DIFFERENTIAL TRANSFORMATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY: INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE EU AND HISTORICAL LEGACIES

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ABSTRACT

Drawing on 53 in depth interviews with EU and Turkish policymakers/decision makers and civil society representatives, this study examines varying levels of Europeanization of civil society across different policy fields in Turkey. It analyses multifaceted processes of the EU impact on civil society development, focusing on three principled issue areas, women, environment and human rights. Suggesting that complex interactions between the EU and domestic politics exist, it argues that historical legacies-inherited characteristics of the past-have shaped the Europeanization outcomes of civil society. Through a structured comparative analysis, on the one hand, it shows that a stronger degree of Europeanization will be accomplished when the EU meets with facilitating historical legacies. On the other hand, it demonstrates that the Europeanization of civil society is less likely where historical legacies function as a constraining condition for the EU impact and transformation. Based on rich empirical evidence across different sectors of civil society, the study finally discusses the nature, potential and limits of the EU impact on civil society development.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this to my father, Hasan Boşnak, wishing he could have seen this day with me.

Bugünü çok görmesini istediğim Babam'a...

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Working on a PhD is a long, challenging road with many difficulties and beauties along the way. You may have to stop and turn around, suffer and discover new routes. I started this journey at the University of Birmingham and ended it at the University of Tubingen. In my story, completing my PhD thesis has indisputably been part of the pathway to unique learning experiences. It is not only a process in which I acquired knowledge but also realize myself. In this journey, I was very lucky to be surrounded with beautiful people who make my life more colorful. First and foremost, I would like express my sincere gratitude to my lead supervisor-Thomas Diez. His patient guidance, invaluable comments and intellectual perspective have influenced my work and my way of thinking. I admire and appreciate his supervision during the course of my PhD. I am profoundly indebted to Bahar Rumelili who has not only been a great supervisor to me but also great inspiration. Her academic brilliance, analytical skills and positive attitude left a deep imprint on my academic venture. Without her encouragement and support, I would not be able to finalize this thesis. I also would like to take this opportunity to thank Andreas Hasenclever on my examination committee for his insightful comments and recommendations.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURE

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABce	Türkiye'nin Çevre ve Tarım İttifakı - Turkey's Environment and Agriculture Alliance
AÇEV	Anne Çocuk Eğitim Vakfı- Mother Child Education Foundation
AK-DER	Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party
AP	Adalet Partisi - Justice Party
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi – Motherland Party
BDP	Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi - Peace and Democracy Party
CEDAW	Convention for the Elimination of All Types of Discrimination Against Women
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFCU	Central Finance and Contract Unit
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Republican's People Party
ÇAÇA	Çocuklar Aynı Çatı Altında- Children Under One Roof Association
ÇEKÜL	Çevre ve Kültür Değerlerini Koruma ve Tanıtma Vakfı – Foundation for the Protection and Promotion of the Environment and Cultural Heritage
DİSK	Türkiye Devrimci İş Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – Revolutionary Labour Unions Confederation Turkey

DD	Doğa Derneği-Nature Association
DP	Demokrat Partisi – Democrat Party
EC	European Community
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EEA	European Environmental Agency
EEB	European Environmental Bureau
EESC	European Economic and Social Committee
EIA	European Impact Assessment
EIDHR	European Instrument of Democracy and Human Rights
EMHRN	Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network
EU	European Union
EWL	European Women's Lobby
FIDH	International Federation for Human Rights
GİKAP	Gökkuşağı İstanbul Kadın Platformu- Rainbow İstanbul Women Organizations' Platform
GONGOs	Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations
Göç-Der	Göç Edenler Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Kültür Derneği- Immigrants' Association for Social Cooperation and Culture
GREVIO	Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence
hYd	Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği- Helsinki Citizens Assembly
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
İHD	İnsan Hakları Derneği- Human Rights Association
İHOP	İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu- Human Rights Joint Platform
KADEM	Kadın ve Demokrasi Derneği- Women and Democracy Association
KA-DER	Kadın Adayları Destekleme ve Eğitme Derneği- Association for Supporting and Training Women Candidates

KAGİDER	Türkiye Kadın Girişimciler Derneği- Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey
KAMER	Kadın Merkezi- Women's Center
KASAD-D	Kadın Sağlıkçılar Dayanışma Derneği- Women Healthcare Professionals Solidarity
KCK	Kürdistan Topluluklar Birliği - Union of Communities of Kurdistan
KİH-YÇ	Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler- Women for Women's Human Rights New Ways
KSGM	Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü- Directorate of Women's Status and Problems
LGBTT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transvestite, Transsexual
Mazlum-Der	İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği- Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed
MEDA	Measures d'accompagnement (accompanying measures)
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PHARE	Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
PKK	Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan- Kurdistan Worker's Party
STGM	Sivil Toplum Geliştirme Merkezi - Civil Society Development Center
TEMA	Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habits
TİHV	Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı- Human Rights Foundation of Turkey
TİP	Türkiye İşçi Partisi- Workers Party of Turkey
TKB	Türk Kadınlar Birliği –Turkish Women's Association
TODEV	Türkiye Otistiklere Destek ve Eğitim Vakfı- Autistics Support and Education Foundation
TOHAV	Foundation for Society and Legal Studies - Toplum ve Hukuk Araştırmaları Vakfı

TÜRÇEK	Türkiye Çevre Koruma ve Yeşillendirme Kurumu- Turkish Environmental and Woodlands Protection Society
TÜRK-İŞ	Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions
UN	United Nations
VAKAD	Van Kadın Derneği- Van Women's Association
WAVE	Women Against Violence Europe
WWF-Turkey	Wild World Foundation Turkey

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The slogan was "there is no other tomorrow!" *(Başka Yarın Yok!)*. "Traditional Turkish coffee was pictured almost spilling over, with the caption: 'We are about to be too late.' " (Altınay 2005:111). Cars with "European Movement 2002" stickers were all over neighborhoods in İstanbul[1]. On 1 August 2002, the European Movement 2002 placed a huge clock in front of the Çankaya Gate of Parliament running backwards. "The clock is ticking" symbolizing the importance of time, counting down for the Copenhagen Summit and reminding everyone that there was 132 days until the summit. The European Movement 2002 was a civil society initiative founded on 9 May, Europe Day, to support Turkey's EU vocation and emphasizing that Turkey was at a crossroads and that urgent reforms were required to meet candidacy obligations and to show Turkey's willingness to join the EU (Altınay 2005:110-111).

Similarly, from the women's movement campaign to reform the discriminatory Civil and Penal Code, to the environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) lobby through their counterparts in European countries and directly with the EU institutions against worrying "Nature and Biodiversity Conservation" draft law, to the formation and rapid dissolution of the Human Rights Consultation Board between the government and human rights NGOs, Turkey has vivid and diverse images of civil society groups during the EU accession process.

In the intensive reform process, civil society has become more visible in the political landscape as a driver of the Europeanization processes. Since then, Europeanization has become one of the central concepts to understand the relationship between the EU and civil society during accession negotiations. Turkey is the longest-waiting country on the EU's accession list; its European aspirations date back to the

[1] These examples are extracted from Altınay 2005:110-111.

Ottoman Empire, and were revitalized in 1999 when Turkey was given the status of membership candidate country in the Helsinki European Council. Recognition of her candidacy status sparked extensive constitutional reforms and subsequent democratic reform packages extended fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey.

Parallel to these developments, civil society has become more active in the political arena. Particularly during the intensive reform process, civil society organizations mobilized around EU related issues and pressured the government to adopt political reforms. More critically, legal changes have altered the political and societal spaces available for the operation of civil society actors. The number of civil society organizations has increased rapidly (Interview Head of the Department of Associations 2011). According to recent figures, the number of active associations has increased by 64 per cent following the official announcement of Turkey's candidacy to the EU (Zihnioğlu 2013:2). In this period, the EU exercised a transformative power over civil society development in Turkey.

While the 1999-2005 period has been recognized as the heyday of Europeanization, and stimulating legal changes and democratic reform packages, the post-2005 period has been identified as a deadlock in EU-Turkey relations and turning away from the EU. The stalemate in the EU-Turkey relationship was coupled with a domestically volatile period (Kalaycıoğlu 2012). Within this context, Europeanization of civil society seems to exhibit variations over time and across issue areas. The EU impact has not been uniform on different sectors of civil society. The relationship between the EU and Turkey and the differential impact of the EU on civil society is puzzling and needs to be unpacked and supported by a theoretical framework and rich empirical evidence. Turkey is an illustrative case for examining the nature, potential and limits of the Europeanization processes.

The Europeanization of civil society is understood in a variety of ways (For a detailed discussion see Chapter 2). In this thesis, I define Europeanization of civil society as "processes that enhance the autonomy and independence of NGOs from the state and develop the NGOs' institutional capacities and networks in a way that enables their effective contribution to policymaking in Turkey and in Europe" (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015: 131). Interaction between domestic civil society, international counterparts and the state is the backbone of Europeanization. A Europeanized civil society establishes both internal and external networks between actors yet at the same time remains independent from the state and the market. While

the internal network refers to interaction between domestic civil society as well as the state and society, external networks denote cooperation between domestic civil society and their international counterparts. In this particular understanding, civil society has been a partner with the state and other actors and a key actor in the policymaking.

This thesis explores the role of the EU in shaping civil society development in Turkey. It examines in detail how the EU used its accession context and conditions to exercise an influence on civil society, analyzes mechanisms of the EU influence and interaction between the EU and domestic factors, and re-assesses the EU's transformative power on civil society. Therefore, the thesis comprises the following elements: the EU context or condition, the mechanisms triggered by the EU, impacts of these mechanisms and an explanation of the EU impact on civil society.

I argue that outcomes of Europeanization have not been uniform across the different sectors of civil society in Turkey. The impact of the EU on civil society seems to exhibit variation and a legacy-based explanation accounts for varying degrees of the EU impact. The EU impact on civil society, transformation and processes that were triggered by the EU is an interactive and dynamic process. Thus, Europeanization is not imposed above as a one-way street; on the contrary, domestic civil society actors, political culture and traditions re-interpret the EU influence at the domestic level and reciprocally influence and shape Europeanization outcomes.

Differentiated outcome of Europeanization is puzzling in the light of existing approaches about the relationship between the EU and civil society, because diverse outcomes and legacy-based domestic conditions have not been taken into account. Analyses of the Europeanization of civil society in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have shown that "Europeanization mainly empowered civil society actors that already had sufficient capacities" (Sedelmeier 2011:20) without considering how domestic factors such as capacities or levels of societal mobilization interlinked to historical legacies (Börzel 2010; Börzel and Buzogány 2010 a,b; Carmin and Fagan 2010; Fagan 2010). I argue that a legacy-based explanation complements these studies, because contemporary domestic conditions such as capacities, levels of societal mobilization or state-society relations can be traced back to past periods and to a large extent shaped by history.

The relationship between the EU and civil society is one of the enduring subjects of inquiry for Europeanization scholars. The continuing interest in the study

of Europeanization of civil society can be justified in at least two ways. The EU frequently emphasizes the role of civil society in the accession process (Ketola 2013; Zihnioğlu 2013) therefore understanding the relationship between the EU and civil society is important for perceiving how the EU influences civil society. Second, in a liberal tradition, the commitment to democracy requires an active civil society, which therefore reinforces the normative appeal of democracy (Putnam *et al.*1994; Putnam 1995). If the EU empowers civil society development, it implies that civil society activities can contribute to a more participatory and dynamic democratic society. Yet the third reason for the scholarly attention on civil society is the ongoing enlargement process. The EU's enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has intensified discussions on the power and growth of civil society, its role in democratization and reform process and the Europeanization of civil society as a condition of the EU membership. The enlargement rounds of 2004/2007 also added new opportunities and challenges, especially in relation to the question of the Europeanization of civil society. In Turkey, the research agenda on the Europeanization of civil society has grown exponentially across different types and sectors of civil society. Yet, empirical studies in Turkey fail to show the EU impact on different sectors of civil society through a structured analysis and explanation of the EU impact.

In this thesis I argue that the EU has a differential impact on civil society and a principle reason for the observed diversity in empirical research is the role of historical trajectories. The fundamental premise of my argument is that the relationship between the EU and civil society cannot be properly understood without analyzing the dynamic interactions between the EU and reactions of the civil society actors in Turkey. Europeanization is perceived as a two way process in which domestic factors together with the EU factors influence each other and shape Europeanization outcomes. Historical legacies both play facilitating and constraining roles in the explanations of the EU impact. I argue that a stronger degree of Europeanization of civil society succeeds when the EU interacts with facilitating historical legacies. Thus, whether the Europeanization outcome corresponds to stronger or limited EU influence to a large extent depends on the legacies of the past.

My theoretical framework and supporting evidence presented in this research have significant implications for understanding the dynamics of civil society and how the EU impacts civil society in general. The omission of a structured comparative study, which characterizes most of the literature on the Europeanization of civil

society to date, results in incomplete conclusions about how the EU impacts civil society. The inherited characteristics of civil society shape their responses to processes of EU influence; therefore, it is vital to take into account legacies of the past when analyzing the Europeanization of civil society. The concept of historical legacy in broader terms understood as "inherited aspects of the past relevant to the present" (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig 2010). Following this definition, in Chapter 4 I identify "which past matters the most" (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig 2010). In particular, three aspects of the past matter the most for the diverse Europeanization outcomes. First, historically, the presence of a dynamic civil society and a good level of mobilization facilitate the EU impact. In contrast, the absence of strong civil society, and divisions hinder the EU influence on civil society. Second, the existence of mechanisms that foster collaboration between the state and civil society promotes the EU's effect. On the contrary, the lack of mechanisms that actively promote state society cooperation impede the EU's impact. Third, the presence and use of transnational networks trigger the EU influence. Conversely, the dearth of transnational networks inhibits the EU's impact. The empirical chapters investigate implications of this argument.

1.1. Civil Society, Enlargement and Europeanization

Civil society has its strong historical roots in the European integration process. At the outset, civil society was promoted to participate in policymaking and to enhance the legitimacy of European institutions. Democratic transitions and accession of Southern European countries brought attention to the importance of stable democratic regimes to the fore and the transformative power of the European Community (EC). Yet, civil society only emerged as a key feature in the EU's enlargement policy during the accession of CEECs. The debate on the role of civil society in democratization became prominent among EU institutions and member states.

The EU's active civil society promotion strategy in CEECs also spurred scholarly interest in the civil society. The state of the art in the Europeanization of civil society literature, deriving from democracy promotion and governance literature and the wider literature on the "generations of Europeanization" perspectives define,

assess and measure the Europeanization of civil society in CEE and Turkey within the context of the enlargement.

Traditional scholarship from democracy promotion has examined the relationship between the EU and civil society from a variety of angles. Some studies have revealed that the EU financial assistance has created a particular type of civil society as "grant-seeking professional organizations" which have become disconnected from their constituencies (McMahon 2001; Mandelson and Glenn 2002; Fagan 2004; 2005). Others have argued the EU has facilitated a new type of politically oriented activism known as "transactional activism" that is based on transactions (Císař 2010; Fagan 2011; Císař 2013).

The literature on the Europeanization of civil society in CEE has also scrutinized the extent to which the EU empowered civil society in the different areas of public policy. Studies have yielded mixed results. On the one hand, there is evidence that the EU has provided diverse opportunities to domestic civil societies and empowered them through the EU's pre-accession instruments, policy rights, civil society funding and transnational networks in the context of EU conditionality. Yet, on the other hand, research has shown that weak governance capacities of both state and non-state actors have limited the Europeanization outcomes (Börzel 2009; Börzel 2010; Börzel and Buzogány 2010 a, b; Grosse 2010).

The literature on the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey has grown rapidly in recent years. Research has shown that the EU has exercised a considerable transformative power on civil society in Turkey, but they differ in outcomes of the EU impact. There is broad agreement that, through conditionality, the EU has imposed a transformative change in the domestic legal framework in governing the operation of civil society in Turkey (Diez *et al.* 2005; İçduygu 2007; Öner 2012; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). Furthermore, research has found that the EU has shaped agendas of civil society, diffused a project culture and accelerated professionalism through EU financial assistance (Ergun 2010 ;Kuzmanovic 2010; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). The EU has also legitimized the activities of civil society and empowered these organizations.

Thus, existing literature on the Europeanization of civil society both in the context of CEE and Turkey reveal that the EU's impact is "transforming", "strengthening" or "weaking" civil society. Both literatures are chatacterized by multiple understandings of civil society, Europeanization processes and outcomes.

Yet, the dichotomy between the "first generation" and "second generation" of Europeanization studies[2] has monopolized the research agenda and has left the exploration of the domestic factors in a vacuum (An exception is Alpan and Diez 2014 and Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016). The present study seeks to contribute Europeanization field by addressing this vacuum in the current academic research.

My theoretical framework, based on a pathway model, was originally developed to study the impact of the EU on border conflicts (Diez *et al.*2006; 2008). The pathway model of EU impact introduces different mechanisms of the EU influence that is theoretically grounded in rationalist and sociological institutionalism in the wider literature. The categories of compulsory, enabling and connective pathways in the model indicate different but interconnected forms of the EU influence and allow me to analyze the interplay between direct and indirect forms of EU involvement. I applied this model to civil society and used analytical categories to examine the EU impact on civil society in Turkey. As the review of the academic debates in Chapter 2 will show in detail, scholars tend to concentrate on the compulsory or enabling pathway of the EU impact, down-playing the connective pathway. During the course of my research it has become clear that the connective pathway is widely and indirectly mentioned, but not yet extensively and systematically studied in the current literature. I argue and in empirical chapters (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) I show that the connective pathway of the EU influence is innovative to understand the interactions between actors and the differential impact of the EU on civil society.

Empirical chapters have three main sections. First, I start by explaining major developments and sector specific characteristics of civil society before 1999. Second, I show mechanisms and outcomes of the EU impact after 1999. In this section, I do not separate mechanisms and outcomes of the EU impact; initially I start with a summary of outcomes followed by an in-depth examination of the EU pathways and outcomes. The main reason for desigining it in this way is to demonstrate in detail how particular EU pathways lead to specific outcomes and capture the dynamic interaction between them. Lastly, I provide a legacy-based explanation to account for diverse Europeanization outcomes of civil society. My objective is twofold. On the

[2] The "first generation" of Europeanization research conceived Europeanization as a top-down process, where EU pressure from above influences the domestic reactions. The "second generation" of Europeanization research perceived Europeanization both as a top-down and bottom-up process, where pressures from below also shape the outcomes.

one hand, an in-depth examination of the EU impact across different sectors of civil society enables me to show how the EU influences civil society by examining simultaneous processes and the interplay between the EU and domestic-level factors. On the other hand I will provide an explanation for the EU impact on civil society.

Such a critical engagement is of paramount importance and provides a more accurate and comprehensive understanding of the EU impact on civil society. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the empirical and theoretical debates in the Europeanization of civil society in two major ways. On the one hand, it contributes towards creating a theoretically innovative and comprehensive account for understanding the EU effect on civil society. I introduce a new theoretical framework that builds on the pathway model of the EU impact and incorporates the concept of historical legacies. I argue that the EU and civil society have an interactive and dynamic relationship and the impact of the EU is moulded by the reactions, understandings, and traditions of civil society organizations. Therefore, any assessment that does not take into account domestic explanations tend to focus on more simplistic explanations. My theoretical framework highlights the interaction of EU and legacy-related domestic factors. While the EU aspect accentuates complex mechansims of the EU impact in multiple levels, the domestic aspect underscores that historical legacies have played a decisive role in Europeanization processes.

On the other hand, my thesis, through a concrete structured comparative analysis across different sectors of civil society, provides rich empirical findings. The 53 qualitative semi-structured in-depth interviews with EU and Turkish policymakers and civil society representatives alongside the European Commission's annual Progress Reports illuminate the Europeanization processes. Previous research has analyzed the EU impact through an examination of single areas, therefore, comparability between cases and in-depth qualitative assessment is a crucial contribution to studies on the Europeanization of civil society. When assessing EU impact, studies have either focused on civil society in general or only on specific types of actors. Although Turkish civil society actors share important characteristics, the EU impact differs across issue areas. In line with other studies, the provision of financial and legal opportunities have a uniform influence across different sectors of civil society. Similarly, all civil society actors have used the EU as a legitimization device. However, the EU has had a diverse impact on state-society relations, cooperation among domestic civil society actors and relationship with external

networks across different segments of the civil society. This is a significant finding, because in contrast to other studies in the field it shows that the EU has a differential impact on civil society.

1.2. Organization of the Thesis

The reminder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I introduce a model to study the impact of the EU on civil society development. My model is based on the pathway model that has been utilized to study the influence of the EU on border conflicts (Diez *et al.* 2006; 2008). I illustrate that an attention to connective pathway regarding how EU influence interactions between various actors and its outcome and incorporation of a key variable in the model can significantly improve our understanding of the relationship between the EU and civil society. I derive the empirical implications of my analytical framework on three levels- women's, environmental and human rights NGOs- which I examine in the empirical chapters in 5, 6 and 7.

Chapter 3 presents the EU's approach to civil society to show how the EU's understanding reflected to an enlargement context. I examine approaches that lay at the center of EU civil society policy. Overall, I find that the EU follows a twin-track approach to civil society. In this approach, civil society is an instrument of democracy promotion and a partner in European governance. In addition, I show that although the EU's policy towards civil society is conceptualized in a particular way, EU member states are molded by different understandings and traditions of civil society.

In Chapter 4 through long-term analysis I trace the development of civil society in Turkey. I examine the development of civil society to point out historical legacies that matter for civil society. Empirically I focus on several legislative frameworks since the Ottoman modernization program (*Tanzimat)* and secondary literature on different aspects of civil society. I show that there are six vital legacies in relation to civil society, which date back to the Ottoman period. These legacies in relation to civil society are still the constituent elements of the civil society in Turkey, and have implications on the EU influence.

In empirical chapters I turn to implications of my pathway model on women, environmental and human rights civil society respectively. I examine how the EU used its accession context and conditions to exert influence on different sectors of

civil society. I focus on the in-depth analysis of the EU mechanisms, impacts of these mechanisms and provide an explanation of the EU impact by invoking a plausibility probe in each empirical chapter.

The findings of the compulsory pathway and enabling pathway of the EU influence show similarities across different sectors of civil society. There are two main findings of the compulsory pathway: First, the EU has enforced a significant change in the legal framework. Yet, the post-2005 period surfaced implementation related problems. Second, EU funding has shaped the agendas and increased the capacity and visibility of civil society.

Assessment of the enabling pathway of the EU influence indicates that civil society actors in all issue areas frequently use EU standards and norms as a reference point to legitimize their actions and to promote their agendas. This has led to empowerment of civil society vis-à-vis the state, but this effect has been vulnerable to fluctuations in EU-Turkey relations.

In Chapter 5 I show that a stronger degree of Europeanization of women's civil society is achieved when the EU meets with facilitating historical legacies. I find that traditionally, women's civil society has been developed, has formed relations with the Turkish state and participated in decision-making processes and has collaborated with their counterparts and established transnational connections with external networks throughout different periods of history. In addition I show how the EU, through different pathways, has enabled women's civil society to cooperate and collaborate with the state institutions, to take an active role in policy-processes, and to form and empower networks both with domestic civil society actors and their counterparts in other countries. I also demonstrate how legacies matter and provide an explanation of the EU impact.

In Chapter 6 I show that the EU impact has been ambivalent on environmental civil society. I illustrate that environmental activism has been moderate; it formed relations with the Turkish state to participate in policy processes but at the same time has been restricted by the state's approach to civil society. Furthermore, environmental civil society has weak cooperation both with other domestic environmental actors and their European counterparts. Even though the EU has provided opportunities, the moderate status of the environmental movement and the weak cooperation among environmental actors have acted as constraining conditions

of the EU impact. I finally show how historical legacies matter for the Europeanization of environmental civil society in Turkey.

In Chapter 7 I show that the Europeanization of civil society is limited when historical legacies function as a constraining condition for the EU impact. The controversial relationship between the state and human rights civil society, the restricted cooperation among human rights actors and the limited use of transnational connections has restrained the EU impact. In the cases of human rights, civil society legacies of the past have functioned as a constraining condition of the EU impact.

Finally, Chapter 8 reviews the major findings of the analyses and highlights their implications for our understanding of the relationship between the EU and civil society. In this concluding chapter I also discuss the limitations of the present research and counterarguments, policy implications as well as new questions for further study.

CHAPTER 2
ANALYZING THE EU IMPACT ON CIVIL SOCIETY: A THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

As I have shown in Chapter 1, civil society has been at the center of the EU enlargement process. This is in line with the argument of many studies in the Europeanization field that the EU has considerable impact on civil society development. One of the most important illustrations of that impact is the emergence of civil society as a central actor in Turkey's pre-accession process for EU membership. Despite this growing interest, there is a lack of an in-depth assessment of mechanisms of the EU impact on different sectors of civil society and their interplay with domestic factors in Turkey. The study analyzes mechanisms of EU influence on different segments of civil society and provides an explanation of EU impact. To understand the impact of the EU, the present chapter develops a theoretical and methodological framework to study civil society.

This chapter is divided into three sections. It starts with a definition of civil society, and a review of the literature on academic debates on the EU and civil society. The first section presents key debates and findings and identifies the gap in the literature. Building on these studies, the second section develops a theoretical framework that proposes a pathway model of Europeanization and conditions of the EU impact. The third section explains the methodology in order to operationalize Europeanization analysis in the empirical chapters.

2.1. Academic Debates on the EU and Civil Society

This section first starts with the definition of civil society, then reviews two main strands of academic literature that are important for this research. These strands are the rising importance of civil society in EU enlargement in CEE (the Europeanization of civil society in CEE) and the investigations into the impact of the EU on civil society development in Turkey (Europeanization of civil society in Turkey).

2.1.1. Definitions: Civil Society and NGOs

As a starting point, it is important to precisely understand the kind of civil society that is under investigation and affected by the Europeanization processes. What is crucial in the current context is to clarify contested meanings of civil society and operationalize it for the purpose of this research. There are two key concepts that require further attention. These are civil society and NGOs. Civil society and NGOs are interrelated but different concepts.

There are several ways of defining and studying civil society.[3] This thesis follows an actor-oriented approach to civil society and concentrates on particular types of actors. This is not to deny the importance of various models of civil society ranging from institutionalized to less- institutionalized; instead this choice has been driven to operationalize the research question that is to trace the EU impact on civil society development in different sectors of civil society. In following an actor-oriented approach to civil society, NGOs are used as a unit of analysis.

The London School of Economics' (LSE) Centre for Civil Society[4] provides an analytically and empirically useful definition of civil society.

> Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from the state, and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degrees of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.[5]

The thesis employs this working definition to civil society in the empirical chapters. In this definition, civil society refers both to various actors and spheres of

[3] There are two main approaches to study civil society. Actor-oriented approaches focus on different kinds of civil society actors and their characteristics while functional approaches concentrate on functions of civil society in various contexts. For more information see Spurk (2009).

[4] The LSE Centre for Civil Society was established in 1995 to conduct research on theoretical and practical aspects of civil society and initiated the specialist MSc program in NGOs and management, and NGOs and development. The Center for Civil Society was closed in 2010.

[5] LSE Centre for Civil Society http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm [Accessed on: 23 December 2009].

collection action, which reflect the interests, and values of a society. Therefore, it encompasses a range of actors, both formal and informal organizations and draws boundaries of civil society between state and market.

Another concept that requires further clarification is a definition of NGOs. There are extensive studies on NGOs in civil society, development studies and international relations literature. Scholars have explored their contributions to good governance, and examine their strategies and tactics (Rucht 2001), their role in agenda setting (Joachim and Locker 2008), and the creation and enforcement of norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The term NGOs is defined as (i) self-governing; (ii) private and separate from both state and market; (iii) not-for–profit organizations that work for the public interest (Salamon and Anheier 1992; Vakil 1997; Lewis 2010; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). NGOs are actors within civil society and operationalized as issue-based NGOs; e.g., women, environmental and human rights NGOs.

2.1.2. The Europeanization of Civil Society in CEE

In recent years, a growing number of studies have investigated the relationship between Europeanization and civil society. With the enlargement of CEECs, the Europeanization of candidate countries has become a separate research agenda (Grabbe 2001; Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2005; Grabbe 2006; Sedelmeier 2011). The studies on the Europeanization of candidate countries are mainly conditionality driven and analyze the transformation of the policy, politics, and polity dynamics of the countries. EU conditionality as a "strategy of reinforcement by reward" provides an external incentive for a candidate country to comply with the EU rules (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). In this regard, the Copenhagen Criteria has been a powerful condition and act as a catalyst for domestic transformations.

The EU's support for civil society development is analyzed in the context of enlargement policy. Mapping out different domains in the literature provides deeper understanding from variety of perspectives on the understanding, assessment, measurement, and outcomes of the Europeanization of civil society. Scholars of civil society have used two main theoretical approaches to analyze the relationship between the EU and civil society in CEE.

EU Assistance for Civil Society in CEE: An Agent of Democracy Promotion?

The role of civil society in donor policies is inspired by the liberal democratic rationale that considers civil society as the cornerstone of democratic and economic development (Ketola 2013:16). Putnam's work, following the Tocquevillean tradition, has been inspirational in understanding the relationship between the vibrant civil society and democracy. For Putnam (2000), strong civil society has been the foundation of democracy, economic development and political institutionalization; thus, associational life plays a key role in building trust, social capital and solidarity. In this understanding, civil society has normative connotations such as "a good force", "participatory", "democratic", "transparent" and "accountable". Drawing on the neo-Tocquevillean school, scholars have emphasized that vibrant civil society is a prerequisite for well-functioning democracy (Gellner 1994; Fukuyama 1995; Diamond 1999; Putnam 2000) and as Encarnación puts it, the concept of civil society has turned into "a magic cure for combatting virtually all of society's ills" (Encarnación 2011: 470).

In the 1990s, international donors began to support civil society as a key component of democracy promotion. In donor policy circles, it is suggested that democracy could be built and strentghened through financial and technical assistance to civil society (Ishkanian 2008: 60-61). For example, after the fall of Communism, democracy promotion through civil society assistance became a central goal of US foreign policy (Carothers 1999; Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Carothers 2004). Like their American counterparts, the EU actively supports democracy promotion through civil society aid in its policies. This is important both in the EU and Turkish civil society context, because it is donor-NGOs relationship that characterises the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey. It is assumed that civil society activism will lead to more democratic, transparent and legitimate governance and more effective policymaking and implementation. Thereby, the existence of a vibrant civil society is not only considered as a necessary condition of democratization but also Europeanization. As I will show in Chapter 3, this approach to democracy promotion lies at the heart of the EU's policy towards civil society and is evident in its enlargement strategy.

Scholars situate the EU's strategy for supporting civil society within the broader literature critiquing external donor assistance for civil society development

(Sampson 1996; Quigley 2000; Wedel 2001; Mandel 2002; Mandelson and Gleen 2002; Mercer 2002; Ishkanian 2008; Encarnación 2011). The external donors have chanelled their civil society development aid mostly through NGOs. This strand of literature problematizes NGOs as the only form of civil society. For donors, civil societies are equated with professional NGOs for competing for externally assisted projects in big cities, heavily dependent on external resources and have been criticized for failing to become involved with local constituencies and therefore not sustainable and accountable to their public. Carothers (1999:248) argues that "Democracy promoters pass through these countries on hurried civil society assessment missions and declare that very little civil society exists because they have found only a handful of Westernized NGOs devoted non-partisan public-interest advocacy work on the national side". This led to "NGO"ization or "genetically-engineered civil societies" (Ishkanian 2008) and reduction of civil society particularly to NGOs, therefore, promotion of a particular model of civil society solely based on donor driven professionalized NGOs.

Civil society promotion as a development strategy has also been debated on the grounds of the impact of external aid and consequences of such programs. The donors strategy of civil society promotion is based on the normative understanding that NGOs tend to hold state holders accountable, resist state power, deliver professional services and are neutrally supported by the broad constituencies. Critics have raised concerns about the consequences of civil society promotion programs and conclude that NGOs are donor driven and disconnected from their constituencies, therefore, far away from actors as agents of change and democratization (Howell and Pearce 2001; McMahon 2001; Mendelson and Glenn 2002; Fagan 2005; Ishkanian 2008; Encarnación 2011). In this regard, donors have not changed power relations, and not transformed civil society into a countervailing force for democratic deficit, and, in practice, such NGOs have functioned as apolitical technical agents. Crawford (2003a) argues that external democracy assistance seeks "a technical solution to a political problems" with very little participation from local actors, and a more participatory approach is needed to strengthen local action for genuine democratization.

In following the traditional scholarship from democracy promotion studies, research has analyzed the relationship between the EU and civil society within CEE. Several country case and comparative study analyses of EU funding have given

various answers to the questions of how the EU assistance to civil society works and promotes activism, whether democracy could be strengthened via civil society funding, and why EU civil society development did not create the intended positive outcomes.

In terms of the notion of civil society, traditonal democracy promotion literature has adopted a broad understanding of civil society. Civil society is understood typically involving all types of voluntary non-profit organizations. It is attributed democratic functions and is based on the principle of participatory democracy, therefore, affilated with direct democracy, political legitimacy, citizens' participation and representation (Zimmer and Freise 2008). Civil society organizations are understood as intermediaries between the citizens and the EU. In this context, civil society has been attributed a positive role. The approach to civil society is important, because it has significant implications for the judgement of the EU impact. In judging the EU impact, democracy promotion scholars have analyzed the extent to which the EU promotes participatory democracy and fosters plurality and democratic credentials of society.

In assessing the EU influence on civil society, studies have shown that EU funding has created a particular form of civil society as "grant-seeking professional organizations" (McMahon 2001; Mandelson and Glenn 2002; Fagan 2004; 2005). Scholars have examined the consequences of the EU's intervention solely through financial instruments. In an analysis of the Czech environmental movement, Fagan (2005) demonstrates that chanelling aid mostly through NGOs has resulted in the professionalization of NGOs which has created influential organizations at the elite level, yet, highly disconnected from their broader communities. These organizations are dependent on donor funding and reflect donors' interests and do not fulfill the democratic functions of civil society such as civic engagement and participation and can only be successful if they align themselves with community-based activism (Fagan 2005).

The expansion of professionalized advocacy has shifted researchers to investigate a particular form of activism that formed as a consequence of the EU's external funding. One of the influential contributions that illustrates the debates on the new form of activism is the study by Petrova and Tarrow. They argue that the EU influence led to different type of activism labelled as "transactional activism" (Petrova and Tarrow 2007). Transactional activism refers to "the ties-enduring and

temporary-among organized nonstate actors and between them and political parties, power holders, and other institutions" that are on transactions (Petrova and Tarrow 2007: 79). Drawing on Petrova and Tarrow's concept of "transactional activism", Císař (2010) examines the impact of international civil society building programs on Czech environmental movement organizations and demonstrates how the EU triggers a particular type of environmental political activism that is based on advocacy organizations and promotes transactional activism. Since then, several studies argue that donors have facilitated a new type of politically-oriented activism known as "transactional activism" which is based on transactions (Císař 2010; Fagan 2011; Císař 2013). These studies draw a more positive picture of EU aid and impact and strives to revise a skeptical understanding of civil society by shifting debates to new forms of political activism. We now know how EU funding created conditions conducive to the emergence and development of a new type of activism that differs from mobilization (Císař 2013). These assessments are essential in understanding the new type of activism that stimulates interactions among various actors and different processes. Although this thesis does not employ the concept of transactional activism per se, a similar premise also found within this thesis: that studying interactions between different actors is fundemental to understand the Europeanization of civil society.

Turning on the understanding of Europeanization of civil society from the perspective of traditional scholarship, this body of research understands Europeanization as a top-down and reactive process where pressures from above increased dependency on the EU and disconnected civil society organizations from grassroots organizations and weakened its democratic credentials. This led to a participatory deficit such as low political participation and activism. However, at the same time, as a consequence of Europeanization processes, civil society has become professionalized, developed its capacities and formed a new type of politically-oriented activism that is based on interactions (Petrova and Tarrow 2007; Císař 2010; Fagan 2011; Císař 2013). Accordingly, the analyses on the Europeanization of civil society in CEE presents diverse findings of the EU impact.

This strand of literature has developed our understanding of the operationalization of civil society in the EU programs, the consequences of the EU's civil society-focused democracy promotion strategy, the participatory deficit of civil society as a result of the EU funding by drawing on top-down approach of civil

society development. However, the relationship between the EU and civil society is more complex and intertwined with other factors; therefore, there is a need to analyze this relationship more comprehensively in order to understand how it influences civil society. These debates have failed to answer the question of how the EU impacts civil society, and presents two problems.

On the one hand, traditional democracy promotion research has mainly been concerned with participatory deficit, the lack of engagement with broader constituencies, low-level of individual participation and the inadequate representation of interests in judging the impact of EU. The grassroots organizations play key roles for mobilization and representation of community interests. However, as Fagan (2011) argues, excessive emphasis on the democratic deficit underestimates the role of advocacy NGOs both as agents of change and policy partners. Chapter 3 demonstrates that the EU pursues a twin-track approach to civil society development and the EU's intervention in civil society was not only advanced on the basis of democracy promotion, but also as partners in European governance and its role in the transformation of relationships. Therefore, we need to move beyond discussions of a participatory deficit and evaluate the EU impact both on the operation of civil society and policies. This takes us to the heart of the following problem.

On the other hand, traditional democracy promotion studies have focused solely on civil society funding as the main instrument of the EU's influence and its outcomes. In this tradition, Europeanization is mainly perceived as a top-down process. However, I argue that the EU has impacted civil society through simultaneous and various processes. The examination of processes and interactions between EU driven and domestic level factors have been absent in this research. Furthermore, there is no assessment of the EU influence in different issue-areas. The new empirical findings in my research suggest that studying various issue-areas and understanding the interactions among various actors is much needed to explain the EU influence. The EU civil society programs and accession context facilitate interactions between non-state actors, state-civil society, and their counterparts in EU countries. Looking at the relationships and analysis of different mechanisms provide important insights into the EU's influence across different sectors of civil society.

Civil society has also inspired research on governance studies. In governance studies, the notion and understanding of civil society derived from the "governance turn" in EU studies, and is based on cooperative forms of policymaking (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006). The basic premise of new modes of governance is the inclusion of all relevant actors (state and non-state) into decision- making to promote non-hierarchical forms of policymaking. Civil society in this context is an instrument of "participatory governance", participant "stakeholder" in the arrangement of "public private partnerships" (Kohler-Koch 2009: 51). Therefore, it is based on participation in decision-making, and the assumption that civil society has specific resources and is expected to provide services and contribute to effective problem solving at the EU level. The approach to civil society has important implications for the judgment of the EU impact. In this tradition, scholars have judged the EU impact on its ability to empower civil society in public policies.

Recently, scholars from governance schools have examined the Europeanization of civil society within the context of CEE (Börzel 2009; Börzel and Buzogány 2010a; Gasior-Niemic 2010). Studies are motivated by the question of the extent to which EU empowered civil society is in different areas of public policy. In general terms, the literature on governance has concentrated on the specific mode of governance based on nonhierarchical coordination and interaction and the involvement of non-state actors in public policies (Börzel 2009: 1). It is based on the assumption that participation of non-state actors into public polices would increase the effectiveness, and legitimacy of these processes. Through an examination of environmental policy, Börzel (2009) shows that the EU's civil society support in candidate countries is predominantly facilitated through conditionality and is intended to engage state and non-state actors in policy processes and the development of new modes of governance. However, comparative and case study analyses of civil society demonstrate that EU intervention has failed to stimulate intended expectations on the practices of new modes of governance, because the countries of the Southern and Eastern enlargement have lacked necessary capacities for the effectiveness of new modes of governance (Börzel 2009).

Studies have also analyzed whether the EU, through its accession process, empowered the civil society in different policy areas. Researchers argue that the EU's

pre-accession instruments, policy rights and civil society funding provided additional resources for non-state actors (Börzel 2009; Börzel 2010; Börzel and Buzogány 2010 a,b; Grosse 2010). However, the extent to use resources is constrained by the capacities of non-state actors. In general, harmonization with *acquis communautaire*, conditionality, and the Copenhagen criteria created a more operative environment for the functioning of the civil society, promoted public inclusion and transparency.

Furthermore, EU policies such as environmental (Börzel and Buzogány 2010a,b) and regional (Gasior- Niemiec 2010) also provided policy rights and mechanisms of participation for civil society. Gasior-Niemeiec (2010) shows the role of social partners in the regional policies in Poland and concludes that civil society organizations could not use opportunities to participate in the committees due to weak capacities and legitimacy of such organizations. Similarly, in a comparative study in Hungary, Poland and Romania, Börzel and Buzogány find that the EU's environmental policy provided the civil society opportunities to participate in policy making and develop cooperation with the state; yet, as the authors put it "double weakness of transition countries and a political culture hostile to public involvement seriously constrained the empowering of non-state actors by 'Europeanization through accession' "(Börzel and Buzogány 2010b: 176).

The EU's pre-accession instruments- political, technical, and financial-, and Community programs supported civil society for building and developing their capacities. Capacity building and development via funding is one of the most important consequences of the EU's intervention in the civil society (Hicks 2004; Carmin and Vandeveer 2004). For example, Carmin (2010) examines the relationship between capacity building and engagement in governance and finds that there are two clusters of organizations as a consequence of capacity building activities: professionalized advocacy NGOs engage in policymaking and grassroots organizations function at the local level. Therefore, funding has empowered the more developed NGOs and their participation in governance.

The literature on CEE also shows that the EU has promoted participation in transnational networks and European umbrella organizations to develop capacities and trigger learning both at the domestic and EU levels. Forest (2006) and Parau (2009) argue that civil societies were empowered through transnational networks in the accession process. Kutter and Trappmann (2010) also show that civil society organizations use transnational networks to promote their "national profile".

Overall, this strand of the literature finds that the Europeanization of civil society has been ambivalent. The EU has provided diverse opportunities to civil society organizations for empowerment; yet, Europeanization has mainly empowered actors with sufficient capacities. Scholars have also showed that weak governance capacities–both state and non-state actors–have limited the Europeanization outcomes. Therefore, studies demonstrate a lack of necessary preconditions for the effectiveness of new modes of governance. They point out the importance of domestic factors such as capacities and political culture. However, research on multilevel governance and various policy areas presents three main problems

First, studies on new modes of governance mainly utilized a policy-oriented angle to understand how different European policy influences domestic NGOs in certain policy fields. In other words, the primary focus has been on the policies, and civil society is analyzed within these policy areas. The relation between policies and civil society is useful to understand how policy areas create opportunities for civil society organizations and shape their agendas. Nevertheless, the Europeanization of civil society is a much broader context, and assessment of civil society as a unit of analysis draws attention from policies to actors and the ways in which they are shaped by the diverse processes of Europeanization. Understanding the impact from multiple aspects is significant to extend the research agenda in Europeanization studies. The EU accession process and assistance to the civil society has provided an opportunity to investigate the interactions between state and non-state actors. Focusing on how the EU impacts those interactions at multiple levels has important implications for Europeanization studies. In this regard, extensive analysis of the EU influence across different segments of civil society has not been adequately examined in the literature.

Second, most of the studies have overemphasized the role of capacities as explanatory factors in understanding the outcomes of Europeanization studies. It is important to ask what other domestic factors are significant for the analysis of Europeanization of civil society? As I will show, an investigation of the society's historical legacies holds significant potential for understanding civil society development. Domestic factors that they highlight such as capacities and political culture can all be linked to historical legacies. Studies have not explicitly pointed out how historical legacies shaped current conditions of civil society and influence Europeanization outcomes in these countries.

Third, most of the analysis of Europeanization of civil society in CEE has focused on the role of civil society organizations within the specific policy area as well as comparative country studies in one-policy fields. However, as shown in this thesis, in-depth assessment of the EU impact through an embedded case study design and explanation of the impact of the EU has been absent in the literature.

2.1.3. The Europeanization of Civil Society in Turkey

Another important area of research which provides information about the relationship between the EU and civil society are the contributions concerned with the EU influence on civil society development in the context of enlargement. These studies explore the relationship between the development and transformation of civil society in Turkey in relation to the European integration.

The literature on the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey has expanded in recent years (Diez *et al.* 2005; İçduygu 2007; Grigoriadis 2009; Ergun 2010; Kaliber 2010; İçduygu 2011; Öner 2012; Ketola 2013; Zihnioğlu 2013; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). Studies have focused on the analysis of different civil society actors (Göksel and Güneş 2005; Rumelili 2005; İçduygu 2011; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015), the impact of the EU on the development of civil society (Diez *et al*. 2005), the role of Turkish civil society and public opinion in the pre-accession process (Kubicek 2005; İçduygu 2011), the philosophical underpinning and rationale of the EU's civil society policy (Ketola 2011; Zihnioğlu 2013), processes (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015) and conditions of the EU influence (İçduygu 2011).

Since the 1999 Helsinki Summit, there has been a positive environment regarding the role of the EU on civil society in Turkish academia. Initially, scholars examined the development of civil society as an instrument of EU democratization (Keyman and İçduygu 2003; Kubicek 2005). For example, Keyman and İçduygu (2003:224) argue that the formal candidacy status of Turkey in 1999 has started to influence the civic sphere where " …the process of European integration means the emergence of the democratic mode of regulation of the state-society relations in Turkey" and adoption of the EU *acquis communitaire* led to the transformation of current domestic politics. Accordingly in 2001, the Turkish government announced the National Program and followed a series of reforms to comply with EU legislation. In a similar vein, studies have underlined the importance of a legal framework to

create a conductive framework for the operation of a civil society (Özbudun and Yazıcı 2004; Bikmen 2005). These reforms- freedoms of association and peaceful assembly- created an enabling environment and induced changes in the operation of a civil society. Therefore, the influence of the EU on civil society has been examined relatively briefly as a part of the broader democratization process in Turkey

Whilst Turkey represents distinct challenge for the EU, it is no longer challenged that the EU has exercised considerable influence over the development of Turkey's civil society. Our understanding of how the EU's financial assistance works, under what conditions it is more or less successful in stimulating change, the logic of EU's civil society policy, and the role of civil society in integration process is now quite developed. The EU influence has been studied both through the normative context of EU enlargement (Kaliber 2012) and the impact of the financial assistance on civil society.

The studies on the Europeanization of civil society have defined civil society in three main ways. Some scholars have included a variety of organizations in their definitions. For example, İçduygu (2011) has defined civil society on the basis of legal status and focused on associations, foundations, public professional organizations and cooperatives in Turkey. Similarly, Zihnioğlu (2013) has identified diverse civil society organizations on the basis of their capacity, working area and ideological lines. Others have defined civil society as particular types of actors such as NGOs (Ketola 2013; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015), and issue areas (Rumelili 2005). Another group has based their analyses on interviews conducted with an unspecified set of organizations (Ergun 2010; Kuzmanovic 2010). Therefore, there are different understandings of civil society.

There are three main perspectives of Europeanization that prevail in the literature. First, Europeanization is defined as EU-driven processes (Göksel and Güneş 2005; Rumelili 2005; Öner 2012; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). For example, Rumelili and Boşnak (2015:131) define Europeanization of civil society in Turkey as "processes that enhance the autonomy and independence of NGOs from the state and develop the NGOs' institutional capacities and networks in a way that enables their effective contribution to policymaking in Turkey and in Europe". This definition of Europeanization emphasizes the different processes. Second, Europeanization is perceived as a bottom-up process where civil society contributes to the Europeanization process. For instance, Kubicek (2005) shows how civil society has

played an instrumental role in advancing the political reform process in Turkey. Third, Europeanization is understood as a more interactive process where cooperation between domestic civil society, international partners, and the state are key constitutive elements that characterize the Europeanization of civil society (Ergun 2010: 511). The first perspective of Europeanization that focuses on multiple processes and the third perspective that tries to understand the interactions that are taking place between the EU and civil society resonate most closely with the approach adopted in this thesis.

In analyzing the EU influence on civil society, scholars have shown that the EU has exercised considerable power over the civil society development in Turkey but they differ in outcomes of the EU impact. There is broad consensus that, through conditionality, the EU has imposed a change in the domestic legal framework governing the operation of civil society in Turkey (Göksel and Güneş 2005; Rumelili 2005; Ergun 2010; Öner 2010; İçduygu 2011; Ketola 2013; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). The new law on Associations and Foundations has created a more conductive environment in Turkey. Studies have discussed EU financial assistance and consequences of assistance to civil society (Göksel and Güneş 2005; Rumelili 2005; Ergun 2010; Öner 2010; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). In this context, the EU has shaped their agendas according to EU priorities, and diffused a "project culture", professionalism and standardization in their activities. The EU has also legitimized the activities of civil society in Turkey (Diez, *et al.* 2005; Rumelili 2005; Kaliber 2010; 2013). For example, Rumelili (2005) argues that civil society in Turkey contributed to the deepening of Greek-Turkish cooperation by using the EU as a symbol of legitimization. The EU has fostered networks both between Turkish NGOs and their counterparts in other European countries and between civil society organizations and policymakers in Turkey (Ergun 2010; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). The networks formed between Turkish and European organizations have provided an opportunity to exchange experiences and knowledge (Ergun 2010) and project issues into the European agenda. The networks formed between NGOs and policymakers in Turkey, on the other hand, have strengthened the role of the former in policymaking and fostered cooperation and partnership between civil society and the state (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015).

Thus, the existing debates on the EU impact on civil society development shows that civil society has been transformed in a variety of ways in Turkey.

Moreover, the literature on the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey provides a comprehensive account of the main transformations of civil society that occur as a result of the EU pre-accession process. The major shortcoming of the current studies is that they tend to end up providing a general and one-sided account of the relationship between civil society and EU pre-accession process and neglects the role of domestic factors. This prevents us to fully capture a comprehensive account of the current developments and instead present a distorted understanding of the relationship.

Furthermore, an in-depth examination of the EU impact through an analysis of different issue-areas and an explanation of the impact has also been absent in the literature. This thesis provides a much more comprehensive understanding of the EU impact on civil society development in Turkey through highlighting the simultaneous relationships and linkages between the domestic historical context and the process of integration. It also presents a substantial historical analysis of prominent civil society organizations- women, environmental and human rights-in Turkey.

To conclude this section, the existing literature on the Europeanization of civil society both in the context of CEE and Turkey reveal that the EU's impact is "transforming", "strengthening" or "weakening" civil society. As discussed elsewhere, the literature has been characterized by multiple and sometimes an incompatible understanding of civil society, Europeanization processes, and its outcomes (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). The comprehensive review of the literature demonstrates that although studies have adopted various perspectives and reached diverse conclusions, the impact of the EU has mainly been studied through top-down and bottom-up approaches. The top-down approaches to civil society have analyzed the ways in which EU pressure, mainly through civil society funding, changes the structure of civil society in line with European practices. It therefore concentrates on "uni-directional" changes and investigates the implementation of European civil society policy at the domestic level. The bottom-up approaches to civil society have examined how domestic civil society actors influence the EU. However, both approaches have failed to explain the role of domestic factors in understanding the relationship between the EU and civil society. The exclusive emphasis on top-down and bottom-up approaches undermines the explanatory power of domestic factors.

More recently, a new and expanding body of research has moved beyond the top-down and bottom-up controversy and explains how domestic factors mattered for

Europeanization studies (Alpan and Diez 2014 and Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016). This thesis has not focused on the EU impact as a one-way process. The Europeanization of civil society has been defined as an interactive process, where domestic civil society actors together with EU interactively mold Europeanization outcomes. In this context, it supports the contention that domestic factors play an important role in Europeanization processes. Yet, my findings emphasize that domestic factors are embedded in an historical context and should not be seen as separate from each other. Therefore, the following sections will highlight the importance of a legacy-based approach to Europeanization that is responsive to the historical context. By focusing on domestic factors and integrating the historical legacies into the analysis to explain the Europeanization of civil society, this thesis explores how legacies have shaped the outcomes of the EU impact.

2.2. Theoretical Framework

Recently, the Europeanization of candidate countries has become a separate research agenda in the literature (Sedelmeier 2011: 5). Within this perspective, conditionality has been the principal focus and examined mainly in the context of Eastern enlargement. Extensive research, mostly deriving from second-generation Europeanization has demonstrated that the EU has considerable impact on the polity, politics, and policy dimensions of the candidate countries by focusing on the mechanisms and procedures of Europeanization (Grabbe 2001; Grabbe 2006; Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2005).

For the purpose of this study, I will examine the EU impact in the context of the theoretical perspectives that have been used to analyze the Europeanization of the candidate studies. This is significant in two ways. First, literature on candidate Europeanization predominantly developed in the context of Eastern enlargement and the CEECs. At the theoretical level, the conceptual framework will be used to analyze enlargement cases beyond the case of the CEECs. Since the impact of the EU varies in different contexts, focusing on the Turkish case could broaden our understanding in this research area. More importantly, conceptualization and operationalization of the domestic factors will broaden our understanding on why and how domestic factors matter for the EU impact. Second, Europeanization of Turkey is a new and emerging sub-field (Diez *et al.* 2005; Engert 2010; Müftüler-Baç 2005; Kubicek 2005; Öniş

2007; Tocci 2005). We know from the empirical literature on Europeanization in the member states that the impact of the EU is differential across countries and issue areas (Sedelmeier 2011: 6). Studies of domestic civil society in Turkey will shift our understanding from general Europeanization to more issue specific cases.

Europeanization scholars have developed theoretical approaches within the context of the "new institutionalism". The notion that "institutions matter" has characterized different variants of institutionalism (Bulmer 2008; Hall and Taylor 1996). Theoretical approaches of the Europeanization of candidate countries are mainly deducted from two main variants- rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. These approaches provide important tools for highlighting different mediating factors for the EU's domestic impact. In particular, conditionality (a strategy emphasized by rationalist institutionalist approaches) and socialization (a strategy highlighted by sociological institutionalist approaches) are the two key mechanisms of EU impact that are contrasted in the Europeanization literature (Börzel and Risse 2003; Cowles *et al.* 2001; Jacoby 2004; Keeley 2004; Kubicek 2003; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005). Although these approaches are analytically different, most of the studies highlight that they are complementary and not mutually exclusive.

The main objective of this thesis is not only to demonstrate whether the EU has an influence on civil society development but also how and under what conditions the EU performs such impact. The role of domestic factors and processes are significant in understanding the EU impact. In the following section, I will show how rationalist and constructivist institutionalist approaches provide different conditions and factors that determine the effectiveness of the EU impact.

2.2.1. Theories of Europeanization

Rationalist institutionalism

In general, this body of literature focuses on the use of conditionality to influence candidate countries. Conditionality is based on the rationalist bargaining model. It follows the "logic of consequentialism" in which actors engage in rational strategic action based on the costs and benefits analysis calculations. They choose the

action that maximizes their utility and minimizes their costs, thus, calculating the consequences of their actions. Here, a pattern of action is explained by reference to goal-seeking behavior. In this case, the EU sets the rules as conditions that candidate countries have to fulfill in order to receive rewards from the EU.

In the Europeanization of candidate countries literature, this is known as the external incentive model (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005). Conditionality is the principle mechanism in which the EU exerts influence on candidate countries and other countries on the basis of meeting specific criteria to gain access to the EU. The literature shows that the effectiveness of conditionality depends on both international facilitating and domestic facilitating factors. At the international level, rationalist institutionalism focuses on the clarity of EU demands, the credibility of conditionality, the size of rewards and power asymmetry, the temporal proximity of rewards, linkages to Western Europe, and monitoring capacity (Börzel and Risse 2000; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005; Sedelmeier 2011: 12-14). Rationalist institutionalism also highlights domestic facilitating factors at the domestic level that mediate the EU's impact. Domestic facilitating factors include adoption costs, administrative capacities, societal mobilization and formal institutions (Börzel and Risse 2000; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005; Sedelmeier 2011: 12-14).

Sociological Institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism analyzes the processes of socialization and persuasion as a mechanism of the EU's impact. As a point of departure, constructivists criticize the concept of *homo-economicus* and conceptualized humans as *homo sociologicus*, whose behavior follows logic of appropriateness. In this context, actors follow norms for intrinsic reasons. Actors do what is appropriate in a given situation based on a given social role. Appropriate behavior is driven by cognitive and normative modes of action that empower complex learning and socialization.

March and Olsen (2006: 689) define the "logic of appropriateness" as follows:

The logic of appropriateness is a perspective that sees human action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior, organized into institutions. Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to

fulfill the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation.

In the Europeanization of candidate countries literature, this perspective is known as the social learning model (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005). Similar to rationalist institutionalism, this body of literature also specifies conditions for effective EU influence. At the international level, this strand of the literature focuses on the legitimacy of EU demands and the legitimacy of the process (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005: 18-19; Sedelmeier 2011: 15-16). In Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2005) the social learning model legitimacy hypothesis suggests that the likelihood of rule adoption increases as the legitimacy of rules increases. Similarly, there are domestic facilitating factors that mediate the EU impact. In the literature, identification with the EU, positive normative resonance with domestic rules, and transnational (epistemic) networks are identified as the domestic facilitating factors (Epstein 2008; Kubicek 2003; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005; Sedelmeier 2011: 12-14).

The Europeanization of candidate countries literature is important for the current study. This literature not only emphasizes the importance of a domestic context but also shows how such context matters in relation to the candidate countries by revealing the domestic facilitating factors of Europeanization. Therefore, different theoretical approaches- whether they are rationalist institutionalism or sociological institutionalism- clearly indicate the importance of domestic factors and identify domestic facilitating factors that mediate the effectiveness of the EU's impact. Most of the literature also highlights the significance of the interplay between international and domestic factors. My work is also situated in this broader literature and precisely emphasizes the importance of a domestic context.

However, literature on the Europeanization of candidate countries has two shortcomings for the current study. First, studies do not adequately problematize domestic factors. Second, research on the Europeanization of candidate countries dominated by rationalist and sociological institutionalism and in most of the explanations, historical factors do not play an important role. The following analysis will position this literature to specify mechanisms of the EU impact. The pathways of

the EU impact derived from theories of rationalist and sociological institutionalism will provide a framework for the subsequent analysis in the empirical chapters.

2.2.2. Pathways of the EU Influence

My purpose in this part is to explain how and under what conditions the EU exercises influence, and show variations in the EU influence. This purpose is pursued by two analytical steps. First, it is crucial to demonstrate how the EU influence occurs. To understand the EU influence, I construct a framework and analyze different types of impacts on civil society development and show the interplay between the EU and domestic-level factors. Secondly, I will show that there is variation in the EU impact by using this analytical classification. This classification is at the center of the puzzle and requires thinking about differentiation and why such differentiation occurs.

Europeanization literature establishes several mechanisms of EU influence that reflect two logics of domestic change. In most of the studies, conditionality and socialization are the two key mechanisms of EU influence (Kubicek 2003; Kelley 2004; Schimelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005). As Schimelfenning (2012: 9) puts it "all other mechanisms of EU impact are best seen as varieties of these two fundamental logics- varieties that work more indirectly and/or transnationally than conditionality and socialization". Since these approaches identify different casual factors for institutional change, they are regarded as alternative but not necessarily exclusive models of EU influence.

To explain the impact of the EU at the domestic level, I used a pathway model that has been employed to examine the EU impact on border conflicts (Diez *et al.* 2006; 2008). In this study of the impact of the EU on border conflicts, Diez *et al.* conceptualize four pathways of EU impact by using the work of Barnett and Duvall (2005) on different categories of power in international politics. They differentiate pathways along two dimensions and construct a two-by-two table. On the one hand, they distinguish pathways according to "whether the impact is generated by concrete EU measures or an effect on integration process that are not directly influenced by EU actors" (Diez *et al.* 2006: 571). On the other hand, the EU impact can be on policies or social dimensions. The first pathway is a "compulsory impact"- direct impact, based on carrots and sticks policies. The second pathway is an "enabling impact" a

form of indirect impact when actors in conflict empower their positions by linking their agendas and positions to the EU. The third pathway, connective impact, is another form of direct impact and established through mainly financial and concrete measures establishing and supporting contact among conflict parties. The final pathway is the "constructive impact" that results in reconstruction of identities (Diez *et al.* 2006: 572-574).

The model through the categories of pathways distinctly shows multiple but interconnected types of EU influence and allows me to capture the interplay between direct and indirect forms of EU involvement. I applied this model to civil society and used analytical categories of compulsory, enabling and connective pathways to explore the EU impact on civil society. However, I will not use the category of the constructive pathway for the analysis of the EU impact on civil society development. When applied to civil society, the constructive impact is the most powerful, but also a long-term transformation of civil society, which depends on a deep change in identity constructions, and (re-) construction of identities (Diez *et al.* 2006). Transformation of civil society in terms of constructions of identities is a long-term process and indicators of change take considerable time to become visible, thus problematic to trace. Nevertheless, it is an incremental structural change that occurs in civil society, but difficult to observe during the course of my research. I have also borrowed labels for different forms of impact from Diez *et al.* (2006; 2008) since it provides a good fit with the main research question that I am examining. The added value of the proposed model is twofold. First, interaction between different mechanisms of EU impact on civil society development is rarely explored in the literature. In the Europeanization of civil society literature, most of the analyses of the EU impact have focused on compulsory and enabling pathways. Nevertheless, it has become clear during my research that the connective pathway has a particular importance although it has been overlooked by most of the literature. In addition to other pathways, the connective pathway of EU influence is innovative both in terms of understanding the interactions between actors and the differential impact of the EU across sectors of civil society. Second, the model shares considerable overlap in the conceptualization of EU impact with most of the literature in the Europeanization field that contrasts logic of actions-logic of consequentialism and logic of appropriateness.

The compulsory pathway is based on a rationalist bargaining model. As emphasized by rationalist institutionalism, it follows a "logic of consequentialism" in

which actors engage in rational strategic action based on the costs and benefits analysis calculations and choose the action that maximizes their utility and minimizes their costs, thus, calculating the consequences of their actions. Here, a pattern of action is explained by reference to goal-seeking behavior. In this case, the EU sets the rules as conditions that civil society actors have to fulfill in order to receive rewards from the EU.[6] In this context, Europeanization is perceived as an "emerging political opportunity structure which offers some actors additional resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals" (Börzel and Risse 2003: 63). Accession conditionality is the principle mechanism in which the EU exerts influence on applicant countries on the basis of the implementation of the *acquis* in order to gain access to the EU's opportunities (Schimmelfening and Sedelmeier 2005). From this perspective, the EU has provided a political opportunity structure to civil society actors through accession conditionality and changed legal environment and financial resources (Börzel and Buzogány 2010b: 161). On the one hand, in the enlargement process, accession conditionality and implementation of EU policies offered opportunities to civil society to strengthen their positions and participate in policy making. On the other hand, financial assistance programs provided access to additional resources for civil society actors.

The enabling pathway emanates when specific civil society actors link their political agendas to the EU and justify and legitimize their actions and decisions with reference to the EU. The EU has functioned as a "legitimization device", "legitimizing usage" (Jacquot and Woll 2003) and becomes a reference point in domestic political debates to justify policies, decisions and actions. For instance, Risse *et al.* (1999) have shown that human rights groups are often marginalized and treated as traitors. In such cases, civil society actors can use a normative EU framework to substantiate their positions and arguments. As Jacquot and Woll explain, in this way legitimization is used "to increase and renew the public acceptance of a policy decision at the national level" (2003: 7). In this framework, civil society actors justify their decisions through European symbolism and with reference to EU norms. For instance, Ian Manners (2002:242) argues that there are five main norms of the EU: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights. Civil society actors can refer to these norms and promote them as legitimate behaviors

[6] The external incentive model is mainly promoted by Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeir (2005) and shows that the EU has the potential to empower non-state actors during the enlargement process.

at the domestic level, which in turn enable civil society actors to advance and legitimize their political agendas. Therefore, identification with Europe generates support and legitimization. However, the enabling pathway of the EU impact depends on the political commitment of the government to fulfill EU conditionality and the prominence of issues on the EU-Turkey agenda (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015: 139).

The connective pathway promotes contact between civil society actors chiefly through common activities. It is expected that support and contact through the context of common projects may lead to "broader societal effect in the form of social networks" (Diez *et al.* 2008:28) across civil society actors in the long term. In the case of civil society, it is possible to observe connective impact at three levels both through the accession process and civil society programs. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 3, the EU's civil society policy promotes interaction between actors through the partnership principle. First, the EU pre-accession process facilitates interaction between the state and civil society. In line its understanding, civil society is seen as partners rather than rivals in decision-making processes. The cooperation between the state and society is also pre-requisites in EU-funded projects. Second, both the EU process and EU programs support interaction between civil society actors. Strong civil society is seen as an essential component of the enlargement process. Third, the EU encourages transnational relations with the European counterparts to trigger learning in civil society. Participation in Euro-umbrella networks and partnership are two key instruments of the connective impact.

Although these categories of the EU pathways have been adapted to civil society and provide a good fit, at the same time adaptation involves some problems. At the theoretical level, there are different analytical categories of the EU impact. Yet, at the empirical level, pathways and outcomes of the EU impact could lead to ambiguous outcomes.

In the original framework, Barnett and Duvall have described compulsory power as "the direct control of one actor of the conditions and actions of another" (2005: 51). Therefore, compulsion exists through direct control, domination and force. In the case of civil society, there is no such force. The EU cannot directly force and control conditions and actions of civil society. For that reason, compulsory impact is never complete because civil society can reject EU conditions and actions. So, how does compulsion work in civil society? The compulsory impact has occurred through the *acquis communautaire* and the financial incentives. The compulsion takes

place in the accession process by pressuring the state to comply with EU legislation. The EU, in this way, has pointed out constitutional, legal reforms to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. Of course, this does not have a direct impact on civil society but by pressuring the Turkish state, the EU has indirectly shaped the functioning of civil society in Turkey. This has created an opportunity for these organizations, and enables them to follow and prioritize their agendas. Therefore, civil society actors were not forced directly by the EU, but the EU empowers and enables these actors by forcing the Turkish government. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will show how this is the case in different issue areas by focusing on concrete examples from the different fields.

Another way that the EU performs compulsory impact is through funding. At the empirical level, the relationship between funding and categories of the EU impact is extremely complicated, and compulsory impact could lead to interrelated but different outcomes. In a way, funding itself is compulsory where it is established through concrete conditions. Nevertheless, the outcome of funding could belong to other categories of the EU impact- compulsory, enabling and connective. For example, one illustration of the compulsory impact is the calls for proposals in the EU projects. In these projects, the EU explicitly spells out conditions for funding for civil society actors. The EU prioritizes certain issue areas according to its policy fields. However, the provision of funding is only compulsory when the EU forces civil society actors to undertake projects according to its priority area rather than their original expertise. This is compulsion because civil society actors are forced to adapt their issue areas according to EU priorities, and there is a strategic move as a logic of behavior to get funding. In other cases, some civil society actors use the "window of opportunity" that the EU provides. In this case, their expertise or agenda fits perfectly with the EU priorities, and they just use this opportunity to promote their agendas and policies, demonstrating the enabling impact. Finally, the EU also provides civil society actors incentives to follow EU rules. For instance, in the EU projects the provision of funding involves a transnational incentive. Thus, the outcome of the funding is connective.

Although rationalist and sociological institutionalism is central to comprehend the pathways of the EU impact and how the EU influences civil society, both approaches neglect the importance of history in understanding Europeanization outcomes. Disregarding history in the analysis presents problems. The rational choice orientation stresses the significance of political opportunities provided by the EU. EU

channels funds to civil society to build and develop the capacities of these organizations. As discussed in section 2.1.2. in detail, several studies show that despite the opportunities provided by the EU, civil society in CEE has lacked capacities; Europeanization has chiefly empowered organizations with sufficient capacities, including the governance capacities. Yet, if the EU does not take into account historical factors and traditions in a country, EU funds by itself do not necessarily empower civil society organizations. For example, transferring funds to Turkish civil society is an important resource for Turkish civil society, but has not created the intended objectives. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 4, traditionally receiving funding from international institutions and foreign countries has been seen as "interference into internal affairs" and "betrayal to one's country". For instance, Chapter 7 further shows that, for a long time, EU demands on human rights have not been seen from the human rights perspective and human rights organizations have been regarded as "traitors". Therefore, the EU influence does not occur independent from the historical context.

Sociological institutionalists emphasize the construction and diffusion of ideas and socialization brought by the EU processes. Learning is a key instrument of sociological institutionalism. Several EU programs have made cooperation between civil society actors a condition for civil society funding. Moreover, the EU has introduced various mechanisms in these programs to trigger learning between actors. One example is the cooperation between domestic civil societies and activities that support cooperation. However, if there is no tradition of cooperation between civil society actors, learning and socialization is limited. Civil society actors learn in light of their former experiences. In Chapter 4, I show that an inherited characteristic of Turkish civil society is lack of cooperation and division between civil society actors. Empirical Chapters-Chapters 5, 6, and 7- show that cooperation between civil society actors varies depending on the issue area. Civil society actors, which have a stronger tradition of cooperation, are more likely to cooperate. The following section will situate the historical dimension into the broader literature.

2.2.3. Historical Legacies as Deep Conditions of the EU Impact

One of the main analytical questions that inform the thesis is how to explain variation in the impact across different issue areas in the context of civil society. In

this context, explanations for variation in the EU's impact offer insights into the conditions under which the EU can influence civil society development. The previous sections have shown that domestic conditions have not been adequately studied and operationalized in the studies of the Europeanization of civil society. This section introduces the concept of historical legacies as an important domestic factor of the EU's influence. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 show how historical legacies matter for understanding the EU impact. This will inform the empirical chapters of the research.

In this section, I discuss how I perceive historical legacy, and the ways in which research can incorporate historical legacy in the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey. This is important in two ways. First the literature on Europeanization offers different explanations, but historical legacies have largely been neglected as explanatory factors in these studies. Explaining variations in civil society will turn my attention to historical legacies and their differential impact on civil society. Second, in the case of civil society, current domestic factors such as state capacities, capacities of social actors, institutional capacities, levels of societal mobilization and political tradition can all be linked to historical legacies. Therefore, historical legacy is an important domestic factor, which matters for civil society. In this context, I argue that Europeanization outcomes shaped by complex interaction between EU driven and domestic legacy factors.

The literature provides two main ways to conceptualize historical legacy. The first camp conceptualizes historical legacies as path-dependent processes, while the second camp follows more an agency-oriented approach in the conceptualization of historical legacies. In the second understanding, selected aspects of the past are reconstructed to adapt to new circumstances (Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010: 430). In analyzing the EU's impact on civil society in Turkey, I conceptualize historical legacies as path-dependent processes. In this particular context, legacies are path-dependent processes, therefore, "once set in motion by contingent choices or critical junctures particular patterns of institutional or cultural development will logically reproduce themselves beyond the control or intervention of individual actors" (Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010:430). Therefore, in this study, historical legacies are conceptualized as continuities of institutions and practices over time.

Whether they are conceptualized as path-dependent or agency-oriented approaches, in broad terms, legacies can be defined as "the inherited aspects of the past relevant to the present" (Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010: 426). Evaluation

of the continuity or change between the past and the present is the key characteristic of legacy-based explanations. The term *historical legacy* is defined in a variety of ways in different fields and regions[7] and can act both as a facilitating and a constraining factor (Ekiert and Hanson 2003: 92). Historical endowments do not only constrain but also enable the current outcomes. For example, as I show in Chapter 5, while legacies have functioned as facilitating domestic factors in women's civil society, Chapter 7 illustrates that historical legacies have played a constraining role in human rights civil society.

As Wittenberg (2013:6) argues "there is no consensus on what counts as a legacy, what kinds of legacies there are, or how to study them". How can one identify historical legacies in Turkish civil society? Wittenberg (2013) has laid out three conditions for a phenomenon to be considered as a legacy: (i) existence of a phenomenon minimum two time periods, divided by conventionally-defined demarcations; (ii) occurrence of the same phenomenon between the past and the present time; and (iii) transmission of the phenomenon from the past rather than solely replicated in the latter period. Even though Wittenberg centers a discussion on pre-communist, communist and post-communist legacies, his criteria on what counts as legacies is useful for identifying legacies in other contexts.

By using these three criteria, Chapter 4 identifies "which past matters most" in the case of civil society in Turkey. I pointed out six key legacies that matter for the analysis of EU impact: the lack of resources and dependency where civil society has been chronically underfunded in terms of resources, a restrictive environment characterized by the absence of autonomous space and opportunities in terms of rights, Europe as an important symbol of framing, a weak state with a strong state tradition, an ideologically divided civil society sphere in terms of internal networks, and the presence of diverse connections with external networks. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 extensively evaluate historical legacies in different sectors of civil society and their roles in the Europeanization of civil society. I argue that these legacies of the past still

[7] Historical legacies have been studied in various regions and fields. There has been expansive literature on communist legacies in the field of Comparative Politics. Some important pioneering works on legacies: Crawford and Lijphart (1997); Ekiert and Hanson (2003); Elster *et al.* (1998); Jowitt (1992); Kopstein (2003); Pop-Eleches (2007); Wittenberg (2006). Authoritarian legacies have also been examined in Western Europe, see Pinto (2010) and Latin America, see Hite and Cesarini (2004). Historical legacies have also been explored in international relations literature. A recent study has examined the legacies of empire, Halperin and Palan (2015). This is by no means an exhaustive list but gives an indication of the many studies taking place on historical legacies.

shape civil society, its relations with different actors and the influence of the EU. In other words, this is critical because historical legacies influence the Europeanization of civil society.

Then, the key question is how are legacies used analytically in the studies of Europeanization? Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning (2010) propose a framework of analysis to examine the role of legacies in Europeanization. This study is a turning point in historical legacies literature because it proposes three different ways in which legacies could be incorporated into the Europeanization processes as explanatory factors. The theoretical framework of Europeanization is mainly dominated by rationalist and sociological institutionalism. The analytical framework does not argue that these approaches should be completely abandoned by legacy-based explanatory models. Rather, legacy-based explanatory models are considered to complement and interact with these explanations.

Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning (2010) have offered three different ways to incorporate legacy-based explanations in Europeanization studies: (i) legacies as deep conditions; (ii) legacies as enduring conditions; and (iii) legacies as encompassing conditions. In the first model, legacies complement explanations of Europeanization and give them more historical emphasis as explanatory factors. Domestic conditions attain intermediate steps in the causal path from legacies to contemporary outcomes (Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010: 431). Historical legacy is not the main cause of the Europeanization outcomes; rather, historical endowments is a deep condition which shapes various contemporary factors. For instance, as I show in Chapter 7, cooperation between human rights organizations and the state largely depends on the state's approach to civil society, and these approaches are to a great extent shaped by historical experiences. Civil society actors in general, and human rights NGOs in particular are perceived as a threat to the survival of the state and hence any activities that are seen in conflict with the state's interests are not tolerated. From the late 1990s onwards, the EU has intended to develop cooperation between the state and society through its pre-accession context and financial assistance by providing opportunities. Yet, the EU influence on the relationship between the state and human rights organizations is limited, because state and society actors lack the tradition of cooperation and the state has treated these organizations as rivals rather than as partners. This example shows how the domestic conditions in the particular country are shaped by the past. Following Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning (2010:432), in this

case “legacies may offer a historically deep explanation of the extent to which external incentive structures are effective in shaping domestic outcomes”.

In the second model, legacies act as enduring conditions. This means that the importance and the effect of legacies change over time. This model highlights the importance of temporal dimension. Legacies may be important at some time in history but not that important at other times. Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning (2010:434) give the following example to show how historical legacies matter as enduring conditions. Accession conditionality has been a very powerful short-term factor across CEECs. Before the candidacy period, countries adopted EU rules in different formats. In this period, legacies had a “discernible” influence whether the CEECs embraced or resisted external institutions and rules. Nevertheless, during the pre-accession period, EU conditionality was powerful and all countries accepted EU rules. After EU membership, the power of the EU conditionality has weakened and diverse effects of the EU membership have surfaced across the CEECs. As Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning (2010:434) argue “…we can assume that legacies will regain causal relevance after accession determining, for example, when and where backsliding, non-compliance or even over-compliance will occur”.

In the third model, legacies act as encompassing conditions. Here, both enlargement and its effects were shaped by deeper historical legacies (Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010: 435). To give an example, the historical-psychological legacies transmitted from the World War II period molded both the EU’s engagement in CEECs and the conviction that their destiny lies in the EU (Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010: 436). Therefore, in this case, both the EU’s commitment and the influence of the enlargement in CEE were shaped by the legacies of the past.

I will take historical legacies as deep conditions and analyze civil society development in this way because conditions of civil society development in Turkey are shaped by the past and are rooted in national political trajectories. In turn, the degree of Europeanization depends on past political traditions in Turkey. As I emphasized above, historical legacies offer “a historically deep explanation”. This is not a claim that historical legacies are the main cause of the current development but give them a more historical focus. In my account of the analysis of civil society development, I include historical legacies in this way and argue that the EU impact on civil society development is shaped by legacies. Figure 2.1 gives an overview of the legacy based explanatory model.

Figure 2.1: Legacies as deep conditions

Legacy ➔contemporary conditions ➔Europeanization outcome
(Cirtautas and Schmmelfenning 2010: 432)

For the purposes of my analysis I have outlined these legacies as deep conditions where domestic conditions attain intermediate steps in the causal path from legacies to contemporary outcomes (Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010: 431). Following this understanding, I identify mechanisms that link historical legacies and Europeanization outcomes. To put it more simply, I demonstrate "how exactly legacies might interact with EU enlargement" (Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010:437). This requires first identifying relevant legacies and then, specifying the mechanisms of the EU impact that link them with outcomes. The process raises several challenges both at the theoretical and methodological levels. Incorporating legacies in Europeanization studies requires specifying causal mechanisms. Recently, in this field, studies have shown that historical legacies act mainly as deep conditions and complements explanations of Europeanization in various issue areas such as state promotion of foreign direct investment (Bandelji 2010), post-accession compliance in Bulgaria and Romania (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010) and political party discourse in Poland (Vermeersch 2010).

We now know that there are different legacies that coexist with each other. Also, studies substantiate the expectation that there might be different historical legacies and these legacies may exert differentiated impacts. One thing should be strongly emphasized: although some studies prioritize particular types of legacies over others and debate the kinds of legacies that matter most (communist, pre-communist or post-communist legacies), I will show that in case of civil society, findings are more issue-dependent and changes both according to the issue area and the mechanism. Therefore, there is no predominant legacy; rather, there is interaction with the EU and a mix of legacies in Turkey. Moreover, these legacies do not have a uniform effect on the mechanisms. In other words, historical legacies exert different effects on the mechanisms. I expect to see greater variations in specific mechanisms. In addition, historical legacies act both as facilitating and constraining factors for the effectiveness of the EU impact. Although legacies have negative connotations and most studies argue that they act as constraining factors, in some issue areas they also

function as facilitating factors. In her research, Bandlej (2010) analyzes how EU integration and legacies interact in foreign direct investment into CEE. She reveals that both "EU integration and legacies of the past shape both the structural and the ideational context of domestic decision-making elites in CEE, and may act not only as constraints but also as enabling conditions facilitating the global economic integration of the region" (Bandelj 2010: 481). In a similar vein, Ekiert (2003) examines patterns of political and economic transitions in post communist Eastern Europe, and finds that facilitating legacies such as the history of political conflicts and reforms, economic liberalization under the old regime, pragmatization of communist elites, stronger political/cultural opposition and strong ties to the West account for successful transformation. These studies show that in particular contexts historical legacies can also function as facilitating factors for transformation.

The current context calls for an analysis of the interaction of mechanisms and historical legacies. Two key questions are addressed in the frame of civil society: How do historical legacies as deep conditions affect the different analytical categories of the EU impact in Turkey and how do these legacies function? Do they act as facilitating or/and constraining factors for Europeanization of civil society? The thesis contends that the interplay of mechanisms and historical legacies exhibit different patterns. Different types of legacies are evident in the different mechanisms of EU impact. In the case of compulsory and enabling impact, historical legacies seem to have less impact, and have uniform effect. The connective impact has different kinds of legacies for issue areas. These mixed legacies act as facilitating as well as constraining factors for the Europeanization of civil society. In the case of connective impact, historical legacies seem to have a stronger effect in accounting for differentiation in the sectors of civil society.

2.3 Methodology of the research

In order to provide a comprehensive account of how EU influence has led to differential impact on civil society development, I will first demonstrate the mechanisms of the EU influence and differential impact of the EU on civil society development. Then, I will provide an explanation for the differential impact of the EU influence. My methodology will address the following issues: what are the main types of actors under investigation, why did I choose these actors, how did I choose these

actors, which data will form the empirical material for the research, how did I collect them, and how will I analyze them?

2.3.1 Selection of NGOs- Why these NGOs?

I have decided to undertake an "embedded case study", involving several subunits rather than focusing on a "holistic case study" as a single unit of analysis to operationalize my framework at the empirical level (Yin 2003: 42-46). As subunits, I focus on three issue areas namely, women, environmental and human rights NGOs. There are two main reasons for the selection of these issue areas. On the one hand, in the Turkish context, women, environmental and human rights NGOs have been key actors in the space of civil society. They are significant both in terms of activities and their contributions to policymaking processes. In Turkey, women, environmental and human rights issues have expanded with a diverse array of activities and organizations. These actors increase public awareness in a variety of issues, provide services, and watch the state's activities. At the same time, they become political entrepreneurs in policy fields. On the other hand, in the European context, civil society has been vital actors in three different policy fields. Gender mainstreaming, environmental governance and human rights draw particular attention role of civil society actors in the formulation and implementation of EU policies. Gender equality is an important aspect of the European Social Model in which the EU has adopted a positive approach to gender equality in all policies such as education, health, social services and employment (Spidla 2004: 18). More importantly, gender mainstreaming- integration of a gender perspective into all other policies- has been significant in the enlargement context as well. The EU has also promoted gender equality in the enlargement context through the prioritization of women's issues in annual Progress Reports and the provision of financial assistance to support the empowerment of women. In environmental policy, both member and candidate countries are expected to put environmental *acquis* into practice and comply with and implement the EU legislation on environment. Both at the EU level and domestic level environmental organizations have been integral components of environmental governance. Finally, the promotion of human rights is an important foreign policy instrument of the EU and human rights conditionality is the most crucial aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria (Smith 2003: 97-120). The EU uses different mechanisms to

promote and protect human rights. In this respect, the relationship between the EU and human rights NGOs is worth analyzing to understand its implications.

NGOs come in all shapes and forms within Turkey. I have established four main criteria to select NGOs for interviews. The NGOs in the three issue areas have been selected according to the following criteria:

First, for the purpose of my research, I concentrate on NGOs that have had experience working with the EU. The relationship with the EU is defined in different ways. The most common way is to get funding from the EU. All of the organizations have conducted different EU projects. Another way of interaction is through exchange of information for EU Progress Reports. EU officials have visited civil society organizations to get information on specific issues. Lastly, civil society organizations may not be the main beneficiaries in the EU projects but they can participate in projects as partners.

Second, I identified three cities that have most benefited from the EU funding: İstanbul, Ankara and Diyarbakır. In addition to EU funding, these cities are significant in many ways. Most of the women's and environmental organizations headquarters are located in İstanbul. Ankara as the capital city is home mainly for human rights organizations. Human rights organizations watch state policy in Ankara and work to influence decision makers. Diyarbakır is a Kurdish populated and the most important city in Southern Turkey.

Third, NGOs are selected on the basis of their size and capacity. They are established advocacy NGOs that operate in center cities and have local and international levels of correspondence. It is important to stress that there are several challenges to empirically study civil society and NGOs as key actors within civil society in Turkey. There are multiple players in civil society ranging from movements, grassroots organizations, bar associations, business associations and informal networks. They are diverse in types and sizes, professional and less professional, large and small, and can wield various functions and influence. The civil society space is characterized by continuities as well as changes.

To understand these dynamics and transformations, most studies have focused on institutionalized civil society. This study also concentrates on national NGOs, because my objective is to trace their development and analyze the EU impact. However, focusing on institutionalized civil society does not capture all actors in civil society. In order to minimize this problem, I have selected NGOs that also conduct

other activities and have strong links with all types of civil society actors. All NGOs that I interviewed have been part of various social movements, platforms and have strong connections with local civil society. For example, most of the NGOs have local branches around Turkey. I particularly eliminated local NGOs for practical considerations- difficulty accessing these organizations, time and financial constraints. Furthermore, most of them do not have websites and published materials. Therefore, there is also a major problem in accessing data to conduct research. My empirical chapters start with a detailed review of major developments of civil society in issue areas, present inherited characteristics and identify sector specific legacies in civil society. These involve different types of actors in civil society. Yet, my analysis of the EU impact centers on NGOs.

Fourth, NGOs are selected according to their areas of impact and visibility of these organizations in public debates. These organizations are influential actors in the domestic framework and issue areas. In all three categories, NGOs are diverse entities and the most important civil society actors in terms of size, area of impact, national coverage, funding, and access to internal and external networks.

The distribution of NGOs according to issue areas is uneven (see Appendix A.2). This is because of my selection criteria. While there are more organizations according to my selection criteria in women's civil society and human rights civil society, there are fewer environmental NGOs. This is also reflected in the empirical chapters. For instance, in the Chapter 5 both primary and secondary data are more extensive compared to the Chapter 6.

2.3.2 Data Collection

My analysis started with an extensive literature review, which included books and articles on Turkish political history, political culture and Turkish civil society as well as Europeanization studies. The former aimed to provide an understanding of the main characteristics of Turkish civil society and identify core events in Turkish political history whereas the latter has allowed perceiving the rationale of EU's civil society policy and constructing the mechanisms of the EU impact to pursue my fieldwork in Turkey. The objective of my fieldwork was to understand the functioning of civil society, interactions among actors, policy domains and structures, the

relationship with the EU and the reactions of NGOs to these processes, which are historically established at the national level.

To understand the structure and functioning of civil society under investigation, I read NGOs documents[8] in each of these issue areas and explored their history, mission, organizational structure, supporters, partnerships, international relations/memberships, projects and other activities. This allowed me to understand NGOs organizational structures comprehensively and prepare for the interviews. Afterwards, I also used these documents for the triangulation of my interviews.

I conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews with NGOs representatives, EU and Turkish officials. Semi-structured interviewing has the utility to examine in-depth experiences of the respondents, and understand certain contexts (Rathbun 2008: 686). I conducted interviews because they provide comprehensive information about how individuals experience, perceive and explain the EU processes. I prepared a topic guide[9] for interviews with NGOs. I structured the topic guide around four themes and questions followed accordingly: organizational structure, and my analytical categories of EU impact- compulsory, enabling, and connective impact. Connective impact is divided into three sub-categories: relations with the state, relations with other civil society organizations, and external relations. The topic guide started with more general questions on organizational structure and moved to particular questions.

Interviews with NGOs were important to understand their opinions, institutional experiences and positions towards the EU processes. Interviews with EU officials from the Delegation of the EU to Turkey were critical for perceiving the EU's approach to civil society, underlining logic and their experiences with Turkish civil society. Interviews with Turkish policymakers in relevant ministries were significant to understand official positions on the EU accession process and their attitudes towards NGOs during these processes.

I conducted 53 in depth semi-structured qualitative interviews and used methods of purposive sampling and snowballing to select the interviewees (Rathbun 2008: 696). Purposive sampling allowed me choose respondents according to their profiles. Snowballing refers to a method where interviewees recommend others for further interviews for establishing contacts. Intermediary organizations such as the

[8] NGOs documents were collected through websites and during the visits to their headquarters. These documents include reports, books, project documents, press releases and pamphlets.
[9] Topic guide structuring around main themes of this research is included in the appendix A.1.

Civil Society Development Centre (*STGM*- Sivil Toplum Geliştirme Merkezi) in Ankara and Diyarbakır also helped me in contacting key respondents.

Most of the interviews were recorded and complemented by extensive notes that were taken during the interviews. I extended my notes after each interview and transcript some parts to use for direct quotations. For confidentiality I made quotations by referring to the names of organizations but did not directly identify names of interviewees. Direct quotations were supplemented by other sources of data for triangulation. In other cases, conclusions drawn from more than one respondent aim to show that the issue was not specific to that organization. Mainly in Diyarbakır, I preferred not to use a voice recorder. During the time of my visit most organizations were under intense scrutiny and most representatives were arrested due to investigations into the Union of Communities of Kurdistan (*Kürdistan Topluluklar Birliği*-KCK),[10] the alleged urban wing of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (*Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan),* known by its Kurdish acronym as the PKK. In these cases I took extensive notes to allow respondents to explain as much as possible. Most of the interviews were conducted in Turkish. Where this is not possible, for example in the Delegation of the EU to Turkey, I conducted interviews in English.

The EU documents such as Progress Reports, project fiches and policy documents retrieved from the EU's official website provided extensive information on the understanding of the EU's civil society policy, its instruments, and main actors (see Chapter 3). This is significant to show that the EU is shaped by a certain understanding of civil society. The EU documents on civil society policy are selected by a sample of the most important documents that identified from the secondary literature. Moreover, EU documents-Progress Reports and project fiches- are other data that helped me to triangulate interview data by providing multiple sources for the same data. For selection, I first used NGOs documents and interviews to identify the EU projects that they have completed. Then I selected projects fiches accordingly.

[10] Anti-KCK operations refer to massive police operations against Kurdish opposition members that were initiated in 2009. The Turkish government justifies anti-KCK operations on the basis that the KCK is an umbrella organization that involves PKK and serves as its political wing. However, a study on the profiles of the defendants shows that the targets of the KCK operations are politicians and activists of Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*-BDP) affiliated supporters (İlkiz 2012:45).

2.3.3 Data Analysis

My empirical analysis starts with an examination of patterns of continuity and change in Turkish civil society and then evaluates how civil society has been influenced by processes of Europeanization. I used multiple methods such as periodization, long-term analysis, process-tracing and plausibility probe to operationalize the Europeanization analysis.

Given that my study focuses on the domestic level, I identified the key turning points in Turkish political history to assess the patterns of continuity and change in Turkish civil society. Periodization mainly used by historical institutionalist scholars has a major benefit for understanding how civil society evolves throughout the different periods of history. Although empirical chapters are divided into two main sections, starting from *Tanzimat* in the Ottoman period I have pointed out five critical periods in Turkish political history: (i) Ottoman Period (1839-1923), (ii) early Republican and multi-party period (1923-1980), (iii) Post-Republican period (1980-1999), (iv) EU period (1999- 2005), and (v) Post-2005 EU period (2005-onwards).

The first period in the study, between 1839-1923, starts with the *Tanzimat* period and analyzes civil society activity until the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Civil society is characterized as associational life. The second period in the study shows civil society activity from the foundation of the Republic to the multi-party period and to the years of turbulence during the successive military coups. The third period demonstrates the influence of the military coups, and the revival of civil society coupled with external processes such as globalization and the EU processes. The fourth period is characterized as a EU candidacy period where a dynamic reform agenda is pursued and the EU becomes an important actor in civil society. The last period from 2005 onwards is a period of weakened EU impact. Identification of turning points in the history of civil society also allowed me to provide a road map for long-term analysis. Chapter 4 analyzes the historical context of civil society until the end of the Post-Republican period in order to show characteristics of the civil society before the EU interaction. Empirical chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) individually analyze sector specific developments in civil society both before and after the EU interaction.

Long-term analysis provided an understanding of the backgrounds of Turkish civil society as well as different issue areas during the course of history (Saurugger

2005). Following on periodization, I used secondary literature to identify main characteristics of civil society and patterns of continuity and change. In section 2.2.3. on historical legacies, following Wittenberg (2013), I use three criteria to explore a phenomenon as a legacy: the existence of a phenomenon over at least two time periods, the occurrence of the same phenomenon between the past and the present time, and the transmission of the phenomenon from the past to the present. By following these criteria and examining civil society activity, I pinpoint and operationalize six key legacies that matter for the analysis of the EU impact: the lack of resources and dependency where civil society has been chronically underfunded in terms of resources, a restrictive environment characterized by the absence of autonomous space and opportunities in terms of rights, Europe as an important symbol of framing, a weak state with a strong state tradition, an ideologically divided civil society sphere in terms of internal networks, and the presence of diverse connections with external networks. All of these legacies in civil society satisfied the previously described three criteria. For each empirical chapter 5, 6 and 7 I repeat a long-term analysis.

One of the most challenging issues in Europeanization research is to demonstrate whether domestic developments would have occurred in the absence of the EU. Differentiating between independent and dependent variables becomes difficult when assessing the impact of EU processes on civil society actors. Multiple actors participate in and are influenced by the Europeanization processes. At the end, it becomes problematic to relate causes and outcomes. Cowles *et al.* (2001) highlight that process tracing and concentration on time sequences between EU policies and domestic changes allow researchers to distinguish between the impact of Europeanization and domestic politics.

In order to study Europeanization of civil society, I use process tracing to understand the development of civil society before EU involvement and to observe domestic and European level developments. Therefore, with regard to the Europeanization of civil society actors, I start with an analysis of the relationships between civil society groups and other actors at the domestic level before the 1999 period when Turkey was granted candidacy status for EU. This method allows me to gain considerable insights into the different sectors of civil society at the domestic level. During the course of this research, I repeated this approach for each sector of

civil society in my empirical chapters. Process tracing allowed me to observe changes at the national level and to distinguish between European and domestic variables.

As the theoretical framework indicates, with regard to the Europeanization of civil society, there are different pathways of EU influence- compulsory, enabling and connective. Through careful process tracing, I observed the relationship between pathways and changes and I showed how a particular pathway was leading into particular outcomes and empirically examine the relationship by focusing on different subunits.

I also developed a list of questions, which helped me for the operationalization of concrete EU pathways. I analyzed all interview materials and documents by using the following questions and categorize the EU influence accordingly:

- Compulsory impact: what is the EU's strategy in the issue areas in the enlargement policy? Which civil society actors does the EU promote in the enlargement policy? Does the EU create a political opportunity structure for civil society? What kinds of "incentives" does the EU employ in order to influence civil society? What kinds of "threats" does the EU employ in order to influence civil society? Are there differences between the EU model of civil society and Turkish civil society? How has the relationship between EU and Turkish civil society evolved over time? Is there any change in the structure of Turkish civil society after EU interaction? Are there any legal provisions that oblige candidate states to comply (civil society and *acquis communautaire*)? Have these legal commitments been mobilized in Turkish civil society? Is there observable evidence of EU pressure inflicted on Turkey to modify its civil society structure? How has Turkish civil society responded to these pressures? Have civil society organizations changed their structures and characteristics to take into account EU requirements? Is there any difference across issue areas?
- Enabling Impact: to what extent and how are EU policies (the *acquis communautaire* or agreements between the EU and the civil society) used as a point of reference within the civil society realm in Turkey? Has the EU become a reference point in the domestic political debates? Are there discussions/events in which the EU is presented as an example to emulate? To what extent are EU norms of appropriate civil society invoked according to

legitimize/delegitimize specific civil society actions/ decisions? Has the use of the norms directed civil society towards a particular form of action? Are these norms cited by a wide variety of civil society actors or is their use restricted to specific types of actors? Is the impact of the EU similar or different across civil society sectors?

- Connective Impact: How does the EU promote cooperation between actors? Why does the EU encourage cooperation between actors? Does the relationship between the state and civil society change after EU interaction? Does the relationship between civil society actors change after EU intervention? Does the connection between civil society actors and external networks change after EU intervention? Does the EU provide mechanisms to build a constructive relationship between actors? How do civil society actors react to these processes? Does the EU provide opportunities and networking across civil society actors? Have these actors been benefited or disadvantaged by these processes? Learning? Is there any difference across issue areas?

After the analytical categorization of material, I developed a set of indicators for assessment of the EU impact. Table 2.1 shows the indicator for each pathway. Each category of the EU pathway has a set of indicators. These indicators are in line with the analytical framework and associated questions and operationalized for the purpose of this research.

Table 2.1: Indicators of the EU impact on Civil Society

	Compulsory	**Enabling**	**Connective**
Indicator	Progress with the adoption and implementation of legal framework • Change in laws- civil society related • Change in specific policy areas EU incentives for the development of civil society • Number of incentives • Types of incentives: financial or/and other forms of incentives	Linkages to the EU Positive references to EU policies • Enlargement • Social Policy • Environment • Human Rights Positive references to EU rules • *acquis communautaire* Positive references to EU norms • Peace • Liberty • Democracy • Rule of law • Human rights.	State-society • Consultation • Mechanisms -Public institutions • Frequency of meetings • Access to information • Selection and diversity of civil society • Feedback from civil society • Degree to which feedback is considered (are there any initiatives about the issue?) • Input from civil society • Only participation into the meetings • No cooperation Cooperation among Civil Society • Establishment of platforms • Joint activities and projects • Membership in umbrella organizations

			• Only in contact • No cooperation External network • Partnership in projects • Membership in networks • Participation in networks • Transfer of experiences into domestic context (top-down) • Raising issues (bottom-up) • Sustainability • No cooperation
Europeanization Outcome	Change in legislation Policy related capacity building Different types of Europeanization outcomes (see section 2.2.2. in pathways of the EU influence – overlap with other categories of the EU impact)	Legitimization and empowerment	Inclusion in decision-making Influence on policymaking Participation in external/internal networks

Finally, I invoke a plausibility probe to show whether legacies matter for both the development of civil society and in the explanation of the Europeanization outcomes. Plausibility probes are considered to be an intermediate step between hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing (Levy 2008). Illustrative case studies fall under this category, and rather than testing a theoretical proposition, the goal is to show the plausibility of the proposition by briefly exploring one relevant case (Eckstein 1975; Levy 2008).

For this purpose, I identify a case for each empirical chapter to illustrate the relevance of the legacy argument. I probe my argument by selecting a different empirical case for each chapter (see Chapter 5, 6 and 7). The key reason for the selection was that Cyprus, Hungary and Czech Republic all represent cases that are different from Turkey, and critical to illustrate the legacy argument. If the theory does not fit closely in these cases, my argument could hardly be expected to be valid.

My analytical framework suggests that the EU has a strong influence on civil society if there is strong cooperation and mobilization between civil society actors, collaboration with the state and effective use of the external networks. I present an in-depth analysis of the importance of these factors for the differential impact of the EU on different segments of Turkish civil society. In addition, brief analyses of the experiences of civil society development in Cyprus, Hungary, and the Czech Republic illustrate that my legacy argument extends beyond the Turkish case. This means that the impact of the EU on civil society in these countries was also mediated by the factors highlighted in my theoretical framework.

2.4. Conclusion

In this chapter I developed an analytical framework to assess the impact of the EU on civil society. I started with a review of the academic debates on the EU and civil society both in the context of CEECs and Turkey. There are two major shortcomings of the studies on civil society. Firstly, comprehensive analysis of the EU influence across different segments of civil society and explanation of the differential impact of the EU has not been studied. Secondly, in the case of civil society, theories of Europeanization are dominated by top-down and bottom-up approaches. These approaches have not sufficiently paid attention to domestic factors, and particularly historical legacies as a domestic factor are absent in the explanations of the Europeanization of civil society. To understand the EU impact, I applied a

pathway model to civil society and used analytical categories of compulsory, enabling and connective pathways. Finally, I incorporate the concept of historical legacies into the explanation of the Europeanization of civil society.

The methodological section addressed these key questions with multiple methods. I study EU impact in three sectors of civil society (women, environment and human rights). In order to uncover the relationship between the civil society and the EU, I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with EU and Turkish policymakers and civil society representatives. Along with the interviews, I operationalized Europeanization analysis by using periodization, long-term analysis, process tracing and a plausibility probe. The following chapter will perform these analyses by focusing on the EU policy towards civil society.

CHAPTER 3
EU CIVIL SOCIETY POLICY

As we have seen in section 2.1.2. , the relationship between the EU and civil society has received considerable attention in the academic literature- the conception of civil society, its assessment, measurement and outcomes of the Europeanization of civil society. The focal point of the development of civil society is the promotion of democracy and partnership as a vehicle of Europeanization. As such, in this policy area, several processes took place at the same time that put civil society under Europeanizing pressures. Studies have hinted at two main approaches to civil society that lay at the center of the EU civil society policy. This chapter argues that the EU pursues a twin-track approach to civil society. First, the EU facilitates civil society as an agent of democracy promotion. Second, civil society has been regarded as a partner in European governance that is based on the partnership interpretation of civil society. To substantiate these claims, I scrutinize the broader framework of the EU policy towards civil society.

In order to do this, the chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part of this chapter provides background of the development of EU's civil society policy. The second part looks at the features of EU's civil society policy in CEECs, and explains how EU exports its civil society model to these countries. The third part investigates EU policy in Turkey and examines motivations behind this policy. Overall, the chapter shows that the EU's policy towards civil society reflects a specific kind of Europeanized civil society based on two approaches that are considered complementary to each other and EU conveys this model to other contexts.

3.1. An Outline of the Development of EU Civil Society Policy

The following section chronologically outlines the milestones in the development of civil society policy and demonstrates how the discourse and the rationale behind the EU policy towards civil society have developed at the EU level. The analysis of policy documents shows how civil society has become a tool for

democracy and a partner in European governance. Although the analyses are based on the original policy documents, the range of the policy documents is selected from secondary literature and shows the nature of the EU approach in the realm of civil society (Ketola 2013: 38-43). The documents show the evolution of civil society policy at the European level. They mainly reflect the developments in the 1990s that start with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the debate on the democratic deficit. The policy documents illustrate that although there are diverse models of civil society within the EU, the EU pursues a twin-track approach to civil society development.

3.1.1. Major Turning Points in the Development of Civil Society Policy at the EU Level

Although the early 1990s mark the main turning point for EU policy on civil society, the presence of interest groups at the EU level dates back to the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957. The Treaty of Rome was established the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) to represent national socio-economic interest groups and involve them in building the European market. Initially, it was designed as a body with advisory powers, and its position "as an institutional expression of the organizations making up civil society" (Smismans 2003: 481) is a later identification of EESC at the European level.

The democratic transitions or "third wave of democratization" and eventual accession of Southern European countries and the independence of CEECs in the 1980s underscored the importance of "stable democracies" (Zihnioğlu 2013: 30). Equally important was the establishment of the European Social Dialogue in 1985 at the initiative of Commission President Jacques Delors aimed to involve the social partners in the internal market process. These developments have paved the way to understanding how the civil society has become prevalent within the EU social policy field.

However, the recognition of civil society as a key actor in EU affairs, the increasing emphasis on civil society by the European institutions and the involvement of civil society organizations in policymaking have become notable in the 1990s (Armstrong 2002; Smismans 2003; Saurugger 2008; Smismans 2006). The Maastricht Treaty's ratification process in 1992 led discussions on the democratic deficit within the EU and the role of civil society actors in EU integration. The Danish 'No' vote

and the limited support of the French on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty contributed to the awareness of integrating civil society in the European project (Zihnioğlu 2013: 29). Equally important, in 1993, the Copenhagen criteria were established during the Danish presidency and political, economic and human rights conditionality were introduced as a major aspect of European politics. Therefore, in the early 1990s, civil society was developed as a strategy to tackle the democratic deficit by the EU institutions. Starting from the early 1990s, the policy documents underlined the EU's motivations behind the EU's civil society policy.

In *An Open and Structured Dialogue between the Commission and Special Interest Groups* (1992), the Commission stressed the importance of developing relations and promoting dialogue with interest groups. The aim of the 1992 communication from the Commission was to promote a dialogue, formalize relations, and initiate a debate about the role of interest groups in the development of the EU's policies (Commission of the European Communities 1992: 1). Therefore, this report highlights the role of interest groups as actors in EU policymaking to enhance transparency and provide a more informed public debate in the Union's activities. In this respect, the Commission differentiated between non-profit making organizations and profit making organizations and interest groups expected to provide services with technical information in EU policymaking (Commission of the European Communities 1992: 1).

This early document on the role of interest groups makes two significant observations about the EU's policy towards civil society. First, civil society is understood as a means of improving democratic deficit at the EU level. By pointing out the Maastricht Treaty that had been ratified at that time, the document stresses "transparency of the decision making process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the public's confidence in the administration" (Commission of the European Communities 1992: 8). Hence, civil society participation is justified on the basis of its contribution to democratization. Second, civil society is perceived as a partner at the EU level where the Commission emphasized the importance of interest groups as policy actors for effective policy outcomes.

Following this document, in 1997, the *Communication from the Commission on Promoting the Role of Voluntary Organizations and Foundations in Europe* built on the idea of democratic and transparent decision making and promote civil dialogue to foster solidarity and citizenship via voluntary organisations and foundations

(Commission of the European Communities 1997; Smismans 2003; Ketola 2013). As Ketola notes, while the previous communication coincided with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and reflected the broader debates at the EU level, this publication corresponded with the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 that detailed the principles of liberal democracy such as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, rule of law and liberty (Ketola 2013: 40). The purpose of the document was to demonstrate the importance of civil society both at the EU and national levels, to show challenges that they faced and to initiate a dialogue and to enhance their contribution to European integration (Commission of the European Communities 1997: 1).

As the Communication highlighted for the first time, there was a strong emphasis on the political importance of these organizations- (i) citizenship, and (ii) democracy promotion:

> For many people, membership of, or volunteering for, voluntary organizations and foundations, provides a vital means through which they can express their sense of citizenship, and demonstrate an active concern for their fellows and for society at large.
>
> Voluntary organizations and foundations foster a sense of solidarity and of citizenship, and provide the essential underpinnings of our democracy. …Their contribution to the effectiveness with which representative democracy functions should not, however, be underestimated…they now play an essential part as intermediaries in exchange of information and opinion between governments and citizens, providing citizens with the means with which they may critically examine government actions or proposals, and public authorities in their turn with expert advice, guidance on popular views, and essential feedback on the effects of their policies (Commission of the European Communities 1997: 5-6).

Besides the contribution to citizenship and democracy promotion, the document emphasizes the increasingly important role of these organizations as partners. Unlike the previous document, the partnership interpretation of civil society is not only articulated at the EU level, but also at the member state level. Therefore, the role of civil society has been valued in promoting democracy and citizenship and developing partnerships both at the member state and EU levels. The document highlights the significance of the partnership between public authorities and the civil society sector by integrating voluntary organizations in planning services and policy making at all levels (Commission of the European Communities 1997: 11).

From 1998 onwards, the EU policy on civil society has acquired a new dimension with start of the accession negotiations with CEECs. Section 3.2. demonstrates in detail the relationship between the enlargement and civil society within the context of the Central and Eastern European expansion. However, at the same time, the Commission's discussion paper in 2000 and white paper in 2001 clearly shows how civil society support has become a key component of the accession process for CEECs (Ketola 2013: 41).

Another document, entitled *The Commission and Non-governmental Organizations: Building a Stronger Partnership* published in 2000, recognizes "fostering participatory democracy", "representing views of specific groups of citizens to the European institutions", "contributing to policymaking", "contributing to project management", and "contributing to European integration" as motivations for cooperating with NGOs (Commission of the European Communities 2000; Ketola 2013:41-42). The document intended to improve and strengthen the relationship between the European Commission and the NGOs (Commission of the European Communities 2000: 2). Furthermore, dialogue and consultation between the European Commission and NGOs has articulated a key part of democratic decision-making and the process of policy shaping.

The document shows how the EU promotes a twin-track approach to civil society. On the one hand, NGOs as an important component of civil society is a tool to foster participatory democracy both within and beyond the EU. It recognized that "belonging to an association provides an opportunity for citizens to participate actively" into a democratic system of government (Commission of the European Communities 2000: 4). On the other hand, NGOs are seen as "vital partners" for the Commission both within the EU and beyond and contribute to policymaking and deepen European integration. Accordingly, the development of partnerships between the European Commission and NGOs has extended to policy dialogue, policy delivery, projects and program management (Commission of the European Communities 2000:5).

In 2001, the Commission published the *White Paper on European Governance*, which is regarded as the key document in terms of structuring relationship with the civil society (Finke 2007; Greenwood 2007; Ketola 2013; Zihnioğlu 2013). The document is concerned with the lack of confidence and the growing gap between the EU institutions and citizens. As a response to these

problems, the Commission promotes the idea of "good governance" consisting of openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence as key components of its strategy (Commission of the European Communities 2001a). The Commission's White Paper on European Governance proposes involvement of civil society actors in the policymaking process as a way to connect the EU with its citizens. In this regard, civil society is attributed a fundamental role.

The document shows how the EU follows its dual approach to civil society. First, civil society provides the basis for the establishment of democracy at the EU level by mobilizing people and supports disadvantaged people (Commission of the European Communities 2001a: 14). Second, civil society as a partner in European governance shapes EU policies and contributes to policymaking.

3.1.2. The Approaches to the EU Civil Society Policy

The analysis of the policy documents in section 3.1.1 demonstrates that the EU's policy towards civil society has two facets that are considered complementary to each other (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015:129). The first facet of the EU policy regards civil society as an agent of democratization and good governance where EU's civil society promotion strategy is justified on the basis of its contribution to democratization (Ketola 2011; 2012; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). According to Ketola, "The approach suggests that EU policy purports a liberal democratic logic, where civil society functions as a bulwark against the excesses of the state and as the means to enable individuals to exercise their democratic voice outside elections" (Ketola 2011: 792).

The second facet of the EU's civil society policy reflects the partnership interpretation of civil society and the development of new modes of governance (Fagan 2005; Börzel 2009; Fagan 2010; 2011). This partnership interpretation of civil society emphasizes the important role of civil society assisting in the development of public policy and the enactment of regulation (Fagan 2005:531). The EU supports civil society through partnership with the state and other actors to transform their strategies and involve them as key actors in European governance. In this regard, the EU regards civil society as a fundamental component of policymaking. In addition to promoting democracy, promoting dialogue plays a key role in the EU's approach to civil society (Ketola 2013). In this respect, civil society organizations are valued for their capacity to lobby and work with governments as well as to implement and watch

the EU policies.

Although the EU's approach to civil society reflects a certain understanding of Europeanized civil society, civil society across European countries is characterized by diverse traditions. Several studies show that understandings of civil society (i.e. the role and importance of associations), types of civic participation, and relationships to the state are very different and have developed very different traditions of civil society across the European countries (Putnam 2002, Wallace *et al.* 2012, Boje 2010; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015:129). For example, Sweden is characterized by a strong state and a strong civil society; the trade unions have been important actors in the administration of the state where state and civil society collaborated closely with each other, and Sweden scores high in all forms of social capital, both in formal associative behaviour and informal social relations (Trägårdh 2007; Pichler and Wallace 2007). In the Southern and Central European countries participation in civil society organizations are rare (Howard 2008;Boje 2010; Howard 2011). In these countries, more informal forms of participation have dominated. In post-communist Europe, the legacy of communist institutional systems, mistrust of organizations, the existence of friendship networks, and post-communist disappointment led to low levels of membership and participation in voluntary organizations (Howard 2008; Howard 2011). Pichler and Wallace (2007) showed that informal forms of civic participation have been significant in these countries and have led to different relationships between the state and society. Churches, in particular the Polish Catholic Church, have played significant roles as a civil society actors by hosting various informal groups in Central European countries (Buchowski 1996; Celichowski 2004). In Central European countries, civic attitudes developed through participation in these types of informal networks and civil society developed as an oppositional force against the state through the Catholic Church (Wallace *et al.* 2012: 4). The model of and participation in civil society has a different tradition in CEE, where it has defined itself in opposition to the state. In Nordic countries, and Western Europe, however, civil society has been more interwoven with the state.

3.2. The EU Civil Society Policy in the EU's Enlargement to CEE

The experience in CEE suggested that enlargement locates the EU in a position to shape large part of applicant states' domestic structures and various policies. In this context, for the first time, the EU explicitly promoted civil society in its enlargement strategy. As previous EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn stated, from big ban enlargement onwards, civil society took place at the heart of the EU's enlargement agenda. Rehn (2008:3) defines the role of civil society and its importance in the enlargement process as follows:

> You (civil society) are the bridge between the EU institutions, national authorities and citizens...raise awareness of the successes and challenges of EU enlargement...strengthen confidence between citizens in the EU and the aspirant members. …support the reforms... civil society organizations have spread the European sprit by promoting the basic values of democracy, human rights, good governance and the rule of law.

For these reasons, civil society has become an increasingly important actor in the EU's enlargement policy. The involvement of the civil society in the process of European integration advanced on the grounds of promoting democracy. The analysis of policy documents show how the EU has employed a twin-track approach to civil society through projects in civil society programs both in CEE and Turkey within the context of enlargement.

In 1993, the European Council set out the Copenhagen criteria, making democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities and a functioning market economy central objectives of the EU enlargement policy. The EU has based its approach on the assumption that vocal civil society is key for democracy. In this context, democracy assistance under political criteria supports the development of civil society not only as a part of the democratization process but also the Europeanization process. This suggests that civil society has to democratize, therefore Europeanize, as a condition of EU membership.

Financial assistance has been at the heart of the EU's civil society development policy towards CEE. Now, the EU follows the same pattern in the current enlargement policy for candidate countries, in various policy areas for member countries, and in the European Neighborhood Policy. The EU's assistance to CEE and direct funding to civil society showed how financial assistance to civil society has become an important instrument in the accession process. The EU has been a key contributor in the region both through Poland-Hungary Aid for

Restructuring Economy (PHARE)[11] and non-PHARE programs. This is the most straightforward way for external actors to support the development of civil society; however, as discussed extensively in Chapter 2 the appropriateness of this approach and effectiveness of external funding has been questioned both by academics and policy makers.

The following section shows the way in which EU promotes civil society in its enlargement policy, and the EU's approach to civil society development through the examination of the civil society programs in CEE. The policy documents illustrate that the EU's twin-track approach, which originates from the EU level has been transferred to the enlargement context. Section 3.2.1. demonstrates how the EU operationalizes its approach through its policy documents in CEE.

3.2.1. EU Support for Civil Society Development in CEE

The development of civil society in CEE is understood as a part of the democratization process. In order to help the candidate countries to meet the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU works closely with civil society organizations and assists civil society.

The main mechanism to support civil society was through the PHARE program. There were two types of civil society development programs: multi-country programs that were managed from Brussels and made aid available to similar NGOs and their counterparts in the EU and national programs that were run locally by foundations, and governmental bodies (Local and Regional Development Planning 1998: 31).

Three Programs that Support Civil Society

The first program, called *The Democracy Program,* was established in 1992 to support civil society activities that strengthen pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights in CEECs (Local and Regional Development Planning 1998:31; Raik 2003: 206). The program supported parliamentary practice and organizations, transparency in public bodies and management, development of NGO representative structures, civic education, human rights and minority rights (Local and Regional

[11] The PHARE program is the EU's main financial instrument to assist the CEECs in their transition from centralized systems to a decentralized economic system and democratic society. The program was started in 1989 first for Poland and Hungary and then extended to all applicant countries in the region.

Development Planning 1998: 31). This program was run by the Human Rights and Democratization Unit and worked closely with Link Inter-European NGOs (LIEN). The program regarded civil society as an important component of democratization and supported democracy related activities. Yet, the support for democracy has constituted about one per cent, a small amount of the total PHARE assistance (Local and Regional Development Planning 1998: 31; Smith 2001: 49; Wedel 2001: 87).

The second program, entitled *"The PHARE Partnership Program"* was initiated in 1993 and focused on socio-economic development and cooperation among the private sector, local governments and NGOs and supported the reform process in the region (Local and Regional Development Planning 1998: 6). The EU has encouraged partnership both with state institutions and their counterparts in the EU countries. In this program, the EU has supported various types of NGOs[12] as well as small number of organizations such as universities, institutes, private organizations and public bodies (Local and Regional Development Planning 1998: 6). In later stages, with the experience of the implementation and transition process, there was strong emphasis on "local and regional development", "the promotion of civil society" and "increased access for civil society" rather than economic development (Local and Regional Development Planning 1998: 32).

The third program, labeled *"The LIEN"* was established in 1994 and was designed to promote integration of disadvantaged groups such as the unemployed, women, handicapped, elderly, and homeless people in the population (Commission of the European Communities 1999b: 42). In particular, the aim of LIEN was to support NGOs to work on behalf of the marginalized groups, to improve permanent support and to encourage their inclusion into the society (Commission of the European Communities 1999b: 42). The main fields of activity were chosen according to EU expertise. The EU's expertise is very strong in these areas. As I will illustrate in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, focusing on EU's expertise has implications on the EU's compulsory impact on civil society development in applicant countries. The fields of activity for EU assistance have been based principally on the EU's priorities such as sections of the *acquis* as well as the Copenhagen criteria rather than their original expertise in the candidate countries. This sometimes led the countries to shift their original focus to obtain the EU funding.

[12] The program includes trade associations, trade unions, chambers of commerce, environmental organizations, educational and training organisations.

In 1999, the Partnership programs and the LIEN were merged into a new program titled *"ACCESS"*. ACCESS was an institution-building program to strengthen civil society in the candidate countries and prepare them for EU membership. Therefore, EU assistance became more specially focused on pre-accession strategy- the EU membership process. As a consequence, primarily civic activities that were related to adoption and implementation of the *acquis* in the area of consumer and environmental protection, and social and health issues have been given priority. The second priority was to promote social integration of the marginalized groups. This does not only show how program towards civil society have been shaped by the EU priorities but also reflects the way in which the EU sets the agenda of the civil society organizations in the candidate countries.

3.2.2. The Approaches to the EU Civil Society Policy in the Context of the CEE Enlargement

As the presentation of the main civil society development programs shows, there was an active EU approach to civil society in the context of the CEE enlargement. The previous enlargements before CEE did not call for an active EU policy approach to civil society. This is both related with EU's internal developments; i.e., the discussions on democratic deficit and the potential of civil society to remedy this deficit and the prominent role of civil society in the accession process; i.e., the EU uses civil society as an agent to Europeanize candidate countries by promoting its values and principles. The EU has done so in pursuing principles of democracy, human rights, particularly promotion of minority rights and dialogue between stakeholders. These principles are evident in various programs, implemented in projects and reflect the rationale of the EU's policy on civil society.

The civil society policy in the CEE context was explicitly based on development of civil society to promote democracy and allow countries to become active partners in the EU policymaking processes. On the one hand, it is assumed that a vibrant civil society perpetuates the EU's principles and values and provides a linkage between the EU and candidate countries. In this respect, civil society organizations are valued for strengthening mutual understanding. For example, as shown in section 3.2.1. , the PHARE Democracy program and ACCESS relied on this understanding. On the other hand, civil society is articulated as a partner in European governance. The EU promotes partnership with the state and other actors to involve

them in political processes. Therefore, civil society as a partner of the state is included in policy making, cooperating with the state and implementing and observing EU policies. For instance, the EU has promoted the partnership model through the ACCESS program. This conception of civil society envisages a model of participative civil society in decision-making processes.

Equally important is the increasing focus on the promotion of dialogue in EU civil society policy. Both in multi-country program and national program, there was an emphasis on communication and networking between civil society organizations for an effective civil dialogue. As part of this dialogue, the principle of partnership is promoted between the EU and candidate countries in civic activities. For example, the PHARE partnership program is intended to promote dialogue.

As this section illustrates, civil society is expected to contribute to democratization in candidate countries. That is, civil society acquires a role and acts as a connecting point between the EU and candidate countries. Moreover, civil society is expected to engage and influence decision-making processes as a partner in European governance. Despite the differences in instruments, there are considerable similarities in the EU's rationale for civil society engagement across the EU level and the enlargement context.

Although the EU is motivated by a certain logic, the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the EU's enlargement strategy have restrained the potential of the EU's policy towards civil society. Several studies note that CEE enlargement was characterized by a tough approach including annual monitoring processes of development, the implementation of larger *acquis* and stronger political, economic, legal and human rights conditionality (Smith 1999; Pridham 2005). However, fast adaptation of the EU legislation came at the expense of the marginalization of society.

3.3 EU Civil Society Policy in the Turkish context

Similar to CEECs, financial assistance has become the main instrument of the EU to foster civil society in Turkey. The EU has targeted Turkish civil society through various financial instruments such as the pre-accession funds and the Community programs. For example, several programs have focused on the development of civil society and capacity building and enhancement of freedom of association and freedom of assembly in candidate countries (Zihnioğlu 2013: 49).

The EU's interest in supporting civil society is legitimized on the grounds of its contribution to democracy and its role in developing the dialogue between Turkey and the EU as a way to prepare Turkey for EU membership (Interview Delegation of the EU to Turkey, Sector Manager 1, 2011). In its Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession (2004), the European Commission has displayed a three-pillar strategy to frame the role of civil society. Within this strategy, civil society has two main functions. First, civil society has a key role in reinforcing and supporting the reform process with Turkey under the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria (Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 8). Second, civil society has a role in strengthening political and cultural dialogue between member states and Turkey by bringing people together (Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 8).

This section reviews civil society activity and demonstrates the rationale behind EU civil society policy that is expressed in the recommendation. The analysis of EU policy documents shows that there are overlaps across the EU's internal policy, the CEECs and Turkey. Section 3.3.1. shows the operationalization of the EU approach by analyzing civil society programs in Turkey.

3.3.1. EU Support for Civil Society Development in Turkey

The first program for civil society development was initiated in 1996 under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In line with the measures d'accompagnement - accompanying measures- (MEDA) Framework Agreement, Turkey received EU funding under the MEDA program between 1996-2001 and civil society organizations were among the main beneficiaries. This program provided financial assistance to ad-hoc applications from individual civil society actors. EU assistance more specifically focused on individual NGO projects such as women and youth empowerment, consumer protection and cultural integration (Özdemir 2007: 10). Similar to the Central and East European experience, these civil society actors comprised a different range of actors and the EU mainly promotes issues in which it has enormous expertise. As empirical chapters will highlight in detail, different sectors of civil society benefitted from these programs.

The second program for civil society development was launched in 2002 and continued until 2005. Following the Helsinki European Council of 1999, Turkey granted a candidate country status for EU membership and started to benefit from the

pre-accession financial assistance. Although pre-accession financial assistance was not designed precisely for civil society, Turkish civil society was among the recipients of this program. With the declaration of Turkey's candidacy, the EU put a greater emphasis on the *acquis communautaire* and intended to integrate civil society actors with projects that have relevance for the compliance of the *acquis*. Eighty- four projects were implemented to complement the harmonization process within the scope of 2002, 2003 and 2004 programs (Zihnioğlu 2013: 44). The EU civil society policy strives to trigger reforms to create an enabling environment for civic activity in Turkey. As indicated in various EU documents, the objective of these reforms is to develop a strong civil society.

For this purpose, civil society development programs are primarily intended to support the capacity building of Turkish civil society. For example, under this program, the STGM was established in 2002 with a budget of €3.4 million. Following the success of the program, it was transformed to the Association of Civil Society Development Centre, a permanent structure that strengthens the organizational capacity of Turkish civil society and ensures development of civil society around Turkey (Özdemir 2007:10; Interview STGM Ankara 2011; Zihnioğlu 2013: 44). The STGM has become a prominent actor in Turkey, and provides a variety of programs to develop Turkish civil society through advocacy, campaign, research, training and lobbying activities.

More importantly, civil society development programs not only aim to enhance the capacity of civil society but also foster democratic development. Civil society programs aspired to promote the EU values and principles by making direct reference to democracy, dialogue and partnership. Civil society development programs such as *Strengthening Civil Society in the Pre-Accession Process, Improving Cooperation between the NGOs and the Public Sector and Strengthening the NGOs' Democratic Participation Level (SKIP)* and *Strengthening Freedom of Association for Further Development of Civil Society* illustrate the dual objective of facilitating partnerships and promoting democracy in Turkey.

The program for *Strengthening Civil Society in the Pre-Accession Process* was launched in 2006 with a budget of €3.4 million to "contribute to the consolidation and broadening of political reforms and EU alignment efforts through strengthening civil society in Turkey in the pre-accession process" (Commission of the European Communities 2005: 1). The project supported various civic initiatives such as the

promotion and protection of culture, women rights, social inclusion of disadvantaged people, protection of consumers, strengthening the protection of children's rights, the environment, and combatting violence against women (Commission of the European Communities 2005; Özdemir 2007: 10; Ketola 2013: 50-51; Zihnioğlu 2013:45). The project document was justified on the basis of its contribution to ongoing reforms, and support of the processes of democratization by involving civil society into the pre-accession process.

Complementary with these programs, the EU has offered a new focus for civil society to facilitate cooperation between civil society and the public sector. For instance, the project entitled *Improving Cooperation Between the NGOs and the Public Sector and Strengthening the NGOs' Democratic Participation Level* was launched in 2005 with the objective to improve cooperation between civil society and the public sector as well as to enhance democratic participation within the framework of the EU alignment process (Özdemir 2007: 10; Ketola 2013: 50-51; Zihnioğlu 2013:45). These aims were achieved through an implementation of an action plan on the public sector and civil society cooperation. The project priorities were aligned with the objectives of the accession process (Communities of the European Commission 2003:1-2; Ketola 2013: 49) and legitimized on the basis of democratic development and preparation to the accession process:

> A well-developed and functioning civil society is an essential element of a democratic system and efficient NGOs have key roles to play in expressing the demands of citizens by encouraging their active participation as well as raising their awareness. Furthermore, many elements of the *acquis communautaire* are based on the existence of operational NGOs operating within the related policy area. Therefore, it is necessary to promote a working "Civil Society- Public Sector" relation within the context of the pre-accession efforts undertaken.
>
> (Communities of the European Commission 2003: 2).

Likewise, *Strengthening Freedom of Association for Further Development of Civil Society Program* aims to "enhance participatory democracy through strengthened NGOs" (Communities of the European Commission 2004a: 1). The program is composed of three main components: building capacity for civil society; raising awareness for civil society and the public and providing support to build cooperation between Turkish civil society and their counterparts in the EU

(Communities of the European Commission 2004a: 4-5; Ketola 2013: 50). Similar to the previous initiatives, the project is justified as important to comply with the first pillar of the Copenhagen criteria.

Various civil society development programs emphasized the importance of reinforcing civil society through various measures such as capacity building activities, cooperation between public bodies as well as European civil society actors. Similar to the EU's internal policy and previous enlargement, civil society is articulated as an instrument of democratization and Europeanization. The next section outlines the Civil Society Dialogue program to highlight the logic of the EU.

Civil Society Dialogue Programs

In addition to supporting democratic development, the EU has also paid attention to bringing citizens from the candidate countries and the EU closer. The experience of the 2004 Enlargement has shown that there is a growing gap between the EU and the public and neither the EU nor candidate countries are sufficiently informed about the opportunities and challenges of EU membership. For this purpose, in 2004, the European Commission proposed the idea of a "civil society dialogue" which was endorsed by the European Council on 17 December 2004:

"Parallel to accession negotiations, the Union will engage with every candidate state in an intensive political and cultural dialogue. With the aim of enhancing mutual understanding by bringing people together, this inclusive dialogue also will involve civil society" (Quoted in Communities of the European Commission 2005: 2-3).

In 2005, The Communication of the *Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Candidate Countries* (2005) emphasized that future enlargement of the EU should be supported by enhanced dialogue in order to better inform public opinions from the EU and candidate countries (Communities of European Commission 2005). This document places vibrant civil society at the heart of the enlargement policy.

The document highlighted the aim of the civil society dialogue as follows:

- To strengthen contacts and mutual exchange of experience between all sectors of civil society in the member States and Candidate countries;
- To ensure better knowledge and understanding of the candidate countries concerned within the European Union, including their histories and their cultures, thus allowing for a better awareness of the opportunities and challenges of future enlargement;
- To ensure a better knowledge and understanding of the European Union within the candidate countries, including the values on which it is founded, its functioning and its policies.

(Communities of the European Commission 2005: 3-4).

Complementary to democracy, there was strong emphasis on dialogue in Civil Society Dialogue I. In this respect, civil society is seen as a key agent to foster cooperation and knowledge between the EU and Turkey through common activities. Furthermore, through this communication, civil society is given the key role of partner in the European governance: civil society assists countries' social transformation and prepares citizens for the enlargement. It is expected that a better informed public could be the driving force of the accession process. The program funds three main areas: development of civil society, social dialogue, employment and social affairs and community programs. In this way, the EU funds supports, legitimizes, and professionalizes NGOs by raising the level of public awareness about the EU. The Civil Society Dialogue I was seen as a continuation of existing activities and establishment of new networks.

In 2006, under the Civil Society Dialogue I, the EU provided around €4.33 million to promote the following grant schemes: *Small Projects Program: Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue, Civil Society Dialogue: Europa-Bridges of Knowledge, Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue: Participation in NGO Events in the EU,* and *Civil Society Dialogue: Culture in Action Program* (Yurttagüller 2009: 10). Similarly, in 2007 and 2008, the financial support to Civil Society Dialogue programs was increased to €21.5 million to implement five programs- *Youth Initiatives for Dialogue, Towns and Municipalities Grant Scheme, Professional Organizations Grant Scheme, Universities Grant Scheme* and *Cultural Bridges Program.* The first phase of the Civil Society Dialogue project was completed in November 2009.

One of the influential projects that was recently completed in 2009 under the first phase *Civil Society Dialogue- EU- Turkish Chambers Forum (2006-2009)* aims to "strengthen the dialogue and cooperation between the Turkish chambers and their counterparts in the EU as a members of civil society; thus promoting the integration of EU and Turkish business communities" (Communities of European Commission 2006b: 1; Interview Republic of Turkey Ministry of EU Affairs, Expert Director 2011). The program intended a strengthening of the communication between Turkish chambers and the European counterparts by helping them to learn about their experiences. In this respect, the Turkish chambers were regarded as important civil

society actors and dialogue was justified on the basis that their roles were in providing information and working "as catalyzers" among business and law makers (Communities of the European Commission 2006b: 5). The project was built on two components. The first component was designed to establish EU-Turkey Chambers Development Forum for "partnerships-building". The second component set out the EU-Turkey Chambers Partnership Scheme. There were different activities ranging from awareness rising to establishing communication networks. Activities included partnership-building events, EU training seminars, publications, and general public relations work for more visibility. In this way, the project promoted the establishment of long-term partnerships through sustainable dialogue and enhanced cooperation. More importantly, it enabled Turkish chambers to actively provide input to the EU accession negotiations and allowed them to become more inclusive partners.

Following the success of the Civil Society Dialogue I program, the second phase of Civil Society Dialogue II was initiated in October 2010. *Promoting Civil Society Dialogue Project II* aimed to advance dialogue with different sectors working in the area of Culture-Arts and Agriculture Fisheries with a budget of € 4.2 million. It also provided financial support for small and local NGOs in Turkey and EU member states through the Micro Grant Scheme. Forty-one NGOs from different cities have been supported for the organization of seminars, workshops and other activities. For instance, three projects under this scheme have been completed. Under a program entitled *A Half Does Not Make a Whole*, The Association for Supporting Entrepreneur Business Women of Ankara organized an international workshop in June 2010. Similarly, another project called *One Hand Has Nothing Civil Society Has Everything* held a conference in Samsun on the effect of EU culture and policies in establishing European citizenship; its international partner from Croatia also participated in the conference.

The Civil Society Dialogue was extended in other sectors and more recently "Civil Society Dialogue III" was launched in 2013 in the field of political criteria and the media. The overall indicative amount under the Civil Society Dialogue III grant program is € 6,150,000 for political criteria and € 3,000,000 for media (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015:133). The goal of the Civil Society Dialogue III program is to create strong connections and high levels of cooperation between civil society in Turkey and their counterparts in the EU on the themes of political criteria, media and EU policy. Civil Society Dialogue also encourages participation of Turkish civil society in

different Community programs. Following table 3.1 shows Civil Society Dialogue Programs I, II and II between the EU and Turkey.

Table 3.1: Civil Society Dialogue Programs I, II and III between the EU and Turkey

	Civil Society Dialogue I	**Civil Society Dialogue II**	**Civil Society Dialogue III**
Implementation Period	2008 - 2009	2010 - 2012	2014 - ongoing
Themes	• Towns and Municipalities • Professional Organizations • Universities • Youth Initiatives	• Agriculture & Fisheries • Culture & Arts • Micro Grant Scheme	• Media • Political Criteria
Total Number of Projects	119	97	55
Budget (MEUR)	19.3	5.3	7

(Republic of Turkey Ministry of EU Affairs 2015)

Starting from 2007, the main financial instrument for Turkish civil society to access EU funding is the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). IPA supports reforms in the candidate countries through financial and technical assistance and prepares them for EU membership. For the period 2007-2013 IPA I was designed to provide assistance through five components: assistance for transition and institution building, cross-border cooperation, regional development, human resource development and rural development (Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey 2007; Zihnioğlu 2013:46). For the period 2014-2020 IPA II set up a new framework for pre-accession assistance. Unlike IPA I, IPA II has a strategic focus and the principle of ownership is promoted through country strategy papers (Commission of the European Communities 2014). Similar to IPA I, one of the priority sectors for funding in IPA II is civil society.

In accordance with the IPA, the Central Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU) which functions as an independent body but is administratively attached to the under secretariat of the Treasury of Turkey takes the responsibility for the budgeting, tendering, contracting, payments, accounting and financial reporting of procurement in the context of the EU funded programs (Ketola 2013: 120; Zihnioğlu 2013:46-47).

The CFCU is founded with the objective to transfer the contracting authority from the European Commission to the Turkish government. It functions as an independent body but is linked to the EU Secretariat General and the National Aid Coordinator. Thus, project proposals for EU funding including the civil society program calls can be directly submitted to the CFCU and funding channels through a governmental body.

The EU has also opened some Community Programs to Turkey to promote cooperation and exchange experiences in different policy areas. Turkey has been participating in Community Programs such as the Education Program, Culture, and Social Policy Programs.

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Turkey Programs

Although human rights are a priority area under all EU financial assistance, the EU has a separate financial program for human rights. The EU has launched the EIDHR solely for human rights issues and since 2002 Turkey has benefitted from the EIDHR. EIDHR is the principal mechanism of support for civil society activities in the promotion of human rights and democracy in third countries. As key beneficiaries of EIDHR, civil society organizations in Turkey benefited from EIDHR funds. In this respect, EIDHR helps "civil society to promote human rights and democratic reform, to support the peaceful conciliation of group interests and to consolidate political participation and representation" (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey [b]). Within this context, there are five main objectives of the EIDHR: (i) increasing respect for human rights in countries and regions where they are most at risk; (ii) helping civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reforms; (iii) supporting actions in human rights fields covered by the EU guidelines; (iv) supporting international and regional frameworks for protection and promotion of human rights and (v) improving electoral processes (Commission of the European Communities 2010). Since 2010, the call for proposals has shown that assisting human rights defenders at the local level has become a prime objective of the EIDHR program alongside the stronger emphasis on the its role in policy making processes.

An examination of the call for proposals shows that priority activities predominantly reflect areas of EU Guidelines on human rights, therefore, human rights actors that are involved in priority areas benefited more from the EU funding

(For detailed discussion see Chapter 7 on human rights organizations). The main priority areas covered the empowerment of civil society in its action in a broad area of human rights. These included the fight against torture and impunity, improved access to justice, human rights education and training programs, enhancing political representation and participation in an organized society, particularly for underrepresented groups including women, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transvestite, Transsexual (LGBTT), Roma and youth (Council of the European Union 2009).

More importantly, the call for proposals for Turkey highlights the EU's approach to civil society within the EIDHR. First, like other civil society programs, civil society is a tool to improve human rights records and democratic credentials. In this respect supporting civil society is regarded as a contribution to "the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms" (Delegation of the EU to Turkey 2012: 4). Moreover, civil society has a significant role in the reform process in Turkey. The Delegation of the EU to Turkey indicated that EIDHR "support has been instrumental in complementing Turkey's reform efforts through enabling better participation of organized citizens in the reform process" (Delegation of the EU to Turkey 2012: 4). Second, interrelated with the first one, civil society is seen as a partner of the EU to support Turkey in its preparation for EU accession. In this regard, civil society has a stronger role in policy making. The Guiding Principles expressed that a specific objective of EU support is: "strengthening civil society's involvement in the making, implementation and monitoring of human rights policies at local and national levels" (Delegation of the EU to Turkey 2012: 4). Thus, the EU integrates human rights organizations in all levels of policymaking processes.

The EIDHR is a thematic financial instrument that overlaps and complements other civil society assistance instruments in Turkey. However, in contrast to IPA, EIDHR has a thematic focus in line with its own broad objectives and is independent in its budget and embedded within EuropeAid. The EIDHR is operated through the calls for proposals; the EIDHR projects in Turkey can be funded through two main ways: Global grant schemes, which are open to all countries, and country support schemes managed by country delegations. Therefore, under EIDHR, funding is not distributed through governmental bodies and civil society organizations directly assisted by the EU bodies. The independence of EIDHR is framed as its key strength-providing assistance independent of the consent of governments.

3.3.2 The Approaches to the EU Civil Society Policy in the Context of Turkish Accession

Civil society is the cornerstone in the enlargement process. It plays an instrumental role in the accession to the EU where support to civil society is also preparation for EU membership. The first pillar of the Copenhagen criteria contends that the candidate country should be a democratic country and should respect human rights and minorities. In this respect, the development of democracy is associated with the existence of a dynamic civil society. Therefore, the EU promotes civil society to help Turkey comply with the political criteria.

In Turkey, civil society engagement is in line with the broader policy aspirations. The EU channels assistance to civil society through various financial instruments. Civil society programs reflect the EU's priorities in civil development by making strong references to democracy, human rights, dialogue and partnership. The EU policy to civil society has two facets that are considered complementary to each other.

The first facet focuses on development of democracy through civil society. For this purpose, the initial program on civil society (Civil Society Development Program) supports capacity building initiatives to develop the institutional structure of civil society. In these programs, civil society is defined as broadly as possible. However, certain issue areas are prioritized in relation to EU expertise. The civil society groups are expected, through their involvement in civil society development programs, to utilize not only issues concerning EU enlargement but also EU priorities. The EU's policy to strengthen civil society is justified on the basis of a certain logic, where civil society is defined as a key player in the democratic game. In this logic, democratization in Turkey is closely related with the existence of open civil society and active citizens. In this process, civil society is expected to develop their capacity so they can fulfill certain functions and contribute to democratic development.

The second facet of the EU policy focuses on the role of civil society as partners in civil society dialogue programs that strengthen contacts, mutual understanding and the exchange experience between the EU and candidate countries. The logic behind these programs is the lessons learnt from the previous enlargement processes. In this context, civil society is seen as a mechanism to understand political and cultural experiences; incorporation of culture is a key component of the civil

society dialogue. There are awareness-raising activities of policies and values. In general, these programs complement civil society development program, but learning is at the heart of the civil society dialogue. Civil society is defined in a broader and more inclusive way and as a linking actor between the EU and citizens. It is assumed that civil society will inform the public and flourish better understanding. In addition, networking is the main strategy in civil society dialogue. There are various activities for NGOs and network building is the main tool for strengthening civil society dialogue. In the case of Turkey, the most important principle of the civil society dialogue is not only the cooperation and collaboration with other civil society actors but also with the Turkish state.

3.4 Conclusion

The question of how the EU impacts civil society development requires an understanding of the rationale and motivations behind the EU policy towards civil society. The policy has implications for understanding Europeanization outcome.

The concept of civil society was entered into the EU policy circle during the early 1990s. It is critical to understand the concept of civil society in the policy language of the EU since it is this concept that is being transferred into different political and cultural contexts during the enlargement process. In section 3.1, the evolution of EU policies within EU context lead to two main conclusions. First, the increasing talk about the importance of civil society in policymaking reflects positive connotations of civil society where civil society is seen as an important instrument in democratization and efficient policymaking. Second, civil society has been deemed crucial for the EU since they have the potential to close the gap between EU policymaking and the citizens and bring EU policymaking closer to the public.

The examination of three different contexts, namely- the EU, Central and East European and Turkish- in relation to civil society reveals similar conclusions in the EU's approach to civil society despite the differences in the focus in civil society programs. The civil society development is associated as a part of good democracy, and governance as well as successful policymaking at the EU level. A comparison between the EU approach to civil society in CEE and Turkey also highlights similarities. In both contexts, the EU introduces civil society within policy frameworks, in a context of ongoing democratization processes. This is

operationalized through the EU assistance to civil society. As section 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate, in its enlargement process, the EU has two complementary pillars for strengthening civil society. The first pillar enhances capacity building and institutional structure of NGOs. The second pillar focuses on dialogues and previous experiences. The policy of civil society dialogue can be found both in CEE and Turkish contexts and based on learning processes.

The efficiency of EU policy on civil society has been a controversial debate both in academic and international policymaking circles. The EU has been criticized along two lines. On the one hand, opponents argue that a neo-liberal model of civil society based on a specific type of organizational structure has been promoted by the EU. On the other hand, critics stress that civil society development is not a technical process. In this context, the EU cannot simply transfer a "blueprint" model of civil society without considering domestic contexts, namely, the effect of historical legacies on civil society. The remaining chapters investigate the impact of the EU on civil society development in Turkey.

CHAPTER 4
HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY

The last few decades witnessed the remarkable rise of civil society in Turkey. Civil society became a magical idea for Turkish politicians; NGOs presented themselves as champions of civil society; media coverage increased their visibility and international donors such the United Nation (UN), the EU, and the World Bank continuously referred to the vital role of civil society in social and political transformations. Likewise, an academic interest in Turkish civil society mainly emerged in the post 1980 period (Göle 1994; Toprak 1996; Yerasimos *et al.* 2000; Kubicek 2002; Keyman and İçduygu 2003; Çaha and Karaman 2004; Seckinelgin 2004; Şimşek 2004a, 2004b; Kadıoğlu 2005; Kubicek 2005; TÜSEV 2006; Toros 2007; Heper and Yıldırım 2011).

In various analyses, an important distinction was drawn between the "new" history of civil society and a long history of associational life (TÜSEV 2006: 35; İçduygu 2011: 382; Kuzmanovic 2012: 11-12). While the new history of civil society is distinguished by the period after 1980 and the emergence of a dynamic civil society activity, the long history of civil society as associational life is affiliated with the existence of various Ottoman institutions and a long tradition of philanthropy and Kemalist civil society organizations that were established in the early years of the republic. Studies have examined civic life in the last period of the Ottoman Empire (Çaha 2001; Çaha and Karaman 2004; Grigoriadis 2009: 42-44), practices of civil society activity in the early period of the Republic (Toprak 1996; Grigoriadis 2009: 44-46), social uses of the concept of civil society (Seufert 2000), shifting meanings and practices of civil society (Kuzmanovic 2012), its role in social transformation and democracy (Seçkinelgin 2004; Keyman and İçduygu 2003; Seçkinelgin 2004; Şimşek 2004a, 2004b) and the impact of the Europeanization processes on civil society (For detailed literature review and discussion see section 2.1.3.). However, there is no detailed analysis of the inherited characteristics of Turkish civil society, and relations

with different actors. Most of the explanations tend to focus solely on the characteristics of a state- society relationship within a particular period of history.

In this respect, this chapter extends the focus of the analysis not only on characteristics of state-society relations in a particular period of time but also the other characteristics of civil society with the aim to identify historical legacies in relation to civil society. As defined in Chapter 2, historical legacies are perceived as the inherited characteristics of civil society and particular aspects of the past that molded civil society in Turkey. For this purpose, through long-term historical analysis and process tracing, this chapter identifies six key legacies that shaped civil society in Turkey: the lack of resources and dependency where civil society has been chronically underfunded in terms of resources, a restrictive legal environment characterized by the absence of autonomous space and opportunities in terms of rights, Europe as an important symbol of framing, a weak state with a strong state tradition, an ideologically divided civil society sphere in terms of internal networks, and the presence of diverse connections with external networks.

I argue that these legacies of the past still shape civil society, its relations with different actors, and the impact of the EU. For this purpose, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section identifies key characteristics of civil society in the Ottoman period. The second part focuses on the same characteristics and analyzes continuity and change from the early period of Republic. The final section concentrates on developments in civil society between the early 1980s and late 1990s.

4.1. Civil Society in the Ottoman Empire

Civil society has been a much debated and contested topic both in academia and policy circles. There are two lines of the debate in Turkish studies in relation to civil society. In the first line of the debate, scholars have argued that weak civil society could be attributed to the legacy of the strong state tradition and religion inherited from the Ottoman Empire (Mardin 1969; Özbudun1996; Heper 2000; Grigoriadis 2009:43; Kuran 2012). According to Heper (2000: 78):

> The absence of civil society in Turkey was an inheritance from the Ottoman Empire, where political, economic and social power coalesced in the center. Within the upper strata, status and wealth were attached to offices, and not to lineages or families. Bureaucratic position, thus, had the greatest weight in determining policy. The elite

justified its appropriation of policymaking based on its presumed cultural preeminence and superior knowledge.

Similarly, Mardin has underscored the dominance of the state and highlighted that "by refusing to allow existing social groups to become differentiated and to attain social autonomy, the state made these structures dependent upon it for support" (1969: 269).

Equally important were the explanations related to Islamic religious beliefs and the lack of institutional structures that impeded the emergence of the civil society. Some researchers argue that, contrary to Christianity, Islam has prevented the existence of civil society independent from the state, lacked institutional structures equivalent to the church to balance the state power and therefore in non-Western patrimonial societies and in tribal societies, civil society is not compatible with Islamic tradition (Gellner 1994; Grigoriadis 2009; Kuran 2012).

In the second line of the debate, other scholars have argued that civil society was not entirely absent in the Ottoman Empire (Norton 2001; Çaha and Karaman 2004). Accordingly, Islamic foundation (*vakf*), religious orders (*tarikat*), guilds (*esnaf/lonca*) and a community system (*millet*) were all "quasi-civil society formations" in Ottoman history (Çaha and Karaman 2004; Grigoriadis 2009: 43; Zencirci 2014: 3). For example, the *vakf* were non-profit organizations that undertook social functions similar to civil society organizations particularly with regard to educational and judiciary issues. As philanthropic organizations, they were relatively independent institutions, not state owned but indirectly dependent on the state. Equivalently, the *tarikat* was an autonomous entity and functioned outside state control and performed social activities such as education. In a similar vein, the *lonca* was an autonomous body that organized the relationship between the tradesmen and the central government. Finally, the *millet* system that existed for non-Muslim minorities developed an "advanced network of social organizations" in addition to religious, educational and charity foundations (Grigoriadis 2009: 44). Chapter 7 discusses the *millet* system from the perspective of human rights civil society.

Despite a different focus of attention, both of these debates emphasize strong state tradition and its implications on civil society in Turkey. As stated by Özbudun (1996:133), the Ottoman state tradition was characterized by "a strong and centralized state, reasonably effective by the standards of its day, highly autonomous societal forces, and occupying a central and highly valued place in Ottoman political culture." In this regard, the Ottoman state tradition was distinguished by two counter trends. On

the one side, the Ottoman political culture was described as a patrimonial bureaucracy where legitimacy depended on the personal rule of the sultan. In this tradition, the power was concentrated in the hands of the sultan and a small number of bureaucratic ruling elite strongly attached to the Ottoman state (Mardin 1969). The sultan was delegated religious and executive power to the ruling institution- military (*askeri).* This means that the sultan would determine a man's status in the society, therefore, he exercised unlimited personal rule. The patrimonial bureaucracy was also highly motivated to "keep under control any sources of power that appeared outside the boundaries of the legitimate power structure" (Mardin 1969: 259). This in turn created a culture that opposed and was hesitant to different "threatening" rival principalities and functioned according to the norms of the state.

Furthermore, in line with a patrimonial system, the sultan and the state not only had unlimited power over its subjects, but also had absolute power over economic life (Heper 2000:65). In the Islamic world, this patriarch's duty of the sultan was known as the duty of *hisba,* meaning the sultan was responsible for the welfare of his subjects (Mardin 1969: 260; Heper 2000: 65). The land was also concentrated in the hands of the sultan. The land system, *tımar,* granted the state lands to military elites in return for their services to the Empire. Therefore, the state and society were considered as inseparable and "the welfare of society depended on the well-being of the state" (Heper 2000:66).

On the other hand, legitimacy did not only rest in the personal rule of the sultan. During the second part of the fourteenth century, the state and sultan started to differentiate from each other. Meanwhile, a new legislation emerged, the tradition of the sultan (*orf-i sultani),* and the sultan was urged to follow reason and prioritize the state interest, not Islamic law. Therefore, the sultan was not perceived as identical to the state anymore. After that, the state was responsible for the order and the sultan became only a symbol for the state (Heper 1985: 35). In other words, for the first time the *orf-i sultani* tradition had introduced a secular aspect to the Ottoman state policy. Consequently, the *adab* tradition promoted secularism, and the dominance of the state in the Ottoman Empire. The *adab* tradition empowered the development of a strong centralist bureaucratic state tradition. This bureaucratic elite became the ruling power in the Ottoman Empire and later in the early Republican period.

The strong and centralized state tradition alongside bureaucratic elites also shaped society in a particular way. In this respect, one of the most important

characteristics of the Ottoman Empire was the sharp cultural divide between "center and periphery" or "palace and rural" (Mardin 1969; 1973). The center refers to the ruling institutions such as the palace, the civilian bureaucracy and the military. Culturally, this group was different from the rest of the population. As Heper (1980: 85) indicates, the center denotes "the groups or persons that support or maintain the autonomy and superiority of the government in the political structure". In contrast, the periphery refers to the citizens and groups that were culturally different and believed in an "Image of Good Society" promoted mainly by a Sunni Islamic religious tradition (Mardin 1975: 15-32). The culture of the periphery was heterogeneous, and it did not have any particular kind of identity. From the nineteenth century, the cultural gap between the center and periphery increased as the center became more aware and influenced by Western culture (Heper 2000: 66). This later paved the way for an ideologically divided society where the elite considered themselves superior to the rest of the population.

Turkey's European aspirations have a long history, which dates back to the Ottoman Empire. Historical precedents of European symbolism started with the initiation of the *Tanzimat* in 1839. Since then, Europe has been an important symbol, a model and a reference point for Turkey. For example, a campaign for recognition of a European Ottoman identity had characterized the Ottoman foreign policy agenda (Grigoriadis 2009:2). In this respect, the invitation from the Concert of Europe was significant for the Ottoman Empire because, symbolically, for the first time Turkey was regarded as a European power (Grigoriadis 2009: 185). It is important to underline that the West and Europe were used interchangeably at that period. In the *Tanzimat* era, the model of the Western European state had been at the center of the Ottoman modernization process. Inspired by the centralized European model, *Tanzimat* leaders attempted a strong concentration of power, so called centralization, as a way of transforming the state and securing the territorial integrity of the Empire. The abolition of traditional checks and balances, the reform of the military and civil bureaucracy and introduction of Western technology further empowered the state and its potential to control the society (Grigoriadis 2009: 68-69).

Modernization was also inspired by the "Western European polity notions" (Kuzmanovic 2012: 15), which had profound effects for the civil society. Europe and the West was an important symbol with regard to the restructuring of society. For example, Europe and the West was a model for the development of secular civil

society structures and a strong reference point at that time. However, *Tanzimat* had failed to introduce the intended social, political and economic reforms and further strengthened the state apparatus at the expense of society. The declaration of the first Ottoman Constitution in 1976, *Kanun-ı Esasi*, ended the *Tanzimat* period and introduced representative institutions toward a political liberalization. Yet, the following years witnessed the struggle between the authoritarian regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II and the Young Turks, a group of intellectuals who strived to limit authoritarian rule (Toprak 1996: 90). The 1908 Young Turk revolution had aimed to bring the Ottoman Empire closer to Europe through political, economic, and social change and ended the absolutist regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The implementation of the Young Turk agenda, especially the formation of the Committee for Union and Progress that established the 1909 Ottoman Law of Associations (*Cemiyetler Kanunu*) was motivated by the Western European polity notions (Kuzmanovic 2012: 15). There was strong reference to the French social order and Western principles. One of the principal new civil actors that emerged in this period was the women's movement. The women's movement contributed to the emergence of a consciousness regarding women's rights through journals and associations. As I will show more comprehensively in Chapter 5, the women's movement made strong references to the West and Europe and European values. This is how Europe and Western principles became important symbols and reference points in early periods of Turkish history.

The Second Constitutional period started with the introduction of the 1909 Ottoman Law of Associations, which regulated activities of civic groups, political parties and workers' groups (Toprak 1983; Alkan 1998: 46). One of the most important consequences of the Second Constitutional period was the mushrooming of the associational activity. In the period between 1908 and 1918, 12 political parties and 37 political or social associations were founded alongside 157 chambers of commerce in different provinces, several chambers of industry, 51 small business associations, different organizations of entrepreneurs and artisans, and sale-credit cooperatives (Toprak 1996: 90).

Although the 1909 Law of Associations set the legal framework for associational activity and relatively liberalized the political atmosphere, it was shaped with a particular understanding. In this context, Article 120 on freedom of association was a good illustration. According to Article 120 (Alkan 1998) on freedom of association:

Ottomans could enjoy the right of assembly, on the condition that they obeyed the law on the subject. Societies were forbidden that aimed to injure the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, change the form of the Constitution or of the government, act contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, or bring about a separation among the various Ottoman elements, or which were contrary to public morals. The formation of secret societies in general was also forbidden.[13]

Therefore, Article 120 is an example of the introduction of a restrictive legal infrastructure. In this respect, Article 120 emphasized community over the individual, unity over diversity, and an understanding of law that privileges integrity and solidarity, which was later inherited by the Turkish Republic. Similarly, Article 18 (Alkan 1998) regulated the financial-administrative infrastructure of associations in a restrictive way. Accordingly, the associations could not accept grants without a government license (Article 18), and members of the associations could not donate more than twenty-four liras annually unless there was permission from the government (Article 8 in Alkan 1998). Therefore, financial-administrative structures were developed under the strict control of the state, were dependent on government permission and subject to state control.

A further element lacking in this period was the existence of international connections with other civil society actors. It is important to highlight that in that time, forming international connections between civil society actors in other countries was not a common practice not only in Turkey but also in other countries as well. Nonetheless, as I will present in subsequent sections and other chapters, the lack of or weak connections with international counterparts, which became more visible in the later years of the Republic was more pronounced in Turkey. This lack of connections can be explained by the historical context that shaped the civil society and two interrelated factors. One explanation is the premature status of civil society and the restrictive legal-institutional framework that inhibited cooperation between international civic actors. Other explanation is related with the perception of the state bequeathed from the Ottoman Empire and later empowered in the Republican era as a consequence of the defeat Sévres Syndrome. In this understanding, the state was skeptical towards any activities that challenged its hegemonic status. The activities were seen as a threat for the survival of the state and intervention in domestic affairs.

13 *The Ottoman Constitution.* Available at: http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1876constitution.htm Accessed on: [1 October 2015]. Translator is unknown.

In the period between the War of Independence and its aftermath, associational activity continued with a total of 45 political parties and organizations (Toprak 1996: 90). Yet, associational activity ended with the foundation of the Republic in 1923 and the inception of single party domination. During the first decade of the Republic until 1946 all opposition groups were silenced. The following section presents the development of civil society between 1923 and 1980, and its characteristics within this period. The section demonstrates that in the early Republican period civil society was characterized by continuities rather than change.

4.2. Civil Society in the Early Republican Turkey and Multi-Party Period (1923-1980)

The new Republic that was founded in 1923 was heavily influenced by the modernization efforts initiated in the Ottoman Empire and left little space for the development of civil society in Turkey (Grigoriadis 2009: 44). Modernization efforts tried to diminish the influence of Islam dogmas that were perceived as a source of backwardness and synthesized the Western and Islamic traditions. The vision of Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) in particular, a leading philosopher from the Ottoman period, was the most influential among the new elite as he argued for merging Western civilization with Turkish culture. His political-social theory titled "Turkish-Islamist-Westernist Modernizm" summed up his "social ideal" as follows: "We are of the Turkish nation (*millet*), of the Islamic religious community (*ümmet*), of Western civilization (*medeniyet*)" (Parla 1985:25). He made a distinction between the culture and civilization. For Gökalp, Turks should borrow Western civilization but maintain their culture. This means that he proposed keeping peculiarities of Turkish tradition and values of Turkish society while following innovations of the Western world in terms of institutions and development. For some, this presents the source of the "paradox" (Ketola 2013:60), which in turn created a "two-tier" civil society, the development of civil society.

The founder of the modern Turkish Republic and first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was inspired by Gökalp's ideas and followed a dynamic reform agenda on the basis of Gökalp's vision. For instance, the highest political authority, the Caliphate, was abolished and powers of the Caliphate were transferred to the new parliament, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

The secular elite was at the center of the Westernization project and dominated the reform process. In following Gokalp's ideas through reforms, individual interest was subordinated at the expense of collective interest and the power was accumulated at the center, which in turn created a strong functioning state. In the 1930s, six key principles of Kemalism were introduced and codified in the Republican constitution. The six principles of Kemalism are *Republicanism* (representative democracy, and rule of law), *secularism* (separation of religious and political institutions), *populism* (elite working for the interest and on behalf of the society), *etatism* (state centered economic development), *nationalism* (based on citizenship rather than ethnic orientation), and *reformism* (introduction of new and dynamic institutions of governance) (Yeğen 2001: 57). The principles of Kemalism were so important they were taught to all citizens in the schools, and therefore, left no other alternative views to develop in the public sphere. Kemalism played a key role in shaping the relationship between civil society and the state.

Even though the reforms emphasized sovereignty of the people and marked an important break from the Ottoman Empire, as Özçetin *et al.* (2014:5) explain," the young Republic *inherited the political reflex* of the Ottoman tradition" (emphasis added). From the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Turkish state was the dominant and assertive force not only in political and economic life but also in associational life (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 223; TÜSEV 2006: 36). The strong state tradition that was furthered by Kemalism prevented the development of vibrant civil society and created a weak model of civil society that mainly depended on state institutions. This strong Kemalist tradition also imposed a "particular model of Turkishness" (Seckinelgin 2004:174) and certain types of organizations flourished that supported those principles. As in the Ottoman period, the hegemonic status of the state was uncontested where the state emphasized that the primary concern in state-society relations is the protection of the state interest and unity.

In terms of a legal-institutional framework, the freedom of association was formally recognized in the 1924 Constitution, but in practice the state controlled the civic sphere and limited any activity that would challenge its interests. For example, Article 70 and Article 79 (Alkan 1998) highlighted freedom of association:

Inviolability of person; freedom of conscience, of thought, of speech, of press, freedom of travel and of contact, freedom of labor; freedom of private property; of

assembly, of association; freedom of incorporation, are among the natural rights of Turks. (Article 70)[14]

Limitations upon freedom of contract, labour, property, assembly, association and incorporation shall be determined by law. (Article 79)[15]

Yet, the 1938 Law of Associations introduced serious limitations on the formation of associations. For example, the law contained a description on high treason and Article 9 added a comprehensive list of the prohibitions and forbidden associations (Alkan 1998: 56-57). Likewise, Article 28[16] of the 1938 Law of Associations restrained the development of an independent financial-administrative infrastructure by introducing heavy restrictions and arbitrary financial control by the government.

Compared to the post-Ottoman period, division in civil society was further deteriorated. In this era, civil society was mainly divided along two lines. On the one hand, there were Kemalist civil society actors, which were based on the official state policy and coopted by the state. These organizations in turn supported the state's policies and empowered its hegemonic position. On the other hand, there were non-Kemalist organizations that were based on different views of civil society. The state in turn supported those civil society organizations that had a Kemalist and secular orientation and left no room for the other types of organizations that were based on different conceptions of civil society. Therefore, we see the development of a homogenous civil society and the dominance of Kemalist organizations in the public sphere. During this period, the development of civil society was shaped under strict state control. The various organizations that were outside the state ideology, such as *tarikats* and opposition political parties, were banned and the Republican People's Party *(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP)* took over the functions of the Ottoman state bureaucracy and enjoyed power until 1946 (Mardin 1973: 304-305). State-controlled civil society organizations such as chambers of commerce, professional associations, and trade unions as corporatist models dominated the political landscape (Grigoriadis 2009: 45). Therefore, the political reflex of the state remained unchanged and there

[14] *The Ottoman Constitution.* Available at: http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1876constitution.htm Accessed on: [1 October 2015]. Translator is unknown.
[15] *The Ottoman Constitution.* Available at: http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1876constitution.htm Accessed on: [1 October 2015]. Translator is unknown.
[16] *The Ottoman Constitution.* Available at: http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1876constitution.htm Accessed on: [1 October 2015]. Translator is unknown.

was a pattern of continuity both in the state structure and in civil society organizations.

Europe and the West as an important symbol continued to dominate the political spectrum. Like the *Tanzimat* period, the conscious Westernization process of the Kemalist elite was inspired by the Western European polity notions (Kuzmanovic 2012: 15). Europe and the West as a model were especially important with regard to the development of civil society. One illustration was a Kemalist Women's organization, the Turkish Women's Union (*Türk Kadınlar Birliği-TKB*). In this context, European/ Western women were a model for the organization. For example, representative of the organization said that the "modern woman in the West has been an important model since the establishment of the organization." (Interview TKB 2011). She added that although *TKB* made connections with the women in the East, they rejected invitations to participate in the activities during this period, because European women were a model for Turkish women and they did not want to be resembled to Eastern women (Interview *TKB* 2011).

In the early Republican period, international connections were also restricted and shaped under the auspices of the state control. The legal framework limited establishment of associations that had international connections. For example, Article 10 of the 1938 Law of Associations stated that foreign associations outside the country could not open branches in Turkey (Alkan 1998: 57). Furthermore, Article 10 prohibited establishing international connections with foreign associations. In some sense, the second paragraph of Article 10 eased the restrictive framework and stated that international associations could be established if there was national interest in cooperation, yet the decision was made by the Council of Ministers. However, the Council of Ministers had the sole authority to decide on the establishment or closure of the associations. Furthermore, some organizations took part in the international conventions. For instance, in 1926 under the leadership of a leading feminist, Nezihe Muhiddin, *TKB* became a member of the International Women's Union.

Transition to the multi-party period (1946-1960)

In 1950, the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Partisi- DP*) won the elections and politicians represented by the DP tried to challenge the dominant role of the state elite with a loose form of secularism. As Mardin (1973) argues, for the first time, political power established the link with the periphery where their vote was coming from the rural peasantry.

Only for a short period of time, the DP leaned towards more liberal reform compared to the CHP, and broadened the spectrum of popular participation by integrating the periphery of Turkish society (Grigoriadis 2009: 29). In particular, the 1946 Law of Association relatively liberalized the political environment and eased the restrictions on the establishment and operation of the associations. This led to a boom in the number of associations and labor unions. During this time, a number of associations multiplied approximately eight times to exceed 17,000 (Özbudun 2000:129). For the first time in Turkish political history, in 1952, the first labor federation, the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu- TÜRK-İŞ*) was established and had civil society activism and a non-political stance. However, like its predecessor, the DP oppressed civil society organizations that had a critical view of its policies. For example, the DP repeatedly prevented *TÜRK-İŞ* to become a member of the International Trade Union Confederation (Özçetin *et al.* 2014: 7) and thus restricted establishing external connections. Furthermore, the press was oppressed by restrictive legislation. More importantly, during this period, top-down and a suspicious approach by governmental authorities limited broader political participation. For example, the Law of Associations was amended in 1952 to enable courts to outlaw activities of associations and protect the properties of associations even before they were ordered to be dissolved (Zihnioğlu 2013: 104). This in turn created a weak civil society, which resembled the early Kemalist period. In this respect, while the organizations that supported government policies were enabled, organizations with oppositional voices were disabled and oppressed.

The DP won again in the 1954 and 1957 elections, but the downfall of the party started with the unpopularity of Adnan Menderes, the prime minister. Similar to the CHP before the DP, Menderes and the DP started to function like an authoritarian party and assumed that the government constituted the state (Ketola 2013: 64). Following on the deterioration of economic performance and the worsening of the

relationship between the government and the opposition, on 27 May 1960, the military stepped in. The 1960 military coup led the execution of DP politicians and the arrest of political activists. Nonetheless, the 1961 Constitution provided a legal framework for the development of civil society and enhancement of rights. For instance, it assured the right to establish associations (Article 29) and the right to congregate and march in demonstrations with prior permission from the authorities (Article 28) (Özbudun 2000). The 1961 constitution also increased the autonomy of universities. For example, civil rights were promoted and students were given the freedom to organize their own associations at the universities. It also gave social rights to trade unions such as rights to free unionization, to strike and of collective bargaining (Özbudun 2000: 129). In sum, political activities such as the activities of new parties, trade unions, and religious groups had more freedoms and individual human rights were protected compared to previous constitutions (Grigoriadis 2009: 29).

However, the political environment was not stable and there were coalition governments between the CHP and the Justice Party *(Adalet Partisi- AP)*. In 1965, the AP won the elections with a clear majority but soon struggled with the new Right-Left politics in Turkey (Sunar and Sayarı 1986). The extreme polarization and ideological division of society along a left-right continuum characterized this period. The new Right-Left politics influenced the development of civil society during this period. During these years, the Revolutionary Labor Unions Confederation of Turkey *(Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu- DİSK)* established and followed a more independent and socialist action in its activities (Blind 2007). The DİSK affiliated with the leftist circles. However, when the fighting between right and left groups deteriorated and destabilized the county, a second military coup took place on 12 March 1971. The 1961 constitution was amended and severely limited the political freedoms on behalf of the state integrity and unity. Zihnioğlu (2013: 107) states that, "the changes covered basically every political and social institution in Turkey, including the trade unions, the press, universities, the Council of State and the Parliament".

After the second military coup, the military and secularist elite considered civil society as a threat to the country's stability. Therefore, the civil society arena was limited and any activities that were outside the state policy were not tolerated.

Between 1971 and 1980 Turkey was politically unstable with clumsy governments. By the end of the 1970s, the political situation worsened, there was violence between militant leftist and state-tolerated rightist groups and the government could not control the situation (Karpat 1988: 145-146).

At the end, for the third time, the army responded with a coup and took over political power on 12 September 1980. As the following section shows, the new Constitution that was approved in 1982 brought severe limitations on human rights and liberties and banned all political activities. Furthermore, the changes in the Law on Associations further restricted and limited the space of civil society (Kubicek 2001: 36).

4.3. Civil Society in Post- Republican Period (1980-1999)

According to the National Security Council, the purpose of the 1980 military coup was to restore the political, social and economic crises predominating in the second half of the 1970s (Zihnioğlu 2013: 109). The makers of the 1982 Constitution did not envisage a vibrant civil society that plays a key role in the political processes. In his speech, Kenan Evren, introduced the draft constitution before the constitutional referendum on 7 November 1982. Evren expressed the military junta's opinion on associations:

> The new Constitution lays down a principle valid for all institutions. Each institution, whether a party, a school, or a professional organization, should remain in its own functionally specified area. In other words, a party will function as a party, an association as an association, a foundation as a foundation, and a trade union as a trade union. Political activity is reserved for political parties. No institution which is not organized as a political party may engage in political activity. On the other hand, political parties should not interfere in areas reserved for trade unions, associations, professional organizations, and foundations. Every institution will function within its framework. (Quoted in Özbudun 2000: 131).

Therefore, a goal of the 1982 Constitution was to prevent the politicization of associations. It banned all organizations from pursuing political objectives, which was seen as responsible for polarizing society and spreading violence in the mid 1970s. The military re-writing of the 1982 Constitution brought severe limitations on individual liberty and empowered state authority to restore the order. The maintenance of law and order and preserving state authority had been at the center of the military intervention. The objective of the 1982 Constitution and its respective

laws were to protect the state by hindering the development of civil society and limiting rights and freedoms.

Particularly, the authoritative and restrictive nature of the constitution was embedded in Articles 33 and 34 in relation to the activities of civil society organizations (Zihnioğlu 2013: 111). Articles 33 and 34[17] stated that:

Associations cannot pursue political goals, cannot have political activities, neither be supported by the political parties nor support them, can not act jointly with the syndicates, professional institutions and foundations. (Article 33)

Associations, foundations, syndicates and professional organizations cannot meet or march on issues other than their interest or objective. (Article 34)

Furthermore, the Law of Associations was promulgated in 1983 and as Özçetin *et. al* (2014:8) emphasizes, it "limited the rights of civil servants' membership in associations and gave the state absolute authority to stop and control activities of associations". The Constitution expressly prohibited involvement in political activities, banned all professional associations and trade unions, closed down political parties, detained their leaders, oppressed leftist and extreme right parties and abolished all connection and mechanisms of joint actions between political parties and groups (Özbudun 2000:131; Zihnioğlu 2013:110). Thus, as was evident in different periods to varying degrees, the legal and institutional environment was restricted for the operation of civil society. At the same time, associations forced to depend on state institutions and remained under the strict control of the state.

After the 1980 military coup, political, economic, and social transformations changed the political landscape in Turkey and impacted the development of civil society. The Motherland Party *(Anavatan Partisi- ANAP)* won the elections and Turkey's new economic liberalization policies and the shift from an import orientated to an export orientated economic model together with the rise of political Islam reshaped the political arena (Grigoriadis 2009: 45-46). Göle describes the difference between the pre-1980 period and post-1980 period as follows: "Whereas the *modernizing* elites of the earlier decades took as their basic mission the secularization of Turkish politics and the transmission of Western values to that polity and to society, the *technocratic* elites of the 1980s defined their goals less in terms of

[17] Constitution of the Republic of Turkey [Turkey], 7 November 1982, Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5be0.html [Accessed on: 15 January 2010].

educating people then of synthesizing Islamic values and pragmatic rationality." (Göle 1994:213).

Significantly, the military junta's intention to "restore" the political order and "stabilize" the country led to the revival of Islam in Turkish politics and society. In order to end the right-left division, the military regime collaborated with moderate Sunni Islam. This policy of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (*Türk –İslam Sentez*i) sought to utilize Islamic values against leftists groups and Kurdish nationalists (Kadıoğlu 1996; Grigoriadis 2009: 50; Ketola 2013: 66). Particularly in the Özal era, political Islam did not only rise in the public sphere, but was also promoted by the active government policy. For instance, the establishment of İmam Hatip Schools (*İmam Hatip Okulları*) was supported. These schools advanced religious education and gave rise to religious civil society which promoted political Islam (Grigoriadis 2009: 50). Tünay (1993) argues that the post-1980 developments created an atmosphere and a new equilibrium for "the Turkish new rights attempt to hegemony". Furthermore, Tünay (1993:11) states that "a shift towards development based on export orientation, restructuring law and order, emergence of new individualism, deterioration of distribution of wealth, and the rise of the new-right politics pointed to an emergence of a new balance of power in Turkey". These developments opened a new space for the civic activity and brought new dynamism for the civil society.

Scholars have argued that the post-1980 period and the 1990s constituted a turning point and a break up in the history of Turkish civil society (Göle 1994 ;Toprak 1996; Özbudun and Keyman 2002; Şimşek 2004; TÜSEV 2006; İçduygu 2007; Keyman and Öniş 2007). Despite the restrictive constitutional and legal framework, the number of civil society organizations proliferated, their areas of interest diversified and therefore the spectrum of civil society expanded and civil society space became "more diffused" (Seckinelgin 2004:174).

Keyman and İçduygu (2003) identified four main processes that facilitated the social and political changes in Turkey in the mid-1980s onwards. The first process is the emergence of alternative modernities where new actors, new mentalities and new identity claims have developed since the 1980s (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 222; Kuzmanovic 2012: 12). The secular and state-centric model of modernity was no longer efficient to regulate the societal relations and the hegemony of this model was challenged by alternative claims. Within this context, the emergence of new actors alongside new discourses created an interest in civil society as an alternative

framework. In addition to Islamic discourse, an array of new actors, from women's groups to environmental groups, human rights groups to Kurdish groups that utilize the language of rights and democratization have been grown. Therefore, the late 1980s witnessed the tolerance of different groups with different cultural backgrounds (Şimşek 2004:112) and issue areas. The second process is the legitimacy crisis of the strong-state tradition in Turkey (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 223; Kuzmanovic 2012: 13). The new developments in the post-1980 period showed the inability of the state to deal with problems. The third process to facilitate social and political changes is the EU accession process (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 223-225; Kuzmanovic 2012: 14) that is extensively discussed in the following chapters. The fourth process is the process of globalization, specifically globalization of markets and the intensification of global communication (Keyman and İçduygu 2003: 225; Kuzmanovic 2012: 15). Globalization has pointed out the limits of national politics and the necessity of collaborative relations to resolve global matters such as environmental degradation, poverty and multiculturalism. Within this context, civil society organizations have become important actors in political processes. Another international development has been the 1996 UN Habitat II conference held in İstanbul. The Habitat Conference created an opportunity for, and mobilized Turkish civil society organizations and other stakeholders to participate in the global movement of civil society as well as increased the awareness of civil society organizations on different matters such as social justice and sustainable development (TÜSEV 2006: 14). It notably provided a bridge for networking between Turkish civil society organizations and their counterparts around the world.

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter situated civil society in a historical context and showed historical legacies in relation to civil society. These legacies, defined as inherited characteristics of civil society, are not only important to demonstrate past and present traditions of civil society but more importantly have implications on the EU impact. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will discuss the interplay among the historical legacies and the EU in different sectors of civil society. The path-dependent character of civil society is the main conclusion of this chapter. This means that despite the growing number of organizations, its diversification, increased autonomy, and strengthening of civil

society, the inherited characteristics of civil society have not changed to a great extent.

The legacy of strong state tradition was inherited from the Ottoman Empire. As I have shown, throughout the different periods, the unity and survival of the state has been the main concern in Turkish political history. Civil society activities that were seen in contrast to the state's interests were not tolerated and suppressed.

The legacy of restrictive legal and institutional framework was prevalent and continued to shape the operation of civil society. All constitutions since the Ottoman Empire introduced freedom of association to varying degrees. For instance, while the 1961 constitution was very liberal in nature, the 1982 constitution was the most authoritarian in nature. Yet, as shown by the 1909, 1924, 1961, 1971 and 1982 Constitutions and respective articles, freedom of association was limited and state controlled. In addition, in terms of financial structure, the state closely monitored civil society organizations and they remained under the strict control of the governments.

The presence and prevalence of the legacy of Europe as an important symbol of framing was evident. Europe and the West are used interchangeably and has been an important symbol in Turkish politics since the *Tanzimat* period. This does not mean that the usage of Europe and its nature has not changed throughout the different periods. On the contrary, the usage of Europe is subject to change. However, it remained as a model, as an important symbol in the debates of civil society.

The legacy of the ideologically divided civil society sphere is one of the peculiarities of civil society in Turkey. Since the Ottoman period, civil society has been ideologically divided and the legal framework has not eased the cooperation among civil society actors. In the Ottoman period, the society was divided between the center and the periphery; in the early Republican period, civil society was divided between Kemalist and non-Kemalist organizations, the transition to multiparty politics did not change the cleavage and the society was divided between government supported organizations and other organizations; after 1960 it was divided along left-right axis and since 1980, the division has been based on a Kemalist-Islamist or Kurdish-Kemalist continuum.

The legacy of limited and diverse external connections is also an inherited characteristic of the civil society. Although cooperation started in earlier times for some organizations, the constitution did not only make it difficult to open foreign civil society branches in Turkey, but also governments strictly controlled civil society

and impeded establishing external connections. One of the key implications of historical legacies is on the EU impact. These legacies are important not only to show patterns of continuity in society, but also significant for the EU impact.

CHAPTER 5
WOMEN'S CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY

Women's civil society, with a particular focus on women's NGOs, provides a challenging case for scholars and policymakers for understanding the potential and limits of the EU influence. This chapter contributes to the growing literature on the Europeanization of civil society, discussed extensively in Chapter 2, with a new and original empirical study on the re-evaluation of EU impact on women's civil society, systematic analysis of mechanisms, their interplay with domestic factors, and reconsideration of how transformative the European integration on women's NGOs in Turkey is. The interaction between the EU and civil society challenges the orthodox top-down approach of Europeanization studies, and shows that the Europeanization outcomes are shaped by the interaction between the EU and domestic factors, and the EU has not necessarily led to uniform impact across different sectors of civil society; legacy-based explanations account for the variation of the EU impact.

My argument is a stronger degree of Europeanization of women's civil society is achieved when the EU meets facilitating historical legacies are grounded in two main literatures. The first one is the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey, which focuses on the transformative impact of the EU on Turkish civil society. The second is the literature on women's studies in Turkey, which has scrutinized the relationship between the EU and the women's movement in Turkey. While the former has extensively examined the compulsory and enabling pathway on civil society this domain of the literature has not been sufficiently concentrated on connective pathways of the EU influence. The latter has focused on the literature on the women's movement in Turkey and the relationship between the EU and women's groups. Some scholars have prioritized the role of the EU as a key factor, for example, Kıvılcım - Forsman (2004) shows that the gender equality laws, and the new Civil Code, are largely driven by the Turkish harmonization process of the EU *acquis*. Others have argued that reforms in the new Civil and Penal Code as well as Constitutional amendments were primarily driven by the advocacy and lobby of the women's groups

(Kardam 2011). Another group of scholars has stressed that the women's organizations' demands were empowered by EU pressure (Arat 2008; Aldıkaçtı-Marshall 2008). Aldıkaçtı-Marshall (2008) has argued that the EU has created favorable conditions for women's groups to influence the drafting processes of law. More recently, Özdemir (2014) has analyzed the role of the EU in triggering legislative reforms by considering its interaction with other domestic and external factors. However, in current literature there is no comprehensive analysis of the Europeanization of women's NGOs, the interplay between direct and indirect forms of EU involvement nor an exploration of interaction between domestic and EU factors.

This chapter fills these gaps and contributes to both literatures. I argue that the EU has differential impact on different sectors of civil society and a stronger degree of the Europeanization of women's civil society is achieved when the EU meets facilitating historical legacies. I substantiate this argument with original empirical evidence and show the role of historical legacies in the explanation of the EU impact. By using categories of the EU impact from Diez *et al.* (2006; 2008), I have examined different processes of the EU influence on women's civil society. My study of compulsory and enabling pathways indicate similar findings across different sectors of civil society. While I will examine both pathways in relation to the women's civil society, most of the analysis will focus on the connective pathway that led to diverse outcomes. As I emphasized in Chapter 2, most of the research on civil society judged the EU influence on the basis of the changes on the operation of civil society and the EU's legitimization power. Although I will present evidence from these aspects, in this thesis I judged the EU impact not only on the operation of civil society but also their role in the policies as well as their interactions among actors. For this reason, I will mostly base my analysis on the connective impact, which is not inclusively surveyed in the literature. I will show how interaction of domestic factors and EU factors led to different outcomes of Europeanization. Finally, I will demonstrate how legacies matter and function as a facilitating condition of the EU impact.

Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, I should emphasize that women's NGOs are not a homogenous group in Turkey. The group in my fieldwork includes the main women's NGOs in Turkey, namely, Kemalist women NGOs, feminist women NGOs, Islamist women NGOs and Kurdish women NGOs. There have been various attempts to categorize women's civil society in Turkey. The selection of

women NGOs informed by two general criteria: (i) national women NGOs, and (ii) advocacy women NGOs that focus their expertize on different aspects of women's issues. Therefore, I focus on one particular type of women's NGOs- active national women NGOs that perform advocacy functions in different areas.

In the first section, I provide an overview of the historical evolution of women's civil society in understanding particular characteristics that shaped the women's movement in Turkey. This section shows peculiarities of women's civil society and argues that historically women's civil society has had strong activism, some form of relations with the state and early international links even in the Ottoman period. The second section applies a model of EU influence on civil society development and demonstrates different dimensions of the EU impact in women's civil society. The third section shows the role of historical legacies in the explanation of the EU impact by invoking a plausibility probe. These results suggest that the successful transformation of women's civil society has depended on domestic factors that act as facilitating conditions. In other words, development of women's civil society has been both influenced by the EU and by particular legacies such as strong activism and mobilization, institutionalization and long international ties. The final section summarizes the findings and looks at the implications for the EU's civil society approach from women's civil society in Turkey. Overall, empirical findings substantiate the conclusion that the EU and legacies of the past shape the development of women's civil society in Turkey, and act as facilitating conditions for the transformation of civil society.

5.1. Major Developments in Women's Civil Society

This section reviews the history of women's civil society and identifies sector specific characteristics of the women's NGOs in the pre-1999 period, before Turkey was recognized as a candidate country in Helsinki. While Chapter 4 has specified overall legacies of the past, in a similar manner this section identifies inherited characteristics of women's civil society. I will show that throughout the different periods of the history, women's civil society has been dynamic, has prioritized women's issues despite the differences, and has collaborated with the state under the national women's machinery and formed transnational connections.

5.1.1.Women's Civil Society in the Ottoman Period (1839-1923)

Women's civil society has strong roots in Turkey and an insightful analysis of the women's movement has showed that strong activism of the women's movement was inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Before the 1980s, many scholars believed that the women's movement started with the foundation of the Republic as a top down project. They argued that there was no women's movement in the Ottoman period, and women's struggle and all the rights on the status of women were granted after the establishment of the Republican regime in 1923. However, this assumption was challenged with the development of a feminist research agenda in Turkey after the 1980s (Demirdirek 1998; Yaraman 2001; Çakır 2007; 2010; Çaha 2010). Many scholars have demonstrated that contrary to common belief, the women's movement was powerful enough to demand rights regarding women's status in society. Therefore, we now know that the women's struggle and mobilization is not a new phenomenon in Turkish political history; it goes back to "pre-Republican times"- the last decade of the Ottoman Empire (Tekeli 1995; Arat 2008). During this period, women demanded new rights and promoted modernist values in Turkish society.

Scholars agree that the period before the *Tanzimat* was static regarding women's issues. Women were seen as a commodity and the *Harem*[18] belonged to the Sultan. Women had no political, social or legal rights. In her book, *The Ottoman Women's Movement* (*Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi)*, Çakır argues that Ottoman women were not only objects of modernization and politics but also active subjects in the struggle for emancipation (Çakır 2010). To support her argument, Çakır traces Ottoman feminism in women's journals, organizations, activities and discourses in the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918). She shows the inception of the women's movement with the start of the modernization process, *Tanzimat*, in the Ottoman period. Çakır's argument has important consequences in understanding Ottoman history, the status of women and transformation of the dominant discourses in relation to the women's issues. Çakır clearly shows that Ottoman women demanded certain rights and they used journals, magazines and associations to raise awareness of women issues, initiated arguments on feminism, and proposed solutions for women's problems. Also, she indicates that in the modernization process, women were at the

[18] In Ottoman Empire *Harem* was described as follows: "(1) Part of a palace, mansion, or house in Islamic countries that was regarded as an intimate sphere and thus forbidden to strangers. (2) All the females living in the harem. (3) The imperial harem in the Ottoman palaces." (Somel 2003: 115).

center of the debates between traditionalists and reformists. This led to the formation of a specific image of women in Turkish society. Elements of that image are still evident in recent debates between Kemalist and Islamist women. As Çakır indicated, the women's movement also shows the ideology and social characteristics of the Ottoman time (Çakır 2007: 68). By using various publications, Ottoman women raised awareness about their rights in public opinion.

Furthermore, women established various associations to discuss women's problems. As Çakır illustrates, the associations created a collective action since individual claims transformed into socially organized demands (Çakır 2007: 68). Membership of Ottoman organizations mainly consisted of elite and middle class educated women who lived in urban cities. These organizations reflected two important characteristics of the Ottoman women's movement. On one side were organizations of women interested in national issues such as economic conditions, improving the national economy and encouraging consumption of the national product. On the other side were issue specific organizations that dealt with various aspects of women's problems. Some organizations only focused on the issue of education, such as the Association for the Protection of Ottoman Turkish Ladies (*Osmanlı Türk Kadınları Esirgeme Derneği*) and the School for Seamstresses (*Biçki Yurdu*). Other organizations promoted the importance of women's consciousness by organizing conferences. The Ottoman women also created associations for participating in business life and philanthropic associations that aimed at healing the wounds of the Balkan Wars (Çakır 2007:72). In addition, there were various ethnic women's associations, which benefitted from the flexible structure of the Ottoman Empire to mobilize their constituencies such as the Beyoğlu Greek Beneficial Association of Women (*Beyoğlu Rum Cemiyet-i Hayriye-i Nisvaniyesi),* the Beneficial Union of Turkish and Armenian Women (*Türk ve Ermeni Kadınlar İttihat Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi*), the Association for the Elevation of Kurdish Women (*Kürt Kadınları Teali Cemiyeti),* and the Association for Mutual Co-operation Amongst Circassian Women (*Çerkes Kadınları Teavün Cemiyeti*) (Çakır 2010: 103-104). However, after the establishment of the Republic these organizations were affected by rising Turkish nationalism.

Even though there were several associations regarding the women's issues, Women's World (*Kadınlar Dünyası*) played an influential role in shaping the Ottoman women's movement. Women's World actively struggled for the rights of

women such as equality and recognition of women's rights in public law through its publications. Another feature of the journal was its writers, composed of women from all segments of society. It was the official journal of the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Ottoman Women (*Osmanlı Mudafaa-i Hukuk-u Nisvan Cemiyeti*), established in 1913 (Çakır 2010: 107). This association had different activities, and in terms of the ideological currents of the time, reflected feminist values.

As I have exemplified in Chapter 4, Europe has been an important symbol and a model for civil society. The publications of women's periodicals and activities of associations in the Ottoman era clearly illustrated how the European and Western women's movement was a model and a reference point for the Ottoman women's movement. One prominent example was the activities of the feminist publications. For instance, Women's World published numerous articles on feminism (Demirdirek 1998; Çakır 2007; 2010; Arat 2008) and made strong references to women suffrage movements in Western Europe. Demirdirek (1998) explains how the Ottoman women were following the women's suffrage movements in Europe and demanding women's right to vote, therefore, using Western movements as a model to demand their rights at home. There were strong references to their "sisters in the West".

A striking characteristic of the Ottoman women's movement was the collaboration and solidarity among women. Ottoman women from all segments of the society (through Women's World) regularly mobilized around the women's issues through various magazines by writing and sharing their experiences as well as demanding their rights. As İştar (2006: 65) argues, these magazines became a platform of communication and solidarity among Ottoman women where they shared their ideas, experiences and problems. Moreover, women cooperated during the War of Independence (1919-1923), and this collaboration has important implications for today's women's movement. Ottoman women did not only collaborate among themselves but also had established external connections with their counterparts. For example, the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Ottoman Women had linkages with the women's movement as well as feminist writers, who contributed to the awareness of the women by writing articles in Women's World (Arat 2008: 390). Furthermore, feminists in other countries increased awareness of their own public about the Ottoman feminist movement. By examining Women's World, Çakır (2007) discovered that Grace Ellison from *The Times* and Odetta Feldman from the *Berliner*

Tageblatt came to İstanbul and in return informed their own public about the experiences of the Ottoman women's movement (Çakır 2007: 72).

Another significant characteristic inherited from the Ottoman Empire was the relationship between state and society. Chapter 4 extensively discussed the Ottoman state tradition, and how the development of civil society and activism have been paralyzed by this strong state tradition. In the Ottoman convention, civil society had no influence over the state. As Grigoriadis (2009:67) points out, "the pursuit of individual interest was dismissed as divisive and harmful for the common good". This negative perception was the predominant attitude towards civil society that legitimized excessive control over civil society actors, and later shaped state policies towards civil society actors. Although the women's movement was strong, women's organizations also had activism within the limits of the state and were influenced by the state's ideology. Women's civil society was not something separate from the state. Nevertheless, women's civil society both resisted and cooperated with the state. For example, one of the principle objectives of the Association for Defense of the Rights of Ottoman Women was to integrate women into economic life and social life. Besides its different awareness - rising activities such as entering the post office to draw attention to the right to enter public offices (Çakır 2007: 72), the organization actively lobbied for the integration of women into economic life in public institutions, and secured placement for two women at the İstanbul telephone company (Arat 2008: 390). In a similar vein, during the War of Independence, Turkish women cooperated with the nationalists against the Ottoman state. A well-known woman, the novelist Halide Edip Adıvar mobilized large constituencies to raise awareness and protested against the occupation.

In sum, during the Ottoman period, Muslim women published journals such as *Demet* (İstanbul, 1908), *Mehasin* (İstanbul, 1908-9), *Kadın* (İstanbul, 1911-12), *Kadınlık* (İstanbul, 1913) and *Kadınlar Dünyası* (İstanbul, 1913-21) and demanded legal reforms in marriage and new rights in education and the economic sphere (Arat 2008: 389-390). In this period, women succeeded in passing a family code that improved the marriage contract for women and polygamy was legally discouraged (Arat 2008: 390). As we have seen, women's activism has a strong long-standing past in Turkey.

5.1.2. Women's Civil Society in the Early Republican and Multi-Party Period (1923-1980)

In the early Republican and multi-party period (1923-80), the state initiated reforms and pursued a modernization agenda. Similar to the last period of the Ottoman empire, the new Republic was mainly motivated by secularist principles and Turkish nationalism, where women were defined in the framework of a "modern ideology". As Seckinelgin (2004: 155) argues, "the position of women must be seen central in this process; it was used as one of the most important interventions to initiate this process". Women's formal emancipation succeeded early, as a part of the modernization and civilisation project. In 1926, the Islamic legal code was replaced by the civil code and introduced new legal rights for women such as equal rights in marriage, divorce and the custody of children (Arat 2008: 392). In 1934, women gained the right to suffrage, and the status of women was improved in education and employment. The Republican reforms and Kemalist ideology socialized women in a particular way and Turkish middle-class women adopted these roles and enhanced the Kemalist female identity (Durakbaşa 1998). For instance, Durakbaşa (1998) illustrated that Kemalist fathers brought up their daughters as exemplary Republican women and supported them to ensure that their daughters were educated to participate in the public sphere. At the same time, these men continued to endorse moral codes in the family. As Kandiyoti rightly points out, Turkish women were now "emancipated but not liberated"(Kandiyoti 1987: 320). In practice, there was little difference between the traditionalist and modernist patterns in relation to the gender roles.

During early Republican and multi-party period, women collaborated with the state, and until the 1980s women did not challenge the restrictions caused by the state (Arat 2008: 392). The state policy reflected the secular state-building project where women were thought to benefit from the various reforms introduced by Atatürk. For instance, Atatürk encouraged Western clothing for women, discouraged veiling and banned polygamy in marriage. As Tekeli (1997) argues, these reforms were mainly directed to the public sphere and neglected the patriarchal family structure in the private realm. Therefore, the Turkish form of "state feminism" mainly concentrated on the public sphere and the secular role of women. It was aligned with the state ideology and strongly supported by the principles of Kemalism. Therefore, female activism was promoted Kemalist state values and was conducted within the boundaries of the state.

In the early years of the Republic, women had actively demanded political rights, yet, their activities empowered the state rather than their feminist identity. In his analysis, Zafer Toprak (1986; 1988), showed that women started the struggle for political rights after the establishment of the new Republic. Nezihe Muhiddin, a well known feminist in the Ottoman women's movement and publisher of the journal Women's Way (*Kadın Yolu)* and her friends attempted to establish the first women's political party called the Women's People's Party (*Kadınlar Halk Fırkası)* in 1923. However, the Women's People Party was not officially recognized because the 1909 election law forbade women from participating in politics. Instead, women were advised to establish an association by the Kemalist elite. They founded the TKB in 1924 with the aim to advocate political rights, particularly, to support women's participation in politics as well as to enhance social rights. The existence of horizontal relations was not common during the early Republican period, due to the decline in the number of women's organizations and strict control of the state over civil society. During this period, only state supported organizations were allowed to function. Yet, the TKB established branches around Anatolia to raise awareness of activities of the association and to enhance solidarity between women.

Europe was an important symbol for the TKB. Like the visionaries of Kemalist modernizers, Ziya Gökalp, the association borrowed elements of Western civilization for the women's movement but maintain their culture. This case illustrates how Kemalist women's associations re-interpreted Western values and principles for their own use. They made strong references to Western women as a model for progression. For instance, as highlighted in Chapter 4, a representative of the TKB explained how the organization had made strong references to Western women as a model.

> The women in the organization were interested in establishing connections with the women in Western countries. They followed their activities, made connections, participated in their activities and exchanged information. They also had connections with Eastern women but most of the time, the TKB did not participate in their activities since they imitated European Women as a model for progression and did not want to be regarded as Eastern women. (Interview TKB 2011).

The TKB established international connections and participated in the International Alliance of Women in 1926. A delegation from the association represented Turkey in the international women's congress in Paris, and in the following years other activists from the association were involved in other

international feminists conventions (Durakbaşa 1998; Zdanowski 2014:56). However, the association was indirectly closed in 1935, following the XII Congress of the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship conference, which took place with the justification that its mission was fulfilled and women had been granted political rights and the right to vote in elections.

Strong state tradition and a focus on nationalism and modernization continued to characterize the Republican women's civil society. Women's issues and particularly educated modern women had an important place in this context. Women's civil society aligned with the Kemalist ideology and activist women and their groups were seen as representatives of the secular state. As Aldıkaçtı-Marshall (2013: 49) stresses, "in the absence of the autonomous feminist movement during the 1940s and 1950s many women, especially in urban areas, mainly put their efforts toward supporting the new administration and remained royal to the secular project". Therefore, the relationship between the state and women's civil society were intertwined until the 1980s.

Due to a volatile political environment and successive military coups, women's issues were sidelined until the 1980s, but women continued to mobilize within political parties and student movements during the 1960s and 1970s. Political parties from right, left, and nationalist stances opened women's branches. Furthermore, women in socialist groups and socialist parties discussed women's issues. However, women's issues were discussed in relation to other themes such as the oppression of the working class and socialism as a solution to women's problems. The Progressive Women's Association *(İlerici Kadınlar Derneği)* was founded in this environment led by a class-conscious leadership of the Workers Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi-TİP)* and reached many women in Turkey. Equally important were influential trade unions and youth organizations at the universities. Importantly, a women's student movement at the universities developed new strategies of mobilization, which were later used in the 1980s in the independent women's movement. Therefore, women had been quite active even before the 1980s period.

5.1.3. Women's Civil Society in the Post- Republican Period (1980-1999)

Similar to other issue areas, the 1980s witnessed an emergence of an independent women's movement and rising awareness on women's issues in Turkey. The most important characteristics were the independent feminist discourse from the official ideology and leftist views, and "variety of feminisms". In the 1980s, with the relaxation of the political climate after the 1980 military coup, women's groups started to develop a new identity, which was different from the state, and became more sceptical towards the state. In this way, the women's movement diversified along different strands. After the 1980s, different issues have been brought up by the feminist movement, such as the elimination of violence and discrimination against women, the misrepresentation of women in the media, the controversy against virginity tests, demand for increase in literacy and education levels of women, sanctions against honor crimes, advancement of women's human rights, adoption of a quota in political participation and increase in representation of women in the parliament. The motto the "personal is political" characterized the women's movement in the 1980s.

Despite their ideological differences, the women's movement has mobilized around different issues from the 1980s onwards. One issue for mobilization was an petition campaign for the UN Convention for the Elimination of All Types of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) that Turkey signed in 1985. Within this context, women criticized the Civil Code and the Penal Code and demanded equal rights under the law and initiated a petition campaign in 1986 (Kardam 2007:195). Arat (2008: 397) claims "feminists of diverse persuasions united over their dissatisfaction with the legal framework". Another issue was the mobilization against domestic violence. In 1987 the women's movement organized various demonstrations. Particularly, the "No to Battering March" was organized in 1987 following a decision by a judge who ruled against a woman's appeal for divorce on the basis that women need to be beaten to be controlled; consequently, a national campaign for the struggle against violence against women was started (Toktaş and Diner 2011: 61). Therefore, women in Turkey were united and cooperated among various issues.

The relationship between the state and women's organizations has taken different forms. Traditionally, civil society organizations were tightly controlled in

Turkey. As Chapter 4 outlined in detail, with the 1980 military coup and authoritative 1982 Constitution, the state restricted various groups, movements and political parties. However, after the military coup, the new government by Özal did not feel threatened by the new women's movement in Turkey, because the government did not take the women's movement seriously and did not attach critical importance to women's organizations (Kardam 2005: 42), but indirectly, the state opened up space for women's mobilization. During this time, women's organizations and the state did not have much interaction. Nevertheless, in 1987 Turkey had established the first public institution called the "Advisory Board for Policies with Regard to the Women" within the State Planning Organization to raise gender awareness with the involvement of representatives from public agencies, NGOs and universities.

Another characteristic is the existence and use of external networks in women's civil society. Women's organizations started to establish formal links with international organizations, discover their rights and use the CEDAW process and regulations strategically to promote their demands. In 1986, women's groups organized a campaign for the implementation of CEDAW and demanded their legal rights. Women's activism together with pressure from the UN's CEDAW opened the way for the adoption of the Law on the Protection of the Family (Law No. 4320) in 1998. The law enacted new measures for the protection of women from domestic violence and penalized domestic violence against women and children. Under this law, domestic violence was no longer considered as a private matter but became a critical problem in the public sphere.

The 1990s was characterized as a period of institutionalization and an emergence of new actors in relation to the women's civil society. In the 1990s, the women's movement led the establishment of civil society organizations in the form of foundations and associations. One important characteristic of the 1990s was various initiations to institutionalize the women's movement. For instance, in 1990, the Women's Library *(Kadın Eserleri Kütüphanesi ve Bilgi Merkezi Vakfı)* was founded in İstanbul. Also, universities established research centers and departments of women's studies. Purple Roof (*Mor Çatı)* the first independent women's shelter was established to find secure accommodation for battered women and symbolized the solidarity of the women's movement. The establishment of the Association for Supporting and Training Women Candidates *(Kadın Adayları Destekleme ve Eğitme Derneği-KA-DER)* reflects another example of the institutionalization of the women's

movement and formation of civil society organizations in the form of associations.

Another important characteristic of the women's movement in Turkey, which became more pronounced during this period, was the cleavages between women's groups, specifically the Kemalist, Islamist and Kurdish identities of these groups. This period characterized the formation of the identity of the women's movement and its institutionalization as well as fragmantation. Nonetheless, the cleavage in women's movement after the 1990s profited from Kurdish and Islamist feminism and "their criticism against Kemalist feminists for being ethno-centric and exclusionary of other identities" (Diner and Toktaş 2010: 47). Especially, there was the formation of an independent women's movement out of the Kurdish movement in southeastern Turkey. Diner and Toktaş (2010:48) express the impact of the Kurdish conflict on women as follows: "On the one hand, the environment of violence and insecurity increased the vulnerability of Kurdish women in the region; and on the other hand, it led to the politicization of Kurdish women, as these women became actively involved in political parties and organizations and participated in meetings, demonstrations and protests, even sometimes ending up in prison". During this period, Kurdish women started to appear in the public sphere. For example, the Saturdays Mothers brought awareness on the issue of missing people under police custody. The establishment of Women's Center (*Kadın Merkezi-KAMER)* marked a turning point in the Kurdish women's movement. KAMER is one of the largest and most respected feminist organizations, very active in 23 cities in the east and southeastern regions of Turkey. The women in KAMER argue that violence starts in the family; therefore, the first goal of KAMER is to prevent violence and raise awareness inside the family. It is important to highlight that from the 1990s onwards the interaction between KAMER and Turkish feminists has increased (Akkoç 2002). For example, all women's organizations that fight violence against women meet annually to discuss different issues (Interview Mor Çatı 2011).

Similarly, political Islam brought another dimension to the women's movement in Turkey. Islamists women demanded a place in the public sphere with a Muslim identity; the headscarf symbolized their appearance in the public sphere. Moreover, women have actively participated in Islamist political parties in Turkey. The ban on wearing headscarves at universities united Islamist women under the same umbrella. Women from religious backgrounds have protested this situation and increased women's political participation in the public sphere. For instance, some

associations similar to Women Against Discrimination (*Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği-AK-DER)* and platforms like Rainbow İstanbul Women Organizations' Platform (*Gökkuşağı İstanbul Kadın Platformu-GİKAP)* were founded to end discrimination against women who wear headscarves (Interview AK-DER 2011). Both Kurdish nationalism and political Islam have challenged Kemalist feminism.

Women from different segments of society continued to mobilize around the women's issues during the 1990s. For example, in 1992, women activist's demands to make changes in the legislative framework led to a nationwide campaign by women platforms in İstanbul, İzmir and Ankara to demand changes in the discriminatory clauses of the Civil Code (Özdemir 2014:127).

In 1990, there was an institutionalization of women's issues under the state machinery and cooperation between the state and the women's organizations in Turkey. The dynamics of this engagement first formally developed with the establishment of the Directorate of Women's Status and Problems (Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü –KSGM), the National Women's Machinery in 1990 to watch the implementation of the CEDAW and the "Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women" which were adopted at the 1985 UN Conference in Nairobi (Ecevit 2007: 196). This process was not initiated by the women's movement in Turkey. Nevertheless, it put the gender issues, particularly gender equality, on the national agenda and created a framework for negotiation and cooperation between the parties. Although initially the women's organizations were suspicious about the establishment of the directorate and raised their concerns on the grounds that it would be a mechanism to control gender discourse and direct the activities of organizations with the "national viewpoint", the directorate gradually gained recognition of the women's organizations (Acuner 2002; Ecevit 2007: 196; Arat 2008: 398-399). Arguably, women's cooperation with the directorate has been successful on two issues. The first was the mobilization and active lobbying of women's organizations for the amendments of the Civil Code and Penal Code, which discriminate against women and reinforce their dependency. The second was the preparation process of the country report for the Fourth World Congress in Beijing in 1995 and collaboration between the women's organizations and the directorate. Likewise, the drafts of the National Plan for Action following the Beijing conference and the draft CEDAW reports in 1998 were involved proposals from women's organizations, revised and

shaped by their recommendations (Ecevit 2007: 197). An expert from KSGM explained the relationship as follows:

> Since the establishment of this unit, we worked together with women's NGOs. The women's movement in Turkey is strong and very dynamic, and these organizations both have knowledge and are aware of the sensitivities of Turkish women. They have been participating in CEDAW reports since the beginning and in some instances really pushed hard for gender related issues (Interview KSGM a 2011).

5.2. Pathways and Outcomes of the EU Impact

This section examines how domestic factors and different forms of EU pathways impact women's NGOs in Turkey. In all categories of EU influence, the EU has impacted civil society simultaneously in two interconnected ways: through its accession context and financial assistance that is explicitly directed to civil society. As emphasized throughout this thesis, the previous research has overwhelmingly focused on two dimensions of impact, changes in the legal framework and EU funding, and the legitimizing power of the EU, which has affected the operation of the civil society. Yet the third form of impact and its findings is interesting. While I will examine the compulsory and enabling impact in relation to women's NGOs, my analysis mainly concentrates on the connective impact, which presents original findings

Before moving to the EU pathways I will start by summarizing the outcomes of the EU influence. First, regarding the compulsory pathway, there have been various outcomes of Europeanization on women's civil society. On the one hand, significant legal changes in the Law of Associations, the Turkish Civil and Penal Code, the Municipality Law and the Turkish Labour Law have removed legal restrictions on the operation of women's civil society. On the other hand, through funding, the compulsory pathway could lead to different types of Europeanization outcomes: (i) compulsory impact, when women's groups prioritize the EU's agenda over their areas of expertise or adapt their projects in line with the EU policies; (ii) the enabling impact, when projects enabled women's civil society to follow and promote their agendas and policies; and (iii) the connective impact, when EU projects have advanced the partnership between actors. Although the approximation of gender legislation continues, the post-2005 period has resulted in implementation related problems and skepticism.

Second, the enabling pathway has empowered women's NGOs vis-à-vis the state by using the EU as a "legitimization device". In this context, women's NGOs have referred to the EU legal framework to integrate gender mainstreaming as a key component into gender related laws. In the post-2005 period, this type of impact has been vulnerable due to the downturn in EU and Turkey relations.

The connective pathway has functioned along three dimensions. In the first dimension, the EU has facilitated cooperation between domestic women's civil society actors. For example, the Civil Code Women's Platform in 2001, the Women's Penal Code Platform in 2002 and the Women's Platform for the Constitution in 2011 has showed cooperation. Additionally, the condition of cooperation in the EU projects has led to the establishment of partnership between domestic civil societies. In the second dimension, through its accession context, the EU has fostered collaboration between women's NGOs and the state institutions. For instance, cooperation between women's NGOs and the KSGM during the reform process, the establishment of the Parliamentary Committee on Equal Opportunities between Men and Women and the cooperation on a new constitution with civil society within this committee, and cooperation with the Family and Social Policies Ministry on a new law have illustrated different cases of collaboration with the state. Similarly, in the EU funded projects, women's civil society has established partnership with the state. In the third dimension, participation in external networks such as European Women's Lobby (EWL) has provided credibility, legitimacy and leverage, access and resources to women's civil society. Finally, external networks in the EU projects have fostered mutual understanding between domestic women's civil society and their counterparts in European countries. Altogether, these outcomes have shown that the EU has a strong impact on women's civil society. The following sections will describe in detail how different pathways of the EU together with the domestic factors have led to strong EU influence on women's civil society in Turkey by providing extensive empirical evidence.

5.3.1. Compulsory Pathway

The first pathway that the EU influences civil society is the compulsory impact. As elaborated in Chapter 2, the compulsory pathway is performed through the *acquis communautaire* and the financial incentives on the basis of conditionality. However, in practice, various forms of the Europeanization outcome occur simultaneously. The findings of the compulsory pathway are also in line with the broader literature on the Europeanization of civil society where "the EU membership candidacy has altered the political and societal context in which specific factors operate" (Diez *et al.* 2005:5). I will show that the EU pressure has changed the framework in which they operate, and is therefore, transformative in the sense that it provided space for activities of the societal actors. In contrast to these studies, an assessment of the post-2005 period shows that the transformative power of the EU has ruptured by implementation related issues, which emerged as an important obstacle.

The compulsory impact has occurred in two different ways. Firstly, the EU pressure on the state to comply with the Copenhagen political criteria has resulted in extensive legislative changes regarding women and the freedom of association and assembly in Turkey. Since 1998, annual Progress Reports stress the legal restrictions on the freedom of association and assembly as well as progress regarding the protection and promotion of women's rights and the approximation of gender equality legislation. The first Progress Report paid attention to the status of women and emphasized that "domestic violence is widespread" and the Civil Code "still retains discriminatory provisions" (Commission of the European Communities 1998b: 17). These warnings were also in line with the demands of the women's movement and the CEDAW committee.

The most significant outcomes of the Europeanization of women's NGOs have been extensive legal changes in the Law on Associations, the Turkish Civil Code, the Turkish Penal Code, Municipality Law and the Turkish Labour Law that have been taking place since 2001, which have influenced the political context in which civil society functions. Similar to other issue areas in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 as well as the broader literature on the Europeanization of civil society (Diez *et al.* 2005; İçduygu 2007; 2011; Arat 2008; Toktaş and Diner 2011; Ketola 2013; Zihnioğlu 2013; Rumelili and Boşnak 2015), there has been general consensus on the positive impact of the Law on Associations, which eased the restrictions on NGOs

among interviewees (Interviews Başkent Kadın Platformu Derneği 2011; Kadın Haklarını Koruma Derneği 2011; Amargi 2012 Kardelen 2012; Selis 2012).[19] The 2004 law lifted requirement that seek permission when opening branches abroad, to hold meetings with foreigners, to inform local officials of assembly meetings and allowed NGOs to receive funding from abroad. Particularly, two main legislative changes in Civil and Penal Codes are illustrative in understanding the Europeanization of women's NGOs. As the previous section demonstrates, the reform of the Turkish Civil Code in 2001, was among one of the top priorities in the women's movement. Historically, women's NGOs have criticized discriminatory measures and for demanding changes in the Turkish Civil Code. However, in spite of the joint efforts of the women's movement and CEDAW obligations, the reform process remained inconclusive (Özdemir 2014: 126). In 2000, the government prepared the draft law of the Civil Code by integrating women's demands, yet, the question of property in the draft law faced objections from the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP*) parliamentarians and Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi)* during discussions of the draft Civil Code in the Grand National Assembly. Feminists wanted to change the separation of property regime in the original document with a new one on the shared property, because in cases of divorce, women would have the right to share the property during the marriage and their labor would be recognized in this way (Arat 2008: 403). As the section 5.3.3 on connective pathways will demonstrate, the women's movement launched widespread campaigns for a gender-sensitive reform of the civil code. Finally, the new Civil Code was adopted with the shared property regime in November 2001.

Another illustration has been the reform of the Turkish Penal Code between 2004-2005 for the EU accession process. In a similar vein with the campaign for the new Civil Code, the women's movement launched a new campaign called the "Campaign on the Reform of the Turkish Penal Code from a Gender Perspective" under the coordination of Women for Women's Human Rights New Ways (*Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler- KİH-YÇ)*. The Penal Code was critical because it regulates several forms of gender-based violations such as violence against women, and governs women's rights from a liberal perspective (Arat 2008: 407-408; Özdemir

[19] During the different interviews, women's NGOs from Kemalist (Kadın Haklarını Koruma Derneği), feminist (Amargi), Islamist/conservative (Başkent Kadın Platformu Derneği) and Kurdish (Kardelen, Selis) orientation said that changes in legal framework are the most important outcomes of the EU impact.

2014: 127). Changes in the Penal Code have been transformative in many ways; changes are shaped by the women's movement demands that are long rooted in their struggle: crimes associated with sexual violence are now defined as crimes against individuals in contrast to crimes against public morality; punished with heavier sentences; sexual harassment, sex attacks and rapes were criminalized; martial rape and harassment at the workplace were recognized as crimes; penalties for domestic violence including sexual violence towards children were increased; virginity tests were criminalized and in the case of honour killings, the "unjust provocation" article for reduction in sentences was amended and reduction was abolished in honour killings (Arat 2008:408; Özdemir 2014:129).

Although legislative reforms lifted the main legal obstacles regarding civil society activity in general, and removed discriminatory provisions in the Penal and Civil Codes, the post-2005 period has witnessed implementation problems. Gaps in the laws persist and many law enforcement officials stress preservation of family unity rather than protecting survivors of domestic violence. These problems remained as main challenges despite the fact that the Commission has repeatedly emphasised them in the Progress Reports on Turkey.

As the previous section indicates, these changes have not solely occurred as a consequence of the EU pressure but were driven by the dynamic women's movement, which has strong historical roots. The EU impact has triggered these reforms and created and altered the legislative context in which civil society operates by enabling various societal actors to follow their agendas and push for their demands.

The compulsory pathway also occurred through the financial assistance to civil society. As discussed in Chapter 2, the relationship between funding and categories of the EU pathway is extremely complicated at the empirical level. Starting from the late 1990s, the EU provided financial aid to the women's civil society that participated in the awareness of women's issues on an ad-hoc basis (e.g. MEDA Program) and the establishment of capacities and cooperation with various actors in the development of gender policies (e.g. Civil Society Development Program and Civil Society Dialogue Program) and protection and promotion of women's rights (e.g. EIDHR). After Turkey's recognition as a candidate country in 1999, the EU intensified its funding for civil society actors that participated in the implementation of EU policies. It is important to note that the call for proposals in relation to women's issues mainly reflected the EU's policy priorities such as empowerment of

women and women NGOs, promoting gender equality in working life, establishing women's shelters for combating domestic violence, and gender equality in education (e.g. MEDA, Civil Society Development, Civil Society Dialogue). The provision of financial assistance is compulsory if it is established through concrete conditions. The EU has shaped women's issues and gender policy in a specific way and prioritized its own agenda. For instance, violence against women has been a key priority area. One indication of the compulsory impact is how women's civil society organizations undertake projects according to available funds and priority areas of the EU. When organizations prioritize EU-funded projects over their areas of expertise or adapt their projects according to EU policies, the compulsory impact has been effective. During the interviews, women's NGOs highlighted that there are many women's NGOs in Turkey which have shifted their area of expertise in order to get funding from the EU. On other occasions, the outcome of the funding could belong to other categories of EU influence as well- enabling and connective (For detailed discussion see section 2.2.2. in Chapter 2).

On the one hand, calls for proposals may provide an opportunity to promote their agendas and empower their policies. In this way, women's actors that engaged in priority areas benefited more from the EU funding and were enabled by the EU initiatives. For example, the EIDHR is a principle instrument for support to civil society activity in the promotion of human rights and democracy. KAMER is a foundation originally established in Diyarbakır with the aim to protect and promote human rights and women's rights especially in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia. Two of the key areas of activity of the KAMER Foundation are honour killings and domestic violence. The KAMER foundation implemented a project titled *We Can Stop This* under the EIDHR "to contribute to the prevention of murders committed in the name of honour, through supporting potential victims in Southeast and East Anatolian Turkey in their challenge to survive as well as to develop a permanent methods for preventing through establishment of preventative networks" (Delegation of European Union to Turkey 2008: 32). As the representative of KAMER Foundation said, "this project [referring to "We Can Stop This"] created a favourable context to implement KAMER's goals" (Interview KAMER 2012). Therefore, in this case, the EU has enabled KAMER to follow its own priorities.

On the other hand, women's NGOs have become partners in EU funding schemes. To give an example, under the "Project on Building Bridges for Prevention

of Violence Against Women" that was financed by the EIDHR Turkey Programme, Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE) collaborated with three partner organizations in Turkey: Purple Roof, the İzmir Women Solidarity Association and the Van Women's Association. As one of the interviewees who has been a partner in the project said:

> We had not conducted any EU project before. It was our first experience as a partner in an EU project. One of the key outcomes of the project is to organize a training of trainers programme. Within this context, WAVE provided experts for activities. Partnerships with European organizations did not only allow us to learn from their experiences but also provided a chance to explain our activities.
>
> (Interview İzmir Women Solidarity Association 2011)

This case is an illustration of how EU funding promotes partnerships between Turkish women's NGOs and counterparts in Europe through the connective pathway of the EU. It also shows that contrary to traditional scholarship, the EU has not seen only as a one-way process. It is an interactive process, where domestic actors engage in cooperation and learn from their experiences.

The EU-funded projects have been extremely important for women's NGOs since they are mostly dependent upon foreign funding like other civil society organizations in Turkey. When I asked interviewees about the EU funding, all of them responded positively and said that there is a financial obstacle for funding civil societies in Turkey and the EU is an alternative for applying and receiving funding.

However, empirical evidence on women's NGOs also reveals that this type of impact has been heavily criticized. The funding procedure is often too bureaucratic, and women's actors try to find other sources of funding and shift to other resources like the Swedish International Development Agency, the UN and the Turkish private foundation, the Sabancı Foundation. Additionally, women's NGOs do not always work in the areas that the EU has requested.

One of the predominant women's NGOs- Mother Child Education Foundation (*Anne Çocuk Eğitim Vakfı-AÇEV*) calls this "bureaucratic logic"- too much focus on regulations and paperwork (Interview AÇEV 2011):

> We worked in various EU projects. Sometimes we are the main beneficiary organizations, and other times we work as partners. We can clearly say that there is a difference between the intermediary actors and this difference affects our working environment, and the willingness to work with the EU again. We work very

professionally but if you ask my opinion after completing these projects, I would definitely tell you that we need to think about it more deeply. We need to think about the impact on our work. From our experience, we now see that the CFCU is very much work regulation orientated. They have a checklist and they just come here and tick the boxes. This does not result in success and also affects the impact. They do not trust us and CSOs feel lots of pressure and working under this pressure is not effective.

5.3.2. Enabling Pathway

Historically, Europe has been an important symbol for the women of Turkey. Since 1999, the EU has been a reference point for women's NGOs for pressuring the state to implement legislation in relation to women's issues. Thus, it has been an instrument for legitimization to develop and to implement gender related policies. The enabling pathway of the EU impact induced empowerment of women's NGOs vis-à-vis the state, but in post-2005 period this influence has been very vulnerable to fluctuations and downturns in EU-Turkey relations.

In the previous section, I demonstrated that the Copenhagen criteria together with the EU's gender *acquis* have facilitated major legal changes in Civil and Penal Codes and altered the political and social framework for functioning of societal actors by enabling women's NGOs. The first two instances in this section concentrate again on the reform processes of the Civil and Penal Codes with a different focus to show how women's NGOs have used the EU strategically and link their agendas to the EU and justify and legitimize their positions with reference to the EU.

The long-established women's movement in Turkey criticized the patriarchal structure of the Civil Code and the inferior position of women, which were strengthened under this code. Since the Ottoman women's movement, constitutional and legal issues have been at the center of women's demands. Particularly, in the Republican period, from the 1950s onwards, several attempts have been made to amend the civil code, but it was mainly in the 1980s that the feminist movement criticized the code from a gender-sensitive perspective. The KİH-YÇ organization adopted the cause, mobilized international support and raised awareness in the international arena (Interview KİH-YÇ 2011). The women's association KA-DER established in 1997 with the aim to develop women's status in politics also endorsed the cause of reforming the code. The code was also supported by the KSGM. Therefore, there were multiple interacting facilitating factors in the domestic arena. In addition, in the international context, both the UN and the EU played facilitating roles

in this process. Women's NGOs pointed out that there was some speculation in the international media about the reform of the Turkish Civil Code because of Turkey's EU accession process. The interviewee from KİH-YÇ (2011) commented on this issue by pointing out how the women of Turkey strategically used the EU framework both in international and domestic arenas by referring to the EU to change the Civil Code:

> We can clearly say that this was not because of the EU. It is true that we use the EU tool to overcome the state's resistance and refer to the Copenhagen criteria to increase the pressure on the state and amend the legislation. Moreover, we have used the EU framework to mobilize international support. Nonetheless, major legal reforms have taken place as a result of successful campaigns led by the dynamic women's movement in Turkey. Turkey's accession to the EU has accelerated the process, but not as a primary driving force. We, women of Turkey, are the drivers of the reform process.

Women's NGOs framed their priorities in relation to the EU to achieve success for their own causes and push the state to accept their proposals.

As I emphasized in the previous section, the Campaign for the reform of the Turkish Penal Code was initiated immediately after the reform of the Turkish Civil Code in 2001 and women have used the EU framework for empowerment. Similarly, under the name of the Women's Platform on the Penal Code, a group of thirty civil society organizations organized campaigns to ensure that the changes on women's status would be reflected in the Penal Code. Until 2005, the Turkish criminal code regarded sexual crimes committed against women as crimes against public morality and social order, rather than violations against individual women's rights (Interview Mor Çatı 2011). The activities of the platform were coordinated by the Women for Women's Human Rights-New Ways. In 2002, the KİH-YÇ initiated a working group and included the representatives of women's NGOs, bar associations and academics to represent different viewpoints and ensure participation.

After the 2002 elections, the Justice and Development Party *(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- AKP)* came to power, the new government formed its own committee and ignored the draft proposal of the feminists. In 2004, former Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan (now President) assailed the women's platform at a media conference and said that "There were even those who marched to Ankara, carrying placards that do not suit the 'Turkish women'. I cannot applaud behavior that does not suit our morality and traditions…A marginal group does not have any right to

represent the 'Turkish women'" (Şen 2004). When former Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan intervened to criminalize adultery through the code in 2005, women's groups established a European network for immediate action and explained to European counterparts how the proposed adultery law is in contradiction with the EU's principles, values and policies. The controversy over the proposed adultery law prompted a crisis between the EU and Turkey, and the EU pressured the Turkish government to withdraw the adultery law. This case illustrates how women's NGOs used the EU framework in order to justify their actions. In this context, it is possible to see a function of the EU as a legitimizer of women's NGOs activism in preventing the adultery law.

Another example of the use of an enabling pathway by the women's NGOs is the demand for representation and the case of KA-DER. Several EU Progress Reports and the European Parliament's Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality repeatedly emphasized that despite the positive changes in the legal framework, one of the vital challenges in Turkey regarding women is the low number of women in politics and the workforce and the significance of introducing quotas to boost female representation.

In 1997, a group of feminist professional women established KA-DER, to help women promote their status in electoral politics. A key principle of the organization was its non-partisan approach towards different political backgrounds. KA-DER brings women together from different ideological perspectives. The general-secretary in KA-DER said that "this is the success and attractiveness of our organization…to empower women from different backgrounds both at local and national levels." (Interview KA-DER 2011). Since the 1999 electoral campaign, KA-DER has prompted a quota for female representation in politics. KA-DER uses the EU framework to launch different campaigns in Turkey (Interview KA-DER):

> In 2003, the European Council recommended EU members states to promote women representation in politics and emphasized the importance of quotas. This recommendation was very critical to pursue our objectives in KA-DER. This helped us to launch a campaign for a 30 % quota for women in political representation.

Therefore, in national elections, KA-DER used the European Council recommendation as a mechanism to legitimize its positions in Turkey.

The Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey *(Türkiye Kadın Girişimciler Derneği- KAGİDER)* represents another illustration of enabling impact. In 2008, a

group of women entrepreneurs came together to establish an organization to help promote women entrepreneurs and women's leadership in Turkey. KAGİDER strongly supports EU membership and established an office in Brussels to undertake lobbying activities with EU institutions. The general secretary of KAGİDER (Interview 2011) noted:

In Turkey the participation of the women in the workforce is extremely low. We can see this in various progress reports (by referring to the European Commission's progress reports). Promoting women's employment and equal opportunities has been our priority in our campaigns.

In the EU Lisbon summit, EU leaders set out a strategy to make Europe more dynamic and competitive. The Lisbon Strategy of the EU has recommended that the women's participation level in the labour market shall be at least 60 % by 2010. Turkey has only managed to raise this rate slightly higher, a figure far below that of EU countries. In order to reach this goal, we need to create more jobs- at least eight million- for women and integrate them into the labour force. For this purpose, in March 2011 KAGİDER initiated a campaign to increase the employment rate of women in Turkey. The main objective was to raise awareness among various actors from politicians, employers to civil society and the media and to help them take action and to improve the employment rate for women of Turkey.

This overview from different women's NGOs shows that women's NGOs used the prospect of EU membership to legitimate their positions in various debates. The EU functioned as a legitimate reference point in various debates and enabled women's NGOs to justify their positions and recommendations on policy proposals and policy changes, to convince the state about their positions. These examples also demonstrate that, in practice, the enabling impact of the EU empowers women's civil society in Turkey in relation to the state. By referring to different EU practices and experiences, women's NGOs pressure the Turkish state to pursue necessary reforms and make arrangements in relation to women's issues.

5.3.3. Connective Pathway

This section provides evidence of how the EU has facilitated contacts between women's organizations by employing the partnership principle (For detailed discussion of the EU's policy towards civil society see Chapter 3). The EU has impacted civil society simultaneously in two interconnected ways: via its accession context and financial assistance, which are directly aimed to civil society. I provided evidence on how the EU has advanced women's civil society to cooperate with the

state institutions, to take part in policy cycles, and to develop and empower networks both with other civil society actors and transnational networks.

Internal Networks- Society-Society

During the course of history, the women's movement has been very dynamic and strong in Turkey. Several issues have acted as mobilizing forces for women in Turkey. Thus, Turkey is characterized by a highly mobilized and active women's movement. Historically, the Turkish women's civil society has been divided and fragmented along ideological lines. In contrast to human rights organizations (see Chapter 7), women's NGOs united and mobilized on the basis of women's issues.

Turkey's EU accession process has facilitated the cooperation and establishment of platforms among women's NGOs. Platforms that were established between women's NGOs promoted collaboration on several issues and enhanced shared values between actors. In addition, connections between actors foster positive dialogue and solidarity. The following examples show how the EU accession process has influenced cooperation between women's NGOs. The first is the establishment of the Civil Code Women Platform. In the beginning of 2001, 126 women's NGOs came together and initiated a major campaign. As discussed in the previous sections, the "shared property" was the most controversial issue during the reform process, and there was strong resistance from the government. As a result of the successful campaign, the opposing groups had to accept demands of the women's movement. A total of 126 women's NGOs from different segments of the society were united for this common purpose (İlkkaracan 2007). The new Civil Code abolished the supremacy of men in marriage and established gender equality in the family.

The second is the establishment of the Women's Penal Code Platform in 2002. Following the success of the Civil Code campaign, in 2002, the KİH-YÇ launched a new campaign titled *Campaign on the Reform of the Turkish Penal Code from a Gender Perspective*. In 2002, KİH-YÇ established the Women's Working Group on the Penal Code, which was composed of representatives of NGOs, bar associations, academicians from all around Turkey (İlkkaracan 2007). The working group prepared its own draft report and lobbied intensively, yet, with the election of AKP in 2002, a new draft of the Penal Code was prepared in 2003, which failed to reform the discriminatory clauses of the code (Özdemir 2014:128). As a consequence, in 2003,

the women's movement started a major campaign and expanded the working group into the national platform, held several awareness raising activities and lobbied extensively. In the words of Pınar İlkkaracan, an activist and co-founder of KİH-YÇ, "The campaign succeeded in achieving a holistic reform to transform the philosophy and principles of the Penal Code in order to safeguard women's rights, and bodily and sexual autonomy" (İlkkaracan 2007: 7).

The third is the establishment of the Women Platform for the Constitution in 2011. The platform is composed of more than 200 women's NGOs and led by KA-DER to lobby their demands for the new constitution.

The EU has also promoted cooperation between civil society actors through projects. In this way, the EU has intended to promote regular interaction among different parts of society (Zihnioğlu 2013: 66) and facilitate partnership between actors. EU programmes have made partnerships with other organizations a condition for funding. For example, the Civil Society Development and Civil Society Dialogue programmes have required partnerships and cooperation between civil society organizations in Turkey.

In 2011, the Progress Report on Turkey "…gender equality, combating violence against women, including honour killings, and early and forced marriages remain major challenges for Turkey" (Commission of the European Communities 2011:31). Under Strengthening Capacity of National and Local NGOs On Combating Violence Against Women Grant Scheme, KAGİDER has established a partnership with the ARI Movement Social Participation and Development Association. The *Linking and Empowering Generations to Combat Violence against Women and Discrimination* project intended to develop capacity building of local women's NGOs and the women's movement working in the field of violence against women and to contribute to the prevention of violence against women by raising awareness of young women and men in universities on women's problems, violence against women and discrimination.

A representative of KAGİDER (Interview 2011) summarizes the benefits of partnership as follows:

> As a consequence of the projects, we have a transfer of knowledge. We exchange views on various issues. More importantly, this is a mutual learning process. We learn from each other. We benefited from this partnership. It mainly strengthened collaboration between us.

Internal Networks- State- Society

There are different types of interactions between the state and civil society. As Arat (2008) argues, the relationship between the state and women's organizations has been shaped by contestation and collaboration. This section shows that the EU, both through its accession process and financial assistance, has further promoted partnership between the state and society, which in turn has empowered women's civil society and its power to influence policy processes. While women's civil society has resisted the patriarchal state structure and policies, at the same, it has cooperated with the state and pushed the state to follow gender-sensitive policies and established a partnership with the state institutions.

The EU's influence on women's NGOs has been stronger compared to environmental and human rights NGOs. In the following section, I will present new empirical evidence from women's NGOs to show these dynamics during the accession process. On the one hand, I will show how the women's NGOs and state cooperated and established harmonious relations during the accession process. On the other hand, I will demonstrate how women's NGOs resisted and criticized the state.

National Institutions and Women's NGOs

The EU has pressured Turkey to initiate reforms regarding women and integrate civil society into these processes. Since the 1980s Turkey has established various institutions to increase gender awareness in public policies. The EU accession process has prompted the foundation of institutions to support alignment with the EU *acquis* as well as to develop a collaborative relationship between the women's NGOs and the state. The continuing cooperation between women's NGOs and the KSGM during the reform process in the 2000s, the establishment of the Parliamentary Committee on Equal Opportunities between Men and Women (from 2009 onwards) and the collaboration on a new constitution with civil society within this committee, and cooperation with the Family and Social Policies Ministry on a new law on the prevention of violence against women – illustrates three empirical cases on how the EU accession process has opened avenues for consultation and collaboration between the state and civil society.

First, the KSGM and women's NGOs collaborated during the process that led

to the new Civil Code and Penal Code in the early 2000s. The KSGM that was established in 1990 upon the ratification of the CEDAW has been the most important institution in restructuring relationships with women's NGOs. The KSGM was originally tied to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security; however, in 1991 it was moved to the Office of the Prime Minister. The relationship between the KSGM and women's NGOs is significant in Turkey. Under the KSGM, they established a harmonious relationship by producing reports on gender policy including the CEDAW reports and the national action plans for gender equality. More significantly, starting from 1997, women's NGOs, the KSGM and academics worked on the draft law, in which proposals from women's NGOs have been vital in shaping the draft law. The KSGM played an active role between women's NGOs and the Civil Code Commission at the Parliament. The consultation between the KSGM and women's NGOs and their input in the Civil Code Commission at the Parliament was key in achieving gender sensitive changes in the new Civil Code (Kardam 2006: 15). Similar to the process that led to new Civil Code, women's NGOs participated in the technical work on drafts of the Penal Code. Therefore, the KSGM benefitted from the involvement and expertise of the women's NGOs in Turkey. The process that led to the new laws clearly demonstrated how interaction between the state institutions and civil society could foster constructive relationships between two parties, and empowers women's NGOs, and their role in policymaking.

Second, the establishment of the Parliamentary Committee on Equal Opportunities between Men and Women (from 2009 onwards) and interactions on a new constitution with civil society actors within this committee illustrates the collaboration between state institutions and women's NGOs. The idea of establishing a commission at the Parliament has been present within the women's movement as well as the National Women's Machinery since the beginning of the 1990s, but it was not implemented by the Parliament. As Turkey became an official candidate to the EU in 1999, parliamentary attention in establishing such a commission substantially increased due to the pressure from the European Commission and European Parliament. In the 2008 Progress Report, the European Commission underlined that the " Parliamentary Committee on Gender Equality have still to be established. Women's civil society organizations have requested the establishment of a fully-fledged committee that could play an essential role in mainstreaming women's issues in all policy areas." (Commission of the European Communities 2008: 20-21). In

addition, women's NGOs established connections with the women's parliamentarians from different political parties and lobbied for the proposal. Consequently, on March 2009, an Equal Opportunities Commission was established after a period of discussions on the name of the commission. The name of the commission was forced to change from a "Gender Equality Committee" to the "Equality of Opportunity Committee" by the AKP. The women's movement objected to the name of the commission and argued that "If the Committee is called "Equality of Opportunity", then we will be hindered by legal regulations. The discrimination and rights violations that women experience will be ignored." (Özcan 2009). Despite the naming debate, many interviewees pointed out that the foundation of the committee was a critical step for gender equality because Turkey had lacked a Commission at the parliamentary level which assesses proposals and amendments from a gender equality perspective (Interviews KA-DER 2011; KAGİDER 2011; Kadın Haklarını Koruma Derneği 2011; Mor Çatı 2011; TKB 2011).

Despite the criticism, women's NGOs cooperated with the Equality of Opportunity Committee on various issues. One of the vital areas that both the EU and women paid attention to was the preparation of the new constitution. Women's platforms such as the Women's Constitution Platform and other organizations prepared proposals on the new constitution. This process is a vital opportunity for women's NGOs to push forward legal changes from a gender equality perspective; the process still continues. Civil society organizations were welcomed to the consultation process that took place at the Parliament by the Equality of Opportunity Committee. The Commission not only took the opinions and recommendations of the women's organizations in those meeting, but has also shared all the views and suggestions expressed by NGOs and published a detailed report including the proposals of the civil society (TÜSEV 2013).

Third, the cooperation between women's NGOs and the Family and Social Policies Ministry on a new law on the prevention of violence against women represents another example of collaboration between actors. The EU Progress and European Parliament Reports repeatedly listed domestic violence as one of the most important problems of women in Turkey, and stressed the shortcomings of the law on domestic violence. The new law that was adopted in 2012 provides important measures to protect victims of violence. According to Nazan Moroğlu, the coordinator for İstanbul Women's Associations and women's activists, "Irrespective of their

marital status, the law encompasses all women – married, single, divorced, young, old, those with a fiancé or a boyfriend," which she described as a "historic law" in terms of expanded rights for victimized women (Hürriyet Daily News 2012). However, she emphasized that the law is not without its shortcomings, since the "legal provisions see women merely as "family members" rather than individuals"- a criticism that was brought by the women's movement. A Ministry of State position for Women and Family Affairs started the reform process. In 2011, it was transformed into the Ministry for Family and Social Policies, which frustrated the women's movement and described it as a step backwards for gender equality. The women's NGOs were very active during the process, presenting their proposals and promoting their positions. Nazan Moroğlu (Hürriyet Daily News 2012) explained the role of the women's movement in this process, and cooperation between the Ministry for Family and Social Policies and women's NGOs as follows:

> Women's NGOs have a written history. For the first time, all women's NGOs were united. Some 237 women organizations worked together day and night following the process, step by step. [Family and Social Policies] Minister Fatma Şahin wanted to have contributions from NGOs. It is, however, difficult to bypass the male-dominated bureaucracy. Although several changes were made despite our objections, I believe that we as women's NGOs have played an important role in the adoption of the law. I can say that this is a success [that stems from] the strong lobbying activities of female lawyers and women's associations.

As I have shown above, the EU impact depends on responses of the civil society actors. In this case, collaboration with the state institutions have led to the empowerment of the women's NGOs. Women's NGOs have actively shaped policies and become key actors in gender policies. The EU process has opened new avenues to women's NGOs to initiate and contribute to policymaking processes.

The EU accession process has also developed consultation between civil society and state institutions. The Women's Policy Machinery already provided a window of opportunity for the women's NGOs in Turkey. There is already regular consultation through Women's Meetings and producing shadow reports that are supported by CEDAW mechanisms. In addition to this mechanism, the EU also promotes consultation as an instrument to develop relationships between the state and CSOs. For instance, the EU progress reports are an instrument to improve the relationship between women's civil society and state institutions. In order to publish progress reports, the European Commission granted the following role to the CSO-

watchdog of polices and implementation processes. The European Commission's Progress Report (2007: 18) welcomed "Cooperation between public institutions and civil society has improved and regular meetings are held with public institutions and women's NGOs to monitor the implementation…". The EU officials consult NGOs for the preparation of the annual progress reports. In this way, NGOs can take priority issues and act as a watchdog in the EU accession process. State institutions cannot neglect issues that are promoted by civil society actors. This is important because civil society becomes active and equal participants of the policy cycles. Therefore, the consultation process between the public institutions and civil society has important consequences for the development of women's NGOs, because through consultation they start to participate in the policymaking process. Throughout this process, public institutions have started to see women's NGOs as partners rather than rivals. They have started to exchange views and cooperate on certain issues. For example, there are regular meetings with CSOs at the Ministry of the EU, and they exchange views on different issues, and various policy areas (Interviews Ministry of the EU, Director I and II 2011).

One significant issue that needs to be further elaborated is the cooptation of women's civil society in Turkey. Following the several elections victories of the AKP, Islamic women's NGOs and Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs) have become widespread and more visible in Turkey. In the case of cooperation, civil society and the state recognize each other's capabilities and cooperate on common ground. Yet, civil society is both closely related but independent from the state (Jones and Marsden 2010: 49). However, cooptation occurs when NGOs lose their autonomy and become regulated by the state (Jones and Marsden 2010: 49). The relationship between the AKP and Islamic organizations[20] can be described as cooptation, because these organizations promote the AKP's interests and policies and therefore are not autonomous from the political party. The AKP in turn has not only enabled these Islamic organizations but also used these organizations instrumentally to push their policies. For example, many Islamist women's organizations support social policies on the empowerment of family rather than gender equality (Interviews AK-DER 2011; Hazar Education Culture and Solidarity Association 2011). In turn, these organizations participate in various

[20] It is important to emphasize that not all Islamic organizations are cooptated by the ruling party.

meetings with the state, and represent Turkey in international meetings. For example, one recent incident is the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO)[21] candidacy process. As I explained in the previous section, women's NGOs played an influential role in ratifying the Council of Europe's Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, known as the İstanbul Convention. However, the Ministry of Family and Social Policy have decided on three NGOs that will participate in the GREVIO process. These three organizations[22] are well known for their close links to the government. In turn, women's and LGBTI organizations are excluded from the process.

Internal Networks-Projects

The EU has also used projects as instruments to develop the relationship and partnerships between the state and civil society. The various EU projects have made partnerships with the state institutions a condition for the EU funding. In Chapter 3, I have shown how this particular understanding of partnership has translated from the EU level. The EU intends to promote its governance approach by integrating civil society organizations into policymaking. The extent of cooperation differs both with the objective of the projects and the willingness of the actors.

Strengthening civil society in the pre-accession process has been the key objective of the EU's civil society policy in the candidate countries. In line with this objective, the *Combating Violence against Women* program is aimed at preventing violence against women by funding civil society organizations, developing capacity building, providing services for victims and increasing awareness in the society (Commission of the European Communities 2006c: 4). According to these objectives, the Commission identified various priority areas. One of them is the establishment of new local organizations, networks, and partnerships. Under this program KİH-YÇ completed a project called *Women's Solidarity Network Against Violence*. As a part of this project, KİH-YÇ collaborated with the General Directorate of Social Services in dealing with violence against women, and in improving services of women's groups

[21] GREVIO monitors the implementation of the Istanbul Convention.
[22] AK-DER, Women and Democracy Association *(Kadın ve Demokrasi Derneği -KADEM)* and Women Healthcare Professionals Solidarity *(Kadın Sağlıkçılar Dayanışma Derneği -KASAD-D).*

and community centers on the local levels.

In an interview the volunteer from KİH-YÇ (2011) explained the relationship with General Directorate of Social Services as follows:

In Turkey, women's organizations have been key actors in raising awareness about combating violence against women and helping victims. Women's NGOs provide services instead of the state institutions, but are never seen as equal partners. At the core of the EU project, cooperation and collaboration is vital to achieve the objectives. The EU project has been instrumental in transforming the relationship with state institutions and in being an equal partner in the processes.

Mor Çatı has implemented different shelter projects. Since 2009, Mor Çatı continues to run an independent shelter project with the support of the Şişli Municipality and the European Commission Delegation to Turkey. When I asked a volunteer of the Mor Çatı about experiences of working with the state institutions, I observed a trend of collaboration and contestation- negative trend so called a formation of symbolic relationship- between these actors. The volunteer from the Mor Çatı (2011) expressed that:

Now we cooperate with the state on various issues. It really depends on the type of the project and the context. If we are the main beneficiary, we cooperate more easily. For instance, we cooperated with Şişli municipality to increase the capacity of women's shelters. It went well. When the beneficiary is the state institution, cooperation is more difficult. They invite us for the meeting but sometimes do not consider us as partners. We have a more symbolic relationship - a relationship just because the project says 'you have to have a partner from women's NGOs'.

Also, the state institutions like the KSGM implemented projects under the pre-membership financial assistance program. The KSGM conducted the *Women's Shelters Guide* project and cooperated with women's NGOs to combat violence against women. The aim of this project is to promote and support partnerships with women NGOs that plan to open shelters for women. An expert from the KSGM (Official 2, 2011) said that :

In order to prepare this project, we benefited from the expertise of the women's NGOs. They provided us valuable input and support. We mainly exchange views, discuss strategies and enhance our dialogue during the projects. They definitely become our partners.

The partnership requirement of the EU programs has resulted in an effective partnership between the state and the society. Women's NGOs have become important policy players and work closely with state institutions through EU programs. There are signs of a rapprochement between the parties. Yet,

rapprochement is not solely shaped by the EU programs. Women's civil society succeeded in cooperating with the state institutions and pushing the state to follow reforms related to women's rights both by mobilizing large constituencies at the domestic level and using external networks to pressure the state. Simultaneously, women's civil society resisted the patriarchal policies and criticized the state. The EU accession process continues to be shaped by these dynamics.

External Networks

The EU has impacted the development of women's NGOs through promotion of external networks. While the EU accession context provides an opportunity to participate in external networks, EU programs have made the development of external networks between countries a condition for funding. Issue-based external networks are an important peculiarity of the European governance. The EU actively promotes the participation of civil society actors in transnational networks and European umbrella organizations. It is expected that civil society organizations will learn to promote dialogue, network, exchange experiences with their counterparts and will transfer EU practices to the national level as well as foster mutual understanding (Interview Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, Sector Manager II, 2011). At other times, participation in these external networks will allow Turkish women's NGOs to use their membership to obtain information, provide contact points, and learn from their experiences.

A good example of how women's NGOs benefitted from external networks is the participation of Turkish women's NGOs in the EWL, the largest alliance of women's organizations in Europe. The EWL has become an increasingly powerful actor for the women's movement because within the EU accession context, women's NGOs from candidate countries obtained the right to become members. Women's NGOs established the Turkish Coordination of the EWL in 2004. KA-DER is the EWL- Secretariat for the Turkish Coordination. The Turkish Coordination of the EWL united in their opinion that "memberships to the EWL represent an historical step in the collaboration and solidarity between women of Turkey and women in Europe. We, the women of Turkey, are members of the EU now." (Interview- Turkish Delegate to the EWL 2013). More importantly, since 2004, the Turkish Coordination of the EWL actively participated in various activities within the framework of the

EWL. External networks developed between the EWL and Turkish Coordination has also enabled women's NGO's to shape EU policies towards Turkey. Therefore, the EWL provides women's NGOs credibility, legitimacy and leverage, the agenda of women, access, and resources.

Turkish NGOs have used these external networks to raise their national image and gain credibility. According to a former Turkish Delegate, "participation in the EWL allow[ed] Turkish women's organizations to demonstrate their diverse strategies of mobilization, Turkish feminism and peculiarities of the women's movement in Turkey" and thus raise the profile of the Turkish women's movement in Europe (Interview Turkish Delegate to the EWL 2013).

Participation in such transnational networks also provided Turkish NGOs with added leverage against the government. For example, Turkish women's NGOs' successful campaign against the government's attempt to criminalize adultery in 2004 rested on both effective domestic organization and strong support from the EWL in Brussels (İçduygu, 2011). Turkish women's NGOs established a European network for immediate action and explained to their European counterparts how the proposed law is in contradiction with the EU's principles, values and policies. Subsequently, the EU pressured the Turkish government to withdraw its proposal to criminalize adultery.

The EWL set an agenda for women's NGOs (Europeanization of national agenda), and facilitated mobilization of collective experiences to work on major issues affecting women. To give an example, the *50/50 Campaign for Democracy* aimed to promote equal representation of women and men in politics. The 2008 campaign was led by the EWL and supported by the European institutions, its members including Turkish coordination of EWL. The Turkish Coordination of EWL launched the campaign urging the ruling and opposition parties to take immediate steps to pass a parity law that would guarantee an equal number of female and male candidates for all elections, and provide a constitutional guarantee of equal representation of women.

In an interview, the previous Turkish Coordinator of the EWL (2013) pointed out the significance of parity law:

"given the fact that Turkish women acquired the right to vote in the 1930s, the representation of women in politics remains very low compared to European countries. We demand a parity law, "parity democracy" in Turkey. We are actively lobbying together with our counterparts in European countries for a parity law. The

experience of France shows that a gender parity law has to be an integral part of gender equality. Like France, we should take urgent steps to achieve a gender parity law and commit to gender equality".

Therefore, the campaign and interviewee point out how the EWL set a national agenda for women in Turkey to increase the legitimacy of the demands of EWL coordination in Turkey.

Finally, the EWL provides access and involvement as well as resources to women's NGOs. The EWL Turkish Coordination has participated in the EWL Observatory on Violence against Women, an observatory that is composed of experts and identifies critical and emerging issues to contribute to the policy work of EWL on violence against women. The EWL also provides women's NGOs resources; for example, the EWL coordination organized capacity building activities as a part of the EWL campaign *Together for a Europe free from prostitution* (2010-2012) regarding prostitution in Europe. Within this context, Turkish-EWL members discussed prostitution and violence against women in a capacity-building seminar, exchanged and obtained knowledge from experts who are coordinating the EWL campaign.

External Networks-EU Projects

The EU has also facilitated the formation of external networks through its civil society programmes. Flying Broom (*Uçan Süpürge*) has identified early and forced marriage as a major social problem and conducted several activities to combat child marriages in Turkey. Since 2003, Uçan Süpürge has completed different projects, has come together with thousands of women from different provinces of Turkey to initiate debates on child marriages, raised awareness through film screenings and discussions, cooperated with different state institutions and parliamentarians, engaged with the members of the European Parliament as well the European Commission, and established a platform called the "Say 'No' to Child Brides" Platform. Uçan Süpürge framed child marriages not as a cultural problem but as a major girl's rights problem.

As a part of the Civil Society Dialogue program (see Chapter 3 for details), under the EU-Turkey Intercultural Dialogue scheme, Uçan Süpürge has conducted a project on early and forced marriages in Turkey and Germany. The overall objective of the EU-Turkey Intercultural Dialogue is "to foster greater mutual understanding between EU and Turkey by increasing intercultural dialogue" (1). Within this scheme,

there have been strong references to "cooperation", "cultural partners", "intercultural dialogue", "mutual understanding", "tolerance" and "interaction". The project has made "cultural partnership" with counterparts in EU member states a condition for the provision of funding. *Uçan Süpürge* has partnered with the International Women's Film Festival Dortmund (DE), a Cologne based organization in Germany, to raise awareness about early and forced marriages both in Turkey and Germany through film screening with no dialogue. The representative of Uçan Süpürge (2011) said that: The theme of early marriages has grown into a pressing issue for both countries." She explained how "Turkish people brought a 'destructive tradition' to Germany, that it became 'a moving problem', a common challenge that needs to be addressed together.

It is believed that non-dialogue short films will facilitate visual thinking on the issue. This project shows how the EU has established partnerships between organizations by utilizing culture, common problems to promote interaction and foster mutual understanding between countries. Consequently, Europeanization has resulted in partnership between organizations, which fostered dialogue.

5.4 Historical Legacy as a Condition of EU Impact

I argue that the EU has exerted a strong influence on women's NGOs in Turkey and provided evidence that strong mobilization of women's NGOs, collaboration with the state, and effective use of the external networks has led to the strong influence of the EU. My analytical framework suggests that the impact of the EU on women's NGOs would have been weaker in the absence of these conditions, which are shaped by deeply rooted historical legacies. Legacies have become significant especially in the connective pathway and have influenced Europeanization outcomes of women's NGOs. As the literature on legacies suggest (See Chapter 2 for more detail), legacies of the past not only constrain the range of current outcomes, but also enable them. Therefore, it is possible that certain aspects and characteristics of the past, especially those resulting from unique experiences of movements, can also function as a way to reinforce Europeanization. This section will show how historical legacies matter for the development of women's NGOs and the EU impact by invoking a plausibility probe.

In order to do this I consider the experience of women's NGOs in the Republic of Cyprus as an illustrative case. Cyprus acceded to the EU in 2004, and has access to the framework for gender equality. The impact of the EU on women's

NGOs appears to be limited. Hadjipavlou and Mertan (2010: 261) argue that "women from all communities had hoped that the entry to the EU would have made a difference… but this has not been the case up till now and it needs to be studied further".

First, the absence of a dynamic women's civil society that promotes cooperation among civil society actors and supports policy initiation in favor of women's issues hinders the EU's impact. In contrast to Turkey, Cyprus never has had an active women's movement, which could have mobilized around women's issues and has been unable to use pre-accession context as an opportunity to promote women's rights and enhance their visibility. Studies have pointed out the absence of a women's movement in Cyprus could be explained by multiple historical factors such as colonialism, nationalism and a national problem (Hadijipavlou and Mertan 2010) that have inhibited the development of a women's movement. These factors are deeply rooted in the history and have functioned as constraining factors for the development of the women's movement in the island. The limited strength of women's movement and mobilization on the basis of gender issues during the pre-accession process inhibited EU's impact on women NGOs in Cyprus. Although civil society space is fragmented and differentiated along their identities in Turkey, women's NGOs are able to collaborate on various issues. Women's civil society establishes platforms, campaigns for a common cause, initiates policy proposals and in successful cases are able to amend legislation in relation to the women's issues. For instance, in Turkey, women's civil society brought together a strong and diverse women's movement coalition in favor of reform and induced amendments in legislation. In Turkey, the existence of a vibrant civic space has been a facilitating condition for maximizing the EU impact.

Second, the lack of mechanisms that actively promote state society cooperation and the absence of a strong women's agency in this network impede the EU's impact. In 1994, the National Machinery for the Rights of Women was established in Cyprus as a requirement of CEDAW. Unlike Turkey, women's NGOs have not played active roles under this machinery. In Cyprus, women's NGOs are organically tied to political parties for material and social support and are refrained from engaging in gender issues (Hadijipavlou and Mertan 2010: 259; Sepos 2008: 143). Women's NGOs have not been able to develop independent positions both from the state and political parties. In the pre-accession process, the women's movement

was totally absent from the political arena. During the EU accession process, transposition of the gender equality framework has been explicitly recognized by officials of the National Machinery for Women's Rights without social involvement of the civil society (Ioannou and Kentas 2011:98). Whereas in Turkey, the women's movement has collaborated with the National Women's Machinery to further gender equality policies, yet, at the same time resisted the state policies when it is against their interests. If women's NGOs could not participate in women's machinery to promote their rights and push the state to follow gender-sensitive legislation, the Europeanization processes would not have empowered women's NGOs in Turkey.

Finally, the dearth of transnational links with international NGOs and networks stands as an important barrier that limits the EU impact on women's NGOs. In Cyprus, external networks with the women's movement both in the region and elsewhere remained very limited due to the ethnic conflict that dominated the national agenda (Hadijipavlou and Mertan 2010). In Turkey, women's NGOs established earlier international ties and pressured the state by using these networks. Such experience with the external networks is likely to ease interaction with European networks. As shown in the previous section, Turkish coordination of the EWL was founded in 2004, and women's NGOs actively participated in the EWL before Turkey's accession to the EU. In Cyprus, the Cyprus Women's Lobby was established in 2008, much later than the accession to the EU. This means that the Europeanization processes are not only triggered by the EU; historical legacies have also played a key role in these processes. If there had not been an effect of historical legacies, the EU impact on women's NGOs would have been different in both countries.

5.4. Conclusion

The promotion of women's civil society actors and gender mainstreaming has been at the center of the EU policy towards civil society. The main focus of this chapter has been to examine the ways in which the EU is triggering civil society development with a particular focus on women's NGOs in Turkey. This chapter demonstrated that the EU has provided opportunities to women's civil society through funding and enabled organizations to legitimize their actions and policies. More importantly, chapter showed that a stronger degree of Europeanization of women's

civil society succeeds when the EU converges with the facilitating historical legacies. Therefore, this chapter highlights the significance of domestic factors such as historical legacies in mediating the EU impact, and the fact that Europeanization is not necessarily constrained by the historical legacies.

CHAPTER 6
ENVIRONMENTAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY

This chapter analyzes the dynamics of civil society and EU relations by investigating the various ways in which Turkey's integration with the EU has influenced environmental civil society in Turkey. As Turkey applied for candidacy, Brussels became the driving force shaping the vision of environmental governance practices and the European Commission has become a key funder for environmental civil society. In the EU, environmental NGOs are active participants in environmental decision-making and policy processes. In an effort to contribute to the expanding literature on Europeanization of civil society, this chapter presents another original empirical study to understand the EU's impact on environmental civil society and examine the mechanisms and interplay between domestic and EU level factors.

I argue that the EU impact on environmental civil society has been ambivalent and has produced mixed effects. My argument is based on two main literature. First, literature on Europeanization of civil society has shown that the EU has altered the legislative framework, provided funding and enabled civil society actors in Turkey. Yet, this research agenda lacks an assessment of Europeanization of environmental civil society in Turkey as well as the influence of the EU on interactions between societal actors. The relationship between Europeanization and environmental civil society is only mentioned in a study on Europeanization of environmental policy (İzci 2005; 2011). In this context, İzci has argued that accession negotiations provide opportunities for the environmental NGOs to strengthen their capacities, to participate in different processes, to improve access to information and enhance consultation with the government (2011: 195-196). However, İzci has not presented a detailed analysis of the EU influence on environmental NGOs. Second, the literature on environmental studies in Turkey has emphasized the importance of the EU for environmental civil society. For example, Adem (2005) has discussed how the EU, alongside other international organizations, established relations with environmental NGOs through "project-based work". She has further highlighted challenges that the

relations bring such as "risk of projectizing" (Adem 2005: 80). Paker *et al.* (2013) have examined environmental organizations more comprehensively and focused on their relations with the state and with financial donors. In assessing the relationship between environmental organizations and financial donors and the state, Paker *et al.* have pointed out the positive impact of the EU process on consultation with the state and in the extension of funds. Additionally, Paker *et al.* have raised problems associated with the EU process such as the tendency of the state to exclude civil society from political processes and the detachment of environmental organizations from their supporters and constituencies due to EU funding (2013: 770). Overall, the current studies have not paid sufficient attention to Europeanization of environmental NGOs in Turkey.

In this chapter, I will focus on the influence of the EU on environmental civil society. I argue that the EU's impact on environmental civil society is ambivalent and haunted by the legacies of the past. While the EU has provided several opportunities, the moderate status of the green movement and activism, and the weak cooperation among environmental actors has functioned as constraining conditions of the EU impact. Furthermore, controversial relations between the state and society and the limited participation in European networks have displayed an ambivalent impact of the EU on environmental civil society. I will illustrate how the interplay between the EU and domestic factors produces such outcomes.

The findings on compulsory and enabling pathways demonstrate similarities and indicate that EU impact is uniform across different sectors of the civil society. Yet, structured comparison of connective pathways shows diverse effects on civil society. I will show how Europeanization outcomes have depended on specific experiences of the past. The judgment of the EU impact is based on its power to effect interaction between actors and policies along with the social and political context of the operation of civil society.

My study mainly focuses on one cluster of environmental civil society in Turkey. In an effort to follow an actor-oriented approach to civil society, I concentrate on national environmental NGOs in Turkey. While there are various types of environmental civil society organizations in Turkey, they will not all be used for the empirical analysis of the EU impact. In order to understand environmental civil society and the particular patterns of development that are associated with these organizations, I will point out other civil society actors, such as local environmental

movements (e.g. the Bergama Movement), environmental platforms (e.g. the environmental platforms), and Green political party within the general context of civil society development. In this context, "environmental civil society" refers to the various types of "environment related organizations including the greens, ecologists, nature conservationists, and environmentalists" (Adem 2005: 71).[23] However, in this chapter, the analysis of the EU impact will be based only on environmental NGOs in Turkey. These environmental NGOs are considered to be the important and established ones in terms of size and capacity, experience of working with the EU, visibility, area of impact, and connections with internal and external networks.

This chapter is structured in four sections. First, I will review the historical development of environmental civil society in Turkey to identify distinct characteristics that molded the environmental movement in Turkey. This part shows distinct characteristics and argues that traditionally, environmental activism has been moderate; it intends to participate in policymaking processes but has been restricted by the state's behavior. In addition, environmental civil society is regarded as impotent due to lack of cooperation with internal and external networks. Second, I will map the mechanisms of the EU's impact in environmental civil society and analyze if and how this impact has altered the situation of environmental civil society in Turkey. In the third section, I will illustrate historical legacies in detail that have conditioned the EU's impact by engaging in counterfactual reasoning. Finally, I will summarize the findings and look at the implications of the EU's civil society approach from the perspective of the environmental civil society in Turkey. Altogether, empirical evidence corroborates the conclusion that the EU and historical trajectories determine the Europeanization outcomes in Turkey.

6.1. Major Developments in Environmental Civil Society

This section examines the history of environmental civil society and presents distinct characteristics of the environmental civil society in the pre-1999 period, before Turkey's candidacy period. I will demonstrate that parallel to historical legacies that have been identified in Chapter 4, environmental civil society has followed inherited characteristics in Turkey: Environmental civil society has limited

[23] The nuance between these organizations –divided between environmental and ecological groups- will not be taken into account in this analysis.

resources, and similar to other civil society actors has operated in a restrictive legal framework. Moreover, environmental civil society has moderate activism and is unable to unite on the basis of environmental issues. It generally has controversial relations with the state and limited participation in external networks. It is also important to note that Europe has been an important reference point in Turkey, which has implications for Turkish civil society including environmental NGOs.

6.1.1. Environmental Civil Society in the Ottoman Period (1839-1923)

Starting from the Ottoman period, intermediary institutions depended strongly on the state. Traditionally, civil society in Turkey has been institutionally weak, underfunded, and has lacked various resources. Furthermore, there has been no financial and legal mechanism to support the development of civil society in Turkey. Unlike their European counterparts, civil society in Turkey has not been supported by the state (Rumelili and Boşnak 2015). Similar to other types of issue-based NGOs, this limitation can also be found in the environmental civil society.

When we trace the development of environmental civil society in Turkey, we find that although environmental civil society is a relatively new phenomenon; environmental initiatives go back to the last period of the Ottoman Empire. Environmental history is still a "fledging field" in Ottoman historiography (Dursun 2007: 211) and the available sources for the history of environmental civil society have been very limited (Özdemir 2002). These studies on the history of the Ottoman Empire and environment find that there were two types of organizations that dealt with environmental issues. The first ones were the associations of environment directly interested in environmental issues and established by Ottoman elites. Environmental understanding was limited to the protection of natural sites and the formation of beautification associations. For instance, the Association of İstanbul's Ancient Monuments founded by Prince Said Halim Pasha, was established with the

objective of the "promotion of Istanbul's works of art as well as its cultural and historical heritage and beauties, and to increase aesthetical consciousness of its people" in 1917 (Özdemir 2002 quoted in Baykan 2013: 8). A second one was the *vakfs* that performed civil society functions in the Ottoman Empire. Although *vakfs* did not explicitly deal with environment, an analysis of the constitutions of these

organizations demonstrates that they highlighted issues of environmental protection (Özdemir 2002). As discussed in the previous chapter, the feminist research agenda illustrated that during the Ottoman period the women's movement was strong and demanded rights in relation to the women issues. Yet, activities were controlled and restricted by the Ottoman institutions. In contrast to the women's movement, there was no environmental activism that raised environmental consciousness and awareness in this period. Due to its relatively recent inception, environmental activism does not have a long-standing past, and sources relating to this area are fairly very rare.

Turkey inherited strong state tradition from the Ottoman Empire. In Turkey, the development of civil society and activism have been paralyzed by the strong state tradition that it inherited from the Ottoman period (Heper 1965; Mardin 1969; Özbudun 1996). In the Ottoman convention, civil society had no influence over the state. In the beginning, classic Ottoman tradition and later the *Tanzimat* reforms, further strengthened the absolute power of the state by concentrating power and eliminating and restricting Ottoman institutions that were considered to be semi-quasi civil society organizations, such as *vakfs* and *tarikat* (Grigoriadis 2009: 43-44). As Grigoriadis (2009:67) notes, "the pursuit of individual interest was dismissed as divisive and harmful for the common good". This negative perception was the predominant attitude towards civil society that legitimized excessive control over civil society actors, and later shaped state policies towards civil society actors.

6.1.2. Environmental Civil Society in the Early Republican and Multi-Party Period (1923-1980)

In early Republican Turkey and during the transition to the multi-party period the number of environmental organizations increased, but the characteristics of civil society in Turkey did not change. In the earlier years of the republic, organizations such as the Prince Islands Settlement Association, Association for the Beautification of Çamlıca, Society of Bosphorus Lovers, Association for the Reconstruction of Martyr Memorials, Association for the Protection of Trees and the Association of Protection of Animals were established by the upper-middle class (Dinçer 1996; Adem 2005). Additionally, the Turkish Forester's Association (1924) was the first semi-governmental forestry NGO in the country established by professionals. Environmental devastation had intensified in the 1950s as a consequence of

urbanization, industrialization and internal migration; in response to environmental degradation, professionals, mainly technocrats, founded associations such as the Green Foresters' Association of Turkey (1950), the Turkish Association for Conservation of Nature (1954), the Association of Assistant Forest Engineers (1951), the Ankara Anti Air Pollution Association (1969), the Society for the Protection of Nature (1975), and the Environmental Issues Foundation of Turkey (1978). The formation of beautification associations and of associations concerning major health and sanitation issues characterized the environmental activity in this period (Adem 2005: 73). Despite the rise in the number of associations, environmental civil society remained weak, fragmented and controlled by the state. Although any kind of organization that was related to the environment represented "the embryonic stage of environmental activism" (Adem 2005: 73) and activities were very limited and controlled by the state, these associations played an important role in raising awareness and improving the environmental law in Turkey (Atauz 2000; Adem 2005; Paker 2013).

6.1.3. Environmental Civil Society in the Post- Republican Period (1980-1999)

In the 1980s, export-led industrialization and implementation of liberal policies led to large-scale infrastructure, housing, and transportation projects. Coupled with mass migration and unplanned urbanization these projects induced ecological devastation and an increase in environmental problems (Adaman and Arsel 2005; Ignatow 2005; Adaman and Arsel 2010). As environmental concerns intensified, the environmental movement developed both at the local and national levels. Local environmental movements such as Güvenpark (1986), Zaferpark (1987), Gökova (since 1986), Yatağan (1989-92), Aliağa (1989-92), Fırtına Valley (1999), Bursa (1992) thermic power plants, Akkuyu and Sinop, potential nuclear plants, Bergama goldmines and a number of dam projects (such as Ilısu and Munzur Dams) engaged in collective action. These movements raised important environmental problems in Turkey's environmental agenda, pushed the state to change its policies and acted as agents of change. The establishment of the Green Party in 1988, which was inspired by its West European counterparts, was considered to be another major development of this phase and improved environmental activism during its course of action until

1994.[24] Although Green Party survived very shortly, this party succeeded in raising awareness of important environmental problems in Turkey's environmental agenda such as the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. Furthermore, as Adem argues, most of the organizations in the 1990s benefited from the experience of the Green Party (Adem 2005: 75). For instance, the Green Party was not only well integrated with local movements, but also utilized strategies such as signature campaigns, rallies, use of the legal system and establishing relationships with environmental organizations and Green parties in other countries (Şimşek 1993:63-68; Künar 1993; Duru 2002). In parallel with these developments, the institutional and legislative bases for environmental protection developed with the 1982 Constitution. Under Article 56, environmental rights were defined as the state's as well as the citizen's duty (Adem 2005: 75-76).

Another important characteristic of environmental civil society is the lack of cooperation among environmental actors. The environmental civil society has included participants from very diverse backgrounds and, as a result, has been unable to develop a "green political tradition" and solidarity and thus remains ineffective in Turkey (Atauz 2000:205; Duru 2013). Since the emergence of the environmental movement, the relations among various environmental actors have not been cooperative. Linkages and cooperation among civil society actors are weak as a result of ideological, cultural and social cleavages (Kuzmanovic 2010:434). This was also reflected in the environmental sphere. In Turkey, the environmental civil society has been scattered and environmental civil society actors compete with one another. This situation also had a negative impact on the development of the Green Party, where the disagreement between the greens and the environmentalists eventually brought the dissolution of the first Green Party (Duru 2002).

Although civil society in Turkey was restricted by the 1971 and 1980 military interventions, in some way these interventions favoured the environmental civil society and environmental campaigns since environmentalists are not perceived as a "threat" by the state (Atauz 2000:199; Duru 2002; Paker *et al.* 2013). Despite the fact that the state has not perceived environmental civil society as a "threat" and generally has tolerated environmental civil society more than human rights organizations (See Chapter 7 on human rights civil society), the state has not promoted and contributed

[24] The Green Party closed in 1994 and established again in 2008. Recently, the Green Party decided to merge with the Equality and Democracy Party.

to the development of environmental civil society. Moreover, since the Republican period, the economic growth policies have been the main determinants of the relationship between the state and environmental civil society; as Aydın (2005:54) rightly points out the "state becomes responsive to the demands of environmental civil society organizations as long as they correspond to the priorities of economic growth". A well-known example in the Turkish context is the different attitude of the state to the demands of civil society in relation to the nature of conservation and energy policies. It is important to highlight that the tension between economic growth policies and the conservation demands is not only peculiar to Turkey but is common in both developed and developing countries (Adaman and Arsel 2012: 323).

In the 1990s, environmental civil society did not only proliferate and expand its activities, but also participated in the policymaking processes (Adem 2005; Keyman 2005; Paker *et al.* 2013). As Adem argues, this period could be seen as the period of professionalization, institutionalization, internationalization and expansion of project based work (Adem 2005: 78-81). Environmental foundations such as the Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habits (*Türkiye Erozyonla Mücadele, Ağaçlandırma ve Doğal Varlıkları Koruma Vakfi- TEMA*), Wild World Foundation- Turkey (*WWF-Turkey*), Greenpeace Mediterranean and Turkish Environmental and Woodlands Protection Society (*Türkiye Çevre Koruma ve Yeşillendirme Kurumu-TÜRÇEK*) expanded their activities, professionalized and specialized in specific issue areas, and broadened the understanding of environmental issues in Turkey. For instance, TEMA specifically focuses on the prevention of soil erosion, deforestation, biodiversity loss and climate change. The Buğday Association is active in supporting ecological living in Turkey. Its main goal is to raise awareness in ecological living both in the society and as a whole; to propose solutions to ecological problems and to support living in harmony with nature. The Nature Association (Doğa Derneği-DD) seeks to protect Turkey's bird species, important bird areas, key biodiversity areas and priority habitats through a national network grassroots programme. The TÜRÇEK has taken the status of "public benefit society" with the aim of preserving nature and the environment in Turkey. The Foundation for the Protection and Promotion of the Environment and Cultural Heritage (*Çevre ve Kültür Değerlerini Koruma ve Tanıtma Vakfı-ÇEKÜL*) strives to foster and build a nation-wide awareness and network for the preservation of the urban and rural, built and natural environment. The Society for the protection

of Nature/WWF-Turkey works towards the implementation of environmental legislation and international agreements on nature conservation. Although these organizations are influential and address specific policy targets in the environmental agenda, they are small in scale and not very effective in policymaking.

The UN has played a significant role in the internationalization of civil society and the establishment of international connections with the Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II Summit) of 1996. This conference provided an avenue for networking with other national and international environmental NGOs. The total number of environmental groups and activities grew steadily after the Habitat Conference. Another novel development was the relationship between transnational activist networks and environmental movements. In the 1990s, the Bergama resistance (e.g. anti-cyanide network), Akkuyu movement (e.g. anti-nuclear network), and the Ilısu Movement (e.g. human rights and cultural heritage network) made extensive use of transnational networks (Çoban 2004; Morvaridi 2004; Kadirbeyoğlu 2005). These transnational networks provided information, experience from similar conflicts in other countries and opportunities for networking between environmental civil society in Turkey and their counterparts in Europe.

In the 1990s, cooperation and alliances among civil society organizations remained weak and fragmented. Overall, these organizations did not work together to influence various policies. As one environmental NGO representative succinctly summarized, "we, in general, have conflicting and competing interests, and we do not know how to work and how to produce together. There is a culture of competition in environmental civil society" (Interview TÜRÇEK 2011). This is yet another demonstration of continuity with the lack of cooperative relations among actors.

Although the institutionalization of an environment policy started in 1974 with the establishment of the Committee for Coordination of environmental problems, a Ministry of Environment was established in 1991[25] and passed a large body of environmental laws and regulations (Adaman and Arsel 2012; İzci 2012;Paker *et al.* 2013: 763). While the state categorizes nature conservation as "harmless" and cooperates with environmental organizations at the policy level, in the case of energy

[25] In 1993 the Ministry of Forestry and the Environment merged. In 2011, two new ministries- the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and the Ministry of Forestry and Hydraulic Works- were established.

issues environmental NGOs often clash with the state. For instance, the DD is one of the members of the National Wetlands Commission under the coordination of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. At the same time, it is fighting against hydroelectric power plants and clashes with the Forestry and Water Works Ministry.

It is also important to note that the institutionalized state machinery is not a monolithic entity and is composed of multiple, different, fragmented institutions and agencies (Adaman and Arsel 2010; 2012;Paker *et al.* 2013). In this context, environmental NGOs have a complex engagement and different modes of interaction with different institutions. There are two directorates in the Ministry of Environment and Forestry: Nature Protection, and National Parks and Forestry. Furthermore, problems of coordination and jurisdiction complicate the issues. As Paker *et al.*2013 illustrates and my interviews have supported, "Different departments can take each other to court, as in the case of State Hydraulic Works and the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (when they were separate entities)" Paker *et al.* 2013: 768). In other words, the environmental NGOs cooperate with some state institutions but at the same time conflict with others in addressing the environmental problems. This has a negative consequence on the relationship between institutions and environmental civil society. For instance, both the Nature Association and the TEMA Foundation show similar tendencies in their relations with the state bodies.

The relationship between the state and environmental organizations should be considered in three different ways (Aydın 2005; Paker *et al.* 2013). In the literature this political accommodation is defined as "critical engagement," which refers to the two-way process between the state and NGOs in which they recognize each other's capabilities to solve societal problems (Aydın 2005: 60). There are three ways of critical engagement: (i) cooperation occurs when both actors recognize each other's capacities and work in collaboration, (ii) conflict occurs when NGOs and the state have a contradictory relationship with each other and (iii) cooptation occurs when the state integrates selected NGOs in its own policy cycle.

Environmental NGOs have been engaging in decision-making and policy processes by becoming commission members to relevant ministries and preparing scientific reports, and, thus, providing services to the public bodies. In this context, environmental NGOs have provided services (e.g. scientific knowledge and expertise) and in turn have participated in the decision-making processes as partners. For instance, the TEMA Foundation provided data about Turkey's natural resources to the

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. As a result, the Ministry began to work on forestation more efficiently (Interview TEMA 2011). Similarly, the DD prepared a database on bird species for various state institutions. Environmental NGOs also undertake lobbying activities to influence decision-making processes both in the national and the international domains. For instance, the TEMA Foundation issued a law on the conservation of soil and land management known as the "The Law on Soil Protection and Land Improvement". The TEMA Foundation actively lobbied for the approval of this law. Lobbying activities include a petition campaign, use of media, seminars, and visits. In this case, the TEMA Foundation provided services and worked with state bodies in drafting this law. Moreover, governments more frequently consult with the environmental NGOs regarding environmental issues. However, consultation appears limited and exists mostly as a symbolic procedure.

The government and private sector's interests in energy sources clash with civil society demands on environmental protection (İzci 2012). The cooperation with the state on one issue does not guarantee further participation in policy making (Paker *et al*. 2013). The relationship between the state and society has also been

controversial. There are various examples of this confrontational relationship. For instance, although the DD takes part in various commissions and provides scientific knowledge to state institutions, it has a contradictory relationship with the state. A well-known example is the court case between the State Hydraulic Works and the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (when they were different institutions), and the involvement of the DD in this controversy. "During this process we presented scientific data on the importance of wetlands in court in order to intervene in investment decisions on hydroelectric power plants and influence water policies" (Interview DD 2011). Another example is the TEMA Foundation's stance towards 2B legislation[26]. In this case, TEMA has been monitoring and working to influence the 2B legislation process.

The final mode of interaction with the state is cooptation. Traditionally cooptation is widely used when the state chooses to work with some organizations and exclude other organizations. This type of relationship is based on the selective understanding and limited inclusion of civil society by the state. In this case, the state

[26] 2B legislation refers to the privatization of forestlands that opens forestlands for construction and sells them to private owners.

strategically chooses environmental organizations that will support its policies and in turn enable these organizations to participate in environmental governance. These organizations act as GONGOs.

Historically, there has been weaker activism and participation in environmental civil society. As I have demonstrated in the previous sections, the lack of a strong environmental movement was inherited from the Ottoman period. In contrast to the women's movement, environmental awareness has been rare and does not have a long history. One of the impediments of the development of environmental civil society is the cleavage among environmental actors. Furthermore, the state tolerated environmental activism but did not develop it further. Overall, these inherited characteristics have shaped environmental civil society in Turkey.

6.2. Pathways and Outcomes of the EU Impact

The following section analyzes the different forms of EU influence on environmental civil society. The EU has impacted environmental civil society through its accession context and financial assistance. As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the literature on the Europeanization of civil society and environmental studies has referred to two pathways of the EU: financial assistance and the EU's role as a legitimization device. Yet, in depth-analysis of environmental civil society has been absent in the literature. More importantly, a connective pathway and its outcome have also not been studied in the context of Turkish environmental civil society.

To start with the outcomes of the compulsory and enabling impacts are similar to the women's civil society. First, the compulsory pathway has led to the change in the law of associations as well as environmental legislation and positively influenced the context in which civil society operates. At the same time, conditionality driven financial assistance to environmental civil society has produced various outcomes that belong to different types of Europeanization outcomes: (i) the compulsory impact, when environmental civil society adapts their issue area according to EU priorities; (ii) the enabling impact, when conducting an EU project enabled environmental civil society to follow their agenda; (iii) the connective impact, when a partnership is established between Turkish environmental NGOs, their counterparts in European countries and with state institutions. Yet, the environmental chapter has not closed, and both legal and implementation problems have surfaced during the post-2005

period. Second, in the case of the enabling impact, environmental NGOs have referenced the EU's environmental *acquis* to push the state in following environmental priorities.

The connective pathway has facilitated cooperation between domestic environmental civil society actors. The establishment of Turkey's Environment and Agriculture Alliance *(Türkiye'nin Çevre ve Tarım İttifakı- ABce)* is an example how the accession context triggered cooperation between domestic actors. Yet, ABce dissolved very rapidly due to the problems related to the environmental civil society in Turkey. The relationship between the state and environmental civil society has not changed to a great extent. Environmental NGOs have continued to participate in policymaking processes but this relationship has been molded by the state's approach to environmental NGOs. While the state has been somehow receptive to conservation issues, in the case of energy, these actors clash with each other. In a similar vein, across three dimensions, namely society- society, state-society and external networks the EU programs have led partnerships between actors. In sum, Europeanization outcomes have been ambivalent on environmental civil society. In the following section, I will present new empirical evidence and interplay between the different forms of the EU influence and domestic factors to show influence of the EU on environmental civil society.

6.2.1. Compulsory Pathway

The first type of impact, which has been discussed in the literature on Europeanization, is compulsory impact. Similar to other sectors of civil society, compulsory impact occurred through the *acquis communautaire* and the financial assistance. This means that the EU uses conditionality as a strategy in which a reward is given or withheld depending on the fulfilment of certain conditions. The outcome of such interventions has been EU-conform behaviour such as legislative adaptation or implementation (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005: 8).

Firstly, the EU pressure to comply with the environmental *acquis* has induced legislative changing in environmental procedures and created opportunities for environmental civil society. In 2003, Turkey became a member of the European Environmental Agency (EEA) and the European environment information and observation network. These memberships have created a management system that the

EU has been using for its member states. In addition to these memberships, in 2006, the Environmental Law was amended in line with the *acquis* and a national environmental approximation strategy was adopted (İzci 2011: 191). The 2006 amendments to the 1983 Law on the Environment stipulates that public participation is a key principle of environmental policymaking, and requires state institutions to create participatory mechanisms for non-state actors.

Turkey started the on-going negotiations on the environment chapter of the *acquis* in 2009. As studies on enlargement have shown (Hicks 2004; Börzel and Buzogány 2010 b), the EU environmental policy has created policy rights by legally involving public involvement in the policy processes. Access to the environmental impact assessment (EIA) directives and environmental information are key components of the environmental chapter of the *acquis communautaire*. The EIA procedures aim to strengthen environmental protection and involve public participation as a fundamental principle of environmental policymaking across all stakeholders. However, the 2009 EU Progress Report indicated that despite the transposition of the EIA directives, public involvement has not been fully aligned with European standards (Commission of the European Communities 2009: 80). Furthermore, Turkey is not a party to the Aarhus Conventions, which grant public rights regarding access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters due to foreign policy concerns. Accordingly, although the EU has provided various policy rights to civil society actors, environmental organisations have not fully enjoyed those rights. This is also an illustration how the state's interests and position disable environmental civil society in Turkey.

Secondly, the compulsory pathway also functioned through the financial assistance to civil society. In the case of compulsory impact, civil society organizations have behaved strategically in an instrumental way and may have been directly affected by EU funds, technical assistance, training, and inclusion in consultation (Kutter and Trappmann 2010: 49). As Kutter and Trappmann (2010:49) argue, "the EU grants these opportunities as an incentive to engage with EU agendas and the implementation of EU rules". In the case of Turkey, the EU has provided all of these instruments in developing environmental civil society and in supporting the accession preparation. As I show throughout this thesis, the compulsory pathway may

lead to different outcomes- compulsory, enabling and connective. The following examples show manifestations of compulsory impact.

Starting from the late 1990s, the EU provided financial aid to the environmental civil societies that participated in the awareness of environmental concerns on an ad-hoc basis (e.g. MEDA program) and the establishment of capacities and cooperation with various actors in the development of environmental policies (e.g. Civil Society Development Program and Civil Society Dialogue Program). After Turkey's recognition as a candidate country in 1999, the EU intensified its funding to civil society actors that participated in the implementation of EU policies. It is important to note that the call for proposals in relation to environmental actors mainly reflected the EU environmental policy's priorities such as water management, waste and air quality, horizontal legislation and multilateral environmental agreements (e.g. LIFE, MEDA, Civil Society Development, Civil Society Dialogue Program). Therefore, environmental actors that engaged in priority areas benefited more from the EU funding. One indication of the compulsory impact is how environmental civil society organizations conduct projects according to available funds and priority areas. When organizations prioritize EU-funded projects over their areas of expertise or adapt their projects according to EU policies, compulsory impact has been powerful.

The EU programmes also enable environmental civil society in Turkey. The EU-funded projects have been extremely important for environmental NGOs since they are mostly dependent upon foreign funding like other civil society organizations in Turkey. A representative of the TEMA said that the EU funding on environmental NGOs is definitely an opportunity since there are alternative ways of funding now (Interview TEMA 2011). The General Secretary of TÜRÇEK (Interview 2011) added: "The EU funding has been an opportunity because in Turkey, the environment is not a priority and funding environmental activities is difficult". In these cases, the EU has enabled environmental organizations. The EU has made the environment a priority and has allowed organizations to make projects on the environment.

The EU introduced particular instruments to support civil society in order to contribute to the development of the implementation of environmental policy at the European level such as the DG Environment- ENGO Dialog Group (Kutter and Trappmann 2010). In following Central and Eastern European experiences, the Commission especially funded the environmentally-related subsequent programmes-

NGO Dialogue, New NGO Forum, Environment Forum (2009-2012) and now the "Development of the ENV.net in Western Balkan and Turkey: giving citizens a voice to influence environmental processes reforms for closer EU integration" programme. On behalf of Turkey, the TEMA was selected and has participated in these programmes. In the context of this programme, TEMA has established partnerships with the European environmental organizations. In this case, the EU programs have promoted cooperation between actors and facilitated the connective impact.

Overall, civil society organisations are dependent on foreign funding, and in this context, environmental organisations welcomed the EU financial and technical assistance. However, the EU's civil society strategy and its implementation is extensively criticised. Environmental organisations have raised their objections towards the EU's civil society strategy and its implementation through projects. For example, calls for projects, selection criteria, implementation processes and procedures received strong criticism.

For instance, the Project Coordinator of the DD (Interview 2011) claimed:

> The Commission guidelines are too strict and bureaucratic. You spend too much time and energy on formalities. The EU always acts according to project guidelines, but sometimes you cannot simply apply what is on the paper. Its format definitely is too restricting and you end up with very inefficient decisions and actions

The project coordinator further emphasized:

> Now we are more skeptical towards EU projects. It is true that we completed successful projects together, but the EU does not take our aims into consideration. We want to work on specific issues on nature, not the general issues on environment. This is what we need in Turkey now! There are urgent issues that Turkey's environment immediately needed, but the EU does not pay attention to these issues.

As a result, the analyses of the compulsory pathway of the EU influence indicate two main outcomes. On the one side, it has caused legislative changes in environmental laws, which in turn affect the operation of environmental civil society. On the other side, financial assistance has strengthened their capacity and shaped their agendas. Yet, in the post-2005 period implementation problems have surfaced and environmental civil society actors have raised their scepticism towards the EU's civil society policy.

6.2.2. Enabling Pathway

The EU does not only perform a direct influence on civil society development and environmental NGOs in Turkey. Similar to women's NGOs, the enabling pathway has empowered environmental NGOs. In this case, environmental NGOs use the EU as an instrument of legitimization, and justify their decisions or actions by referring to EU requirements and directives on the environment and norms.

The EU has emerged as an important reference point in this respect, both providing a positive example to emulate and setting standards for environmental NGOs in Turkey. Although there is an increasing awareness of environmental issues and values, ecological issues often fall to the bottom of the list of policy priorities. In this context, environmental NGOs have referred to the EU's environmental policy and *acquis* to push the state to follow environmental priorities. These NGOs have found new ways to repackage their priorities, initiatives and policy recommendations so that their agenda appears to fit more closely to the EU environmental policy; thus, EU membership can be used in a repeated manner to convince state officials to put real resources into environmental programs. In this way, environmental NGOs in Turkey utilize the EU framework both for political persuasion and manipulation.

Through this mechanism, environmental actors have enhanced the legitimacy of the positions that they promote. My interviews and the press releases from environmental NGOs show that this role of the indirect effect of the EU has been used extensively by environmental NGOs in Turkey.

An example of the enabling impact on environmental NGOs is the positive reference to the EU accession process in order to justify its policy positions on water. The DD has framed its opinion on water policies in relation to the EU.

> The DD acknowledges that the harmonization process with the European Union constitutes a significant opportunity for a more rational use of water resources through reviewing Turkey's water policy. The Nature Association is ready to provide the necessary public opinion support to the Turkish government and the European Commission within the framework of these main principles for rewieving Turkey's water policy, carrying out necessary scientific studies and creating water legislation.
>
> (DD- Opinion on Water).

Also, there is an important incident in which environmental NGOs used the EU as a framework against the state. In 2003, the Turkish government prepared a draft law known as the *Nature Conservation and Biodiversity Law* within the context

of the Global Environment Facility[27] which supported the Biodiversity and Natural Resources Management Project. This law changed its name to the *Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Law* but had problems on several levels from its approach to its context-- including the abolishment of the natural site conservation status and the ignorance of the NGOs participation. All of the environmental NGOs that I interviewed participate in a network called the *Nature Law Watch Initiative* which monitors the nature law process in Turkey. In this context, it is possible to see the function of the EU as a legitimizer of environmental NGOs' activism in preventing the Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Law in its current status. A representative of TEMA (Interview 2011) pointed out that:

> We have been following this process from the beginning and argue that the Nature and Biodiversity law is not in line with the EU's environmental *acquis*. On the contrary, its approach is against the EU environmental regulations from its method of preparation to the context of the law.

An interviewee from the DD (2011) emphasized:

> When you look at various environment chapters in the EU progress reports, the EU continuously highlights the importance of nature protection and biodiversity. The current status of the Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Law abolishes a great body of legislation about Natural Sites, which is also highly important for the contribution to the Turkish Nature 2000 network.

Therefore, from time to time, environmental NGOs use the EU framework to perpetuate and justify their claims, and use the EU as a reference point in environmental NGOs in a new way to repackage important environmental issues in Turkey.

On different issues, environmental NGOs have referenced the EU directives on the environment (e.g. the EU Habitats Directive, EU nature conservation legislation- Natura 2000) and the requirements of fulfilling the environmental *acquis* to pressure the government. Accordingly, as in CEE (Kutter and Trappmann 2010), environmental NGOs have used EU rules to mobilize support for different issues. However, as discussed elsewhere (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2005), the enabling impact, and, thus, legitimization of the EU is dependent on two further conditions: the commitment of the government to fulfill EU conditionality and the importance of

[27] Global Environment Facility includes the UN Development Fund, the UN Environmental Program and the World Bank, and provides funding to environmental civil society organizations working in the area of biodiversity conservation and climate change.

issues on the EU-Turkey agenda. Since 2007, the credibility of the EU membership perspective has declined and the reforms have slowed down in Turkey. As a result, the EU's enabling impact has weakened. As a representative of the TEMA (Interview 2011) puts it "The EU perspective is not only important for TEMA to follow green policies but also for the environment of Turkey. Nevertheless, the EU is not a focal point for TEMA's activities in every occasion, the EU has been significant from time to time according to institutional and country's (Turkey) priorities". Therefore, as İçduygu argues, civil society actors "retain their EU perspective", but they do not use the EU as a legitimization device for every occasion (İçduygu 2011: 338). The importance of issues on the agenda of EU-Turkey relations also has been a significant condition for the EU's enabling impact. When an environmental issue is a priority in the EU-Turkey agenda, NGOs can reference EU reports and statements of EU officials to promote their own standpoints vis-à-vis the Turkish government. For instance, further negotiations on the EU's environment and climate change chapter and participation in various environmental conventions may provide additional benefits for the NGOs (e.g. The Aarhus Convention- the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to justice in environmental matters).

6.2.3. Connective Pathway

This section will specifically show that the EU's impact on environmental civil society is ambivalent and shaped by certain characteristics of the past. The EU has promoted impacted civil society in two ways. First, Turkey's EU accession process has facilitated interactions between actors. Secondly, as a way to promote cooperation among civil society actors, the EU has mainly used projects and joint activities that are affiliated with those projects. EU programmes have made cooperation with other organizations a condition for funding (See also Chapter 3, Chapter 5 and Chapter 7). The following part provides evidence on the ways in which the EU fosters environmental civil society to cooperate with the state institutions, to get involved in policy processes, and empower networks both with other environmental civil society actors and transnational networks.

Internal Networks-Society Society

Historically, environmental movement has been active but similar to other issue areas it has been divided. However, in contrast to women's movement environmental movement unable to unite and prioritize environmental issues. The following section will examine the dynamics between the EU and environmental NGOs in Turkey.

The EU accession process has triggered the formation of internal networks between environmental organisations. Another important initiative within the context of the EU accession process is the establishment of platforms and joint activities. A good example of how environmental NGOs used internal networks is the establishment of ABce. ABce was established by the TEMA, the DD, the ÇEKÜL and the Buğday Association, and represents predominant actors in the environmental civil society from diverse environmental backgrounds. Nevertheless, ABce dissolved and was an unsuccessful initiative in Turkey.

The Representative of TEMA stated:

> Our relationship with other environmental NGOs is developing. We work together on the EU projects, we cooperate and we learn how to work together. Of course, compared to the EU practices our relationship is very underdeveloped. Networking and alliances are improving among environmental civil society organizations. We established ABce in order to follow the EU accession negotiations and to contribute to chapters on agriculture and environment. But… as you see what happened? It didn't work out.
>
> (Interview TEMA, 2011).

The Project Coordinator of the Buğday Association added: "ABce was an attempt to support the EU accession process and to develop cooperation among environmental NGOs, but it was a very unsuccessful initiative." (Interview Buğday Association, 2012).

The EU has also promoted participation in internal networks through its projects. The requirement of cooperation in EU programs has resulted in some alliances, such as the development of environmental federations among civil society organizations. Environmental NGOs also benefited from the EU accession process and established platforms to follow EU negotiations and contribute to environmental policies. However, cooperation in environmental civil society is still limited and the extent of change is not significant in Turkey.

An example of how the EU has promoted cooperation among environmental NGOs has been explained by one of the prominent environmental NGOs in Turkey as follows:

As the General Secretary of TÜRÇEK (Interview 2011) explains:

> We generally have conflicting interests and competition, we do not know how to work and how to produce together. However, in some instances, we manage to change this culture of competition through EU projects. TÜRÇEK completed a project with other environmental NGOs and we set up an environmental federation. This is a success story for us.

This one-year EU-supported project was completed in collaboration with 8 East Black Sea Region NGOs, under the coordination of the TÜRÇEK. *KarDoğa: The Cooperation Network Pilot Project on Nature Conservation in the Black Sea Towards the National Nature Conservation Network* was an EU-supported project that was implemented in 2011 under the *Empowering Civil Participation at the Local Level program* to enhance "the institutional capacity of civil society organizations, strengthen participatory democracy at the local and national levels, and to encourage dialogue among the state, civil society organisations and the private sector" (Central Finance and Contracts Unit 2008: 3). The project entailed training seminars for local organisations and a workshop between state institutions and local environmental organisations. Consequently, the pilot project strengthened cooperation among local as well as national organisations, fostered an information exchange and communication, and promoted dialogue with state institutions. However, environmental organisations emphasized that most of the joint activities and projects completed under EU-funded projects did not continue regularly following the completion of the project (Interviews TEMA, DD, TÜRKÇEK).

As a result of this project, participating NGOs established the first conservation nature federation in the Black Sea region, strengthened cooperation among local as well as national NGOs, fostered information exchange and communication, and contributed to environmental policy making in Turkey. However, joint activities and projects completed under EU-funded projects did not continue regularly follow the completion of the project.

Internal Networks-State-Society

The EU's civil society policy approach promotes partnership between the state and society. In this context, the EU has facilitated the formation of a second type of internal network between the civil society and state in Turkey. As indicated in an earlier section, there are different modes of interaction between the state and civil society. Historically, both state institutions and civil society organizations have been skeptical towards each other and the interaction has been shaped under this negative perception. The state and environmental NGOs have worked together in various contexts since the 1990s, but the relationship has been shaped by the state's attitudes and receptiveness towards these actors. This tradition is also reflected in the EU accession context as well as projects; the EU has not changed certain tendencies in this relationship.

The EU accession process has developed consultation between civil society and state institutions. For instance, since 2009 the Ministry for EU Affairs holds regular meetings with civil society organisations. As noted by Turkish policymakers, civil society meetings not only inform civil society about the recent developments in Turkey's EU negotiation process, but also promotes dialogue through exchange of information between the ministry and civil society (Interviews Ministry for EU Affairs, Expert Directorate and Director of Civil Society Communication and Culture) However, most of the organisations complained that the selection criteria for these meetings remain ambiguous and participation in the meetings has been symbolic (Commission of the European Communities 2013: 11; Paker *et al.* 2013: 767). One environmental organisation, for example, noted, "This is not real participation. We are not involved in decision-making processes. But were we there? Yes, we were" (Paker *et al.* 2013: 767).

The EU programs have made partnership with state institutions a condition for funding. A representative of the TEMA Foundation illustrated the cooperation between the NGO and state under the EU projects as follows:

> As a condition of the EU projects, we need to cooperate with Ministry of Environment and Forest in order to implement our projects. Especially in big projects we need to collaborate with various public bodies. During the course of these projects, we have experienced both cooperation and conflict. For example, we generally have a conflictual relationship on the status of hydroelectric power plants, but for other issues we do cooperate. One thing is clear: we start to work more efficiently together

under the EU projects. At the end, our relationship is still fragmented but at least we do have dialogue now

(Interview TEMA 2011).

A good example of how the EU has established internal networks between the environmental NGOs and the state is the cooperation under the EU programs.

In relation to these programs, the Project Coordinator of the DD described the relationship between the state and the DD (Interview 2011) as follows:

We have a strange relationship with the state. We work with public institutions, and local authorities as a part of the EU projects. From time to time we work with the Ministry of Environment and Forest, and from time to time we are in conflict with the Ministry of Environment and Forest. As you can imagine, on investment issues we fight with each other, because the environment is always a secondary issue for the state. The EU projects facilitated more cooperation with the state, but still our relations are differentiated across environmental issues and different public bodies

According to the environmental *acquis*, Turkey has to comply with the EU's environmental and climate change legislation and has to prepare the list of sites for the Natura 2000 network and legislation on nature protection in the context of the EU accession process. Furthermore, many chapters of *acquis communautaire* are based on the existence of active NGOs within the policy areas. It is justified on this basis that there should be a working relationship between the civil society and the public sector. The project between the state and Nature Association was conducted under this logic. With the collaboration of the Turkish Ministry of Environment and Forestry, the Nature Association implemented its project to boost the Natura 2000 protected areas network in Turkey. This project was implemented with the idea of *Improving Co-operation Between the NGOs and the Public Sector and Strengthening the NGOs' Democratic Participation* (Commission of the European Commission, 2003). The project aimed to strengthen "the NGOs democratic participation level and the ties between the public sector and the civil society within the framework of EU alignment process" (Commission of the European Commission 2003:1). The total budget of the EU funded project is 48,278,047 Euro. Project activities included education work undertaken within the key biodiversity areas; national working group meetings; and inventory conducted on the key biodiversity areas in Turkey. The main objective was to develop the technical capacity on nature conservation and integrate environmental civil society actors in the decision-making processes on nature conservation. For this purpose, the Nature Association and state institutions work

together at various levels.

As a result of this project, the DD's Policy Coordinator, states that:

> This partnership was highly important and productive. It was also a crucial step in complying with legislation on nature protection within the context of the EU candidacy process. As a result of this project, the book on the key biodiversity areas will provide data for adhering to conditions such as Natura 2000 protected areas network in the EU accession process. We also hope that this will reflect the Turkish Nature Conservation Policy. (Buğday Association Press Releases).

Overall, the partnership requirement of the EU programs has resulted in an effective partnership between the state and the society. Although environmental NGOs contribute to policymaking and work closely with state institutions through EU programs, environmental NGOs still play a marginal role in environmental policy making. The EU accession process has also opened avenues for consultation between the state and civil society. However, most of the NGOs have complained that their participation is symbolic and has not reflected proper contributions in decision-making.

External Networks

The existence and use of external networks has been another important factor of the EU's impact on civil society development. The EU also actively promotes the participation of civil society actors in transnational networks and European umbrella organizations. It is expected that civil society organizations will learn to promote dialogue and networking among nationally based environmental NGOs, and will transfer EU practices to the national level (Interview Delegation of the European Union, Sector Manager Environment 2011). At other times, participation in these external networks will allow Turkish environmental NGOs to use their membership to obtain information, provide contact points, and learn from their experiences. Furthermore, in EU programmes, developing external networks has also been a condition for funding.

Another important example of how environmental NGOs have benefitted from external networks is the participation of environmental NGOs in the European

Environmental Bureau (EEB), an important environmental umbrella organization at the EU level. For example, membership in the EEB at the EU level has provided an opportunity to develop relations between Turkish environmental NGOs and European environmental NGOs. In European governance, the EEB describes its objective as follows: "to protect and improve the environment of Europe and to enable the citizens of Europe to play their role in achieving this goal" (EEB 2010). The EEB Mission Statement further highlights that "The EEB is the environmental voice of European citizens, standing for environmental justice, sustainable development and participatory democracy. We want the EU to ensure all people a healthy environment and rich biodiversity" (EEB 2010: 2). The EEB (2010:3) describes its role in the enlargement process as follows: "we provide information about existing and upcoming policies, inform EU decision makers about the views and demands of our members and seek their support, as well as working in coalitions with other organisations to have our views accepted".

The TEMA and the Buğday Association are members of EEB and regularly participate in meetings. Representative of the TEMA (EEB 2010: 5) said: "The EEB gives us the possibility to participate in experts' meetings and workshops where we can share our expertise and raise awareness on the most important environmental issues".

The EEB incorporated these NGOs fully into their own work and gave them an opportunity to take part in all EEB decision making. This means that the EEB opens transnational space to environmental actors. These societal actors started to expand their activities and acquire different roles through cooperation. For example, participating environmental actors have the opportunity to take part in the decision making on environmental policy.

The EU has intended to encourage the participation of environmental NGOs in European umbrella organizations in order to develop learning through interaction. Although environmental NGOs work with European umbrella organizations, these experiences have not transferred into the domestic contexts. Unlike women's NGOs, there are no cases of simultaneous policy initiations. Furthermore, environmental NGOs have not efficiently used the EEB to pressure the government to pass green legislation in Turkey.

At the same time, in EU programmes, formation of external networks has been a condition for funding. For example, the *Development of the ENV.net in Western*

Balkan and Turkey: Giving Citizens a Voice to Influence Environmental Processes Reforms for Closer EU Integration builds on the experiences of the previously EU-funded project, the Environment Form, with a prime objective of building constructive dialogue among NGOs (Interview TEMA 2011).

6.3. Historical Legacy as a Condition of EU Impact

I argue that the EU has an ambivalent effect on environmental NGOs in Turkey and have presented evidence that moderate environmental activism and lack of cooperation between environmental civil society organizations, relationship with the state and limited connections with the external networks has led to ambiguous EU influence. The role of legacies is crucial particularly in the connective pathway and has affected the Europeanization outcomes of the environmental NGOs. In the case of environmental NGOs, legacies of the past act both as constraining (e.g. the weak environmental activism and lack of cooperation among environmental civil society actors limits Europeanization outcome) and facilitating (e.g. the relationship between state-society in some instances pave the way for cooperation) factors of the EU's impact. This part on historical legacies will demonstrate how historical trajectories matter for the development of environmental NGOs and the EU impact by considering the case of environmental NGOs in Hungary as a plausibility probe.

Hungary became a EU member state in 2004, and has been subject to accession conditionality like Turkey. The impact of the EU on environmental NGOs seems to be stronger there than in Turkey. During the pre-accession process, environmental NGOs in Hungary did not only benefit from the EU's financial assistance, policy rights and legitimization power, but also environmental legislation played an important role in the environmental protests in Hungary. Above all, Hungarian environmental NGOs have collaborated with the state in certain fields and resisted the state in others, and utilized the transnational as well as EU environmental networks.

First, the presence of active environmental civil society that fosters collaboration among civil society on the basis of environmental issues facilitates the EU impact. Contrary to Turkey, Hungary has a dynamic environmental movement, which used a EU context as an opportunity for mobilization and to promote environmental issues and raise environmental awareness. During the communist rule,

environmental movements were more tolerated groups compared to the political parties. In the last years of the communist rule, Hungary's relatively free regime in CEE did not prevent development of a large Danube movement opposing the construction of the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros dams and other environmental activism at the local level and among university students (Hicks 2004: 217). Furthermore, participation in the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, allowed activists to pressure their governments and form independent groups (Carmin and Hicks 2002; Hicks 2004). Environmental groups had mobilized public support for change during the collapse of the communist rule and Hungarian environmental NGOs were the key players in the democratic transition in the 1980s (Hajba 1994; Hicks 2004:218). The EU pre-accession context has provided an opportunity for environmental NGOs in Hungary, and EU biodiversity legislation played a key role in one of the most historic environmental protests in Hungary (Börzel and Buzogány 2010 a: 724). The construction of a NATO radar locator on Zengő Hill, an important natural preserve in southern Hungary, mobilized protest groups during the EU accession process. The local environmental NGOs joined with large Budapest-based activists from Greenpeace Hungary and Védegylet (Protect the Future). In the words of Börzel and Buzogány (2010a: 724) "… the highly polarized Hungarian public sphere put its ideological differences aside to prevent the destruction of a common good". The domestic pressure from the environmental groups and society together with the danger of breaching EU environmental law stopped the government from constructing the locator on Zengő Hill (Börzel and Buzogány 2010 a). Yet, the green movement in Turkey, which incorporates actors from very different backgrounds, does not have strong activism and is unable to collaborate on environmental issues. If there had been mobilization on the basis of "a common good" as in Hungary, rather than differences and the use of EU context accordingly, the EU impact would have been stronger on environmental NGOs in Turkey. In Turkey, divided environmental civil society together with weakening of the EU power has been a constraining condition for the EU impact.

Second, the presence and use of mechanisms to promote dialogue with the state institutions, and existence of an active environmental mobilization to push the state facilitate the EU's impact. The interaction between the state and civil society may take many forms ranging from cooperation to conflict to cooption (Aydın 2005). After the collapse of the communist rule in Hungary, the significance of the

environmental movement weakened. For instance, former environmental activists take official positions in the Environmental Ministry in Hungary (Hicks2004). Although the interests of the environmental NGOs and the state clash from time to time, during the EU accession process, the environmental NGOs were strengthened from the EU processes. Unlike Turkey, environmental NGOs used the EU context and established networks during the implementation of the EU biodiversity policy. The environmental NGOs network *CEEWEB for Biodiversity* was founded by environmental groups in CEE and offered a training program for local administrations (Börzel and Buzogány 2010 a). The Hungarian National Alliance of Conservationists trained judges on the new biodiversity legislation.

Similarly in Turkey, there are also cases where environmental civil society as well as the state has benefited from this partnership. For example, mutual information exchange and technical knowledge allows environmental NGOs to engage in policy making. For instance, the DD has cooperated with the Ministry of Environment at the policy level to meet the objectives of the Habitat Directive and designate Special Areas of Conservation and Special Protection Areas under the Wild Birds Directive. At the same time, the Nature Association has taken legal action against the State Hydraulic Works. In addition, traditionally, the state has had selective dialogue with civil society organizations in Turkey. The selective dialogue usually paves the way

for cooptation where the state has a tendency to incorporate NGOs into the decision making process in order to control them. The EU's approach to civil society development is based on a partnership interpretation of civil society. For this reason, the balanced and cooperative relationship between the state and society has acted as a good foundation for the EU's impact. The cooperative relationship between the state and civil society has been a facilitating condition for the EU's impact.

Lastly, the presence and effective use of the transnational connections stimulates the EU impact on environmental NGOs. The EU's accession process has provided opportunities for civil society to participate in external networks. Although the environmental civil society established transnational links before interacting with the EU (e.g. Bergama movement) and established relations with the UN, the environmental civil society did not make use of these transnational connections. However, in CEE including Hungary, the EU process and financial assistance facilitated the formation of regional networks such as *Justice and Environment* and

CEEWEB for Biodiversity. While the former provided detailed legal analysis on the implementation of biodiversity law, latter operated under the supervision of the European Habitat Forum and established links between nature conservation NGOs and the European Commission (Börzel and Buzogány 2010a: 727).

In Turkey, environmental civil society has established external networks and cooperated with international NGOs. Although there are few NGOs that have participated in these networks after Turkey's candidacy for the EU, there is no further cooperation, or transfer of policies and experiences to the domestic level. In Turkey, environmental NGOs do not utilize strategies and use these networks regularly. If there had been well-established relations with the external networks in Turkey, environmental NGOs would have impacted more from the EU processes. Inefficient experience of the environmental civil society with external networks has functioned as a constraining factor for the EU's impact.

6.4. Conclusion

Environmental governance has been at the heart of EU policymaking. I argue that the EU impact has been ambivalent on environmental civil society. This chapter demonstrated that similar to other issue-based NGOs, the EU has enhanced the capacity and legitimized the positions of the environmental NGOs in Turkey. More importantly, it has drawn attention to the role of historical legacies in shaping the Europeanization outcomes of environmental civil society.

The evolution of the environmental movement shows that environmental activism was moderate prior to EU interaction. In general, the status of green activism is neither strong nor weak, and the state has perceived environmental organizations as "harmless" compared to human rights organizations. Nevertheless, the mode of interaction between the state and environmental NGOs has been volatile. After EU interaction, the environmental civil society has been affected by the EU-driven processes. Although the EU has impacted environmental civil society in various ways, the EU's impact has been ambivalent.

The analysis of the empirical evidence reveals that the extent of the EU's impact has depended on factors such as the status of activism, the cooperation between environmental actors, the state-society relations, and the existence of transnational connections. These have been important determinants of the EU impact in the case of civil society.

CHAPTER 7
HUMAN RIGHTS CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY

Since Turkey's application for candidacy, human rights issues have become an essential precondition for accession to the Union and human rights NGOs are critical in the advancement of international human rights as well as the norm-creation processes. The accession process has both directly and indirectly resulted in increasing EU pressure and monitoring states' policies towards human rights issues. In this context, human rights NGOs represent an interesting case for comprehending the possibilities and constraints of the EU's role in the transformation of civil society.

I argue that Europeanization of human rights NGOs is less likely when historical legacies function as a constraining condition of the EU impact. First, the broader literature on the Europeanization of civil society primarily dealt with the question of how the EU has changed political opportunity structures in candidate countries in favor of civil society (See Chapter 2 for a comprehensive discussion). This strand of the literature has profoundly studied the compulsory and enabling pathway of the EU influence. Yet, the connective pathway that captures a web of relations between actors and their interaction is widely mentioned, but not yet comprehensively and systematically investigated.

Second, the literature on human rights in Turkey has also surveyed the relationship between the EU and human rights organizations. While some of them explicitly analyzed the EU's influence on human rights organizations (Duncker 2007; Alemdar 2011; Öner 2014), others have studied the relationship in a wider framework in relation to human rights (Plagemann 2000; Arat 2007; Çalı 2007). Duncker has highlighted the diverse landscape of human rights NGOs in Turkey and their conceptions of rights as well as their reactions to the European process. Duncker (2007:55) has argued that "competition over funding and medial representation increases" with the EU funding, and both western orientated and Muslium human rights groups use the European process to advance their goals and have integrated "an

EU dimension into their discourse". At the same time, she pointed out criticism of western values that civil society actors voiced and "the struggle about the definition power of what human rights actually are" (Duncker 2007:56). Öner (2014) has evaluated the perceptions of Turkish civil society after the deterioration of EU-Turkey relations in the fields of human rights, freedom of speech and media freedom and concluded that civil society organizations still use the EU as a reference point and a normative context. Therefore both studies have investigated the compulsory and enabling influence of the EU, yet, there is no analysis of the connective pathway of the EU impact. Only Alemdar (2011) has assessed the relationship between human rights institutions, the state and the EU by employing boomerang and spiral models and showed the main weaknesses of these models. Therefore, in contrast to others, she has analyzed the relationship between the state and human rights actors during the accession process, but she mainly concentrated on the interaction with the state. To date, the literature has not sufficiently examines connective pathway of the EU influence on human rights organizations along with the in-depth analyses of the other mechanisms of the EU impact.

The present study on human rights NGOs aims to fill these gaps and contribute to both strands of literature by providing an extensive examination of the EU impact on human rights NGOs. I argue that the EU's pressure on human rights NGOs has failed to stimulate deeper change and is constrained by the legacies of the past. The findings demonstrate that different and selective understandings of rights between human rights NGOs, confrontational relations and limited cooperation between the state and the human rights actors, and the minimal use of transnational connections have constrained the EU's impact. I support this argument with an original case and show the importance of historical legacies in the explanation of the EU impact.

The examination of a compulsory and enabling pathway demonstrates similar findings across different sectors of civil society. Although I present an analysis of both pathways in the context of the human rights civil society, most of the discussion will revolve around the connective pathway that led to differential outcomes of Europeanization. As I have shown throughout this thesis and in each empirical chapter, studies on civil society have judged the EU influence on the way that it has altered the legal context in which civil society actors operate, and how this has legitimized their actions. I will also demonstrate issue specific empirical evidence on

these aspects, yet, this thesis judged the EU impact on the basis of its power to influence policies and interact between actors. I will show how interaction between domestic factors and EU factors led to limited impact on human rights NGOs. Lastly, I will show how legacies matter and function as a constraining condition of the EU impact.

Before moving to the empirical section, it is important to understand how I define human rights civil society. This chapter concentrates on human rights NGOs in Turkey. Similar to other types of issue areas in Chapters 5 and 6, human rights NGOs in Turkey are not homogenous and cover various types of organizations. This study looks at different organizations in various human rights categories such as state torture, minority rights, cultural rights, and rights of disadvantaged sectors of the population. Within this broad grouping, most of the organizations have particular connections with Turkey's Kurdish Question. Most of the analysis will be centered on the Kurdish question, because there is a crucial human rights dimension as a result of the excessive use of powers, and significant consequences of the state-induced internal displacement (Kurban and Ensaroglu, 2010; Cengiz and Hoffmann 2013). As a human rights problem, the Kurdish issue involves two central dimensions. On the one hand, the issue has a domestic dimension. The Kurdish ethnonationalism is constituted as one of the main obstacles of the Turkish democracy and democratization process (Gunter 1997; Özbudun 2000; Somer 2005). On the other hand, it has been a significant issue in the context of the EU-Turkey relations. Turkey's Kurdish problem is connected to various human rights violations in Turkey such as restrictions on freedom of expression, torture, arbitrary killings, disappearances, displacement problems and prohibitions on using the Kurdish language. Various EU progress reports highlight that there are "serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of minorities" (Commission of the European Communities 1998b; 1999a).

To understand human rights civil society and the specific characteristics of development, I will also introduce other civil society actors dealing with human rights issues including trade unions, bar associations, grassroots associations, and identity-based Kurdish associations. However, the examination of the EU's impact will be based exclusively on human rights NGOs.

I have separated the chapter into four parts. First, I will present an historical development of human rights civil society to show particular characteristics that have

molded the human rights movement in Turkey. This part demonstrates essential features of human rights civil society and argues that traditionally, human rights civil society has had a conflictual relationship with the state, only recently developed cooperation across human rights actors and does not use mechanisms of transnational connections effectively. The second part applies a pathway model of the EU influence and shows various aspects of the EU impact on human rights civil society. The third part illustrates the function of historical legacies to account for the EU impact by invoking a counterfactual case. These results show that historical legacies that function as constraining conditions may limit the EU impact. The last part summarizes the findings and looks at the implications for the EU's civil society approach from the human rights civil society in Turkey.

7.1. Major Developments in Human Rights Civil Society

This section scrutinizes the history of human rights civil society and different human rights issues that have been part of this movement and points out sector specific characteristics of the human rights NGOs in the pre-1999 era. I will demonstrate that in different periods of the history, human rights civil society has been vocal, but compared to the women's movement (See Chapter 5 for detailed description), the human rights movement has been unable to mobilize around human rights issues due to diverging understanding of human rights, has been less cooperative both with human rights actors and state authorities, and less connected with external networks.

Human rights have long history in Turkey. The idea of human rights dates back to the Ottoman Empire with reference to minorities, was severely undermined during the Kemalist period and revolved within the boundaries of class struggle as social justice in the 1960s. In the 1970s, state sponsored systematic torture became an intrinsic part of the military regime. However, until the 1980s, human rights were regarded as a marginal issue, and only dealt with in leftist circles. Human rights activism has peaked as a consequence of a military coup, in response to the severe state repression, torture and death in the 1980s. The 1990s was characterized by increasing violence against the Kurdish population, and the Kurdish question has become a central issue for the mobilization of the human rights movement. During this period, human rights activism has centered on different aspects of the Kurdish

problem. Alongside with the Kurdish problem, other human rights issues- LGBTT rights, hate crimes- emerged in the 1990s and 2000s. Although the human rights agenda has changed and expanded throughout the different periods of history, the Kurdish question has remained as the primary focus in the debates on human rights in Turkey.

7.1.1. Human Rights Civil Society in the Ottoman Period (1839-1923)

Historically, a comparison of women's and environmental civil societies with the human rights civil society shows that the development of human rights organizations is a more recent phenomenon both globally and domestically. In contrast to women's and environmental fields, there were no associations that dealt with human rights issues in the Ottoman era. Although it is not possible to talk about human rights activism in the Ottoman period, neither in associational nor in grassroots form, some scholars claim that the idea of "human rights" entered into the discussions and was present mainly in reference to "minority rights" (Aral 2004; Falk 2007; Kabasakal-Arat 2007:2). It is argued that "Ottoman heritage exhibited high degrees of tolerance for non-Muslim religions, and included the conferral of an impressive degree of autonomy upon religious and ethnic minorities, by way of the millet system." (Falk 2007: xvi). Their lives and properties were protected by the Ottoman state and minorities had certain rights such as the right to speak their own languages, to enjoy their religious freedom, to set up foundations, and to have education (Aral 2004: 475). Nevertheless, these protections were only applicable to non-Muslims- Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and Jews- and this was a very narrow interpretation of rights, since the Ottoman state denied various rights of other distinct groups such as the Kurds (Kabasakal -Arat 2007). During the Ottoman period, human rights were understood in the context of "minorities" and were restricted to a particular range of issues. Thus, this communitarian understanding of human rights where human rights was defined, understood and justified in relation to religious communities were prescribed in the Ottoman years (Grigoriadis 2015) and continued to shape the understanding of minorities and human rights throughout the different periods of the Turkish history. In this context, no minority status was granted to the Kurds.

As outlined in the previous chapters, an inherited characteristic from the Ottoman era was the controversial relationship between the state and human rights

civil society. The strong state tradition has inhibited the development of civic activism and rights. Chapter 4 demonstrates that state is strong in the coercive and arbitrary sense rather than in regulative and distributive powers (Kalaycıoğlu 2002; Çelik 2010; Kaliber and Tocci 2010) and has influenced civil society. In the case of human rights issues, the state has perceived any activity as threatening, divisive and harmful for its unity. This perception and the conflicting interests among actors have further impeded the development of a cooperative relationship between state institutions and human rights civil society. Moreover, this negative perception that dates to the Ottoman Empire has shaped the state's understanding of rights. The relationship between the state and human rights organizations is the most controversial among issue areas discussed in this thesis. The following sections will show different dimensions of the controversy.

7.1.2. Human Rights Civil Society in the Early Republican and Multi-Party Period (1923-1980)

In the early Republican period and during the transition to the multi-party system, there were severe human rights violations in Turkey. During the early Republican period, there was excessive control by the CHP over the state apparatus. In this period, there were several Kurdish uprisings, and left wing opposition groups were repressed for being traitors, sectarians and religious fundamentalists. The Kemalist idea of forming a national identity had drastic consequences on the human rights situation since those attempts led to assimilationist and discriminatory practices by the state. This strong Kemalist tradition also imposed a "particular model of Turkishness" (Seckinelgin 2004: 174), which in turn conflicted with the rights of different groups. Since Kemalism neglected the existence of different cultural identities, any organizations that were not motivated by Kemalist principles were seen as traitors *(bölücüler)* rather than being seen from a civil society perspective (Seckinelgin 2004: 176). Considering this understanding, Kurdish uprisings of the 1920s and 1930s in the eastern and southeastern Kurdish populated regions were perceived as a threat to the nation state (Kaliber and Tocci 2010: 195). In this context, the relationship between the state and human rights organizations has been extremely problematic and difficult to sustain. Civic activism questioning the Republican order was considered as a threat to the territorial integrity of the state and to Kemalist

ideology, and was harassed by the state. Overall, human rights activism was restricted and not developed in the early Republican years.

Nevertheless, in the aftermath of World War II, the UN Commission on Human Rights promoted the formation of domestic human rights organizations (Plagemann 2001; Çalı 2007) and associations of human rights directly interested in these issues were established by members of the political parties. The first human rights association was founded by a group of state elites, diplomats and academics following the formation of the UN in 1945 (Plagemann 2001; Çalı 2007). The Association for Human Rights and Fundamental Rights and Freedoms was established by the members of the CHP. In response to this development, the opposition party, the DP, established the Association for the Protection of Human Rights. As Çalı argues "these organizations were primarily products of the corresponding instrumental motives of the government and opposition parties to conform to the new international order" and the human rights understanding mainly reflects positions of the political parties with which they were affiliated (Çalı 2007: 219). Associations survived for only a short time and were shut down following the accusations that they had leftist tendencies. Therefore, attempts to institutionalize human rights issues failed at an early stage. As Plagemann correctly points out, "demanding human rights was seen as a propaganda weapon for communists and enemies of the state, and as interference in Turkish internal affairs" (Plagemann 2000:434). This perception of human rights organizations as "enemies of the state" and what Elise Massicard labelled the "enemies of unity" (cited in Çelik 2010) has shaped the rights understanding in Turkey.

In the 1960s, following the military coup, the 1961 Constitution made extensive references to human rights and to the protection of civil and political rights. Furthermore, the constitution defined Turkey as a state based on human rights and new categories of rights such as economic and social rights were introduced (Kabasakal-Arat 2007). The 1961 Constitution was a very liberal constitution. However, class politics was the defining feature of the time, and human rights were understood within the boundaries of class struggle as social justice rather than as a maintenance of minimum standards for all (Kabasakal-Arat 2002; Çalı 2007). Following the deterioration of the relationship between the left and right wing groups, in 1971 the military stepped in and left-wing activists alongside right-wing groups were imprisoned and tortured and poor conditions became systematic. In response to

these violations, international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International publicized human rights violations and informed the public about the poor conditions in Turkey. In 1974, cooperation between the Turkish left and Amnesty International led to the foundation of the Turkish branch of Amnesty International that conducted investigations into the human rights violations (Çalı 2007: 220-221). However these initiatives remained limited and did not develop any substantial measures to prevent rights violations in Turkey. Equally important was the armed insurgence of the PKK in the 1970s, which deteriorated the relations between the Turkish state and the majority of Kurdish society.

7.1.3. Human Rights Civil Society in the Post- Republican Period (1980-1999)

In 1980, the human rights movement gained momentum both inside and outside of Turkey. As Grigoriadis argues, a sharp deterioration in the record of human rights in Turkey was one of the key characteristics, which was inherited from the 1980-1983 military regime (Grigoriadis 2015). Communism and Kurdish secessionism were two main threats that were reflected as pretexts for the 1980 military coup. The highly restrictive and authoritarian 1982 Constitution limited fundamental rights and freedoms and restricted space for the civil society. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, several articles in the 1982 Constitution and Law of Associations gave the state absolute authority to stop and control activities of associations and political parties. Furthermore, rights of minorities were restricted under the 1982 Constitution. For example, Article 42 banned education in any language other than Turkish. The 1980 coup resulted in excessive human rights violations by the state and as a consequence, two different types of human rights work developed in Turkey (Plagemann 2000:434). On the one hand, international organizations such as Amnesty International, the Federation of Human Rights and the International Commission of Jurists passed on information regarding the human rights violations in Turkey to the public and highly publicized cases of violations. On the other hand, protests in prisons supported by the relatives and friends of prisoners led to the development of domestic human rights activism. It is in this context that human rights awareness started to increase and organizations such as the Human Rights Association *(İnsan Hakları Derneği- İHD)* and the Support Association for Families of Detainees and Prisoners *(Tutuklu ve Hükümlü Aileleri Yardımlaşma Derneği)* were

founded in Turkey (Plageman 2000: 434-435). The İHD deserves more attention since it is the main organization that has survived from its establishment. It started as a solidarity movement that consisted of relatives and friends of leftist prisoners that campaigned for general amnesty and against the situation in prisons and the death penalty (Plagemann 2000; Çalı 2007). The state had strict control over these organizations and human rights organizations suffered heavy repression such as the arrest of its members, legal proceedings, attacks on and closure of its offices, and deaths. The very nature of human rights created confrontation with the state. Human rights organizations resisted against the state and defined their role in opposition to the state, because in most cases the rights violator was the state itself. However, in the Turkish context, since the Ottoman period, controversial relations between the state and human rights organizations has been more pronounced and the political reflex of the state still plays a defining role in the evolution of human rights organizations.

Turkey's entry into the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 1987 played an important role in the articulation of state repression within the framework of international human rights law and the legitimization of human rights organizations (Çalı 2007: 222). When Turkey recognized the right to individually petition the ECtHR in 1987, the ECtHR became a litigation center, and there was a rapid increase in the number of petitions (Kurban 2008: 3). As Kurban et al. rightly claims, "it was initially for Kurds that the European human rights law offered an alternative arena for rights-based litigation" (Kurban 2008: 3). As I will show in the following section, human rights organizations play a critical role in publicizing human rights violations and in defending the rights in European courts. Although Turkey has participated in the international human rights regime, the state considers the human rights movement as dangerous to its survival, a characteristic that dates back to the Ottoman era, and has developed a suspicious and negative reflex towards human rights actors dealing with the Kurdish question.

In the 1980s, the armed conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK further polarized human rights organizations and accelerated the conflict both between human rights actors and the state. During the 1980s, violence was a key element of the Kurdish question, and the state essentially denied the existence of a Kurdish problem and repressed civil society actors mainly in the Kurdish populated regions. The polarization in Turkish politics has particular consequences for the human rights organizations. Human rights organizations defined their role and their understanding

of rights within the boundaries of existing divisions-Kemalist, Kurdish, Islamist, leftist, liberal. Therefore, ideological divisions are always superior to human rights issues. The controversy over different human rights issues- the Kurdish problem, LGBTT rights- indicates the continuation of this feature in Turkey.

In addition to international human rights organizations, the Turkish asylum seekers who lived in Europe have cooperated with domestic human rights organizations and have played a significant role in the internationalization of human rights issues and in the establishment of international connections both with European and international organizations. The connections were established through these groups. For example, Casier shows that immigrants and refugees stay connected with their countries and shape the homeland agenda through the mobilization of immigrants' and refugees' associations (Casier 2010). Although human rights NGOs have established these connections with international organizations, international human rights NGOs and various governments, only particular domestic human rights NGOs such as İHD use these connections and the use of external networks is not widespread across the human rights movement.

In the 1990s, domestic human rights organizations grew not only in quantity/number but also in the breadth of their activities. Initially, human rights activism focused on helping the victims of the military coup. However, the increasing violence in the South East and the intensive armed conflict between the state security forces and the PKK led to serious human rights violations in the region. In this context, human rights organizations not only concentrated on helping victims of the military coup, but also focused on rights violations that were associated with the different dimensions of the Kurdish question. For instance, the İHD dealt with the many violations against the fundamental human rights and freedoms. The İHD has been one of the principal organizations that has addressed the Kurdish question as a human rights issue since the mid-1990s. During the mid-1990s, the İHD focused on violations of civil and political rights toward the Kurdish population and campaigned for freedom from discrimination (Çalı 2007: 224). Additionally, in the late 1990s, the İHD campaigned for the enjoyment of cultural rights for citizens of Kurdish origin.

In the 1990s, the spectrum of human rights issues was expanded. The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey *(Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı- TİHV)* was founded by the İHD. Its main goal has been to provide treatment and rehabilitation for victims, to document human rights violations in Turkey, and more recently, to carry out projects

on the prevention and investigation of torture. The Association for Human Rights and the Solidarity for *Oppressed (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar için Dayanışma Derneği, Mazlum-Der)* was originally founded to work against discrimination on religious grounds. Mazlum-Der has become a leading voice in framing religious beliefs as a human rights issue. The Kurdish issue and the situation in Southeast Anatolia are important to the organization. Mazlum-Der has campaigned for the cultural rights of the Kurds on the basis of a multi cultural nation-state (Plagemann 2000: 452). The Immigrants' Association for Social Cooperation and Culture *(Göç Edenler Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Kültür Derneği- Göç-Der)* was established in 1997 to conduct research on the socio-economic and socio-cultural situation of the Kurdish people living in Turkey, who are forcibly displaced due to armed conflict. They have released extensive reports on forced displacement-related concerns. The Children Under One Roof Association *(Çocuklar Aynı Çatı Altında Derneği-ÇAÇA)* was founded to provide assistance for at-risk children living in Diyarbakır. The detailed examinations of the constitutions and the mission statements and publications of the these human rights NGOs in Turkey demonstrate that all of these organizations dealt with general human rights violations, most of them specialized in different issue areas within the Kurdish question, and expanded the understanding of the human rights issue in Turkey. Hence, the Kurdish question reflects various human rights violations that have consequences in the political, economic and cultural domains. Therefore, throughout the 1990s, the human rights agenda has been expanded in Turkey where organizations do not solely focus on promotion of individual rights but also collective rights. In the 1990s, human rights organizations have not only reflected major human rights issues in Turkey, but they have also contributed to democratization and active citizenship.

Since the 1990s, the cooperation among human rights organizations has accelerated, but remained limited among few organizations due to diverging understanding of human rights. Within the political developments of the 1990s, the İHD has cooperated and allied with both unions and new social movements such as the feminist and environmentalist movements. Initially, human rights organizations (e.g. the Mazlum-Der and the İHD) undertook petition campaigns and protested poor prison conditions together (Çalı 2007:225). They supported each other's activities and collaborated on various themes such as the arbitrary use of force, civil and political rights, discrimination, and violation of the freedom of religion. According to Çalı,

another important consequence of human rights activism has been the dialogues among divergent groups and individuals such as the left-right, Turkish-Kurdish, and Islamist-secular on the basis of "the minimum non-negotiable standards of the existence of a political community" (Çalı 2007:227). Nevertheless, as emphasized, cooperation among human rights groups has been limited due to the diverging understanding of rights among these groups. For example, the İHD has developed within leftist circles and has been criticized due to its extensive focus on the Kurdish question. Similarly, most of the Kemalist organizations that identified themselves as human rights actors refuse to cooperate with Mazlum-Der. Mazlum-Der as a conservative Islamic human rights NGO has rejected cooperating on LGBTT rights.

More recently, an important advance in the field of human rights organizations has been the emergence of human rights platforms and the development of solidarity among various actors. Most of the human rights organizations have established platforms in different issue areas to raise awareness of critical human rights problems in Turkey. These platforms act independently and improve solidarity between organizations. For instance, there are issue specific platforms such as the Migration Platform to support social solidarity and address the problems of victims of forced migration. In relation to the Migration Platform, representative of Göç-Der (Interview 2012) explained how platforms improve relations and lead to successful outcomes:

> Forced migration is one of the critical aspects of the Kurdish problem and has had severe consequences. By establishing this platform we not only raise our voices and solidarity, but our voices are stronger together. We highlight common problems, exchange good practices and we work together on resolution of these problems. The output is very successful.

Important social matters such as nationalism, xenophobia, military coups and antimilitarism have led to the establishment of platforms by human rights defenders (Çetin 2008:48).

In the 1990s, the institutionalizing and monitoring of human rights policy started first with the foundation of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Human Rights Investigation Commission, and later in 1994 with the establishment of the State Ministry Responsible for Human Rights.

Similar to other policy areas, in the case of human rights policies, the institutionalized state machinery is not monolithic and is composed of different actors, agencies and institutions. As Çalı illustrates, these institutions have complex and overlapping sets of mandates (2007: 230). In this context and due to the nature of

human rights issues, human rights NGOs have a complex engagement and often-confrontational modes of interaction with different state institutions. To put it differently, human rights NGOs cooperate with some institutions but most of the time are in conflict with others in addressing human rights policies/issues. The relationship between the state and human rights NGOs generally occurs in the form of conflict and cooption.

Human rights organizations have been engaging in policy making by delivering various services but often have been constrained by the state's approach to these organizations. This is another demonstration of continuity in the relationship between the state and human rights groups where these groups have been seen as rivals rather than partners throughout different periods of history. For instance, organizations work closely with the Turkish Grand National Assembly Human Rights Investigation Commission and provide services. The mandate of this commission is regarded as the most independent and trusted by these organizations (Çalı 2007: 230). However, this commission lacks enforcement, and cooperation with other agencies is limited. Interaction between state institutions and human rights NGOs is very restricted. Both the state institutions and human rights NGOs were suspicious to collaborate with each other during the 1990s.

In the 1990s, the dominant mode of interaction between the state and human rights NGOs was conflict. For instance, when the İHD criticized the state approach towards the Kurdish question and stated that "the association regards Kurd problem as one of the basic democracy and human rights problems in Turkey" (History of İHD 2008), members were seen as separatists that threatened territorial integrity. The head of the İHD Diyarbakır Branch said that the state brought legal proceedings to the association and to its members (Interview İHD 2012). The İHD's branches frequently suffered from pressure, surveillance and closure of offices.

It was only in the late 1990s when Turkey was declared a candidate for membership that the state approach began to change towards human rights issues. As Tocci explains, "a rights-based approach to its solution began to emerge" (Tocci 2005). Before that, granting rights was seen as a form of discrimination of national identity and a threat for the territorial integrity. In this context, human rights NGOs, with respect to the Kurdish issue were traditionally perceived as constituting threats to Turkey's national security. For instance, the EU's policy towards human rights issues has been strongly criticised by Kemalist elites as it has been seen as disruptor of

internal affairs and threat to the unity of the Turkish state and subjected to accusations of separatism (Dagi 2001; Rumford, 2001;Sugden 2004).

7.2. Pathways and Outcomes of the EU Impact

This section analyzes how historical legacies and EU factors impact human rights NGOs in Turkey. In all categories of the EU influence, the EU has impacted civil society simultaneously in two interconnected ways: through its accession context and financial assistance that is explicitly directed to civil society.

The examination of a compulsory and enabling pathway demonstrates similar findings across different sectors of civil society. Similar to other issue areas, the EU has altered the legal context in which civil society actors operate, and has legitimized human rights NGOs. Several laws such as broadcasting in Kurdish have passed regarding the human rights issues. Although human rights civil society benefitted from these legal changes, implementation related problems have surfaced during the post-2005 period. In relation to legitimization power of the EU, human rights NGOs have referenced the EU norms to legitimize and broaden the discussion of human rights issues in Turkey.

In connective pathway, Europeanization outcomes on human rights NGO have been weak. First both EU context and programs have failed to change the relationship between human rights NGOs. These organizations still have diverse understanding of human rights. Second, the EU has limited influence on the relationship between the state and society. One way to demonstrate the EU influence is to examine the interaction between the national human rights institutions and the human rights NGOs. The relationship with the Human Rights Presidency under the Prime Minister's office, and boards in the presidency (from 2002 onwards), the interaction with provincial and sub-provincial Human Rights Boards (from 2002 onwards), and the draft law process on the foundation of the National Human Rights Institutions (from 2010 onwards), and later, the period after the establishment of this institution (from 2012 onwards)- represents three empirical cases of the restricted EU impact on the state and society relationship. Last human rights organizations have not used external networks sufficiently. The next section demonstrates the outcomes of the EU impact on human rights NGOs, and the role of historical legacies as a constraining condition of the EU impact.

7.2.1. Compulsory Pathway

In the EU accession process, the issue of human rights and democratization constitutes the most important aspect of the EU's enlargement policy. In order to help Turkey comply with the Copenhagen criteria, and to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights, the EU uses various instruments.

The first pathway in which the EU affects civil society is the compulsory impact. As has been shown in relation to the other empirical chapters, compulsory impact is performed through the *acquis communautaire* and the financial incentives. It is a mechanism that occurs on the grounds of conditionality. However, the compulsory impact could lead to various-often related but different- outcomes. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is one of the challenges of the adaptation of the theoretical framework to civil society.

Firstly, the compulsion takes place in the accession process by pressuring the state to comply with the EU legislation. The EU, in this way, has pointed out constitutional, legal reforms to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. Through this mechanism by pressuring the Turkish state, the EU has indirectly shaped the functioning of civil society organizations. This has created an opportunity for these organizations, and enables them to follow and prioritize their agendas. Therefore, civil society actors were not forced directly by the EU, but the EU empowers and enables these actors by forcing the Turkish government. For example, the Copenhagen criteria, alongside the law on associations, required extensive reforms from Turkish governments in many areas. One of the crucial areas that is repeatedly indicated in the progress reports is Turkey's poor human rights records and legal framework on the freedom of assembly. Therefore, since the Commission's first report, human rights issues and legislative reforms in relation to the civil society has been at the center of the assessment of compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. These pressures on the Turkish government have resulted in the major constitutional and legislative reforms regarding human rights issues, and have impacted civil society actors.

One of the most important outcomes of the Europeanization of human rights NGOs has been the major constitutional and legislative reform related to the human rights issue and functioning of civil society. As a consequence of the EU pressure,

starting from 2001, a series of reforms were made concerning human rights issues. For example, the removal of the state of emergency in Kurdish regions in 2002 had positive impact on the functioning of civil society actors in southern Turkey. In Diyarbakır, most of the human rights organizations said that restrictions on the freedom of association and expression were eased with the removal of the state of emergency (Interviews İHD, TİHV, ÇAÇA, KAMER, Mazlum-Der). Therefore, the EU's pressure on the Turkish state has not only changed the legislation but also created a positive atmosphere for the functioning of the civil society. The new Law on Associations eased language restrictions in the activities of associations where they can use foreign languages in their non-official correspondence. Furthermore, the provision of broadcasting in Kurdish made improvements in human rights. The reform process in Turkey is a good illustration of the compulsory impact where the EU's conditionality on the Turkish state in relation to the human rights issues-Kurdish problem- has created an enabling environment for the human rights organizations.

Although the constitutional and legal amendments made various changes in relation to the human rights and the law on associations, problems continued to be observed in their implementation. For instance, NGOs that promote cultural identity and particular religions still face bureaucratic restrictions and are not able to register (Altan-Olcay and İçduygu 2012: 167). Moreover, the post-2005 period and downturn in EU-Turkey relations have undermined the developments in the field of human rights. Human rights activists highlight that "in parallel to the deterioration of EU-Turkey relations there has been a decrease in human rights standards and a sharp increase in human rights violations, which has crippled their effectiveness and ability to influence policy" (Kaliber and Tocci 2010: 203; Kaliber 2014:41).

More importantly, the amendments made to the Anti-Terror Law[28] have directly affected and imposed constraints in the field of freedom of association, assembly and expression. As Yıldız and Muller rightly affirm, the broad definition of terrorism has targeted organizations as "terrorist organizations", and therefore criminalized their members and activities (Yildiz and Muller 2008:66). This has direct influence in the activities of human rights actors in the Kurdish populated regions. Most civil society activists such as human rights defenders, trade unionists journalists, lawyers have faced arrests because, as the representative of the İHD in Diyarbakır

[28] A new Anti-Terror Law was introduced in 2003 to replace the 1991 law. However, in 2006 it was amended following the criticism that the 2003 law had weakened the state in its fight against terrorism.

acknowledges, "anything can count as 'terrorist activity' and undermine both our individual rights and collective activities" (Interview İHD 2012). The new amendments to the Anti-Terror Law made in 2012 and 2013 tackle the narrow conceptualization of terrorist activity. Yet, implementation problems have continued to influence human rights NGOs negatively.

The measures on anti-terror legislation and their relationships with human rights have been subject to discussions both on the EU level and among EU member states. The first terrorist attacks on the United States of America in September 2001, then the atrocities in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 and recently the Paris attacks have spurred debates on anti-terror legislation around the world. As a response to the 9/11 attacks, EU member states have reacted differently to security threats and have introduced new laws that induced discussions whether the new legislative steps curtail other fundamental freedoms in these societies (Haubrich 2003). Equally important has been the EU's response to security threats following the 9/11 attacks. The EU has taken a variety of measures, including introduction of European Arrest Warrant, designed to simplify surrender procedures within the EU's territorial jurisdiction. Yet many commentators and international human rights NGOs have criticized EAW procedures and its commitment to obey human rights law. For example, Amnesty International's report entitled *Human Rights Dissolving at the Borders? Counter-terrorism and EU Criminal Law*, questioned European Arrest Warrant goals and addressed three fundamental issues from the perspective of human rights and liberties. The report suggested that failure to agree on a precise definition of terrorism as a basis for framing EU law, a lack of judicial reviews by the European Court of Justice and dealings with third countries caused serious concerns for fundamental freedoms and liberties (Amnesty International 2005). The Report emphasizes "Human rights are often portrayed as a potential barrier to effective protection from "terrorist" acts rather than a pre-requisite for genuine security… it is in the breach, not in the respect of human rights, that security is put at risk" (Amnesty International 2005: 2). Therefore, anti-terrorist measures within the EU are vaguely defined and discrepancies exist within EU member states. This in turn undermines the EU's credibility and its transformative power on civil society. The section on a connective pathway discusses the paradox between the EU, Turkish anti-terror legislation and civil society in detail.

Secondly, the EU performs compulsory impact through funding. As discussed before, the relationship between funding and categories of the EU impact is extremely complicated. The outcome of funding could belong to other categories of the EU impact- compulsory, enabling and connective. Since the late 1990s, the EU has provided funding to human rights civil societies that participated in awareness of human rights issues on an ad hoc basis (e.g. MEDA Program), enhanced capacities (e.g. Civil Society Development Program) and protected and promoted human rights, pursued the development of human rights policies and support for human rights defenders (e.g. EIDHR). The EIDHR is the principal mechanism of support for civil society activities in the promotion of human rights and democracy in third countries (EIDHR is examined in depth in Chapter 3). It is important to note that the call for proposals in relation to human rights civil society supports the EU's policy priorities. The main priority areas covered empowerment of civil society in its action in a broad area of human rights. This area included the fight against torture and impunity, improved access to justice, human rights education and training programs, enhancing political representation and participation in organized society, particularly for underrepresented groups including women, LGBTT, Roma and youth (Council of the European Union 2009).

As emphasized before, financial assistance is compulsory if it forces civil society actors to undertake projects according to EU's priority areas. For example, a human rights activist stresses that "Our organization is new. Our main problem is the funding. When there are calls for proposals from the EU, sometimes we realize that it is not our exact area of activity. Sometimes we want to conduct other projects. Nevertheless, we do not have so many opportunities for funding. In those cases, we adapt our area according to the EU priorities in the call for proposals." (Interviewee Pembe Hayat). This is an indication of the compulsory impact where organization has adapted the area of activity according to EU priority areas.

Nevertheless, evidence on human rights NGOs illustrates that compulsory impact, in many cases, has not been effective. Similar to other types of issue areas, human rights NGOs claim that the application procedure is always too bureaucratic compared to other types of international funding, and in some cases priority areas do not correspond with their fields of expertise (Interviews İHD, TİHV, Göç-Der 2012). For example, the İHD President (Interview 2012) complained that:

The EU programs are too complex and bureaucratic. The EU should abandon empty formalities. We are not an association that is only based on projectionism. We do not apply to programs only for funding. For example, if our area of expertise does not match the EU priorities in the call for applications, we simply do not apply to these programs.

At the same time, EU programmes may provide an opportunity to promote human rights NGOs' agendas and empower their policies. In this way, the EU enables these organizations. For instance, under the EIDHR Programme, in order to combat torture and impunity, human rights NGOs completed various projects such as *Strategic Mapping of Torture in Turkey* (Helsinki Citizens Assembly- *Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği-hYd*), *Review of Legislation on Torture and Implementation of it During the EU Harmonization Process in Turkey and Training Providing Legal Service and Raising Public Awareness in Order to Prevent Torture* (TİHV), and *No for Silence: Establishing Effective Collaboration and Methods to Fight Against Torture and Impunity* (İHD) (Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey 2008). A representative of the TİHV (Interview 2012) said that "issues of human rights are highly sensitive, and lack of financial resources have always been an obstacle for us. Although it is too complex, the EU funding has been helpful in many ways. When there is a call for application in our area of expertise, it is a great opportunity for us to support our activities". In this case, the EU has enabled these organizations since the priority areas in the calls for proposals perfectly fit with their agendas.

EU programs also promote partnerships among organizations. For example, under the EIDHR Program, the TİHV completed a project titled "Effective Protection of the Rights of Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Other Persons in Need of International Protection". The overall objective of the project is "to protect the rights of persons in need of international protection by contributing to the national implementation of international norms protecting these rights" (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey [c]). Within this project, the TİHV has established a partnership with the Van Women's Association *(Van Kadın Derneği- VAKAD).* Trainings were organized with Van-based organizations and meetings were held in exchange for information. Therefore, in this instance, the EU has facilitated partnerships between civil society organizations. Collaboration between human rights NGOs is an example of connective impact.

Recently, by using Foucault's conception of neo-liberal governmentality, Mühlenhoff (2014) offered an analysis of EU civil society funding through the EIDHR documents and its discursive impact in Turkey. In following Laclau and Mouffe, she has presented the discursive concept of hegemony and shows that the EIDHR supports NGOs of a liberal narrative yet by means of a neo-liberal governmental power. She argues that the EU, and EIDHR programs in particular de-politicizes the NGOs and the neo-liberal governmentality constitute them as technical service providers rather than political actors (Mühlenhoff 2014).

However, the EU impact does not occur only through funding and human rights NGOs are subjected to various EU influences. The EU funding is the most important instrument to influence civil society in the EU's policy towards civil society. Yet, the EU accession process involves other mechanisms (both direct and indirect), which proceed in multiple ways at the same time. For example, one of the central finding is the de-politicization of the NGOs through the EIDHR. Therefore, her concentration is on the EIDHR, which is only a particular type of program for civil society. She points out that EIDHR empowers civil society in a specific way and attributes certain functions to civil society organizations. Nevertheless, there are other programs and instruments for Turkish civil society such as IPA, Civil Society Dialogue I, II, III and the EU Civil Society Facility programs. Unlike EIDHR, these programs involve other types of activities such as training of NGOs, partnerships with state institutions, and partnerships with the European NGOs and participation in European networks, which can not only be interpreted as instances of de-politicization. The EU has affected civil society through several processes such as formation of internal and external networks, legitimization, which all attributed civil society other functions in addition to a service provision. Moreover, domestic factors and characteristics of these movements are significant since they interact with the EU pressure and shape the Europeanization outcomes. Historically speaking, human rights NGOs use different ways to participate in the politics besides the EU funds. For example, as I will demonstrate in the next section, during the struggles against the state, human rights NGOs are politicized.

7.3.2. Enabling Pathway

Historically, Europe has been an important reference point for civil society. Europe, particularly the ECtHR has become a normative context for human rights groups. From 1999 onwards, human rights NGOs together with the ECtHR have used the EU as a reference point to legitimize their policies. Similar to other sectors of civil society in Chapters 5 and 6, the enabling pathway of the EU impact facilitated the empowerment of human rights NGOs. However, in the post-2005 era the impact of the EU has been weakened parallel to the deterioration of EU-Turkey relations.

Traditionally, human rights NGOs were perceived as separatists and considered as a threat to national unity and security. As Çalı argues, "the state authorities characterize human rights movement as the marriage of "international traitors" with "international enemies," and maintained a skeptical and suspicious attitude toward human rights organizations." (Çalı 2007 :222). This case was supported by interviews, such as when the Human Rights Joint Platform (*İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu- İHOP*) General Coordinator and human rights defender (Interview 2011) stated:

> For so long, our demands have been perceived as a threat to national unity and security. We had serious problems with the state authorities. They always thought that our attitude was offensive and separatist. There was not any other way to convince them. For this reason, from time to time we frame our demands in different ways especially by referring to the decisions of the ECtHR. In the past, officials considered us as traitors; now this has started to change.

In this context, both the EU and the ECtHR were regarded as key actors in providing positive examples to emulate and for the rising credibility of the human rights NGOs. The EU accession period provided opportunities for human rights NGOs to raise different human rights issues in relation to the EU in order for them to pressure the state. In this way, human rights NGOs have increased their credibility and legitimacy. Similarly, through the ECtHR, organizations exert influence on the state. Human rights NGOs now advance their reforms by referring to the decisions of the ECtHR and the EU context. Framing these issues in relation to the EU empowers human rights NGOs and provides leverage to defend and justify their claims. Therefore, similar to other organizations, human rights NGOs in Turkey use the EU frame both for political persuasion and manipulation.

An example of the enabling impact on human rights NGOs is the reference to the EU's progress reports as a means to raise concerns about the human rights situation, publicize violations and pressure the state to change legislation. In a press release, İHD raised the concerns on freedom of thought and expression in Turkey.

In relation to the freedom of thought and expression, the association said that:

It's clear that existing legislation is being used to force investigations, open lawsuits and give punishments in this area. It can be seen that the judicial decision-making mechanism does not have an independent and libertarian-minded conception of law and lack democratic culture. The 2007 EU progress report stresses that obstacles to freedom of expression are increasing. (Human Rights, The Kurdish Issue and Turkey, 2009).

In a similar vein, in the opening speech of the 15th general assembly of the İHD, President Öztürk Türkdoğan once again emphasized that "we need to focus on the process of membership to the EU which is the important dynamic in the democratization process of Turkey." (Opening Speech of the 15th General Assembly of IHD, 2010). In relation to this membership process, the İHD President said that "the İHD supports the EU perspective and the Copenhagen criteria for the democratization process in Turkey. We strongly believe that EU values and democratic culture could promote human rights norms and our objectives in Turkey." (Interviewee İHD, 2012).

Similarly, the ÇAÇA refers to the EU accession process to promote its policy on children and to raise awareness about children's rights.

The ÇAÇA President (Interview 2012) has stated that:

When we look at the legislation on children rights in Turkey we can easily pinpoint that we are too away from meeting international standards. The main reason is the perception in the country on children's rights. We emphasize that our expectation from the EU process is to comply with the legislation on children's rights. We can use the EU *acquis* to change our legislation in a positive way and reflect it to children's rights. The EU accession process is a key dynamic for rights and democratization in Turkey

Another illustration of the enabling impact is the reference to the EU progress reports to publicize the current situation on the prevention of torture and ill treatment and pressure the state to follow the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture. Activist and member of TİHV Diyarbakır said:

The state said that there is no torture and ill treatment anymore. Is it really the case? Can we really say that there is no torture anymore? Not, at all! There might be a downward trend in systematic torture in the Diyarbakır prison such as falaka (beating

the soles of feet) or electric shocks. But torture has not disappeared; on the contrary, now there is another dimension- psychological torture. You can also see various examples in the EU progress reports. The law is there (referring to the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture) but what about the implementation? (Interview TİHV Diyarbakır 2012).

The 2012 Progress Report verified this by concluding " As regards prevention of torture and ill treatment, despite the positive downward trend in reports of torture and ill treatment in places of detention, law enforcement officers continued to resort to force and, particularly in unofficial places of detention, this is cause of concern. There was little progress in tackling impunity" (Commission of the European Communities 2012: 72).

These cases show that human rights NGOs have used the EU framework to justify their decisions, actions and policies. These cases also demonstrate that in practice the enabling impact of the EU empowers human rights NGOs in Turkey in relation to the state. By referring to different EU practices and experiences, human rights NGOs pressure the Turkish state to pursue necessary reforms and make arrangements in relation to human rights issues.

As discussed elsewhere, legitimization and empowerment depends on the condition of the commitments of the government and the salience of issues on the agenda of EU-Turkey relations (Rumelili and Boşnak forthcoming). It is now widely accepted that the credibility of EU membership has declined in Turkey. As a consequence, the EU as a legitimization device has become less attractive to human rights organizations. Although human rights NGOs clearly indicate that they still support and are in favor of the EU perspective, they do not use the EU as a legitimization device for every occasion. During my fieldwork and interviews most of the human rights organizations emphasized that they only use the EU framework when their working priorities intersect with the EU agenda.

7.3.3. Connective Pathway

This section illustrates how the EU has intended to promote cooperation between/among actors through the partnership principle. The EU has exerted influence through its accession context and financial assistance. I provide evidence to show that the outcome of the EU impact has been limited compared to other sectors of the civil society. Particularly, I will show how the Europeanization of human rights

NGOs has been constrained by domestic factors.

Internal Networks- Society- Society

The human rights movement has been vocal in promoting and protecting human rights in Turkey. Similar to other sectors of civil society, human rights civil society is divided. Yet, contrary to women's NGOs (see Chapter 5), human rights NGOs are unable to unite and mobilize on the basis of human rights issues.

The EU has promoted the cooperation between human rights NGOs. The following section from Turkey's human rights scene shows how the EU has been unable to facilitate fruitful cooperation between actors and the consequences of such interaction. First, the accession process has flourished consultation and cooperation between civil society actors. In the case of women's and environmental NGOs, platforms have been established between issue based NGOs around a common cause- to take an active role in the accession process. While women's NGOs have established EWL Turkish coordination, and environmental NGOs have formed ABce, human rights organizations have failed to collaborate efficiently on the EU related issues. Nevertheless, an important development in cooperation among the human rights area has been the establishment of the İHOP by prominent human rights organizations in Turkey. The İHOP was founded in 2005 as an independent platform to share information between four human rights NGOs. The Human Rights Joint Platform initially was composed of İHD, TİHV, hYd, Amnesty International Turkey and Mazlum-Der. TİHV and Mazlum-Der are not affiliated with the İHOP but still participate in some meetings in their fields of expertise. In recent years, new members -İHAD and İHGD- joined the İHOP. Human rights NGOs in the İHOP share the belief that the Turkish state should democratize and fulfill its fundamental obligations of protecting human rights and freedoms. For this purpose, the İHOP has defined its mission as "empowering the capacity, components, general impact of the human rights movement in Turkey and general impact of it" (İHOP Mission). The İHOP General Coordinator has stated that

> our objective is to create a participatory and pluralistic environment, to empower cooperation between human rights actors that will allow us to participate and influence decision making processes and policies in Turkey. More importantly, the İHOP conducts research and releases monitoring reports on human rights issues. For example, in order to monitor legislative developments in Turkey against the ECtHR standards, we conduct a project titled the Human Rights Monitor to monitor human rights policies and practices in Turkey

(Interviewee İHOP 2012)

The İHOP has conducted various EU programs. Additionally, the İHOP draws attention to the new areas of rights and promotes cooperation in different thematic fields through various coalitions and initiatives such as the Coalition for International Criminal Court in Turkey, and the Justice for Children Initiative.

The EU has also used projects to promote collaboration among human rights NGOs. The General Coordinator of the İHOP (Interview 2011) expressed it as follows:

> Human rights NGOs used to cooperate before establishment of the İHOP, but we had ad hoc meetings. Through the İHOP, we learn and share our experiences more successfully with each other. The EU projects help us enhance cooperative relations. We conduct a variety of EU projects and establish networks and alliances on different thematic fields. Our collaborative project on mapping discrimination is a good example.

The İHOP carried out this EU supported project with a group of human rights activists. The project is an information/network analysis mapping of discrimination in Turkey. These maps focus on different cases of discrimination and illustrate the interaction of key persons and institutions (Discrimination Maps).

Therefore, the İHOP represents a successful case of cooperation and interaction in the human rights area. One of the impediments of closer cooperation has been a differing understanding of human rights. As Duncker argues, the discussions on freedom of religion and homosexuals' rights show different conceptualizations of rights in Turkish politics (Duncker 2007). For instance, in 2007, Mazlum-Der, a conservative organization, left the İHOP over the controversy on the issue of homosexuality.

Another example of the different understanding of rights and the lack of cooperation is the debates about the abolition of Article 301. For example, the EU has paid particular attention to freedom of expression as one of the fundamental human rights. The EU Progress reports and EU officials have criticized the legal practices in relation to the freedom of expression, and warned Turkey to take necessary initiatives to bring the legislation in line with the *acquis* and EU standards. In this way, the EU has exerted pressure on the Turkish government to abolish Article 301 in the Turkish Penal Code under which several journalists, human rights defenders, writers, and academics have been prosecuted for the crime of "insulting Turkishness". Although

there was extensive public debate about the abolition of Article 301, and human rights organizations all opposed the article, they failed to come together and pressure the government to abolish the article. For example, human rights NGOs made press statements[29], criticized the content of the law individually, and urged the government to comply with the European standards. However, they failed to campaign against Article 301 in solidarity. Feray Salman, human rights activist said that " there is no common human rights language and understanding in the human rights movement" (Interviewee İHOP 2012).

Internal Networks- State-Society

As noted in various chapters, there are different levels of interaction between the state and civil society. Traditionally, the development of a state and society relationship has been shaped by coercion where the state continuously interferes with these organizations. From the beginning, the state does not recognize the rights and demands, and the interaction has been predominantly negative. In some cases, the state and human rights organizations have cooperated, but selective understanding of the rights towards these organizations has shaped the interaction. The state's approach also has been reflected in the EU projects, and the projects have failed to change certain understandings of the state's actions towards these organizations. The relationship is not consistent, and in some cases human rights organizations and state institutions cooperate. In other contexts, the relationship is too fragile and they reject cooperation with each other.

The president of the İHD explained the relationship between NGOs-state as follows:

> We have a difficult relationship with the state institutions. For EU projects, we need to cooperate in some instances, but this cooperation is a more symbolic "cooperation". It depends on the timing. There are some periods when we have a more constructive relationship and other times when we have a more conflictual relationship. We do suffer from heavy pressure especially in relation to the Kurdish problem. Our understanding of rights is completely different from each other. (Interviewee İHD, 2012)

[29] The İHD and Mazlumder have made various press statements to support the abolition of Article 301; Amnesty International campaigned against Article 301.

An empirical record shows that the relationship between the state and human rights organizations have been controversial and manifests in a variety of ways in the Turkish case. The following section explain it through concrete examples. There are two main ways to show how the EU has limited impact on human rights organizations.

National Human Rights Institutions and Human Rights Organizations

The EU has exerted pressure on Turkey to initiate human rights reforms and integrate societal actors into these processes. Although Turkey established various governmental institutions previously to deal with human rights, there was no permanent and genuine institutionalization processes that internalized human rights norms. The EU accession process has triggered the foundation of human rights institutions. Starting from 2001, several state bodies were set up in Turkey to monitor and promote human rights. The EU has not only supported institutionalization to align with the *acquis* or with European standards but also intended to foster a constructive relationship between the human rights organizations and the state. However, the relationship between state bodies and human rights NGOs is yet another demonstration of the continuation of their controversial relationship in terms of different approaches to the understanding of rights-universal versus particular-, and policymaking –participatory versus restrictive.

First, in the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey established governmental human rights bodies such as the Human Rights Presidency, the High Human Rights Board, the Human Rights Consultation Boards and the Investigation Boards to enforce human rights in Turkey. These bodies were expected to complement each other. The Human Rights Presidency in the Prime Ministry is authorized to monitor the legislation; High Human Rights Board is an inter-ministerial committee to make proposals to strengthen rights policies and is composed of representatives of the Ministries of Interior, Justice and Human Rights; the Human Rights Consultation Board is designed to function as a permanent forum of exchange of opinions between the Government and NGOs; finally the Investigation Board is expected to conduct investigations in human rights abuses (Commission of the European Communities 2001b: 21).

Therefore, the Human Rights Consultation Board was established as a consequence of the direct pressure from the EU to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria and to develop the dialogue between the state and civil society. It is important to understand the structure and composition of this body. The structure was different and independent from the Human Rights Presidency, but nevertheless associated with the Presidency. The Human Rights Consultation Board was composed of three main actors- NGOs, experts and representatives from ministries under the office of the Prime Minister. Members from human rights civil society actors both established human rights NGOs such as Mazlum-Der, TİHV, other NGOs that are close to government (GONGOs) and professional organizations, and independent experts mainly from universities. According to the legislation, there needs to be regular consultation every 3 months. The president of the Human Rights Consultation Board was Prof. İbrahim Kaboğlu who was elected in the first meeting; the Human Rights Consultation Board established 13 different work groups to prepare reports on those issues (Oran 2014).

The Minority and Cultural Rights Work group published a report on minority rights in 2004 and urged the government to think about alternative conceptions and perceptions of minorities. However, the report caused severe reactions both from the government and GONGOs and led to the dissolution of the Human Rights Consultation Board following the rejection by the Human Rights Presidency. In 2005, the president resigned. After the publication of the report, the Human Rights Consultation Board was dissolved and legal proceedings started against the two principal authors of the report. Several EU Progress Reports (from 2005 onwards) noted that "Since the publication of a report on minority rights in Turkey in October 2004, the Human Rights Advisory Board under the Office of the Prime Minister - a body composed of NGOs, experts and representatives from ministries – has not been operating" (Commission of the European Communities 2005b: 21).

Therefore, this mechanism became ineffective in promoting the state and society relations. Overall, the independence of the Board was brought into question and human rights NGOs refused to collaborate with the government afterwards.

This incident shows that human rights NGOs has been constrained by the state, and extensive understanding of human rights has not flourished in the Turkish context. Moreover, the reactionary approach against the report on the basis of "threat to unity" and "traitors" shows how inherited characteristics of the past are still evident

in the state and society relationship. This is also a demonstration of the diverging understanding of rights between civil society actors. The crises of the report was also fuelled by the GONGOs, whereas the prescribed notion of minorities contradicted with their understanding.

Second, the interaction between provincial and sub-provincial Human Rights Boards and the human rights organizations that started in 2002 shows that a lack of cooperation as well as the existence of negative perceptions towards each other continue to shape this relationship between actors. As a part of human rights institutionalization, Turkey has established the Human Rights Boards in 81 provinces to provide training on human rights, processing applications on human rights violations, providing state-sponsored services and visiting places of detention.

Human rights NGOs point out the complex and ineffective institutionalization of these bodies. Starting from 2001, these bodies have increased extensively, but their mandates, effectiveness and reliability remain a cause of concern for human rights NGOs (Interview İHD 2011; 2012, Mazlum-Der 2011; 2012). For instance, the EU Progress Report in 2003 noted that "the number of sub-provincial Human Rights Boards was increased from 831 in 2002 to 859 in 2003 (Commission of the European Communities 2003b: 25), and the complex structure of institutional framework further strengthened when "the number of provincial and sub-provincial Human Rights Boards increased from 859 to 931 in 2004 (Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 32). Despite the rise in numbers, the number of applications to these bodies remains low. For example, the representative of the İHD said that they have more applications of human rights violations compared to these bodies and this is the an indication of low trust towards these institutions (Interview İHD 2012).

> We still receive an enermous number of applications from individuals, and they do not. What does this mean in terms of human rights, and the reliabilty of these institutions? There is no trust in the understanding of the rights of these institutions (Interview İHD 2012)

This is also verified by the EU Progress reports where the numerous reports highlight the low number of applications to the Boards. For example, Progress Report 2005 noted that "From October 2004 to March 2005, the Human Rights Presidency and the provincial Human Rights Boards attached to the Presidency received complaints of human rights abuses from 565 individuals. This figure represents less than one complainant per board, suggesting limited awareness of the

existence of the boards and/or low levels of trust" (Commission of the European Communities 2005b: 107).

Human rights NGOs also criticized the composition and independence of the boards, and refused to participate in these boards. Initially boards included members of the security forces (Commission of the European Communities 2002: 27). This contradicts with the understanding of rights of the human rights NGOs since security forces have been key violators of the rights in the Southeast and their approach to the Kurdish question is well known through military means. Security forces have long perceived the Kurdish problem as a security problem and threat to the unity of the Republic. They have long used military means to solve Kurdish problems rather than granting rights to the Kurdish population. On the contrary, two prominent human rights NGOs such as the İHD and Mazlum-Der perceive the Kurdish question not as a security problem but the main human rights and democratization problem of Turkey. Although the new Law on Association removes representativeness of the security forces from the boards, two major human rights NGOs- İHD and Mazlum-Der- still refuse to participate because of the independence of the boards. These boards are chaired by the Governors and include participation from the Governors' administrations. Consequently, the boards have been brought in question by human rights organizations in Turkey. For example, in its press statement, Mazlum-Der described the issue as follows:

> The main source of the problem is the internalization of the dominant culture by the Boards chair/ members (referring to the Governors and the Governors' administrations) that embrace/view human rights violations as the management practice.
>
> (Mazlum-Der Press Statement)

Therefore, the provincial and sub-provincial boards are accorded no, at best little credibility by human rights NGOs. This fact also supported by the 2005 Progress Reports where effectiveness of the boards brought into the question depending on "the approach of the deputy governor chairing them" (Commission of the European Communities 2005b: 107).

Third, the process during the preparation of the draft law on the establishment of the National Human Rights Institutions and later, the period after the establishment of this institution indicate the limited cooperation and consultation with the human rights NGOs.

As indicated above, several bodies have been established as a part of the EU accession process to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights. Nevertheless, the institutional framework indicated that none of the bodies are independent and therefore, not in line with the UN Paris Principles. The EU Progress Report 2008 emphasized, "The institutional framework for human rights promotion and enforcement does not meet the independence requirement and lacks financial autonomy and transparency" (Commission of the European Communities 2008: 12)**.** The following year, the Commission emphasized that "efforts are needed to strengthening the institutional framework on human rights, in particular as regards the establishment of an independent human rights institution and of an Ombudsman" (Commission of the European Communities 2009: 15). Following the pressures from the EU, in February 2010 a draft law on the establishmentof the Turkish Independent Human Rights Institution was submitted to the Parliament.

A sub-committee was established to review the draft law under the Parliamentary Commission to Investigate Human Rights violations. Twelve human rights NGOs and organizations[30] were invited by the government and opinions from the NGOs were discussed. Human rights NGOs objected to the draft law as it failed to meet international standards, particularly the independency and financial autonomy criterion in line with the Paris Principles and expressed that they were ready to cooperate with the government institutions to prepare a new draft on the basis of the Paris principles. The EU also encouraged the government "to bring it into line with the UN framework, in particular as regards the independence and functional autonomy… and …to conduct this process in close consultation with NGOs" (Commission of the European Communities 2010: 17). The following year, the EU stressed that the draft law did not comply with the UN Paris principles, in particular as regards to independence and functional autonomy- accountability, appointment of members, requirements of pluralism and gender balance of staffing, and greater cooperation and involvement of civil society was needed (Commission of the European Communities 2011: 21). However, despite all the criticism and the warning to integrate the stakeholders into the processes, the government failed to take it into

[30] These are: hYd, İHD, TİHV, Mazlum-der, Amnesty International Turkey, Foundation for Society and Legal Studies *(Toplum ve Hukuk Araştırmaları Vakfı-TOHAV)*, the Union of Turkish Bar Associations, bar associations of Ankara, İzmir and Diyarbakir, the Hacettepe University Human Rights Center, and Turkey Autistics Support and Education Foundation *(Türkiye Otistiklere Destek ve Eğitim Vakfı- TODEV)* that were invited to participate the meeting held on 18 April 2012.

consideration.

The process and the establishment of the human rights institutions indicate that the controversial relations between the state and the civil society have still been the key characteristics of Turkish politics.

State and Human Rights Organizations and Defenders

In Turkey, the EU has not changed the relationship between the state and human rights NGOs. Traditionally, the state has intervened in the activities of civil society actors. While intervention in the civil society has not been peculiar to human rights NGOs, and has existed across all sectors of the civil society, compared to women's and environmental NGOs, the state intervention into the activities of human rights NGOs and defenders has been widespread and evident in the following ways.

First, historically speaking, criminalization of the activities of the human rights NGOs and defenders has been evident extensively throughout the different periods in Turkish politics. Previous sections have shown this pattern in different periods; the following section shows that the EU accession process has failed to change this.

Several EU reports have criticized the judicial harassment and criminalization of the human rights NGOs and defenders and their activities such as limitation of freedom of expression, arbitrary arrest, investigations, discrimination and violence.

Civil society actors, especially those that concentrate on human rights questions have been subjected to severe pressures, close monitoring, restriction of their activities and rights-censorship of press releases and closure of associations. This is illustrated by the several investigations and the high number of court cases brought against them. For example, EU progress report 2003 estimated that there are 500 cases pending against human rights defenders (Commission of the European Communities 2003b: 33).

For instance, different branches of the İHD were closed and opened several times. According to reports, between October 2003 and August 2004, 98 court cases and investigations were brought against the İHD (Commission of the European Communities 2004b: 42). Since 2004, 50 court cases and various investigations have been launched to the İHD (Commission of the European Communities 2005b). The

majority of cases were related to press conferences and the work of human rights defenders.

Most of the LGBTT associations have faced legal proceedings and threats to personal safety which have had a negative influence on the work of human rights defenders. For instance, Lambda İstanbul Solidarity Association in 2009 and the LGBTT Black Pink Traingle Association in 2010 have both faced closure on the basis of the violations of rules on morality and Turkish family strucure. This also shows the difference and restrictive understanding of rights which contradicts the universal rights, and the freedom of association. The EU Progress Report criticized "the court's ruling made the legality of the association conditional on not "*encouraging lesbian, gay, bisexual, transvestite and transsexual behavior with the aim of spreading such sexual orientations*"; this is not compatible with the EU's rejection of homophobia and its anti-discrimination standards" (Commission of the European Communities 2009:19).

National security and public order were used and restricted the freedom of association. Furthermore, the 2006 amendments made to the Anti-Terror Law introduced new constraints for human rights associations and defenders in terms of freedom of expression and association. The broad definition under the Anti-Terror Law restricted activities and targeted legal and non-violent organizations as "terrorist organizations" (Yıldız and Muller 2008: 66). As discussed before, Anti-Terror legislation has also been a cause for concern in EU countries and EU member states have different reactions on the Anti-terror law. These practices have also constrained the EU's credibility where in some instances the EU itself has lacked the legal framework to assure the protection of human rights.

The new law has contradicted the freedom of association and expression. High numbers of investigations have been launched against human rights defenders, trade unionist, journalists, lawyers, children and politicians (Commission of the European Communities 2010-2014). For example, members of the İHD, Göç-Der Diyarbakir, have been arrested as part of the KCK-PKK operations. Muharrem Erbey, the president of the Human Rights Association in Diyarbakir and vice president of the national Human Rights Association were arrested under KCK operations. The representative of the İHD in Diyarbakır said that the "detention of Muharrem Erbey was a consequence of his work as a human rights defender and lawyer inhuman rights

projects, seminars, workshops and press statements - all interpreted as terrorist propaganda" (Interview İHD 2012)

Similarly, the General Secretary of Göç-Der Diyarbakır was arrested and accused of being a member of "an armed, illegal organization". Organizing a visit to an evacuated village for a group of foreigners which was one of the main activities of the association- to raise awareness on displacement - were accusations for the member of terrorist activities and propaganda (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network 2011: 35).

These cases illustrate that the relationship between the state and human rights organizations are still shaped by the past legacies where the state perceived human rights organizations as a threat to national security and public order in Turkey.

Projects

Partnership between the state and society is also promoted through EU programs. As evident in previous chapters, the EU's civil society policy has been motivated by the partnership principle. In this way, through its projects and activities, the EU has facilitated the formation of an internal network between the state institutions and civil society actors (See Chapters 5 and 6 for various examples in different issue-areas). However, in relation to the human rights organizations, the EU has used the EIDHR to strengthen and develop the capacities of human rights actors and involve them in the making, implementation and monitoring of human rights policies. As emphasized, this instrument has been employed only for human rights actors, but worked in connection with other mechanisms of the EU impact. In relation to the state-society relationship, every call for projects includes 'associates', but not partners. The associates involve "national public-sector institutions, municipal authorities and unions of municipal authorities, city councils, "muhtars" and local and national media" (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey 2011: 8). Therefore, in contrast to other civil society programs, in the EIDHR the project's associates are affiliated with the state institutions that seem to play a reduced role in the project cycle. Higher educational institutions, international organizations, independent political foundations and other civil society organizations sharing a border with Turkey can be considered and act as partners (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey 2011: 8).

The following example will demonstrate how the EU promotes partnerships between the state and society. The EU's progress reports continuously emphasize deficiencies in children's rights such as enrollment rates in compulsory education, child labor, poor social protection and care services for children, the level of child poverty, violence against children, early marriages, and arrested children in the prisons (Commission of the European Communities 2013). In Southern Anatolia, children are living under severe conditions and are affected by these problems due to the Kurdish problem. Hundreds of children have been detained, tried, and convicted in Diyarbakır courts. In realizing these problems and helping to raise awareness of children's issues, prominent human rights organizations such as the İHD, TİHV and local NGOs undertake different EU projects on different dimensions of the these problems.

With the collaboration of various institutions, ÇAÇA implements an EU project to raise awareness for at-risk children living in Southern Anatolia. The project also aims to strengthen the capacity and the ties between the public sector and civil society within the EU accession process (ÇAÇA 2005: 2). In the conclusion of the project, ÇAÇA highlights that "the project has failed to develop intended results in relation to developing the relationship between the institutions" (ÇAÇA 2005: 3).

The ÇAÇA (Interview 2012) Coordinator highlights the main problem in the projects as follows:

> The main problem is the state's perception against rights-based issues. For instance, children who are living and facing severe problems in Southern Anatolia are not considered in the context of rights and democratization. Rather, these issues constitute a serious security threat to the existence of the state. Cooperation existed but importance of rights is neglected.

The EU programs themselves do not lead to cooperative relations, because at the same time the state is continuing to interfere with the activities of human rights organizations. Therefore, the EU's influence on human rights NGOs has been restricted by domestic factors.

External Networks

The existence and use of external networks has been another detrimental factor in the EU's effect on civil society development. In the EIDHR programs, the

EU has encouraged partnerships with international NGOs. Although the partnership has promoted ties with the countries "sharing a border with Turkey", organizations may also act individually without partner organizations. Therefore, there is no strict conditionality on establishing partnerships with European civil society organizations.

The outcome of the transnational relations is that human rights organizations have established one-to-one relations with international human rights organizations. They not only conduct projects, but also establish informal relations to transfer information on human rights violations in the country. For instance, the İHD has conducted projects with the Netherlands' state-sponsored and administered Matra Programme that aims to support Turkey's EU accession and to improve human rights conditions in Turkey (Call for project proposals for Matra and Human Rights Programme 2014).

Another example how human rights organizations could benefit from external networks is the participation of human rights organizations in Euro-umbrella networks. The relationship between domestic human rights organizations and European umbrella organizations are at the embryonic stage. There is no wide participation in these networks. All of the organizations noted that due to the EU accession process, European officials from various networks visited and exchanged knowledge, but most of the contact between organizations and EU networks only takes place through official visits.

The European Association for the defense of Human Rights is composed of leagues and associations defending human rights in EU countries. It is one of the prime Euro-umbrella networks on human rights issues, and is a partner with the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). Together they work closely with other European networks to fight for the respect of human rights, such as with the European Civic Forum, the European Liasion Committee on Services of General Interest, the European Network Against Racism, the Human Rights and Democracy Network, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), and the NGO platform on asylum and migration. Human rights organizations in Turkey have connections with EMHRN and FIDH.

The EMHRN is a significant umbrella organization on human rights issues at the EU level. For instance, membership in the EMHRN has played a significant role in improving relations with their European counterparts through learning their experiences and discussing the issues of human rights practices. The EMHRN

describes its mission as "to promote and strengthen human rights and democratic reform within its regional mandate through civil society networking and cooperation" (Mission, Values & Objectives).

The İHD and hYd are members of EMHRN and participate in its activities. Most of the human rights organizations said that they follow the activities of different European and international networks, but they do not participate in activities due to insufficient financial and human resources (Interview İHAD 2011).

7.3. Historical Legacy as a Condition of EU Impact

I argue that compared to women's and environmental NGOs, the impact of the EU on human rights NGOs has been more limited. I have provided evidence that different understanding of rights in the societal sphere, controversial relations with the state and the limited use of the transnational connections have led to the weak influence of the EU. My analytical framework implies that if certain factors of the past had been different (domestically strong human rights activism, more receptive state- society relations, and good transnational relations), the impact of the EU on human rights NGOs would have been different. Historical trajectories have become important factors particularly in the connective pathway and have influenced Europeanization outcomes of human rights NGOs. In this case, historical legacies act as constraining factors of the EU impact. In this section, I will show how legacies matter for the development of human rights NGOs and the EU impact by a plausibility probe involving the experience of human rights NGOs in the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is a good illustrative case due to a well-known history of the human rights movement that has a relatively cooperative relationship with the state and well-established connections with external networks.

In its 1998 first Progress Report on the Czech Republic, the European Commission concluded that "The Czech Republic continues to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria although continued attention needs to be focused on the situation of the Roma in Czech Society" (Commission of the European Communities 1998a:42). The most important human rights problem in the Czech Republic was minority rights and discrimination against the Roma. Yet, discrimination against the Roma was constructed as a social and cultural problem, not as a human rights issue in the Czech Republic (Swimelar 2008: 511). The pre-accession process strengthened the position

of the human rights organizations on minority issues, and through the EU conditionality and framing, enabled them to change the discourse on the Roma from a cultural problem to a human rights issue.

First, the existence of a strong human rights civil society that promotes cooperation among civil society actors in favor of human rights issues facilitates the EU impact. In the Czech Republic, following the signing of the Helsinki Final Act[31], there was strong human rights activism of diverse constituencies on the basis of the principles of fundamental rights and well-connected external networks before the EU candidacy process. The adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, and its human rights norms created an opportunity for the dissent activists across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to perform independent activity and commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms (Thomas 1999; 2001). In Czechoslovakia, Helsinki human rights norms mobilized the emergence of a grassroots movement, and establishment of an informal platform. Charter 77 was established in 1977 as a principal societal actor in rights activism and mobilized the public around basic principles of the human rights issues. For example, the Charter presented itself as a "free informal, open community of people of different convictions, different faiths, and different professions" (Thomas 2001: 177), and recognized the primacy of human rights as the basis of political activism despite their ideological differences. The mobilization around human rights discourse played a key role in strengthening and legitimizing human rights movement in Czechoslovakia.

In contrast, in the context of the Kurdish problem of Turkey, organizations that identified themselves as human rights organizations were unable to mobilize on the basic principles of rights due to the diverse constituencies. If there had been mobilization on the basis of human rights rather than their ideological differences in Turkey, through the accession process, the human rights NGOs would have played an important role in the human rights policies as a partner (rather than rivals of the state). In Turkey, the existence of a deeply divided civil society sphere has been a constraining condition for the EU impact.

Second, the existence and use of mechanisms to promote dialogue with the state bodies and the presence of strong human rights mobilization facilitate the EU's

[31] The detente between superpowers led to the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 which included respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms alongside non-intervention in internal relations. The Helsinki Accord explicitly recognized human rights norms and international monitoring mechanisms.

impact. The nature of the human rights issues led to the specific kind of relationship with the state. Since the state is the main violator of the rights and source of repression, the human rights organization has defined its role in opposition to the state. Therefore, they are principle actors that resisted the repressive regime, and play an important role in bringing attention to rights violations both domestically and internationally. The very nature of human rights organizations led to such intervention from the state. For example, initially Helsinki had failed to comply with the human rights norms, and the Communist party state followed a strict policy of repression and confrontation with Czechoslovak society (Thomas 1999; 2001). However, as Thomas demonstrated, alongside with other factors (economic factors, leadership), the Helsinki Final Act catalyzed an extensive change in state-society relations in Eastern Europe (Thomas 1999; 2001). The ratification of the respective human rights conventions strengthened the human rights defenders.

For instance, during the candidacy period in the Czech Republic, the EU pressure did not lead only to establishment of the national human rights institutions, such as creation of an Ombudsman (Public Defender of Rights) but also the development of more cooperative relations between the state and human rights organizations. During the pre-accession process, the consultation process on the establishment of an Ombudsman involved active participation of human rights organizations. Human rights organizations actively contributed to the process by formulating opinions, attending the frequent meetings with the authorities, engaging in public debates, participating in the policies on human rights issues. Whereas in Turkey, the EU accession process has not led to the development of cooperative state-society relations in the human rights field. For example, the national human rights institutions were established without consultation with the human rights organization, and authorities have neglected their opinions. If there had been more cooperative relations between the state and society in Turkey, human rights NGOs would have participated in and have been strengthened more from the EU process.

Lastly, the existence and use of transnational networks facilitates the EU's impact on human rights NGOs. In the case of Eastern Europe, following the Helsinki Act, human rights organizations established well-connected networks and were assisted by Western countries. The transnational networking between Charter 77 and other Helsinki Watch organizations and governmental agencies both in Western Europe and the U.S made human rights conditionality a central component for the

economic reform in the East bloc (Thomas 2001) and empowered the human rights groups.

During the EU accession process, Czech human rights organizations and activists activated these networks, as well as Euro-umbrella networks to pressure the state on the promotion of Roma rights, and constructed Roma as a human rights issue. The EU, through its euro-umbrella organizations, has created opportunities for human rights NGOs in the Czech Republic to pressure the state, and empower the human rights organizations as key actors in the EU process and governance. For example, Romani International NGOs such as the International Romani Union in Prague, and the Roma National Congress in Hamburg empowered and pushed for the policies on Roma rights. If there had been well-established relations with the external networks in Turkey, human rights NGOs would have put more pressure on the Turkish state on human rights policies.

7.4. Conclusion

The previous sections showed that EU has limited impact on human rights organizations. While compulsory and enabling pathways led similar effects across different sectors of civil society, connective pathway created diverse outcomes. Human rights organizations has developed their capacities with EU funding but at the same time criticized the EU funding. In case, enabling impact human rights NGOs have used EU as a legitimization device, yet post-2005 developments and deterioration of EU-Turkey relations have weakened the influence of enabling pathway.

This chapter also showed that in the case of human rights civil society, legacies have functioned as constraining conditions of the EU impact. In particular, a lack of sustainable cooperation among actors, confrontations between the state and human rights NGOs and limited use of external networks have constrained the EU's impact.

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

I started this thesis by exploring the relationship between Europeanization and civil society and discussed the impact of Europeanization on civil society development and the role of civil society organizations in advancing Europeanization. My study examined EU impact across different segments of civil society and found that the EU has a differential impact on civil society in Turkey. This outcome that emphasizes the diverse impact of the EU is puzzling in light of the existing approaches to Europeanization of civil society, and hinted at a new perspective, critical engagement and re-evaluation on how the EU impacts civil society. By providing in-depth analysis of mechanisms and their interplay with domestic factors, I re-examined "the transformative power of European integration".

Building on this observation, I argued that the EU impact on civil society cannot be understood without analyzing the dynamic interactions between the EU and responses of the civil society actors in Turkey. Therefore, Europeanization is not understood as a linear process whereby a top-down agenda set by the EU influences civil society. It is, on the contrary, both an interactive and dynamic process, where domestic civil society actors, policies, political cultures, and traditions re-interpret EU influence at the domestic level and interactively shapes Europeanization outcomes. Furthermore, I argued that the EU has a differential impact as well, suggesting varying levels of Europeanization of civil society across issue areas in Turkey. Finally, I provided a legacy-based explanation to account for varying degrees of EU impact, and argued that historical legacies that shaped domestic conditions along with external factors mattered for understanding the Europeanization outcomes in Turkey. To model the impact of the EU at the domestic level, I proposed to incorporate the concept of historical legacies as deep conditions into the studies of Europeanization of civil society to explain the differential impact of the EU across different issue areas, and examined its empirical implications from several dimensions.

In this last chapter I review the theoretical and empirical findings of my research and discuss its contributions. I also discuss implications and limitations of the study. My findings open venues for new research agendas and I conclude by discussing possible directions for further research.

8.1. Overview of the Research Findings

My theoretical framework in Chapter 2 started with an overview of a rapidly expanding social science research agenda seeking to define, assess and measure the Europeanization of civil society in CEE and Turkey within the context of the EU enlargement. The state of the art in the Europeanization of civil society literature, deriving from various theoretical backgrounds and a broader literature on the "generations of Europeanization" perspectives, reveals that the EU's impact is "transforming", "strengthening" or "weakening" civil society. Therefore, the literature is characterized by multiple understandings of civil society, Europeanization processes, and outcomes. Yet, this research agenda is still dominated by the dichotomy of top-down and bottom-up approaches, and neglects the role of domestic factors in understanding the relationship between the EU and civil society. Only recently a small but growing body of research has been investigating the significance of domestic-level factors from different angles (Alpan and Diez 2014; Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber forthcoming). In line with the recent studies in the field, I have contributed to the academic debates examining the EU impact on the development of civil society, and showed the importance of the simultaneous processes and interplay between the EU and domestic-level factors by focusing on three sectors of civil society, women, the environment and human rights. I argued that in-depth examination of the EU impact through a structured comparative study across different sectors of civil society and an explanation of the differential impact of the EU has been absent in the studies of Europeanization. Drawing on in-depth semi-structured interviews and careful process-tracing, I demonstrated that the EU's impact on civil society has not been uniform across different sectors of civil society, and that the historical legacies of women's, environmental and human rights organizations in Turkey have shaped the EU's impact in those areas. I emphasized that the EU has impacted civil society simultaneously in two interconnected ways: through its accession context and financial assistance that is explicitly directed to civil society.

The pathways of EU influence and the associated outcomes cannot be understood without taking into account these interconnected and complex dynamics of Europeanization.

To understand the impact of the EU at the domestic level, I used a pathway model that has been employed to study the impact of the EU on border conflicts (Diez *et al.* 2006; 2008)[32]. The pathway model of EU impact focuses on the direct and indirect impact of the EU, and identifies different mechanisms of influence, which are theoretically grounded in rationalist and sociological institutionalism in the broader literature. The model through the categories of compulsory, enabling and connective pathways clearly expresses diverse but interconnected forms of the EU influence and allowed me to capture the interplay between direct and indirect forms of EU involvement. I applied this model to civil society, and used analytical categories to explore the EU impact on civil society in Turkey. In the Europeanization of civil society literature, most of the analyses of the EU impact have focused on compulsory and enabling pathways while inadequate attention has been paid to the connective pathway of the EU impact. In three empirical chapters (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), I showed that the findings of the connective pathway of EU influence is innovative both in terms of understanding the interactions between various actors and the differential impact of the EU across different sectors of civil society. I presented extensive empirical evidence to highlight the differences in connective impact across three issue areas. Finally, in order to explain the differential outcomes of the EU influence on civil society, I incorporated the concept of historical legacies in the explanation of the Europeanization of civil society. I have conceptualized legacies as path-dependent processes in tune with the positions of Historical Institutionalists. My findings in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 show that the historical legacies as a domestic factor play a pivotal role in explaining the Europeanization outcomes.

The methodological section at the end of Chapter 2 elaborated my methodological framework, and mapped out the key variables in the study of Europeanization of civil society in Turkey. In following actor-oriented approaches to civil society I operationalized civil society mainly as NGOs in different policy domains. The concept of historical legacy in broader terms was/is conceived as

[32] As I show in Chapter 2, in the Europeanization literature, there are different conceptualizations of pathways of the EU influence and the classification by Diez et al. share considerable overlap in the conceptualization of the EU impact with most of the literature in the Europeanization field.

"inherited aspects of the past relevant to the present"(Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig 2010). This was a useful starting point to define historical legacy in the context of civil society in Turkey. Building on this definition and using various criteria, Chapter 4 identified "which past matters the most" (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig 2010) in the case of civil society in Turkey. In judging the EU impact, I based my analysis not only on the operation of NGOs but also on policies.

I conducted a total of 53 qualitative semi-structured in-depth interviews with EU and Turkish policymakers and civil society representatives in İstanbul, Ankara and Diyarbakır in addition to extensive analyses of documents of EU, civil society organizations and the Turkish state. This research provided me with rich empirical data to understand the functioning of civil society, the connections between actors, detailed knowledge of principle issue areas, and the relationship with the EU.

In order to operationalize Europeanization analysis, I used multiple methods such as periodization to identify the main turning points in the history of civil society and to provide a road map for the long-term analysis across cases; process tracing to capture an understanding of civil society before EU involvement and to observe domestic and European level developments; long-term analysis to show continuities and changes and to identify historical legacies in civil society, and finally a plausibility probe to demonstrate how legacies matter in the explanation of the Europeanization outcomes. The empirical chapters -Chapters 5, 6 and 7- employed these methods in a complementary way.

In Chapter 3, I argued that the EU pursues a twin-track approach to civil society, and when assessing the EU impact it is important to understand the EU policy towards civil society - its rationale, instruments, key policy actors and the interactions between actors. In the EU's approach to civil society, civil society is an agent of democratization and Europeanization, and a partner in European Governance. Despite this particular conceptualization of civil society, EU member states have been shaped by a twin-track approach to civil society through projects in civil society programs and by diverse understanding and structures of civil society (strong versus weak civil society), different traditions of state-society relationships (cooperative versus controversial versus weak state), and diverse types of participation (formal versus informal). An analysis of EU policy documents showed how the EU has employed Turkey in the context of enlargement.

In Chapter 4, I employed long-term analysis by identifying critical junctures and traced the development of civil society in Turkey. I traced the development of civil society to identify historical legacies in relation to civil society, which is understood as the inherited aspects and characteristics of the past relevant to the present. Detailed investigation of civil society since the Ottoman period highlighted the inherited characteristics of civil society and particular aspects of the past that shaped civil society in Turkey. I identified six key legacies that matter for the analysis of EU impact: the lack of resources and dependency where civil society has been chronically underfunded in terms of resources, a restrictive environment characterized by the absence of autonomous space and opportunities in terms of rights, Europe as an important symbol of framing, a weak state with a strong state tradition, an ideologically divided civil society sphere in terms of internal networks, and the presence of diverse connections with external networks. I argued that these legacies of the past still shape civil society, its relations with different actors, and the impact of the EU.

In empirical chapters, I explored how the EU impacted women's (Chapter 5), environmental (Chapter 6) and human rights (Chapter 7) civil society by focusing primarily on NGOs. I followed the same format in the three empirical chapters. To address this question in the relevant issue area, I first traced the development of different sectors of civil society throughout history to envisage key aspects and characteristics of women's (Chapter 5), environmental (Chapter 6), and human rights (Chapter 7) civil society in Turkey. Following this analysis, I scrutinized the debates on the relationship between the EU and civil society in specific issue areas to illustrate how the literature tackled my research question. Analysis revealed that while there was a substantial study in terms of compulsory and enabling pathways, and similar findings, the previous literature has not paid adequate attention to the connective pathway of the EU impact. I then provided new evidence for the differential impact of the EU across different sectors of civil society, and finally demonstrated the role of historical legacies in the explanation of the EU impact by employing counterfactual reasoning.

The findings of the compulsory and enabling pathways of the EU influence showed similarities across all issue areas. I reached two main conclusions on the compulsory pathway of EU influence, and argued that the EU impact is ambivalent. My conclusion has pointed out not only similar findings within the Turkish context,

but results share considerable similarities with CEECs. In the Turkish context, first, it has enforced a substantive change in the domestic legal framework governing the operation of civil society in Turkey, but in the post-2005 period implementation-related issues have emerged as significant obstacles. Second, EU civil society assistance has strengthened the capacity and visibility of civil society, and shaped their agendas according to EU priorities and diffused a "project culture" and professionalization in their activities. However, evidence showed that civil society actors have reacted and criticized EU funding programs.

Evaluation of the enabling pathway of the EU influence in issue areas revealed that civil society frequently uses the EU conditionality, standards, and norms as reference points in promoting various policy initiatives in Turkey. I showed how different actors used the EU as a "legitimization device" in different issue areas. The enabling pathway of the EU impact led empowerment of civil society vis-à-vis the state, but this effect has been very vulnerable to fluctuations and downturns in EU-Turkey relations.

The key finding in Chapter 5 is the stronger degree of Europeanization of women's civil society that is accomplished when the EU meets facilitating historical legacies. I showed that historically, the women's movement has been strong and active in Turkey, has established connections with the Turkish state to get involved in decision-making processes and women's civil society has prioritized women's issues such as violence despite their differences and formed transnational links with external networks. I also provided evidence on how the EU has enabled women's civil society to further their relations with the state institutions, to make a policy initiation, and to develop, build and empower networks both with other civil society actors and transnational networks. Lastly, I illustrated how legacies matter and have functioned as a facilitating condition of the EU impact.

In the second empirical chapter of the thesis, Chapter 6, I demonstrated that the EU impact has been ambivalent on the environmental civil society. I showed that traditionally, environmental activism has been moderate, it established relationships with the Turkish state to get involved in policymaking processes but has been constrained by the state's approach to these organizations. Environmental civil society has been unable to develop effective cooperation and alliances, and has formed limited transnational networks. I argued that while the EU has provided opportunities, the moderate status of the green movement and activism and the weak cooperation

among environmental actors to develop a green tradition have functioned as a constraining condition of the EU impact. Furthermore, controversial relations between the state and society and the limited participation in European networks have led to an ambivalent impact of the EU on environmental civil society. Finally, I showed the role of legacies in the Europeanization of environmental civil society in Turkey.

The findings of Chapter 7 demonstrated that the Europeanization of civil society is less likely where historical legacies function as a constraining condition for the EU impact. Historically, human rights civil society has had a controversial relationship with the state, only recently developed cooperation across human rights actors, and do not use mechanisms of transnational connections effectively. The examination of the EU impact demonstrated that the different and selective understandings of rights between human rights NGOs, confrontational relations and limited cooperation between the state and the human rights actors, and the minimal use of transnational connections have constrained the EU's impact.

8.2. Contributions

This thesis makes several contributions both at the theoretical and empirical levels to our understanding of the Europeanization of civil society. Theoretically, I argued that the effect of the EU on civil society development cannot be properly understood without analyzing the interaction between the domestic and EU level factors. Europeanization studies that do not incorporate historical legacies, which characterize the state of the art in the literature (with the exception of Ciratus and Schimelfenning 2010), are likely to result in an incomplete assessment of Europeanization outcomes, since the EU and civil society actors at the domestic level have an interactive and dynamic relationship, and the impact of the EU is shaped by the reactions, understandings, and traditions of civil society organizations. To address this, I put forward a new theoretical framework that builds on the pathway model of the EU impact. My theoretical extension and re-interpretation of a concept of legacies takes full advantage of the peculiarities of civic actors in multiple ways such as state-society, society-society, the transnational aspect and their interactions with the EU. It, therefore, comprehensively showed unique characteristics of civil society and the web of relations among actors in Turkey. In this respect, it shares important similarities with the governance literature. However, research on governance mainly employed a

policy –oriented perspective to study how European policy influences domestic NGOs in a specific field (Börzel and Buzogany 2010 a, b). This study primarily analyzes civil society as a unit of analysis and focuses on the ways in which they are shaped by the processes of Europeanization in several ways.

The theoretical framework and ample empirical evidence presented in this thesis highlight that the EU impact on civil society is ambivalent and differential, and historical legacies have shaped the Europeanization outcomes of civil society. Thus, the differential impact of the EU on civil society development can be explained by the historical legacies across different sectors of the civil society in Turkey. The simultaneous recognition of EU- and legacy-related factors is a theoretical innovation with implications for the study of Europeanization, civil society, and the enlargement process.

The EU aspect - the pathway model of the EU impact - highlights complex and complementary mechanisms of the EU impact in multiple levels and allowed me to assess the EU impact more comprehensively across different levels. The pathway model of the EU impact has been widely used in the literature. However, until now studies have focused on some aspects of the EU impact in relation to civil society, mainly on changes in the legal framework and how civic actors used the EU framework as a way of legitimizing mobilization. In their assessment, civil society has either been treated as a broad category and includes various types of civil society actors or as an issue-based actor. The vague definition of civil society complicates the assessment of the EU impact since different civil society actors have different trajectories with various institutions, and can produce diverse outcomes when they interact with the EU. Moreover, studies have neglected in-depth analyses of EU impact on state-society relations, development of the public sphere, and the relationship between transnational networks and European civil society, which reflects different dynamics of Europeanization. Comparative systematic assessment of different issue areas over different periods provided me with rich empirical material and interesting findings. My work highlights the importance of networks –both internal and external- and comparative analysis across different issue areas as another avenue of research and contribution to study the EU impact on civil society.

The domestic aspect of this framework stresses that historical legacies have played a pivotal role in Europeanization processes. Civil society actors with divergent past experiences would respond differently to EU pressures. In Chapter 2, the

theoretical framework shows that the EU is more likely to produce a stronger impact with facilitating legacies of the past. For example, women's civil society has facilitating historical legacies such as more cooperative state-society relations, strong women activism, and established transnational relations. This in turn, creates a stronger EU impact. In contrast to women's civil society, in human rights organizations, historical legacies have functioned as a constraining condition of the EU impact. For example, legacies such as the controversial state-society relationship, an ideologically divided public sphere and inconsistent use of transnational networks have constrained the EU impact. Therefore, historical legacies matter for the EU impact and civil society actors are active agents; they respond and reinterpret these processes.

My thesis highlights the importance of domestic-level explanations to understand Europeanization outcomes and thus responds to the critiques of biased towards EU-level explanations at the expense of other factors. This approach -integration of historical legacies into Europeanization explanations- can be applied to other policy domains to show the responses of actors and the role of legacies in Europeanization outcomes. The historical legacies of civil societies that are operationalized by the level of mobilization, the tradition of state-society relations, and the extent of the transnational connections can be applied to other countries -member states, candidate countries, and the wider neighborhood- to examine the EU impact on civil society development. I expect to find strong EU impact if historical legacies of civil societies under analysis have a cooperative state-society relationship, advanced-level activism, a tradition of cooperation among civil society and advanced connections with external networks.

The empirical analyses that I followed in this thesis contribute to the literature beyond understanding the implications of my theory. Most studies of Europeanization on civil society focus on the empirical relationship between Turkish political reform and EU funding and civil society without paying attention to a detailed examination of different dimensions of impact on different sectors of civil society and how EU pressures interact with domestic conditions.

The extensive interviews -53 qualitative semi-structured in-depth interviews- with EU and Turkish policymakers and civil society representatives shed light on the processes through which the EU has shaped their rights, resources and, formation of internal and external networks. Empirically, the EU impact is analyzed through an

examination of single areas; therefore, comparability between cases and comprehensive qualitative assessment is a much-needed contribution in studies on the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey.

8.3. Policy Recommendations and Limitations

To start with policy recommendations, the findings of this research have particular recommendations on EU's civil society policy particularly along two dimensions.

First, my findings show that historical legacies have played an important role in Europeanization outcomes. Thus, a legacy-based approach outlines legacies of the past that can both enable and constrain the EU's influence. Similar to other studies in the field (Börzel 2010; Börzel and Buzogány 2010b), I also have shown that the EU has provided several opportunities to civil society. The main finding of these studies is that when civil societies have weak capacities, actors are unable to benefit from the EU's opportunities.

The key instrument of the EU's approach to civil society is the transfer of funds. It is expected that through accession context and programs, which involve capacity development activities, civil society would develop its capacity and therefore will play an instrumental role in the EU accession process. For example, as Chapter 3 extensively analyzed the Civil Society Development Program in Turkey chiefly motivated by this premise (if the EU provides resources to civil society, it will develop the capacities). However, resources do not simply empower these actors. These actors are embedded in a historical context and how they use and perceive the EU influence are shaped by their past traditions and experiences. Therefore, the first lesson learnt is that the EU should actively design policies that consider domestic peculiarities and a/the historical context. History matters, and the EU should shift towards more tailor-made civil society policy. The "One size fits all" approach simply does not work in all contexts.

The second policy recommendation, closely related with the first one, is that the EU should promote a "notion of ownership" in its civil society programs. In the Turkish context, the EU has two main civil society programs, namely capacity building and development (e.g. Civil Society Development Program) and dialogue programs (e.g. Civil Society Dialogue I, II and III). Several interviewees have

indicated that these programs have not taken into account Turkey's domestic peculiarities. In all sectors of civil society, interviewees have criticized the "top-down approach" of the EU. For example, in the EU programs there are activities to develop socialization and transfer technical knowledge between the EU and Turkish civil society. Within the context of these programs, EU experts frequently travel to Turkey and conduct projects together with the Turkish civil society. However, these experts generally do not know the Turkish agenda, the priorities of these organizations and their policy traditions. Therefore, the role of civil society has remained negligible in these processes. If the EU designs activities and the content of these programs together with civil society, actors would not only be more empowered from these processes but also feel a sense of belonging to these programs.

There are two main limitations that need to be further discussed. The first one relates to the tautological fallacy of the legacy-arguments. Most of the scholars in the field have recognized that such arguments risk producing "excessively shallow explanations" (Kitschelt 2003: 68) because it is difficult to identify factors that are not historical legacies (Meyer-Sahling 2009; Cirtautas and Schimmelfenning 2010; Wittenberg 2013). In this respect, all outcomes that are identified are results of causal factors in the past. And, as Wittenberg (2013: 9) explains, "all outcomes are legacies in the causal sense". Thus, legacy explanations do not render themselves into very causal analysis. I am fully aware of this fundamental problem of legacy explanations, and in order to minimize this problem I take the legacies as deep conditions of the EU impact. This means that legacies are not the primary cause of the explanations; rather, they shape the current conditions as deep factors. Furthermore, I emphasize that legacy-based explanations complement other studies in the field and give them more historical emphasis. Therefore, I do not suggest replacing other explanations in the Europeanization studies. Rather, I stress that it will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the EU influence. This is also in line with the studies that incorporate historical legacies in the explanation of Europeanization[33]. As I elaborated in Chapter 2, these studies have used the concept of historical legacies in different ways but emphasize that historical legacies cannot be completely independent from variables in the classical sense.

[33] See special issue on Europeanization and Legacies in *Europe-Asia Studies* 62 (3).

Although I acknowledge challenges of legacy-based explanations, I think benefits of such explanations outweigh shortcomings in the context of the current study. To emphasize, the main contribution of my thesis is the finding that the EU has a diverse impact on different segments of civil society. In Chapter 2, I have shown that there is extensive work on the Europeanization of civil society in Turkey. In all of these assessments, students of Turkish studies have not analyzed different issue-areas of civil society. Thus, they either argue that the EU has a transformative or limited impact on civil society. Yet, there is no structured comparison between issue areas. This study has not only systematically analyzed EU influence on different sectors of civil society, but offered an explanation why such difference occurs. A detailed examination of civil society development has indicated that one of the most important factors is historical legacies. Historical legacies explain diverse EU outcomes on civil society. This is a value-added contribution of the legacy explanations.

The second one is the relevancy of my thesis in light of political developments since 2005. Between 1999 and 2005, Turkey has undertaken several reforms in various domains and there was optimism about the transformative power of the EU in these processes. However, the post-2005 period is characterized as the deterioration in the EU-Turkey relationship and "disenchantment by both sides" (Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber forthcoming). Both internal (e.g. consolidation of AKP's power after its second election victory in 2007 and declining Turkish public support for the EU membership) and external factors (the veto of the Republic of Cyprus on the opening of new chapters, the Eurocrisis and the rise of far right political parties) have played a role in the downturn of the EU-Turkey relations (Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016; Keyman and Aydın-Düzgit 2007; Öner 2013). Given these developments, is it still relevant to raise questions about the role of the EU and its transformative power on civil society in Turkey?

In Turkey, the relationship between the civil society and the EU has been extensively studied. The findings show that the EU has an impact and transformative power on civil society, yet since 2005 the EU's power is more limited than before (See section 2.1.3 Europeanization of civil society in Turkey). In these studies, civil society analyses come in different forms, but one similarity they share is the assessment of the EU impact through organized and institutionalized civil society actors. For example, Rumelili and Boşnak (2015: 135) found that the EU impact has been "significant in extent, limited in scope to a small subset of Turkish NGOs". As

described in the methodology section, although NGOs have connections with movements and local civil society actors, an examination of the EU influence does not incorporate a non-organized and less institutionalized form of civil society. This is a general problem and a fundamental challenge for the students of Turkish studies.

Furthermore, recent political developments have signaled two major trends in the studies of Turkish civil society. First, the AKP's consecutive general election victories have further consolidated its power and created its own civil society. As Kaya (2015) rightly points out, under the rule of the AKP faith –based voluntary organizations and charities have become prominent. These organizations are mainly GONGOs and coopted by the AKP and used instrumentally to support its policies. Second, in response to the authoritative AKP's policies and "Erdoğan's way of ruling" non-organized forms of participation have been key to understanding recent dynamics in Turkish civil society. The experiences of the Gezi movement in May 2013 and Ballot and Beyond (*Oy ve Ötesi*)[34] in 2014 highlight the importance of civic and political participation. However, so far the relationship between Europeanization and faith-based voluntary organizations and civic initiatives has not been adequately studied. Turning on to the key question, it is critical to examine the EU impact on civil society, because Europeanization is still a relevant phenomenon in civil society, though its impact is mostly concentrated on the NGOs.

8.4. Directions for Future Research

In this thesis I introduced a framework for understanding the relationship between the state of civil society and Europeanization outcomes. While I explored the implications of this framework from several angles, the analyses presented here can be seen as the beginning of a broader research agenda. In this section I highlight some of the areas that warrant further investigation.

One of the most exciting future tasks is the exploration of the mechanisms through which different civil society actors such as interest groups, grassroots organizations, local groups as well as new policy areas are shaped by the Europeanization dynamics. This is much needed within the single case study

[34] It started as a civil platform by volunteers to improve the reliability of the electoral processes in Turkey. In March 2014, *Oy ve Ötesi* became a civil movement and participated in a civil observation of the election pools with its 30,000 volunteers. In April 2014, it was reorganized as an association (Korkmaz 2015).

countries and across the different countries. As discussed in the previous section, so far most of the studies have focused on institutionalized civil society actors. Comparing different civil society actors and different policies will expand our understanding of the Europeanization of civil society.

The Gezi Events signaled the importance of a less institutionalized form of mobilization, the existence of an "unorganized" civil society and raised discussions in the public sphere. This opens another avenue to researchers to conduct a study on the Europeanization of the public sphere in Turkey and its transformation. Research on the understanding of the public sphere in Turkey, its transformation, and its relationship with Europeanization shape our understanding of interactions of the civic actors in a wider space and its implications for civil society in Turkey.

Another direction in which the interrogation of this study can be continued is to map out in detail the EU's civil society policy, its rationale, objectives, main policy agents and instruments through a comparative analysis across countries to comprehend our understanding of the policy both at the EU level and in implications on different countries. It would be very fruitful, for example, to design a comparative study on the basis of the characteristics of the civil society, and state-society relations in an old member state, a new member state, a candidate country and a country from the European Neighborhood. We need to further understand similarities and differences across cases and the role of the EU's civil society policy in these countries.

To conclude, in this thesis I revisited one of the most enduring themes of study in Europeanization studies. My endeavor was both a challenge and an opportunity, as the large body of existing work implied that the relationship between the state of the civil society and Europeanization outcomes was not comprehensively understood despite the scholarly interest. I have offered a theoretical account to understand this relationship and reached an original conclusion for the studies on the Europeanization of civil society: the EU impact on civil society is differential, and it is possible to observe this with a careful consideration of legacy-related factors at the domestic level. While my analyses explored various implications of my argument, the mechanisms considered are quite complex, and there are many avenues for further research. I hope that the comparative framework that I put forward will form the theoretical foundations of a new research agenda on civil society and Europeanization studies.

APPENDICES

A.1 TOPIC GUIDE

General Questions on the Organizational Structure- Organizasyon Yapısı

1. Could you present yourself and your personal history in this organisation briefly?
   Kısaca kendinizi tanıtır ve kişisel sivil toplum geçmişinizden bahseder misiniz?

2. What are the main objectives and activities of your organisation/ association/platform/union? Have the aims changed since the establishment of the organisation and if so, why?
   Dernek olarak başlıca amaç ve etkinlikleriniz nelerdir? Kuruluşundan sonra amaç ve etkinliklerinizde herhangi bir değişikilik var mı? Varsa, neden?

3. When I look at your activities, I can see that you work on_____ various fields and undertake different projects and campaigns. How do you evaluate/see your activities in comparison to other women/human rights/ environment organisations?
   Sizin çalışmalarınıza baktığımız zaman sizin _____ alanlarda projeler/kampanyalar yaptığınızı görüyoruz. _____'nin genel kadın/ insan hakları/çevre örgütleri içindeki rolünü bu alanlarda nasıl görüyorsunuz?

4. What is your vision about the EU Accession process?_____'nın Avrupa Birliği katılım süreci ile ilgili görüşleri nelerdir?

   EU: an opportunity or obstacle? AB sizin için bir fırsat mı yoksa sınırlayıcı bir unusur mu?
   AB sizin için ne ifade ediyor?

5. Has there been any change in your institutional/organisational structure after the 1999 Helsinki summit?
   1999 Helsinki Zirvesi sonrasında yapısal değişikliklere gidildi mi? AB'ye

uyum için somut olarak neler yapıldı? Yapısal değişikliklere gidildi ise, değişiklikler nelerdir?

Compulsory Impact- AB Katılım Süreci ve AB Mali Yardım Programları

1. Do EU institutions (European Parliament, Commission etc.) play any role in your official organization policy?Sizin bir STK olarak politika oluşturmanızda AB kurumlarının (parlamento, komisyon vs) rolü var mı? AB'ye adaylık sürecinin elinizi güçlendirmesi söz konusu mu?

2. How is your organisation funded? How would you describe current funding? Kaynak olarak sağladığınız 100 lira, hangi kaynaklardan ve ne oranda (%) geliyor.

3. Have you applied for external funding? If no, why? Herhangi bir AB fonu için başvuruda bulundunuz mu? Eger bulunmadıysanız,

   - Neden başvuruda bulunmadınız?

4. Why did you apply for external funding? Neden AB fonuna başvuruda bulundunuz?

5. Could you please describe your experience with this process? Biraz bu süreçten bahseder misiniz?

6. Would you apply again- If yes/no, why? AB fonuna tekrar başvurmayı düşünüyor musunuz? Eğer düşünüyorsanız/ düşünmüyorsanız neden?

Enabling Impact

1. How does the EU impact certain debates in relation to your organisation? Is there any reference to the EU in your debates? Sizce, AB belirili konulardaki kamuoyu tartışmalarını etkiledi mi (örneklendir)? Etkiledi ise,

   - Nasıl etkiledi? Belirli konularda tartışmalar var mı? AB'ye referans var mı?

2. How do you use the EU in your activities (legitimisation) Siz örgüt faaliyetlerinizde AB ile ilişkiyi nasıl kullanıyorsunuz?

Connective Impact

1. Do you collaborate with other NGOs in your area (ask for both NGOs and INGOs) ? If yes,
   - Which ones and why?
   - How frequent are these relations?
   - What are the issue areas/ projects?

(AB ülkelerinde STK'larıyla) işbirliğiniz/iletişiminiz var mı (AB mali yardım programı çerçevesinde ya da dışında)? Eğer varsa,

- Hangi örgütlerle işbirliği içerisindesiniz? Neden bu örgütler?
- İletişiminizin sıklığı nedir?
- İşbirliği yaptığınız alanlar veya projeler var mı?

2. Do you collaborate with other NGOs in EU countries? If yes,
   AB ülkelerinde STK'larıyla, AB mali yardım programı bağlamında (ortaklık), issbirliğiniz/iletişiminiz var mı? Eğer varsa,
   - How do you choose your partners? Ortaklarınızı nasıl buluyor ya da nasıl seçiyorsunuz?
   - Do you face any difficulties in the course of the projects? Proje süresince ortaklarınızla karşılaştığınız zorluklar nelerdir?
   - Do you still collaborate after you complete the projects? Proje tamamlandıktan sonra ortaklarınızla işbirliğine devam ediyor musunuz?
   - If no, why? Eğer etmiyorsanız neden ?

3. Is your NGO a member of any network or umbrella group? STK ağı veya şemsiye kuruluşa üye misiniz (AB'de ve Türkiye'de)?

4. Are you member of other international platforms? AB platformları dışında hangi uluslarası platformlara dahilsiniz?

5. Does your NGO have experience working with governmental actors? If yes/no

   - Reasons for collaboration or lack of collaboration?
   - How would you evaluate these relations? Positive- negative?
   - How does EU impact these relationships?

Would you like to add anything else?

A.2 List of Civil Society Organization Interviews

Index No	Name of the Institution	Position of the Interviewee	Date of the Interview	Location of the Interview
1	İzmir Kadın Dayanışma Derneği	Volunteer	3 January 2011	İstanbul
2	Environmental Activist	Volunteer	17 March 2011	İstanbul
4	Turkish Environmental and Woodlands Protection Society	General Secretary	23 March 2011	İstanbul
5	TEMA		14 April 2011	İstanbul
6	ÇEKÜL	Project Coordinator	20 April 2011	İstanbul
7	DD	Project Coordinator	26 April 2011	İstanbul
8	Women Rights Association Against Discrimination	General Secretary	20 September 2011	İstanbul
9	Mor Çatı	Volunteer	27 September 2011	İstanbul
10	Kadın Haklarını Koruma Derneği	Vice President	15 October 2011	İstanbul
11	The Socialist Feminist Collective	Volunteer	17 October 2011	İstanbul
12	Hazar Education Culture and Solidarity Association	Vice President	18 October 2011	İstanbul
13	KA-DER	General Secretary	19 October 2011	İstanbul
14	Delegation of the European Union to Turkey	Sector Manager Environment Sustainable Development and Climate Change	21 October 2011	Skype
15	KAGİDER	Deputy Secretary General	24 October 2011	İstanbul
16	Association of Women of Republic	Vice President	25 October 2011	Ankara

17	İHD	President	25 October 2011	Ankara
18	Republic of Turkey Ministry of EU Affairs	Director Directorate of Civil Society, Communication and Culture	25 October 2011	Ankara
19	Republic of Turkey Ministry of EU Affairs	Director Directorate for Political Affairs	25 October 2011	Ankara
20	Republic of Turkey Ministry of EU Affairs	Expert Directorate of Project Implementation	25 October 2011	Ankara
21	Capital City Women's Platform	General Secretary	26 October 2011	Ankara
22	Human Rights Research Association	Vice President	26 October 2011	Ankara
23	Mazlum-Der	President-General Coordinator	26 October 2011	Ankara
24	Delegation of European Union To Turkey		26 October 2011	Ankara
25	Delegation of European Union To Turkey	Sector Manager democratisation and Civil Society Institution Building and Civil Society Sector	26 October 2011	Ankara
26	Delegation of European Union To Turkey	Sector Manager democratisation and Civil Society Institution Building and Civil Society Sector	26 October 2011	Ankara
27	İHOP	General Coordinator	27 October 2011	Ankara
28	Republic of Turkey Ministry of Family and Social Policies KSGM	Expert	27 October 2011	Ankara
29	Republic of Turkey Ministry of Family and	Expert	27 October 2011	Ankara

	Social Policies KSGM			
30	STGM	Training Assistant	27 October 2011	Ankara
31	Flying Broom	Volunteer	28 October 2011	Ankara
32	TKB	Vice President	28 October 2011	Ankara
	Pink Life	Volunteer	28 October 2011	Ankara
33	Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Department of Associations		28 October 2011	Ankara
34	AÇEV	Deputy General Manager	01 November 2011	İstanbul
35	hYD		01 November 2011	İstanbul
36	Women for Women's Human Rights	Volunteer	16 November 2011	İstanbul
37	Amargi Kadın Akademisi	Volunteers	25 January 2012	İstanbul
38	KAOS GL	Secretary of Law Affairs	25 January 2012	İstanbul
39	TİHV	Representative	25 January 2012	İstanbul
40	Buğday Association for Supporting Ecological Living	Volunteer, Project Coordinator	08 March 2012	Skype
41	STGM	Representative	21 May 2012	Diyarbakır
42	Diyarbakır Bar Association	President	22 May 2012	Diyarbakır
43	İHD Diyarbakır Branch	Representative	22 May 2012	Diyarbakır
44	Mazlum-Der Diyarbakır Branch	Representative	23 May 2012	Diyarbakır
45	Human Rights Foundation of Turkey Diyarbakır	Representative	23 May 2012	Diyarbakır
45	KAMER	Volunteer	23 May 2012	Diyarbakır
46	Selis Kadın Derneği	Volunteer	24 May 2012	Diyarbakır
47	Bağlar	Coordinator	24 May 2012	Diyarbakır

	Belediyesi Kardelen Kadın Evi			
48	Göç-Der	Volunteer	24 May 2012	Diyarbakır
49	ÇAÇA	President	24 May 2012	Diyarbakır
50	Sarmaşık Association for Struggle Against Poverty and Sustainable Development	General Secretary	24 May 2012	Diyarbakır
51	Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations Turkey-Ankara Office	Deputy Resident Advisor Turkey	22 January 2013	Ankara
52	EWL	Former Delegation, European Women's Lobby	23 January 2013	Ankara
53	EWL	Former President, KADER Ankara	23 January 2013	Ankara

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