumlicher und zeitlicher Kontingenzen, indem sie zwei Überzeugungen stabilisiert: Zum einen, dass auch in unvorhersehbaren Situationen, also „komme was wolle“, der Nehmer integres Verhalten an den Tag legt; zum anderen, dass der Nehmer sich in seinem vertrauenswürdigen Charakter auch über die Zeit hinweg nicht verändern wird.²¹ Aufhebung oder Ausblendung ermöglicht auf diesem Wege die Bildung stabiler Erwartungen, ohne dabei auf fortwährende Informationseinholung angewiesen zu sein, denn Vertrauen impliziert „confidence concerning one’s own judgment of another“ (Barbalet 2009, S. 375). Dementsprechend wird das dem Vertrauen zugrunde liegende Informationsproblem schlichtweg aufgehoben. Deshalb kommt Vertrauen tatsächlich dem oft zitierten Glaubenssprung – einem „*leap of faith*“ – gleich (Lewis und Weigert 1985; Möllering 2006c, Kap. 5).²² Dabei muss davon ausgegangen werden, dass umso stärkere Aufhebungsprozesse notwendig werden, je größer die Reaktionszeit bis zur möglichen Vertrauenserwiderung ist. Schließlich wird Ungewissheit umso größer, je weiter Handlungen in der Zukunft liegen.²³

¹⁹ Möllering orientiert sich am Hegelschen Begriff der Aufhebung, dem eine Doppelbedeutung innewohnt, da es Negieren und Aufbewahren gleichermaßen mit einschließt (Möllering 2001, S. 409, 2006a).

²⁰ Bernd Lahno (2002, S. 43–45) meint, dass der Vertrauende zwar immer noch die Alternative des Vertrauensbruchs wahrnimmt, aber davon ausgeht, dass der Vertrauensnehmer diese Alternative nicht wählen wird.

²¹ In diesem Sinne können auch jene rationalistischen Modelle, die versuchen, Entscheidungen unter Ungewissheit zu formalisieren (bspw. Binmore 2009, Kap. 9; Kelsey und Quiggin 1992), nicht mit Vertrauen gleichgesetzt werden.

²² Entsprechend meint Möllering (2006b, Kap. 5.4) auch, dass Vertrauen im Letzten ein Willensakt sei und spricht von einem „will to believe“ (siehe auch Svendsen 2008, S. 97–101).

²³ Möchte man Vertrauen trotzdem als Wahrscheinlichkeitsschätzung modellieren, so geht dies in Form einer psychologischen, rationalistischen Vertrauentheorie. Aufhebungsprozessen könnte dann die Rolle

Vor dem Hintergrund der beiden diskutierten ontologischen Besonderheiten wird ersichtlich, dass Vertrauen nicht mehr zwischen Egoisten, sondern innerhalb von Wertegemeinschaften entsteht. Zudem werden Vertrauen und Kontrolle nun klar voneinander unterscheidbar: Indem der Vertrauensgeber seine Erwartung auf die moralische Integrität des Nehmers stützt und er zudem auf der Basis von Aufhebungsprozessen auf kontinuierliches Informationsupdating verzichten kann, werden Kontrollmechanismen als Quelle positiver Kooperationserwartungen nebensächlich. Auf diese Weise wird Vertrauen tatsächlich zu einem Mechanismus der Komplexitätsreduktion. Aufwändiges Informieren und Kontrollieren dienen nicht mehr als Basis von Vertrauen, denn nun gilt: „trust begins where prediction ends“ (Lewis und Weigert 1985, S. 976; siehe auch Williamson 1993).

Tabelle 2.1: Zusammenfassung der ontologischen Argumentation

Kritik am rationalistischen Modell	Lösung im aufhebungsbasierten Modell
Eine Vertrauensbeziehung ist mehr als eine Interessengemeinschaft von Egoisten.	Der Geber sieht den Nehmer als integrale Person und Teil einer besonderen Beziehung an.
Vertrauen findet unter Ungewissheit statt, eine rationale Bildung der Vertrauens Erwartung setzt aber die Annahme von Unsicherheit voraus.	Das irrationale Moment der Aufhebung ermöglicht Modellierung von Vertrauen unter Ungewissheit.
Vertrauen und Kontrolle sind nicht unterscheidbar, wenn <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) die Wirkung struktureller Kontrollen als Quelle der Vertrauens Erwartung dienen darf, 2) in Modellen mit fixen Präferenzen Vertrauen auf eine Situationsvariable reduziert wird, 3) fortwährende Informationseinholung notwendig für die Bildung und Aufrechterhaltung einer Vertrauens Erwartung ist. 	Vertrauen und Kontrolle werden unterscheidbar, da <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) die Erwartung ausschließlich auf die akteursspezifischen Eigenschaften des Nehmers abzielt, 2) strukturelle Determinanten dabei keine Rolle spielen, 3) Aufhebungsprozesse die fortwährende Informationseinholung zunehmend unwichtiger werden lässt.

zugesprochen werden, die Generalisierung von selektiven Erfahrungen und somit eine Formulierung einer Wahrscheinlichkeit trotz ungewisser Umweltbedingungen zu ermöglichen.

2.4.2 Aufhebung im Fokus

Um Missverständnisse zu vermeiden, wollen wir das Verhältnis zwischen Aufhebung und Informationsupdating noch weiter spezifizieren: Einerseits kann, im Gegensatz zum rationalen Vertrauensgeber, der zur Aufhebung befähigte Vertrauensgeber auf intrusive Informationseinholung unmittelbar vor der Vertrauenshandlung, innerhalb der Reaktionszeit und zum Zeitpunkt der Vertrauenserwiderung verzichten. Denn er ist davon überzeugt, dass sich der Nehmer als vertrauenswürdig erweisen wird. Andererseits ist davon auszugehen, dass der Austausch von Informationen notwendig ist für die Bildung von Vertrauen und das Erlernen von Aufhebung – zumindest in den meisten Fällen. Akteure müssen sich gegenseitig als vertrauenswürdige Interaktionspartner erkennen und ein Gefühl der Vertrautheit entwickeln (Luhmann 2009, Kap. 3).²⁴ Vertrautheit muss freilich mehr sein, als bloße Interaktionsgeschichte und kalte Information. Dies zeigt unsere Kritik am rationalistischen Lernmodell. Aus der Perspektive sozialpsychologischer Ansätze wird deshalb argumentiert, dass Vertrautheit zwischen Akteuren dann entstehen kann, wenn sie sich als Mitglieder ein und derselben moralischen Gemeinschaft wahrnehmen. Michael A. Hogg und Kollegen (Hogg 2000; Hogg et al. 2007) zeigen beispielsweise empirisch, dass Gruppenkategorisierung der Reduktion von Ungewissheit dient. Offenkundig fällt es Individuen leichter, Gruppenmitgliedern Vertrauen entgegenzubringen als Außenstehenden.²⁵ Sozialisations- und Selbstkategorisierungsprozesse werden somit zur Basis von Vertrauen. Im Verlauf dieser Prozesse internalisieren Akteure die zentralen Werte und Normen einer Gruppe und können gruppenspezifische Verhaltenserwartungen herausbilden (Lewicki und Bunker 1995; Stolle 2002; Uslaner 2002; Mercer 2010; Williams 2001; Kramer 1999).²⁶

Aus der Sozialpsychologie ist zudem bekannt, dass *in-group*-Vertrauen mit Wahrnehmungsverzerrungen und Vorurteilen einhergeht: Während konfrontatives Verhalten von Mitgliedern der eigenen Gruppe eher durch externe Zwänge erklärt und damit relativiert wird, werden vergleichbare Aktionen bei Fremden mit schlechten Charaktereigenschaften in Verbindung gebracht. Umgekehrt gilt, dass kooperatives Verhalten von Grup-

²⁴ Vincent Pouliot (2008, S. 278) theoretisiert Vertrauen als Beispiel für praktische Vernunft. In diesem Sinne können wir uns auch vorstellen, dass die Fähigkeit zur Aufhebung durch diese Handlungslogik theoretisiert werden könnte.

²⁵ Siehe auch Yamagishi und Kiyonari (2000, S. 127).

²⁶ Nach Eric Uslaner (2002, S. 18–19) existiert innerhalb von Identitätsgruppen sogar eine Norm zu vertrauensvollem Verhalten.

penmitgliedern ihrem guten Charakter angerechnet wird, während freundliche Handlungen von Fremden grundsätzlich misstraut und auf mögliche böse Absichten untersucht werden. Die Gruppenzugehörigkeit beeinflusst also, wie objektiv identische Handlungen subjektiv unterschiedlich interpretiert werden. Diese Erkenntnis unterstreicht die existierende Kritik am rationalistischen Vertrauenskonzept: Offenbar justieren Vertrauensgeber ihre Vertrauenserwartung nicht auf objektive Weise im Lichte neuer Informationen, wie es die rationalistische Lerntheorie erwartet. Vielmehr werden neue Informationen nach Maßgabe bereits bestehender Vertrauenserwartungen unterschiedlich interpretiert (Taylor und Jaggi 1974; Jervis 1976; Hewstone et al. 1982; Pettigrew 1979).

Neben Gruppenkategorisierungen werden Emotionen als wesentliche Stellgrößen für Vertrautheit und Vertrauensbereitschaft identifiziert (Jones 1996; Becker 1996; Lahno 2001, 2002, Kap. 7).²⁷ Nach Jack Barbalet (2009, S. 375) braucht es einen emotionalen Trigger für Vertrauenshandlungen: „The basis of trust, then, is the feeling of confidence in another’s future actions and also confidence concerning one’s own judgment of another“. Vertrauen ist in dieser Sichtweise ein „*emotional belief*“ (Mercer 2010), und damit sowohl kognitiv als auch affektiv begründet. Zwar können die beiden Dimensionen einen jeweils unterschiedlich hohen Anteil an Vertrauen haben, doch bedarf Vertrauen immer einer affektiven Komponente (Lewis und Weigert 1985, S. 971). So konnten Michael Kosfeld et al. (2005, 674) in einer neurologischen Studie nachweisen, dass eine durch die Gabe des Hormons Oxytocin ausgelöste positive Emotion – ein „Gefühl der Wärme“ gegenüber anderen Menschen – im spieltheoretischen Experiment eine signifikant höhere Vertrauensbereitschaft zur Folge hatte (siehe auch Zak und Kugler 2011).²⁸ Zusammenfassend zeigt sich, dass Vertrautheit durch eine positive Interaktionsgeschichte hergestellt wird, die zu wechselseitiger Identifikation und emotionaler Bindung als extrarationale Relationseigenschaften führt. Aufhebung gründet wiederum auf Vertrautheit

²⁷ Nach Jonathan Mercer (2005, 95, 96) bestehen zwischen Gruppenzugehörigkeit, Emotionen und Vertrauen enge Zusammenhänge: „I argue that identity produces emotion that creates trust“.

²⁸ In manchen Studien werden Emotionen im Kontext von Vertrauen auch als Erfahrungsspeicher konzeptualisiert. So begreift Maria Neumaier (2011, S. 294) Vertrauen als Form „verdichteten Wissens“ (bzw. als „somatischen Marker“), welches sich aus vergangenen Erfahrungen bildet und in ähnlichen Situationen abgerufen und auf solche übertragen wird. Mit zunehmender Erfahrung entsteht eine stabile Verhaltensdisposition, die es ermöglicht, in bestimmten Situationen „kognitiv unaufwändig zu vertrauen“. Dieser Prozess läuft dabei zu einem erheblichen Teil im Unbewussten ab: „Prozesse ohne Beteiligung des Bewusstseins sind besonders schnell und werden subjektiv als besonders sicher empfunden“. Zudem kann eine emotionale Bindung als Basis für Vertrauen erklären, warum Vertrauensenttäuschung als Treuebruch oder Verrat empfunden werden, während in kalkülbasierten Interaktionen, in denen Vertrauen keine Rolle spielt, unkooperatives Verhalten als reine Enttäuschung wahrgenommen wird (Michel 2012, S. 13).

und lässt Schlüsse aus selektiven Erfahrungen auf die allgemeine Vertrauenswürdigkeit des Interaktionspartners zu.

Im Gegensatz zu Ansätzen, die die Bildung von Vertrautheit ins Zentrum stellen, stehen Studien, die individualpsychologische Dispositionen für ausschlaggebend halten (Rathbun 2012a; Uslaner 2002): Demnach mache es Sinn, Akteure nach Maßgabe ihrer Neigung zu generalisiertem Vertrauen zu typologisieren. Die einschlägige Literatur unterscheidet (Fischer 2009, S. 697) hier etwa zwischen „kooperativen“, „individualistischen“ und „kompetitiven“ Akteuren und zeigt, dass ihre Vertrauensbereitschaft unter ähnlichen Bedingungen signifikant variiert. Dementsprechend entsteht Vertrauen nicht allein auf der Basis von Vertrautheit, sondern erscheint im Sinne generalisierter Vertrauensbereitschaft als feststehende individualpsychologische Variable seitens des Vertrauensgebers.

2.4.3 Die Relevanz der ontologischen Unterscheidung

Unsere ausführliche ontologische Diskussion ist analytisch wichtig und empirisch folgenreich. Denn das Vertrauenskonzept würde jeden Mehrwert verlieren, wenn Vertrauenserwartungen nicht strikt auf akteursspezifische Eigenschaften bezogen werden. Andernfalls könnten wir Vertrauen als genuine und über Kontrolle hinausgehende Kooperationsressource überhaupt nicht sehen. Zudem ist es wichtig, dass Vertrauen in der Zuschreibung moralischer Dispositionen, Identifikation und emotionaler Nähe gründet. Auf diese Weise erreichen Vertrauensbeziehungen tatsächlich eine andere Qualität als egoistische Interessengemeinschaften. Gleichzeitig halten wir auch daran fest, Vertrauen als Aufhebungsentscheidung zu begreifen. Nur so lässt sich die extra-rationale Eigentümlichkeit unseres Untersuchungsgegenstandes angemessen erfassen und nur auf diese Weise lassen sich die irrationalen Momente, die bei Aufhebungsentscheidungen eine Rolle spielen, fokussieren. Wie gezeigt, weisen rationalismuskritische Ansätze auf sozialpsychologische Gruppenprozesse, Emotionen und Dispositionen als Basis von Vertrauen hin. Bleiben diese Faktoren in theoretischen Modellen und ihren empirischen Überprüfungen unberücksichtigt, laufen sie Gefahr, an Erklärungs- und Aussagekraft zu verlieren. Beispielsweise kann eine rein rationalistische Lerntheorie Vertrauensbildungsprozesse kaum angemessen erfassen und übersieht wichtige Bedingungen für ihren Erfolg.

2.4.4 Vertrauen als Komplementärmechanismus

Unsere starke Kontrastierung von kontroll- und vertrauensbasierter Kooperationserwartung hat vor allem heuristischen Wert. Deshalb plädieren wir in der empirischen Forschung für einen pragmatischen Umgang mit der Frage, aus welchen Gründen Akteure zusammenarbeiten. Denn in unserem Verständnis schließen sich Kontrolle und Vertrauen im strengen Sinne nicht wechselseitig aus. Hier folgen wir Anthony Giddens (1985): Soziale Akteure reproduzieren in ihrer Praxis soziale Strukturen – was wir wissen können –, gleichzeitig sind sie aber immer auch für Überraschungen gut – womit wir rechnen sollten. Ob diese Überraschungen aber mit Respekt vor den legitimen Interessen anderer einhergehen, darauf können wir nur vertrauen. Denn Akteure haben bei aller Strukturiertheit ihrer Handlungen immer Entscheidungsspielräume, in denen sie sich als moralische Akteure bewähren könn(t)en. Hieraus folgt für die Kooperationsforschung, dass Kontrolle und Vertrauen bei allen begrifflichen Unterscheidungen in komplementärer Weise die Bildung positiver Erwartungen anleiten (siehe Abbildung 2.3). Niemand wird bestreiten, dass die antizipierte Wirkung von Kontrollmechanismen – sei es in Form struktureller Einschränkungen oder sei es in Form kontinuierlicher Informationseinholung – in der internationalen Politik für die Herausbildung positiver Erwartungen wichtig ist. Gleichzeitig wollen wir aber auch die Möglichkeit nicht außer Acht lassen, dass Akteure auf Kontrollmechanismen verzichten, da sie einander vertrauen. Wenn aber Vertrauen in einem Komplementärverhältnis zu Kontrollmechanismen steht, dann ist nicht mehr von Interesse, ob Akteure vertrauen oder kontrollieren, sondern wie viel von der objektiv existierenden Ungewissheit aufgehoben werden kann, und damit einhergehend wie viel strukturelle Kontrolle oder Informationseinholung notwendig ist, damit Akteure robuste Kooperationserwartungen bilden können: Welche Kontrollmechanismen werden institutionalisiert, wie viel Informationen werden eingeholt und verarbeitet, und wie stark wird dem Partner vertraut? Die Frage nach dem Mischungsverhältnis von Vertrauen und Kontrolle tritt in den Vordergrund. In diesem Sinne verringert ein Mehr an Vertrauen die Notwendigkeit von Kontrollmechanismen, um positive Erwartungen herausbilden zu können. Wir machen uns somit die umgangssprachliche Intuition zu Nutze, dass Vertrauen – auch zwischen Staaten – wachsen kann. Wir haben es deshalb nicht mit einer Dichotomie wie beim strategischen und kommunikativen Handeln zu tun, sondern mit einem realweltli-

chen Phänomen, das mehr oder weniger stark ausgeprägt sein kann. In diesem Sinne umgehen wir auch die meta-theoretische Zwickmühle der ZIB-Debatte (Deitelhoff und Müller 2005; Herborth 2007; Risse 2007).




Abbildung 2.3: Die positive Erwartung als Ergebnis von Kontrolle und Vertrauen

2.5 Vertrauen in den IB

2.5.1 Vertrauen als Kalkül in den IB

Rationalistische Ansätze zur internationalen Politik schätzen die Bedeutung von Vertrauen höchst unterschiedlich ein. So geht der offensive Neorealismus von aggressiven Machtmaximierern aus, auf deren Kooperationszusagen kein Verlass ist. Deshalb sollten Staaten ihrem Außenverhalten *Worst-Case-Szenarien* zugrunde legen. Entsprechend formuliert Mearsheimer (2001, S. 32): „There is little room for trust among states. For sure, the level of fear varies across time and space, but it cannot be reduced to a trivial level“. Wesentlich optimistischer sind defensive Neorealisten. Sie modellieren Staaten nicht als Macht- sondern als Sicherheitsmaximierer, die einander dann vertrauen können, wenn sie sich in einem entspannten Umfeld ohne vitale Konflikte bewegen (Glaser 1994, S. 71).

Der bayesianische Realismus von Kydd (2005, Kap. 1, 2) greift zentrale Annahmen der beiden neorealistischen Spielarten auf und verknüpft sie mit Intuitionen des neoklassischen Realismus. Demnach können Staaten entweder ausbeuterische Expansionisten oder kooperationsbereite Sicherheitsmaximierer sein. Letztere müssen sich allerdings als solche erkennen, bevor sie vertrauensvoll kooperieren können. Dies wird durch relativ einfach modellierte Signalspiele erreicht, die sich stark an Charles E. Osgoods psycholo-

gisch fundiertem Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-Reduction Modell (GRIT) orientieren (Lindskold 1978; Osgood 1962). Dementsprechend gleicht Kydds Vertrauenskonzeption am ehesten einer psychologisierten Rationalismusvariante. Staaten können ihr Interesse an kooperativen Beziehungen und ihre Vertrauenswürdigkeit kommunizieren, indem sie zeigen, dass sie bereit sind, riskante Vorleistungen zu erbringen. Solche Vorleistungen werden als kostspielige Signale modelliert, die meist die Form unilateraler kooperativer und riskanter Gesten annehmen. Das im Rahmen einer ersten Signallrunde aufgebaute Vertrauen bildet die Grundlage für weitergehende Zusammenarbeit. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass nur solche Signale glaubwürdig sind, zu deren Sendung ausschließlich vertrauenswürdige Staaten bereit sind. Sie sollen zeigen, dass für den Senderstaat die potentiellen Gewinne von Kooperation das Risiko der Signallrunde kompensieren und deshalb mit seiner zukünftigen Zuverlässigkeit gerechnet werden kann. Signale, die diesen Anforderungen nicht gerecht werden, sind als *cheap talk* bedeutungslos.²⁹ In drei Fallstudien zum Beginn des Kalten Krieges, zur Gründung der NATO und zum Ende des Kalten Krieges arbeitet Kydd die Analysekraft seiner formalen Theorie heraus (Kydd 2005, Kap. 5-8).³⁰ Zu erwähnen ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass Signalspiele bei der Bildung aufhebungs-basierten Vertrauens eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Ob sie allerdings lediglich Erwartungssicherheit durch glaubwürdige Informationen fördern und damit die Grundlage für langfristige Annäherungsprozesse bilden, oder ob sie in einem genuinen Sinne aufhebungs-basiertes Vertrauen erzeugen können, ist strittig (siehe unten). Dementsprechend bleibt die Frage ungeklärt, ob die Signale in Kydds Fallbeispielen Vertrauen erzeugen konnten.

Auch in der neoliberalen Kooperationstheorie spielt rationalistisches Vertrauen eine wichtige Rolle zur Ermöglichung von Zusammenarbeit unter den Bedingungen von Anarchie und Interdependenz (Keohane 1986; Ostrom 2003). Brian C. Rathbun argumen-

²⁹ Harald Müller argumentiert gegen die Effektivität von *costly signaling* zur Herstellung von rationalistischem Vertrauen, da der bloße Empfang kostspieliger Signale nicht die Vermutung unbekannter privater Informationen auf Vertrauensnehmerseite schwächen kann (Müller 2004, S. 398). Die Theorie des *costly signaling* sei somit auf Annahmen angewiesen (etwa ein geteiltes Verständnis von Sicherheit und Kosten), die nicht selbstverständlich seien. Aaron M. Hoffman (2007, S. 302–305) merkt zudem an, dass Staaten, die sich ernsthaft misstrauen, nicht bereit sein werden, das Risiko überzeugender kostspieliger Signale einzugehen.

³⁰ Weitere oft zitierte empirische Beispiele für die vertrauensbildende Wirkung von kostspieligen Signalen sind die Rede Anwar Sadats vor der israelischen Knesset 1977, der Besuch des indischen Premiers Atal Bihari Vajpayee im pakistanischen Lahore sowie die einseitigen Abrüstungsbemühungen im Rahmen des Österreichischen Staatsvertrags (Larson 1997a, 1997b; Wheeler 2010).

tiert sogar, dass Vertrauen das Fundament der rationalistischen Kooperationstheorie darstellt. Meistens wird Vertrauen dabei lediglich implizit konzeptualisiert:

„This is the kind of trust utilized, often only implicitly, in rationalist work in international relations. It provided the foundation of what was known as ›neoliberal institutionalism‹ [...]“ (Rathbun 2009, S. 350).

Es kann tatsächlich argumentiert werden, dass rationalistisches Vertrauen in allen Ansätzen mitgedacht werden muss, in denen auf der Basis von Informationen Unsicherheit minimiert und Kooperation ermöglicht wird. Im Gegensatz zu den psychologisierten Theorien von Osgood und Kydd werden diese Informationen im Neoinstitutionalismus jedoch weniger durch kostspielige Signale als durch die transparenzschaffende Wirkung internationaler Institutionen erzeugt. Sie organisieren einen kontinuierlichen Informationsfluss und sorgen für deren zuverlässige Auswertung. So dienen der *Open Skies Treaty* oder das Wiener Dokument der Überprüfung von Regeleinhaltung und der Identifikation von Regelbrüchen bei Rüstungskontrollmaßnahmen. Selbiges gilt für zahlreiche internationale Organisationen wie der Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde, die in ihren praktischen Funktionen als Informationsdienstleister theoretisiert werden und somit der Herstellung von rationalistischem Vertrauen dienen.³¹ Dass es sich hierbei im Kern um kontroll- und informationsbasierte und weniger um eigenschaftsbasierte Kooperationserwartungen handelt, bleibt unbenommen.

Informationsbasiertes Vertrauen gilt darüber hinaus als zentrale Bedingungen für die erfolgreiche Zusammenarbeit im iterierten Gefangenendilemma. Damit die von Robert Axelrod (1984, 174, 182) als *Tit-for-Tat* bekannte Interaktionsstrategie kooperationsermöglichend wirkt, müssen Staaten zum einen über das vergangene Kooperationsverhalten Bescheid wissen, um im nächsten Spielzug entsprechend reagieren zu können. Zum anderen sollten die Akteure hinreichend über die Interdependenz und den damit verbundenen langen Schatten der Zukunft informiert sein. Schließlich müssen sie ein Mindestmaß an Kooperationsbereitschaft der anderen Seite erwarten können, damit sie rezip-

³¹ Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen erlauben nicht nur die Bildung von rationalistischem Vertrauen durch Informationseinholung. Sie wirken auch vertrauensbildend, indem sie als *costly signal* verstanden werden, da die Preisgabe militärisch sensibler Informationen durchaus mit Risiken verbunden ist. Ob vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen auch zur Erzeugung aufhebungsbasiereten Vertrauens dienen können, ist eine bislang wenig erforschte Fragestellung.

roke Austauschbeziehungen überhaupt eingehen und kooperative Strategien wählen können.³² Folglich legen die Akteure ihren Kooperationsentscheidungen subjektive Wahrscheinlichkeitseinschätzungen zur Robustheit der Dilemmastruktur und der Rationalität ihrer potentiellen Partner zu Grunde, die als rationalistisches Vertrauen interpretiert werden können (Kydd 2005, S. 7–11).³³

Insgesamt lässt sich festhalten, dass rationalistisches Vertrauen in der einschlägigen Literatur oftmals implizit mitgedacht, aber kaum explizit theoretisiert und analysiert wird. Eigentlich stellen in dieser Hinsicht nur die Arbeiten von Kydd eine Ausnahme dar. Und selbst Kydd legt seinen Überlegungen keine strengen Rationalitätsannahmen zu Grunde, sondern wählt eine weichere, psychologisierte Rationalismusvariante. Ansonsten gilt, dass Vertrauen in der rationalistischen Kooperationstheorie informationsbasierte und kurzfristige Erwartungssicherheit ermöglicht. Auf diesem Weg findet zwar eine indirekte Beschäftigung mit dem Vertrauensphänomen statt, allerdings bringt das Konzept nichts wirklich Neues für die Analyse internationaler Politik. Zu dieser Schlussfolgerung kommt auch Mercer: „If trust depends on external evidence, transparency, iteration, or incentives, then trust adds nothing to the explanation“ (Mercer 2005, S. 95).³⁴

2.5.2 Vertrauen als Aufhebung von Ungewissheit in den IB

Vertrauen im Sinne der Aufhebung von Ungewissheit scheint in der internationalen Politik auf den ersten Blick ein seltenes Gut zu sein. Gleichwohl zeigt ein zweiter Blick, dass es in unterschiedlichen Forschungszusammenhängen entweder implizit vorausgesetzt oder explizit thematisiert wird. Insgesamt identifizieren wir mehrere Bereiche in den IB, die sich auf die eine oder andere Art und Weise mit aufhebungsbasierendem Vertrauen auseinandersetzen: die Forschung zu internationaler Gemeinschaftsbildung, die psychologisch fundierte Außenpolitikforschung, die Versöhnungsforschung sowie jüngere Forschungsansätze zu Respekt und Freundschaft. Booth und Wheeler (2008) gehören zu jenen Autoren, die sich bislang am intensivsten mit aufhebungsbasierendem Vertrauen in der internationalen Politik auseinandergesetzt haben.³⁵ In ihrem konzeptionell starken Buch

³² Dies gilt vor allem, wenn Defektion des Interaktionspartners einen überproportional großen Schaden mit sich bringt.

³³ Kydds (2005) Studien sind eine der wenigen empirischen Beiträge, die das Konzept des rationalistischen Vertrauens explizit empirisch verwenden, siehe aber auch Alex Gillespie (2012).

³⁴ Siehe auch Rathbuns (2009) Kritik am rationalistischen Vertrauenskonzept.

³⁵ Neben Booth und Wheeler hat auch Hoffman (2002, 2006, 2007) einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Vertrauensforschung in den IB geleistet, der vor allem im Hinblick auf konzeptionelle Überlegungen und auf die

beschreiben sie Ungewissheit unter anarchischen Bedingungen als Konstante, der durch gemeinsame Informationspolitik und robuste Kontrollmechanismen nicht beizukommen sei. Vielmehr lasse sich die Logik des Sicherheitsdilemmas dauerhaft nur durch Vertrauen überwinden. Hier nähern sich die beiden Autoren unserem Idealtyp von Vertrauen an und fokussieren sein extra-rationales Element, indem sie Empathie, emotionale Bindung und integriertes Verhalten als zentrale Eigenschaften von Vertrauensbeziehungen herausstellen. Die Bildung eines Vertrauens, das geeignet ist, das Sicherheitsdilemma zu überwinden, beginne mit einem „*leap in the dark*“ (Booth und Wheeler 2008, S. 234; Wheeler 2010). Dieser „Sprung ins Dunkle“ wiederum wird von den beiden Autoren als kostspieliges Signal im Sinne Kydds begriffen. Er beschreibe einen subjektiv riskanten „frame-breaking conciliatory move“ und helfe, den Interaktionspartner von der eigenen kooperativen Absicht zu überzeugen (Wheeler 2010, 326, Fn. 19). Ohne eine solche riskante Vorleistung lassen sich Dilemmasituationen nach Überzeugung von Booth und Wheeler nicht durchbrechen. Als weitere Bedingungen für erfolgreiche Vertrauensbildung nennen die beiden Autoren eine wechselseitige Sensibilität für die fatalen Dynamiken des Sicherheitsdilemmas und die Entwicklung langfristiger gemeinsamer Interessen und geteilter Werte auf transnationaler Ebene (Booth und Wheeler 2008, S. 234).

Vor dem Hintergrund ihres Vertrauenskonzepts kritisieren Booth und Wheeler (2008, S. 155) Kydds rationalistische Beschreibung von Vertrauensbildungsprozessen, die das Ende des Kalten Krieges einleiteten: Kydd sehe nur kostspielige Signale, wo in Wirklichkeit schon Vertrauen geherrscht habe, da er die bereits erfolgte emotionale Annäherung und Bindung der Staatschefs in seinem rationalistischen Modell nicht greifen könne. Problematisch an dieser Kritik bleibt allerdings, dass Booth und Wheeler keine strukturierten und belastbaren Indikatoren für Vertrauen angeben. Vielmehr verlassen sich die Autoren auf ihre eigene Interpretation von Handlungen und Aussagen der Akteure. Ohne valide und reliable Indikatoren lassen sich vertrauensbildende kostspielige

Operationalisierung von Vertrauensbeziehungen bedeutsam ist. Seine theoretischen Überlegungen zu Vertrauensbildungsprozessen, die er auch in Fallstudien zum institutionellen Design der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und zur Wasserverteilung zwischen Israel, Jordanien und den palästinensischen Gebieten empirisch überprüft, wirken allerdings konfus. Entscheidend für die Überwindung von Misstrauen und dem Aufbau von Vertrauen sind nach Hoffmann internationale Institutionen. Sie hätten das Potential, Unsicherheiten soweit abzumildern, dass Raum für Vertrauensverhältnisse entsteht. Allerdings bleibt das Verhältnis von Institutionen und Vertrauen ungeklärt. Manche Passagen, vor allem solche in seinem Buch, lesen sich so, als ob Institutionen Kontrollmechanismen etablieren und diese Kontrollmechanismen eine notwendige Voraussetzung für Vertrauen sind. Vertrauen droht damit über die Hintertür von Institutionen wieder seine ontologische Eigenständigkeit zu verlieren, da funktionierende Beziehungen im Letzten auf Kontrolle beruhen.

Signale jedoch nicht von genuinen Vertrauenshandlungen unterscheiden. Beobachtet man das bloße Handeln der Akteure scheinen beide Interpretationen zulässig.

Trotz dieser methodologischen Schwäche können die Fallstudien zu den Oslo-Verhandlungen (Booth und Wheeler 2008, S. 245–251), zur Annäherung zwischen Indien und Pakistan (Wheeler 2010) und zur Überwindung des nuklearen Rüstungswettlaufs zwischen Argentinien und Brasilien durch die Institutionalisierung eines effektiven bilateralen Verifikationsregimes (Wheeler 2009) als Plausibilitätsproben für die Notwendigkeit von Vertrauen für die Überwindung des Sicherheitsdilemmas dienen. Sie legen darüber hinaus nahe, dass der sprichwörtliche Sprung ins Dunkle selbst unter widrigen Bedingungen Vertrauensbildungsprozesse in Gang setzen kann. Wobei die drei Fallstudien – und hier vor allem die Untersuchung zum Oslo-Prozess – auch deutlich machen, dass dieser Sprung scheitern kann. Schließlich bleibt strittig, ob das Vertrauenswagnis in den drei Fällen tatsächlich zu robustem Vertrauen zwischen den Akteuren geführt hat. So wendet Torsten Michel (2012, S. 9) ein, dass der Aufbau intrusiver Kontrollmechanismen zur Beendigung der argentinisch-brasilianischen Rüstungs rivalität eher für weniger Misstrauen als für mehr Vertrauen spreche. Ähnliches ließe sich mit Blick auf den Oslo-Prozess und die indisch-pakistanische Annäherung sagen. Umgekehrt kann aber mit Booth und Wheeler argumentiert werden, dass die Akzeptanz von Verifikationsrechten die Preisgabe sensibler Informationen impliziere und in diesem Sinne ein erhebliches sicherheitspolitisches Wagnis darstelle, welches vertrauensvolle Partner voraussetze (siehe auch die Position der Sowjetunion zu Verifikation als Form legitimierter Spionage (Kokoyev und Androsov 1990)).

Weitere Arbeiten, die zwischenstaatliches Vertrauen und Gemeinschaftsbildung in Zusammenhang bringen, knüpfen an sozialpsychologische Forschungen zu in-group-Dynamiken an. So kann nach Alexander Wendt langanhaltende Kooperation zur Herausbildung kollektiver Identitäten führen, wie das Beispiel der westeuropäischen Integration zeige. Solche Identitäten gingen mit einem starken Wir-Gefühl einher. Auf dessen Grundlage würden Akteure immer wieder füreinander eintreten, ohne dass dies für sie selbst mit einem unmittelbaren Vorteil verbunden wäre. Allerdings seien Staaten hierzu nur bereit, wenn sie nicht fürchten müssten, von anderen Gruppenmitgliedern in Schwächephasen übervorteilt zu werden (Wendt 1999, S. 357–363). In diesem Sinne setzt kollektive Identität Vertrauensbildung voraus und geht mit Vertrauen einher. Wendt zufolge zeichnen sich erfolgreiche Integration und Gemeinschaftsbildung also dadurch aus, dass die

Gruppenmitglieder voneinander Solidarität erwarten, ohne dass sie zuverlässig von außen erzwungen oder motiviert werden könnte:

„External constraints may play a role in initiating the building of trust, but collective identity implies giving over to the Other at least some responsibility for the care of the Self, and that generally requires [...] a belief that the Other will constrain itself in the demands it makes on the self“ (Wendt 1999, 359, Hervorh. dort).

Gruppenidentität und Vertrauen werden auch in den Untersuchungen zu internationalen Sicherheitsgemeinschaften verknüpft.³⁶ Für Sicherheitsgemeinschaften sind generalisierte Erwartungen friedlicher Konfliktbeilegung unter den Mitgliedern charakteristisch. Diese Erwartung wird von einer starken, kollektiven Identität getragen (Adler und Barnett 1998a, S. 45–48). Vertrauen wiederum erscheint als Überzeugung, dass sich andere Staaten in einer komplexen Welt aus innerem Antrieb bei der Bearbeitung von Interessengegensätzen an gemeinsamen Werten und Normen orientieren werden. Es bildet sich ähnlich wie bei Wendt in langfristigen Lernprozessen heraus, in deren Verlauf sich eine situationale, an strategischen Kalkülen ausgerichtete Orientierung der Akteure in eine dispositionale Orientierung verändert, die auf moralische Integrität und eine geteilte Weltdeutung setzt. Aus dieser Perspektive wird die rationalistische Konzeptualisierung von Vertrauen also nicht pauschal verworfen, sondern perspektiviert.³⁷ Aufhebungsbasiertes Vertrauen steht am Ende eines weitgehend durch kalkulative Logik geprägten Annäherungsprozesses. Demnach kann anhaltende Kooperation zwischen egoistischen Nutzenmaximierern Konsequenzen für eben diese Nutzenmaximierer haben, indem sie zur Ausbildung kollektiver Identitäten führt. Aus dieser Sicht spielen internationale Institutionen zwar bei der Vertrauensbildung durchaus eine wichtige Rolle, indem sie Erwartungen durch Regelsetzung und Regelüberwachung in interdependenten Beziehungen stabilisieren. Ihre Bedeutung sinkt aber in dem Maße, in dem sich eine robuste Sicherheitsgemeinschaft etabliert hat: „States no longer rely on concrete international organizations to maintain trust but do so through knowledge and beliefs about the other“ (Adler und Barnett 1998a, S. 46). Hinsichtlich seines empirischen Ertrags bleibt das Programm zu Sicherheitsgemeinschaften leider weit hinter seinen fundierten theoretischen Erwartungen zurück. Wenn überhaupt, dann wird Vertrauen in den Fallanalysen als peripherer Faktor

³⁶ Vgl. Adler (1997), Adler und Barnett (1998a, 1998b), Barnett und Adler (1998), Bengtsson (2000), Kacowicz et al. (2000), Kupchan (2010), Väyrynen (2000).

³⁷ Siehe auch das Modell zu Vertrauensbildung von Roy J. Lewicki und Barbara B. Bunker (1995).

erwähnt, dessen genaue kausale Rolle nicht näher untersucht wird. Dies gilt auch für spätere Fallanalysen (Kacowicz 2000; Adler und Greve 2009; Flesmes 2003; Jones 2008).

Da sich bis heute Sicherheitsgemeinschaften meist zwischen Demokratien entwickeln, vermutet die konstruktivistische Forschung zum demokratischen Frieden einen Nexus zwischen demokratischer Gemeinschaft und zwischenstaatlichem Vertrauen (Müller und Wolff 2006; Risse-Kappen 1995). Allerdings erscheint Vertrauen hier weniger als Ergebnis langfristiger Lern- und Sozialisationsprozesse, sondern entsteht unmittelbar auf der Grundlage geteilter Werte und Normen. Demnach erkennen sich Demokratien aufgrund ihrer ähnlichen innenpolitischen Strukturen als Demokratien und wissen, dass gewählte Regierungen ihre Gesellschaften niemals von der Notwendigkeit eines Krieges gegen eine andere Demokratie würden überzeugen können. Gewalt sei allenfalls zur Verteidigung oder Verbreitung demokratischer Werte zulässig und deshalb seien Kriege zwischen Demokratien ausgeschlossen.

In der psychologisch fundierten Außenpolitikanalyse lassen sich weitere Anknüpfungspunkte für ein aufhebungsbasiertes Vertrauenskonzept finden. So setzt Rathbun (2011a, 2011b, 2012a) die generalisierte Vertrauensdisposition von außenpolitisch Verantwortlichen mit ihren Weltbildern und Überzeugungen in Beziehung. Bemerkenswert ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass sich die Ausprägung von Vertrauensdispositionen relativ präzise über die Nähe zu realistischen oder konstruktivistischen Theoremen bestimmen lässt. So zeigt die Analyse der außenpolitischen Einstellungen von Republikanern und Demokraten im amerikanischen Kongress nach 1945, dass bei Republikanern Misstrauen, Unilateralismus und Realismus zusammengingen, während Demokraten ihre eher kooperative und vertrauensvolle Orientierung mit einer intuitiven Neigung zu konstruktivistischen Argumenten verbanden. Diese Unterschiede in der generellen Vertrauensneigung spiegeln sich nach Rathbun (2012a, S. 329) in Präferenzen über das Design internationaler Institutionen wider. Während Akteure mit einer ausgeprägten generalisierten Vertrauensdisposition sich eher für prinzipienorientierte, multilaterale Designs einsetzen, die der Logik diffuser Reziprozitätsspiele folgten, wollten Akteure mit geringer Vertrauensdisposition nur Institutionen mit schwachen Verbindlichkeiten akzeptieren, die ihnen starke Vetomöglichkeiten einräumten und auf spezifischer Reziprozität basierten.³⁸

³⁸ Nach Robert O. Keohane (1986, S. 21) verwandelt sich spezifische Reziprozität im Zuge erfolgreicher Zusammenarbeit in diffuse Reziprozität. Staaten erwarten dann nicht mehr unmittelbare Gegenleistungen, sondern halten sich an Vereinbarungen und gemeinsame Regeln, weil sie davon ausgehen, dass auch andere Staaten in vergleichbaren Situationen eben diese Vereinbarungen und Regeln respektieren werden, und

Entsprechend waren Demokraten unter identischen, internationalen Rahmenbedingungen auch eher bereit für die NATO in bündnispolitische Vorleistung zu treten als die Republikaner, die fürchteten, dass die Europäer ein amerikanisches Engagement opportunistisch ausnutzen und ihre eigenen Verteidigungsanstrengungen reduzieren würden. Auf Basis weiterer Fallbeispiele zur Gründung des Völkerbunds und der UNO argumentiert Rathbun, dass internationale Institutionen nicht Ausdruck fehlenden Vertrauens seien, wie anderswo behauptet (Koremenos et al. 2001, S. 766). Vielmehr setzen sie immer wieder ein erhebliches Maß an Vertrauen voraus (vgl. auch Jönssen 1993) für die Rolle von kommunikativ hergestelltem Vertrauen bei der Errichtung internationaler Regime.³⁹

Weitere Anknüpfungspunkte für eine anspruchsvolle Vertrauensforschung finden sich in Arbeiten zu *images* in der Außenpolitik.⁴⁰ Beispielweise kann Vertrauen als konstitutives Element des *ally image* verstanden werden. Empirische Forschungen bestätigen den Zusammenhang zwischen Aktivierung des *ally image* und Vertrauensbildung. So ergeben Rezarta Bilalis (2010, S. 287) Feldexperimente starke Korrelationen zwischen der Aktivierung des *ally images* und Vertrauen, Respekt, und Bewunderung. Wichtig ist dabei, dass auch in der *image*-Forschung unsere konzeptionelle Unterscheidung besteht: Kooperative Erwartung können auf dem Wissen über Egoismus oder Integrität des Anderen basieren (Herrmann et al. 1997, S. 408–411).

Darüber hinaus wird aufhebungsbasiertes Vertrauen in der Versöhnungsforschung thematisiert. Die Rolle von Vertrauen wird dabei meist mit Hilfe von Feldexperimenten in Nachkriegsgesellschaften untersucht. So können Arie Nadler und Ido Liviatan (Nadler und Liviatan 2006, S. 467–469) zeigen, dass im Rahmen israelisch-palästinensischer Friedensprojekte Äußerungen gegenseitiger Empathie und Schuldeingeständnisse nur dann zu erhöhter Versöhnungsbereitschaft führen, wenn sich die verfeindeten Gruppen ein Mindestmaß an Vertrauen entgegenbringen. Die Analyse nordirländischer Versöhnungsprojekte von Miles Hewstone et al. (2008) ergibt, dass unkooperatives Verhalten innerhalb der eigenen in-group zu drastischeren Vertrauensbrüchen führt, als dies für in-group-out-group-Interaktionen der Fall ist. In einer weiteren Studie belegen sie zudem

deshalb Kosten wie Nutzen der regelorientierten Zusammenarbeit gleichmäßig verteilt sind. In diesem Sinne stehen Vertrauen und diffuse Reziprozität in einem unmittelbaren Zusammenhang, wobei wir mit Rathbun übereinstimmen und Vertrauen als Grundlage für diffuse Reziprozitätserwartungen betrachten.

³⁹ Einzelne Studien haben auch versucht, generalisiertes Vertrauen und damit verbundene Perzeptionen von Fremdstaaten auf Bevölkerungsebene zu erheben (Brewer et al. 2004).

⁴⁰ Siehe Alexander et al. (1999), Brewer und Alexander (2002), Herrmann (1988), Herrmann (2003), Herrmann et al. (1997).

den durch die *inter-group-contact*-Hypothese postulierten Zusammenhang zwischen regelmäßiger Interaktion und Vertrauensbildung (für eine Zusammenfassung dieser Forschungen siehe Hewstone et al. (2008)). Hieran anlehnend betonen John F. Dovidio et al. (2008, S. 233–236) den Zusammenhang zwischen regelmäßiger kooperativer Interaktion, den dadurch aktivierten Prozess der Re kategorisierung ehemals antagonistischer Gruppenidentitäten zu einer neuen und gruppenübergreifenden „Superidentität“ und der Bildung von Vertrauen.⁴¹ Eher abstrahierend theoretisiert Reuben M. Baron (2008, S. 287) die kausale Verortung von Vertrauen in Versöhnungsprozessen, und kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass ein Mindestmaß an Vertrauen als Bedingung für Versöhnung, gesteigertes Vertrauen als Folge von Versöhnung begriffen werden kann. Einen anderen Ansatz folgen Trudy Govier und Wilhelm Verwoerd (2002, S. 185–186). Für sie ist eine kausalanalytische Trennung von Vertrauensbildung und Versöhnung unzulässig, vielmehr ist Versöhnung nichts anderes als Vertrauensbildung. Die Autoren zeigen dabei, dass die in der Literatur gängigen Konzeptionen und Zieldefinitionen von Versöhnung (*Friendship, Cooperation, Peaceful Coexistence*) allesamt, entweder implizit oder explizit, Vertrauensbildung als notwendigen Bestandteil begreifen.

Schließlich wollen wir noch auf zwei jüngere Forschungsprogramme hinweisen, in denen aufhebungsorientierte Varianten von Vertrauen eine Rolle spielen. In der Forschung zu internationalen Freundschaften ist Vertrauen ein zentrales Konzept, dem das Potential zugesprochen wird, positive Kooperationsspiralen zu aktivieren und aufrecht zu halten. Allerdings zeigen die vorliegenden Veröffentlichungen auch, dass noch Uneinigkeit über die Ontologie zwischenstaatlicher Freundschaftsbeziehungen herrscht und damit wiederum unklar ist, ob zwischenstaatliches Vertrauen notwendige Bedingung, integraler Bestandteil oder das Resultat von Freundschaft zwischen Staaten darstellt (für einen Überblick zu Freundschaft in den internationalen Beziehungen siehe Andrea Oelsner und Antoine Vion (2011)). Gegenteiliges gilt für die Forschungen zu Respekt als Determinante stabiler zwischenstaatlicher Kooperation (Wolf 2008, 2011, S. 122–123). Kausaltheoretisch wird hier Vertrauen eine explizite intervenierende Rolle zugeschrieben: Respekt stellt eine notwendige Bedingung für die Entstehung von Vertrauen dar, wobei Vertrauen wiederum robuste Kooperation im anarchischen Umfeld ermöglicht. Wenn Respekt sicherlich als notwendige, jedoch nicht als hinreichende Bedingung für

⁴¹ Siehe Nadler und Saguy (2004), Raudsepp und Wagner (2012), Rubini und Palmonari (2012).

Vertrauen verstanden werden kann, so muss Reinhard Wolfs Plädoyer für eine tiefergehende Auseinandersetzung mit Respekt als indirektes Plädoyer für die Beschäftigung mit weiteren Entstehungsbedingungen zwischenstaatlichen Vertrauens verstanden werden.

Zusammenfassend lässt sich festhalten, dass Vertrauen, verstanden als Aufhebung von Ungewissheit, in unterschiedlichen Bereichen der IB thematisiert wird. Die Hauptliteratur lässt sich dabei auf einen begrenzten Autorenstamm eingrenzen, wobei sich in hochrangigen Journals bislang nur wenige Beiträge zu aufhebungsbasiertem Vertrauen finden lassen. Eine tiefergehende ontologische Auseinandersetzung mit der Frage, was zwischenstaatliches Vertrauen ist, was es sein kann und zwischen wem es sich herausbildet, ist noch Mangelware. Empirische Analysen liegen kaum vor. Dies überrascht nicht zuletzt deshalb, als Vertrauen in Theorie und Praxis immer wieder eine herausragende Bedeutung für ein friedliches soziales Miteinander zugesprochen wird. Wir führen daher das Fehlen fundierter Vertrauensforschung weniger auf eine allgemeine Vertrauensskepsis innerhalb der wissenschaftlichen Community zurück, sondern sehen vielmehr die anspruchsvolle Konzeptualisierung und den erschwerten empirischen Zugang zu Vertrauen als Hauptgrund hierfür. Was nach wie vor fehlt, sind überzeugende Indikatoren für Vertrauen zwischen Staaten.⁴²

2.6 Der empirische Zugang zu Vertrauen als Aufhebung

Generell spricht einiges dafür, dass rationalistische Vertrauensontologien mit unzulässigen Annahmen arbeiten und weitverbreiteten Intuitionen dessen, was Vertrauen ausmacht, nicht gerecht werden. Ob es allerdings Vertrauen, verstanden als Aufhebung von Ungewissheit, tatsächlich in der generell als vertrauensfeindlich eingeschätzten internationalen Politik gibt, ist damit noch lange nicht gesagt. Eine plausible theoretische Annahme ersetzt keinen empirischen Nachweis. Ein solcher Nachweis von Vertrauen ist nicht zuletzt deswegen so schwierig, weil sich Vertrauen als Einstellung nicht unmittelbar beobachten lässt. Wendt (Wendt 1999, S. 360) spricht in diesem Zusammenhang auch von unserer „inability to read others’ minds“. Wenn überhaupt, dann sind solche nicht beobachtbaren Handlungsdispositionen über den Umweg von Verhaltensauffälligkeiten erfassbar (Deitelhoff und Müller 2005; Hasenclever 2001). So könnte beispielsweise eine

⁴² Für Experimentalstudien gilt diese Feststellung freilich nicht. Hier werden die etablierten Fragebogen-Items aus der Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie für die Erfassung von Vertrauenserwartungen verwendet.

ungewöhnlich hohe Kooperationsdichte ein Hinweis auf Vertrauen sein, wenn sich die Qualität der Zusammenarbeit anders nicht erklären ließe. Solche kontrafaktischen Szenarien bleiben aber in den Sozialwissenschaften störanfällig, da wir gute Gründe zu der Annahme haben, dass konkrete Handlungsentscheidungen in aller Regel überdeterminiert sind und sich durchaus aus unterschiedlichen metatheoretischen Perspektiven interpretieren lassen (Hanrieder 2008, S. 176). Deshalb führt kein Weg daran vorbei, zunächst zu klären, wer in den internationalen Beziehungen sinnvollerweise als Subjekt von Vertrauen identifiziert werden kann, um sich dann zu überlegen, was geeignete Indikatoren sein könnten, um Vertrauen in den internationalen Beziehungen in nachvollziehbarer Art und Weise anzuzeigen.

2.6.1 Wer vertraut wem?

Innerhalb der Forschung zu Vertrauen zwischen Organisationen wird generell davon ausgegangen, dass es sich sowohl beim Vertrauensgeber als auch beim Vertrauensnehmer um individuelle oder kollektive Akteure handeln kann (Currall und Inkpen 2006, S. 237; Fulmer und Glefand 2012, S. 1170; Janowicz und Noorderhaven 2006; Sydow 2006).⁴³ Entsprechend lassen sich in der Literatur vier Arten von Vertrauen unterscheiden: Vertrauen zwischen Individuen (interpersonales Vertrauen), gruppenspezifisches Vertrauen von Individuen, personenspezifisches Vertrauen von Gruppen und Vertrauen zwischen Gruppen (interorganisationelles Vertrauen).

Tabelle 2.2: Mögliche Akteurskonstellationen

Vertrauensnehmer Vertrauensgeber	Individuum	Kollektiv
Individuum	Vertrauen zwischen Individuen	Gruppenspezifisches Vertrauen von Individuen
Kollektiv	Personenspezifisches Vertrauen von Gruppen	Vertrauen zwischen Gruppen

⁴³ Siehe eine ähnliche Akteurskonzeption bei Govier und Verwoerd (2002, S. 187) und Bart Nooteboom (2006).

Interpersonales Vertrauen gilt als die Grundform des Vertrauens (Janowicz und Noorderhaven 2006, S. 270; Offe 2001, S. 253; Zaheer et al. 1998, S. 143). Vertrauensvolle Personen erwarten von ihren Partnern, dass sie willens und fähig sind, riskante Vorleistungen angemessen zu erwidern. Vertrauen in der internationalen Politik bedeutet dann zunächst und zuerst, dass die außenpolitisch Verantwortlichen den Zusagen ihrer Partner Glauben schenken: Ihren Worten werden Taten folgen, und diese Taten werden geeignet sein, die Vereinbarungen so zu verwirklichen, dass die Interessen der Partner angemessen berücksichtigt werden. In diesem Sinne spricht einiges dafür, dass sich François Mitterrand und Helmut Kohl als aufrichtige und durchsetzungsstarke Politiker schätzten. Bei allen inhaltlichen Gegensätzen gingen sie davon aus, dass der andere sie nicht bewusst hintergehen würde. In ähnlicher Weise müssen sich Menachem Begin und Anwar Sadat oder Raúl Alfonsín und José Sarnay aufeinander verlassen haben, als sie sich daran machten, die ägyptische-israelischen bzw. die argentinisch-brasilianischen Beziehungen von Konfrontation auf Kooperation umzustellen. Dabei blendeten sie nicht nur die Möglichkeit opportunistischen Verhaltens ihrer Partner aus und unterstellten ihnen ein starkes Interesse an dauerhafter Kooperation, sondern sie gingen auch davon aus, dass sie ihre Verabredungen innenpolitisch durchsetzen konnten.⁴⁴

Gruppenspezifisches Vertrauen von Individuen liegt vor, wenn sich Akteure ohne größere Not auf Fremde verlassen. Letztere werden dabei als Mitglieder vertrauenswürdiger Bevölkerungsgruppen oder als Repräsentanten vertrauenswürdiger Organisationen wahrgenommen. Im ersten Fall sprechen Carl Offe (2001, S. 271) und Jörg Sydow (2006, S. 385) von kategorialen Vertrauen. Es geht dann nicht darum, dass der Vertrauensgeber den Vertrauensnehmer persönlich kennt und vertraut, sondern dass er ihn als Angehörigen einer sozialen Kategorie erkennt und vertraut – also beispielsweise als Vertreter einer Ethnie, Religion oder auch Partei, der vom Vertrauensgeber insgesamt Zuverlässigkeit und Wohlwollen gegenüber den eigenen Interessen unterstellt wird.⁴⁵ So zeigen beispielsweise Umfragen des Eurobarometers, dass Schweden, Niederländer, Luxemburger und

⁴⁴ Wenn Vertrauen ausschließlich auf einer solchen interindividuellen Ebene stattfindet, dann müsste zwischenstaatliches Vertrauen zum einen mit wechselnden Politiker-Generationen variieren. Zum anderen müsste letztendlich bezweifelt werden, ob langfristiges Vertrauen zwischen Staaten überhaupt möglich ist, da Vertrauensgeber immer damit rechnen müssen, dass der als vertrauenswürdig eingeschätzte Interaktionspartner sein Amt verliert und somit die Basis der Vertrauensbeziehung wegfällt. Vertrauen, welches ganzen Gruppen entgegengebracht wird, könnte hingegen lange Vertrauenshorizonte erklären. Andere Ansätze, die von einer diskursiven Verankerung von Vertrauenserwartungen ausgehen sind dazu ebenso fähig, wenn davon ausgegangen wird, dass ein solcher Diskurs über mehrere Generationen vererbt wird.

⁴⁵ Wie oben ausgeführt wurde, können Gruppenkategorisierungen als Basis für Aufhebungsprozesse betrachtet werden. Besonders stark ist deshalb eine gruppenspezifische Vertrauenserwartung, wenn die

Dänen innerhalb der EU als besonders vertrauenswürdig eingeschätzt werden, während Italienern und Griechen deutlich skeptischer begegnet wird (Delhey 2004, S. 24).⁴⁶ Im zweiten Fall von gruppenspezifischem Vertrauen ist der Begriff des Systemvertrauens einschlägig (Giddens 1990; Luhmann 2009; Möllering 2006b). Jetzt geht es um Vertrauen in das Funktionieren von Organisationen wie das Polizei- oder Rechtswesen. Hier kann beispielsweise die Zuverlässigkeit der Polizei von den Bürgern und Bürgerinnen unterschiedlich eingeschätzt werden. Entsprechend stark oder schwach ist dann auch die Erwartung in das vertrauenswürdige Handeln von Polizisten ausgeprägt (Janowicz und Noorderhaven 2006, S. 268; Nooteboom 2006, S. 259; Sydow 2006, S. 382).⁴⁷

Wie Akbar Zaheer, Bill McEvily und Vincenzo Perrone (1998, S. 141) feststellen, können kollektive Akteure genauso wenig vertrauen, wie sie denken oder fühlen können: „It is individuals as members of organizations, rather than the organizations themselves, who trust“. Gleichwohl lassen sich zwischen kollektiven Akteuren mehr oder weniger vertrauensvolle Beziehungen unterscheiden (Bachmann und Inkpen 2011; Möllering 2006c; Sydow 2006). Diese Beziehungen werden durch Diskurse konstituiert, in denen kollektive Wahrnehmungen in Form von gruppenspezifischen Freund- und Feindbildern transportiert werden und die für die Kooperationsbereitschaft der zuständigen Entscheidungsträger relevant sind (Koeszegi 2004, S. 647–648; Zaheer et al. 1998, S. 143).⁴⁸ Empirisch lässt sich diese Art des Vertrauens auf unterschiedliche Art und Weise abgreifen. Einen Weg stellen wiederum Umfragen dar, in denen gezeigt werden kann, dass eine Mehrheit von Gruppenmitgliedern einer anderen Staatsbevölkerung vertraut. So wird in Deutschland und Frankreich von Meinungsforschungsinstituten wie Infratest Dimap, dem Pew Research Center oder Sofres regelmäßig erhoben, welchem anderen Land die Bürger

Gruppe als Teil der eigenen Identitätsgruppe interpretiert wird (Lewicki und Bunker 1995; Uslaner 2002, S. 28).

⁴⁶ Eine Studie von Bill McEvily et al. (2006) zeigt übrigens, dass Individuen Vertrauenserfahrungen mit Einzelmitgliedern einer Gruppe auf die gesamte Gruppe verallgemeinern.

⁴⁷ Während also einzelnen Polizisten im Fall von interaktions-basiertem Vertrauen deshalb vertraut wird, weil sie persönlich bekannt sind, begegnet ihnen der Vertrauensgeber im Fall von kategorien-basiertem oder institutionen-basiertem Vertrauen als Repräsentant einer vertrauenswürdigen Gruppe oder Organisation. In den letzten beiden Fällen ist die Gruppe oder Organisation das Objekt des Vertrauens (Möllering 2006c, S. 355) und trägt das Vertrauen in ihre Repräsentanten, die für den Vertrauensgeber durchaus Fremde bleiben können (Bachmann und Inkpen 2011, S. 282).

⁴⁸ In dem Augenblick, in dem allerdings kollektiven Akteuren Interessen unterstellt werden, wie dies gerade in den Internationalen Beziehungen oft der Fall ist, kann es auch Sinn machen, vom Vertrauen kollektiver Akteure zu sprechen. Dann gilt: “An organization’s trust is signified by a decision to engage in action that allows its fate to be determined by another person, group or organization” (Currall und Inkpen 2006, S. 236). Ähnlich argumentieren Nooteboom (2006, S. 249) und Sydow (2006, S. 381).

und Bürgerinnen vertrauen. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen sehr gut abschneiden, während die deutsch-chinesischen oder die französisch-russischen Beziehungen deutlich schlechtere Werte erhalten. Ein anderes Verfahren zur Erfassung interkollektiver Vertrauensbeziehungen stellt die Befragung sogenannter *boundary spanners* („Grenzgänger“) dar (Sydow 2006, S. 381; Zaheer und Harris 2006, S. 185). Hierbei handelt es sich um Personen mit guten Kontakten zu einer fremden Gruppe, deren Meinung in der eigenen Gruppe Gewicht hat bzw. als Substitut für die Gruppenerwartung betrachtet werden kann. Deshalb wird in der Literatur erwartet, dass *boundary spanners* über Vertrauensbeziehungen zwischen Gruppen zuverlässig Auskunft geben können.

Die vierte Vertrauensform betrifft wieder die Beziehungen zwischen kollektiven und individuellen Akteuren. Allerdings haben wir es jetzt mit Gruppen als Vertrauensgebern und Individuen als Vertrauensnehmern zu tun. Deshalb spielen auch bei dieser Vertrauensform Diskurse eine zentrale Rolle, in denen die Wertschätzung von Gruppen für Personen sichtbar wird. So hatten beispielsweise 87 Prozent der Deutschen im März 2012 wenig oder gar kein Vertrauen in den russischen Präsidenten Wladimir Putin (Infratest Dimap 2012).

In der Literatur zur Rolle von Vertrauen in Politik und Gesellschaft wird davon ausgegangen, dass alle vier Formen von Vertrauen für die Einschätzung konkreter Vertrauensverhältnisse relevant sind.⁴⁹ Personen setzen mehr oder weniger großes Vertrauen in andere Personen und Gruppen. Sie lassen sich dabei von ihren individuellen Wahrnehmungen und Einschätzungen leiten, die selbst wiederum nachhaltig von Diskursen und den dort transportierten kollektiven Wahrnehmungen und Einschätzungen zur Vertrauenswürdigkeit von Personen und Gruppen beeinflusst werden. Innerhalb dieses mehrdimensionalen Vertrauenssystems kommt der interpersonellen Ebene zunächst ein analytischer Primat zu (Janowicz und Noorderhaven 2006; Schweer 2012, S. 112; Zaheer et al. 1998). Das gilt vor allem für den Aufbau von Vertrauensverhältnissen in schwach institutionalisierten Kontexten (Schweer 2012, S. 112; Zaheer und Harris 2006, S. 185). Gleichzeitig zeigen Studien aber auch, dass konkretes Misstrauen zwischen Personen durch Vertrauen in Institutionen kompensiert werden kann. So lässt sich nach Möllering (2006b, 365, 373) oder Sydow (2006, S. 381) immer wieder beobachten, dass sich ein

⁴⁹Siehe auch Currall und Inkpen (2006, S. 240), Fulmer und Glefand (2012, S. 11–68), Lewis und Weigert (1985, S. 974), Schweer (2012, S. 108).

Vertrauensgeber zu einer Vertrauenshandlung entschließt, weil er überzeugt ist, dass die aus seiner Sicht wenig vertrauenswürdige Person, mit der er es unmittelbar zu tun hat, in eine vertrauenswürdige Organisation eingebunden ist, die ihre Repräsentanten hinreichend kontrolliert.

Schließlich ist davon auszugehen, dass Vertrauenskurse für die Vertrauensbereitschaft von Vertrauensgebern eine zentrale Rolle spielen. Deshalb wird Vertrauen von Möllering (2006b, S. 365) auch als *embedded agency* begriffen. Je nachdem wie stark diese Vertrauenskurse ausgeprägt sind, kann es sogar Sinn machen, kollektive Akteure so zu behandeln, als ob sie vertrauen könnten. Dies gilt vor allem für Fälle, in denen kollektive Akteure in hoch institutionalisierten Kontexten eingebunden sind, in denen Vertrauen quasi als Norm erscheint (vgl. auch Uslaner (2002, Kap. 2) für die normative Basis von Vertrauen). Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen wären ein Beispiel. Umgekehrt kann es natürlich auch sein, dass Feindseligkeiten zwischen Gruppen oder Staaten so massiv sind, dass letztere als kollektive Akteure behandelt werden können, die unter den Bedingungen eines ausgeprägten Sicherheitsdilemmas ihre mehr oder weniger rationalen Entscheidungen treffen.

2.6.2 Zwei Indikatoren für Vertrauen zwischen Staaten

Im Folgenden wollen wir eine Möglichkeit der Operationalisierung von zwischenstaatlichen Vertrauensbeziehungen skizzieren. Dabei gehen wir davon aus, dass nicht nur das Vertrauensverhältnis zwischen zwei Staaten politikfeldspezifisch variieren kann, sondern auch mögliche Indikatoren an die Eigenschaften unterschiedlicher Interaktionsfelder angepasst werden müssen. Deshalb begrenzen wir uns im Folgenden auf das Politikfeld Sicherheit. Dabei orientieren wir uns an Hoffman (2002) und Rathbun (2012a), die es bislang als Einzige versucht haben, strukturierte Indikatoren für zwischenstaatliches Vertrauen zu entwickeln. Aus akteurstheoretischer Sicht fokussieren wir Vertrauenserwartungen von individuellen Entscheidungsträgern bzw. von Gruppen von Entscheidungsträgern. Denn letztendlich stehen sie in der Verantwortung und entscheiden, ob sie dem Interaktionspartner vertrauen wollen oder ihn kontrollieren müssen.⁵⁰ Dementsprechend sehen wir die Möglichkeit, für die empirische Feststellung von Vertrauensbeziehungen

⁵⁰ Die Frage, wem dieses Vertrauen entgegengebracht wird, ist für unsere Operationalisierungsskizze unerheblich.

auf unsere konzeptionellen Überlegungen zum Komplementärverhältnis von Vertrauen, Information und Kontrolle zurückzugreifen.

Kontrollmechanismen spielen in den internationalen Beziehungen unbestreitbar eine wichtige Rolle. Selbst im Rahmen gut etablierter Sicherheitsgemeinschaften kommt es immer wieder zu Irritationen, die durch die Weiterentwicklung gemeinsamer Institutionen bearbeitet werden müssen. Dies zeigen nicht zuletzt die verschiedenen Institutionalisierungsschübe in den deutsch-französischen Beziehungen nach 1960. Ebenso gehört die Einholung von Informationen – auch über befreundete Staaten – zur täglichen Aufgabe der Politik. Gleichzeitig müssen aber Kontrolle und Informationsgewinnung nicht alles sein. Für die Analyse konkreter zwischenstaatlicher Vertrauensbeziehungen stellt sich deshalb die Frage nach dem Mischungsverhältnis von Aufhebung, Kalkül und Kontrolle hinsichtlich ihrer kooperationsermöglichenden Wirkung.

Wie viele andere Theoretiker gehen auch wir davon aus, dass sich zunehmendes Vertrauen im abnehmenden Gebrauch von Kontrollmechanismen niederschlagen sollte (Offe 2001, S. 248). Zudem unterstellen wir dem Vertrauensgeber, dass er abwägt, ob er stark genug vertraut, um auf Informationseinholung und Kontrolle verzichten zu können, oder aber ob das vorhandene Vertrauen hierfür nicht ausreicht. Mit wachsendem Vertrauen sollten Staaten somit weniger Ressourcen für Informationsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen aufbringen. Ministerielle, nachrichtendienstliche und militärische Einheiten, die sich mit spezifischen bilateralen Sicherheitsbeziehungen befassen, sollten schwächer besetzt werden. Zudem könnte angenommen werden, dass vertrauende Staaten auf die Errichtung von Kontrollmechanismen verzichten, zum Beispiel auf teure militärische Abschreckungskapazitäten, auf institutionalisierte Formen von Sicherheitskooperation bzw. auf die Möglichkeit intrusiver Verifikationsmechanismen.⁵¹ Eine solche Erfassung von Vertrauensbeziehungen kann allerdings nur unter bestimmten Bedingungen gelingen: Erstens muss sichergestellt werden, dass die bloße Möglichkeit militärischer Aggression besteht. Vertrauen muss aus objektiver Sicht ein Wagnis darstellen: Deutschland kann Frankreich sicherheitspolitisch vertrauen, aber nicht Neuseeland. Zweitens muss darauf geachtet

⁵¹ Wenn man von der Möglichkeit eines Mehr oder Weniger an Vertrauen in zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen ausgeht, stellt sich natürlich die Frage nach der Skalierung von Vertrauen und, damit verbunden, nach der Messung unterschiedlicher Vertrauensniveaus. Hier könnte argumentiert werden, dass sich unterschiedlich starkes Vertrauen in der unterschiedlich kombinierbaren Anwendung möglicher Komplementärmechanismen niederschlagen sollte. Der Aspekt der logischen und validen Skalierung soll an dieser Stelle jedoch nicht weiter ausgeführt werden.

werden, dass der Nexus zwischen Verifikation und Vertrauen in der Realität komplizierter ist, da, wie oben bereits angedeutet, die Akzeptanz von Verifikation schon ein Mindestmaß an Vertrauen voraussetzen könnte. Drittens kann von der bloßen Existenz von Verifikationsmaßnahmen nicht auf fehlendes Vertrauen geschlossen werden: Auf ihre Nutzung kommt es an. Zum Beispiel sind Deutschland und Frankreich Mitglied im Open-Skies-Verifikationsregime, jedoch nutzt keines der beiden Länder seine Überflugrechte zur Kontrolle des jeweils anderen. Zudem muss beachtet werden, dass neben den oben genannten direkt beobachtbaren Kontroll- und Informationsaktivitäten weitere, weniger direkt beobachtbare Mechanismen existieren, die positive Kooperationserwartungen entstehen lassen können (etwa Kooperation aufgrund von Reputationsorgen, starker wirtschaftlicher Interdependenzen oder Kooperation aufgrund von *audience costs*, die demokratische Entscheidungsträger zu tragen haben, wenn sie ihr Wahlversprechen über kooperatives Verhalten nicht einhalten). Es zeigt sich also, dass kontextsensible Messung unbedingt wichtig ist (Adcock und Collier 2001, S. 534). Für eine empirische Analyse empfiehlt es sich deshalb auch, solche Drittfaktoren konstant zu halten.

Da dies jedoch nicht immer möglich erscheint, schlagen wir zur Absicherung der Validität der Vertrauensmessung einen Komplementärindikator vor, der auf die Aussagen entweder von politischen Entscheidungsträgern oder aber im gesamtgesellschaftlichen Diskurs abzielt.⁵² Ein solcher zweiter Indikator ermöglicht es, durch die Analyse von verbalen und schriftlichen Aussagen Vertrauenserwartungen zu erheben. So sollten sich Vertrauenserwartungen erstens in der gegenseitigen Zusprechung bestimmter vertrauenswürdiger Eigenschaften widerspiegeln (Loyalität, Solidarität, Freundschaft, Verbundenheit).⁵³ Zweitens sollten vertrauensvolle Beziehungen durch Akteure mit eindeutigen, emotionalen Attributen versehen werden, die auf Identifikation und Verbundenheit hindeuten. Drittens sollte allein die Möglichkeit vertrauensunwürdigen Verhaltens durch den Anderen unbeachtet bleiben. Und schließlich sollte die eigene Kooperationsbereitschaft durch die vertrauensvollen Beziehungen selbst begründet werden.

⁵² Ein weiterer guter Grund für einen solchen Komplementärindikator besteht in der Möglichkeit, dass individuell existierende Vertrauenserwartungen sich aufgrund widriger struktureller Gegebenheiten nicht notwendigerweise in Handlungen niederschlagen müssen. So könnte ein tatsächlich vertrauender Entscheidungsträger etwa aufgrund der Gesetzeslage gezwungen sein, auf vertrauensvolle Handlungen zu verzichten. Für die Erfassung der individuellen Vertrauenserwartung würde ein strikt handlungsbasierter Indikator in diesem Fall ein falsch-negatives Ergebnis liefern.

⁵³ Das Problem strategischer Sprechakte und weiterer Fallstricke bei solchen Inhaltsanalysen sind immer ein Problem und müssen freilich berücksichtigt werden.

Unser Operationalisierungsvorschlag kann an dieser Stelle nur als grobe Skizze verstanden werden, die durch konkrete Messanweisungen und Regeln spezifiziert werden muss. Dabei sehen wir die Kombination der beiden Indikatoren als unerlässlich an, da nur auf diese Weise ihre jeweiligen Schwächen ausgeglichen werden können. Zudem erlaubt die kombinierte Anwendung eine Absicherung der Validität der Vertrauensmessung, wenn die Ergebnisse der Analyse von Aussagen und Kooperationsausgestaltung im vertrauentheoretisch zu erwartenden Verhältnis miteinander kovariieren. Die von uns propagierte Messstrategie stellt somit hohe Anforderungen an die benötigten Daten hinsichtlich ihrer Detailtiefe und Fülle. Eine Quantifizierung von Vertrauensindikatoren scheint deshalb noch in weiter Ferne, weshalb wir als Anwendungsgebiet solcher Indikatoren vornehmlich vergleichende Fallanalysen und Prozessanalysen sehen.

2.7 Konklusion

In dem vorliegenden Aufsatz haben wir einen Überblick zum Thema Vertrauen als Forschungsgegenstand in den Internationalen Beziehungen gegeben. Vertrauen ist ein oft bemühter Begriff – vor allem in der politischen Praxis aber zunehmend auch in der IB-Forschung. Allerdings haben sich bislang nur wenige mit der Frage auseinandergesetzt, was Vertrauen ist bzw. in der politischen Realität überhaupt sein kann. Deshalb haben wir zunächst die rationalistische und die von uns als aufhebungsbasiert benannte Vertrauensontologie diskutiert und dabei argumentiert, dass ein rationalistischer Zugang zu dem Phänomen des Vertrauens unterkomplex ist. Möchte man Vertrauen als realweltliches und ontologisch eigenständiges Phänomen begreifen, empfehlen wir die Anwendung eines aufhebungsbasierten Vertrauenskonzepts.

Wegen seiner Nähe zu etablierten Modellen der strategischen Entscheidung ist rationalistisches Vertrauen nicht mehr als alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen. Deshalb verwundert es auch nicht, wenn es sich implizit in den meisten rationalen Erklärungsmodellen zu internationaler Kooperation wiederfinden lässt. Explizit beschäftigt sich Kydd (2000b, 2005) mit zwischenstaatlichem Vertrauen aus rationalistischer Perspektive. Erste Studien, die versuchen ein explizit aufhebungsbasiertes Konzept von Vertrauen für die Analyse internationaler Politik zu entwickeln, liegen zwar vor. Während ihre konzeptionellen Leistungen zwar durchaus überzeugen können, tragen die empirischen Befunde bislang noch nicht die hohen theoretischen Erwartungen. Deshalb schlagen wir zum einen

akteurstheoretische Fundierungen für zwischenstaatliches Vertrauen vor, zum anderen bieten wir einen Ansatz zur Operationalisierung von Vertrauen.

Abschließend wollen wir noch auf eine, aus vertrauensskeptischer Perspektive oftmals angebrachte Frage über die mögliche *dark side* von Vertrauen hinweisen: Experimentelle Studien zeigen, dass die Bildung starker Vertrauensbeziehungen verheerende in-group-out-group-Dynamiken auslösen können. In-Group-Vertrauen zwischen Staaten kann dann leicht mit Misstrauen gegenüber anderen Staaten einhergehen und eine erhöhte Bereitschaft hervorrufen, Vertretern der out-group Schaden zuzufügen (Ostrom 2003). In diesem Sinne muss ein bedingungsloser Vertrauensoptimismus sicherlich relativiert und damit verbunden die Frage gestellt werden, wie Vertrauensbildung so gestaltet werden kann, dass destruktive und misstrauensgenerierende Wirkungen gegenüber Dritten vermieden werden können.

3 When Less is More: Constructing a Parsimonious Concept of Interstate Peace for Quantitative Analysis

Lukas Kasten

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Peace researchers have recently started to develop datasets that allow distinguishing between different levels of interstate peace. In this article, I first argue that existing conceptualizations and measurements suffer—to varying degrees—from two major specification problems: on the one hand, they face problems of what I call “ontological underload,” as they do not include all essential constitutive dimensions. On the other hand, they face problems of “ontological overload,” as they integrate factors as endogenous dimensions that should better be understood as exogenous causes of different levels of peace. I propose a new concept P^* that avoids both problems. P^* is based on a profound and parsimonious ontology that allows for straightforward theory formulation and empirical analysis. It incorporates three dimensions—behavior, expectations, and duration/stability—that allow us to differentiate between different levels of interstate peace. In this article, I also discuss how P^* can be operationalized for a dataset of 126 dyads.¹

Keywords: interstate peace, conceptualization, measurement, parsimony

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3.1 Introduction

I propose a concept of interstate peace for quantitative analysis that is based on the common premise that peace is more than just the absence of war. This implies not only the idea of positive peace which is, despite the absence of violence, characterized by the presence of certain positive attributes.² It also suggests that peace is a matter of degree and that we can think of more and less peaceful relations: States may not fight any war and, in this sense, be in peace but still engage in militarized rivalry, they may practice neutral co-existence or they may even become friends. For instance, France and Germany as well as North and South Korea have, for a long time, not fought a war and thus could be said to be in peace. At the same time, one would intuitively agree that the Franco-German dyad is more peaceful than the inter-Korean peace is.

The idea of peace as “more than the absence of war” has so far largely been ignored by quantitative peace research, where a dichotomous and negative definition of peace—whether or not states engage in militarized interstate disputes—has so far formed the dominant conceptual baseline for empirical explorations.³ This led to the problematic fact that, for instance, nonviolent periods between France and Germany in the 1990s, and periods of nonviolence between the Koreas, have so far been treated equally, both in theory and in empirical analysis: Both scenarios have been coded with a “0”, representing absence of militarized conflict, although they obviously differ tremendously in quality.

It is thus fair to state that quantitative peace research presents a science of war and violent conflict as it has so far predominantly engaged with questions of “Who fights Whom, When, Where, and Why?” (Bremer 2000).⁴ Similarly, Vasquez has stated that considerably “less research has been done on peace than on war” (Vasquez 2000, p. 329); Wallensteen has observed the urgent need for a program on the “Correlates of Peace” (Wallensteen 2000, p. 270); similarly, Regan has argued that “members of the Peace Science community should study peace directly rather than through war” (Regan 2014,

² I use the concept of positive peace as it is applied by empirical positivist researchers. This excludes normative conceptions from Galtung (1969) and others, which focus on questions of justice, and take a perspective strongly informed by critical theory.

³ The existing literature on interstate rivalry (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Thompson and Dreyer 2011) takes a different approach, but still neglects the positive range of the peace spectrum.

⁴ Even research programs that explicitly claim to identify the determinants of interstate peace, such as research on the liberal peace or the capitalist peace, rather present studies of “nonviolence” (Oneal et al. 2003; Schneider and Gleditsch 2013).

pp. 345–348); moreover, Gleditsch, Nordkvelle, and Strand (2014, p. 155) have examined 50 years of research published in the *Journal of Peace Research* and the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, thereby concluding that “(n)egative peace, in the sense of reducing war, has always been the main focus in peace research” (see also Diehl 2016).

This is even more surprising, as the idea that peace is more than the absence of war presents one of the building blocks of modern peace research. It prominently entered scientific discourse through Karl Deutsch’s concept of security community (Deutsch 1957) and Kenneth Boulding’s (1978) seminal work on stable peace. After some years of stagnation, the end of the Cold War triggered another series of research on peace (Shamir 1992; George 1992; Rock 1989), followed by further key contributions such as Adler and Barnett’s (1998a) on the concept of security community, Kacowicz et al.’s (2000) on regions of stable peace, and Kupchan’s (2010) on friendship in IR (see also Wendt 1999; Koschut and Oelsner 2014). This literature strand has produced valuable insights that, however, are solely based on case studies that revolve around a limited set of empirical cases. We may thus have some in-depth knowledge for certain typical cases of interstate peace-building, but we lack more systematic and generalizable insights on the causes and processes of peace.

Tackling this research gap first and foremost necessitates elaborations on the concept of peace itself. Existing qualitative literature already proposes different ways to define different levels of peace. However, taking a quantitative approach necessitates further conceptual thinking on the issues of specification and measurement that accounts for the particularities of quantitative causal analysis. Today, there exist two such conceptualizations of interstate peace: in 2010, Reşat Bayer introduced a three-level concept of peace, and Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl, and Alexandru Balas have just recently proposed a conceptualization that distinguishes between five levels of interstate peace (Bayer 2010; Goertz et al. 2016).

Sure enough, there may exist a potentially infinite number of ways to conceptualize levels of interstate peace, and researchers may differ in their assessment of their strengths and weaknesses depending on the criteria and rules they apply. In this article, I introduce three guiding rules that deal with the question of how we should select the constitutive dimensions of a concept. First, it will be argued that researchers should not under-specify their concepts and include all those dimensions that are necessary to avoid

what I call problems of ontological underload. These consist of low resonance with extant and established definitions and low internal discriminatory power. At the same time, the second rule emphasizes that concepts should still be specified as parsimonious as possible. This first and foremost implies that concepts should exclude any factors that should better be understood as exogenous causes of the concept at hand. Otherwise, concepts will suffer from problems of ontological overload: that is, poor causal utility as they prohibit the empirical testing of cause-and-effect relationships as well as a decrease in the overall power of empirical tests through the inclusion of untested assumptions. Finally, the third rule deals with a special case and discusses how the first two rules can be applied when inter-dimensional cause-and-effect relationships form an essential constitutive part of the concept at hand—which in fact is the case for the concept of peace. In sum, the three rules suggest a concept of peace that is more than the absence of war but still follows the premise of less is more.

To be clear, the overall value and innovative strength of the existing peace concepts from Bayer (2010) and Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016) can hardly be overestimated. At the same time, my emphasis of the importance of the three rules outlined above already suggests that both concepts may suffer from problems of ontological underload and overload. Therefore, I propose a new concept of interstate peace P^* that is explicitly based on the rules outlined above. Accordingly, I do not blindly accept that peace is more than the absence of war and inflate the concept to its limits, but rather critically reflect on what this “more” should imply. Thus, P^* minimizes both ontological problems in parallel through the parsimonious inclusion of only three dimensions that are most essential to established understandings of peace: state behavior—what states actually do; decision-makers’ expectations—what they expect from each other now and in the future; and the stability and duration of this behavioral and perceptual patterns.

In the following, I will first give an overview of the method of concept formation and discuss why problems of underload and overload should be taken seriously. I will then briefly discuss in how far the two existing concepts of interstate peace face problems of under- and overload and why there is room for improvement. I will then illustrate the specification process for P^* , thereby showing how the concept minimizes the two specification problems. In the subsequent part, I will present a measurement framework that allows researchers to put P^* into practice and apply it to a preliminary dataset of altogether 126 dyads. In the remaining sections, I will briefly describe the data and discuss

its reliability and validity, also in comparison to already existing datasets, as well as discussing the added value of P^* .

In sum, this article not only provides a conceptualization of interstate peace that can be used as an alternative to existing approaches but also discusses important criteria for concept formation. In this way, this article also contributes to the methodological literature on concept formation in general and specifically to the catalogue of quality criteria that researchers may apply in their own conceptual work.

3.2 Concept Formation: Four Steps

The existing methodological literature, especially Goertz (2006), emphasizes that concepts consist of three ontological levels, the specification of which can be structured along four steps (Goertz 2006; Adcock and Collier 2001; Gerring 2012):⁵ First, researchers define the basic level of the concept, that is, the concept's overall properties and its positive and negative pole (the minimum and maximum value of the concept). For all non-dichotomous concepts, also the "gray zone" between the two poles and its scaling are to be determined. The second step consists of the choice of dimensions on the concept's second level—the constitutive attributes of the concept—that form the intension of the concept. It thereby seems most reasonable to tie in with extant definitions which, however, may be high in number and variety. To obtain an overview and reduce complexity, Gerring suggests an inductive clustering procedure, with which one subsumes the "plentitude of meanings implied by a term" under a limited number of essential core dimensions (Gerring 2012, p. 133). To do so, one may first identify the core conceptual literature, then compile a list of all dimensions mentioned, and finally form clusters of ontologically similar dimensions. Researchers may then choose the dimensions they deem most essential to their understanding of the concept at hand. As a third step, researchers define the structure of the concept that presumes an ontologically consistent and logical procedure for the aggregation of d dimension into an overall final score s (Gerring 2012, p. 117; Goertz 2006). The fourth and final step focuses on the concept's third level and consists of the concept's operationalization through the identification of indicators that allow for measuring the dimensions of the concept in a valid and reliable way.⁶

⁵ See also the ground-laying work on concept formation of Giovanni Satori (1984).

⁶ Regarding a concept of peace, the term "level" may mean different things: on the one hand, it may refer to the basic, second, and third level as they have just been discussed, and on the other hand, "levels" may

3.3 Concept Formation: Avoiding Ontological Underload and Overload

Concept specification is always a controversial endeavor up to the point that concepts may become “essentially contested” (Gallie 1955). Preferences over one or the other specification will always depend on the literature field and scientific discourses to which researchers are native as well as on the theoretical context and research question at hand. Nonetheless, concept formation is not an arbitrary process, and not without reason, methodologists have compiled lists of quality criteria and guiding rules (Gerring 2012; Adcock and Collier 2001; Sartori 1984). For the specification of P^* , I will formulate three rules that I deem most important for the specification of a “good” concept of interstate peace. These rules all deal with a very essential and central question: How should we choose the dimensions of a concept? Which and how many dimensions should we include in a concept’s intension?⁷

First, it is important to include all those dimensions that are necessary to minimize problems of what I call under-specification and ontological underload. Otherwise, the concept may face two serious problems: first, it may come with low resonance. Concepts should be “faithful ... to extant definitions and established usage,” and researchers should choose the kind and number of dimensions to be included accordingly (Gerring 2012, p. 117). For instance, and most obviously, a concept of interstate peace that would only focus on the absence of war, but neglect other forms of militarized interaction, would not resonate with existing definitions and thus most likely not become accepted by the scholarly community. Second, underload will have a deteriorating effect on the concept’s internal discriminatory power, that is, its ability to distinguish between cases that are similar from dissimilar ones. For instance, a concept that would specify peace solely in terms of

refer to the actual values a concept of peace can take on, such as low, medium, and high, or cold, normal, and warm peace. To avoid confusion, I will use the term “concept levels” whenever the former meaning is used.

⁷ Existing literature has already dealt with this question in different ways: For instance, Sartori has discussed how a manipulation of a concept’s intension moves a concept up or down on a ladder of abstraction/generality and/or decreases the extension of the concept (Sartori 1970). Moreover, researchers have elaborated on minimal and maximal strategies of concept formation, the former including only the most essential constitutive core of the concept and the latter presenting thick and ideal-type concepts (Gerring and Barresi 2003). Gerring (2012) has argued that researchers should choose dimensions in a way that the resulting concept comes with causal utility and resonates with extant definitions and established usage. Moreover, Sartori has argued for a rule of parsimony and Goertz has argued that one should avoid “hardwiring” hypotheses into concepts (Sartori 1984; Goertz 2006, p. 66; Wacker 2004, pp. 635–637). These methodological discussions come closest to the following elaborations and have heavily influenced the same.

the presence and absence of militarized interaction would not be able to differentiate between cases that lack militarized conflict due to mutual deterrence and cases for which the absence of militarized conflict results from positive reasons, such as mutual trust. Clearly, the more dimensions we use to define different levels of a phenomenon, the more specific and differentiated become our definitions.

Rule 1: Concepts should include all dimensions that are necessary to avoid problems of ontological underload.

To avoid problems of ontological underload, researchers may inflate their concept through the integration of as many dimensions as possible. However, they should be aware that concepts may also become over-specified and suffer serious problems of ontological overload. This is always the case when researchers blindly integrate assumptions about causal relationships between two or more dimensions into a concept. That is, when researchers “confuse the theory with the definition” (Wacker 2004, p. 636), or as Goertz (2006, p. 66) puts it, when researchers “hardwire” hypotheses into the concept. For instance, Deutsch already included a hypothesized cause-effect relationship in his definition of security community when he defined integration in terms of “a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’” (Deutsch 1957, p. 5), suggesting that it is identification and institutions that finally cause positive expectations.

Ontological overload is a serious problem for two reasons: First, it diminishes a concept’s causal utility as the inclusion of assumptions about cause-effect relationships between the dimensions of a concept impedes their theoretical and empirical examination from the outset for obvious reasons of circular reasoning and tautological analysis (Gerring 2012, p. 130). For instance, using Deutsch’s definition of security community impedes straightforward analysis of the causal role of institutions and identity in the process of security community building, as both factors have already been incorporated into the definition and their positive effect on the formation of positive expectations has been assumed as true *ex ante*.⁸ Accordingly, integrating assumed causes renders a concept inflexible and sometimes even useless for the holistic exploration of the causes of a phenomenon of interest.

⁸ For similar arguments, see also existing discussions on whether economic development should be perceived as constitutive or causal to the process of democratization (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Linz 1975).

Second, cause-effect relations should in general not be assumed as true *ex ante*, but always left “open for further empirical and causal examination” (Goertz 2006, p. 66). Too many untested assumptions decrease the power of our empirical tests, as the risk of erroneous conclusions increases, the more untested and thus potentially wrong assumptions are included in our theoretical, conceptual, and measurement models. Against this background, it should become clear why researchers should on the one hand avoid problems of underload but on the other hand always follow a logic of less is more—that is, why they should always give priority to parsimonious concepts that do not include cause-and-effect assumptions in their intention (Gerring 1999; Wacker 2004; Sartori 1984).

Rule 2: Concepts should be specified in a parsimonious way and exclude potential explanatory factors to avoid problems of ontological overload.

Notably, excluding cause-effect assumptions becomes a problematic advice when causal relationships between dimension form an essential constitutive part of the concept at hand. Whenever this is the case, researchers should still follow the ideal of parsimony. That is, they should limit the concept’s intension to those dimensions and cause-and-effect relationships that are sufficient to minimize problems of underload. The concept should thereby be restricted to those cause-effect relations that seem most plausible and, at best, for which certain empirical evidence is given. In this way, the conceptualization accounts for the complexity of the phenomenon at hand but still minimizes problems of ontological overload through its parsimonious and plausible modeling.⁹

Rule 3: If cause-and-effect relations form an essential constitutive part of a concept, one should include only the most essential dimension in the concept and explicate the assumed causal relationships to minimize problems of underload and overload.

3.4 Existing Concepts of Peace for Quantitative Analysis

As I have outlined in the introduction, there exists a multitude of multilevel conceptualization of interstate peace, but only two of them have been developed for quantitative

See also discussions on whether international institutions should be defined in terms of “rules of behavior,” their effects, or solely in terms of “intended effects” (Simmons and Martin 2003).

⁹ Sure enough, decisions about the inclusion or exclusion of dimension cannot be based on any objectively derived standard. Concept formation is always in some sense based on subjective considerations, and in the best case grounded on scholarly consensus that emerges during a research program.

analysis. First, Reşat Bayer published a concept in 2010 that distinguishes between war, frozen peace, cold peace, and warm peace. The three peace levels are defined through the cumulative presence of three dimensions: whether states solely accept each other, if they also interact, and if they have resolved their differences (see table 3.1). The concept is operationalized through data on diplomatic relations, peace treaties, rivalry termination, and bilateral treaty signatures. The second conceptual contribution comes from Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016), who distinguish between five levels of interstate peace based on two key dimensions: the presence or absence of “disagreements and how they are dealt with by the participants” (Goertz et al. 2016, p. 28). At the levels of severe rivalry, lesser rivalry, and negative peace, disagreement over various issues persist and relations are marked by different degrees of militarization. Positive levels of peace, in contrast, are marked by “mechanisms and expectations for peaceful conflict resolution ... and war or the use of military force as a means of conflict resolution is unthinkable or has a probability of zero” (Goertz et al. 2016, pp. 40–41). Against this background, Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016, p. 41) identify four attributes of positive peace: “(1) absence of major territorial claims, (2) institutions for conflict management, (3) high degrees of functional interdependence, and (4) satisfaction with the status quo.” The concept is operationalized through a sophisticated vignette technique and a multitude of behavioral indicators (see table 3.2).

Table 3.1: Bayer’s (2010) concept

	Frozen peace	Cold peace	Warm peace
<i>Conceptualization</i>			
Accept others	No	Yes	Yes
Interact with others	Negligible	Varies	Yes
Resolved differences	No	Varies	Yes
<i>Operationalization</i>			
Diplomatic relations		Suffices	Necessary
Peace treaty		Suffices	Necessary
End of rivalry			Necessary
Bilateral agreements after war (or after rivalry)			Necessary

Table 3.2: *Concept of Goertz et al. (2016), table adapted from Goertz et al. (2016, p. 27)*

Key dimensions: the presence or absence of disagreements and how they are dealt with by the participants					
	Negative range: disagreement over various issues, relations are marked by different degrees of militarization			Positive range: absence of major territorial claims, institutions for conflict management, high levels of functional interdependence, satisfaction with the status quo	
<i>Operationalization</i>					
	Severe rivalry	Lesser rivalry	Negative peace	Warm peace	Security community
War plans	Present	Present	Present	Absent	Joint war planning
Conflicts	Frequent MIDs, variety of hostility levels	Isolate MIDs; Thompson rivalries; ICB crises	Absent	No plausible counterfactual war scenario	No plausible counterfactual war scenario
<i>Communication and issues</i>					
Main issues in conflict	Unresolved	Unresolved	Mitigated, some resolved, some low salience	Resolved	Resolved
Communication	Absent	Absent	Intergovernmental	Intergovernmental and highly developed transnational ties	Institutionalized mechanisms
<i>Agreements, institutions, and diplomacy</i>					
Diplomacy	No recognition; diplomatic hostility	No recognition; diplomatic hostility	Diplomatic recognition; statements suggesting conflict	Diplomatic relations	Diplomatic coordination
/Level /number of Agreements	None	None	Peace negotiations and/or agreements	Nascent functional agreements; nascent integration	Extensive institutionalized functional agreements

While there is no doubt that these concepts are significant for the overall discipline of peace research, there is still room for critical reflection, especially as the developed concepts do suffer from problems of ontological underload and overload. For instance, Bayer's concept suffers from ontological underload on the behavioral dimension and here especially regarding negative and militarized forms of interstate interaction: As his specification reveals, Bayer only accounts for the absence of war as a necessary condition for a dyad to be assigned to one of the three peace levels. Bayer thus ignores lower forms of militarized interaction in his specification and does not determine if and which forms of violence below the war threshold can appear on different levels of peace. In the worst case, the concept might thus assign dyads to higher peace levels although they show repeated instances of militarized interaction below the war threshold. Another shortcoming is that Bayer assigns dyads to the level of warm peace when they have signed at least 10 bilateral agreements from 10 different issue areas. Although this is a generally reasonable approach, it ignores that states may stop interacting in a meaningful way after they have reached the 10-treaty threshold, which then would rather resemble a neutral relationship. Against this background, it becomes obvious why Bayer's concept faces problems of ontological underload that decrease its resonance and internal discriminatory power.

In contrast, I argue that the main shortcoming of Goertz et al.'s concept is that it shows problems of ontological overload as the authors include causal assumptions about the effects, first of the absence of territorial claims, and second of international institutions for conflict management (Goertz et al. 2016, pp. 40–41).¹⁰ With regard to the former, Goertz et al. argue that the absence of territorial claims presents a necessary constitutive dimension of positive peace, as such claims disproportionately often lead to violent conflict.¹¹ This, however, seems problematic for two reasons: first, it is a key proposition of peace research that disagreement and conflict represent constants in any relationship and that it is rather the nonviolent management thereof that distinguishes negative from positive relations. As I argue, there is no reason why this proposition should not also apply to territorial claims. Second, while there is no doubt that the empirical nexus between territorial conflict and militarization is strong, it is still not deterministic in kind,

¹⁰ Notably, the authors argue elsewhere (Klein et al. 2008, p. 77) that it is not only unproblematic, but even necessary to include these causal assumptions in the concept, as from their view, "one cannot be in the peace zone unless both states have resolved major territorial conflicts or established functioning institutions for dealing with boundary claims ... In summary, our inclusion of these factors as defining peace ... makes sense because to explain peace means explaining how these factors came to be."

¹¹ Also, Bayer (2010) includes the resolution of differences into his concept.

as cases exist—such as the German-Dutch dyad—which we would intuitively assign to a higher level of peace though territorial claims do exist. And third, as non-territorial conflict issues may become as well highly salient and severe, their solution would then become equally important for dyads to reach higher levels of peace, which, in turn, renders a sole focus on territorial conflict a selective choice. Thus, it seems more reasonable to treat the nexus between disagreement and peace as an empirical question and to ask if and under which conditions the absence of certain conflict issues impacts on the quality of peace in general. This would not only increase the concept’s causal utility but also enhance the power of empirical testing and the concept’s flexibility.

Things become trickier regarding Goertz et al.’s decision to include the peace-bringing effect of “institutions for conflict management” on the second concept level, and to use the area, number, and kind of agreements as indicators on the third concept level. This is problematic, as the specification strategy assigns an important role to institutions but remains unclear and rather unsystematic regarding specific coding criteria and rules. That is, the applied vignette technique leaves unanswered how the authors exactly distinguish between different designs, numbers, levels of integration, and policy areas, and how all this guides the concrete coding of empirical cases at hand. On the one hand, this lack of clarity increases the risk of endogeneity issues for any empirical analysis that aims to assess the role of institutions in the process of interstate peace-making—which is in fact a central question in the research program;¹² it makes competitive hypothesis testing difficult—for instance on the effects of democracy versus international institutions on transitions to peace—and it decreases the power of empirical tests through the inclusion of untested assumptions. On the other hand, it is hardly deniable that institutionalized cooperation represents one of the most essential dimensions of established understandings of peace. Accordingly, while the inclusion of institutions obviously increases problems of overload, it seems almost impossible to leave them completely outside the concept if problems of underload are to be avoided. This is where my third rule will come into play as an important guideline for the following specification of P^* .

¹² For instance, the appendix to the released peace data from Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016) reveals that the Franco-German dyad is assigned to the level of warm peace in 1957 also because both states were members of the then-founded European Economic Community. Moreover, the dyad is assigned to the level of security community in 1992 because of their signature of the Maastricht Treaty. The authors thus use these steps toward deeper integration as indicators for higher levels of peace, which renders the empirical analysis of the effect of economic integration on interstate peace highly problematic, if not even impossible.

3.5 Specification of P^*

Just as for any concept, the specification of a concept of interstate peace presumes decisions on the concept's basic, second, and third level. In the following, I will discuss the specification of P^* 's three concept levels, and thereby focus on how my specification decisions help minimize problems of ontological underload and overload.

3.5.1 Basic Concept Level

On its basic level, P^* comes with the following properties: first, I decided to follow previous conceptualizations in their baseline argument that the notion of peace only becomes meaningful for dyads that have a relationship, that is, do have the means, opportunities, and reasons to interact—either negatively or positively—in a significant way (Goertz et al. 2016).¹³ It thus makes no sense to assess the level of peace for dyads such as Vanuatu–Central African Republic, as these states have no significant relationship nor do they have a strong reason to establish one.

Second, I think of peace as a dyadic phenomenon: the quality of a relationship will be assessed for pairs of states and the non-directed dyad-year represents the unit of analysis of this concept. Notably, scholars have also thought of peace as a regional phenomenon (Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov 2000). However, such an approach may cause an unnecessary loss of information, as it may not capture the diversity of intra-regional dyadic relationships. Moreover, the dyadic perspective fits with today's standard quantitative research design in interstate peace and conflict research and in this way allows for directly tying in with existing stock of knowledge on interstate peace and conflict (Dafoe et al. 2013).

Third, the concept will include a range of negative relations, positive peace levels that are constituted by certain positive attributes that add some significant quality to the relationship, and a peace level of mere neutrality. This seems reasonable, as a decrease of negative attributes of a relationship does not necessarily come with an increase in positive ones (and vice versa), as states may just cede to interact at all and reach a state of neutrality.

¹³ As for instance Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016) argue, this applies to states that are geographically proximate, major power relationships, military allies, members of strong regional IGOs, rivals, and states with prior colonial relationship.

Fourth, I included the level of war as a separate category in the concept, as it represents the most extreme deviation from “normal” interstate conduct. Accordingly, P^* will not subsume war under any category of rivalry (see Goertz et al. 2016 how do so), thus also accounting for the fact that wars may occur outside the rivalry context.

Fifth and finally, I chose to apply an ordinal scaling to P^* , thereby tying in with existing concepts. In sum, these general specifications will lead to a concept for which war forms the negative pole, followed by peace levels that represent negative, neutral, and positive relationships. Notably, existing concepts differ regarding the definition of the positive pole, either treating it as a situation between two separate states or even taking the amalgamation and merging of two or more states into consideration (Deutsch 1957; Kupchan 2010). Due to the lack of a significant number of unifications, P^* follows the former approach.

3.5.2 Second Concept Level: Choice of Dimensions

Overview on clusters of constitutive dimensions: The three rules of concept formation that have been elaborated above emphasize that one should choose the number and kind of constitutive dimensions in a way that avoids ontological underload while at the same time excluding those that would cause problems of overload. To do so, I started to generate a first overview on the dimensions that have been used by existing concepts so far. They have been retrieved through the application of Gerring’s (2012) clustering procedure described above. It thereby turns out that dimensions of peace can be subsumed under six core dimensions that capture aspects of behavior, perceptions, culture/identity, harmony, transnationality, and duration/stability (see also table 3.3).

Table 3.3: Six clusters of dimensions of peace

Behavior	Perceptions	Culture/identity
Different forms and modes of cooperation, different forms and qualities of militarized interaction	Perceptions of peace as the “normal situation,” perceived probability of war, levels of threat perceptions, expectations of distrust, trust and confidence	Shared identity, the sharing of norms and values, public discourses, the presence of intensive propaganda warfare, the significance of revisionist groups' voice in political debate
Harmony	Transnationality	Time
Absence of disagreement and conflict, status quo orientation	Trans-social ties and contact	Duration, Stability

Clustering based on a sample of often-cited and influential conceptualizations (Adler and Barnett 1998a; Bayer 2010; Boulding 1978; Deutsch 1957; George 1992; Kacowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov 2000; Goertz et al. 2016; Kupchan 2010; Miller 2000a; Oelsner 2007; Koschut and Oelsner 2014; Russett and Starr 1992; Shamir 1992).

Table 3.4: Six levels of P*

	War	Hot Rivalry	Cold Rivalry	Neutral Peace	Advanced Peace	Strong Peace
dominant behavior	manifest warfare	repeated militarized conflict	isolated conflicts, threats, confrontation	diplomatic relations, no significant interaction	network of bilateral ties	even denser network of bilateral ties
dominant expectation	strong distrust	distrustful	less distrustful	no significant expectations	trustful	strong trust
stability of behaviors and expectations		deeply entrenched				deeply entrenched

Table 3.5: Operationalization of P^*

War	War data from Maoz (2005) and COW (Sarkees 2010)
Hot Rivalry	Data on interstate militarized rivalry, high-level KGD-rivalries with at least one MID with severity score > 100, data from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), severity score computed based on Diehl and Goertz (2000)
Cold Rivalry	Remaining periods of general rivalry, consisting of either low-level KGD rivalry (Klein et al. 2006), severe isolated conflicts (Klein et al. 2006), strategic rivalry (Thompson and Dreyer 2011), an ICB rivalry (Hewitt 2005), or a diplomatic rivalry (Moyer et al. 2016; Bayer 2006; Keesing's 2004), connected over time through a 10-year-density rule if applicable
Neutral Peace	Residual level
Advanced Peace	20 bilateral treaties signed under conditions of neutrality, no more than 15 years between two treaty signatures, data from World Treaty Index (Poast et al. 2015) and websites of foreign ministries.
Strong Peace	65 bilateral treaties signed under conditions of neutrality or advanced peace, no more than 15 years between two treaty signatures, 10-year minimum duration data from World Treaty Index (Poast et al. 2015) and websites of foreign ministries.

Application of rule 1—avoiding ontological underload: Importantly, P^* will not include all the core dimensions identified, as it is the aim of this concept to avoid both problems of ontological underload and of overload at the same time. Accordingly, the next step consisted of ensuring compliance with rule 1 through determining which of the six core dimensions are most essential and thus should be treated as truly constitutive to the concept of peace. In brief, I decided that P^* should include the following three dimensions: first, what states do to each other (behavior); second, what elites expect each other to do in the future (perceptions); and third, whether these perceptions and behaviors form part of stable and long-term patterns (duration/stability). I argue that these three dimensions are necessary and at the same time sufficient for the specification of a concept that minimizes problems of ontological underload.

The first highly essential dimension of interstate peace captures interstate behavior. Sure enough, states cannot reach higher levels of peace if they engage in militarized confrontation. Similarly, it seems intuitively convincing that states will be assigned to a higher level of peace only when they engage in cooperation of a certain quality. P^* 's behavioral dimension thus subsumes interactions of the negative, neutral, and positive

kind. On the negative side, it captures manifest warfare, militarized confrontation below the war threshold, as well as non-militarized confrontation, such as sanctions, or the external support of rebel groups. On the positive side, P^* captures how intense states engage in formalized bilateral cooperation and whether they renew and expand their bilateral cooperative ties. P^* 's behavioral dimension also captures whether states maintain diplomatic relations, and thereby treats the same not as a positive, but as a neutral kind of interaction, as it represents a fundamental norm and standard in today's international politics. Diplomatic relations do not necessarily indicate positive relations, but their non-existence surely indicates deviation from the norm, especially for states that are in a relationship and do, or at least have shown, significant patterns of interaction (see above). At the same time, they are a prerequisite for proactive positive interaction.

A sole focus on behavior is by no means sufficient for a valid conceptualization of different peace levels. As already mentioned above, the eschewal of violent interaction may indeed reflect neutral or positive relations but may also follow from mutual deterrence. Moreover, cooperative interactions, such as the signing of a bilateral agreement, do not necessarily indicate that states have reached the positive range of relationship levels, as even rivals may sign treaties such as ceasefire agreements or peace accords. Accordingly, including state elites' expectations into the concept seems necessary, as it provides the perceptions that cause and follow from the behavior at hand. Importantly, this stands in line with various key ontological elaborations on the concept of peace. For instance, Kenneth Boulding even defined his concept of stable peace solely in terms of expectations when he defined the same as "a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved" (Boulding 1978, pp. 12–13). Deutsch's (1957) definition focuses on the generation of "dependable expectations of peaceful change," but also includes two dimensions—institutions and positive identification—that represent causes of these expectations. Slightly differently, Adler and Barnett (Adler and Barnett 1998a) distinguish between a baseline definition for the concept of security community that solely consists of "dependable expectations of peaceful change," and an extended definition for "tightly coupled" communities that emphasizes the causal role of identity and institutions for the generation and stabilization of these expectations. Regarding the negative range of the spectrum of interstate relations, the rivalry literature has as well always been treating expectations of future

militarized conflict as a core attribute of interstate rivalry (Klein et al. 2006; Thompson and Dreyer 2011; Thompson 2001).

For the specification of P^* , I decided to focus on expectations of trust and distrust. For the present purpose, trust and distrust can be defined as mechanisms that allow for the development of positive or negative expectations about the other side's future behavior and increase or reduce the willingness to engage in risky forms of cooperation (Brugger et al. 2013a; Keating and Ruzicka 2014; Booth and Wheeler 2008; Kydd 2005). In the realm of international politics, trust and distrust play an important role in at least two cooperation problems: first, in the context of interstate anarchical security relations, trust resembles a belief in the other's status quo orientation, which enables states to mitigate or even transcend commitment problems and security dilemma dynamics. When A has sufficient trust in B's status quo orientation, she expects him to behave peacefully, even when changing material incentives would increase his objective expected utility of revisionist and offensive action. Distrust, in contrast, equals the belief that the other side follows a revisionist orientation. The other side is expected to change the status quo whenever possible, which, in turn, increases the risk of militarized escalation for preemptive or preventive reasons (Kydd 2005; Booth and Wheeler 2008; Fearon 1995).¹⁴ Second, in the context of formalized and non-formalized cooperation, trustful states believe in the cooperative intentions, whereas distrustful states believe in the exploitative preferences of the other side. Accordingly, trustful states will expect reliable compliance with the terms of an agreement, whereas distrustful states will expect notorious defection. Importantly, it seems reasonable that both cooperation problems are interrelated: trust and distrust in the first realm will affect expectations in the second (and vice versa).

As the third and final dimension of P^* , I decided to include the duration and stability of the behavioral and perceptual patterns that characterize a relationship. I thereby follow Adler and Barnett, who have emphasized that the quality of relationships does not become reflected in short-term events and perceptual shifts, but rather in what has been called "deeply entrenched habits" (Adler and Barnett 1998a; Diehl 2016).

¹⁴ The concepts of trust and distrust can be nicely integrated into a bargaining-theoretical framework, as it was popularized by Fearon (1995). Whereas trust should minimize problems of credible commitments and increase actors' readiness to reveal private information, distrust should have the opposite effect and thus increase the risk of bargaining failure. Bargaining theory might thus also be a fruitful source for theory formulation on transitions from lower to higher peace levels.

Application of rule 2—avoiding ontological overload: Importantly, it is the central aim to keep the concept as parsimonious as possible to ensure compliance with rule 2 and reduce problems of overload. Therefore, no further dimension was added to the concept's constitutive container. As this stands in contrast with existing concepts, some elaboration seems appropriate. For instance, several concepts include multilateral forms of cooperation—treaties and organizations—as well as they account for different institutional design features and functions (Miller 2000a; Shamir 1992; Adler and Barnett 1998a; Goertz et al. 2016; Oelsner 2007). However, I chose to keep the dimension of positive behavior as simple as it is and to focus solely on state's decision to engage in bilateral cooperation. First, I argue that this specification—combined with my operationalization strategy—will produce a sufficient degree of internal discriminatory power and allow researchers to distinguish between the most important different levels of peace. Second, I argue that the often assumed link between certain design features and the presence of certain positive expectations is neither inherently plausible, nor can it be assumed as true *ex ante*.¹⁵ Third, I assume that it is in fact one of the central empirical questions which forms and modes of institutionalized cooperation may indeed help states move from rivalry and war toward peace and friendship.¹⁶ Accordingly, a parsimonious definition of interstate peace seems more promising, as it allows using different institutional design features of bi- and multi-lateral institutions as independent variables in our theoretical and empirical models (see below).

In a similar vein, I deviate from Deutsch (1957) and Adler and Barnett (1998a), who include a causal link between a “sense of community” and “expectations of peaceful change” in their definition of security community (Deutsch 1957, p. 5). Constructivist concepts such as positive identification, norms, and values may indeed help explain why and how the prospects for trust and dense forms of cooperation increase, but they are by no means necessary therefore. In this way, the concept does not *ex ante* presume a constructivist ontology which adds significantly to the concept's theoretical flexibility. At the same time, it allows using constructivist variables as exogenous explanatory variables.

¹⁵ For instance, one may argue that supranational economic integration and the integration of military structures presumes strong positive expectations. However, the case of West Germany's integration into NATO and the European Community followed a completely different logic, that is, the perceived need for containment of Western Germany's military capabilities (Brugger et al. 2013a).

¹⁶ Notably, these arguments also apply for multilateral treaties and organizations for which the nexus between institutional membership, design features, and expectations may be even less certain, as is the case for bilateral institutions due to the complexities of multilateral settings.

Moreover, and like Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016), I chose the state and its political elites as the level of analysis and suggest to treat population-level and transnational attributes as exogenous factors that may or may not have an effect on inter-elite dynamics. Finally, and in contrast to Bayer and Goertz et al., I do not treat the absence of conflict issues and specific kinds thereof as constitutive for the positive range of the peace concept. The reason is clear and has already been discussed in more detail above. P^* thus leaves open if and how strong the absence of certain conflict issues impacts on the quality of relationships.

Application of rule3—explicating causal assumptions: Importantly, and despite the concept only resting on three essential dimensions, P^* is not free from causal assumptions, as the concept suggests the operation of a causal nexus between state elites' perceptions and their actual behavior. Clearly, what states have done in the past influences what they expect each other to do in the future, and also how they behave in anticipation of these future scenarios. As the literature on interstate rivalry has already emphasized, it is the experience of militarized conflict that stabilizes distrustful expectations of future militarization and in this way increases the risk of the same (Klein et al. 2006; Diehl and Goertz 2000). In the same vein, positive experiences may induce trustful expectations of future cooperation. Importantly, and in line with rule 3, this causal nexus between expectation and behavior is rather unproblematic for two reasons: first, the assumption about a general nexus between expectations and behavior is plausible throughout. Second, P^* 's intension is still specified in a parsimonious way that allows a test of all sorts of hypotheses on the causes of peace.

3.5.3 Second Concept Level: Specification of Peace Levels

As a next step, the three dimensions that have just been discussed were used to specify altogether six different levels of P^* (see table 3.4). P^* 's negative pole is thereby most easy to determine, as it is represented by manifest warfare. Here it is a matter of course that distrust is intense, as there is no room at all for trustful expectations on the battlefield. Moreover, dyads reach the maximum of militarized competition possible, as indicated by high fatality rates and each participant's objective to defeat the other side through massive use of military power.

The next level of hot rivalry largely resembles the general concept of militarized interstate rivalry (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Klein et al. 2006): here, states cannot manage their conflicts nonviolently and show significant and strong degrees of mutual distrust. That is, they expect each other to resort to military means and do so repeatedly. Distrust thus does not only follow from negative experiences, but also increases the risk of future conflict, as it renders bargaining solutions to ongoing conflicts hardly achievable. At the level of hot rivalry, these defining behavioral and perceptual patterns are “deeply entrenched.” Foreign policy is highly militarized, and alternative strategies seem hardly possible. Accordingly, formalized cooperation represents the exception, as states’ strategic thinking is dominated by relative gains concerns. If cooperation occurs, however, it is only of an unstable nature.

At the level of cold rivalry, competition is less severe than under conditions of hot rivalry. While states still expect militarized conflict to occur, they do not resort to arms repeatedly and militarization plays a less dominant role than it does at the level of hot rivalry. However, states do threaten each other (either explicitly or rather implicitly) as well as they resort to confrontative strategies through which they aim at weakening the other side. Examples may be sanctions and embargoes, sporadic threats, or the external support of rebel groups (Maoz and San-Akca 2012). Distrustful expectations and states’ resort to confrontative foreign policy strategy guide decision-maker’s thinking but are less dominant and are not necessarily as entrenched and rigid as in the case of hot rivalry. The defining perceptions and behaviors may be sustained for decades, but they may well come and go within much shorter periods.

The level of neutral peace describes relations where states have managed to overcome rivalry and have normalized their relationship in a sense that no significant militarized interactions or distrustful expectations structure their relationship. Apart from the absence of rivalry, the neutral peace level is defined by the maintenance of diplomatic relations. As I have discussed above, their severance would indicate a negative relationship. Apart from the conduct of diplomacy, no further significant cooperative relationships have evolved at this stage. States neither cooperate, nor do they maintain trustful expectations in any significant manner. Importantly, the level of neutrality does not necessarily exclude any marginal forms of interactions and expectations. However, these will not reach the threshold necessary for the assignment of a dyad to a non-neutral level of peace. For instance, states may experience harmless isolated disputes, which are of low

significance for the overall relationship, and a couple of bilateral treaties may exist that states usually sign as part of the process of normalization, such as a peace treaty and treaties on issues such as diplomatic relations, interstate traffic, mail and communication, or scientific and cultural cooperation.

Accordingly, the quality of the level of advanced peace is well beyond that of solely normalized relationships. Here, states are not only able to manage their conflicts without resort to military means, but also start to rule out violent confrontation from their set of possible future scenarios. Trustful expectations have developed, which allow states to discard relative gains and concerns and strive for the generation of absolute gains through manifest and active bilateral cooperation. Accordingly, states have established a dense network of bilateral cooperative ties and their mutual trust motivates them to expand it regularly. Moreover, evolving trust also allows states to find more effectively nonviolent solutions to potential newly erupting conflicts. Thus, the quality of peace is much stronger and more robust than at the level of neutral peace, and accordingly, the likelihood of falling back onto any level of rivalry has decreased significantly.

At the level of strong peace, states have managed to even further strengthen the positive attributes that have already characterized the level of advanced peace. That is, states have further expanded their bilateral ties to a significant degree and the gained positive experiences have led to the stabilization of state elites' positive expectations; thus, militarized conflict is unthinkable, and trust motivates states to deepen their bilateral ties to maximize joint gains in tandem. What further distinguishes strong from advanced levels of peace is that the former may be more or less robust, while the latter is more enduring in kind. Finally, it is important to emphasize that the level of strong peace—as any other level of P^* —is still defined solely in terms of behavior, expectations, and duration/stability. Accordingly, even positive levels of peace are not necessarily marked by perfect harmony, as states may even sporadically experience crisis, which, however, will be managed by nonviolent means (Risse-Kappen 1996).

3.5.4 Third Concept Level: Operationalization of Peace Levels

The following section presents a possible operationalization for the six levels of P^* that have been defined above.¹⁷ The retrieved coding rules are applied to a sample of 126 dyads, covering the period of 1945–2001. The sample consists of all strategic rivalries identified by Thompson and Dreyer (2011) that end in or after 1945. The sample thus contains dyads that were in serious conflict during World War II and/or afterward and are thus of high relevance for the course of contemporary international relations.¹⁸

To capture and distinguish between negative levels of war, hot rivalry, and cold rivalry, I first generated an indicator that allows identifying periods of what I call general rivalry. This indicator identifies all dyad-years that are marked by the minimum degree of militarization and/or distrust that is necessary for the coding of levels cold rivalry, hot rivalry, or war. I therefore used the following datasets, all of which would indicate a certain degree of militarization and/or the presence of distrustful expectations. First, Maoz's (2005) dyadic war data, which are based on the Correlates of War Project. War is defined as "sustained combat involving regular armed forces on both sides" with at least 1,000 battle-related fatalities per year among all the state participants. States qualify as war participants if they either suffer at least 100 fatalities or if at least 1,000 armed personnel are engaged in active combat (Sarkees 2010, p. 3).¹⁹

Second, I used version 5.20 of the dataset on interstate militarized rivalry from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), which distinguishes between isolated militarized conflict and militarized rivalry through a sophisticated aggregation of data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) (Maoz 2005; Ghosn et al. 2016). I made use of the rivalry data (KGD rivalry), which captures relationships that are marked by repeated militarized disputes that are linked not only by underlying issues, but also through decision-makers' experiences and expectations. In the author's words, the experience of militarized conflict operates as a "push from the past" that results in distrustful expectations of future militarized conflict and their likely occurrence. Moreover, I made use of their data on isolated

¹⁷ Importantly, the parsimonious specification of the ontological content of P^* presumes a corresponding operationalization that is based on a slim and efficient choice of indicators and coding rules, since otherwise problems of overload would just be transferred onto the concept level of indicators (e.g., using indicator I prohibits the use of any explanatory factor that may also include I in its conceptualization).

¹⁸ Another sample selection criterion was pragmatic in kind: the data on treaty signatures were already available for this sample and ready for implementation.

¹⁹ If possible, datasets were merged through the EUGene Software Package (Bennett and Stam 2000). Otherwise, datasets were merged by hand.

militarized conflicts. Importantly, Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) argue that isolated instances of militarized conflict often occur in multilateral disputes, where two states participate on different sides, but do not join the dispute with the aim of direct confrontation. This is why I focused on isolated conflicts that are at least “almost fatal,” as indicated by a severity score of >100 on the dispute severity scale from Diehl and Goertz (2000).²⁰ I assume that this subset contains cases of isolated conflicts that are likely to come with certain distrustful perceptions and are thus meaningful for the assessment of a relationship’s overall quality.²¹

Third, I used Thompson and Dreyer’s (2011) dataset of strategic rivalries, the measurement of which is based on three criteria: states must “regard each other as (a) competitors, (b) the source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming militarized, and (c) enemies” (Thompson 2001, p. 560). Accordingly, and in contrast to the KGD rivalry concept, this measure is not based on the aggregation of militarized interstate disputes but on direct analysis of state elites’ perceptions through the analysis of qualitative data. Therefore, strategic rivals may be militarized, but do not have to be so necessarily.

Adding to that, data on ICB crisis density rivalries were used. This data comes with features that are similar to Thompson’s measure, as a crisis is defined solely in terms of the leader’s perceptions and thus is not necessarily militarized. More specifically, the ICB project defines a crisis as a situation in which leaders “perceive a heightened probability of military hostilities, a grave threat to national values, and a shortened and finite time within which to make decisions” (Hewitt 2005, p. 186). Accordingly, Hewitt’s (2005) crisis-density measure of interstate rivalry captures periods that are marked by

²⁰ The severity measure ranges from 0 to 214 and is a function of the highest action taken by the two states and the number of fatalities. For a detailed discussion on its conceptualization and operationalization, see the appendix in Diehl and Goertz (2000). The measure was slightly adapted (fatality numbers were all set to 1,000 for interstate wars). Up to the threshold of 100, disputes are increasingly severe but do not produce fatalities. Shortly above the threshold (severity score of 130), disputes become fatal. Accordingly, disputes above the threshold of 100 can be described as either highly severe but nonfatal or highly severe and fatal. Disputes below the threshold are of a lower-level.

²¹ Whenever thresholds were incorporated into the coding rules, these thresholds were either determined theoretically or inductively through the identification of natural jumps in the data’s distribution. Only in some cases, such theoretical or empirical criteria could not be specified, which necessitated the use of arbitrary thresholds. Future versions of the dataset will include more cases, and accordingly might also enable us to identify natural thresholds where this was so far not possible.


repeatedly emerging threat perceptions that are temporally proximate enough to be treated as part of one ongoing conflict relationship.²²

Finally, I used data on diplomatic relations to capture what I call diplomatic rivalry. Data come from Bayer (2006), Moyer, Bohl, and Turner (2016), and my own compilations using Keesing's World News Archive (2004). I assumed that the severance of relations indicates a certain degree of distrust, as it represents a significant deviation from normal interstate conduct (see above) and shows that states are not capable of managing their conflicts in a constructive way.²³

I then coded the general rivalry measure positively for those dyad-years for which at least one of the used datasets scored positively. Graph 3.1 illustrates for a fictitious case how the used datasets aggregate to a positive score on the general rivalry indicator. It further shows that the used measures may overlap over time; and it becomes clear that periods of the general rivalry may be interrupted (in the example case 1962—1964). Following the logic of a dispute-density approach, I then assumed that periods of general rivalry are linked—through issues and especially through underlying expectations—if they are temporally proximate enough. I thus recoded these periods between two general rivalries also positively if no more than 10 years lie between both rivalries. Rivalries that are separated by more than 10 years were treated as separate (in the example, the recoded general rivalry would thus cover the whole time-span from 1947 to 1973).

²² For specific density thresholds, see Hewitt (2005). I did not include isolated ICB crises, as they are unlikely to be meaningful for interstate relationships if they do not come with an isolated MID with a severity score of > 100 . For instance, this is the case for the ICB crisis between Poland and Russia that occurred during the upheaval of Solidarnosc in 1980/1981. This crisis mainly concerned the relationship between the Soviet leadership and internal nongovernmental Polish actors and had no influence on the relationship between the governments of Poland and the USSR.

²³ A diplomatic rivalry was coded when diplomatic relations were severed for at least three years.



Graph 3.1: Elements of general rivalry and their aggregation.

I then filtered out periods of war and hot rivalry from the general rivalry data using Maoz's war data and Klein et al.'s rivalry data (KGD rivalry). Regarding the latter, I assured that rivalries as such are sufficiently militarized through the inclusion of a severity threshold. More specifically, I only used those KGD rivalries for the coding of hot rivalry that contain at least one MID with a severity score of > 100 . Thus, to fall into the category of hot rivalry, a KGD rivalry must contain at least one MID that is at least "almost fatal." Importantly, the KGD rivalry measure already contains criteria for the stability of behavioral and perceptual patterns that define an interstate rivalry. Thus, no further coding criteria regarding duration were necessary.

The remaining positive scores of the general rivalry indicator were used to capture periods of cold rivalry (for the illustrative example, this would be for the periods 1947–1951 and 1962–1973): these periods are characterized by the absence of war and hot rivalry, and by the presence of either a low-level KGD rivalry, a severe isolated conflict, a strategic rivalry, an ICB rivalry, or a diplomatic rivalry, connected over time through the 10-year-density rule if applicable. As my specification of the cold rivalry level suggests, no strict criteria for the stability of perceptions and behaviors apply at this level, which is why no duration threshold was added.²⁴

²⁴ Exceptions exist: whenever periods of war, hot rivalry, or cold rivalry were interrupted for only one year, this interruption was ignored. For instance, if a dyad is coded level -1 in $t-1$ and $t+1$ and level -2 in

So far, the measurement strategy allowed me to distinguish between periods of war, hot rivalry, and cold rivalry. Accordingly, any of the remaining dyad-years that had not yet been coded are at least neutral in kind. For these periods, positive levels were identified through the adaption of a density measure to cooperative events, that is, to the signature of bilateral treaties.²⁵ The measurement strategy was thereby based on the basic assumption that the signing of treaties is not only a constitutive dimension of positive peace but may also serve as an indicator of trustful expectations. Quite generally, the writing and signing of treaties comes with certain costs, that is, transaction costs, and accordingly, states will only sign new treaties that they expect to be implemented (Haseclever et al. 1997). In other words, states must have a minimum degree of trust in the other side's willingness to comply, and even more fundamentally, also in the other side's peaceful intend. States will only sign treaties if they can expect that militarized conflict will not erupt in the future, as it would render the signing of new treaties a risky, if not even useless, act. However, as one cannot deny that even rivals may sporadically sign treaties, several coding rules were necessary to increase the measurement's validity: first, I only focused on treaties that are signed after the end of rivalry—that is, when states have reached a phase that is at least marked by neutrality. I assume that these treaties will not be based on highly cautious and unstable expectations, as is the case under conditions of rivalry, but rather on more confident expectations. Second, I included a certain frequency threshold: states do not only have to sign treaties, but they must expand their network of bilateral ties, as it is suggested in the specification of the concept, with a certain frequency. And finally, I included a threshold regarding the cumulative sum of treaties signed under conditions of neutrality. This assured that states would have already made a series of cooperative decisions and positive experiences in the past, which had led to the development of trust and would motivate for future cooperative behavior. Accordingly, the following coding criteria were determined: To reach the level of advanced peace, states must have signed at least 20 treaties after the end of war or rivalry (under conditions

t, year t was coded as -1 as well. In contrast, when a one-year coding was part of an ongoing transition (i.e., level -1 until $t-1$, level -2 in t , and level -3 in year $t+1$), the data remained unchanged, as this coding pattern just indicates usual processes of escalation and de-escalation.

²⁵ As no data exist that directly capture trustful perceptions for a large- N sample of dyads, I had to make use of a behavioral measurement strategy for both positive peace levels (Brugger 2015). Data on bilateral treaties come from the World Treaty Index (Poast et al. 2015), but also from websites of foreign ministries. The WTI covers a large set of existing bilateral treaties but is far from being complete. Accordingly, I extracted information on bilateral treaties from foreign ministry websites, which often provide online databases on bilateral treaties. The full list of treaties as well as a list of the used data sources can be provided upon request.

of neutrality) and they must keep on signing treaties at least every 15 years. The level of strong peace is reached when 65 treaties have been signed and no more than 15 years lie between any further treaty signature. For the level of strong peace, I also included a duration criterion to comply with the level's ontological specification: States must keep on signing treaties for at least 10 years to be assigned to the level of strong peace. Otherwise, they are assigned to the level of advanced peace (see also table 3.5).

3.6 Descriptive Analytics

As there is no space for a detailed description and discussions of the retrieved peace data, only its most important characteristics shall be discussed in this section.²⁶ First, to get an overall impression of the quality of the coded peace data, table 3.6 summarizes patterns of transitions from and to different levels of peace. As transitions from lower to higher levels of peace (and vice versa) are often understood as incremental processes, one might expect that a one-level change should come with higher probability than big jumps that overleap two or more peace levels (dyads should rather change from level L to $L + 1$ or $L - 1$ than to $L \pm 2$ or $L \pm 3$). My data largely meet this expectation: when a dyad is at war, the subsequent level of hot rivalry is reached with higher probability (.2521) than levels of cold rivalry (.0798) and neutrality (0.0084). Similarly, when dyads leave the level of hot rivalry, they most likely fall back to war (.0219) or reach the level of cold rivalry (.026). The same patterns apply for the level of cold rivalry and neutrality.²⁷ Interestingly, dyads that leave the level of advanced peace either reach the level of strong peace (.0183) or fall back onto one level of rivalry (.0122). No dyad falls back to neutral peace. Moreover, only one dyad that has reached the level of strong peace does not remain there but directly falls back onto the level of hot rivalry (Italy–Yugoslavia, which have built a relation of stable friendship during the cold war years but fall back into rivalry with the Yugoslavia war in 1992; see also Ruzicic-Kessler 2014).

²⁶ The retrieved data for the given sample is provided in the Supplementary Appendix.

²⁷ The levels of advanced and strong peace cannot be reached from the levels of war and hot and cold rivalry by operational definition, as it is hardly possible that a dyad would sign 20 or even 65 treaties in year one after war or rivalry.

Table 3.6: Transition patterns, unit of analysis is the dyad-year, with row percentages

Peace in year t	Peace in year t+1						Total
	War	Hot Rivalry	Cold Rivalry	Neutral Peace	Advanced Peace	Strong Peace	
War	157	60	19	2	0	0	238
	65.97	25.21	7.98	0.84	0.00	0.00	100.00
Hot Rivalry	60	2574	71	30	0	0	2735
	2.19	94.11	2.60	1.10	0.00	0.00	100.00
Cold Rivalry	13	44	2240	69	0	0	2366
	0.55	1.86	94.67	2.92	0.00	0.00	100.00
Neutral Peace	4	34	43	3600	41	0	3722
	0.11	0.91	1.16	96.72	1.10	0.00	100.00
Advanced Peace	0	8	2	0	632	12	654
	0.00	1.22	0.31	0.00	96.64	1.83	100.00
Strong Peace	0	1	0	0	0	289	290
	0.00	0.34	0.00	0.00	0.00	99.66	100.00
Total	234	2721	2375	3701	673	301	10005
	2.34	27.20	23.74	36.99	6.73	3.01	100.00

Moreover, we might expect that higher peace levels come with increasing stability and robustness, and accordingly, the likelihood to fall back onto a lower level should decrease as the actual peace level increases. As table 3.6 reveals, the data largely correspond with this expectation. The likelihood to fall back onto any lower peace level is .0219 for hot rivalry, .0241 for cold rivalry, .0218 for neutral peace, .0153 for advanced peace, and .0034 for dyads at the level of strong peace. The stability of different peace levels is also depicted in table 3.7, which gives summarizing statistics for the duration of all six levels of P^* . The data reveal that the level of strong peace, on average, lasts longer than any other peace level (mean duration of 24.08 years), followed by the level of neutrality (21.82 years), hot rivalry (15.99 years), advanced peace (15.41 years), and war (1.91 years).

Table 3.7: Summary statistics for duration of peace levels

Level	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
War	82	1.91	2.37	0	11
Hot Rivalry	161	15.99	15.31	0	64
Cold Rivalry	178	12.58	16.86	0	132
Neutral Peace	165	21.82	21.49	0	101
Advanced Peace	41	15.41	10.69	1	41
Strong Peace	12	24.08	14.28	9	49

Besides the description of transition patterns, a brief discussion of P^* 's reliability and validity can provide some overview of the concept's overall quality. Starting with P^* 's reliability, it is important to realize that P^* 's operationalization rests on empirical data that either already exist or that can easily be retrieved from websites and other sources (data on diplomatic relations and treaties). Accordingly, there was only little room for subjective interpretation or inter-coder variance when the data for P^* were compiled. The same applies to the process of data aggregation, as the construction of the measures for P^* 's six levels is based on clear-cut coding rules that are easily replicable. Accordingly, given that we accept that the used datasets are reliable in kind, the operationalization of P^* should as well come with a high degree of reliability.²⁸ Against this background, P^* comes with certain comparable advantage vis-à-vis the peace data from Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016), whose coding-rules are not as clear cut and rely heavily on subjective coding decisions that are not as easily replicable as is the case for P^* .

With regard to the assessment of the concept's validity, lacking space prohibits a detailed discussion of single cases. I therefore start with table 3.8, which gives a brief insight into the face validity of the data, thereby focusing exemplarily on coded periods of strong peace. To briefly summarize, I assume that the given data are quite plausible, especially as existing case study literature comes to similar results.

²⁸ Sure enough, datasets that are based on direct measurement of decision-makers' perceptions, such as Thompson's strategic rivalry data and data on ICB crisis, have always been criticized for reliability issues. However due to both datasets' prominent role in peace and conflict research, I assume that they come with acceptable quality.

Table 3.8: Results for coding of strong peace

Dyad		Start strong peace	End strong peace
United States of America	German FR	1980	Ongoing
United States of America	Japan	1979	Ongoing
Brazil	Argentina	1995	Ongoing
Chile	Argentina	1999	Ongoing
United Kingdom	German FR	1977	Ongoing
United Kingdom	Italy	1970	Ongoing
United Kingdom	Japan	1997	Ongoing
France	Germany	1959	Ongoing
France	Italy	1964	Ongoing
Germany	Poland	1995	Ongoing
Italy	Yugoslavia	1981	1991
Yugoslavia	Bulgaria	1994	Ongoing

The criterion of content validity asks if “a given indicator ... adequately capture[s] the full content of the ... concept” (Adcock and Collier 2001, p. 538). Accordingly, one must ask if P^* 's operationalization captures all three dimensions that were used to specify the six levels on the second concept level. Unsurprisingly, I assume that this is the case: P^* 's negative levels of war and rivalry and the defining constitutive dimensions of behavior, expectations, and stability are measured through elaborated and established datasets that are combined and aggregated in a sound way. Moreover, I assume that my calibration of the treaty-density measurement allows capturing not only the number of bilateral ties and repeated instances of treaty signatures, but also the level of trust that is said to exist in advanced and strong levels of peace.

Finally, the criterion of convergent validity asks if “the scores ... produced by alternative indicators ... of a given systematized concept ... [are] empirically associated and thus convergent” (Adcock and Collier 2001, p. 540). The underlying logic is thereby that concepts that aim at measuring similar or even one and the same things should be empirically correlated to a sufficient degree. Or, in other words: if a newly generated measurement correlates highly with already established ones, validity can be assumed. I

thus compare my data for P^* with the data from Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016) and Bayer (2010), assuming that all three datasets aim at measuring similar phenomena (although they do heavily diverge with regard to the constitutive dimension included). The correlation between P^* and both Goertz et al.'s and Bayer's peace data is quite satisfying (.77 with the former and .67 with the latter).²⁹ I assume that these correlations are sufficiently high, and thus one may assert that P^* does not capture anything completely different than what is largely understood as "levels of peace." At the same time, I assume that the correlations are low enough to legitimize the existence of P^* (if correlations were nearly perfect, there would be no need for P^*). P^* thus presents a concept and measurement that captures a similar, but not identical, phenomenon, as the concepts do differ not only in their ontological content, but also regarding their measurement results (see also tables 3.9 and 3.10, providing a tabular comparison of the datasets).

Table 3.9: Comparison of P^ and peace data from Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016), peace period is the unit of analysis*

Peace Scale from Goertz, Diehl, and Balas (2016)							
P^*	Severe Rivalry	Lesser Rivalry	Negative Peace	Warm Peace	Security Community	Transformation	Total
War	100	3	1	0	0	1	105
Hot Rivalry	1,698	77	67	0	0	27	1,869
Cold Rivalry	291	534	430	4	0	68	1,327
Neutral Peace	132	206	1,372	99	0	38	1,847
Advanced Peace	0	92	324	135	2	8	561
Strong Peace	0	7	95	119	58	0	279
Total	2,221	919	2,289	357	60	142	5,988

²⁹ Goertz, Diehl, and Balas' (2016) level of "transition" was excluded for the computation of the correlation coefficient.

Table 3.10: Comparison of P^* and peace data from Bayer (2010), peace period is the unit of analysis

Peace Scale from Bayer (2010)					
P^*	War	Frozen Peace	Cold Peace	Warm Peace	Total
War	14	31	7	0	52
Hot Rivalry	0	236	402	12	650
Cold Rivalry	0	50	145	16	211
Neutral Peace	0	5	193	174	372
Advanced Peace	0	0	16	188	204
Strong Peace	0	0	0	57	57
Total	14	322	763	447	1,546

3.7 Summary: The Added Value of P^*

Through its parsimonious and clear-cut ontological specification and structure, P^* allows for profound theorizing on the causes and impediments of peace. Its three-dimensional structure thereby suggests that researchers may theorize on three different sets of potential explanatory variables: first, variables that impact state expectations (for instance democracy); second, variables that impact on their propensity to interact (for instance geographical proximity); and finally, variables that have influence on the stability of the resulting patterns (for instance internal or external shocks). Researchers thus may focus on all three sets of variables if they want to provide a comprehensive explanation for the increase, decrease, or stagnation of interstate peace. Moreover, they have to realize not only that it is a fallacy to assume that “the inverse of the ‘coefficients’ associated with war will get us peace” (Regan 2014, p. 345); also, a move from rivalry toward neutrality may follow a different logic than a move from neutrality to positive peace: that is, the reduction of mistrust is a different process than the building of trust, and accordingly, different explanatory factors may come into play.

The fact that P^* is not only parsimonious regarding its intention but also at the level of indicators comes with further added value.³⁰ P^* allows for theoretical reasoning and empirical analysis of various research questions that existing datasets would not be able to answer, as they would face serious endogeneity issues. This also includes, for instance, questions about the effect of international institutions. P^* allows researchers to explore the role of international organizations and multilateral treaties within the process of peacemaking, without facing endogeneity issues, as these institutions do not form part of the concept. Notably, they may even ask for the effect of specific bilateral institutions that show certain features regarding their design or issue area, as only the number and frequency of bilateral treaty signatures form part of the concept's intension and operationalization. For instance, researchers may want to estimate the causal effect of bilateral confidence-building measures (CBM) or preferential trade agreements (PTA) on transitions to higher levels of peace. Accordingly, they may first formulate theoretical assumptions about the causal link between such institutions and transitions to peace. On the empirical level of indicators, they would then analyze whether bilateral treaty signature patterns are more likely to increase in quality if one of the agreements that has been signed beforehand is a CBM or a PTA.

In sum, keeping the concept P^* as parsimonious as possible increases the theoretical and empirical discretion of researchers significantly. P^* allows researchers estimating causal effects of various interesting variables without the risk of estimating obvious endogenic and tautological correlations. P^* may thus help us gain valuable insights about the causes and processes of peace even though—or particularly because—the concept follows the logic of less is more.

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³⁰ Sure enough, every dataset and every operationalization is a moving target that needs continuous evaluation and improvement in light of a critical comparison of the coded results. Due to the inductive determination of several thresholds, coding rules might change in upcoming versions of the dataset when new cases will be added.

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Supplementary Appendix: Peace Codings for 126 Dyads

Table 3.11: *Peace codings for 126 Dyads*

Afghanistan	Pakistan	0	1947	1948
Afghanistan	Pakistan	-2	1949	2001
Albania	Greece	-2	1946	1949
Albania	Greece	-1	1950	1993
Albania	Greece	-2	1994	1997
Albania	Greece	0	1998	ongoing in 2001
Angola	South Africa	-1	1975	1993
Angola	South Africa	0	1994	ongoing in 2001
Argentina	UK	1	1946	1975
Argentina	UK	-2	1976	1981
Argentina	UK	-3	1982	1982
Argentina	UK	-2	1983	1983
Argentina	UK	-1	1984	1989
Argentina	UK	0	1990	2000
Armenia	Azerbaijan	-1	1991	1991
Armenia	Azerbaijan	-2	1992	2001
Bahrain	Qatar	0	1971	1983
Bahrain	Qatar	-1	1984	ongoing in 2001

Belize	Guatemala	-1	1981	ongoing in 2001
Bolivia	Chile	-1	pre1945	ongoing in 2001
Brazil	Argentina	-1	Pre1945	1985
Brazil	Argentina	0	1986	1987
Brazil	Argentina	1	1988	1994
Brazil	Argentina	2	1995	ongoing in 2001
Bulgaria	Romania	-1	Pre1945	1945
Bulgaria	Romania	0	1946	1971
Bulgaria	Romania	1	1972	ongoing in 2001
Bulgaria	Turkey	-2	Pre1945	1952
Bulgaria	Turkey	0	1953	1985
Bulgaria	Turkey	-1	1986	1987
Bulgaria	Turkey	0	1988	ongoing in 2001
Burundi	Rwanda	-1	1962	1973
Burundi	Rwanda	0	1974	ongoing in 2001
Cambodia	Rep of Vietnam	0	1954	1955
Cambodia	Rep of Vietnam	-2	1956	1967
Cambodia	Rep of Vietnam	-1	1968	1975
Cambodia	Vietnam	0	1954	1968
Cambodia	Vietnam	-2	1969	1969
Cambodia	Vietnam	-3	1970	1979
Cambodia	Vietnam	-1	1980	1983
Cambodia	Vietnam	0	1984	ongoing in 2001
Cameroon	Nigeria	0	1960	1974
Cameroon	Nigeria	-1	1975	1980

Cameroon	Nigeria	-2	1981	1998
Cameroon	Nigeria	-1	1999	ongoing in 2001
Chad	Libya	0	1960	1965
Chad	Libya	-1	1966	1975
Chad	Libya	-2	1976	1994
Chad	Libya	0	1995	ongoing in 2001
Chad	Sudan	0	1960	1963
Chad	Sudan	-1	1964	1969
Chad	Sudan	0	1970	ongoing in 2001
Chile	Argentina	-1	Pre1945	1951
Chile	Argentina	-2	1952	1984
Chile	Argentina	-1	1985	1991
Chile	Argentina	0	1992	1994
Chile	Argentina	1	1995	1998
Chile	Argentina	2	1999	ongoing in 2001
China	India	0	1947	1949
China	India	-2	1950	1960
China	India	-3	1961	1962
China	India	-2	1963	1987
China	India	0	1988	1992
China	India	1	1993	ongoing in 2001
China	Japan	-3	Pre1945	1945
China	Japan	-2	1946	1958
China	Japan	-1	1959	ongoing in 2001
China	Taiwan	-2	1949	2001
China	Vietnam	0	1954	1972

China	Vietnam	-1	1973	1974
China	Vietnam	-2	1975	1977
China	Vietnam	-3	1978	1979
China	Vietnam	-2	1980	1985
China	Vietnam	-3	1986	1987
China	Vietnam	-2	1988	1998
China	Vietnam	-1	1999	ongoing in 2001
Colombia	Venezuela	0	Pre1945	1963
Colombia	Venezuela	1	1964	1981
Colombia	Venezuela	-2	1982	2000
Costa Rica	Panama	0	Pre1945	1994
Costa Rica	Panama	1	1995	ongoing in 2001
Croatia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	-2	1992	1996
Croatia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	1997	2000
Croatia	Yugoslavia	-2	1992	2000
Djibouti	Eritrea	0	1993	1994
Djibouti	Eritrea	-1	1995	ongoing in 2001
DR Congo	Angola	-2	1975	1978
DR Congo	Angola	-1	1979	1997
DR Congo	Angola	0	1998	ongoing in 2001
DR Congo	Rwanda	-1	1962	1966
DR Congo	Rwanda	0	1967	1995
DR Congo	Rwanda	-2	1996	2001

DR Congo	Uganda	0	1962	1976
DR Congo	Uganda	-2	1977	2001
Ecuador	Peru	-2	Pre1945	1955
Ecuador	Peru	-1	1956	1976
Ecuador	Peru	-2	1977	1998
Ecuador	Peru	-1	1999	ongoing in 2001
Egypt	Israel	-3	1948	1948
Egypt	Israel	-2	1949	1954
Egypt	Israel	-3	1955	1956
Egypt	Israel	-2	1957	1966
Egypt	Israel	-3	1967	1973
Egypt	Israel	-2	1974	1989
Egypt	Israel	0	1990	ongoing in 2001
Egypt	Jordan	-1	1946	1947
Egypt	Jordan	-2	1948	1962
Egypt	Jordan	-1	1963	1984
Egypt	Jordan	0	1985	2000
Egypt	Saudi Arabia	0	Pre1945	1956
Egypt	Saudi Arabia	-1	1957	1961
Egypt	Saudi Arabia	-2	1962	1967
Egypt	Saudi Arabia	-1	1968	1985
Egypt	Saudi Arabia	0	1986	ongoing in 2001
Egypt	Syria	0	1946	1959
Egypt	Syria	-1	1960	1990
Egypt	Syria	0	1991	ongoing in 2001
Equatorial Guinea	Gabon	0	1968	ongoing in 2001

Eritrea	Sudan	0	1993	1993
Eritrea	Sudan	-2	1994	1999
Eritrea	Sudan	-1	2000	ongoing in 2001
Ethiopia	Eritrea	0	1993	1997
Ethiopia	Eritrea	-1	1998	ongoing in 2001
Ethiopia	Sudan	0	1956	1966
Ethiopia	Sudan	-2	1967	1997
Ethiopia	Sudan	0	1998	ongoing in 2001
France	Germany FR	-3	Pre1945	1945
France	Germany FR	-1	1946	1955
France	Germany FR	0	1956	1956
France	Germany FR	1	1957	1958
France	Germany FR	2	1959	ongoing in 2001
France	Italy	0	Pre1945	1950
France	Italy	1	1951	1963
France	Italy	2	1964	ongoing in 2001
Germany	Russia	-3	Pre1945	1945
Germany	Russia	-1	1946	1971
Germany	Russia	0	1972	1987
Germany	Russia	1	1988	ongoing in 2001
Germany FR	German DR	-1	1955	1974
Germany FR	German DR	0	1975	1990
Germany FR	Poland	-1	Pre1945	1972
Germany FR	Poland	0	1973	1988
Germany FR	Poland	1	1989	1994
Germany FR	Poland	2	1995	ongoing in 2001

Ghana	Nigeria	-1	1960	1966
Ghana	Nigeria	0	1967	ongoing in 2001
Ghana	Togo	-1	1960	1960
Ghana	Togo	-2	1961	1994
Ghana	Togo	-1	1995	1995
Ghana	Togo	0	1996	ongoing in 2001
Greece	Bulgaria	-2	Pre1945	1952
Greece	Bulgaria	0	1953	1990
Greece	Bulgaria	1	1991	ongoing in 2001
Greece	Turkey	0	Pre1945	1957
Greece	Turkey	-2	1958	2001
Guinea-Bissau	Senegal	0	1974	1988
Guinea-Bissau	Senegal	-1	1989	ongoing in 2001
Honduras	El Salvador	-1	Pre1945	1968
Honduras	El Salvador	-3	1969	1969
Honduras	El Salvador	-2	1970	1993
Honduras	El Salvador	0	1994	ongoing in 2001
Honduras	Nicaragua	-1	Pre1945	1956
Honduras	Nicaragua	-2	1957	2001
Hungary	Romania	-3	Pre1945	1945
Hungary	Romania	-1	1946	1947
Hungary	Romania	0	1948	1995
Hungary	Romania	1	1996	ongoing in 2001
Hungary	Yugoslavia	-2	Pre1945	1952
Hungary	Yugoslavia	-1	1953	1955

Hungary	Yugoslavia	0	1956	1990
Hungary	Yugoslavia	-2	1991	2000
India	Pakistan	-3	1947	1949
India	Pakistan	-2	1950	1964
India	Pakistan	-3	1965	1965
India	Pakistan	-2	1966	1970
India	Pakistan	-3	1971	1971
India	Pakistan	-2	1972	2001
Iran	Afghanistan	0	Pre1945	1978
Iran	Afghanistan	-2	1979	1999
Iran	Afghanistan	-1	2000	ongoing in 2001
Iran	Egypt	0	Pre1945	1954
Iran	Egypt	-1	1955	ongoing in 2001
Iran	Iraq	-2	Pre1945	1979
Iran	Iraq	-3	1980	1988
Iran	Iraq	-2	1989	1999
Iran	Iraq	-1	2000	ongoing in 2001
Iran	Israel	0	1948	1959
Iran	Israel	-1	1960	ongoing in 2001
Iran	Saudi Arabia	0	Pre1945	1980
Iran	Saudi Arabia	-1	1981	1983
Iran	Saudi Arabia	-2	1984	1988
Iran	Saudi Arabia	0	1989	ongoing in 2001
Iraq	Egypt	0	Pre1945	1958
Iraq	Egypt	-2	1959	1962
Iraq	Egypt	0	1963	1979

Iraq	Egypt	-1	1980	1989
Iraq	Egypt	-3	1990	1991
Iraq	Egypt	-2	1992	1999
Iraq	Egypt	-1	2000	ongoing in 2001
Iraq	Israel	-3	1948	1948
Iraq	Israel	-2	1949	1972
Iraq	Israel	-3	1973	1973
Iraq	Israel	-2	1974	1998
Iraq	Israel	-1	1999	ongoing in 2001
Iraq	Kuwait	-2	1961	2001
Iraq	Saudi Arabia	-1	Pre1945	1960
Iraq	Saudi Arabia	-2	1961	1989
Iraq	Saudi Arabia	-3	1990	1991
Iraq	Saudi Arabia	-2	1992	2001
Iraq	Syria	0	1946	1975
Iraq	Syria	-2	1976	1989
Iraq	Syria	-3	1990	1991
Iraq	Syria	-1	1992	ongoing in 2001
Italy	Ethiopia	-1	Pre1945	1951
Italy	Ethiopia	0	1952	ongoing in 2001
Italy	Turkey	0	1925	ongoing in 2001
Italy	Yugoslavia	-2	Pre1945	1956
Italy	Yugoslavia	0	1957	1960
Italy	Yugoslavia	1	1961	1980
Italy	Yugoslavia	2	1981	1991
Italy	Yugoslavia	-2	1992	2000

Ivory Coast	Ghana	-1	1960	1970
Ivory Coast	Ghana	0	1971	ongoing in 2001
Jordan	Israel	-3	1948	1948
Jordan	Israel	-2	1949	1966
Jordan	Israel	-3	1967	1967
Jordan	Israel	-2	1968	1970
Jordan	Israel	-3	1971	1973
Jordan	Israel	-1	1974	1981
Jordan	Israel	-3	1982	1985
Jordan	Israel	-1	1986	1994
Jordan	Israel	0	1995	ongoing in 2001
Jordan	Saudi Arabia	-1	1946	1958
Jordan	Saudi Arabia	0	1959	ongoing in 2001
Kenya	Somalia	-2	1963	1989
Kenya	Somalia	0	1990	ongoing in 2001
Kenya	Sudan	-1	1963	1965
Kenya	Sudan	0	1966	1988
Kenya	Sudan	-1	1989	1994
Kenya	Sudan	0	1995	ongoing in 2001
Libya	Egypt	0	1951	1972
Libya	Egypt	-1	1973	1974
Libya	Egypt	-2	1975	1985
Libya	Egypt	-1	1986	1992
Libya	Egypt	0	1993	2001
Libya	Sudan	0	1956	1971
Libya	Sudan	-1	1972	1985
Libya	Sudan	0	1986	ongoing in 2001

Malaysia	Indonesia	-2	1963	1965
Malaysia	Indonesia	-1	1966	1967
Malaysia	Indonesia	0	1968	1981
Malaysia	Indonesia	1	1982	ongoing in 2001
Malaysia	Singapore	0	1965	ongoing in 2001
Mali	Burkina Faso	-1	1960	1973
Mali	Burkina Faso	-2	1974	1986
Mali	Burkina Faso	0	1987	ongoing in 2001
Mauritania	Morocco	-1	1960	1987
Mauritania	Morocco	0	1988	ongoing in 2001
Morocco	Algeria	-2	1962	1984
Morocco	Algeria	-1	1985	1987
Morocco	Algeria	0	1988	ongoing in 2001
Mozambique	South Africa	-1	1975	1982
Mozambique	South Africa	-2	1983	1987
Mozambique	South Africa	-1	1988	1993
Mozambique	South Africa	0	1994	1999
Mozambique	South Africa	1	2000	ongoing in 2001
Mozambique	Zimbabwe	-1	1975	1979
Mozambique	Zimbabwe	0	1980	ongoing in 2001
Netherlands	Indonesia	-1	1949	1950
Netherlands	Indonesia	-2	1951	1962
Netherlands	Indonesia	0	1963	1981
Netherlands	Indonesia	1	1982	ongoing in 2001
Nicaragua	Colombia	0	Pre1945	1978
Nicaragua	Colombia	-1	1979	ongoing in 2001

Nicaragua	Costa Rica	0	Pre1945	1947
Nicaragua	Costa Rica	-2	1948	1957
Nicaragua	Costa Rica	-1	1958	1976
Nicaragua	Costa Rica	-2	1977	1998
Nicaragua	Costa Rica	-1	1999	ongoing in 2001
North Korea	South Korea	-2	1949	1949
North Korea	South Korea	-3	1950	1953
North Korea	South Korea	-2	1954	2001
Poland	Lithuania	0	Pre1945	1959
Poland	Lithuania	-1	1960	1992
Poland	Lithuania	0	1993	1996
Poland	Lithuania	1	1997	ongoing in 2001
Poland	Russia	0	Pre1945	1957
Poland	Russia	1	1958	1992
Poland	Russia	-1	1993	1997
Poland	Russia	0	1998	ongoing in 2001
Russia	China	-2	Pre1945	1994
Russia	China	0	1995	ongoing in 2001
Russia	Japan	-2	1945	2001
Saudi Arabia	Yemen	0	Pre1945	1961
Saudi Arabia	Yemen	-2	1962	1980
Saudi Arabia	Yemen	-1	1981	ongoing in 2001
Senegal	Mauritania	-1	1960	1962
Senegal	Mauritania	0	1963	1988
Senegal	Mauritania	-1	1989	1995
Senegal	Mauritania	0	1996	ongoing in 2001

Somalia	Ethiopia	-2	1960	1976
Somalia	Ethiopia	-3	1977	1978
Somalia	Ethiopia	-2	1979	1985
Somalia	Ethiopia	-1	1986	1988
Somalia	Ethiopia	0	1989	ongoing in 2001
Spain	Morocco	0	Pre1945	1955
Spain	Morocco	-1	1956	1956
Spain	Morocco	-2	1957	1980
Spain	Morocco	-1	1981	1991
Spain	Morocco	0	1992	1997
Spain	Morocco	1	1998	ongoing in 2001
Sudan	Egypt	0	1956	1973
Sudan	Egypt	1	1974	1990
Sudan	Egypt	-2	1991	1996
Sudan	Egypt	0	1997	2000
Syria	Israel	-3	1948	1948
Syria	Israel	-2	1949	1965
Syria	Israel	-3	1966	1967
Syria	Israel	-2	1968	1970
Syria	Israel	-3	1971	1973
Syria	Israel	-2	1974	1981
Syria	Israel	-3	1982	1982
Syria	Israel	-2	1983	2001
Syria	Jordan	0	1946	1948
Syria	Jordan	-2	1949	1982
Syria	Jordan	0	1983	ongoing in 2001
Syria	Saudi Arabia	0	1946	1960
Syria	Saudi Arabia	-1	1961	1970

Syria	Saudi Arabia	0	1971	ongoing in 2001
Tanzania	Malawi	-1	1964	1994
Tanzania	Malawi	0	1995	ongoing in 2001
Thailand	Vietnam	-1	1954	1960
Thailand	Vietnam	-2	1961	1966
Thailand	Vietnam	-3	1967	1973
Thailand	Vietnam	-2	1974	1995
Thailand	Vietnam	0	1996	ongoing in 2001
Turkey	Syria	-1	1946	1954
Turkey	Syria	-2	1955	1998
Turkey	Syria	-1	1999	ongoing in 2001
Uganda	Kenya	0	1963	1964
Uganda	Kenya	-2	1965	1997
Uganda	Kenya	0	1998	ongoing in 2001
Uganda	Rwanda	-1	1962	1964
Uganda	Rwanda	0	1965	1990
Uganda	Rwanda	-2	1991	2001
Uganda	Sudan	0	1962	1962
Uganda	Sudan	-1	1963	1967
Uganda	Sudan	-2	1968	2001
Uganda	Tanzania	-1	1962	1970
Uganda	Tanzania	-2	1971	1977
Uganda	Tanzania	-3	1978	1979
Uganda	Tanzania	-1	1980	1984
Uganda	Tanzania	0	1985	ongoing in 2001

UK	Germany	-3	Pre1945	1945
UK	Germany	-1	1946	1954
UK	Germany	0	1955	1957
UK	Germany	1	1958	1976
UK	Germany	2	1977	ongoing in 2001
UK	Italy	0	Pre1945	1949
UK	Italy	1	1950	1969
UK	Italy	2	1970	ongoing in 2001
UK	Japan	-3	Pre1945	1945
UK	Japan	-1	1946	1950
UK	Japan	0	1951	1954
UK	Japan	1	1955	1996
UK	Japan	2	1997	ongoing in 2001
UK	Russia	-2	Pre1945	1999
UK	Russia	-1	2000	ongoing in 2001
USA	China	0	Pre1945	1948
USA	China	-2	1949	1949
USA	China	-3	1950	1953
USA	China	-2	1954	2001
USA	Cuba	0	Pre1945	1950
USA	Cuba	1	1951	1958
USA	Cuba	-2	1959	1996
USA	Cuba	-1	1997	ongoing in 2001
USA	Germany FR	-3	Pre1945	1945
USA	Germany FR	-1	1946	1954
USA	Germany FR	0	1955	1958
USA	Germany FR	1	1959	1979

USA	Germany FR	2	1980	ongoing in 2001
USA	Japan	-3	Pre1945	1945
USA	Japan	-1	1946	1951
USA	Japan	0	1952	1955
USA	Japan	1	1956	1978
USA	Japan	2	1979	ongoing in 2001
USA	Russia	-1	1945	1945
USA	Russia	-2	1946	2000
Uzbekistan	Kazakhstan	0	1991	1993
Uzbekistan	Kazakhstan	1	1994	ongoing in 2001
Venezuela	Guyana	-2	1966	1999
Venezuela	Guyana	-1	2000	ongoing in 2001
Vietnam	Rep of Vietnam	-1	1954	1959
Vietnam	Rep of Vietnam	-2	1960	1963
Vietnam	Rep of Vietnam	-3	1964	1975
Yemen AR	Yemen PR	-1	1967	1990
Yemen PR	Oman	-1	1971	1971
Yemen PR	Oman	-2	1972	1982
Yemen PR	Oman	-1	1983	1990
Yugoslavia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	-2	1992	1994
Yugoslavia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	-1	1995	ongoing in 2001
Yugoslavia	Bulgaria	-2	Pre1945	1952

Yugoslavia	Bulgaria	-1	1953	1955
Yugoslavia	Bulgaria	0	1956	1958
Yugoslavia	Bulgaria	1	1959	1993
Yugoslavia	Bulgaria	2	1994	ongoing in 2001
Yugoslavia	Greece	-1	Pre1945	1953
Yugoslavia	Greece	0	1954	1963
Yugoslavia	Greece	1	1964	1991
Yugoslavia	Greece	-2	1992	2000
Yugoslavia	Russia	0	Pre1945	1947
Yugoslavia	Russia	-1	1948	1955
Yugoslavia	Russia	0	1956	1995
Yugoslavia	Russia	1	1996	1997
Yugoslavia	Russia	-2	1998	2000
Zambia	Malawi	-1	1964	1986
Zambia	Malawi	0	1987	ongoing in 2001
Zambia	South Africa	-1	1964	1967
Zambia	South Africa	-2	1968	1987
Zambia	South Africa	-1	1988	1994
Zambia	South Africa	0	1995	ongoing in 2001
Zambia	Zimbabwe	-2	1965	1979
Zambia	Zimbabwe	-1	1980	1980
Zambia	Zimbabwe	0	1981	ongoing in 2001
Zimbabwe	South Africa	0	1965	1965
Zimbabwe	South Africa	-1	1966	1968
Zimbabwe	South Africa	0	1969	1979
Zimbabwe	South Africa	-1	1980	1993
Zimbabwe	South Africa	0	1994	ongoing in 2001

4 Trustful Behavior is Meaningful Behavior: Implications for Theory on Identification-based Trusting Relations

Lukas Kasten

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This article emphasizes that trustful behavior is meaningful behavior which communicates that the interaction partner is perceived as a trustworthy actor. It shows how this almost trivial insight can enrich our theoretical understanding of trusting relations in a significant way. Three assumptions will be derived which emphasize the relational character of trust and which focus on causal and constitutive interactions between trustful behavior and certain inter-subjective structures in which a relationship is embedded: first, trustful behavior (re-)produces shared social identity; second, trustful behavior satisfies the socio-emotional needs of the trusted actor; and third, trustful behavior complies with a social norm and obligation to trust. These assumptions will be applied for a theoretical analysis of processes of building and maintaining identification-based trusting relations. It will be highlighted that the active celebration of trustful behavior itself is necessary for the (re-)production of the socio-emotional foundation of an identification-based trusting relationship. Moreover, the theoretical analysis will provide a discussion of appropriate and effective reassurance strategies which actors may follow in times of uncertainty and doubt. In sum, the article provides a new perspective on the relationship between trust and risk: not only trustful behavior is (objectively) risky, but also the refusal of trust. Actors who unnecessarily refuse to engage in trustful behavior risk deteriorating the relationship.¹

Keywords: Identification-based trust; meaning of trust; trust-building; trust-maintenance; norms; as-if trusting

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4.1 Introduction

Trustful behavior comes with an inherently positive message. It signals to an interaction partner that she is seen as a trustworthy actor, that is, as an upright and honest actor. Whereas this insight seems trivial at first glance, the central argument of this article is that it can enrich our understanding of trust and especially of identification-based trust (IBT) in a significant way.

Understanding trustful behavior as meaningful behavior allows for the formulation of three assumptions. These assumptions account for the relational character of trust and highlight the social embeddedness of trusting relations. They do so by emphasizing that trustful behavior causally and constitutively interacts with certain inter-subjective structures. The first assumption states that trustful behavior constitutively produces and reproduces a shared social identity between the actors involved. The second assumption argues that trustful behavior elicits positive emotional reactions on the side of the trustee and satisfies his socio-emotional desire to be trusted by in-group members. The third assumption emphasizes that trustful behavior complies with a social norm and obligation to engage in trustful behavior in in-group relations.

Notably, these assumptions build on and revive ideas and arguments that have already been contemplated by philosophers, sociologists, and social psychologists. However, although diffuse agreement exists about the general validity of the assumptions, only few accounts provide detailed theoretical explanations for why trustful behavior interacts with patterns of social identity, with socio-emotional desires to be trusted, and with a social obligation to act trustfully. Moreover, it is hardly deniable that the ideas and arguments included in the assumptions have played only a minor role in today's trust research. Against this background, the aim of this article is threefold: the first aim is to attract trust researchers' attention and to highlight the causal and constitutive inter-actions between trustful behavior, social identity, socio-emotional desires, and norms of trusting as such. The second aim is to provide a theoretical framework which gives a parsimonious and straightforward theoretical foundation for each assumption, mainly making use of sociological and social-psychological theory. The third aim is to show that the assumptions are important and come with added value.

I will therefore show how the assumptions can be used to enrich our understanding of IBT relationships. I will argue that building and maintaining IBT relations presumes

not only continuous trustworthy behavior, as one might intuitively assume. Rather, trustful behavior itself becomes equally necessary, as it fosters the socio-emotional foundation on which IBT relations are founded. This implies that, under certain circumstances, actors may also have to engage in as-if trustful behavior, that is, behavior which resembles trustful behavior from the outside perspective but does not rest on a trustful expectation. Moreover, I will discuss appropriate and effective reassurance strategies which actors may follow when an IBT relationship is still to develop or when temporary doubts erupt in an already established IBT relationship. I will highlight the concept of what I call “soft” reassurance strategies that help actors to safeguard against exploitation without obviously reflecting an actor’s lack of trust. In this way, soft reassurance strategies meet the need for (as-if) trustful behavior while at the same time reducing the risk of continued cooperation. As these derivations show certain similarities to established theoretical arguments, my discussion will also illustrate how they contradict and/or complement existing accounts.

This article has the potential to contribute to several literature strands: First, the article adds to the ontological literature on IBT relationships (Lewicki et al. 2006). Second, the article can enrich literature on IBT building and maintenance (Child 2001; Lewicki and Bunker 1996; Shapiro et al. 1992). Third, the article also joins a research strand which puts the subjective experiences of trustful behavior and of feelings of being trusted in the center of attention, thus supporting relational and interactive perspectives which put equal weight on the analysis of actors in their roles as trustors and trustees (Baer et al. 2015; Frederiksen 2014; Korsgaard 2018; Miller 2000b; Six et al. 2010; Skinner et al. 2014).

The article is structured as follows: first, I will provide some very basic conceptual specifications. The third chapter reviews the literature which is closely connected to this article’s central assumptions and line of reasoning. In the fourth chapter, I will discuss the three assumptions which deal with trustful behavior as meaningful behavior. I will then illustrate how they can be applied and how they inform our understanding of IBT relationships in the fifth chapter. The article ends with a short summarizing conclusion.

4.2 Conceptual Foundations

A fruitful discussion of the meaning of trustful behavior presumes the following conceptual specifications: First, it is necessary to distinguish between trustful expectations and trustful behavior (McKnight and Chervany 2001). Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998, p. 395) provide a widely accepted definition of a trustful expectation as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another”. A trustful expectation “re-duces” or “suspends” a trustor’s subjective uncertainty about a trustee’s future behavior and enables the trustor to engage in trustful behavior (Möllering 2006c). Trustful behavior can be defined as a cooperative move which a trustor engages in without safe-guarding against exploitation, thus making himself truly vulnerable. Trustful behavior is objectively risky, but subjectively perceived as non-risky, due to the trustor’s positive expectation. For different reasons which will be elaborated below, actors may also engage in behavior which resembles trustful behavior from an outside perspective, although they do not maintain a trustful expectation. I will follow Hardin (1993) and Möllering (2006c) and call this kind of behavior as-if trustful behavior. Both, trustful behavior and as-if trustful behavior elicit a perception of being trusted on the side of the trustee. It equals the perception that “another party is willing to accept vulnerability to one’s actions” (Baer et al. 2015, p. 1637). Finally, it is important to clearly separate (as-if) trustful behavior from trustworthy behavior. The former resembles an objectively risky first move, while the latter represents the cooperative response. Game-theoretical models often assume that trustful behavior at the same time represents trustworthy behavior, but it is of utmost importance for the following elaborations to clearly separate them conceptually (Kydd 2000a).

4.3 Literature Review

As this article highlights that trustful behavior interacts with certain relational and intersubjective structures, the following literature review first discusses in how far existing literature strands generally account for the social embeddedness of trusting relations and the causal and/or co-constitutive nexus between agency/interaction and social structure (and vice versa).

Clearly, rationalist or “calculus-based” theories of trust reduce the relational and social aspects of trust to a minimum. Here, it is assumed that actors view each other as egoists who cooperate only out of egoistic self-interest, and the formation of a trustful expectation and the decision to engage in trustful behavior rest solely on information about the other side’s present self-interest in reciprocating cooperation (Hardin 2002; Lewicki et al. 2006). External material incentive structures may elicit cooperation, but social and intersubjective structures do not play any role within this entirely voluntarist ontology of trust. Moreover, successful trustful interaction allows actors to increase actors’ gains but is not inter-subjectively meaningful in any sense. It may facilitate an update of an actor’s probability estimates about the other side’s interest in cooperation, but as rationalist ontology is blind for inter-subjective structures, it is also blind for the interplay between trustful interaction and the same. Notably, as actors are aware that material structures as well as preferences may change over time, continuous gathering and processing of information about the other side’s actual interest is necessary to maintain a trusting relationship (Rousseau et al. 1998).

Existing stage models of trust and trust-building assume that calculus-based trust may transform into identification-based trust (IBT) (Lewicki et al. 2006). Identification-based trust is a thoroughly relational concept that assumes that a positive interaction history produces the necessary cognitive and socio-emotional foundations of trustful relations (Barbalet 1996; Lewis and Weigert 1985). Questions of social embeddedness and intersubjective structures play an important role within the concept of IBT as mutual identification, that is, a shared social identity is seen as the basis of especially strong and robust trusting relations (Lewicki et al. 2006; Rousseau et al. 1998, p. 399). As Simmel argues, trust rests on an “element of socio-psychological quasi-religious faith” (Simmel 1990, p. 179). Shared social identity thereby plays a twofold role, as it facilitates both trustful expectations and trustworthy conduct. When actors identify with each other, they view each other as moral in-group members who follow the same norms and values (Lewicki et al. 2006; Rathbun 2009; Uslaner 2002). This allows actors to form expectations “without the need to constantly collect information in every new situation” (Rathbun 2009, p. 351; Rousseau et al. 1998) and to establish “certainty beyond observable evidence” (Mercer 2005, p. 95). Social-psychologists also show that shared social identity activates automatic cognitive processing modes, positive stereotyping and cognitive schemata which allow actors to form positive expectations without engaging in complex and

effortful calculation (Dovidio et al. 2010; McEvily 2011; Rompf 2015).² As noted above, a shared social identity also serves as a foundation for trustworthy and pro-social behavior, as it binds actors together and facilitates perceptions of the other side as extension of the self. Hence, a shared social identity can be understood as the container of a deeply internalized norm of trustworthy conduct (see for instance Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000).

Another important concept of trust that explicitly accounts for the social embeddedness of relations and for the interaction between agency and structure is the concept of institutional-based trust. It follows neo-institutionalist ontology and understands institutions as shared formal and informal roles, rules, routines, expectations, and practices which constitute and establish a “world in common” and “situational normality”. Against this background, “taken for granted assumptions” and “perceptions of safety” evolve which render trustful conduct and trustworthy reciprocation the “normal” thing to do (Bachmann and Inkpen 2011, p. 293; Möllering 2006b; Zucker 1986).

It has been shown that institutional-based and identification-based conceptualizations of trust assume that the social setting impacts on actors’ willingness or ability to engage in trustful and trustworthy behavior. At the same time, it is important that both conceptualizations do not model the nexus between social structure and interaction as a one-way street. Rather, they view agency and structure as truly reciprocal and co-constitutive (Frederiksen 2014; Möllering 2013). For instance, Möllering (Möllering 2005b, 22, 23) interprets Giddens’ notion of “active trust” in a structurationist sense, as Giddens argues that trust has to be “worked on” and that actors actively reproduce its socio-emotional foundation through trustful behavior and being trustworthy in a “mutual process of self-disclosure” (Giddens 1990, 96, 121). Moreover, Sydow’s (2006) structuration perspective on trust also explicitly emphasizes the recursive relationship between structure and agency. Within and besides those accounts that generally acknowledge the social embeddedness of trusting relations and that model the interactions between agency and structure, only few explicitly deal with trustful behavior as socially meaningful behavior

² Research on in-group favoritism also shows that actors tend to represent in-group members as especially trustworthy as it serves the socio-emotional need to represent one’s own in-group as superior, in this way fostering self-esteem. Researchers have thereby shown that “[a]cross experimental and field studies (...), the dimensions on which evaluative bias in favour of in-groups occurs most reliably are those associated with trustworthiness, honesty, or loyalty” (Brewer 1979, p. 321; see also Dion 1973).

and its interaction with social identity, socio-emotional desires, and a social norm and obligation to act trustfully.

Horsburgh (1960), Pettit (1995), Miller (2000b), Pelligra (2010), and Dunning, Fetchenhauer, and Schlösser (2012), among others, highlight the positive message that is inherent to trustful behavior. For example, Pettit states that “(t)he act of trust will communicate (...) that the trustor believes the trustee to be truly trustworthy, or is prepared to act on the presumption that he is” (Pettit 1995, p. 214).

Möllering has prominently illustrated the constitutive relationship between trusting and identity, emphasizing that trustful behavior “builds on and sustains personal and collective identities” (Möllering 2013, p. 293). In a similar vein, Thomas (1979, p. 100) assumes for the case of friendship that “a commitment to trust is presupposed as a defining characteristic of the relationship” (2015, see also; Frederiksen 2014; Maguire et al. 2001; Skinner et al. 2014; Zhang and Huxham 2009).

The idea that trustful behavior elicits positive emotional reactions on the side of the trustee and satisfies his socio-emotional desire to be trusted dates back to Adam Smith who argued that “(n)ature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to please” .³ Similarly, Skinner et al. (2014) use social exchange theory and gift-giving theory to argue that trustful behavior and being trusted can be perceived as a gift. Baer et al. (2015), in contrast, doubt the existence of a desire to be trusted as they argue that being trusted may also trigger emotional exhaustion.

Deutsch (1973, p. 146) already mentions that (as-if) trustful behavior may become a social obligation and therefore must be understood as one form of “social conformity“ in close in-group relationships. Thomas describes “relationships in which such a heavy weight is placed upon the need to trust that the obligation to trust seems to be irrefragible (...)” (Thomas 1979, pp. 100–101). Similar, Eric Uslaner speaks of a “commandment to treat people as if they were trustworthy” (Uslaner 2002, p. 18). For Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna (1996, p. 376), trust may become important for the reproduction of “identities and images that attend being a ‘good’ group member who cares about maintaining that good standing” (see also Baron 1998; Hardin 2002, 76, 469; Hartmann 1962;

³ Researchers generally account for the positive emotional reactions that are elicited by trustworthy behavior (for instance Chen et al. 2011). My elaborations, however, focus on the emotional significance of trustful behavior for the trustee.

Luhmann 1979, pp. 44–45; Rotter 1980, p. 4; Singh 2012). Similarly, institutional-based trust concepts include the idea of trust as “normative isomorphism”, which suggests that “actors who have been socialised to place or honour trust in certain types of situation will conform to this expectation, because otherwise they would be going against their own nature or against the objective reality of society” (Möllering 2005b, p. 13; see also Zucker 1986).

In sum, there exists a large literature which explicates the social embeddedness of trusting relations and accounts for the causal and constitutive interactions between structure and agency. The idea that trustful behavior interacts with social identity, socio-emotional desires and a social obligation to act trustfully has already been subject to scholarly reasoning as well. Diffuse agreement exists regarding the plausibility of the assumed interactions, but most accounts remain superficial and do not provide in-depth theoretical explanations. In the following section, I will provide a parsimonious and straightforward theoretical foundation that rests on sociological and social-psychological thinking.

4.4 Assumptions

The following elaborations emphasize that trustful behavior is expressive behavior, which comes with intersubjective meaning when it is observed and experienced. More specifically, trustful behavior communicates that the trustor perceives the trustee as a trustworthy actor. Hence, the message which is inherent to trustful behavior is positive throughout, as it represents the trustee as upright and honest. From the perspective of the trustee, being trusted elicits positive emotions and is flattering. A trustee who is being trusted experiences the other actor’s trust and that he is seen in a positive light.

Due to its inherently positive message, trustful behavior represents a behavior-al symbol of social belonging. It is therefore reasonable to argue that trustful behavior constitutively produces and reproduces perceptions of we-ness, that is, a shared social identity. Social identity can be defined as “that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1978, p. 63). Social identity specifies “Who is us? (...) (W)hat people belong to the in-group, and, by extension, what defines the boundaries of the group, and who does not belong” (Herrmann

and Brewer 2004, p. 6). Hence, social identity is defined through differentiation – an imagined boundary which determines who is “in” and who is “out”. To think in terms of “us” and “them”, groups must have something in common (‘What are we?’) (Herrmann and Brewer 2004, p. 6; Jenkins 2008). Typically, scholars focus on intra-group goals, social purposes, collective worldviews, and on norms, values, materialized symbols, but also on behavioral practices, which can become a constitutive and thus group-defining element in the process of identity-production and reproduction. For instance, Eisenstadt and Giesen have argued that the formation and maintenance of collective identity requires

“special processes of induction, ranging from various rites of initiation to various collective rituals, in which the attribute of ‘similarity’ among its members, as against the strangeness, the differences, the distinction of the other, is symbolically constructed and defined (...)” (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995, p. 74).

Quite similarly, Mead’s (1934) symbolic interactionist theory also suggests that through the logic of reflected appraisal, symbol-laden practices “produce and reproduce the social structures that constitute and regulate those practices and their associated identities (...) We are – or become – what we do” (Wendt 1999, p. 342). As Wendt argues, actors “learn to see themselves as a reflection of how they are appraised by significant Others. The key variable here is how the Other treats or ‘casts’ the Self” (Wendt 1999, p. 341).

Accordingly, behavior becomes constitutive for a shared social identity when it reflects similarity and “we-ness” between in-group members. Against this background, it should become clear why trustful behavior becomes constitutive for the production and reproduction of social identity in an ongoing process of “‘being’ or ‘becoming’” (Jenkins 2008, p. 5). As trustful behavior communicates a positive view of the other, it represents a strong symbol for in-group similarity. Actors who cast and appraise each other as trustworthy partners represent their relationship as one between similar in-group members who treat each other as trustful and trustworthy friends. Mistrustful behavior, in turn, symbolizes and (re-)produces inter-group distinctiveness. In this vein, trustful behavior among in-group members and mistrustful behavior towards out-group strangers foster in-

group cohesion and constitute and strengthen group boundaries separating the in-group from the outside world:⁴

Assumption I: Trustful behavior constitutively produces and reproduces social identity.

Due to the positive content and message of trustful behavior and the flattering feeling of being trusted, actors may develop a desire to be trusted especially by in-group members. It is a key insight from social psychology that actors obtain at least parts of their positive self-perception and self-esteem from group membership (Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1978). One may therefore argue that individuals find it important to be regarded and treated as trustworthy in-group members by other in-group members. Similarly, Korsgaard (2018, p. 20) briefly mentions that “[a]n important outgrowth of identification is that the relationship itself holds value such that individuals place a greater value on being trusted by their partner”. Importantly, I argue that individuals care what good friends, relatives, and close colleagues and superiors think of them, but may not be concerned about the opinion of strangers. This is in line with Pettit, who argues that a desire to be trusted only exists “if there is not a division in the community, in particular a division between the trustee and those others, which makes people on one side indifferent to what people on the other think of them” (Pettit 1995, p. 221).

In sum, the second assumption highlights that being trusted by in-group members elicits positive emotions as it contributes to people’s positive identity and can be understood as an identity-related and socio-emotional need which people strive for. In this way, trustful behavior becomes socio-emotionally important as it serves as a confirmation of a trustee’s group membership. As Skinner et al. (2014, p. 201) argue, “trust signals to the trust recipient that (s)he is accepted and seen as an important group member”.

Assumption II: Trustful behavior satisfies the trustee’s socio-emotional desire to be trusted by in-group members.

The third and final assumption states that trustful behavior complies with a social norm and obligation to engage in trustful behavior which may guide intra-group interactions.

⁴ Hence, structure (social identity) and agency (trustful behavior) become inseparable from this perspective (see also Frederiksen 2014).

Following Elster (2009) certain behaviors may become socially obligatory when it is expected by others and this expectation is enforced by the threat of external sanction mechanisms. Hence, trustful behavior becomes a social norm and obligation when an actor demands to be treated in a trustful way – as a trustworthy actor – or otherwise will resort to sanctioning behavior. Similarly, Deutsch assumes that “[i]n many social situations, trust is expected, and violations of this expectation lead to social sanctions, which may be very severe” (Deutsch 1973, p. 146). Assumption II thereby provides a theoretical explanation for why and under which conditions people may develop such an expectation of being trusted: it is the socio-emotional value that people attach to being trusted. Being trusted confirms in-group belonging and therefore elicits positive feelings of self-worth. It becomes a psychological “reward” individuals may call for in exchange for their eschewal of opportunistic behavior (Baker 1987, p. 8; Horsburgh 1960, p. 351; Thomas 1979, 93, 99). Against this background, engaging in trustful behavior can also be understood as respectful behavior in intra-group interactions. Actors expect from each other to be treated in a respectful, that is, trustful way. They expect to be recognized as a valuable group member with upright character who deserves to be treated trustfully (Dunning et al. 2014, p. 125).⁵ Hence, when an actor engages in trustful behavior, he respectfully meets the other side’s expectations. He recognizes the trustee’s good character and shows respect for his moral integrity. In contrast, mistrustful behavior may be perceived as an act of disrespect and may lead to social sanctions and deteriorations. This is why trustful behavior complies with a social norm and obligation to engage in trustful behavior.

Assumption III: Trustful behavior complies with a social norm and obligation to engage in trustful behavior which structure intra-group interactions.

4.5 Application of Assumptions and Discussion

The assumptions that have been formulated in the previous chapter highlight different ways in which trustful behavior interacts with the inter-subjective structures of a relationship: first, trustful behavior comes with meaning of social belonging, and in this way, it

⁵ Importantly, the idea that trustful behavior may become a social norm shows similarity but does not fully resemble an understanding of trust as “normal” and routinised behavior as suggested by institutional-based trust concepts (see above). When a social norm of trust is at work, the decision to engage in trustful behavior is more conscious and reflexive than institutional-based trust concepts would suggest.

(re-)produces intersubjective perceptions of we-ness. Moreover, when actors engage in trustful behavior, they satisfy socio-emotional desires to be trusted and comply with a social norm and obligation to act trustfully, in this way avoiding social sanctions and the weakening of social affect and socio-emotional ties. As these insights all connect to intra-group processes of social identification, they are especially well-suited for enriching our understanding of identification-based trusting relationships.

4.5.1 The Ontology of Identification-based Trusting Relations

Most basically, the assumptions inform existing conceptualizations of IBT relations (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). The interactions between trustful behavior, shared social identity, socio-emotional desires, and a social norm and obligation to trust have so far played a marginalized role in existing conceptualizations of IBT. This is a shortcoming insofar as they highlight that manifest trustful behavior is inherently necessary for maintaining an IBT relationship. Not only trustworthy responses, but also trustful behavior itself is necessary for the reproduction of a shared social identity and social affect and hence, of the socio-emotional foundation of both identification-based trustfulness and trustworthiness (see discussion of the concept of IBT above). Hence, maintaining robust and stable IBT relations presumes not only reliable cooperation and trustworthy conduct, but also the active celebration of trustful behavior.⁶ Actors have to engage in mutual, explicit and unequivocal trustful behavior to ensure the continuation of the relationship at hand. The importance of trustful behavior for the maintenance of IBT relations has so far only sporadically been contemplated. As already mentioned above, Giddens (Giddens 1990, 93, 121) is one of the few scholars who have explicated that trust is to be “worked on” and can be maintained only through trustful and trustworthy behavior (see also Möllering 2013). As he argues, “trust has to be won, and the means of doing this is demonstrable warmth and openness” (Giddens 1990, p. 121). The above elaborations highlight that trustful behavior represents one way to do so – trustful behavior demonstrates warmth

⁶ This insight renders IBT necessarily symmetric and mutual in kind. A can only trust B if B also trusts A. In contrast, calculus-based trust may in fact be asymmetrical in kind, as it only presumes information about the other side’s egoistic interest in cooperation, but not a social relationship which can only be maintained when both actors engage in trustful (and trustworthy) conduct. For the evolving debate on the symmetry of trust, see Korsgaard, Brower, and Lester (2014).

and openness to one's interaction partner. In turn, actors who stop expressing their trustfulness risk the abandonment of the relationship. Trustful interaction thus not only rests on socio-emotional identification, it also reproduces the same.

4.5.2 Crisis of Trust and Trust Repair in Identification-based Trusting Relations

Even IBT relations are not free from turbulence. In case of an obvious violation of trust, the bonds of the relationship will significantly deteriorate, and existing research has identified several conditions for the successful repair of trust, such as the determination of the nature of the violation, an increase in transparency, the violator's recognition of the trust violation, and his admission of the destructive act as well as the victim's acceptance of the violator's excuse (Bachmann et al. 2015; Lewicki and Wiethoff 2008).

However, whether a violation has taken place is often far from self-evident and situations are often marked by ambiguity. This is especially the case as positive attribution biases likely operate within intra-group relations (Hewstone et al. 1982; Oldroyd 2002). Crises of trust that are marked by mere ambiguity come with specific challenges. Actors who generally value the relationship may hesitate to openly express their doubts as doing so could lead to serious deteriorations. Open accusations may not only be perceived as unfounded, but also as offensive by the other side.⁷ They may trigger the deterioration of a relationship as they may contradict socio-emotional desires and social norms and obligations to engage in trustful behavior. Actors may therefore choose to conceal their doubts and engage in trustful behavior even though their trustful expectations are temporarily shaken, that is, they may engage in as-if trustful behavior. As Deutsch argues, "(...) the choice to trust may be the lesser of two evils. (...) The open expression of lack of trust (...) may be considered a serious violation of the ethics of personal relations" (Deutsch 1973, p. 146).⁸ At the same time, one must not forget that the decision to engage in as-if trustful behavior only represents the right decision if accusations are in fact unfounded. It presents a dangerous strategy when the other side has malevolent intentions. Hence, the

⁷ Existing research on trust-repair incorporates this line of reasoning only insofar as it is argued that the accused may perceive accusations as "unreasonable" (Lewicki and Bunker 1996; Lewicki and Wiethoff 2008).

⁸ These insights can also enrich theoretical models which identify the antecedents or "reasons" which may motivate and enable actors to engage in trustful behavior. For instance, McKnight and Chervany (2001) show how interactions between an individual-psychological "disposition to trust", "institution-based trust", a "trusting belief" and "trusting intentions" results in "trust-related behavior". My elaborations highlight that trustful behavior may also result from normative considerations about its social appropriateness.

doubtful trustor faces a challenging dilemma in ambiguous situations of uncertainty and doubt. He must decide between as-if trusting – through which he risks his own exploitation – and explicating his doubts – through which he risks the deterioration of the relationship when accusations are unfounded. Future research on crises of trust and their management may take these challenges into account and identify strategies to deal with them in a constructive way.

4.5.3 Building Identification-based Trusting Relations

My assumptions also contribute to our theoretical understanding of processes of IBT building (Child 2001; Korsgaard 2018; Lewicki and Bunker 1995, 1996; Shapiro et al. 1992). They suggest that the building of IBT relations presumes that actors engage in trustful behavior even though trustful expectations have not yet developed – that is, they have to engage in as-if trustful behavior. As-if trustful behavior becomes necessary as it facilitates the formation of social identity which serves as the socio-emotional foundation of both, an increasingly trustful expectation and a strengthening trustworthy character. As-if trustful behavior not only reproduces perceptions of we-ness, but also initially produces the same. Moreover, it satisfies the socio-emotional desire to be trusted and complies with the social norm and obligation to act trustfully, both of which may become increasingly important in the course of a growing IBT relationship.

This insight complements existing accounts which also highlight the nexus between as-if trustful behavior and the formation of trustful expectations. Researchers have argued that as-if trustful behavior allows actors to gather information about the other side's trustworthiness, tying in with Ernest Hemmingway's saying that "[the] best way to find out if you can trust somebody is to trust them". Following this logic, as-if trustful behavior serves as a testing strategy (Cook et al. 2005b; Molm et al. 2009). Relational signaling theory, in turn, understands as-if trustful as a costly or risky cooperative (unilateral) move through which actors can communicate their trustworthy intent. For instance, Six et al. argue that "by acting trustingly the individual makes himself vulnerable to abuse by the other individual and communicates his own trustworthiness" (Six et al. 2010, p. 286). Similar to that, Zand (1972, p. 231) argues that actors signal trustworthiness when they disclose information about themselves, accept influence, and reduce control (see also Swinith 1967). Against this background, trust-building processes are often

modelled as dynamic spiraling process, constituted by virtuous cycles between (increasingly) trustful expectations and (increasingly) trustful cooperative exchange (Ferrin et al. 2007, 2008; Korsgaard 2018; Zand 1972). Existing models thereby suggest that as-if trustful behavior solely serves as a means to exchange information about each other's trustworthiness, in the above sense of signalling and testing. In contrast, I argue that mutual as-if trustful behavior is necessary as it is socially meaningful. As-if trustful behavior contributes to the building of trustful expectations as it communicates that the other is seen as a trustworthy partner. Moreover, (as-if) trustful behavior itself demonstrates "warmth and openness" (Giddens 1990, p. 121), and facilitates the production of positive affect and socio-emotional ties that form the baseline of strong identification-based trustful expectations.

My theoretical perspective also complements existing accounts which highlight the nexus between (as-if) trustful behavior and the strengthening of the trustee's trustworthiness. Research on "therapeutic trust" and "trust responsiveness" suggest that (as-if) trustful behavior may rest on a trustor's hope to trigger a cooperative response through the very act of (as-if) trusting (. Theory on trust responsiveness assumes that (as-if) trustful behavior naturally triggers cooperative responses as actors have a general desire to please and to be seen as virtuous, prudent, and loyal by others that rests on the need for "self-love" (Pelligra 2010; Pettit 1995). Actors have an intrinsic motivation to maintain their positive reputation in society and, hence, will respond trustworthy when others place their trust in them (or pretend to do so through as-if trustful behavior). Notably, theory on trust responsiveness is rather static, as it assumes a general and constant desire to be trusted and a general tendency to respond positively to trustful acts. It therefore cannot explain how and why neutral and interest-based relationships may transform into close relationships that are guided by a deeply internalized norm of mutual trustworthiness. Therapeutic trust comes closer to such a transformational approach. Baron argues that "if we act as if we expect the best from the others, they will often behave better as a result" (Baron 1998, p. 411) and Horsburgh suggests that "there is a tendency to like those who are prepared to rely upon us" (Horsburgh 1960, p. 348). However, whereas Baron and Horsburgh do not specify the operating mechanisms behind this process, my elaborations suggest that (as-if) trustful behavior establishes a socio-emotional bond between trustee and trustor that facilitates the internalization of a norm of trustworthy cooperation between in-group friends (see also Frederiksen 2014, p. 185).

In sum, the theoretical perspective developed above suggests that the building of IBT relationships presumes that actors must actively celebrate their growing relationship though manifest (as-if) trustful behavior. To repeat it once more: as-if trustful behavior facilitates the formation of shared social identity and hence of the foundation of both, identification-based trustfulness and trustworthiness. In contrast, actors that continue to treat each other with caution and or even with suspicion will not be able to establish an IBT relationship.

4.5.4 Appropriate Reassurance Strategies in (Growing) Identification-based Trusting Relations

It was argued above that as-if trustful behavior may become necessary for maintaining and building IBT relationships. This renders the building and maintenance of IBT relations a challenging task especially for actors who are not overly risk-tolerant. However, my assumptions can be used to identify appropriate reassurance strategies which actors may choose to reduce the subjectively felt (and objectively existing) risk of as-if trustful behavior. More specifically, they recommend applying what I call “soft reassurance strategies”, which provide some reassurance against exploitation without resorting to obviously mistrustful behavior. For instance, actors may try to find ways to cautiously formulate inquiries and demands for proofs of trustworthiness which will not be perceived as offensive. They may explain why they feel uncertain and ask for understanding for their own situational concerns or doubts. Another soft reassurance strategy consists of the use of reputational networks. Actor A may secretly consult a third party who can offer reliable information about B’s true intent.

Moreover, an actor may propose to institutionalize the relationship along a logic of mutual coordination. Coordination aims to align and synchronize activities and to increase synergies and surplus, for instance by pooling resources and increasing communication (Lumineau 2017; Vlaar et al. 2007). In the private sphere, moving in together may resemble the logic of “institutionalized coordination” between partners. In the business sphere, firms may initiate a joint venture and base their collaboration on a logic of institutionalized coordination. In all instances, coordination follows a logic of “we-ness” and “doing things together” and frames a relationship in a trustful way (Tenbrunsel and Messick 1999). At the same time, coordination can also provide reassurance and decrease subjective uncertainty as it binds actors together, increases contact and interdependencies,

and facilitates information flow. Adding to that, Lumineau (2017) argues that coordination may also have a trust-building effect, listing several mechanisms which link coordination-based interaction to the building of trust.

Against this background, coordination may provide a perfect strategy as it represents both a strategy for soft reassurance and for (re-) building and strengthening trust. At the same time, my elaborations clearly advise against adopting reassurance strategies which rest on the logic of explicit control, such as provisions for monitoring and verification, as they are likely to be perceived as expressions of manifest mistrust. In this way, my elaborations also intersect with research dealing with control and coordination in business relations and the prospects for building and maintaining trust (Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa 2005; Christ et al. 2006, 2012; Ferrin et al. 2007; Frey and Jegen 2001; Vlaar et al. 2007). The perspective developed in this article is clearly positioned with those accounts which assume a negative effect of control-based cooperation and a positive effect of coordination on trust. It assumes that these negative and positive effects should be especially strong in the context of (growing) IBT relationships. Moreover, it emphasizes that the building and maintenance of IBT relations presumes not only that actors eschew mistrust-symbolizing controls and cooperate on a neutral basis – they also have to engage in manifest (as-if) trustful behavior. My theoretical elaborations thereby provide the ontological substance for theoretical inspiration and innovation as they highlight and explicate causal and constitutive mechanisms that have so far played a rather marginal or implicit role in the literature on control, coordination, and trust.

4.6 Conclusion

This article has started with an almost trivial idea: trustful behavior is meaningful behavior which communicates that the trusted interaction partner is seen as a trustworthy actor. It was the general argument that this insight opens space for theoretical reasoning on the role of trustful behavior which has the potential to enrich and in-spire future research on trust in a significant way. Three assumptions have been de-rived which state that trustful behavior (re-)produces shared social identity, that it satisfies the trustee's socio-emotional needs, and that it complies with a social obligation to act trustfully. Researchers may find these assumptions as such innovative and thus worth exploring. It may

therefore seem a promising enterprise to step back and engage with the assumptions empirically. The social meaning of trusting behavior and its interaction with social identity, with desires to be trusted and with an obligation to trustful action represent phenomena that have so far been mostly ignored within empirical trust research.

The assumptions about the role of trustful behavior have been applied to the realm of identification-based trusting relations. As a result, arguments have been formulated that emphasize the necessity of explicit and manifest celebrations of (as-if) trustful behavior for the reproduction of the socio-emotional foundation of an identification-based trusting relationship itself. Future research may empirically investigate the validity of the proposed causal and constitutive mechanisms that connect (as-if) trustful behavior and experiences of being trusted to processes of building and maintaining identification-based trusting relationships.

Further arguments have highlighted the specific challenges that may arise when crises of trust erupt under conditions of ambiguity. Finally, the appropriateness and effectiveness of strategies for soft reassurance have been discussed. Hopefully, these arguments may also stimulate future theoretical and empirical research and contribute to progress within their respective literature strands.

By highlighting that (as-if) trustful behavior is essential for the building and maintenance of IBT relationships, this article provides support for an innovative perspective on the relationship between trust and risk: not only trustful behavior is (objectively) risky. As Thomas argues, there exist certain “risks in not trusting one another too” (Thomas 1979, p. 100). Actors who unnecessarily stop to engage in trustful behavior risk the deterioration of the relationship at hand. Building and maintaining identification-based trusting relationships therefore presumes both trustworthy conduct and the active celebration of trustful behavior.

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Notes on Contributor

Lukas Kasten is a research associate at the Institute of Political Science of the Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Germany. He is a peace and conflict researcher with a special interest in trust-building processes between individuals, groups, and organizations. His research focuses on the nexus between social identity and trust and on the effects of international security institutions on processes of trust-building between states.

5 Trust Constitutes Identity: Implications for Concepts and Theories of Interstate Peace, Community, and Friendship

Lukas Kasten

Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript

Theories on security community-building and interstate friendship identify the building of trust and collective identification as the two main conditions of sustainable peace-building. In this article, I emphasize that trust is constitutive to collective identity and illustrate the added value of this ontological perspective. A constitutive perspective on trust and identity reveals that peaceful interstate communities are communities of trust within which trust-symbolizing practices not only have a (re-)productive effect on collective identity processes but also satisfy actors' socio-emotional needs, comply with a social norm of trust and become a matter of respect. I further argue that trust-symbolizing practices become necessary already in the process of community-building: if states treat each other in a distrust-symbolizing way, collective identity cannot develop. I apply these insights for the formulation of two propositions that deal with the transformational effects of security institutions. I first argue that security institutions may have different effects in different stages of a relationship: under conditions of distrustful rivalry and neutrality, they may be perceived as a constitutive manifestation of their conflictual relationship and impede the formation of collective identity. When trust as already started to grow, they may exert a positive effect and further strengthen collective identification and trust. Second, I will argue that actors will likely view institutionalized interstate alliances (IIAs) as symbols of trust whereas they will perceive of security management institutions (SMI) as symbols of lacking trust. Hence, SMIs should reproduce distrustful self-other distinctions, whereas IIAs should exert a strong transformational effect. The remainder of the article discusses theoretical implications, mainly regarding issues of path dependencies. As the argument goes, states that establish distrust-symbolizing institutions in early phases of rapprochement may never be able to improve their relationships substantially.

Keywords: trust, social identity, constitution, international institutions, peace, security community

5.1 Introduction

Traditional constructivist literature on security communities, interstate friendship, and stable peace highlights the building of trust and the development of a collective identity as the foundation of stable peace, where the “the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved” (Boulding 1978, pp. 12–13; Wendt 1999; Kupchan 2010; Adler and Barnett 1998a).

Whereas it seems intuitively clear that trust and mutual identification stand in a close relationship with each other, the actual ontological status of the relationship between both phenomena is subject to scholarly debate. On the one hand, scholars follow a throughout causal view and assume that mutual identification forms a causal foundation for trustful expectations, and trustful behavior causally facilitates cooperative interaction which in turn strengthens mutual identification (Lewicki et al. 2006). On the other hand, researchers have emphasized that trust and trustful behavior stand in a constitutive relationship to social identity (Kasten 2018). As Möllering (2013, p. 293) tellingly puts it, „[p]eople are who they are because of whom they trust and who trusts them”. Constructivist theory on interstate peace-building has so far remained rather unspecific regarding the ontological kind of relationship between trust and identity. For instance, Adler and Barnett assume that trust and identity “are reciprocal and reinforcing: the development of trust can strengthen mutual identification, and there is a general tendency to trust on the basis of mutual identification” (Adler and Barnett 1998a, p. 45). Whether they think in terms of constitution or causation – or both – remains unclear. It is the basic premise of this article that both ontological views are theoretically and empirically valid. At the same time, I argue that constructivist scholarship must pay more attention to the constitutive perspective on trust and identity to gain a comprehensive understanding of processes of interstate peace-building.

More specifically, a constitutive perspective on trust and identity comes with two major implications. First, peaceful interstate communities should be understood as “communities of trust”, which not only rest on trust but for which mutual trust is also constitutive from the perspective of the actors involved. Trust-symbolizing practices play a crucial role in this context. They not only have a producing and reproducing effect but also satisfy actors’ socio-emotional needs, comply with a social norm of trusting and become

a matter of respect in communities of trust. Second, I argue that trust-symbolizing practices also play an essential role in the process of peace-building. Intersubjective feelings of we-ness and mutual trust cannot develop when individuals keep on treating each other as untrustworthy suspects. These insights will be applied for a theoretical analysis of the transformational effects of security institutions. I will argue that international security institutions can only contribute to identity transformation processes when they facilitate practices that symbolize mutual trust. This premise may help us to understand when and which security institutions are likely to impede or to facilitate the formation of collective identity and trust. First, it will be argued that security institutions may impede the formation of collective identity and trust when distrust or uncertainty prevail but may facilitate their growth and strengthening when trust has already started to grow. Second, I will distinguish between two types of security institutions. As I will argue, security-management institutions (SMIs), such as arm control treaties or CBMs are especially likely to reproduce representations of negative self-other distinctions and difference, whereas institutionalized interstate alliances (IIAs) are more likely to produce and reproduce representations of we-ness. This insight turns the process of interstate peace-building into a path-dependent process: states that establish distrust-symbolizing security institutions in early phases of rapprochement may not be able to reach a stage in their relationship which is marked by positive social identification and mutual trust.

The article borrows from, ties in with, and contributes to literature on interstate trust (Ruzicka and Keating 2015), identity transformation (Wendt 1994), security community-building (Adler and Barnett 1998b), interstate friendship (Kupchan 2010; Koschut and Oelsner 2014), interstate stable peace (Kacowicz et al. 2000; Boulding 1978), and international institutions (Hasenclever et al. 1997; Martin and Simmons 1998). It applies insights from traditional constructivist social theory (Wendt 1999; Jenkins 2008), practice theory (Adler and Pouliot 2011; Pouliot 2010), social psychology (Mead 1934; Lewicki et al. 2006) and philosophical and ethical accounts on trust and distrust (Pettit 1995; Thomas 1979). It also applies insights from business, management, and organizational studies, where the constitutive perspective on trust and identity recently gained prominence (Möllering 2013; Skinner et al. 2014; Kasten 2018).

The article proceeds as follows: In the second chapter, I will discuss trust and identity as the two main concepts of this article. In the third chapter, I will introduce the constitutive perspective on trust and identity, followed by a discussion of the implications

of a perspective on peaceful interstate communities as communities of trust. In the fifth and sixth chapter, I will elaborate on the transformational effects of trust-symbolizing practices and international security institutions. Theoretical implications of this insight regarding the path-dependent trajectories of peace-building processes will also be discussed. The conclusion will present the empirical plausibility of this article's theoretical arguments as well as potential ways for further empirical research.

5.2 Conceptual Foundations

This article ties in with traditional constructivist peace-building theory, referring mainly to the concepts of security community, interstate friendship, and stable peace, all of which will be subsumed under the label of "peaceful interstate community" in this article (Adler and Barnett 1998a; Kupchan 2010; Wendt 1999; Koschut and Oelsner 2014; Kacowicz et al. 2000; Goertz et al. 2016). Within this literature strands, trust in the peaceful and benevolent character of the other and a shared social identity present two main constituents of "positive" forms of interstate peace. As Adler and Barnett (1998a, p. 45) tellingly put it, "mutual trust and collective identity (...) are the proximate necessary conditions for the development of dependable expectations of peaceful change".

Social identity can be defined as "that part of the individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel 1978, p. 63). Social identity is defined through differentiation – an imaginary boundary that determines who is "in" and who is "out". It is at (and through) these boundaries where identity is "found and negotiated" (Jenkins 2008, p. 22). To think in terms of "us" and "them", groups must have something in common (Herrmann and Brewer 2004, p. 6). Typically, scholars focus on intra-group goals, social purposes, worldviews, deeply internalized norms¹, values, symbols, but also rules, routines, and practices.

Positive identification binds actors together and facilitates perceptions of the other side as an extension of the self. Hence, a shared identity presents a container of a deeply internalized norm of cooperative conduct (Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000). Constructivist

¹ Norms may be followed for strategic and instrumental reason, or because actors have internalized them (Wendt 1999; Checkel 2005; Elster 2009).

literature on interstate peace focuses on internalized norms of military self-restraint as one constituent of collective identity. This norm facilitates cooperation and non-violent conflict management and serves as a foundation for trustworthy and pro-social behavior.

Importantly, social identity can be understood as a continuum since the “cognitive distance” is subject to variation (Adler and Barnett 1998a, p. 47; Wendt 1994, p. 386). Wendt distinguishes between enmity, rivalry, and friendship, the last one resembling a situation where the self-other distinction becomes blurred (Wendt 1999, p. 229). Similarly, Cronin (1999, p. 17) distinguishes between six forms of social identification, ranging from hostility to indifference to symbiosis. For this article, it is necessary to realize that social identification can take on negative, neutral, and positive forms.

Trust and distrust are both understood as mechanisms that reduce uncertainty about another actor’s future behavior. A trustful expectation resembles a dependable expectation of reciprocated cooperation whereas a distrustful expectation equals an expectation of exploitative anti-social conduct. Rationalist, calculation-based concepts of trust and distrust (CBT/CBD) rest on the assumption that actors view each other as egoists that cooperate or defect depending on whether it is in their situation-specific self-interest (Kydd 2005; Hardin 2002). As situations can change in an unforeseeable way as well as “a state’s intention can be benign one day and hostile in the next” (Mearsheimer 2001, p. 31), the maintenance and stabilization of calculus-based trust and distrust depend on continuous gathering and processing of information (Rousseau et al. 1998, p. 399; Kydd 2005, p. 202) and actors’ expectations can solely refer to the presence and nearby future.

In line with Mercer (2005, p. 95), who argues that “trust (which) depends on external evidence, transparency, iteration, or incentives, (...) adds nothing to the explanation”, constructivists have applied an extra-rationalist and identification-based ontology of trust and distrust that rests on social-psychological insights. Here, trust and distrust have a cognitive and a socio-emotional foundation (Lewis and Weigert 1985; Lewicki et al. 2006). In case of identification-based trust (IBT), the cognitive foundation refers to positive experiences and a non-violent interaction history which offers “good reasons” to expect similar behavior in the future. Regarding the socio-emotional foundation of IBT, Simmel argues that trust is more than inductive knowledge, as there is a “further element of socio-psychological quasi-religious faith” (Simmel 1990, p. 179) which scholars most

often specify through the concept of a shared social identity. Social identity not only facilitates pro-social and trustworthy conduct (see above). It also allows for the formation of expectations “without the need to constantly collect information in every new situation” (Rathbun 2009, p. 351; Rousseau et al. 1998) as the other side is seen as an actor with constant and situation-independent character traits.² Moreover, positive identification also decreases the need for complex calculation, as it activates automatic cognitive processing modes, stereotyping and cognitive schemata (Dovidio et al. 2010; McEvily 2011; Rompf 2015). It is this understanding of social identity as a foundation of strong trustful expectations which represents the causal view on identity and trust.

Notably, the identification-based form of trust (IBT) allows states to “transcend” security-dilemma-dynamics and credible commitment problems, while rationalist forms of trust only allow for their “mitigation” (Booth and Wheeler 2008). Identification-based distrust (IBD), in turn, rests on past experiences of a negative kind and on perceptions of the other side as a significant “other” with opposing and constant negative character traits. Hence, worst-case expectations and inherent bad faith models dominate in actors’ minds, and security-dilemma dynamics are likely to escalate (Stuart and Starr 1981).

Against this background, relations of enmity and rivalry can be understood in terms of negative identification and IBD (Stuart and Starr 1981; Thompson 2001). Neutral relations are marked by the absence of any significant interaction and identification-based expectations. Uncertainty would reach its maximum, which, however, actors may reduce through rationalist modes of expectation formation (CBD/CBT) (Kupchan 2010). Relationships of peaceful interstate community, in turn, would be marked by positive social identification and IBT (Adler and Barnett 1998a; Kupchan 2010; Wendt 1999; Koschut and Oelsner 2014; Klein et al. 2008).

Theories on interstate trust and identity should also specify a level of analysis. I follow the literature on security community and view interstate trust-building and collective identity formation as an inter-elite process, focusing on political leaders, decision-makers and bureaucrats (Adler and Barnett 1998a). Individual representatives may thereby form the vanguard of rapprochement and peace-building when they interact with

² In line with this, Mercer argues that trust should be understood as “certainty beyond observable evidence” (Mercer 2005, p. 95).

the other side and report their experiences and perceptions to their home audiences. However, my conceptions of *interstate* trust and community capture expectations and social identity patterns among larger parts of states' political elites.

Table 5.1: *Different levels of peace*

	Enmity/Rivalry	Neutrality	Peaceful Interstate Community
Social Identity	negative	neutral	positive
Expectations	IBD	no IBD/IBD, CBT and CBD possible	IBT

5.3 Trust constitutes Identity

Whereas a causal view on trust and identity is surely theoretically and empirically valid, scholars from neighboring disciplines of IR have begun highlighting that trust is also constitutive to social identity. It rests on the idea that trustful behavior is expressive behavior as it comes with specific meaning when it is observed, experienced, and interpreted by the actors involved. Trustful behavior elicits a perception of being trusted on the side of the trustee. It equals the perception that “another party is willing to accept vulnerability to one’s actions” (Baer et al. 2015, p. 1637). Trustful behavior thus carries certain information on how the trustor views the trustee. As Pettit argues,

“(t)he act of trust will communicate in the most credible currency available to human beings—in the gold currency of action, not the article money of words—that the trustor believes the trustee to be truly trustworthy, or is prepared to act on the presumption that he is: believes or presumes him to be truly the sort of person who will not take advantage of someone who puts herself at his mercy. It does not just record the reality of that attitude, it shows that the attitude exists. To think that someone is trustworthy, (...) is ordinarily to think well of him; it is to hold him in high regard” (Pettit 1995, p. 214).

The fact that trustful behavior communicates a favorable view of the trustee renders the same a signal of commonality, especially when A’s trustful behavior towards B is

contrasted with A's distrustful behavior towards others. In this way, trustful behavior becomes a symbol of social belonging, and thus, constitutive to processes of social identity. Möllering emphasizes that "trustee and trustor keep on constructing their identities together in the process of trusting" (Möllering 2013, p. 293). Moreover, Skinner et al. state that if "the decision to trust is intimately linked to self-identity, through parties' chosen affiliations, it matters who trusts us, and who we choose to trust" (Skinner et al. 2014, p. 210). In a similar vein, Thomas argues that trusting someone is "to accept everyone as equal members in a community of trust" (Thomas 1979, p. 99). Thomas also highlights friendship as one of those instances in which "a commitment to trust is presupposed as a defining characteristic of the relationship" (Thomas 1979, p. 100).

Different theories offer different social mechanisms that can help us understand why and how trustful behavior may become constitutive for actors' social identity. To begin with, it seems reasonable to understand trustful behavior as trust symbolizing *practice* that is socially meaningful, expressive and symbol-laden and becomes constitutive to actors' intersubjective understandings of their relationship.³ Constructivists have ever since emphasized that social identity may not only rest on norms and values but also on practices. Wendt's symbolic interactionist framework suggests that, through the logic of reflected appraisal, symbol-laden practices "produce and reproduce the social structures that constitute and regulate those practices and their associated identities (...). 'We are – or become – what we do'" (Wendt 1999, p. 342; Cronin 1999, p. 33). As he argues, actors "learn to see themselves as a reflection of how they are appraised by significant Others. The key variable here is how the Other treats or "casts" the Self" (Wendt 1999, p. 341). Accordingly, when actors treat each other in a trustful way – as a trustworthy other – actors develop an identity as members of a relationship between trustful and trustworthy friends. Moreover, practice-theoretical accounts partly borrow from symbolic interactionism in their theoretical reasoning, assuming that "practices are the vehicle of reproduction. Intersubjectivity lives on in and through practice" (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 18, 19). Hence, Pouliot suggests that "(r)ather than conceiving we-ness as the driver of practice" it seems more reasonable to "construe collective identity as the *result* of practice (...). Collective identification is embedded in practice" (Pouliot 2010, p. 237). Similarly, Adler notes that "a common practice" makes states "share an identity and feel they are a 'we'"

³ Practices can be defined as "socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world" (Adler and Pouliot 2011, p. 3).

(Adler 2008, p. 201). At this point it may also be helpful to follow Adler and Pouliot (2011) in understanding practices as social frames which provide actors with a definition of the situation as they “represent the world in specific ways; they implicitly make a claim that “this is how things are” (Adler and Pouliot 2011, p. 7). The authors further suggest using “Goffman-like frames as the micro-foundations of the macro effects of practices on strategic interaction”. Accordingly, both, symbolic interactions as well as practice-theoretical accounts suggest that trust-symbolizing practices can become part of a “collective ritual”, “in which the attribute of ‘similarity’ among its members, as against the strangeness, the differences, the distinction of the other, is symbolically constructed and defined” (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995, p. 74). Trust-symbolizing practices generate “a sense of shared belonging (...) shared rituals (...) can also act for the community as symbols of community” (Jenkins 2008, p. 111 citing Cohen). In this way, trust-symbolizing practices form “part of the actors’ continuous becoming” (Möllering 2013, 293, 294).

Notably, trust-symbolizing practices may as well stabilize or even strengthen socio-emotional ties as they also correspond with actors’ desire to be trusted which may play an increasingly important role for actor's socio-emotional well-being in the course of a relationship. This line of reasoning rests on the assumption that actors obtain significant parts of their positive self-perception from their membership in social groups.⁴ Wendt has argued that collective self-esteem is one of the essential needs of state actors. Collective self-esteem “refers to a group’s need to feel good about itself, for respect and status. Self-esteem is (...) one of those things that individuals seek in group membership” (Wendt 1999, p. 236). Against this background, trust-symbolizing practices are socially and emotionally important for actors, as being trusted communicates moral worth and confirms actors’ social identity. As Skinner et al. (2014, p. 201) argue, “trust signals to the trust recipient that (s)he is accepted and seen as an important group member”. When actors mutually confirm their in-group membership through trust-symbolizing practices, this elicits positive emotions as it contributes to people's positive identity.⁵ Signals of

⁴ Research on in-group favoritism assumes that individuals upgrade their in-group for reasons of individual self-esteem and positive identity (Tajfel 1978). Positive representations of the in-group imply positive representations of the self.

⁵ Interestingly, this is in line with everyday usage of trust vocabulary in German language, where trust is often represented as a gift (jemandem Vertrauen schenken), see also literature on trusting as gift-giving (Mathews 2017).

lacking trust (neutrality) or even distrust, in turn, will elicit negative emotions, as it reflects exclusion or even out-group negativity.

It follows that the refusal of being trusted may push an unsatisfied trustee to resort to anti-social or sanctioning behavior. The socio-emotional value that people attach to being trusted may render the same a “reward” that individuals may call for in exchange for their eschewal of opportunistic behavior (Horsburgh 1960, p. 351; Baker 1987, p. 8). This can render trust-symbolizing behavior a social obligation and thus a social norm that may guide intra-group interactions. As Deutsch argues, “[i]n many social situations, trust is expected, and violations of this expectation lead to social sanctions, which may be very severe” (Deutsch 1973, p. 146). Notably, the idea of a social obligation to engage in trustful behavior was already contemplated by French moralist La Rochefoucauld (1613-1680) who stated that “it is more shameful to distrust one's friends than to be deceived by them”. Similarly, Nicklas Luhman assumes that “[o]nce mutual trust has been safely established, it would be blatantly tactless – if not quite a disastrous lapse – if one of the participants wanted to return to the learning stage and to use the cautious strategies which were sensible at that early juncture” (Luhmann 1979, 44, 45; see also Hartmann 1962, p. 469; Rotter 1980; Kramer et al. 1996, p. 376; Uslaner 2002). Thomas speaks of

“some special relationships in which priority must always be given to trusting (...). To test this it is worth considering those relationships in which such a heavy weight is placed upon the need to trust that the obligation to trust seems to be irrefragible (...). The situations that seem closest to these conditions are those in which a commitment to trust is presupposed as a defining characteristic of the relationship that is held to exist between two people. Friends ought to trust each other because mutual trust is essential to friendship” (Thomas 1979, pp. 100–101).

The idea that trust-symbolizing practices come with socio-emotional value for the actors involved render trustful behavior not only a social norm but also a matter of respect and status recognition (Wolf 2011): people want to be treated the way they think they deserve to be treated. In a similar vein, Thomas argues that “(t)o accept someone as a friend is to assume that he can be trusted, and friends expect and are right to expect that they are thought to be responsible in these ways” (Thomas 1979, p. 93). In contrast, the ill-founded

refusal of trust-symbolizing cooperation “can destroy the possibility of maintaining mutual respect” (Thomas 1979, p. 99), as it would signal value incongruence, moral contempt, or social exclusion. As Horsburgh argues, a

“trustworthy man feels disappointed and discouraged if he fails to receive what is easily thought of as the reward of trustworthiness, namely, other people’s trust. If he is denied this reward he may lapse into temporary dishonesty” (Horsburgh 1960, p. 351).

Notably, this view on trust and respect differs from existing accounts in IR, as Wolf (2011) has argued that respect may facilitate the building of trust, in the sense that the former is a cause of the latter. In contrast, my elaborations highlight that trust-symbolizing behavior may serve as a symbol of respect: “people may trust to maintain the pretense that the other person has a worthy character; they may avoid distrust because such a choice violates that pretense and shows disrespect (Dunning et al. 2014, p. 125).⁶

In sum, trust-symbolizing practices produce and reproduce collective identity; they elicit positive feelings and increase the socio-emotional value of a relationship; they comply with a social norm of trusting that may structure a relationship; and they serve as a signal of respect. In that trust-symbolizing behavior contributes to the formation of collective identity, it facilitates not only to the evolution of a trustworthy character and elicits trustworthy cooperation – it also facilitates the formation of the socio-emotional foundation of strong and robust identification-based trustful expectations.⁷ In contrast, distrust-symbolizing practices do not only reproduce negative social identity but also interfere with the socio-emotional dynamics and inter-subjective structures that may evolve and sustain in a relationship over time. In this way, distrust-symbolizing practices decrease the prospects for both, trustworthy conduct and trustful expectations.

5.4 Peaceful Interstate Communities as Communities of Trust

A constitutive view of trust and identity suggests a new perspective on peaceful interstate communities as “communities of trust”. Within such communities, actors do not only

⁶ See also theoretical and empirical research on the crowding-out effect of distrustful controlling behavior in the realm of business and management (Frey and Jegen 2001).

⁷ For the effect of trustful behavior on the evolution of trustworthy character, see also research on therapeutic trust and trust responsiveness (Guerra and Zizzo 2004; Horsburgh 1960; Kramer et al. 1996; Pelligra 2010; Pettit 1995; Baron 1998; Horsburgh 1960).

maintain trustful expectations. Actors themselves also perceive mutual trust and trustful interaction as a constitutive dimension of their community which separates them from outside strangers. Moreover, within communities of trust, trustful behavior satisfies actor's socio-emotional needs, it complies with a social norm of trusting, and it becomes a matter of respect.⁸ Communities of trust can only persist when actors engage in ritualized "celebrations" of trust-symbolizing practices as they reproduce positive social identity which forms not only a basis for trustworthy cooperation but also for strong and robust identification-based trustful expectations. When friendly states (unfoundedly) start treating each other in an untrustful way, relations will deteriorate (Koschut 2016).

The "community of trust" framework informs three existing conceptualizations of peaceful interstate communities. First, the traditional conceptualization of security communities depicts the same as "communities of norms", emphasizing shared and internalized norms of self-restraint as their constitutive foundation (Adler and Barnett 1998a). The idea of a community of trust suggests a perspective that emphasizes that mutual trust and corresponding practices become equally constitutive for actors' feelings of we-ness and the socio-emotional separation of the in-group from the outside world.

Second, Koschut (2014) depicts security communities as "emotional communities", in which the symbol-laden and ritualized enactment of "emotional norms" contributes to the reproduction of a collective identity and trust in that it allows states to react appropriately in case of positive and negative intra-communal events. My elaborations, in contrast, show that the emotional expression of trust itself may reproduce identity and become a norm and a matter of appropriateness whereas distrustful expressions may become throughout inappropriate within interstate community. Not only compliance with emotional norms but also with a norm of trusting may be necessary to stabilize and strengthen cohesive processes.

Third, conceptualizations that make use of non-representational social ontology conceive of security communities as "communities of habit" (Hopf 2010) or "communities of practice" (Adler 2008; Pouliot 2010). Both approaches rest on the idea the collective identity and representational forms of trust are by no means necessary for the development of security communities. What is more important is that actors adopt self-evident

⁸ See also Berenskoetter (2007, p. 660) who argues that a desire for belonging and recognition may facilitate a desire for intimate relations.

practices or habits of diplomacy and nonviolent dispute resolution. The “communities of trust” framework deviates from this ontology, first, by emphasizing that strong and robust community still presumes conscious forms of mutual trust; and second by focusing not on practices as such, but on the role of especially trust-symbolizing practices as constituents of community. Clearly, the terminology of community implies we-ness, but distrust-symbolizing practices stand in stark contradiction to the very notion of we-ness in the first place. From this perspective, it seems throughout paradox when Adler and Pouliot (2011) describe the US-Soviet relationship during the cold war years as a “community” constituted by practices of deterrence and arms control, both of which obviously symbolize lacking trust in the bilateral relationship.

5.5 Building Peaceful Interstate Communities

The “community of trust”-framework comes with strong implications for theories that deal with processes of community-building, as it suggests that trust-symbolizing practices become necessary already here. As Wendt (1999, p. 342) argues, actors not only *are* but also *become* what they do. Practices not only constitutively reproduce identity but also produce the same in the first place. Moreover, a socio-emotional desire to be trusted and the social norm of trust may play an increasingly important role for actor's socio-emotional well-being in the course of an improving relationship, which is marked by increasing degrees of positive identification. Hence, successful community-building presumes that actors engage in trust-symbolizing practices although they do not (yet) trust each other, that is, they have to engage in as-if trustful behavior (Kasten 2018). As-if trustful behavior resembles trustful behavior from an outside perspective but does not rest on a trustful expectation (Hardin 1993; Möllering 2006c). Importantly, it also elicits a perception of being trusted on the side of the trusted person and hence may foster socio-emotional bonds. In contrast, distrust-symbolizing practices will contribute to the reproduction of negative self-other distinctions. Intersubjective feelings of we-ness cannot develop when individuals keep on treating each other as untrustworthy suspects.

This insight provides an essential specification of existing theories that try to identify conditions under which cooperation is most likely to facilitate collective identity formation and norm internalization processes (Checkel 2005; Johnston 2001). For instance, positive contact theory focuses on equal status, shared goals, supporting authorities and

personalized interaction (Allport 1954). Theories of persuasion and communicative action emphasize the authoritative role of socializing agents and the general openness of the socialized agent for new information and arguments (Risse 2000; Gheciu 2005). Theories of symbolic interactionism focus on mechanisms of reflected appraisal and other-casting, thereby emphasizing the importance of pro-social behavior and practices of military self-restraint (Wendt 1999). My elaborations, in turn, emphasize that, whenever actors interact, they must perceive the accompanying practices as trust-symbolizing practices if positive mutual identification is to evolve.

Moreover, a view that emphasizes the importance of trust-symbolizing practices provides specifications to existing theories on trust-building which also focus on the role of as-if trusting. In these theories, as-if trusting has mainly been interpreted in terms of risk-taking behavior, through which actors can gather and provide behavioral evidence of cooperative intent. One theoretical approach ties in with Ernest Hemmingway's saying that "[the] best way to find out if you can trust somebody is to trust them" (Cook et al. 2005b; Molm et al. 2009). From this view, actors take the risk of a cooperative first move and find out if the other side reciprocates cooperation or exploits one's vulnerability. Another approach assumes that actors can teach each other about their benevolence through risky and costly cooperative moves – the famous "leap in the dark" (Wheeler 2010; Booth and Wheeler 2008; Hardin 1993; Kydd 2005; Zand 1972; Swinth 1967). As Six et al. argue, "by acting trustingly the individual makes himself vulnerable to abuse by the other individual and communicates his own trustworthiness" (Six et al. 2010, p. 286).

Notably, approaches which solely associate as-if trusting with risk-taking behavior can only explain how risk-taking provides behavioral evidence for actors' cooperative intent – they cannot say anything about if and how as-if trusting may also contribute to the socio-emotional foundation of IBT. The constitutive perspective, in contrast, understands as-if trusting behavior in terms of its social meaning and its constitutive effects on the (re-)production of a shared social identity. Furthermore, my elaborations allow for the conclusion that risk-taking interactions can only contribute to the building of IBT if actors interpret them as trust-symbolizing practices which frame relationships in terms of commonality and we-ness. This is important as I will later show that the overall framing of risk-taking behavior may not necessarily be of a trust-symbolizing kind. Even though individual actors may engage in risk-taking behavior, the overall framing of interactions may reflect a lack of trust (neutrality) or even distrust. Hence, risk-taking behavior is not

necessarily trust-symbolizing in kind, but it seems reasonable that any trust-symbolizing practices are risky as such.

If trust-symbolizing practices and as-if trusting are essential to processes of conflict transformation, one must ask how states come to engage in corresponding behavior under conditions of distrust or uncertainty, where subjective perceptions of risk are high. I refer to three prominent accounts: first, Hardin (1999) has argued – quite simplistically – that it may be rational to behave irrationally for the purpose of trust-building, that is, to engage in overly risky behavior. Second, one may follow Rathbun (2012b) and focus on political leaders' generalized trust which may allow them to engage in risky and trust-symbolizing forms of cooperation with strangers which may then allow for interstate trust- and community-building among larger parts of political elites. Third, and most convincingly, Wheeler (2013) focuses on how face-to-face interactions between political leaders may generate inter-individual trust which allows political leaders to engage in frame-breaking gestures which, in turn, can contribute to conflict transformation on the interstate level, that is, among and between broader parts of political elites.

5.6 Security Institutions, Trust-symbolizing Practices, and Community-building

In the following, I will make use of the derived theoretical insights to provide a theoretical discussion of the role of international security institutions within the process of conflict transformation and community-building. This discussion focuses on “secondary” institutions, that is, on explicit and written arrangements that consist of sets of rules designed to increase member states' mutual security, and which forbid, require or permit particular kinds of military actions (Koremenos et al. 2001; Müller 2003; Buzan 2004). Examples may include institutions with a security mandate that aim at exerting a constraining or transparency-generating effect on interstate relations, such as arms control agreements, CBMs, but also institutionalized interstate alliances which may as well affect relations among their members (Long et al. 2007; Müller 2003).

Theorizing international institutions always begs questions about the actual direction of causality between institutions and the quality of interstate relations, as institutions may imply risks and sovereignty costs. For the case of peace-building and conflict transformation, I assume that institutions may, but do not necessarily have to follow a process

of rapprochement and improved relations. Hence, one may follow Wheeler (2018) and assume that joint institutions become more likely when individual state leaders realize that they have a mutual interest in institutionalized security cooperation, that is when a certain amount of inter-individual trust has been built (see above). However, it was already mentioned above that Rathbun (2012b) notes that the decision to establish institutions may also rest on leader's generalized trust. Moreover, it seems equally likely that especially under the conditions of asymmetric power relations, stronger states may force weaker opponents into institutional memberships (Ikenberry 2001)).⁹ Finally, one may assume that enemy states may be willing to form joint international institutions in the face of common threats.

Importantly, proponents of a constitutive ontology would discount questions of causality and view institutions as constitutive for relationships and how actors perceive of them. Nonetheless, the logic of "bracketing" still allows to order one factor (e.g., institutions) prior to the other (e.g., community) and hence to formulate constitutive effects between the former and the latter (Wendt 1999, p. 316).

Once being established, institutions are likely to impact – causally and/or constitutively – on perceptions and expectations of present and future generations of larger parts of states' political elites. For the following section, it is the key question when this effect is most likely to be positive in kind. In fact, literature on the positive and transformative effects of international institutions is vast. For instance, institutions may serve as safety nets in early phases of rapprochement, stabilize relations and "foster cooperation (...) in the absence of trust" which may then contribute to the building of trust and the formation of collective identity (Adler and Barnett 1998a, 50; Hoffman 2006). Moreover, Wheeler has argued that individual-level trust between leaders may allow for the establishment of institutions which represents a frame-braking move that may facilitate the transformation of enemy images and the building of trust among larger parts of political elites. Similarly, Kydd (2005) has argued that institutions may represent risky and costly signals through which actors can teach each other their genuine interest in cooperation. Institutionalized cooperative exchange may also lead to the formation of collective identity and the internalization of corresponding norms (Adler and Barnett 1998a; Kupchan 2010; Oelsner 2007; Wendt 1999, p. 359). Institutions have been described as platforms where actors

⁹ See for instance institutional order after World War II, and Syria's 2013 forced accession to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

can engage in “communicative action” (Risse 2000) and as “sites of socialization and learning, places where political actors learn and perhaps even ‘teach’ others what their interpretations of the situation and normative understandings are” (Adler and Barnett 1998a, 42, 43; Gheciu 2005). Institutions may also “generate and enhance norms and practices of self-restraint” (Adler and Barnett 1998a, 42, 43) which, may “engender affinity among states” through a logic of reflected appraisal and other-casting (Kupchan 2010, p. 45; Wendt 1999). Institutions may also facilitate discourses that emphasize a regional culture, a joint history, or instill “belief in a common fate” (Adler and Barnett 1998a, p. 43; Diez et al. 2006).

Notably, several scholars also suggest that institutions may exert negative effects: for instance, institutions may increase the salience of conflict (Kinsella and Russett 2002, p. 1059; Fausett and Volgy 2010, p. 83). Moreover, institutions may impede teaching and learning about trustworthiness and benevolence, as state actors may attribute the other side’s cooperative conduct to the cooperation-inducing effect of institutions (Wendt 1999, p. 359). As Mercer has argued, “if observers attribute cooperation to the environment rather than the person, then trust cannot (...) develop” (Mercer 2005, p. 95). Similarly, Wendt (1999, 342, 359) emphasizes that “the logic of reflected appraisal turns on how actors *think* they are appraised”. Institutions may thus impede mechanisms of other-casting and reflected appraisal when actors attribute each other’s cooperative conduct and restraining behavior solely to their constraining effect. In the next step, however, Wendt (1999, pp. 360–361) also argues that continuous and repeated compliance with the rules and provisions of institutions over long time spans will gradually strengthen actors’ conviction that the other side’s cooperative conduct is an expression of intrinsic character and thus, truly self-restraining in kind. Hence Wendt remains optimistic: as long as states comply with an institution’s rules and procedures, the prospects for identity transformation are fairly well.

A constitutive perspective on trust-symbolizing practices provides important and complementary specifications to the present theoretical literature: if security institutions and their inherent practices are perceived as reflections of lacking trust or even distrust, acting through them may impede transitions towards peaceful interstate community even though, or precisely because actors comply with their rules and procedures. Security institutions are especially likely to exert a transformative effect when actors perceive of institutionalized practices as trust-symbolizing in kind. Sure enough, the actual meaning

of institutionalized cooperation always lies in the eyes of the beholder. Nonetheless, the following sections provide a discussion of when security institutions are more likely to be viewed as symbols of lacking trust (or even distrust) and when actors likely perceive of them as reflections of mutual trust.

5.6.1 Trust and Distrust, Security Institutions, and Trust-symbolizing Practices

I first argue that actors are more likely to perceive security institutions and their inherent practices as symbols of lacking trust or even distrust when states join or establish them in situations of enmity/rivalry or neutrality, where distrust or uncertainty prevail. This line of reasoning rests on the assumptions that, when trust is absent, states will use and understand security institutions as substitutes of trust through which they may stabilize relations and prevent them from deteriorating or even escalating. For instance, Adler and Barnett (1998a, p. 50) have emphasized that states use institutions in early phases of rapprochement “to foster cooperation and to verify in the absence of trust (...)”.¹⁰ State agents are then especially likely to perceive institutionalized practices as a constitutive representation of their conflict-prone relationship. Hence, even though Wheeler may be correct when he suggests that institutionalized security cooperation may be risky and thus presume a certain amount of optimism regarding the other side’s interest in cooperative security among political leaders, the overall framing of security institutions, its original purpose as well as institutionalized practices may still reflect a sense of uncertainty – or even distrust. State agents, such as bureaucrats or ambassadors who act through these institutions, will then follow a logic of “keeping each other apart”. In this way, agents’ everyday practices are likely to reproduce negative or neutral self-other distinctions and impede larger scale transformations towards “positive” forms of peace, such as peaceful interstate communities of trust.

In the worst case, actors will frame institutionalized practices in terms of mutual distrust. For instance, Krass has argued that state agents may view arms control verification as an “institutionalized” form of distrust, that may cause “even greater hostility and distrust than would have existed without them” (Krass 1985, 162, 163). Security cooperation practices are then likely to contribute to the (re-)production of representations of

¹⁰ Functionalist theories have ever since argued that states establish institutions as a reaction to problems of uncertainty or distrust (Koremenos et al. 2001).

enmity/rivalry and may impede both, transformations from enmity/rivalry towards neutrality and from neutrality towards more positive levels of peace. In a more moderate case, actors may perceive of security institutions neither as reflections of trust nor as reflections of distrust but rather of mere neutral relations, where calculus-based trust renders cooperation possible. In Wheeler's (2018) words, the institutionalization of security cooperation is then perceived as a "frame-braking move" that projects a more peaceful but still neutral relationship, where states make use of cooperative forms of mutual security to stabilize their relationships in the face of uncertainty. Hence, following cooperative practices within the framework of a security institution may facilitate a move from rivalry towards more neutral relations – they may facilitate the reduction of distrust and the deconstruction of negative self-other distinctions. However, they would still impede the formation of a positive collective identity and the building of identification-based trust as institutions are still perceived as substitutes of trust.

In contrast, under conditions of trust, a positive interpretation is likely to dominate actors' overall framing of security institutions. This might be the case as institutions become less important to stabilize cooperation between states (Adler and Barnett 1998a). As trusting states take each other's peaceful conduct for granted, they will cede to use security institutions as conflict management tools among themselves. If institutions do not even get fully dismantled, states will use them to pursue joint goals. This may result in a change of an institution's original aim and scope, shifting from managing bilateral security problems among members towards coordinating joint policies to solve joint problems, such as fighting international terrorism or deterring other third-party threats. Trusting states may also start to coordinate joint policies towards other institutional members. For instance, within a multilateral arms control regime, trusting states may coordinate their verification strategies and policy initiatives towards third members which represent actual or potential threats. It seems most reasonable that states which coordinate their policies towards a joint goal or other institutional members engage in cooperative practices that symbolize togetherness and mutual trust. This conclusion holds especially true for states which direct their coordinated efforts against an out-group stranger whom they encounter in a neutral or even distrustful way. Against this background, one may assume that once trust starts to grow or is already present, acting through security institutions and following associated everyday practices will (re-)produce and strengthen representations of we-ness and in this way foster mutual IBT and interstate community.

5.6.2 Security Management, Interstate Alliances, and Trust-symbolizing Practices

It is also promising to distinguish between different (ideal-) types of security institutions. I follow Wallander and Keohane (1999) and distinguish between security management institutions (SMIs) and institutionalized interstate alliances (IIAs). SMIs are established primarily to increase security between member states. Examples may include confidence-building measures or arms-control regimes. IIAs, in turn, primarily aim at increasing security of member states vis-à-vis shared threats. However, IIAs may also affect relations between allies themselves and history shows that states actively use them when distrust or neutrality prevail to stabilize relations and contain each other, Germany's accession to NATO being a case in point. For instance, IIAs may include explicit provisions for inter-allied security management, such as the WEU which included arms control provisions for the limitation of Germany's military capabilities (Leeds 2005). Adding to that, an IIA's provisions for inter-allied policy-coordination and military integration may also exert effects on inter-allied conflict (Long et al. 2007). For instance, alliance treaties may foresee joint military exercises, joint bases, joint research and development programs, joint policy planning and implementation or even the integration of command structures and forces. These provisions do not only create synergies, as they also help to overcome the "dilemma of alliance politics" as they reduce states' incentives to renege from alliance commitments through increasing mutual interdependencies (Wallander 2000; Snyder 1984). Moreover, research has shown that these provisions also serve to reduce the risk of violent conflict among allies (Wallander 2000; Wallander and Keohane 1999). For instance, Tuschhoff (1999) argues that inter-allied policy-coordination within NATO, and especially reporting schemes on member states' military potentials increase transparency among members to a level that renders surprise attack against other NATO members almost impossible from the outset.

In the following, I argue that neutral or distrustful states that act through SMIs never pretend to be trustful friends, as the overall framing of security management practices as such signifies suspicion and conflict. In contrast, states which manage to establish a cooperative relationship within the framework of an IIA act as if they were trustful friends, as they do not fight each other and rely on the help of their allies in case of emergency.

Clearly, the primary purpose of SMIs is to increase security among member states. Typical provisions of an SMI, such as the explicit and direct limitation of member states' military discretion, the exchange of military information, or the verification of state behavior can clearly be interpreted as reflections of lacking trust as states make use of them to hedge against one-sided defection and to reduce the risk of deteriorating or even escalating relations (Keating and Ruzicka 2014). Again, this applies even though the institutionalization of these provisions may presume a certain amount of optimism about congruent interests among political leaders (Wheeler 2018). In other words – even the decision to install or join an SMI may come with risks and costs, associated institutionalized practices which are followed by state agents still reflect an overarching logic of “keeping each other apart”, rooted in uncertainty or even distrust. Moreover, SMIs most often follow a logic of specific reciprocity, which, as Axelrod (1984) and Keohane (1986) argue, does not rest on trust but on congruent egoist interests only. Thus, when state agents act through SMIs, representations of lacking trust (or even distrust) should dominate actors' overall framing of the institution and its inherent practices should reproduce the same accordingly. In line with this, Mitchel (2012, p. 877) argues – in contrast to Wheeler (2009) that Argentina's and Brazil's accession to the NPT and their opening of their nuclear facilities for mutual inspections was not a “cementation” of trust, but rather reflected a manifest lack of trust. Moreover, then US Secretary of State John Kerry argued with regard to the 2013 Joint Plan of Action on Iranian nuclear activities that “verification is the key. [...] we're not just going to verify, or trust and verify, we're going to verify, verify, and verify” (Morrisey 2013). Similarly, Kissinger noted in the context of arms control negotiations on SALT that the US would “advocate these agreements not on the basis of trust, but on the basis of the enlightened self-interest of both sides” (Schors 2016, p. 90). Notably, one may again distinguish between a strong and a moderate version of this line of reasoning, one assuming a framing of SMIs in terms of distrust and the other in terms of neutrality, with corresponding prospects for the improvement of relations.

IAs, in turn, are more likely to facilitate practices which actors frame in terms of mutual trust. When states regularly and reliably comply with the provisions of an IIA, for instance, when they define common goals and strategies, identify common enemies and problems, engage in joint military exercises, join forces in joint military maneuvers or on the battlefield and run the risks of entrapment and free-riding, they engage in practices

that symbolize we-ness and mutual trust – even when trust is not (yet) present.¹¹ This is especially true as Wendt has argued that a “common fate” increases the likelihood of successful identity transformation (Wendt 1999). Sure enough, trust-symbolizing acts of policy-coordination and military integration become more significant for the actors involved when they are contrasted against allies’ distrustful joint action against outside threats. Moreover, Rathbun has pointed out that institutionalized alliances such as NATO rest on the logic of diffuse reciprocity, which reflects a strong form of trust (Rathbun 2012b; Keohane 1986). In case of manifest crises, policy-coordination provisions may exert a stabilizing and reassuring impact on relations in a non-explicit way. IIAs may help states to secretly reassure themselves about the other’s non-malevolent intent without making possibly unfounded distrust/uncertainty explicit and risking the deterioration of a relationship. Allies may also temporarily make use of explicit security management provisions that may form part of an IIA’s framework (Risse-Kappen 1996). If they manage to overcome irritations and crisis, an IIA’s institutional framework allows them to switch back quickly into trust-symbolizing practices of “doing things together”, in this way increasing the prospects that feelings and perceptions of we-ness are re-established in short time. Accordingly, one may conclude that state agents that act through IIAs should be especially likely to reproduce representations of trust and we-ness and thus facilitate transformations towards peaceful interstate community.

Finally, the following specifications seem appropriate: first, it seems reasonable to combine theoretical arguments about SMIs and IIAs with insights from the preceding section. For instance, one may assume that the positive effects of IIAs on collective identity formation and trust-building should be especially strong when trust has already started to grow. Trusting states will make less use of explicit security management provisions that may form part of an IIA’s framework and follow predominantly trust-symbolizing practices of policy coordination and military integration. Moreover, one may argue that SMIs are most likely to reproduce negative or neutral self-other distinctions as long as trust is absent. When trust starts to grow, states will cease using them for “keeping each other apart” and will make use of SMIs for joint actions towards joint problems and goals in ways that signify trust and we-ness (see above). Notably, a similar effect can be

¹¹ Examples for the community-building effects of IIAs include NATO and the Elysee Treaty, both of which facilitated not only rapprochement but even friendship between France and Germany shortly after the end of Second World War, when mutual distrust and rivalry still characterized the relationship (Thompson and Dreyer 2011).

expected when states have joint memberships in both, SMIs and IIAs in parallel. In this case, it seems plausible that IIAs render trust-symbolizing practices of “doing things together” dominant in a relationship and in this way also impact on practices that states follow in the context of SMIs. For instance, members of NATO (an ideal type IIA) may at the same time be members of the OSCE (an ideal type SMI), but NATO members do not verify and monitor each other within the OSCE CBM- and arms control regime. Quite the contrary is true, as NATO members coordinate their verification missions in non-NATO states within NATO’s Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) in order to “ensure that cooperative verification measures are carried out without unwanted duplication of national efforts and that the most efficient use is made of the collective resources of Alliance countries” (NATO VCC 2018).

5.6.3 Security Institutions, Path-dependencies, and Community-building

The theoretical elaborations provide substantial support for a perspective which emphasizes the path-dependent nature of processes of peaceful interstate community-building (Wendt 1999, p. 340; Adler and Barnett 1998a, p. 49). “Path dependent patterns are characterized by self-reinforcing positive feed-back. Initial choices, often small and random, determine future historical trajectories” (Krasner 2016, p. 83). In line with this, institutions which states establish or join in early phases of rapprochement can trigger constitutive mechanisms that increase or decrease the likelihood that negative social identity patterns become “locked in” and “taken-for-granted”, depending on their actual framing as either trust- or distrust-symbolizing.

This insight comes with serious implications for theoretical models that depict processes of conflict transformation and interstate community-building as a step-wise process of incrementally increasing cooperative gestures and levels of institutionalization, as for instance depicted in Osgood’s (1962) GRIT-strategy (Swinth 1967). My elaborations suggest that states which begin a process of rapprochement by establishing security institutions which symbolize lacking trust (or even distrust) may never manage to improve their relations substantially and form peaceful interstate communities. When state agents keep on acting through these institutions, the cognitive and socio-emotional space for alternative future realities may diminish.

More specific models suggest that conflict transformation begins with the establishment of SMIs and ends with their dismantlement or transformation and the full integration of national military and security policies into a supranational institution (Adler and Barnett 1998a, 50, 54; Kupchan 2010; Oelsner 2007). However, it has been argued that rival states which install SMIs may never reach a situation where “verification and monitoring are increasingly dismantled or become less important for maintaining cooperation” (Adler and Barnett 1998a, p. 54). In contrast, states that manage to establish institutionalized forms of interstate alliances right at the beginning of rapprochement may increase prospects of community-building significantly. In sum, it seems utmost important that states at one point in the process of peace-building take a significant leap and establish institutions which are truly trust-symbolizing in kind.

5.7 Conclusion

In how far are the above elaborations empirically plausible? For instance, Shore (1998) provides a convincing empirical illustration of the concept of a “community of trust”. As he argues, the US and Canada demilitarized their border shortly after the end of the Civil War in 1871, which, however, was “based on domestic political incentives, not warm sentiment” and “had little to do with friendship” (Shore 1998, 333, 344). Leaving the border undefended was a trust-symbolizing practice that contributed to social cohesion (Shore 1998, p. 344). The trust generated and symbolized by the undefended border became “part of Canadian and American self-identification (...). The pervasive discourse of North Americanism took the trust already implicit in the US-Canadian relationship and turned it into a source of identification” (Shore 1998, 348, 355). Shore’s study on the American-Canadian security community also highlights the existence of a norm of trust between close friends. As he argues, “Canadian trusted Americans, and vice versa, because that was how North Americans were “supposed” to behave. Individuals and groups who behaved otherwise (...) were outside the accepted bounds of politics, and were duly chastised or ignored” (Shore 1998, p. 348).

Another illustrating example that highlights how distrustful interaction may violate a norm of trust and become a matter of disrespect is given by German reactions in the context of the NSA spying scandal. Here, then former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder argued that “(t)he USA do not have any respect for a loyal alliance partner and

our country's sovereignty. The actual core of the problem has so far not been discussed. It is the American's enormous distrust towards an alliance partner that has shown a high degree of solidarity" (Haselberger 2014, own translation). As the quote reveals, Schröder's concern with US spying activities was not only of legal kind, as it also had a socio-emotional component: Germany, as a reliable partner, would not "deserve" American distrust. Moreover, the positive relationship between trust-symbolizing practices, social cohesion, and trustworthy conduct also becomes reflected in former US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson statement that "[t]he chief lesson I have learned in long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him; and the surest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and to show your distrust" (Stimson and Bundy 1971, p. 644).

In this article, the "community of trust"-framework has also been used to make a general argument that highlights that the transformative effect of security institutions may depend on whether actors frame institutionalized practices as trust- or distrust-symbolizing practices. It was argued that a framing which emphasizes lacking trust or even distrust is especially likely when uncertainty or distrust prevail. Moreover, I argued that SMIs are especially likely to reproduce representations of self-other distinctions, whereas IIAs are well suited to produce and reproduce representations of we-ness. From this perspective, it is by no means surprising that NATO represents the strongest security community one has ever witnessed, and that the German-Franco-relationship even stands out as an especially strong case of peaceful interstate community. NATO provides the prototype of a trust-symbolizing institutionalized alliance, and the Franco-German relationship mainly rests on a bilateral friendship treaty that binds both states together through trust-symbolizing policy-integrating and coordinating practices, which, however, have also provided means for bilateral crisis management whenever irritations erupted (Krotz 2010). It is also unsurprising that other community-building projects, such as within OSCE or ASEAN remain far less developed than the NATO community (Adler 1998; Acharya 2009). Sure enough, OSCE and ASEAN face multiple problems and hurdles, but from a multi-causal perspective, the fact that OSCE and ASEAN mainly rest on common security-management practices that tend to reproduce representations that emphasize distrust and conflict may represent one cause among others. The same applies to relations between NATO members and Russia, who – although having experienced temporary heights – never managed to improve substantially and sustainably (Pouliot 2007). From a perspective that

emphasizes the importance of trust-symbolizing practices, it is thereby important to note that besides coordinated action within NATO's PfP program, institutionalized relations between Russia and NATO have always been dominated by security-management practices within the context of multiple arms control and CBM treaties. The fact that NATO and Russia never managed to cooperate substantially following a logic of "doing things together" outside the context of security-management may provide one reason for the lack of substantial improvement. This theoretical view fits with Putin's 2001 speech in the German Bundestag where he lamented that "we speak of a partnership. In reality, we have still not yet learned to trust each other" (own translation).

Importantly, the theoretical framework developed in this article does not only allow for superficial plausibility probes. Rather, researchers should use them to derive testable hypothesis and mechanisms regarding both, processes of community-building and maintenance. A multitude of methodological strategies, measurements and data may be used for their future investigation, including experimental research designs, case-study designs, or statistical large-N methods (Lyon et al. 2012; Brugger 2015; Keating and Ruzicka 2014; Pouliot 2010; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2008; Goertz et al. 2016).

In sum, this article provides the theoretical foundation for future research that sheds more light on the constitutive interactions between trust, identity, and the development of peaceful interstate community. Future empirical studies will reveal their empirical significance and, in this way, may not only inform scholarship but also policy practitioners with further valuable insights.

6 Security Organizations and Transitions from Rivalry towards Positive Interstate Peace: Theory Formulation and Quantitative Empirical Analysis

Lukas Kasten

Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript

Research on security communities, interstate friendship, and stable peace has already dealt with the role of security organizations on transitions from rivalry to positive interstate peace. However, the vast majority of studies is positively biased and emphasizes the operation of virtuous cycles between IGOs and peace. Moreover, empirical insights overwhelmingly rest on case studies, and hence are not generalizable to a larger set of cases. This is a shortcoming as, from a theoretical perspective, the role of security organizations is far from being clear. Using insights from bargaining theory, constructivist theory, social psychology and the literature on trust-building between business organizations, I present arguments which suggest that security organizations may increase but also decrease the prospects for transitions towards positive interstate peace. I also argue that especially highly institutionalized organizations exert significant effects, and that these effects vary depending on the actual level of peace. For my quantitative analysis, I use data on security organizations and a multi-level conceptualizations of interstate peace. My empirical findings show that only highly institutionalized security organizations exert significant and consistent effects, which are, however, highly ambivalent and vary between levels of peace. At the same time, my analysis shows that dyads on higher levels of peace tend to have more joint memberships in these organizations. In combination, these insights provide important implications: Only on higher and positive levels peace, a virtuous cycle between security organizations and peace may evolve. On lower levels of peace, this cycle may be interrupted and may even turn into reverse.

Keywords: peace, security organizations, trust, trust-building, stable peace, positive peace

6.1 Introduction

This article presents a quantitative analysis of the effects of international security organizations (SOs) on interstate peace. More specifically, it investigates whether SOs can help states not only to end their hostilities, but also to reach higher and more “positive” levels of peace, where “the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved” (Boulding 1978, pp. 12–13)

Qualitative research on interstate security community, friendship, and stable peace has ever since dealt with processes of transitions from rivalry to positive levels of peace (Adler and Barnett 1998b; Kupchan 2010; Koschut and Oelsner 2014; Kacowicz et al. 2000). In contrast, quantitative peace researchers have just recently begun to think of peace as a multi-level concept (Bayer 2010; Goertz et al. 2016). Until then, “(n)egative peace, in the sense of reducing war, has always been the main focus in peace research” (Gleditsch et al. 2014, p. 155; see also Regan 2014). This also applies to the quantitative research program that explores the pacifying effects of IGOs (Prins and Daxecker 2008; Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Boehmer et al. 2004). Accordingly, we know a lot about the effects of IGOs on militarized conflict. Whether IGOs can also help states to leave a state of rivalry and to reach the positive range of peaceful interstate relations is a question that has not yet been subject to quantitative analysis.

This paper rests on a conceptualization of positive peace that views the absence of militarized conflict and the presence of mutual trust and dense cooperative ties as its constitutive dimensions (Kasten 2017). In line with this conceptualization, I assume that SOs may impact on interstate peace-building processes in mainly two ways: First, institutions can affect the prospects for interstate crises management during phases of rapprochement and also when serious conflict erupts between neutral or even friendly states (Risse-Kappen 1996). Second, I assume that SOs may affect the building of “identification-based trusting relations”, which represents an especially strong and robust form of trusting relations and which can be understood as an important constitutive dimension of positive conceptualizations of interstate peace (Adler and Barnett 1998a; Brugger et al. 2013b).

My theoretical and empirical analysis distinguishes between highly institutionalized SOs and SOs of low institutionalization. It has been shown that the highly institutionalized form reduces the risk of militarized conflict and this study will explore whether

they also exert a transformational effect on interstate relations. (Boehmer et al. 2004). My theoretical framework will present arguments that show that SOs may exert positive and negative effects on the prospects for transitions towards positive peace. It will also be argued that the actual effects of SOs may depend on the actual phase of interstate peace-building.

The empirical results show that joint memberships in SOs of low institutionalization neither facilitate nor impede transitions from rivalry towards higher levels of peace. Regardless of the actual level of peace, they just do not exert any effects on the likelihood of transitioning towards the subsequent higher peace level. For highly institutionalized SOs, in turn, the empirical results seem more substantial: highly institutionalized SOs have no effect for transitions from rivalry to more neutral relations. However, once dyads have reached a level of neutral peace, highly institutionalized SOs decrease the prospects to move to a higher peace level as well as they decrease the likelihood of a fallback onto a level of rivalry. Thus, highly institutionalized SOs may prevent neutral relations to further improve but at the same time decrease the risk of militarized escalation and of the resumption of interstate rivalry. Importantly, once dyads have reached a positive level of “advanced peace”, highly institutionalized SOs facilitate a further strengthening of peace as well as they decrease the risk of substantial deteriorations of relationships. They increase the likelihood of upward transitions towards the subsequent, higher peace level and decrease the risk of fallbacks onto lower peace levels.

Notably, this study also investigates the reverse effect between the level of peace and the number of joint memberships in highly institutionalized SOs, revealing positive effects. Taken together, these insights have significant implications on existing theory that suggests the operation of a virtuous cycle between IGOs and peace (Russett et al. 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999). This cycle may indeed operate on levels of positive peace but may be interrupted and may even turn into reverse on lower levels of peace.

The paper starts with a literature review, followed by two conceptual sections on interstate peace and trust, and on SOs. It proceeds with the presentation of the theoretical framework and the derivation of hypotheses. I will then present the chosen research design, followed by the presentation of empirical results and their interpretation and discussion. In the conclusion I discuss potential future steps in the quantitative study of interstate peace more generally.

6.2 Theoretical Motivation

Much has been written on the pacifying effects of IGOs and the literature can be largely divided into a rationalist and a constructivist strand. Rationalist approaches view IGOs as conflict and crisis management tools. Making predominantly use of bargaining-theory, they argue that IGOs can help to find mutually acceptable bargaining solution as they ease problems of private information, credible commitment, and issue divisibility (Fearon 1995; Boehmer et al. 2004; Russett et al. 1998). Constructivist theory, in turn, views IGOs as “social environments” that may contribute to the formation of collective identity, to the internalization of norms, and to the building of strong mutual trust (Adler and Barnett 1998a; Anderson et al. 2015; Checkel 2005; Russett et al. 1998; Diez et al. 2006; Johnston 2001). At the same time, researchers generally find a reciprocal relationship between dyadic joint IGO membership and peace, as the latter is supposed to also increase the former (Donno et al. 2015; Russett et al. 1998). Against this background, researchers also tend to speak of virtuous cycles of IGOs and the pacification of interstate relations (Russett et al. 1998; Russett and Oneal 2001).

I identify several theoretical and empirical research gaps: First, one must acknowledge that constructivist works have already provided some ideas on how IGOs may affect processes of interstate distrust-reduction and trust-building. For instance, Kupchan (2010, 48, 49) argues that institutionalized reciprocal restrained increases transparency, lowers transaction costs, extends expectations of reciprocity, and establishes linkages on the societal level. Similarly, Wendt (1999, 360, 361) argues that “by observing each other’s habitual compliance (...) states gradually learn that others have no desire to break the rules (...) and as such can be trusted (...)”. Adler and Barnett (1998a, 42, 43) assume that institutions can contribute to the building of trust as they “facilitate and encourage transactions (...) by establishing norms of behavior, monitoring mechanisms, and sanctions to enforce those norms”, and as they facilitate social learning and the formation of a positive social identity. As they argue, trust is accomplished through “sustained interactions and reciprocal exchanges, leaps of faith (...), trial-and-error, and a historical legacy of actions and encounters” (Barnett and Adler 1998, p. 414). However, existing theoretical accounts solely touch upon possible mechanisms and causal pathways and fail to fully think them through. I hence follow Ruzicka and Keating (2015, p. 21), who argue that “[a]ll too frequently, such processes [of trust-building] are merely equated with increased cooperation”. What follows is that researchers have so far failed to realize

that institutions may not only facilitate, but may also impede the building of trust, and hence, transitions from rivalry towards positive peace.

Tying in with this, my second objection holds that the existing theoretical literature is generally biased towards an optimistic view on the pacifying effects of IGOs. Sure enough, existing research has accounted for the realist claim which dismisses IGOs as mere epiphenomena (Mearsheimer 1994), and have analyzed the actual direction of the causal arrow between IGOs and peace more thoroughly (Donno et al. 2015). Still, optimism prevails, and researchers keep on emphasizing the operation of virtuous cycles between IGOs and peace (Russett and Oneal 2001). Hence, rationalist and constructivist arguments that highlight potentially negative effects of IGOs are scarce (Kinsella and Russett 2002; Fausett and Volgy 2010). In line with this observation, empirical studies that reveal positive effects of IGOs on militarized conflict have discounted the same as artifacts of mis-specified statistical models (Kinsella and Russett 2002). In contrast, this article's theory section takes seriously into account that IGOs may in fact exert negative effects on peace, and especially on transformational processes of trust-building and social identification. I thereby borrow from social psychology and research on the effect of contractual constraints on the prospects for inter-organizational trust-building, where it has been argued theoretically and shown empirically that institutional constraints may in fact impede the building of trust and the formation of socio-emotional affect (Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa 2005; Vlaar et al. 2007; Ferrin et al. 2007; Lumineau 2017; Strickland 1958; Molm et al. 2009; Kasten 2018).

Third, several accounts theorize the role of IGOs in different phases of transformational processes towards positive peace. It is thereby common to assume that security management institutions, such as CBMs and arms control treaties are necessary in the initial phase of rapprochement and become less important in later phases, where organizations for the integration of economic and military policies stand in the foreground (Oelsner 2007; Adler and Barnett 1998a; Kupchan 2010). In contrast, I will argue that the actual effect of institutions on the prospects for transitions towards positive peace depends on the actual phase of this process. This leads to the theoretical claim that especially in early phases, specific organizations may actually impede transitions towards higher levels of peace while in latter phases, they may facilitate the same.

Fourth, and most importantly, current empirical research lacks comprehensive statistical insights on the effects of SOs on transformational process from rivalry towards positive peace. Empirical quantitative literature that deals with the effects of IGOs is dominated by studies that focus on the occurrence, onset, or escalation of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) (Russett et al. 1998; Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Boehmer et al. 2004; Shannon et al. 2010; Haftel 2007; Long et al. 2007; Mattes and Vonnahme 2010; Bearce et al. 2006). Studies thereby show that highly institutionalized IGOs with strong institutional capacities and a security mandate are especially likely to strongly reduce militarized conflict (Boehmer et al. 2004; Shannon et al. 2010).

Importantly, most existing quantitative studies make use of both, rationalist and constructivist arguments to underpin their theoretical expectations. However, it should be clear that they can only estimate the effects of IGOs on the likelihood of “negative peace”, that is, the absence of militarized conflict as such, and miss to analyze whether IGOs also exert effects on deeper-going transitions of interstate relations, as they are theorized within constructivist theory. Notable exceptions exist: First, Bearce and Bondanella (2007) make use of constructivist social learning theory and show that IGOs that facilitate interpersonal contact exert a positive effect on interstate interest convergence. Second, few studies have also analyzed the effects of IGOs on rivalry termination. Quite problematically, these studies produce ambivalent results, indicating positive and null effects (Prins and Daxecker 2008; Cornwell and Colaresi 2002) Moreover, they solely capture the number of joint IGO memberships. As one can reasonable expect different effects for different types of IGOs, treating all IGOs as equal may mask insightful and significant cause-effect relations (Boehmer et al. 2004). Adding to that, it should be clear that studies on rivalry termination solely focus on transitions from rivalry to neutrality, but do not shed light on transitions towards more positive levels of peace.

Sure enough, there already exists a multitude of qualitative case studies that analyze the role of SOs in rivalry termination processes and processes and security community building, friendship, and stable peace (Deutsch 1957; Boulding 1978; Rock 1989; Kacowicz et al. 2000; Kupchan 2010; Koschut and Oelsner 2014; Adler and Barnett 1998b; Acharya 2009). However, due to the limits of case-study-based methods of causal inference, these studies cannot provide us with estimates regarding their overall net-effect. In fact, estimates of this kind seem highly interesting from the perspective of the

theoretical framework that will be developed in this article. When SOs may trigger mechanism with positive and/or negative effects, and when these effects may vary between institutional type and between phases of peace-building, it seems most necessary to gain general insights on the actual link between SOs on transitions towards positive peace.

In sum, a deviation from a sole focus on MIDs and the analyses the effect of IGOs on transformational processes from rivalry to positive peace can provide important insights regarding the role of IGOs and their effects on interstate relations. In doing so, the present study ties in with a recently initiated quantitative research program on interstate positive peace, that is now just about to evolve (Diehl 2016; Goertz et al. 2016; Bayer 2010).

6.3 Interstate Peace, Trust and Distrust

Quantitative peace researchers have just recently started to conceptualize and operationalize peace as a multi-level phenomenon and to gather the data necessary for statistical analysis (Goertz et al. 2016; Bayer 2010). However, Kasten (2017) has shown that existing concepts for quantitative analysis tend to suffer from problems of “ontological overload” and “ontological underload”. That is, they either include not enough or too many constitutive dimensions, running the risk of low resonance with common sense understandings of the concept or tautological reasoning and empirical analysis (when constitutive dimensions of the dependent variable are used as independent variables).¹ I therefore make use of Kasten’s (2017) concept P^* . Following the author, it is the central advantage of P^* that it provides a valid specification although it is designed in a throughout parsimonious way. It includes only three dimensions into its “constitutive container”, that is, state behavior, decision-makers’ trustful and distrustful expectations, and the duration and endurance of resulting behavioral and perceptual patterns.

Trust and distrust can be understood as mechanisms that reduce uncertainty about another actor’s future behavior. For the realm of interstate security, trust can most generally be defined as the expectation that the other side will resort to throughout nonviolent

¹ For instance, Goertz et al.’s (2016) measure uses memberships in IGO with conflict-management functions as an indicator. Using their measure would clearly render this article’s analysis tautological (see also Kasten 2017, 35, 36).

strategies for interstate conflict management (Booth and Wheeler 2008; Hoffman 2002; Wendt 1999).² Distrust, in turn, represents the contrary expectation.

Rational conceptualizations of trust and distrust assume that actors view each other as egoists that cooperate or defect depending on what best serves their self-interest under given situational circumstances (Hardin 2002). As situations and preferences can generally change in an unforeseeable way (Mearsheimer 2001, p. 31), the maintenance of expectations depend on continuous gathering and processing of information (Rousseau et al. 1998, p. 399; Kydd 2005, p. 202) and stable situational circumstances.

In line with Mercer (2005, p. 95), who argues that “trust (which) depends on external evidence, transparency, iteration, or incentives, (...) adds nothing to the explanation”, constructivists have applied an extra-rationalist and identification-based ontology of trust and distrust, which comprises a cognitive and a socio-emotional foundation (Lewis and Weigert 1985; Lewicki et al. 2006). In case of identification-based trust (IBT), the cognitive foundation refers to positive experiences and a non-violent interaction history which offers “good reasons” to expect similar behavior in the future. The socio-emotional foundation of IBT refers to positive identification, that is, a collective identity and constitutive norms of military self-restraint. (Kupchan 2010; Wendt 1999; Adler and Barnett 1998a). Collective identity facilitates pro-social and trustworthy conduct and allows for the formation of expectations “without the need to constantly collect information in every new situation” (Rathbun, 2009, p. 351; Rousseau et al., 1998) as the other side is seen as an actor with constant and situation-independent character traits. Positive identification also decreases the need for complex calculation, as it activates automatic cognitive processing modes, stereotyping and cognitive schemata (Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010; McEvily, 2011; Rompf, 2015).

Notably, the identification-based form of trust (IBT) allows states to “transcend” security-dilemma-dynamics and credible commitment problems, while rationalist forms of trust only allow for their “mitigation” (Booth and Wheeler 2008). Identification-based distrust (IBD), in turn, rests on past experiences of a negative kind and on perceptions of the other side as a significant “other” with opposing and constant negative character traits.

² I follow the literature on security community and view interstate trust-building as an inter-elite process, focusing on decision-makers and high-level bureaucrats (Adler and Barnett 1998a). They are likely to interact within SOs and to report their experiences and perceptions to their home audiences. In this way, trust-building processes on the inter-elite level are likely to affect states’ foreign policy strategies on the state level (see also Brugger et al. 2017).

Hence, worst-case expectations and inherent bad faith models dominate in actors' minds, and security-dilemma dynamics are likely to escalate (Stuart and Starr 1981).

Against this background, it should become clear that conceptualizations of positive interstate peace emphasize that states trust on the basis of positive identification (Adler and Barnett 1998a; Kupchan 2010). Hence, P^* specifies the levels of advanced and strong peace through increasingly strong IBT relationships and dense bilateral ties. Levels of war, hot and cold rivalry are marked by militarized conflict and identification-based distrust (IBD) (Stuart and Starr 1981; Thompson 2001). The level of neutral peace is marked by the absence of any significant interaction and expectations, and accordingly, uncertainty reaches its maximum (see also table 6.1).

Table 6.1: *Kasten's (2017) six-level concept of peace*

	War	Hot Rivalry	Cold Rivalry	Neutral Peace	Advanced Peace	Strong Peace
Dominant Behavior	manifest warfare	repeated militarized conflict	isolate conflicts, threats, confrontation	diplomatic relations, but no significant interactions	network of bilateral ties	dense network of bilateral ties
Dominant Expectations	strong distrust	distrustful	less distrustful	no significant expectations, uncertainty prevails	trustful	strong trust
Duration/Stability of Behavior and Expectations		deeply entrenched				deeply entrenched

6.4 International Security Organizations

Following established definitions, an intergovernmental organization “(1) is a formal entity, (2) has states as members, and (3) possesses a permanent secretariat or other indication of institutionalization such as headquarters and/or permanent staff” (Pevehouse et al. 2004, p. 103). IGOs with a security mandate include sets of rules and procedures that are purposefully designed to increase member states' security. These rules can be conceived

of as statements that forbid, require or permit particular kinds of military actions (Korzenios et al. 2001; Müller 2003).

The following theoretical framework distinguishes SOs with regard to their degree of institutionalization. This may reflect whether SOs include provisions that facilitate regular meetings and exchange, provisions for the exchange of information (reporting schemes, obligations for mutual notification of military maneuvering, exchange of observers), provisions that explicitly restrict member states' military discretion (arms control, limitations of troop maneuverings and exercises), or provisions for mediation, arbitration, or adjudication, provisions to coerce and force states into compliance (Boehmer et al. 2004, p. 18).

6.5 Theoretical Framework

This article's theoretical framework builds on the idea that interstate relations should be understood as a continuous bargaining process (Fearon 1995). States generally aim at avoiding costly militarized conflict but may fail to do so mainly due to two central bargaining problems: first, private information about relative capabilities and resolve may lead to the collapse of bargaining space from the outset. And second, states may be unable to credibly commit to a bargaining solution. In a situation of rivalry, both bargaining problems become throughout severe: states do not refrain from the use of military force, they have strong incentives to misrepresent information, and mutual distrust escalates commitment problems. In contrast, on the level of positive peace, bargaining solution should be relatively easy to find, as norms of nonviolent conflict management render the use of force highly unlikely, collective identity facilitates the convergence of interests, and mutual trust helps states to transcend commitment problems. Nonetheless, it is important to realize that serious crises may also erupt between neutral and even friendly states, when trust is shaken and conflicts may potentially escalate (Risse-Kappen 1996; Brugger et al. 2013a; Hasenclever and Kasten 2015). Against this background, and in line with Kasten's conceptualization of P^* , transitions from rivalry to positive peace presume three processes: first, states must be able to prevent the escalation of crises and manage to stabilize their relations under conditions of distrust, uncertainty, and low trust. Second, states must establish a dense network of bilateral ties; and third, states must be able to

reduce distrust and to build identification-based trusting relations. In a best-case scenario, all processes run in parallel and reinforce each other.

This article's theoretical framework focuses on two general pathways through which SOs can impact on transitions from rivalry towards positive interstate peace: first, they can facilitate or impede successful crisis management; and second, they can facilitate or impede the reduction of IBD and the building of identification-based trusting relationships.

6.5.1 SOs Facilitate Transitions towards Positive Levels of Peace

To begin with, SOs may facilitate crisis management as they may provide platforms for interstate negotiations and decrease transaction costs of diplomatic interaction. They may also intervene more actively which may include “facilitative intervention in the form of good offices, mediation, conciliation, and fact-finding, and binding intervention in the form of arbitration or adjudication” (Anderson et al. 2015, p. 653; Abbott and Snidal 2016). On a more abstract level, institutions may help to overcome informational problems when they inform states about each other's relative military capabilities and resolve (Abbott 1993). Moreover, states can signal their resolve when they openly violate against an institution's rules and procedures and are willing to incur the costs that may follow from sanctions, embargos, or naming and shaming (Boehmer et al. 2004). SOs may also help to mitigate credible commitment problems through facilitating iterated cooperation along a logic of tit-for-tat. Moreover, IGOs can facilitate cooperation through activating reputational mechanisms of naming and shaming. IGOs may also constrain states and stabilize power ratios, and in this way prevent significant power shifts and decrease incentives to renege from agreements. Moreover, they may possess coercive and enforcing capacities through which they can actively deter states from exploitation and punish the same (Abbott 1993; Boehmer et al. 2004; Russett et al. 1998; Hasenclever and Weiffen 2006).

SOs may also contribute to the building of the cognitive foundation of IBT-relationships. As mentioned above, the cognitive foundation consists of a positive interaction history, that is, past “proofs” of benevolent character. Following socio-psychological insights, actors can best gather such proofs when they engage in risk-taking behavior. Signaling theory assumes that actors can credibly reveal their benevolent character when

they repeatedly send cooperative signals over longer time spans (Osgood 1962; Kydd 2005; Six et al. 2010).³ Moreover, actors can probe each other's intent through a strategy of trial-and-error (Molm et al. 2009). In both cases, cooperative moves must be risky in kind. Otherwise, actors may not learn about each other's intrinsic character, but perceive the other side's cooperative move and response as of ulterior intent, as a sole exception from the rule, or attribute it solely to external structural pressures (Larson 1997b, p. 720; Wheeler 2010). As Molm concludes, the "risk of betrayal or defection provides the necessary condition for inferring partners' trustworthiness from their behavior" (Molm et al. 2009; Cook et al. 2005b).

Against this background, SOs can help states to produce the cognitive foundation of trust when they provide opportunities for risk-taking behavior. In fact, actors may perceive compliance with a SO's rule and provisions as inherently risky, as opportunities for one-sided defection may never be completely ruled out. For instance, critical verification theory emphasizes that it seems possible to use verification strategies to "prove non-compliance with an agreement, [but] it is impossible to use evidence to prove total compliance. However much evidence of compliance is gathered, the possibility that some non-compliance remains undetected will always exist" (Krass 1985).⁴ Hence, states may defect from the constraining provisions of SOs and in this way gain significant military advantage. Provisions that increase interstate transparency may as well seem risky as they may create risks of "legalized forms of espionage".⁵ For instance, Krass argues that verification provisions always provide opportunities to "gain valuable military intelligence under the cover of arms control agreements", as "the same data which are used in one government agency to provide evidence of compliance can be used by another to target nuclear missiles more accurately or effectively" (Krass 1985, p. 117).⁶ Thus, states that

³ Signaling theory has gained prominence as a rationalist theory, although it has its roots in social-psychology (Kydd 2005; Osgood 1962; Six et al. 2010).

⁴ One may ask why states should establish SOs when they perceive them as inherently risky, especially under conditions of distrust or uncertainty. Existing research thereby focuses on the role of individual decision-makers: Rathbun (2012b) argues that "generalized trust" may allow actors to engage in risky-forms of cooperation even with strangers. Wheeler (2018), in turn, focuses on how face-to-face interactions between political leaders may generate inter-personal trust. Both authors hence assume that key decision-makers' trust enables the installment of risky institutions on the interstate level. As I argue, institutionalized interaction may then affect interstate relations on a larger scale, including the political elites of both countries.

⁵ For instance, the US Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP) stated that among all verification techniques, "on-site inspections pose the greatest risk to national security, proprietary, or other sensitive information." (DTIRP 2005, p. 2).

⁶ States may even fear espionage from neutral third parties, such as IGOs. For instance, Iran accused the IAEA of forwarding information that led to the assassinations of Iranian scientists (CSM 2012).

continuously comply with an institution's rules and procedures –although opportunities for cheating may exist – can gather and send valuable information following the logic of signaling and testing. In this way, they may compile a comprehensive track-record of cooperative exchange each other's compliant behavior and gather “good reason” to trust.

SOs may contribute to the building of the socio-emotional foundation of identification-based trusting relations in that they facilitate the formation of a collective identity and the internalization of norms of military self-restraint. SOs that facilitate meetings and cooperative exchange may provide opportunities for “positive contact” (Allport 1954). Moreover, Wheeler (2018) argues that personal face-to-face interaction is highly conducive to the building of socio-emotional affect and trust. SOs may also provide platforms for the exchange of ideas and argumentation, in this way facilitating norm internalization processes along the logic of persuasion and communicative action (Risse 2000; Checkel 2005; Gheciu 2005; Adler and Barnett 1998a, 42, 43).⁷ Moreover, actors may perceive the constitutive rules and procedures of SOs as reflecting practices of military-self-restraint. As “We are – or become – what we do”, these practices may lead to the internalization of corresponding norms and the formation of collective identity through mechanisms of habitualization, and “reflected appraisal” and “other casting” as they are known from symbolic interactionist theory. (Wendt 1999, 341, 310-311, 360-361; Hopf 2010; Pouliot 2010, p. 237). As Adler and Barnett (1998a, 42, 43) argue, institutions “generate and enhance norms and practices of self-restraint”.⁸ Or as Kupchan (2010) puts it, “acts of strategic restraint engender affinity among states”. Moreover, researchers have emphasized that especially trust-symbolizing practices constitutively (re-)produce actors' representations of we-ness (Kasten 2018) (“Trust Constitutes Identity”). For instance, Möllering emphasizes that “[p]eople are who they are because of whom they trust and who trusts them...[t]rust builds on and sustains personal and collective identities” (Möllering 2013, p. 293). As actors not only are, but also become what they do, the formation of collective identity hence presumes that states engage in trust-symbolizing practices already in a stage of a relationship where we-ness and friendship is still to evolve. Actors must treat each other as if they were trustworthy to build the socio-emotional foundation of trust in the first place. Notably, as actors may perceive rules and procedures of SOs as

⁷ See also Johnston (2001), Acharya (2009), Hampton (1998), Bearce and Bondanella (2007).

⁸ IGOs may also facilitate the development of a culture of regionalism and instill “belief in a common fate” (Adler and Barnett 1998a, p. 43).

generally risky (see above), they may also perceive their mutual compliance with these rules as trust-symbolizing practices.

Notably, one may argue that especially highly institutionalized SOs should trigger the operation of the above mechanisms: first they may have the necessary institutional capacities to significantly ease bargaining problems (Boehmer et al. 2004); second, they include a vast multitude of rules and procedures against which states may defect and which may thus facilitate learning along the logic of risk-taking; third, they may provide more opportunities to engage in social learning and teaching as well as they include a multitude of rule and procedures that may be perceived as reflections of military self-restraining practices and as trust-symbolizing practices.

H1: SOs increase the prospects for transitions towards a higher level of peace.

H2: Highly institutionalized SOs are especially likely to exert a positive effect on the prospects for transitions towards a higher level of peace.

6.5.2 SOs Impede Transitions towards Positive Levels of Peace

How could institutions increase the risk of militarized conflict and impede successful crises management? One line of reasoning suggests that institutions may increase the likelihood that conflicting issues develop in the first place. Institutions may increase “the salience of their members for each other and raise the possibility of diplomatic and political disputes that will catch the headlines” (Kinsella and Russett 2002, p. 1059). Fausett and Volgy (2010, p. 83) similarly argue that IGOs that increase interstate transparency may “breed discontent and highlight differences of interests, policies, and values”. Institutions may also trigger conflict about the interpretation of their constitutive rules and procedures or may start to question their legitimacy and effectiveness. Moreover, Boehmer et al. (2004, p. 29) argue that IGOs may increase uncertainty. This may be the case, for instance, when they deliver ambiguous information about states’ compliance record. Especially under conditions of rising tensions, increasing transparency may also contribute to the fueling of distrust. This may be the case, for instance, when states retrieve information about the other side’s massive military potential or when states prove their resolve through purposefully defecting against an institution’s rules and procedures.

SOs may also impede the formation of the cognitive foundation of IBT when actors perceive institutions as the primary explanation for the other side's non-violent conduct. In other words, when actors attribute each other's non-violent and restraining conduct solely to an institution's constraining effects, learning about the other side's intrinsic character becomes difficult, even when states keep on complying with an institution's rules and procedures. Actors may then remain ignorant and wonder how the other side may behave in the absence of these institutional constraints (Wendt 1999, p. 359). In a similar vein, Mercer has argued that "if observers attribute cooperation to the environment rather than the person, then trust cannot (...) develop" (Mercer 2005, p. 95). Hence, Adler and Barnett (1998a, 42, 43) could be completely wrong when they suggest that institutions can contribute to the building of trust as they include "monitoring mechanisms, and sanctions to enforce (...) norms".

Moreover, SOs may also impede the formation of the socio-emotional foundation of IBT. First, one may assume that regular personal interaction with (former) arch enemies may reproduce negative stereotyping as actors may interpret the other side's behavior in a biased way that confirms existing preconceptions. Moreover, positive identification and norm internalization processes may not evolve when actors attribute the other side's cooperative conduct to the effects of institutional constraints and do not perceive them as inherently voluntary in kind. For instance, a symbolic interactionist perspective suggests that practices of military self-restraint may only facilitate positive mutual identification if they "signal to the Other that the Self respects its different and will be self-limiting towards it, thus creating the basis for mutual trust" (Drulák 2011, p. 143). Hence, if actors do not perceive the other side's non-violent conduct as a voluntary act and as an act of *self-limiting*, it is unlikely that mechanisms of "other-casting" and reflected appraisal will trigger identification and internalization processes (Wendt 1999, 342, 359).⁹ Adding to that, while it has been argued that actors may perceive of SOs as symbols of mutual trust, it seems equally reasonable that they view them and their constitutive rules and procedures as expressions and symbols of lacking trust or even mutual distrust. In fact, established theories on institutional design generally follow an understanding of international institutions as substitutes for trust. From this view, institutions become necessary precisely because states act in an environment of uncertainty or even distrust (Korzenios et al. 2001). For instance, Adler and Barnett (1998a, p. 50) have emphasized that

⁹ See also Johnston (2001, p. 505).

states use institutions in early phases of rapprochement “to foster cooperation and to verify in the absence of trust (...)”. Hence, acting through SOs may well impede the formation of socio-emotional affect as a constitutive perspective on trust- and distrust-symbolizing practices and identity suggests that distrust-symbolizing practices may contribute to the reproduction of negative self-other distinctions (Kasten 2018) (“Trust constitutes Identity”). For instance, Krass (1985, 162, 163) views arms control verification as an “institutionalized” form of distrust which may cause “even greater hostility and distrust that would have existed without them”.

Again, one may argue that these mechanisms most likely operate within highly institutionalized SOs: first, they provide a vast amount of information and hence are most likely to reveal discord and increase uncertainty and distrust; second, they include a multitude of strongly constraining rules and provisions and hence, increase the likelihood that actors view them as the sole reason for each other’s cooperative conduct; third, and for the same reason, they decrease the likelihood that actors view each other’s military restraining behavior as self-limiting and voluntary in kind and as trust-symbolizing practices.

H3: SOs decrease the prospects for transitions towards a higher level of peace.

H4: Highly institutionalized SOs are especially likely to exert a negative effect on the prospects for transitions towards a higher level of peace.

6.5.3 The Effects of SOs depend on the Actual Level of Peace

Until this point, arguments about possible positive and negative effects of SOs have been formulated in a general way without distinguishing between the actual level of peace a dyad may be located on. However, reasonable arguments exist that SOs are especially likely to exert negative effects when distrust prevails. This is so as social-psychological research on perceptual biases and fatal attribution errors argues that actors tend to interpret the other side’s actions and behaviors in ways that confirm their preconceptions (Jervis 1976; Hewstone et al. 1982; Taylor and Jaggi 1974; Oldroyd 2002). In international relations, research on “inherent bad faith”-models and enemy images, which rest on these insights, has already emphasized the destructive effects of biased perception and

interpretation under conditions of distrust (Stuart and Starr 1981). Adding to that, attribution biases may also operate under conditions of uncertainty, especially when actors share a history of violent interstate rivalry.

Hence, one may reasonably assume that SOs are especially likely to increase the salience of conflict and to breed discontent under conditions of distrust and uncertainty. Information provided by SOs may be also more likely interpreted as ambiguous in kind and therefore increase uncertainty or distrust even more. Moreover, when distrust or uncertainty prevails, actors may be more likely to attribute the other side's cooperative conduct to the constraining effect of SOs and to perceive the other side's restraining behavior as non-voluntary in kind and not as an act of self-limiting. As illustrated above, the cognitive and socio-emotional foundation of identification-based trust is then unlikely to develop. Adding to that, actors that act through SOs under conditions of distrust and uncertainty may be more likely to perceive them as constitutive part and manifestations of their distrustful and negative relationship ("Trust constitutes Identity", p. 162).

Under conditions of (growing) trust, in turn, just the opposite is the case, as actors are likely to be biased towards positive and complaisant perceptions and interpretations of the other side's behavior. Conflicts are more likely to be solved in consensual mode, cooperation is more likely to be attributed to intrinsic character, and restraining behavior is more likely to be interpreted as self-restraining behavior. As trusting states take each other's peaceful conduct for granted, they will more and more cede to use security institutions as a conflict management tool among themselves. Rather, states will use them to pursue joint goals, to solve joint problems or to coordinate their policies towards other institutional members and third-party threats. Hence, bilateral interaction within SOs is more likely to be framed in terms of mutual trust and togetherness (see "Trust constitutes Identity", p. 162 – 163). Hence, the following hypotheses can be derived.

- H5: SOs decrease the prospects for transitions from hot rivalry, cold rivalry and negative peace to a higher level of peace and increase the prospects for transitions from advanced peace to strong peace.
- H6: The effects stated in H5 are especially likely for highly institutionalized SOs.

6.6 Model Specification and Operationalization

The hypotheses derived in the theory section were empirically analyzed with a dataset that includes all strategic rivalries as identified by Thompson and Dreyer (2011) which have ended in or after 1939. Thus, the sample includes all rivalries that existed or ended during World War II or started after 1945, thus being of major relevance for the post-world-war II period and today. The observation period covers the years from 1946 until 2001, the unit of analysis being the nondirected dyad-year. A dyad enters the dataset in the first year of strategic rivalry (or in 1946 if the rivalry begun before) and remains until the end of the observation period, that is, 2001.

6.6.1 Dependent Variables: Levels of Peace

I used Kasten's (2017) concept and operationalization of P^* to capture the level of peace for each dyad-year. P^* defines levels of war, hot rivalry and cold rivalry through distrust and militarized conflict. To measure these levels of war and rivalry, P^* makes use of data on militarized interstate disputes, interstate rivalry, interstate crisis, and diplomatic relations. For a detailed discussion of aggregation procedures, I refer to Kasten (2017). The level of neutral peace is defined as the absence of war, rivalry, and any positive levels of peace. P^* 's positive levels of advanced and strong peace are defined through increasing levels of bilateral cooperation and trust. Empirically, Kasten makes use of what he calls a "treaty-density-approach". The measurement strategy follows the general logic of dispute-density-approaches from literature on interstate rivalry, which rest on the assumption that repeated militarized disputes do not only represent a behavioral pattern, but also serve as an indicator of mutual distrust and threat perceptions. The treaty-density-approach applies this logic to the positive range of interstate relations and distinguishes between neutral, advanced and strong peace by focusing on the number and frequency of bilateral treaty signatures. It reasonably assumes that states will only be willing to incur the costs of signing and implementing treaties if they can expect no serious and manifest militarized conflict to occur in the future, that is, they must have strong and robust trust in each other's benevolent character, that is, identification-based trust (see Kasten (2017) for a detailed discussion of his operationalization strategy).

As Kasten shows, this measurement strategy comes with a promising degree of validity, also compared to existing approaches, and despite its parsimonious specification (Goertz et al. 2016; Bayer 2010).

6.6.2 Independent Variables: SOs

To measure the effect of SOs, I first produced a baseline dataset of security IGOs, making use of data from Bernauer et al. (2010), Shannon et al. (2010), and Lundgren, (2014). I assume that capturing the yearly number of a dyad's joint organizational memberships presents an appropriate measurement strategy, as it increases or decreases opportunities for the above theorized mechanisms to evolve and to exert effects on dyadic relations. *SIGO_HIGH* captures a subset of SOs which are highly institutionalized. I thereby follow Shannon et al.'s (2010) and Lundgren's (2014) coding decisions. *SIGO_LOW*, in turn, captures joint memberships for the remaining SOs.

Notably, one would expect that a SO's facilitating and/or impeding effects on transitions towards positive peace will not unfold instantaneously but rather after some time has passed (Zürn and Checkel 2005, p. 1066). I therefore used lagged versions of the organizational variables (Bearce and Bondanella 2007, pp. 716–717). However, instead of arbitrarily choosing one specific time lag, I estimated multiple separate models with lags from 1 to 10 years. This allows me to base my conclusion on the interpretation of a more encompassing overview on the estimated lagged effects. I thereby assume that a small number of significant lags (e.g. between zero and three significant effects) as well as contradictory effects for different lags (e.g. two lags with significant positive and two lags with significant negative effects) do not offer a degree of consistency that would be necessary for the formulation of well-grounded and meaningful conclusions about any effect of my key independent variables. In contrast, a sufficient number of lags with consistent significant results will be treated as a profound basis for the formulation of empirical conclusions.¹⁰

¹⁰ This procedure is not based on any formalized statistical inferential model but rather on common sense. However, future methodological research may tie in with this approach and develop a formal statistical procedure for inferences of this kind.

6.6.3 Control Variables

To reduce the risk of spurious correlations, I included several control variables which can be theoretically linked to both, the dependent variable and the key independent variables and which represent standard control variables in quantitative studies that estimate the effects of IGOs on militarized conflict as well as the effects of IGOs on rivalry termination. There, their choice has also been theoretically well-founded and substantiated making use of realist, liberal, and constructivist arguments (see especially Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Cornwell and Colaresi 2002; Wendt 1999; Kupchan 2010; Adler and Barnett 1998a; Cronin 1999; Prins and Daxecker 2008; Russett and Oneal 2001). For the lack of space, I refer the reader to these studies for detailed theoretical foundations.

The specified models control for regime type using the adapted Polity IV score of the less democratic state (*POLITY2_SML*) (Marshall and Jaggers 2005). Economic interdependence is measured by *DEPENDENCE_SML*. It captures the economic dependence of the less dependent state by summing its imports and exports in the dyad divided by its gross domestic product. To assure that the main independent variables do not solely reflect the overall level of institutionalization in a dyad, *NIGO* controls for the number of joint IGO memberships (Pevehouse et al. 2004). Moreover, I control for whether states have joint *ALLIANCE* memberships besides those they may have within the framework of the SOs under analysis (Gibler 2009). *MAJORPOWER* indicates if at least one state in a dyad is major power, following the Correlates of War definition and operationalization. *RELMILCAP* uses COW's CYNC-Scores to measure military capabilities of the stronger state relative to the weaker state (Singer 1988). To control for geographic proximity, I also included an indicator for *CONTIGUITY* and the natural log of *DISTANCE*. *CUMMIDS10* captures the cumulative sum of MIDs that occurred in the previous 10 years in a dyad (Maoz 2005).¹¹ To control for different logics operating in the international system after the end of the Cold war, *ENDCW* indicates the post 1990 dyad-years. Data for all our control variables comes from Pevehouse and Russett (2006). All control variables were lagged by one year to reduce the risk of endogeneity.

¹¹ I do not count the total cumulative sum of MIDs, as other studies do, as I find it reasonable that MIDs in the younger past have a stronger impact than MIDs that happened a long time ago.

6.6.4 Model Specifications

To test the derived hypotheses, I largely follow Owsiak et al. (2016) who investigate transitions from rivalry to neutral peace. More specifically, I specify separate models for each of the levels of hot rivalry, cold rivalry, neutral peace, and advanced peace, and use a dichotomous dependent variable which indicates whether or not a dyad has moved towards a higher level in a given dyad-year.

Notably, although my theory solely deals with transitions to higher levels, I also compute the likelihood for downward transitions, that is the risk of fallback on any lower levels of peace, in this way presenting a comprehensive picture of the effect of SOs.¹² Doing so also accounts for the idea of asymmetric hypotheses on peace and conflict which reasonably argues that the effects of the causes of peace (i.e. upward transitions) are not just the inverse of the effects of the causes of violent conflict (i.e. downward transitions) (Regan 2014, p. 348; Owsiak et al. 2016, pp. 177–178).

Effects will be estimated using simple logit analysis, using Katz et al.'s (1998) procedure to account for temporal dependence including a year count (*YEARCOUNT*) and three cubic splines as well as robust standard errors clustered on the dyad to account for spatial dependence. The implementation of these model specifications renders logit analysis almost similar to Cox proportional hazards event-history analysis, which are as well commonly used in studies on rivalry termination (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, pp. 80–83). However, I follow Owsiak et al.'s (2016, p. 162) pragmatic approach and use logit models as they rest on less restrictive assumptions and are more easy to interpret.

6.7 Empirical Analysis

I start with some descriptive information on our dependent and key independent variables: Table 6.2 presents descriptive summarizing statistics for P^* . It indicates that the number of transitions is generally quite high, therefore providing a valid empirical basis for inferential statistics: 56 dyads move from hot rivalry to cold rivalry, 50 dyads on the level of

¹² I do not analyze transitions from war to rivalry as my theoretical framework focuses on transformational processes and not on war termination. I analyze transitions to any higher or any lower level as dyads may also overleap levels in their transitioning behavior. I do not analyze fall backs from strong peace to lower peace levels since my dataset does not include enough cases.

cold rivalry transitions to neutral peace. 28 Dyads reach the level of advanced peace and 12 dyads manage to build strong peace.

The baseline dataset on SOs includes altogether 66 SOs of which 27 have been coded as “highly institutionalized” (see also the appendix for a full list). Table 6.3 shows data on SOs on the dyad-year level for each level of peace. It shows substantial variation of the number of joint memberships for each level of P^* , and it is now the question if this variation helps to explain variation of the dependent variable, that is, whether dyads move towards higher (or lower) levels of peace.

Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics for levels of P*

	Dyads ¹³	Dyad Years	Mean Duration	Std.Dev.	Min	Max	Upwards Transitions	Downward Transitions
Hot Rivalry	98	1819	18.43	14.32	2	55	56	23
Cold Rivalry	96	1219	11.70	11.29	1	55	50	28
Neutral Peace	87	1332	14.66	12.78	1	55	28	34
Advanced Peace	28	449	15.53	11.56	1	43	12	7
Strong Peace	12	214	17.83	13.70	2	42	-	1

Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics for SIGO_LOW and SIGO_HIGH by level of peace

	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Hot Rivalry					
<i>SIGO_LOW</i>	1,845	1.04	1.31	0	10
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i>	1,845	1.92	1.31	0	5
Cold Rivalry					
<i>SIGO_LOW</i>	1,223	.83	1.17	0	8
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i>	1,223	1.89	1.19	0	4
Neutral Peace					
<i>SIGO_LOW</i>	1,785	1.00	1.31	0	9
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i>	1,785	1.82	1.46	0	5
Advanced Peace					
<i>SIGO_LOW</i>	474	2.09	1.91	0	10
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i>	474	2.59	1.38	0	6
Strong Peace					
<i>SIGO_LOW</i>	213	5.33	2.29	2	11
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i>	213	4.78	1.73	1	7

¹³ Since dyads can leave and enter a level multiple times, the total sum of this column is greater than the number of dyads in the dataset.

Table 6.4: Results from logit analysis for *SIGO_HIGH* and *SIGO_LOW* with lags *t-1* to *t-10*

	ROW	VARIABLES	lag t-1	lag t-2	lag t-3	lag t-4	lag t-5	lag t-6	lag t-7	lag t-8	lag t-9	lag t-10
Hot Rivalry Upwards	1	<i>SIGO_LOW</i>	0.538** (0.246)	0.527** (0.242)	0.480* (0.281)	0.275 (0.321)	0.121 (0.378)	-0.320 (0.358)	-0.595* (0.333)	-0.862*** (0.306)	-0.668** (0.323)	-0.707* (0.380)
	2	<i>SIGO_HIGH</i>	-0.0287 (0.328)	0.0547 (0.333)	0.0281 (0.327)	-0.0618 (0.234)	-0.00116 (0.275)	0.276 (0.313)	0.234 (0.261)	0.363 (0.235)	0.231 (0.274)	0.259 (0.291)
Hot Rivalry Downwards	3	<i>SIGO_LOW</i>	-0.647 (0.494)	-0.380 (0.513)	-0.122 (0.591)	-0.301 (0.600)	-0.0873 (0.642)	0.111 (0.719)	0.309 (0.776)	0.551 (0.814)	0.281 (0.989)	0.519 (1.018)
	4	<i>SIGO_HIGH</i>	-0.575 (0.769)	-0.778 (0.707)	-0.662 (0.626)	-0.788 (0.552)	-0.705 (0.489)	-0.633 (0.451)	-0.566 (0.414)	-0.478 (0.385)	-0.343 (0.372)	-0.248 (0.372)
Cold Rivalry Upwards	5	<i>SIGO_LOW</i>	-0.00855 (0.268)	-0.120 (0.277)	-0.139 (0.233)	0.0274 (0.233)	0.236 (0.268)	0.338 (0.300)	0.243 (0.302)	0.156 (0.305)	-0.111 (0.264)	-0.157 (0.254)
	6	<i>SIGO_HIGH</i>	-0.0117 (0.325)	-0.265 (0.267)	-0.334 (0.264)	-0.132 (0.254)	-0.185 (0.258)	-0.0428 (0.247)	0.0143 (0.212)	0.0414 (0.209)	0.0857 (0.214)	0.118 (0.217)
Cold Rivalry Downwards	7	<i>SIGO_LOW</i>	0.613 (0.383)	0.582 (0.464)	-0.00948 (0.532)	0.219 (0.505)	0.250 (0.498)	0.443 (0.607)	0.107 (0.621)	0.286 (0.731)	0.661 (0.930)	0.925 (1.108)
	8	<i>SIGO_HIGH</i>	0.635 (0.392)	0.662* (0.383)	0.310 (0.325)	0.324 (0.303)	0.395 (0.353)	0.0990 (0.340)	0.160 (0.388)	0.241 (0.456)	-0.000621 (0.463)	0.0215 (0.510)
Neutral Peace Upwards	9	<i>SIGO_LOW</i>	-0.0271 (0.195)	0.0758 (0.231)	-0.0367 (0.213)	0.0518 (0.218)	-0.121 (0.402)	-0.205 (0.422)	0.126 (0.416)	0.289 (0.500)	0.573 (0.586)	0.293 (0.554)
	10	<i>SIGO_HIGH</i>	-0.581* (0.311)	-0.620** (0.313)	-0.541* (0.314)	-0.545* (0.295)	-0.349 (0.315)	-0.325 (0.278)	-0.594** (0.237)	-0.522** (0.245)	-0.442* (0.262)	-0.323 (0.265)
Neutral Peace Downwards [§]	11	<i>SIGO_LOW</i>	-0.891 (0.545)	-1.105 (0.779)	-1.528** (0.692)	-1.335** (0.656)	-1.222* (0.635)	-1.121* (0.655)				
	12	<i>SIGO_HIGH</i>	-1.211*** (0.369)	-1.160*** (0.423)	-1.314*** (0.411)	-1.291*** (0.419)	-1.248*** (0.446)	-1.193*** (0.375)				
Advanced Peace Upwards	13	<i>SIGO_LOW</i>	0.826 (0.811)	0.746 (1.351)	0.794 (1.268)	0.859 (1.667)	1.444 (2.382)	1.068 (1.887)	-0.670 (0.691)	-0.781 (0.639)	-0.549 (0.593)	-0.998 (0.752)
	14	<i>SIGO_HIGH</i>	0.136 (1.172)	3.050*** (0.844)	3.046*** (0.848)	3.728*** (1.420)	4.221** (1.810)	2.860*** (1.074)	1.728* (0.993)	1.073 (0.828)	1.164 (0.926)	0.976 (0.910)
Advanced Peace Downwards	15	<i>SIGO_LOW</i>	-1.459*** (0.493)	-1.683** (0.755)	-1.363** (0.691)	-1.227* (0.679)	-0.859 (0.626)	-1.501 (1.088)	-2.088 (1.538)	-1.647 (1.595)	-1.459 (1.770)	0.000188 (2.317)
	16	<i>SIGO_HIGH</i>	-1.653** (0.738)	-0.922* (0.556)	-0.952 (0.595)	-0.995* (0.597)	-1.196** (0.577)	0.256 (0.813)	1.021 (1.047)	0.815 (1.011)	0.795 (1.094)	-0.307 (1.642)

Framed cells with significant effects. §Different model specification (see text). Empty cells due to STATA endless iterations. Separate models have been estimated for each combination of dependent variable (upward or downward transition from any level of *P**) and each lagged version of *SIGO_LOW* and *SIGO_HIGH*. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 6.5: Results from logit analysis, full models with control variables for lag $t-4$ of SIGO-variables

	1 Hot Rivalry Upwards	2 Hot Rivalry Downwards	3 Cold Rivalry Upwards	4 Cold Rivalry Downwards	5 Neutral Peace Upwards	6 Neutral Peace Downwards	7 Advanced Peace Upwards	8 Advanced Peace Downwards
<i>SIGO_LOW</i> ($t-4$)	0.275 (0.321)	-0.301 (0.600)	0.0274 (0.233)	0.219 (0.505)	0.0518 (0.218)	-1.335** (0.656)	0.859 (1.667)	-1.227* (0.679)
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i> ($t-4$)	-0.0618 (0.234)	-0.788 (0.552)	-0.132 (0.254)	0.324 (0.303)	-0.545* (0.295)	-1.291*** (0.419)	3.728*** (1.420)	-0.995* (0.597)
<i>POLITY2_SML</i> ($t-1$)	-0.0126 (0.0598)	0.0241 (0.0628)	0.0499 (0.0578)	0.0551 (0.0598)	0.146*** (0.0440)	0.0262 (0.0932)	-0.505 (0.336)	0.233** (0.104)
<i>DEPENDENCE_SML</i> ($t-1$)	-71.28 (74.32)	-380.1 (253.2)	-97.38 (102.1)	100.9 (72.75)	94.61 (70.21)	-565.4 (423.7)	446.0* (234.7)	73.78 (113.0)
<i>NIGO</i> ($t-1$)	-0.000551 (0.0271)	0.0617 (0.0436)	0.0271 (0.0291)	-0.0432 (0.0352)	0.0450 (0.0388)	0.0505 (0.0397)	0.116 (0.221)	-0.0926* (0.0538)
<i>ALLIANCE</i> ($t-1$)	0.569 (0.657)	0.289 (1.097)	-0.989 (0.668)	0.373 (0.894)	-0.228 (0.819)	0.790 (0.668)	3.065 (7.149)	0.0107 (1.472)
<i>RELMILCAP</i> ($t-1$)	0.172 (0.203)	-0.347 (0.313)	-0.337 (0.314)	0.190 (0.414)	0.416 (0.345)	0.0531 (0.527)	-2.476 (5.032)	2.378** (1.011)
<i>MAJORPOWER</i> ($t-1$)	-0.834 (0.770)	0.608 (1.570)	-0.738 (0.951)	0.614 (1.365)	0.627 (0.950)	0.469 (1.252)	-5.955 (4.633)	-3.364 (2.724)
<i>CUMMIDS10</i> ($t-1$)	-0.0277 (0.119)	0.153 (0.178)	0.385*** (0.148)	om	0.270 (0.507)		om	om
<i>CUMMIDS</i> ($t-1$)						-0.121 (0.196)		
<i>DISTANCE</i> ($t-1$)	0.146 (0.270)	-0.0897 (0.465)	0.135 (0.341)	-0.186 (0.319)	0.137 (0.413)	0.439 (0.506)	3.899* (1.993)	0.0264 (0.906)
<i>CONTIGUITY</i>	-0.862 (0.644)	-1.121 (0.763)	1.642** (0.761)	1.313 (1.075)	1.180 (1.113)	1.260 (1.631)	-1.503 (1.930)	0.878 (3.354)
<i>ENDCW</i> ($t-1$)	1.545*** (0.457)	om	1.198** (0.585)	-0.824 (1.051)	-1.278* (0.715)	-0.803 (1.076)	0.814 (1.995)	2.708 (1.943)
Observations	771	590	587	363	909	1,212	315	315
Wald chi	97.24	61.55	35.75	119.55	51.17	50.07	92.94	254.60
Prob>chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0031	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.1098	0.1365	0.1537	0.1754	0.1576	0.4082	0.4872	0.4344
Log PseudoL	-92.073472	-43.768998	-84.826809	-46.215471	-71.167556	-67.442026	-22.739202	-18.986039

Splines and year count variable not reported. Model 4 and Model 6 use total sum of cumulated MIDs instead of *CUMMIDS10* (see text). Empty cells due to endless iterations in STATA. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 6.6: Substantial effects for a typical one-unit change of *SIGO_HIGH* on likelihood of upward transitions from the level of neutral peace and advanced peace

	Low Value	High Value	Percentage Change
Neutral Peace P(upwards), <i>SIGO HIGH</i> (2 → 3)	.0303114 (.0086878 - .0755554)	.0188004 (.0047585 - .0530665)	-39.626%
Advanced Peace P(upwards), <i>SIGO_HIGH</i> (3 → 4)	.0607605 (.0000398 - .5252532)	.3255755 (.0012297 - .9719042)	+535,834 %

Substantial effects for *SIGO_HIGH* lagged by 4 years. All other values are set on their means or modes.

Table 6.7: Reciprocal causality: results from linear regressions with fixed effects

	1 <i>delta_HIGH</i>	2 <i>delta_LOW</i>
<i>P*</i> (t-1)	0.0606** (0.0241)	0.00619 (0.0157)
<i>POLITY2_SML</i> (t-1)	0.00302 (0.00253)	0.0105*** (0.00314)
<i>DEPENDENCE_SML</i> (t-1)	2.394 (1.631)	1.449 (1.923)
<i>NIGO</i> (t-1)	-0.00535*** (0.00146)	0.000361 (0.000919)
<i>ALLIANCE</i> (t-1)	-0.0575 (0.0356)	-0.0363 (0.0331)
<i>RELMILCAP</i> (t-1)	0.0385 (0.0306)	0.0805* (0.0416)
<i>FATALMID</i> (t-1)	0.00897 (0.0543)	0.0142 (0.0365)
<i>CUMMIDS10</i> (t-1)	-0.0102 (0.00675)	-0.00592 (0.00654)
<i>DISTANCE</i> (t-1)	-0.545* (0.276)	-0.163 (0.235)
<i>CONTIGUITY</i>	-0.0486 (0.0923)	-0.0960** (0.0394)
<i>ENDCW</i> (t-1)	0.0188 (0.0260)	0.218*** (0.0261)
Constant	3.898** (1.823)	1.169 (1.552)
Sigma_u	.52598128	.18070979
Sigma_e	.33068364	.37183658
rho	.71671137	.19106203
Observations	2,612	2,612
F	2.03	14.74
Prob>F	0.0327	0.0000
R-squared	0.024	0.096
Number of Dyads	104	104

Dependent variables are *delta_HIGH* and *delta_LOW*. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, * $p \leq 0.10$

For my inferential analysis, I computed separate models for each combination of lags (t-1 to t-10), peace level (cold rivalry – advanced peace), and transition (upwards/downwards), always including both, *SIGO_HIGH* and *SIGO_LOW* into the analytical equation to control for the possibility that one variable may represent only a reflection of the other.¹ Table 6.4 shows the results from logistic regressions. It reports the effects of the lagged versions of *SIGO_HIGH* and *SIGO_LOW* on the likelihood of moving upward or downward on the ladder of *P** for each level of *P**. Control variables are not included in table 6.4, but table 6.5 displays them for exemplary models with a 4-year lag version of the *SIGO*-variables. The appendix contains full regression tables for all estimated models.

6.7.1 Transition Processes on the Levels of Hot and Cold Rivalry

The first 8 rows examine the effects of *SIGO*-variables on transition processes on levels of hot rivalry and cold rivalry. Notably, they show that highly institutionalized SOs do not exert any effect at all on these levels, neither positively, not negatively, and neither on upward nor on downward transitions.² Similar conclusion can be drawn for SOs of low institutionalization: here, only row (1) shows that *SIGO_LOW* increases the likelihood of upward transitions when being lagged by one, two, or three years, and decreases the same for 7- and 8-year lags. Hence, *SIGO_LOW* may on the short run exert positive effects, but on the long run, their effect turns negative. This result is interesting for itself but lies outside of this paper's theoretical explanatory focus. Therefore, I stay with the general conclusion that the present analysis cannot produce any clear and consistent findings regarding the role of SOs in the context of rivalry, be it hot or cold in kind. It seems that rival states with joint memberships in SOs do not interact in any meaningful way through them which then also explains the lack of co-variation between the *SIGO*-variables and the dependent variables. These results tie in with theories and studies on rivalry termination that emphasize the importance of realist variables and internal (regime change, economic crises) and external shocks (great wars, end of bipolarity) (Cornwell and Colaresi 2002; Goertz and Diehl 1995; Valeriano 2015).

¹ I also estimated these models without the alliance indicator, as SOs themselves may represent alliances. Results remained robust.

² The 2-year-lag exerts a positive effect on upwards transitions from cold rivalry, but this result should be rather dismissed as a statistical artefact as it represents an exception and no other lag exerts any statistically significant result in this row (row 8).

6.7.2 Transition Processes on the Levels of Neutral Peace

Things become more exciting on the level of negative peace (rows 9 and 10), where the empirical pattern provides support for hypotheses H3 and H4: while *SIGO_LOW* exerts no significant effects, *SIGO_HIGH* exert an impeding effect on transitions to higher levels of peace for almost all lagged versions of the variables.

Estimates of the effects of security organization on downward transitions with original model specifications did not produce any results due to endless estimation iterations in STATA. I hence replaced CUMMID10 with the total cumulated sum of CUMMIDs, which at least produced results for the specified models with lags between 1 and 7 years. The results show that both *SIGO*-variables decrease the risk of falling back onto lower levels of P^* ,

In sum, the level of neutral peace reveals interesting results. SOs of low institutionalization may not facilitate transitions to higher peace levels, but they can decrease the risk of falling back onto levels of rivalry. Highly institutionalized SOs, in turn, decrease the likelihood of both, upwards and downwards transitions from negative peace, and in this sense increase the likelihood that a dyad remains on the level of negative peace.

6.7.3 Transition Processes on the Levels of Advanced Peace

Things completely change in rows 13 to 16 which examine transitions from advanced peace to strong peace and fallbacks from advanced peace on lower peace levels. Rows 13 and 14 show that *SIGO_HIGH* consistently and significantly facilitates transitions to strong peace for the majority of lagged versions of the variable. *SIGO_LOW*, in contrast, exerts no effect. This is consistent with hypotheses H1 and H2 which expect that security IGOs, and especially highly institutionalized SOs should increase the prospects for upwards transitions. Moreover, rows 15 and 16 reveal that both, *SIGO_LOW* and *SIGO_HIGH* decreases the risk of fallbacks for the majority of estimated models.

6.7.4 Level-dependent Effects of SOs

Importantly, the overall pattern of empirical results also provides some support for hypotheses 05 and 06 which expect that SOs – and especially highly institutionalized forms – should decrease the likelihood of upward transitions from the levels of hot rivalry, cold

rivalry and neutrality while they should increase this likelihood for the level of advanced peace. While no significant effects can be reported for both levels of rivalry, *SIGO_HIGH* shows significant negative effects on the likelihood of upward transitions for the level of negative peace, and significant positive effects on the likelihood of upward transitions for the level of advanced peace. Hence, whether or not SOs exert an effect on upwards transitions and whether this effect is positive or negative in kind seems to depend strongly on the actual level of peace.

6.7.5 Substantive Effects, Control Variable, Summary

To get a better understanding of the effects of *SIGO_HIGH*, its substantive effects on upward transitions from neutral and advanced peace were calculated using estimates from the exemplary models from table 6.5 which include a 4-year-lag of the *SIGO*-variables. Table 6.6 displays the substantive effects. They have been computed for *SIGO_HIGH* set at its rounded mean and at one rounded standard deviation above. All other variables were held constant at their means or modes. As the table shows, a one-unit increase of *SIGO_HIGH* (from 2 to 3) decreases the likelihood of an upward transition from neutral peace to higher levels by nearly 40%. On the level of advanced peace, increasing the number of joint memberships in *SIGO_HIGH* from 3 to 4 increases the likelihood of transitioning to strong peace by more than 535 %. This extra-ordinarily strong effect is most likely explained by the fact that the majority of dyads reaching the level of strong peace are members of NATO (7 out of 12) and NATO itself is coded as a highly institutionalized SO.³

Regarding the effects of the included control variables I refer the reader to the exemplary 4-year-lag models in table 6.5. As a full discussion and examination of these results lies outside this paper's scope, I only want to shed light on *POLITY2_SML*, as the results are partly counter-intuitive from the perspective of democratic peace theory, which also presents strong arguments for the positive effect of democracy on transitions towards positive peace (Russett 1998). My results indicate that the level of democracy facilitates upwards transitions from neutral peace but does not prevent falls-backs to levels of rivalry. On the level of advanced peace, the variable exerts no effect on upward transitions but increases the risk of fallbacks. Notably democratic peace theorists do not have to

³ Accounting for the NATO effect through the inclusion of a dummy-control variable that would indicate joint NATO-membership was not possible as it lead to problems of overdetermination.

worry, as I re-run these models using a dummy-indicator for joint democracy (both states with at least level 6 on the polity IV scale), which then showed the expected effects.

In sum, the presented results offer several important insights. First, and in contrast to any of the expectations formulated in this article's theory section, SOs are unlikely to exert any meaningful and consistent effects on transitions towards higher levels on both levels of rivalry. For the levels of neutral and advanced peace, the estimated logit regressions confirm the expectation that especially highly institutionalized SOs exert effects on upward transitions. As well in line with my expectations, the results reveal that the effect of these organizations varies between levels of neutral peace (impeding upward transitions) and advanced peace (facilitating upward transitions). My analysis has also revealed several insights regarding the effect of SOs on the risk of fallbacks. However, these do not stand in the center of this article's theoretical and empirical analysis and will therefore play no further role in the following elaborations.

6.8 Virtuous Cycles of IGOS and Peace?

The following section takes a closer look on the idea that IGOs and peace may form part of a virtuous cycle. Scholars that examine the effects of IGOs on militarized conflict have theoretically argued and empirically shown that IGOs may on the one hand decrease the likelihood of militarized conflict while on the other hand, the absence of militarized conflict also increases the likelihood that dyads have joint memberships in IGOs (Russett et al. 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999). They therefore assume the operation of positive feedback loops between IGOs and peace as both phenomena seem to causally reinforce each other in a positive manner. Through its more differentiated conception of interstate peace, this study can shed new light on the reciprocal relationship between IGOs and peace. More specifically, it provides a new and more detailed and ambitious understanding of the phenomenon of virtuous cycles: In its original version, these cycles consist solely of reciprocal causal loops between IGOs and the prevention of militarized conflict. A multi-level conceptualization of peace depicts them as positive reciprocal loops between IGOs and transitions towards higher levels of peace.

To shed more light on the possible empirical operation of such a more ambitious virtuous cycle, I examined the effects of the level of dyadic peace on joint memberships in SOs of high and low institutionalization (Russett et al. 1998). I therefore estimated

models that include P^* as independent variable which captures the actual level of peace for each dyad-year. Following established approaches, these models also included all control variables that have been used in my previous analysis and an indicator for fatal MIDs (Russett et al. 1998; Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). All control variables were lagged by one year. I computed the first difference of the *SIGO*-variables *delta_HIGH* and *delta_LOW* and estimated linear regressions with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by dyad.⁴

Table 6.7 presents the results obtained from regression analysis. They show that the level of P^* increases the number of new joint memberships in highly institutionalized SOs (model 01, table 6.7). At the same time, P^* exerts no significant effect on SOs of low institutionalization (model 02 table 6.7). Taken together, these results tie in with previous studies which have found out that “highly institutionalized organizations and those with a security mandate (...) prove particularly selective” and tend to choose especially peaceful states as their members (Donno et al. 2015, p. 251). Another explanation may be that states on lower levels of P^* refrain from joining especially highly institutionalized SOs as they fear to be constrained in their military discretion and foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis their competitors. SOs of low institutionalization, in contrast, do not differentiate between more or less peaceful states in their membership acceptance. Adding to that, one may assume that states join these organizations irrespective of the quality of their actual relationship with other states, most likely as they don’t have to fear any serious intervention into their foreign policy discretion.

In combination with the results from my previous analysis, these findings have important implications for our understanding of the potentially virtuous relationship between SOs and peace. To begin with, they show that no such virtuous relationship exists between SOs of low institutionalization and transitions towards higher levels of peace. Neither does the level of peace increase the number of joint memberships in these organizations, nor do the organizations themselves increase the prospects for upward transitions. However, they may indeed help to prevent fallbacks onto lower levels of P^* when dyads have reached the level of neutral or advanced peace, but this does not comply with a more ambitious understanding of “vicious cycles”.

⁴ I computed first differences as they are more likely to follow a normal distribution and hence allow making use of simply interpretable linear regression techniques.

In how far do highly institutionalized SOs form part of a virtuous cycle? As my results indicate, dyads that climb up the ladder of peace increasingly tend to have joint memberships in highly institutionalized SOs. However, it is important to realize that there is still variance on each level of peace with regard to the number of joint dyadic memberships in these organizations. My previous analysis has thereby shown that this variance can help to explain whether dyads move up the ladder of peace especially for dyads on the level of neutral peace and strong peace. Thereby, the obtained empirical patterns on the one hand contradict the idea of virtuous cycles for highly institutionalized SOs. On the level of rivalry, this cycle is interrupted by the fact that *SIGO_HIGH* do not exert any effects at all. On the level of neutral peace, it even turns into reverse: a transition towards neutral peace may generally increase the number of dyadic organizational memberships, but quite tragically, these memberships may decrease the prospects for further upward transitions to higher peace levels. On the other hand, empirical results for the level of advanced peace confirm the idea of a virtuous cycle: more peaceful relations generally increase the prospects for joint memberships and vice versa. Hence, only when dyads make it onto the level of advanced peace, virtuous cycles are likely to operate.

6.9 Conclusion

This article contributes to the evolving quantitative research program on interstate peace in that it investigates the effect of SOs on transitions from rivalry to positive interstate peace. In this way, the paper follows Diehl's (2016) call to look beyond war and negative peace and to start exploring peace more thoroughly.

Taken together, the results of this study come with serious implications for theories on institutions and interstate peace-building: in contrast to the theoretical literature on processes of security community, friendship and stable peace, my findings disconfirm a throughout optimist stance on SOs. They suggest that SOs may in fact play a facilitating role when states have already reached a level of advanced peace. In contrast, SOs do not seem to play any significant role within processes of rapprochement and the termination of rivalry. Moreover, they may even impede further pacification processes when states are on a level of neutral peace. This article's theoretical framework thereby provides several explanations for this empirical pattern.

My findings also come with implications for research that deals with the nexus between SOs and the prevention of militarized conflict and their escalation. This article suggests that researchers may be more cautious with regard to generalizing statements about the conflict-reducing effects on SOs, and especially of highly institutionalized forms thereof. The fact that they cannot help to pacify interstate rivalries may indicate that SOs generally play a rather marginal role in rivalry relationships. Future studies that examine their effects on MID occurrence, onset, or escalation should therefore condition these effects on the actual level of peace, using data from Kasten (2018) or others (Klein et al. 2008; Bayer 2010). This will reveal if SOs robustly decrease the risk of militarized conflict, or if their effects dependent of the actual level of peace.

The results that have been presented in the empirical section of this article reveal important insights. However, it is needless to say that the present study only presents a first attempt to put more light on the role of security organizations on transformations from rivalry and positive peace. Just as any other study, it cannot answer all our questions to our full satisfaction. For instance, it is a commonplace that statistical correlations do not test causal mechanisms – at least outside the laboratory. Moreover, the present study could not reveal which of the assumed mechanisms in fact operate and how strong their effect is. This is why it is important that future case study-oriented research gains more insights regarding the mechanisms which are described in this article's theory section. This especially holds true for mechanisms that assume a negative effect of SOs on the building of mutual trust, as this line of reasoning as not yet gained any attention in today's theoretical and empirical research on SOs and peace.

Moreover, it is important to realize that every dataset is a running target. Kasten's conceptualization and operationalization of P^* presents a good starting point but future studies may expand the dataset over time and space in order to increase the external validity of statistical estimations. Researchers may also work on a refined version of the treaty-density-approach to further increase the measures' internal validity. Moreover, more disaggregated data on SOs seem necessary to gain insights on the effects of specific provisions of SOs. Only then, practitioners can make use of scientific insights and equip SOs in a way that optimizes their peace-bringing effects.

Appendix

List of SOs – High Institutionalization

- Council of Europe
- Economic Community of Central African States
- Intergovernmental Authority on Development
- Organization of the Islamic Conference
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
- Permanent Court of Arbitration
- Southern African Development Community
- Organization of Central American States
- United Nations
- Caribbean Community
- Nordic Council
- Commonwealth of Nations
- South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
- African Union
- Commonwealth of Independent States
- Economic Community of West African States
- European Union
- Pact of the League of Arab States
- The North Atlantic Treaty
- Organization of American States
- West European Union
- Warsaw Pact
- Arab Maghreb Union
- Organization of Eastern Caribbean States

List of SOs – Low Institutionalization

- Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
- Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
- Black Sea Economic Cooperation
- Council of the Baltic Sea States
- Conference on Disarmament
- Central European Initiative
- Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
- Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
- Common Market for Eastern & Southern Africa
- Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
- East African Community
- Euro-Atlantic-Partnership Council
- European Atomic Energy Community
- International Atomic Energy Agency
- International Civil Defense Organization
- International Science and Technology Centre
- Lake Chad Basin Commission
- Mercosur
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency
- Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation
- Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
- Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
- RIOGroup
- Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
- Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
- Visegrad Group
- Wassenaar Agreement
- WCDC/Arbeitsgemeinschaft Donauländer
- Zangger Committee

Complete Regression Tables

Table 6.8: Complete results from logit analysis. Dependent variable: upward transition from hot rivalry

Lag of <i>SIGO</i> variables	(1) Hot Rivalry Up t-1	(2) Hot Rivalry Up t-2	(3) Hot Rivalry Up t-3	(4) Hot Rivalry Up t-4	(5) Hot Rivalry Up t-5	(6) Hot Rivalry Up t-6	(7) Hot Rivalry Up t-7	(8) Hot Rivalry Up t-8	(9) Hot Rivalry Up t-9	(10) Hot Rivalry Up t-10
<i>SIGO_LOW</i> (t-x)	0.538** (0.246)	0.527** (0.242)	0.480* (0.281)	0.275 (0.321)	0.121 (0.378)	-0.320 (0.358)	-0.595* (0.333)	-0.862*** (0.306)	-0.668** (0.323)	-0.707* (0.380)
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i> (t-x)	-0.0287 (0.328)	0.0547 (0.333)	0.0281 (0.327)	-0.0618 (0.234)	-0.00116 (0.275)	0.276 (0.313)	0.234 (0.261)	0.363 (0.235)	0.231 (0.274)	0.259 (0.291)
<i>POLITY2_SML</i> (t-1)	-0.0374 (0.0668)	-0.0297 (0.0652)	-0.0225 (0.0634)	-0.0126 (0.0598)	-0.00707 (0.0583)	-0.00431 (0.0590)	-0.00361 (0.0619)	-0.00850 (0.0662)	-0.00520 (0.0652)	-0.00488 (0.0648)
<i>DEPENDENCE_SML</i> (t-1)	-81.66 (83.58)	-74.94 (79.04)	-70.10 (75.96)	-71.28 (74.32)	-66.34 (71.84)	-57.93 (67.28)	-62.08 (67.76)	-63.01 (69.65)	-66.48 (69.49)	-67.82 (71.96)
<i>NIGO</i> (t-1)	-0.0226 (0.0354)	-0.0266 (0.0347)	-0.0192 (0.0343)	-0.000551 (0.0271)	0.00439 (0.0261)	0.0109 (0.0266)	0.0243 (0.0260)	0.0303 (0.0279)	0.0275 (0.0272)	0.0284 (0.0287)
<i>ALLIANCE</i> (t-1)	0.831 (0.724)	0.721 (0.720)	0.658 (0.719)	0.569 (0.657)	0.445 (0.652)	0.133 (0.696)	0.0134 (0.724)	-0.167 (0.779)	-0.0329 (0.757)	-0.0585 (0.752)
<i>RELMILCAP</i> (t-1)	0.192 (0.211)	0.190 (0.206)	0.192 (0.203)	0.172 (0.203)	0.178 (0.203)	0.223 (0.215)	0.200 (0.227)	0.233 (0.219)	0.209 (0.217)	0.228 (0.230)
<i>MAJORPOWER</i> (t-1)	-0.992 (0.710)	-0.937 (0.724)	-0.948 (0.725)	-0.834 (0.770)	-0.773 (0.702)	-0.652 (0.659)	-0.513 (0.667)	-0.438 (0.687)	-0.462 (0.708)	-0.470 (0.748)
<i>CUMMIDS10</i> (t-1)	-0.00839 (0.123)	-0.0222 (0.121)	-0.0252 (0.121)	-0.0277 (0.119)	-0.0333 (0.117)	-0.0346 (0.115)	-0.0242 (0.117)	-0.0236 (0.114)	-0.0234 (0.113)	-0.0239 (0.112)
<i>DISTANCE</i> (t-1)	0.0904 (0.289)	0.105 (0.283)	0.132 (0.279)	0.146 (0.270)	0.156 (0.262)	0.199 (0.261)	0.183 (0.278)	0.200 (0.292)	0.153 (0.298)	0.151 (0.308)
<i>CONTIGUITY</i>	-1.034* (0.626)	-0.981 (0.632)	-0.919 (0.644)	-0.862 (0.644)	-0.869 (0.657)	-0.929 (0.685)	-0.961 (0.699)	-1.004 (0.708)	-0.980 (0.680)	-0.978 (0.676)
<i>ENDCW</i> (t-1)	1.523*** (0.492)	1.621*** (0.499)	1.601*** (0.497)	1.545*** (0.457)	1.552*** (0.454)	1.670*** (0.448)	1.706*** (0.419)	1.814*** (0.411)	1.739*** (0.409)	1.762*** (0.403)
<i>YEARCOUNT</i>	0.700*** (0.232)	0.688*** (0.229)	0.659*** (0.225)	0.633*** (0.228)	0.628*** (0.228)	0.644*** (0.227)	0.681*** (0.238)	0.685*** (0.242)	0.660*** (0.237)	0.648*** (0.238)
<i>_spline1</i>	0.00921*** (0.00339)	0.00888*** (0.00339)	0.00846** (0.00334)	0.00801** (0.00334)	0.00789** (0.00334)	0.00805** (0.00335)	0.00832** (0.00343)	0.00823** (0.00351)	0.00792** (0.00347)	0.00778** (0.00350)
<i>_spline2</i>	-0.00488** (0.00194)	-0.00466** (0.00195)	-0.00440** (0.00192)	-0.00407** (0.00191)	-0.00397** (0.00191)	-0.00396** (0.00191)	-0.00399** (0.00193)	-0.00387* (0.00199)	-0.00375* (0.00198)	-0.00367* (0.00201)
<i>_spline3</i>	0.00103* (0.000538)	0.000957* (0.000539)	0.000882* (0.000534)	0.000749 (0.000529)	0.000701 (0.000532)	0.000639 (0.000520)	0.000580 (0.000511)	0.000507 (0.000534)	0.000513 (0.000535)	0.000496 (0.000555)
<i>Constant</i>	-6.510*** (2.146)	-6.556*** (2.131)	-6.689*** (2.095)	-6.715*** (2.157)	-6.791*** (2.150)	-7.408*** (2.285)	-7.527*** (2.492)	-7.975*** (2.643)	-7.389*** (2.724)	-7.432*** (2.815)
Observations	771	771	771	771	771	771	771	771	771	771
Wald chi	87.51	96.24	95.09	97.24	109.82	117.87	119.74	126.38	113.16	109.39
Prob>chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.1325	0.1285	0.1224	0.1098	0.1065	0.1116	0.1178	0.1299	0.1202	0.1216
Log PseudoL	-89.72538	-90.140441	-90.776891	-92.073472	-92.422049	-91.886043	-91.245506	-89.994461	-91.002222	-90.860153

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6.9: Complete results from logit analysis. Dependent variable: downward transition from hot rivalry

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Lag of SIGO variables	Hot Rivalry Down t-1	Hot Rivalry Down t-2	Hot Rivalry Down t-3	Hot Rivalry Down t-4	Hot Rivalry Down t-5	Hot Rivalry Down t-6	Hot Rivalry Down t-7	Hot Rivalry Down t-8	Hot Rivalry Down t-9	Hot Rivalry Down t-10
<i>SIGO_LOW</i> (t-x)	-0.647 (0.494)	-0.380 (0.513)	-0.122 (0.591)	-0.301 (0.600)	-0.0873 (0.642)	0.111 (0.719)	0.309 (0.776)	0.551 (0.814)	0.281 (0.989)	0.519 (1.018)
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i> (t-x)	-0.575 (0.769)	-0.778 (0.707)	-0.662 (0.626)	-0.788 (0.552)	-0.705 (0.489)	-0.633 (0.451)	-0.566 (0.414)	-0.478 (0.385)	-0.343 (0.372)	-0.248 (0.372)
<i>POLITY2_SML</i> (t-1)	0.00174 (0.0614)	0.00872 (0.0558)	0.0153 (0.0596)	0.0241 (0.0628)	0.0277 (0.0697)	0.0243 (0.0703)	0.0248 (0.0717)	0.0259 (0.0727)	0.0213 (0.0721)	0.0180 (0.0748)
<i>DEPENDENCE_SML</i> (t-1)	-388.0 (275.5)	-382.6 (269.2)	-360.2 (265.5)	-380.1 (253.2)	-362.9 (252.7)	-340.6 (253.6)	-325.5 (257.3)	-314.0 (264.8)	-314.1 (267.7)	-309.1 (267.9)
<i>NIGO</i> (t-1)	0.0697 (0.0632)	0.0675 (0.0504)	0.0479 (0.0447)	0.0617 (0.0436)	0.0479 (0.0378)	0.0372 (0.0356)	0.0273 (0.0353)	0.0140 (0.0362)	0.0154 (0.0406)	0.00100 (0.0425)
<i>ALLIANCE</i> (t-1)	0.153 (1.315)	0.377 (1.210)	0.257 (1.133)	0.289 (1.097)	0.198 (1.065)	0.135 (1.045)	0.0905 (1.046)	0.0849 (1.081)	-0.0703 (1.135)	-0.0614 (1.159)
<i>RELMILCAP</i> (t-1)	-0.256 (0.323)	-0.304 (0.299)	-0.322 (0.302)	-0.347 (0.313)	-0.349 (0.317)	-0.359 (0.325)	-0.368 (0.328)	-0.370 (0.323)	-0.315 (0.305)	-0.323 (0.297)
<i>MAJORPOWER</i> (t-1)	0.750 (1.562)	0.713 (1.569)	0.802 (1.583)	0.608 (1.570)	0.785 (1.560)	0.959 (1.593)	1.118 (1.605)	1.268 (1.576)	1.167 (1.544)	1.282 (1.528)
<i>CUMMIDS10</i> (t-1)	0.125 (0.176)	0.139 (0.174)	0.143 (0.171)	0.153 (0.178)	0.150 (0.177)	0.150 (0.181)	0.147 (0.186)	0.140 (0.191)	0.141 (0.187)	0.137 (0.186)
<i>DISTANCE</i> (t-1)	-0.0511 (0.432)	-0.100 (0.449)	-0.128 (0.449)	-0.0897 (0.465)	-0.130 (0.459)	-0.172 (0.453)	-0.206 (0.450)	-0.229 (0.443)	-0.210 (0.429)	-0.234 (0.431)
<i>CONTIGUITY</i>	-1.181 (0.755)	-1.126 (0.726)	-1.065 (0.715)	-1.121 (0.763)	-1.085 (0.737)	-1.069 (0.727)	-1.057 (0.728)	-1.033 (0.731)	-1.072 (0.757)	-1.024 (0.757)
<i>ENDCW</i> (t-1)	om	om	om	om	om	om	om	om	om	om
<i>YEARCOUNT</i>	0.641* (0.338)	0.622* (0.326)	0.623** (0.311)	0.647** (0.308)	0.673** (0.328)	0.682** (0.347)	0.678* (0.365)	0.665* (0.375)	0.672* (0.372)	0.641* (0.368)
<i>_spline1</i>	0.0103 (0.00658)	0.0102 (0.00649)	0.0102 (0.00633)	0.0104* (0.00618)	0.0109* (0.00656)	0.0111 (0.00685)	0.0110 (0.00705)	0.0107 (0.00710)	0.0108 (0.00704)	0.0103 (0.00698)
<i>_spline2</i>	-0.00587 (0.00436)	-0.00585 (0.00433)	-0.00595 (0.00425)	-0.00598 (0.00413)	-0.00634 (0.00437)	-0.00645 (0.00453)	-0.00636 (0.00461)	-0.00624 (0.00458)	-0.00625 (0.00458)	-0.00596 (0.00453)
<i>_spline3</i>	0.00106 (0.00120)	0.00109 (0.00119)	0.00116 (0.00118)	0.00112 (0.00114)	0.00123 (0.00119)	0.00128 (0.00121)	0.00128 (0.00120)	0.00127 (0.00116)	0.00127 (0.00121)	0.00121 (0.00118)
<i>Constant</i>	-4.760 (3.805)	-4.215 (3.802)	-3.903 (3.714)	-4.223 (4.071)	-3.950 (3.978)	-3.728 (3.896)	-3.506 (3.827)	-3.287 (3.715)	-3.543 (3.693)	-3.223 (3.668)
Observations	590	590	590	590	590	590	590	590	590	590
Wald chi	100.85	103.41	81.80	61.55	50.51	45.83	41.34	39.60	49.03	55.37
Prob>chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0003	0.0005	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.1300	0.1336	0.1262	0.1365	0.1312	0.1282	0.1263	0.1256	0.1174	0.1176
Log PseudoL	-44.099155	-43.918947	-44.291151	-43.768998	-44.037549	-44.192111	-44.286064	-44.32149	-44.738546	-44.729108

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6.10: Complete results from logit analysis. Dependent variable: upward transition from cold rivalry

Lag of SIGO variables	(1) Cold Rivalry Up t-1	(2) Cold Rivalry Up t-2	(3) Cold Rivalry Up t-3	(4) Cold Rivalry Up t-4	(5) Cold Rivalry Up t-5	(6) Cold Rivalry Up t-6	(7) Cold Rivalry Up t-7	(8) Cold Rivalry Up t-8	(9) Cold Rivalry Up t-9	(10) Cold Rivalry Up t-10
<i>SIGO_LOW</i> (t-x)	-0.00855 (0.268)	-0.120 (0.277)	-0.139 (0.233)	0.0274 (0.233)	0.236 (0.268)	0.338 (0.300)	0.243 (0.302)	0.156 (0.305)	-0.111 (0.264)	-0.157 (0.254)
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i> (t-x)	-0.0117 (0.325)	-0.265 (0.267)	-0.334 (0.264)	-0.132 (0.254)	-0.185 (0.258)	-0.0428 (0.247)	0.0143 (0.212)	0.0414 (0.209)	0.0857 (0.214)	0.118 (0.217)
<i>POLITY2_SML</i> (t-1)	0.0518 (0.0608)	0.0520 (0.0576)	0.0533 (0.0577)	0.0499 (0.0578)	0.0458 (0.0581)	0.0430 (0.0583)	0.0454 (0.0584)	0.0469 (0.0599)	0.0497 (0.0600)	0.0493 (0.0596)
<i>DEPENDENCE_SML</i> (t-1)	-92.97 (105.4)	-107.6 (105.8)	-109.6 (102.6)	-97.38 (102.1)	-96.75 (102.1)	-87.07 (103.4)	-84.07 (101.7)	-83.30 (102.9)	-90.95 (104.3)	-89.92 (104.7)
<i>NIGO</i> (t-1)	0.0238 (0.0323)	0.0395 (0.0307)	0.0434 (0.0295)	0.0271 (0.0291)	0.0189 (0.0275)	0.00902 (0.0274)	0.0122 (0.0266)	0.0148 (0.0278)	0.0225 (0.0275)	0.0222 (0.0277)
<i>ALLIANCE</i> (t-1)	-1.077 (0.812)	-0.840 (0.770)	-0.829 (0.695)	-0.989 (0.668)	-0.946 (0.662)	-1.038 (0.675)	-1.081 (0.675)	-1.082 (0.677)	-1.121 (0.695)	-1.128 (0.700)
<i>RELMILCAP</i> (t-1)	-0.325 (0.322)	-0.339 (0.314)	-0.330 (0.313)	-0.337 (0.314)	-0.359 (0.326)	-0.341 (0.331)	-0.321 (0.327)	-0.316 (0.323)	-0.316 (0.313)	-0.313 (0.315)
<i>MAJORPOWER</i> (t-1)	-0.710 (1.041)	-0.595 (0.917)	-0.615 (0.906)	-0.738 (0.951)	-0.812 (0.918)	-0.853 (0.963)	-0.819 (0.964)	-0.797 (0.964)	-0.705 (0.956)	-0.698 (0.967)
<i>CUMMIDS10</i> (t-1)	0.386*** (0.147)	0.386*** (0.144)	0.386*** (0.146)	0.385*** (0.148)	0.387** (0.153)	0.382** (0.155)	0.377** (0.153)	0.376** (0.151)	0.386*** (0.149)	0.386** (0.150)
<i>DISTANCE</i> (t-1)	0.138 (0.345)	0.149 (0.340)	0.170 (0.341)	0.135 (0.341)	0.110 (0.350)	0.102 (0.360)	0.110 (0.355)	0.121 (0.350)	0.150 (0.342)	0.149 (0.338)
<i>CONTIGUITY</i>	1.658** (0.784)	1.602** (0.736)	1.605** (0.723)	1.642** (0.761)	1.679** (0.757)	1.728** (0.781)	1.716** (0.781)	1.694** (0.773)	1.629** (0.776)	1.608** (0.778)
<i>ENDCW</i> (t-1)	1.208** (0.597)	1.234** (0.573)	1.182** (0.563)	1.198** (0.585)	1.271** (0.585)	1.345** (0.594)	1.313** (0.586)	1.286** (0.607)	1.216** (0.591)	1.226** (0.591)
<i>YEARCOUNT</i>	1.201* (0.671)	1.227* (0.673)	1.332* (0.799)	1.235* (0.714)	1.234* (0.648)	1.298** (0.633)	1.326** (0.668)	1.289* (0.665)	1.219* (0.657)	1.225* (0.663)
<i>_spline1</i>	0.0388** (0.0168)	0.0388** (0.0169)	0.0405** (0.0191)	0.0391** (0.0172)	0.0393** (0.0160)	0.0418** (0.0163)	0.0425** (0.0170)	0.0415** (0.0170)	0.0394** (0.0168)	0.0395** (0.0166)
<i>_spline2</i>	-0.0179** (0.00705)	-0.0178** (0.00712)	-0.0183** (0.00778)	-0.0180** (0.00713)	-0.0181*** (0.00679)	-0.0193*** (0.00696)	-0.0195*** (0.00718)	-0.0191*** (0.00718)	-0.0182** (0.00707)	-0.0182*** (0.00697)
<i>_spline3</i>	0.00272*** (0.00100)	0.00264*** (0.00101)	0.00260** (0.00101)	0.00268*** (0.00100)	0.00273*** (0.00102)	0.00290*** (0.00103)	0.00289*** (0.00102)	0.00285*** (0.00103)	0.00273*** (0.00100)	0.00272*** (0.000978)
<i>Constant</i>	-8.695*** (3.253)	-8.722*** (3.180)	-9.255** (3.642)	-8.718*** (3.379)	-8.418** (3.345)	-8.482** (3.360)	-8.692** (3.414)	-8.727** (3.393)	-8.870*** (3.297)	-8.890*** (3.296)
Observations	587	587	587	587	587	587	587	587	587	587
Wald chi	38.40	43.06	40.71	35.75	34.95	32.22	33.95	34.12	35.73	35.53
Prob>chi2	0.0013	0.0003	0.0006	0.0031	0.0040	0.0094	0.0055	0.0052	0.0032	0.0034
Pseudo R2	0.1525	0.1569	0.1607	0.1537	0.1576	0.1583	0.1552	0.1538	0.1535	0.1545
Log PseudoL	-84.944582	-84.50152	-84.121258	-84.826809	-84.435934	-84.364419	-84.67155	-84.810967	-84.841629	-84.746936

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6.11: Complete results from logit analysis. Dependent variable: downward transition from cold rivalry

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Cold Rivalry Down	Cold Rivalry Down	Cold Rivalry Down	Cold Rivalry Down	Cold Rivalry Down	Cold Rivalry Down	Cold Rivalry Down	Cold Rivalry Down	Cold Rivalry Down	Cold Rivalry Down
Lag of SIGO variables	t-1	t-2	t-3	t-4	t-5	t-6	t-7	t-8	t-9	t-10
<i>SIGO_LOW</i> (t-x)	0.613 (0.383)	0.582 (0.464)	-0.00948 (0.532)	0.219 (0.505)	0.250 (0.498)	0.443 (0.607)	0.107 (0.621)	0.286 (0.731)	0.661 (0.930)	0.925 (1.108)
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i> (t-x)	0.635 (0.392)	0.662* (0.383)	0.310 (0.325)	0.324 (0.303)	0.395 (0.353)	0.0990 (0.340)	0.160 (0.388)	0.241 (0.456)	-0.000621 (0.463)	0.0215 (0.510)
<i>POLITY2_SML</i> (t-1)	0.0517 (0.0648)	0.0563 (0.0638)	0.0474 (0.0601)	0.0551 (0.0598)	0.0538 (0.0604)	0.0677 (0.0672)	0.0524 (0.0648)	0.0574 (0.0649)	0.0680 (0.0685)	0.0736 (0.0691)
<i>DEPENDENCE_SML</i> (t-1)	105.1 (87.23)	87.45 (85.05)	95.38 (75.27)	100.9 (72.75)	104.3 (73.46)	110.1* (66.74)	105.0 (70.41)	109.1 (70.27)	123.2* (74.77)	133.5* (80.31)
<i>NIGO</i> (t-1)	-0.0762** (0.0352)	-0.0757** (0.0381)	-0.0297 (0.0364)	-0.0432 (0.0352)	-0.0475 (0.0311)	-0.0389 (0.0321)	-0.0306 (0.0287)	-0.0386 (0.0300)	-0.0344 (0.0282)	-0.0401 (0.0285)
<i>ALLIANCE</i> (t-1)	0.172 (1.004)	0.220 (1.050)	0.268 (0.936)	0.373 (0.894)	0.370 (0.869)	0.399 (0.839)	0.348 (0.806)	0.319 (0.845)	0.383 (0.842)	0.391 (0.879)
<i>RELMILCAP</i> (t-1)	0.188 (0.584)	0.118 (0.517)	0.184 (0.415)	0.190 (0.414)	0.236 (0.445)	0.122 (0.474)	0.161 (0.459)	0.193 (0.474)	0.144 (0.478)	0.173 (0.501)
<i>MAJORPOWER</i> (t-1)	1.061 (1.632)	1.226 (1.540)	0.603 (1.382)	0.614 (1.365)	0.630 (1.350)	0.485 (1.381)	0.500 (1.357)	0.553 (1.319)	0.409 (1.416)	0.429 (1.403)
<i>CUMMIDS10</i> (t-1)	om	om	om	om	om	om	om	om	om	om
<i>DISTANCE</i> (t-1)	-0.291 (0.316)	-0.387 (0.323)	-0.189 (0.337)	-0.186 (0.319)	-0.187 (0.318)	-0.155 (0.329)	-0.127 (0.317)	-0.148 (0.325)	-0.183 (0.339)	-0.215 (0.352)
<i>CONTIGUITY</i>	1.326 (1.144)	1.431 (1.182)	1.257 (1.074)	1.313 (1.075)	1.438 (1.142)	1.425 (1.280)	1.366 (1.262)	1.526 (1.342)	1.360 (1.276)	1.419 (1.307)
<i>ENDCW</i> (t-1)	-1.198 (1.170)	-1.223 (1.262)	-0.824 (0.924)	-0.824 (1.051)	-0.829 (1.077)	-0.894 (1.056)	-0.788 (1.011)	-0.858 (1.078)	-1.026 (1.187)	-1.199 (1.395)
<i>YEARCOUNT</i>	2.137*** (0.759)	1.983*** (0.751)	1.612*** (0.469)	1.621*** (0.498)	1.717*** (0.582)	1.765*** (0.633)	1.784*** (0.619)	1.883*** (0.699)	1.781*** (0.579)	1.834*** (0.602)
<i>_spline1</i>	0.0849** (0.0340)	0.0802** (0.0341)	0.0664*** (0.0242)	0.0677*** (0.0257)	0.0721** (0.0298)	0.0721** (0.0328)	0.0724** (0.0327)	0.0767** (0.0358)	0.0705** (0.0297)	0.0721** (0.0304)
<i>_spline2</i>	-0.0401** (0.0175)	-0.0379** (0.0175)	-0.0313** (0.0131)	-0.0321** (0.0138)	-0.0343** (0.0158)	-0.0341* (0.0175)	-0.0342* (0.0175)	-0.0362* (0.0190)	-0.0329** (0.0159)	-0.0335** (0.0162)
<i>_spline3</i>	0.00141 (0.00144)	0.00131 (0.00145)	0.00102 (0.00135)	0.00113 (0.00138)	0.00124 (0.00148)	0.00118 (0.00161)	0.00115 (0.00165)	0.00123 (0.00171)	0.000946 (0.00151)	0.000894 (0.00155)
<i>Constant</i>	-5.303* (2.833)	-4.089 (2.605)	-4.522** (2.295)	-4.294** (2.134)	-4.530** (2.062)	-4.550** (2.293)	-5.069** (2.441)	-5.100** (2.579)	-4.476* (2.517)	-4.336* (2.591)
Observations	363	363	363	363	363	363	363	363	363	363
Wald chi	95.13	91.51	131.64	119.55	108.54	110.81	97.78	97.79	98.59	101.16
Prob>chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.1956	0.2009	0.1716	0.1754	0.1807	0.1729	0.1677	0.1725	0.1736	0.1808
Log PseudoL	-45.08328	-44.786832	-46.431573	-46.215471	-45.921511	-46.3591	-46.649607	-46.38183	-46.316386	-45.915511

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6.12: Complete results from logit analysis. Dependent variable: upward transition from neutral peace

Lag of SIGO variables	(1) Neutral Peace Up t-1	(2) Neutral Peace Up t-2	(3) Neutral Peace Up t-3	(4) Neutral Peace Up t-4	(5) Neutral Peace Up t-5	(6) Neutral Peace Up t-6	(7) Neutral Peace Up t-7	(8) Neutral Peace Up t-8	(9) Neutral Peace Up t-9	(10) Neutral Peace Up t-10
<i>SIGO_LOW</i> (t-x)	-0.0271 (0.195)	0.0758 (0.231)	-0.0367 (0.213)	0.0518 (0.218)	-0.121 (0.402)	-0.205 (0.422)	0.126 (0.416)	0.289 (0.500)	0.573 (0.586)	0.293 (0.554)
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i> (t-x)	-0.581* (0.311)	-0.620** (0.313)	-0.541* (0.314)	-0.545* (0.295)	-0.349 (0.315)	-0.325 (0.278)	-0.594** (0.237)	-0.522** (0.245)	-0.442* (0.262)	-0.323 (0.265)
<i>POLITY2_SML</i> (t-1)	0.150*** (0.0463)	0.147*** (0.0454)	0.147*** (0.0436)	0.146*** (0.0440)	0.142*** (0.0418)	0.140*** (0.0421)	0.144*** (0.0442)	0.146*** (0.0433)	0.151*** (0.0437)	0.146*** (0.0416)
<i>DEPENDENCE_SML</i> (t-1)	107.7 (65.82)	101.1 (68.76)	102.8 (70.40)	94.61 (70.21)	105.5 (66.06)	107.2 (65.25)	87.18 (72.64)	86.99 (72.19)	88.81 (72.69)	95.79 (66.17)
<i>NIGO</i> (t-1)	0.0497 (0.0380)	0.0453 (0.0366)	0.0490 (0.0377)	0.0450 (0.0388)	0.0445 (0.0394)	0.0466 (0.0411)	0.0434 (0.0391)	0.0332 (0.0378)	0.0195 (0.0406)	0.0250 (0.0387)
<i>ALLIANCE</i> (t-1)	-0.315 (0.888)	-0.212 (0.858)	-0.277 (0.861)	-0.228 (0.819)	-0.346 (0.868)	-0.354 (0.861)	-0.207 (0.861)	-0.236 (0.887)	-0.278 (0.932)	-0.313 (0.923)
<i>RELMILCAP</i> (t-1)	0.457 (0.353)	0.462 (0.355)	0.440 (0.354)	0.416 (0.345)	0.381 (0.340)	0.362 (0.345)	0.331 (0.356)	0.328 (0.356)	0.347 (0.360)	0.343 (0.360)
<i>MAJORPOWER</i> (t-1)	0.635 (0.927)	0.576 (0.986)	0.704 (0.986)	0.627 (0.950)	0.742 (1.040)	0.831 (1.057)	0.735 (1.008)	0.584 (1.088)	0.353 (1.180)	0.466 (1.180)
<i>CUMMIDS10</i> (t-1)	0.281 (0.515)	0.295 (0.522)	0.284 (0.510)	0.270 (0.507)	0.238 (0.483)	0.236 (0.473)	0.278 (0.507)	0.277 (0.500)	0.289 (0.508)	0.248 (0.477)
<i>DISTANCE</i> (t-1)	0.143 (0.414)	0.101 (0.416)	0.144 (0.422)	0.137 (0.413)	0.228 (0.429)	0.242 (0.429)	0.112 (0.396)	0.116 (0.401)	0.102 (0.410)	0.192 (0.428)
<i>CONTIGUITY</i>	1.263 (1.129)	1.197 (1.135)	1.200 (1.125)	1.180 (1.113)	1.296 (1.115)	1.299 (1.114)	1.086 (1.091)	1.120 (1.080)	1.173 (1.060)	1.279 (1.052)
<i>ENDCW</i> (t-1)	-1.224 (0.751)	-1.292* (0.762)	-1.243* (0.727)	-1.278* (0.715)	-1.269* (0.710)	-1.277* (0.723)	-1.211* (0.700)	-1.186* (0.705)	-1.180* (0.697)	-1.240* (0.733)
<i>YEARCOUNT</i>	0.200 (0.290)	0.216 (0.294)	0.200 (0.298)	0.189 (0.313)	0.124 (0.284)	0.0830 (0.285)	0.112 (0.295)	0.127 (0.294)	0.158 (0.306)	0.130 (0.296)
<i>_spline1</i>	-0.000860 (0.00708)	-0.000743 (0.00717)	-0.00115 (0.00721)	-0.00136 (0.00753)	-0.00237 (0.00714)	-0.00304 (0.00711)	-0.00296 (0.00709)	-0.00263 (0.00714)	-0.00206 (0.00719)	-0.00216 (0.00715)
<i>_spline2</i>	0.00176 (0.00360)	0.00173 (0.00364)	0.00194 (0.00366)	0.00202 (0.00380)	0.00244 (0.00365)	0.00272 (0.00363)	0.00273 (0.00362)	0.00260 (0.00365)	0.00238 (0.00364)	0.00234 (0.00364)
<i>_spline3</i>	-0.000930 (0.000644)	-0.000932 (0.000644)	-0.000971 (0.000651)	-0.000967 (0.000650)	-0.000998 (0.000643)	-0.00101 (0.000644)	-0.00102 (0.000652)	-0.00102 (0.000658)	-0.00102 (0.000653)	-0.000981 (0.000658)
<i>Constant</i>	-7.374** (3.334)	-7.095** (3.358)	-7.518** (3.417)	-7.406** (3.308)	-8.089** (3.426)	-8.149** (3.399)	-7.020** (3.146)	-6.964** (3.147)	-6.828** (3.162)	-7.529** (3.277)
Observations	909	909	909	909	909	909	909	909	909	909
Wald chi	49.00	59.67	56.93	51.17	58.33	65.86	65.75	58.21	53.56	65.83
Prob>chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.1626	0.1637	0.1589	0.1576	0.1471	0.1472	0.1611	0.1568	0.1570	0.1460
Log PseudoL	-70.748011	-70.654152	-71.063148	-71.167556	-72.055868	-72.048447	-70.873883	-71.234101	-71.223285	-72.148093

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6.13: Complete results from logit analysis. Dependent variable: downward transition from neutral peace

Lag of SIGO variables	(1) Neutral Peace Down t-1	(2) Neutral Peace Down t-2	(3) Neutral Peace Down t-3	(4) Neutral Peace Down t-4	(5) Neutral Peace Down t-5	(6) Neutral Peace Down t-6
<i>SIGO_LOW</i> (t-x)	-0.891 (0.545)	-1.105 (0.779)	-1.528** (0.692)	-1.335** (0.656)	-1.222* (0.635)	-1.121* (0.655)
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i> (t-x)	-1.211*** (0.369)	-1.160*** (0.423)	-1.314*** (0.411)	-1.291*** (0.419)	-1.248*** (0.446)	-1.193*** (0.375)
<i>POLITY2_SML</i> (t-1)	0.0117 (0.0773)	0.0116 (0.0827)	0.0222 (0.0972)	0.0262 (0.0932)	0.0243 (0.0960)	0.0231 (0.0968)
<i>DEPENDENCE_SML</i> (t-1)	-152.8 (280.0)	-104.4 (317.0)	-539.5 (421.7)	-565.4 (423.7)	-559.8 (410.2)	-572.4 (415.9)
<i>NIGO</i> (t-1)	0.00676 (0.0301)	0.0156 (0.0372)	0.0562 (0.0413)	0.0505 (0.0397)	0.0461 (0.0392)	0.0413 (0.0416)
<i>ALLIANCE</i> (t-1)	-0.0790 (0.589)	0.0342 (0.626)	0.758 (0.692)	0.790 (0.668)	0.871 (0.681)	1.019 (0.766)
<i>RELMILCAP</i> (t-1)	-0.0952 (0.387)	0.113 (0.459)	0.113 (0.555)	0.0531 (0.527)	-0.0258 (0.534)	-0.117 (0.613)
<i>MAJORPOWER</i> (t-1)	0.0374 (1.077)	-0.204 (1.292)	0.249 (1.272)	0.469 (1.252)	0.857 (1.298)	1.232 (1.493)
<i>CUMMIDS</i> (t-1)	-0.297 (0.256)	-0.223 (0.250)	-0.0851 (0.185)	-0.121 (0.196)	-0.120 (0.193)	-0.0970 (0.186)
<i>DISTANCE</i> (t-1)	-0.0403 (0.496)	0.0158 (0.547)	0.430 (0.499)	0.439 (0.506)	0.396 (0.528)	0.495 (0.572)
<i>CONTIGUITY</i>	0.851 (1.448)	0.799 (1.538)	1.253 (1.616)	1.260 (1.631)	1.099 (1.621)	1.211 (1.721)
<i>ENDCW</i> (t-1)	-0.292 (0.758)	-0.812 (0.899)	-0.775 (1.019)	-0.803 (1.076)	-0.772 (1.142)	-1.689 (1.458)
<i>YEARCOUNT</i>	-0.0190 (0.347)	0.350 (0.402)	0.993* (0.572)	0.920 (0.580)	1.271 (0.885)	1.532 (1.381)
<i>_spline1</i>	-0.00317 (0.0109)	0.00395 (0.0125)	0.0146 (0.0163)	0.0128 (0.0163)	0.0162 (0.0234)	0.0153 (0.0342)
<i>_spline2</i>	0.00149 (0.00527)	-0.000935 (0.00591)	-0.00386 (0.00746)	-0.00317 (0.00737)	-0.00354 (0.0101)	-0.00161 (0.0141)
<i>_spline3</i>	-0.000253 (0.00101)	-0.000226 (0.00111)	-0.000610 (0.00130)	-0.000650 (0.00126)	-0.00106 (0.00147)	-0.00195 (0.00175)
<i>Constant</i>	-1.391 (4.447)	-3.803 (5.254)	-10.35** (4.838)	-10.11** (4.694)	-11.77** (4.996)	-14.83*** (5.551)
Observations	1,217	1,215	1,213	1,212	1,210	1,194
Wald chi	41.87	32.62	50.77	50.07	84.03	50.30
Prob>chi2	0.0004	0.0083	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.3393	0.3490	0.4226	0.4082	0.3965	0.4098
Log PseudoL	-80.526799	-76.787636	-65.818188	-67.442026	-66.360933	-62.362222

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6.14: Complete results from logit analysis. Dependent variable: upward transition from advanced peace

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Advanced Peace	Advanced Peace	Advanced Peace	Advanced Peace	Advanced Peace	Advanced Peace	Advanced Peace	Advanced Peace	Advanced Peace	Advanced Peace
Lag of SIGO variables	Up t-1	Up t-2	Up t-3	Up t-4	Up t-5	Up t-6	Up t-7	Up t-8	Up t-9	Up t-10
<i>SIGO_LOW</i> (t-x)	0.826 (0.811)	0.746 (1.351)	0.794 (1.268)	0.859 (1.667)	1.444 (2.382)	1.068 (1.887)	-0.670 (0.691)	-0.781 (0.639)	-0.549 (0.593)	-0.998 (0.752)
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i> (t-x)	0.136 (1.172)	3.050*** (0.844)	3.046*** (0.848)	3.728*** (1.420)	4.221** (1.810)	2.860*** (1.074)	1.728* (0.993)	1.073 (0.828)	1.164 (0.926)	0.976 (0.910)
<i>POLITY2_SML</i> (t-1)	-0.273 (0.199)	-0.416 (0.257)	-0.415* (0.241)	-0.505 (0.336)	-0.540 (0.336)	-0.330** (0.167)	-0.158 (0.108)	-0.141 (0.108)	-0.154 (0.102)	-0.126 (0.109)
<i>DEPENDENCE_SML</i> (t-1)	-3.670 (201.2)	185.1 (219.3)	257.2 (179.7)	446.0* (234.7)	612.1** (279.9)	455.4*** (155.4)	269.3** (116.5)	192.5* (99.96)	188.1** (95.93)	175.3* (104.5)
<i>NIGO</i> (t-1)	0.0773 (0.0798)	0.0701 (0.207)	0.0687 (0.192)	0.116 (0.221)	0.0859 (0.241)	0.0535 (0.198)	0.157 (0.0977)	0.173* (0.0910)	0.150* (0.0793)	0.163** (0.0688)
<i>ALLIANCE</i> (t-1)	6.170 (6.083)	4.098 (7.151)	3.732 (6.491)	3.065 (7.149)	2.663 (6.247)	1.942 (3.642)	2.197 (1.710)	3.114 (1.978)	3.001 (2.014)	3.414 (2.267)
<i>RELMILCAP</i> (t-1)	-2.931 (3.640)	-2.802 (5.320)	-2.612 (4.578)	-2.476 (5.032)	-2.406 (4.304)	-1.376 (2.803)	-0.341 (1.845)	-0.522 (1.590)	-0.795 (1.581)	-0.889 (1.740)
<i>MAJORPOWER</i> (t-1)	-0.835 (3.199)	-4.916 (3.961)	-4.801 (3.579)	-5.955 (4.633)	-6.520 (4.483)	-4.365 (3.556)	-4.372 (2.681)	-3.804* (2.242)	-3.327* (1.952)	-3.579* (2.040)
<i>CUMMIDS10</i> (t-1)	om	om	om	om	om	om	om	om	om	om
<i>DISTANCE</i> (t-1)	1.387 (1.589)	3.814** (1.805)	3.674** (1.783)	3.899* (1.993)	3.916* (2.027)	2.556** (1.086)	1.384 (0.984)	1.050 (0.906)	1.288 (1.046)	1.188 (1.219)
<i>CONTIGUITY</i>	-0.00135 (1.639)	-0.673 (1.692)	-0.756 (1.559)	-1.503 (1.930)	-2.347 (2.150)	-1.623 (1.577)	-1.143 (1.498)	-0.869 (1.400)	-0.401 (1.452)	-0.0859 (1.741)
<i>ENDCW</i> (t-1)	0.255 (1.501)	1.031 (2.173)	1.175 (2.427)	0.814 (1.995)	0.725 (2.072)	0.988 (1.715)	0.640 (1.691)	0.453 (1.542)	0.595 (1.410)	0.374 (1.339)
<i>YEARCOUNT</i>	4.086 (3.320)	3.667 (4.215)	3.222 (3.167)	3.553 (2.990)	5.216 (4.848)	3.614** (1.447)	3.839** (1.893)	3.748** (1.763)	3.785** (1.802)	3.687* (1.907)
<i>_spline1</i>	0.0966 (0.0726)	0.0999 (0.0999)	0.0904 (0.0766)	0.107 (0.0865)	0.148 (0.129)	0.100** (0.0424)	0.102** (0.0488)	0.0959** (0.0436)	0.0941** (0.0436)	0.0894** (0.0449)
<i>_spline2</i>	-0.0549 (0.0396)	-0.0596 (0.0553)	-0.0546 (0.0428)	-0.0663 (0.0522)	-0.0886 (0.0749)	-0.0597** (0.0258)	-0.0591** (0.0280)	-0.0553** (0.0247)	-0.0534** (0.0244)	-0.0504** (0.0250)
<i>_spline3</i>	0.00711 (0.00456)	0.00876 (0.00636)	0.00834 (0.00515)	0.0108 (0.00802)	0.0131 (0.0101)	0.00867** (0.00408)	0.00792** (0.00372)	0.00723** (0.00324)	0.00662** (0.00305)	0.00599* (0.00319)
<i>Constant</i>	-36.05 (22.74)	-55.81** (24.58)	-53.44** (21.79)	-59.45** (25.68)	-65.78** (31.95)	-45.44*** (15.17)	-37.34** (14.88)	-34.53** (14.91)	-35.95** (15.70)	-35.28** (17.56)
Observations	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315
Wald chi	159.60	140.55	158.97	93.00	49.53	209.80	139.91	219.66	163.01	292.14
Prob>chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.3732	0.4443	0.4504	0.4872	0.4905	0.4220	0.3763	0.3578	0.3559	0.3561
Log PseudoL	-27.79348	-24.63948	-24.368641	-22.739202	-22.588979	-25.629532	-27.654148	-28.474275	-28.557344	-28.549239

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6.15: Complete results from logit analysis. Dependent variable: downward transition from advanced peace

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Advanced Peace Down	Advanced Peace Down	Advanced Peace Down	Advanced Peace Down	Advanced Peace Down	Advanced Peace Down	Advanced Peace Down	Advanced Peace Down	Advanced Peace Down	Advanced Peace Down
Lag of SIGO variables	t-1	t-2	t-3	t-4	t-5	t-6	t-7	t-8	t-9	t-10
<i>SIGO_LOW</i> (t-x)	-1.459*** (0.493)	-1.683** (0.755)	-1.363** (0.691)	-1.227* (0.679)	-0.859 (0.626)	-1.501 (1.088)	-2.088 (1.538)	-1.647 (1.595)	-1.459 (1.770)	0.000188 (2.317)
<i>SIGO_HIGH</i> (t-x)	-1.653** (0.738)	-0.922* (0.556)	-0.952 (0.595)	-0.995* (0.597)	-1.196** (0.577)	0.256 (0.813)	1.021 (1.047)	0.815 (1.011)	0.795 (1.094)	-0.307 (1.642)
<i>POLITY2_SML</i> (t-1)	0.393*** (0.131)	0.269*** (0.103)	0.234** (0.106)	0.233*** (0.104)	0.222** (0.0964)	0.126 (0.0782)	0.127* (0.0681)	0.116* (0.0684)	0.118* (0.0688)	0.139 (0.0958)
<i>DEPENDENCE_SML</i> (t-1)	158.7 (99.88)	136.6 (99.56)	97.84 (103.6)	73.78 (113.0)	46.76 (142.1)	15.98 (195.1)	65.38 (257.1)	30.77 (291.6)	30.46 (290.3)	-59.25 (243.3)
<i>NIGO</i> (t-1)	-0.0584 (0.0480)	-0.0527 (0.0538)	-0.0763 (0.0547)	-0.0926* (0.0538)	-0.110** (0.0544)	-0.119* (0.0624)	-0.164** (0.0814)	-0.172** (0.0820)	-0.181** (0.0821)	-0.171** (0.0759)
<i>ALLIANCE</i> (t-1)	-1.601 (1.553)	-0.452 (1.406)	-0.107 (1.474)	0.0107 (1.472)	0.122 (1.470)	0.284 (1.800)	0.181 (1.947)	-0.0706 (1.942)	-0.217 (1.978)	-0.171 (1.905)
<i>RELMILCAP</i> (t-1)	2.319*** (0.892)	2.670*** (1.016)	2.430** (0.997)	2.378** (1.011)	1.951** (0.926)	2.559** (1.162)	3.268** (1.531)	2.814** (1.413)	2.768* (1.475)	1.742 (1.519)
<i>MAJORPOWER</i> (t-1)	-0.841 (2.660)	-3.560 (2.499)	-3.387 (2.644)	-3.364 (2.724)	-2.114 (2.714)	-4.517 (3.803)	-6.921 (5.042)	-5.435 (4.343)	-5.175 (4.360)	-1.841 (4.548)
<i>CUMMIDS10</i> (t-1)	om	om	om	om	om	om	om	om	om	om
<i>DISTANCE</i> (t-1)	-0.562 (0.934)	-0.325 (0.872)	-0.0537 (0.858)	0.0264 (0.906)	-0.0444 (1.104)	0.713 (0.962)	1.421 (1.119)	1.414 (1.027)	1.553 (1.028)	1.129 (1.340)
<i>CONTIGUITY</i>	3.425 (2.854)	-0.00366 (3.086)	0.559 (3.299)	0.878 (3.354)	1.675 (3.317)	-0.852 (3.564)	-1.249 (3.580)	-0.0255 (2.977)	0.498 (3.071)	2.931 (2.890)
<i>ENDCW</i> (t-1)	3.245 (2.352)	3.070 (2.435)	2.798 (2.135)	2.708 (1.943)	2.645 (1.782)	3.422* (1.978)	3.894* (2.066)	3.868* (2.319)	3.965 (2.522)	3.504 (2.736)
<i>YEARCOUNT</i>	1.712 (1.092)	1.608 (1.315)	1.149 (1.084)	0.914 (0.911)	0.755 (0.721)	1.657 (1.079)	1.730* (0.946)	1.570 (0.979)	1.553 (1.011)	1.381 (1.052)
<i>_spline1</i>	0.0737 (0.0474)	0.0633 (0.0465)	0.0472 (0.0396)	0.0392 (0.0352)	0.0346 (0.0299)	0.0492 (0.0335)	0.0459 (0.0279)	0.0417 (0.0268)	0.0409 (0.0260)	0.0436* (0.0259)
<i>_spline2</i>	-0.0520 (0.0322)	-0.0432 (0.0294)	-0.0330 (0.0254)	-0.0280 (0.0229)	-0.0253 (0.0200)	-0.0307 (0.0206)	-0.0275 (0.0171)	-0.0252 (0.0161)	-0.0248 (0.0153)	-0.0285* (0.0152)
<i>_spline3</i>	0.0116* (0.00664)	0.00892* (0.00513)	0.00710 (0.00453)	0.00627 (0.00423)	0.00592 (0.00395)	0.00516 (0.00353)	0.00414 (0.00314)	0.00396 (0.00298)	0.00398 (0.00279)	0.00555* (0.00302)
<i>Constant</i>	-1.479 (7.768)	-2.538 (7.469)	-3.221 (7.327)	-3.002 (7.590)	-1.873 (9.528)	-10.51 (8.117)	-15.70* (8.934)	-15.42* (8.260)	-16.62** (8.283)	-12.84 (11.28)
Observations	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315	315
Wald chi	258.64	129.39	198.05	254.60	565.88	937.60	1308.01	1254.58	1850.73	4757.19
Prob>chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.4953	0.4789	0.4496	0.4344	0.4131	0.3731	0.3745	0.3555	0.3503	0.3403
Log PseudoL	-16.940383	-17.493242	-18.475494	-18.986039	-19.699592	-21.043189	-20.995849	-21.633196	-21.808348	-22.146523

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Teil III

Literaturverzeichnis und Anhänge

Literaturverzeichnis

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Datenträger mit PDF-Version der Dissertation, Datensätzen und STATA Do-Files

PDF-Version der Dissertation

Dissertation_Kasten_2018.pdf

Datensätze und Do-Files im STATA-Format

PStar.dta	Daten für die Operationalisierung und Analyse in „When less is More“
PStar.do	Do-File für die Operationalisierung und Analyse in „When less is More“
SO_trans.dta	Daten für die empirische Analyse in „Security Organizations“, Tabellen 6.2 – 6.6, 6.8 – 6.15
SO_rc.dta	Daten für die empirische Analyse in „Security Organizations“, Tabelle 6.7
SO.do	Do-File für die empirische Analyse in „Security Organizations“