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**Why Darfur is not a Modern-Day Rwanda: A Comparative Study
Differentiating Types of Genocide**

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Deutsche Zusammenfassung

Immer öfter vergleichen sowohl die Medien also auch Politiker den derzeitigen Genozid in Darfur mit dem Ruanda-Genozid von 1994. Ist das ein fairer, treffender Vergleich? Oder ist dieser Vergleich einfach ein politischer Trick, um Länder unter Druck zu setzen eine Intervention in Darfur vorzubereiten? In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden hauptsächlich zwei Forschungsfragen untersucht. Erstens wird gefragt, wie die zwei Konflikte sich unterscheiden und welche Faktoren diesen Unterschied erklären können. Als zweite Forschungsfrage wird geprüft, ob diese Unterschiede beitragen könnten, eine neue Typologie von Genozid aufzubauen. Wenn ja, dann wie würde eine neue Typologie von Genozid aussehen?

Die Arbeit ist in sieben Teile unterteilt. Kapitel Eins beinhaltet eine Einleitung zum Thema der Arbeit. Das Forschungsdesign und die Definition vom Genozid werden in Kapitel Zwei dargestellt. Die Methodologie der Arbeit wird in Kapitel Drei erklärt. Kapitel Vier zeigt die wichtigsten Unterschiede zwischen den Konflikten in Ruanda und in Darfur auf (die abhängigen Variablen). Kapitel Fünf sucht strukturelle und direkte Ursachen für die Konflikte (die unabhängigen Variablen), um die Unterschiede zwischen den Konflikten zu erklären. Kapitel Sechs stellt zuerst die alten Typologien des Genozids Forschung vor und erläutert dann eine neue, hilfreichere Typologie, die aus dem Erkenntnisgewinn aus den Fallbeispielen hergeleitet wurde.

Schließlich wird Kapitel Sieben die Hauptpunkte der Arbeit zusammenfassen und fünf Ergebnisse vorstellen. Der erste Schluss ist, dass Ruanda und Darfur verschiedene Typen von Genozid darstellen. Während Ruanda als ein *totaler Genozid* beschrieben werden könnte, ist Darfur ein *selektiver Genozid*. Ein *totaler Genozid* wurde als ein Genozid definiert, in dem die gesamte Ziel-Gruppe in einem Land in Gefahr ist, und zweitens, ist der soziale und ökonomische Schaden in einem *totalen Genozid* sehr hoch. Auf der anderen Seite, findet ein *selektiver Genozid* an einer Ziel-Gruppe nur in einer Region eines Landes statt. Der Schaden, sowohl menschlich als auch ökonomisch, ist niedriger als in einem *totalen Genozid*. Als zweites Ergebnis lässt sich festhalten, dass obwohl die strukturellen Ursachen für beide Konflikten gleich sind, sich die direkten Ursachen unterscheiden. Darüber hinaus kam ich zum dritten Schluss, dass die strukturellen Gründe zeigen, warum ein Genozid überhaupt stattfinden könnte. Die direkten Ursachen erklären hierbei die Unterschiede zwischen Ruanda und Darfur. Von den direkten Fak-

toren wurden einige als „Indikatoren für totalen Genozid“ ausgewählt. Viertens, scheint zivile Beteiligung am Genozid ein besonderer gefährlicher direkter Faktor zu sein. In diesem Zusammenhang ist davon auszugehen, dass je höher die zivile Beteiligung am Konflikt ist, desto wahrscheinlicher ist es, dass ein *totaler Genozid* stattfinden wird. Im letzten Teil stelle ich dar, dass es mit Hilfe der neuen Typologie möglich ist zu zeigen, dass starke Regierungen, die sich keiner äußeren Bedrohung ausgesetzt sehen, anfälliger dafür sind einen *totalen Genozid* zu implementieren. Auf der anderen Seite wird eine schwache Regierung, die Interventionen und die Macht anderer Staaten fürchtet, einen *totalen Genozid* vermeiden und stattdessen versuchen einen *selektiven Genozid* durchzusetzen.

Die Relevanz dieser Arbeit ist sowohl akademisch als auch praktisch. Die alten Typologien von Genozid kategorisieren Genozid nach *einer* Ursache. Da Konflikte immer komplexer werden und die meisten schon multi-kausal sind, sind solche Klassifikationssysteme nicht mehr gültig. Zweitens, aus einer praktischen Sicht hoffe ich, dass diese Arbeit dazu beitragen kann, die Zahl von zukünftigen Genoziden zu reduzieren und auch mögliche Interventionen zu verbessern. Wenn ein intervenierender Staat die Art eines Genozids kennt, wird er besser vorbereitet sein um diesen bekämpfen zu können. Im Besonderen, sollten zukünftige Interventionen folgende „Indikatoren für totalen Genozid“ beachten (z.B. eine hohe Bevölkerungsdichte, autoritäre Struktur, Zugang zu Waffen, Propaganda der Medien, und Manipulation der Bevölkerung). Die Indikatoren hängen mit der aktiven Beteiligung von Zivilisten an Genozid zusammen, einem anderen wichtigen Faktor dem intervenierende Staaten Beachtung schenken sollten. Obwohl die Unterschiede zwischen Ruanda und Darfur in dieser Arbeit hervorgehoben wurden, sollte betont werden, dass es nicht Ziel dieser Arbeit war eine Intervention in Darfur auszuschließen. Im Gegenteil, falls es zu einer Intervention von außen kommt, dann sollte sie aus den richtigen Gründen erfolgen. Eine Intervention zu unternehmen, nur weil der Konflikt „genau wie Ruanda“ aussieht wäre ein Fehler. Wie in dieser Arbeit klar gemacht wurde, könnten Ruanda und Darfur unterschiedlicher nicht sein (Ruanda ist ein Beispiel für einen so genannten *totalen Genozid*, wohingegen Darfur ein Beispiel für einen *selektiven Genozids* ist). Eine Intervention müsste die Unterschiede zu Ruanda erkennen, um eine erfolgreiche Intervention zu sein und um eine dauerhafte Lösung für den Konflikt finden zu können.

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A single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic.
-Stalin

*It happened, therefore it can happen again: this is the core of what we have to say. It
can happen, and it can happen everywhere.*
-Primo Levi, 1986 *The Drowned and the Saved*

1. Introduction

There is an understandable tendency in genocide studies to lump genocides together as much as possible in order to claim a rightful place in history. Considering the scarcity of genocides in history (compared to the occurrences of “war” or “conflicts”), this urge to group them together under the umbrella of “genocides” makes sense. Nevertheless, over-generalizing genocides can be dangerous for scholarly work because it can overlook important, inherent differences between the cases. While most research focuses on likening genocides, little literature has tried to differentiate one genocide from another. This is a valuable aim because differentiating genocides from one another and trying to uncover reasons for these differences can help us better understand them and consequently, be able to prevent genocides from occurring. However where this is impossible perhaps we can intervene more effectively by differentiating genocides. In other words, if scholars can categorize genocides into different types and uncover certain characteristics and causes of each type, then they will increase the possibility of preventing a future conflict from developing into a full-blown genocide. By successfully mapping out these differences, it would be possible to identify the familiar pattern of a “Type A Genocide” or a “Type B Genocide” and to know what outcomes to expect from each before the conflict escalates even further. Michael Brown underscores the necessity of such work when he writes: “The starting point for advancing our understanding of the causes of internal conflict is identifying different types of conflict and the different sets of causal factors that are decisive in different settings” (Brown 1997: 25). Many authors have tried to define a suitable typology of genocide, but their theories remain of little use for states which intervene in the genocide. After explaining why the old typologies of genocide are of little use today, I will propose a new typology which is more suitable for categorizing the complex nature of current conflicts.

In order to achieve these goals, this study will examine the cases of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the continuing genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan, which started in February of 2003. In current reports about the developments in the Darfur genocide, the situation has been often carelessly labelled “a modern Rwanda” without any systematic investigation to compare the conflicts in any greater depth. In a recent article in the *International Herald Tribune*, Darfur was called “The New Rwanda” be-

cause of the international community's failure to intervene in this African genocide.¹ The UN humanitarian coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, went so far as to say that Darfur is exactly like Rwanda; only the number of victims has changed.² It is dangerous to equate so flippantly the two conflicts in order to force the international community to act. Although international intervention is desperately needed in Darfur, if the international community were to act on these grounds alone, it would be intervening for the wrong reasons. As will be argued in this research, such a comparison is deceptive because the conflicts are actually quite different and treating them as the same phenomenon just nine years apart would be a grave mistake. This paper will take issue with Kapila's statement, claiming instead that the genocides represent two different types. It will furthermore be of importance in this research to explain why the genocides developed into two different types. It is important to note that these types should be thought of as models along a continuum and not as set, concrete types.

The research questions of this paper can therefore be summarized as follows: *how do the Rwandan and Sudanese genocides differ, and what factors can explain this difference? Secondly, can this differentiation help to build a new typology of genocides, and what will a new typology look like?* This paper will outline the research design in the second section, the methodology in section three, and the most important differences between Rwanda and Darfur in section four. Section five searches for explanations for this differentiation, and finally, section six will demonstrate the need for a new typology by reviewing the current literature and will undertake the first steps in building a theory of a new typology in order to pave the way for future research on this topic. Finally, the findings of this research will be summarized in section seven, and the important conclusions will be discussed.

2. Research Design

2.1 A Justification of this Study

Most genocide research has a double goal: the first, to study the causes of genocide as a scientific phenomenon, and secondly, to help in the fight to prevent such horrific events from ever happening again. Similarly, the research goal of my paper is not

¹ "The New Rwanda" November 29, 2005: in: *International Herald Tribune*.

² In an interview to the UN's Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), Mukesh Kapila stated: "The only difference between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers involved," March 2004.

simply to make another theoretical contribution to political science. Rather, it also has the practical purpose of contributing to the prevention of genocide. Hopefully by distinguishing between two types of genocide and by isolating the reasons for these types, future incidents can be better prevented. Frank Chalk fittingly summarizes the aspirations of genocide scholars, who “are motivated by hope and a sense that through study we can improve prediction of genocides and that through predication and education we can mobilize support for humanitarian interventions to deter and prevent new Holocausts” (Chalk 1989: 150). It would clearly be ideal if we could stop all conflicts in their tracks before they ever even become genocides. However, this is most likely not realistic since all of the genocides of the 20th century were only stopped too late, when they were already fully-developed genocides. Therefore, this work also strives to develop a typology of genocide which would help future interventions. For intervention forces, it is certainly more cost-effective, and most likely also more efficient, to combat an anticipated conflict or possibly a low-scale conflict rather than a full-blown genocide. While knowing the causes of conflict will help to prevent future conflicts, understanding both the causes and the likely outcomes of the genocide will be useful for intervention forces. Therefore, to further both of these conflict management tactics, this work will study both the causes and the possible outcomes of genocides. Furthermore, this study can be justified because of the scarcity of current research on the topic, as will be discussed in the next section.

2.2 Status of Current Research

Stretching across decades, from the Armenian genocide to the Holocaust, and from the Native American to the Bosnian genocide, the phenomenon of genocide sadly is not rare. On the other hand, the study of it has been rather neglected and underdeveloped in political science; instead being a topic more likely to be examined by sociologists, ethnologists, psychologists and historians. The studies that do exist focus primarily on preventing future genocides by developing a general theory of genocide, which would explain the occurrence of all genocides.³ In addition, there is a need for more comparative studies on the topic of genocide, as Midlarsky points out (Midlarsky 2005: 13). After the word “genocide” was coined in World War II, the first studies on the

³ Cf. Mazian 1979; Harff 1988; Dadrian 1990; Freeman 1991; Valentino 2000; Waller 2002; and Adelman 2005.

topic gradually began to appear. However, it soon became apparent that the Holocaust would overshadow genocide research. What makes this particularly problematic is that Holocaust scholars are often very sceptical about comparing the Holocaust to any other genocide, claiming its uniqueness cannot be comprehended by others.⁴ Although countless volumes have been written about the Holocaust, there still remains surprisingly little research about genocides in general. Michael Freeman points out that the scarcity of research is debatable because it could simply be a linguistic mistake which prevents us from recognizing the amount of work already done on this topic (Freeman 1991: 185). Using this line of reasoning, he says that genocide research has actually already been conducted in studies on human rights, wars, and crime. A second reason why we may be misjudging the quantity of research on the topic is that the definition of genocide remains too unclear, as will be discussed in the next section. Still, Freeman argues against these possibilities and claims that the apparent scarcity of research concerning genocides is real and not a miscalculation.

In particular, some authors have noted the need to research indicators of genocide, which will also be a goal of this work, when investigating the causes of the Rwandan and Darfur genocides. Chalk reiterates the need for this research in his work: “In our opinion, there has not been nearly enough research done on the preconditions of genocide to specify such indicators with any degree of reliability” (Chalk 1990: 4). Although the Rwandan genocide happened twelve years ago, there still has not been very much literature written about the deeper reasons for the genocide. According to Steve Utterwulghe, “few authors have actually tried to fully investigate the causes of the tragedy. Those who did have limited their research to the immediate causes: overpopulation and land shortage on the one hand and the role of extremists on the other” (Utterwulghe 1999: 8). In addition, much of the research about Rwanda does not even focus on the causes of the genocide, but rather on the conditions in post-genocide Rwanda. In this regard, this thesis should fill the need for clarification of the deeper reasons for genocide, which is important for the prevention of genocide.

As was mentioned in the introduction, many human rights groups and members of the media have referred to the 1994 Rwandan genocide when discussing the ongoing genocide in Darfur. Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, a comprehensive study

⁴ Cf. Freeman 1991: 185.

comparing the Rwandan genocide to the ongoing one in Darfur one has never been written. A more complete comparative study of the two conflicts would be useful because it would show us whether these brief allusions in the media are accurate or not. It would also give us a better way to judge the ongoing conflict in Darfur by comparing it to a past precedent. This research will therefore also attempt to fill this thematic gap in scholarly literature.

In addition to addressing the under-researched topics of genocide and Rwanda and Darfur, this work will propose a new theory for a typology of genocide based on the two case studies. While there already is some literature on this topic, most of it focuses on dividing genocides into types according to different causes or motives of the perpetrators.⁵ The current typologies, however, do not consider the possible outcomes of the genocides at all. However, for those working to prevent or to stop genocides, a systematic consideration of the potential effects of genocide on the economy, the people and the future of the country is of the utmost importance. In addition, the current typologies are also of little use because they oversimplify the causes of conflict. Conflicts today have become increasingly complex and rarely can they be classified under one cause. Therefore, classifying genocides according to oversimplified causes cannot help prevention and intervention to the same extent that examining potential causes and outcomes together can.

2.3 Defining Genocide

As in any study, defining our terms of reference is essential, and in this case, the obvious word that needs to be defined is “genocide”. Genocide is often casually used by the media and others wanting to attract instant attention without careful consideration of the definition of the phenomenon. There are many different possible definitions, and therefore finding an appropriate one for the purposes of this study is necessary. The word “genocide” was first coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944, in his book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Lemkin 1944: 79). Lemkin was convinced that the Holocaust represented a different phenomenon from war, and for this reason, he created a new word from the Greek “genos,” meaning “people,” and “cide” from the Latin for “to kill.”

⁵ Cf. Authors who have created typologies of genocide include: Lemkin 1944; Dadrian 1975 and 1990; Savon 1972; Fein 1984; Kuper 1985; Smith 1987; Chalk 1990; and Valentino 2000.

Lemkin helped establish the most commonly quoted and used definition of genocide, which is found in the Convention for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Although the Convention was completed in 1948, it did not enter into force until 1951. Article Two provides a general definition:

“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such:

- A) Killing members of the group;
- B) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- C) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- D) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- E) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”⁶

Even though it comes from international criminal law, I will follow this definition in my research because it is the most commonly used one. Although many international organizations, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), follow this definition of genocide, some genocide scholars have not always accepted this definition as is because it leaves out several important aspects, namely genocide committed against certain political or social groups.⁷ The Convention only focuses on national, ethnic, racial or religious genocide. The debate about whether to include social and political groups does not really affect this study since the victims in the cases of Rwanda and Sudan were not political or social targets. However, it would make for a more comprehensive, inclusive definition of genocide if these two groups were also accounted for. Furthermore, other acts which are not listed in the convention are now considered acts of genocide as well. Rape, a common occurrence in both the Rwandan and Darfur genocides, is now categorized as a possible act of genocide by international law. In the Akayesu Trial Judgement at the ICTR, rape was considered an act of genocide in the Rwandan genocide.⁸ Making the case that both Rwanda and Darfur can be classified as “genocide” will be addressed in section three.

⁶ The complete Convention can be found on the UNHCHR website: <<http://www.unhchr.ch>> 2005.

⁷ Cf. Chalk 1989: 151. Chalk believes the exclusion of these two categories would wrongly ignore the cases of thousands of people who were systematically targeted for social or political reasons. One of his many examples is the Nazi persecution of homosexuals. Krain suggests using the word “politicide” for describing political targets (Krain 1997). For other alternative definitions of “genocide,” see Huttenbach 1988 and Shaw 2003.

⁸ Cf. Karagiannakis 1999.

3. Methodology

3.1 Classifying the Research

When developing a methodology, one of the first steps is to identify the type of research being conducted. This study falls under the category “theory-oriented” research, in Shively’s differentiation of types of research (Shively 1990: 1-11). It could also be more specifically classified as “theory-proposing” research, as described by Van Evera since it will offer a new theory and new hypotheses, but it will not necessarily conduct a thorough test of these hypotheses (Van Evera 1997: 89). In this research, my goal is to form a theory regarding the factors causing different types of genocide. In addition, political science research is often divided into “descriptive” or “explanatory” studies. The first part of this research could be considered “descriptive” because it will identify the differences between the two genocides. The second part, however, is an “explanatory” study because it will attempt to reveal the factors which explain why genocides develop into particular types.

3.2 Case Selection

It is important to justify the choice of case studies, since a badly chosen set of cases can be detrimental to any research. Other cases were considered, but for a variety of reasons, the Rwanda and Darfur genocides were chosen. The first reason for this choice was that both cases are generally considered genocides by a number of scholars and political actors. Even though many states failed to call it so at that time, it is now acknowledged that the 1994 Rwandan conflict was actually a genocide.⁹ The Rwandan case clearly fits into the definition of genocide under the Genocide Convention because Hutus were killing Tutsis “with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.”¹⁰

In the more recent Darfur conflict, political actors have not reached a consensus yet concerning the correct term for the conflict. A recent UN report investigating the

⁹ The United States is the most obvious example of the failure to call the Rwandan genocide “genocide.” There are many different reasons for this, including the failed peacekeeping mission to Somalia, which was in the minds of all the politicians at the time. Another reason, of course, is that if the United States were to use the “g” word, then it would be obliged to intervene, as outlined in the 1948 Convention for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. For these reasons, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright used the term “acts of genocide” to describe the 1994 slaughter.

¹⁰ Cf. The Genocide Convention: <<http://www.unhcr.ch>> 2005.

violence in Darfur concluded that genocide had not occurred.¹¹ Even the most active human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have refrained from labelling the conflict “genocide” and have instead embraced the term “ethnic cleansing” to describe the situation. The United States, however, has already taken the first step. Under former Secretary of State Colin Powell, the Darfur conflict was officially declared “genocide” by the United States.¹² Nevertheless, the US has managed to avoid the obligation to act even though the Convention for the Prevention of Genocide requires a state to intervene if it believes “genocide” is occurring in another country. The EU Parliament has also recently labelled the conflict “genocide” of some sort, when it encouraged Sudan to “to end impunity and to bring to justice immediately the planners and perpetrators of crimes against humanity, war crimes and human rights violations, which can be construed as tantamount to genocide.”¹³ Genocide organizations and some NGOs have also used this term to describe the situation in Darfur.¹⁴

The debate is not only complicated by the wide spectrum of opinions from different political actors and their opinions but also because of the array of possible terms for the conflict. The possibilities not only include “genocide” vs. “non-genocide” but also “genocide” vs. “ethnic cleansing.” Some have chosen to name Darfur “ethnic cleansing” because it appears that Africans are simply being driven off their land. Nevertheless if the *Janjaweed* wanted their land, it does not make sense that they would burn down all of the villages. So far there have not been extensive reports that Arab nomads are indeed taking over this land, and instead, many of the destroyed villages remain deserted (Prunier 2005: 157). In addition, a label of “ethnic cleansing” would also ignore the *Janjaweed*’s ethnic slanders (calling black Africans names such as “slaves”) and deliberate targeting of Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa civilians. Despite the controversy over the label, genocide is clearly occurring in Darfur, as will be shown later in the paper when the conflict is described. When using the Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide, there is no doubt that Darfur should be considered a geno-

¹¹ <<http://www.un.org>> 2005.

¹² On September 9, 2004, Secretary Powell declared: “Genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and *Janjaweed* bear responsibility and that genocide may still be occurring,” in: *Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The US Record 2004-2005*, p.5.

¹³ “EU lawmakers call Darfur crises ‘genocide,’ urge trials of militiamen,” in: *Agenda France Presse*, September 16, 2004.

¹⁴ Ex. The Save Darfur Coalition <<http://www.savedarfur.org>>, The Institute for the Study of Genocide <<http://www.isg-iags.org/>>, and Physicians for Human Rights <<http://www.phrusa.org/research/sudan/>>.

cide.¹⁵ The Arab militias seem intent on destroying the African Furs, Masalit and Zaghawa groups “in whole or in part” because of their ethnicity. The militias are clearly targeting only African villages, although Arab villages often are situated nearby, but left untouched.¹⁶

In other words, the controversy over this label is more of a linguistic dance instead of an accurate description of the conflict itself. Many of the hesitations from states and human rights organizations can simply be chalked up to political worries and the potential obligation to intervene if the conflict is labelled “genocide.” Therefore, the concern over states not calling Darfur a “genocide” should not prove problematic to this study.

3.3 Defining Variables

Besides choosing the cases because they both represented genocide, they were also selected because they represent the extreme outcomes of genocide. By comparing extreme cases, it is hoped to be able to filter out variables which cause extreme results. Stephen Van Evera has compiled a list of criteria for selecting case studies, including “extreme values on the independent variable, dependent variable, or condition variable” (Van Evera 1997: 77). In this work, our extreme variable is the dependent variable, which represents the outcome of the genocide. The selection of these two cases can also be justified according to Smelser’s negative comparative method (Smelser 1973: 56). Using this method, the “investigator takes two ‘groups’ that differ in outcome (dependent variable) and attempts to locate differences in conditions between them (independent variable)” (Smelser 1973: 56). Nevertheless, there are some problems with comparative studies in general, including the fact that they are less reliable compared with statistical, large *n* studies. These issues are, however, inherent to case studies, and particularly to small *n* studies, and are therefore simply necessary to be aware of because little can be done to solve these problems.

The independent variables will be the factors which caused a specific type of genocide. While some of these factors are very similar in both cases – for example, hate

¹⁵ Cf. “If we use the December 1948 definition it is obvious that Darfur is a genocide...” (Prunier 2005: 156) and “in any case there is no doubt that in rural Darfur there has been a systematic effort to kill people and wipe out specific tribes and that the killing amounts to genocide by any accepted definition” (Kristof 2006: 15).

¹⁶ Cf. <<http://www.unsudanig.org>> 2004, p. 2.

ideology, resource scarcities, and the role of colonial powers – other variables differ greatly, e.g. the role of the media. Following Mohamed Suliman’s definition, I will differentiate between structural and direct causes of the genocide. Structural causes are those “responsible for making the country susceptible to unrest, while the direct causes are the ones that actually precipitate violent conflict” (Suliman 2001: 52).

The dependent variables, on the other hand, will be the outcomes of the genocides. I make the case in this paper that the Rwandan and the Darfur outcomes are very different, as seen by their casualties according to the target group percentage, the intensity, the numbers of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPS), those requiring humanitarian aid, the economic conditions before and after the genocides, and the amount of destruction to the country and to the region. While I have coined Rwanda’s genocide a *total genocide*, the outcome of Darfur’s genocide can be labelled a *selective genocide*. These terms will be explained in greater detail in the next section. This brief overview of the dependent variables will be elaborated in the following sections. Since the dependent variables greatly differ between the two conflicts, they will be analyzed first in this study. After studying these, the independent variables will be examined in order to isolate the reasons for the different outcomes.

RWANDA		DARFUR	
Independent Variable	→ Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	→ Dependent Variable
Causes of conflict -Structural -Direct	<i>Total genocide</i>	Causes of conflict -Structural -Direct	<i>Selective genocide</i>

3.4 Avoiding Typical Methodological Problems

There are some methodological problems which frequently weaken research in international relations. When building theories, there are two typical problems which confront scholars: the structure-agency problem and the level-of-analysis problem. The first issue, the structure-agency problem, is described in depth by Stuart McAnulla (McAnulla 2002). In essence, the debate is about how much actors “have the ability to

shape our destiny as against the extent to which our lives are structured in ways out of our control” (McAnulla 2002: 271). While “structure” is understood as our context, “agency” is the actors (either individual or groups) who take action within this context. This research argues that both structure and agency have played a role in shaping the Rwandan and Darfur genocides. Therefore, both factors must be analyzed for a holistic analysis of the conflicts. For example, in Rwanda and Darfur, the structure of a weakened economy helped to make the country vulnerable to genocide, but other factors such as “ethnic hatred” explain that the conflicts were also caused by agents’ actions. Nevertheless, although both factors will be analyzed in this research, most of the direct causes which explain the difference between the developments in the Rwandan and Darfur genocides are due to *agency* factors and not *structural* ones. Therefore, the theory-building part of this research will be primarily based upon agency and not structural factors.

A second methodological problem which often proves to be a stumbling block for researchers in international relations is the level-of-analysis problem. According to this methodological rule, studies in social sciences should be isolated to one level of analysis within the international system. In other words, either the sub-state, the state or the international explanation should be employed, which should be chosen according to the level of the phenomenon to be explained. Using a sub-state explanation for an international phenomenon, for example, should be avoided. In addition, sometimes authors mistakenly use multi-level factors to explain a phenomenon. This methodological problem should not be a hindrance for this research because the studied phenomenon (the presence of a *total* or *selective genocide*) is on the state level. The factors which I will study as causal factors are similarly state level explanations. In his article about the level-of-analysis problem, J. David Singer prefers analyses on the state level over studies on the international level, which can often get overstretched and over generalized (Singer 1969: 24-28).

4. Types of Genocide: Comparing Rwanda with Darfur

It will be argued in this section that the Rwanda and Darfur genocides represent two different types of genocide – *total* and *selective genocide* – which are the dependent variables in this study. By *total genocide*, it is meant that the genocide is aimed against the entire target population across the whole country and that the social and economic

destruction is severe. The term *selective genocide* means first that the genocide is only aimed at part of the target population and that the social and economic destruction is limited (at least it is not as destructive as *total genocide*). Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that *total* and *selective genocides* are still both genocides because under the Genocide Convention, genocides can target a population either in whole or in part. It is logical that a *selective genocide* can develop into a *total genocide* (but do not necessarily have to), but that the reverse is unlikely. The reasons for this difference will be further examined in section five.

The statistics which will be cited in the following should all be understood as estimates. It is extraordinarily difficult to calculate the exact numbers affected by these conflicts since not many observers have been present during the genocides because of the danger, the remoteness and the difficulties posed by conflict areas. In addition, the Sudanese government made visas very difficult for journalists and aid workers to obtain. For these reasons, no one truly knows the actual numbers affected by the conflicts. Organizations active in the area have published vastly differing estimates of the numbers affected, and in such cases, the median estimate was chosen for this research. The statistics will evaluate both the social and the economic devastation of the genocides. Most of the statistics will be given in percentages so that the two genocides can be more accurately compared. It was hoped to compare the social factors in terms of the percentage of the target population, but this was not possible because some of the factors included more than just the target population. For example, the numbers needing humanitarian aid in Rwanda after the genocide included not only Tutsis, but also displaced Hutus. For an overview of the results of this comparison, refer to *Table 1: Comparing the Genocides in Rwanda and Darfur* in the Appendix.

4.1 Examining Rwanda: A Total Genocide

The first characteristic of a *total genocide* is the fact that the genocide is aimed at killing the whole target population, and not just a part of the target population. In Rwanda, all of the Tutsis were targeted, with no exceptions. These attacks were carried out to the extreme; also targeting Hutus who were slightly sympathetic to the plight of the Tutsis, or even those who refused to participate in the killings.

Secondly, a *total genocide* can be recognized by the high level of destruction and devastation which it leaves. Evaluating social and economic indicators of the geno-

cide can help to classify the Rwandan genocide as a *total genocide*. The population of Rwanda was around 7.5 million at the time of the genocide.¹⁷ From the total population, the target group in the genocide composed about 15% of the population (the percentage of Tutsis in the population). Realistically, however, this statistic should be a little higher because ambivalent or resistant Hutus were also targets in the genocide. In terms of intensity, according to some scholars, the Rwandan genocide of 1994 was the fastest and most effective genocide that the world has ever seen (Gourevitch 1999: 13). In only 100 days, some 800,000 people (mostly Tutsis but also some Hutus) died. In fact, the genocide was so devastating that 75% of the target group was killed by the end of the genocide (Shah 2003). A calculation of the average estimate of the casualties results in 8,000 casualties per day. What is even more incredible is that the genocide was even more intense during the first four weeks of the killings (Barnett 2002: 1).

Another way to evaluate the conflict's level of destruction is by the number of refugees. There were 2 million refugees who fled as a result of the Rwandan genocide, which is 26.6% of the total population of Rwanda.¹⁸ In the case of Rwanda, this statistic can be deceptive because many of the perpetrators of genocide (mainly Hutus) crossed over the borders and received aid from the international community until they were strong enough to attack their victims again. Other factors which can be used as a measurement for evaluating the genocide include the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the number of those needing humanitarian aid. Rwanda had approximately one million IDPs during the genocide and four million in need of aid.¹⁹ When calculated as the percent of the total population, 13.3% were IDPs while 53.3% needed humanitarian aid. The country is one of the most densely populated places in the world, with a population density of approximately 336 inhabitants per square kilometer.²⁰ The population density explains in part why the majority of the population was involved in the genocide one way or another (either as a victim, perpetrator, or a bystander).

In addition to the social factors, the outcome of the genocide can also be evaluated according to economic factors. Comparing the GDP per capita before and after the genocide can help us understand how the genocide has affected most people. According

¹⁷ <<http://www.oxfam.org.uk>> 2006.

¹⁸ <<http://www.forcedmigration.org>> 2006.

¹⁹ <<http://www.oxfam.org>> 2004.

²⁰ This estimate was derived by dividing 8.4 million by 25,000 square kilometers (the size of Rwanda). These figures were taken from the CIA Factbook <<http://www.cia.gov>> 2006a.

to the CIA World Factbook, the GDP per capita in 1993 was \$750 in Rwanda and only \$50 more two years later.²¹ The real GDP growth rate in 1995 in Rwanda was 0%, whereas it is currently 7% in Sudan.²² Evaluating the degree to which it destroyed the infrastructure of the country also proves to be an important indicator of whether this is a *total* or *selective genocide*. The destruction left in the aftermath of the genocides was significant despite the genocide's short duration. The devastation varied from cutting off running water and electricity to destroying the social, agricultural, legal and health infrastructure throughout the country (but in Kigali in particular). It was estimated that 80% of all Rwandan health professionals had either fled the country or been killed in the genocide (Tardif-Douglin 2006). In addition, houses were often severely damaged – their windows and doors often completely ripped off the building (Adelman 1999: 297). The impact that the genocide had on the infrastructure in Rwanda is difficult to compare to Darfur because Rwanda was more developed than Darfur even before the genocide.²³ As will be argued in the next section, if the Rwandan genocide had lasted longer, it is believed that the devastation to the country's infrastructure would have been even more significant than in Darfur.

The genocide not only affected Rwanda itself, but it also left deep scars on the whole Great Lakes region, destabilizing the area for years after the conflict. After the genocides were over, the conflict simply shifted locations and moved to the eastern part of Zaire, what is today the Democratic Republic of Congo. In October of 1996, Rwandan Tutsis, living in Zaire, started to attack Hutu refugee camps there. Zaire was very unstable and weak at the time, and so the Rwandan genocide was just one more destabilizing factor for the political situation in Zaire (Adelman 1999: 336). Some authors claim that the fall of Zairean President Mobutu was “intimately interconnected” to the Rwandan genocide (Adelman 1999: 347). In addition, the sheer number of Rwandan

²¹ Back-issues of the CIA World Factbook 1994 with statistics from 1993 can be found at the U.S. Government Printing Office <<http://www.gpo.gov>>. Back-issues of the CIA World Factbook 1996 with statistics from 1995 can be found on the University of Missouri at St. Louis website. <<http://www.umsl.edu>>.

²² Cf. the Sudan statistics in the CIA Factbook <<http://www.cia.gov>> 2006b and for the Rwanda statistics, see <<http://www.umsl.edu>> 1996.

²³ Rwanda was often called the “Switzerland of Africa” because of its relatively good social structure, including health care, running water, and education before the genocide, and even in rural areas. On the other hand, Darfur was chronically ignored by the government, which led to years of underdevelopment and marginalization.

refugees – 2 million – in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi, who needed support, was a strain and another source for destabilization.²⁴

4.2 Examining Darfur: A Selective Genocide

The primary reason why Darfur is considered a *selective genocide* is because only a part of the African population in Sudan has been targeted, unlike the Rwandan genocide, which targeted all of the Tutsis across the whole country. In other words, many other black African ethnic groups in other regions, such as the Dinka or the Nuer tribes who live in South Sudan, are not being targeted.

A *selective genocide* can also be evaluated by the limited destruction, in comparison with a *total genocide*. Although the Darfur genocide has lasted much longer than that in Rwanda, the social and economic factors indicate a genocide that has generally left less devastation to the people and the region. The population of the region of Darfur is about 6 million, which is roughly one and a half million less than in all of Rwanda at the time of the genocide. Compared to Rwanda, where the target group composed about 15% of the population, in Darfur the target group is much larger. The main target group consists of non-Arabs, who make up about 40% of the population in Darfur.²⁵ The most obvious social indicator of the genocide's devastation is the number of casualties, vastly differing in estimates, from 180,000 to 400,000.²⁶ Since access to Darfur has been limited, scholars have found it difficult to obtain accurate numbers not based on rumor and hearsay. It must also be taken into account that many of these deaths have not resulted directly from conflict, but rather from side-effects of the violence, namely malnutrition and disease. The percentage of the target population, that was killed or died from other related causes, can be calculated using our previous statistic. The result is 12.5%, which is clearly much less compared to the 75% of the target population killed in Rwanda.²⁷

The deaths have taken place over a span of three years, starting in February 2003 (although the time before this was certainly not free of casualties caused by conflict

²⁴ <<http://www.forcedmigration.org/>> 2006.

²⁵ <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/darfur.htm>> 2006.

²⁶ The estimate of 180,000 has been proposed by Human Rights Watch. However other groups, such as the Coalition for International Justice, have estimated that 180,000 Darfurians have died out of health reasons alone, leading the total death toll as high as 400,000.

²⁷ This figure was obtained by first calculating the population of non-Arabs in Darfur, which is 40% of 6 million, which is 2.4 million. Then, using 300,000 as the number of casualties from a target group of 2.4 million in Darfur, the percentage of the target population was calculated.

between the parties). Nevertheless, this was the “official” start of the genocide. Dividing the number of casualties by the length of the conflict results in an average of 169 to 375 casualties per day, depending on the figures used for the calculation. This is quite different compared to the Rwandan genocide, which averaged 8,000 people per day. The devastation of the genocide can also be measured by the numbers of people affected. As seen in the Rwandan genocide, using the numbers of refugees as a means for understanding the devastation is problematic because it was not always the victims, but rather sometimes the perpetrators themselves who fled to refugee camps. However, in Darfur this has not been the case. The refugee camps are occupied solely by the displaced victims from the attacks in Darfur. It is estimated that there are 200,000 refugees living mainly on the western border of Chad.²⁸ This equals 3.3% of the total population who were refugees after the genocide. Compared to Rwanda, this is a very small number, since 26.6% of the total population were refugees in Rwanda. The refugees in Darfur are living in extremely poor conditions with little food and water and barely adequate housing. While humanitarian aid organizations are present in the area, there have been some refugee camps which they have not been able to access. On the other hand, far more people have been internally displaced in Darfur than in Rwanda. The number of IDPs ranges between 1.5-1.8 million, and they are mainly situated in Northern and Western Darfur.²⁹ When converted into a percentage of the total population, 25-30% of the total population are IDPs. In Rwanda, on the other hand, 13.3% of the total population were IDPs. These people are extremely vulnerable because they still risk being attacked again by the *Janjaweed* (the government-sponsored militia), and they have little assistance from humanitarian organizations to sustain themselves. The measure of IDPs in Darfur is deceptive because it seems to disprove the thesis that Rwanda was a more destructive, *total genocide*. The fact that there are more IDPs in Darfur than in the Rwandan genocide can be explained by the fact that Darfur is a very large region compared to Rwanda, and therefore many civilians fleeing the conflict have not been able to reach the border with Chad where they would officially become a “refugee.” In addition, the militias have prevented IDPs from crossing the border by creating road-blocks.³⁰ The militias fear in part that an increase in refugees might spark international

²⁸ Estimate from the UNOCHA, <<http://www.un.org>> 2004.

²⁹ Estimate from the UNHCR, <<http://www.unhcr.org>> 2006.

³⁰ <<http://www.hrw.org>> 2004a, p. 36.

recognition of the conflict. Some IDPs have not even been able to escape temporary camps in Darfur, which are often surrounded by militias which prevent people from fleeing.³¹

Another indicator of the social devastation caused by the genocide is the numbers needing humanitarian aid to survive. According to the United Nations, 2.5 million people affected by the Darfur conflict are in need of humanitarian aid.³² When calculated in percentages, 41.6% of the total population need humanitarian aid, which is still relatively little in absolute numbers compared to the 53.3% of the total population in Rwanda who needed aid. Many of them have not been reached because of the remote location of the camps and because of the rainy seasons, which have slowed down transportation. Many aid organizations have concluded that air transport remains the only way for delivering aid to these areas. The low population density has caused difficulties for the humanitarian organizations since villages are so spread out. Darfur is one of the least populated states in Sudan. In a region the size of France, the population density averages around 5-10 people per square kilometer.³³ The low population density helps to explain the lower level of devastation to the region compared with Rwanda. With a lower population density, the target groups are more spread out and therefore more difficult for the *Janjaweed* militias to reach.

Another way to judge the effects of the genocide on the country is through the economic devastation to the infrastructure and economy. When comparing the GDP per capita before and after the genocide, it is clear that the genocide in Darfur has not been as destructive to the economy as that in Rwanda. Since economic statistics for Darfur itself were not available, statistics for all of Sudan will have to be used instead. In Sudan, the GDP per capita in 2001 was \$1,420 and \$2,100 in 2005.³⁴ Despite the conflicts in the South and in Darfur, the Sudanese economy has continued to increase. Compared to the GDP per capita in Rwanda, which has basically not changed from 1993 to 1995, the Darfur genocide seems to have had a weaker impact on the economic situation of the country, which can also be judged by looking at the GDP real growth rate, as done

³¹ Ibid.

³² <<http://www.sudantribune.com>> 2005.

³³ Cf. <<http://www.sudan.net>> 1997.

³⁴ Back-issues of the CIA Factbook 2003 with statistics from 2002 can be found at <<http://www.bartleby.com/>> and the CIA Factbook 2006 with statistics from 2005 can be found at <<http://www.cia.gov/>> 2006b.

in the previous section. As shown there, the GDP real growth rate is significantly higher in Sudan than in Rwanda.

The economic impact can also be judged by evaluating the destruction to the state. According to estimates by Professor Eric Reeves, who has done fieldwork in Darfur, some areas of Darfur have seen 70-99% of the villages completely destroyed by the *Janjaweed* militia.³⁵ Nevertheless, the destruction seems to be unevenly spread throughout Darfur. In 2004, northern Darfur villages were attacked more frequently by bombing raids whereas in southern and western Darfur, militias were more often used to drive people out of their homes.³⁶ Using satellite technology to monitor areas of Western Darfur between March 2003 and May 2004, Amnesty International estimates that the militias have destroyed 44% of the Fur and Masalit villages.³⁷ To give an idea of how many villages have actually been affected, Flint estimates that between 700 to 2,000 villages have been destroyed (either in part or in whole) through militia raids (Flint 2005: 112). Even though it is now slightly outdated, USAID created a map of Darfur depicting all of the destroyed and damaged villages in August 2004 (see Table 6). At that time, USAID believed 395 villages had been destroyed and 121 damaged.³⁸ As is apparent from the map, most of the villages were in southwest Darfur. Usually the militias practice a scorched earth policy, which means that they burn, loot, and pillage everything in their path. In other words, the *Janjaweed* typically leaves behind significant destruction including burning all the crops of Darfur farmers. The farmers are then left with no possibility of livelihood or economic prosperity for the future. Although the Rwandan genocide also resulted in great destruction, the perpetrators simply did not have enough time to cause the amount of destruction seen in Darfur. Furthermore, because Hutus and Tutsis were relatively well integrated in Rwanda before the genocides, Hutu perpetrators had no incentive to destroy whole cities because they would also be destroying their own city at the same time. Despite the fact that the physical destruction seems to have been just as devastating in Rwanda and Darfur, it is the author's opinion that if the Rwandan genocide had lasted longer, it would have destroyed more infra-

³⁵ <<http://www.sudanreeves.org>> 2006.

³⁶ <<http://www.hrw.org>> 2004a, p. 15.

³⁷ <<http://www.amnesty.org>> 2004c, p. 2.

³⁸ <<http://www.usaid.gov/>> 2004.

structure and caused even greater economic destruction than what we have witnessed in Darfur. Furthermore, Rwanda was more developed than Darfur before the genocides.

Finally, the Darfur genocide can be evaluated by the destruction it has caused to the surrounding region. Since the genocide is still ongoing, it is difficult to say for certain what the long-term effects will be. Nevertheless, so far, the genocide has not appeared to have the same major destabilizing effect that was seen in the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. Although there are thousands of Darfur refugees in Chad, they have not caused massive destabilization so far, although there are some indications that may happen. Recent news articles have reported that the *Janjaweed* is crossing the border into Chad and continuing to attack refugees.³⁹ Furthermore, there are reports that the refugees are also being driven back into Darfur because of attacks from Chadian rebel groups (who some say are coordinating with the *Janjaweed*), and when they return to Darfur, they risk attacks from the *Janjaweed* once again (Quist-Arcton 2006). Ethnic tensions between Africans and Arabs in Chad have been flaring up because of the violence in Darfur.⁴⁰ In part this ethnic tension is due to the fact that Arab militias from Darfur have crossed over the boarder and attacked some Masalit groups in Chad.⁴¹ Some articles suggest that the Chadian government itself is in danger of collapse: “The FUCD (The United Front for Democratic Change) is seeking to overthrow President Idriss Deby, who seized power in 1990 after launching a rebellion from bases in Darfur.”⁴² In fact, recently the Chadian government announced that it successfully averted an attempt by rebel groups, supported by Darfur groups, to overthrow the government.⁴³ This is, however, a claim that Sudan denies. Most likely, the true extent of destabilization to the region will only become apparent after the conflict is resolved.

From these statistics, it becomes even more apparent that Darfur represents *selective* rather than *total genocide*. While the conflict was spread throughout all of Rwanda, in Sudan, the violence is concentrated in just one area. In addition, the violence in Darfur has still resulted in few casualties, fewer killed in terms of the percentage of the target group, fewer refugees, and fewer needing humanitarian aid. Darfur

³⁹ <<http://www.hrw.org>> 2006.

⁴⁰ <<http://www.hrw.org>> 2004, p. 38.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 40.

⁴² <<http://news.bbc.co.uk>> 2006c.

⁴³ <<http://news.bbc.co.uk>> 2006b.

therefore represents a different type of genocide from the Rwandan genocide because of the social effects and the economic impacts on both the country itself and the region.

5. Explanations for Variations in Genocide

Having already considered the dependent variable (the outcome of the genocides), I will now study the independent variable (the causes for the genocides). The causes will hopefully explain the differences between the types of genocide. Thirteen main structural reasons have been identified as causes for the Rwandan genocide, which correspond to thirteen main structural explanations for the Darfur genocide. These structural causes should be understood more as “correlates of genocide,” instead of absolute causes. These factors make a genocide more likely, but they do not directly cause the outbreak. It is clear that some of the structural causes of genocide are also very common factors of underdevelopment, and that they do not necessarily have to lead to the outbreak of genocide. The direct causes, however, are those factors that are responsible for the outbreak of the genocide. Unlike the structural causes, the direct causes differ between the Rwandan and the Darfur genocides. Books could, and have, been written about these different causes, but for the purposes of this paper, only a short overview will be given. It is more important in this research not to try to uncover all the causes of the genocides in general, but rather to try to understand which factors have caused the differences between these two genocides. For an overview of the structural and direct causes of genocide for both cases, see *Table 2: Explaining the Structural Causes of Rwanda and Darfur* in the Appendix.

5.1 Case Study: Rwanda

5.1.1 An Overview of the Conflict

What has often been called simply an “ethnic conflict” and left at that is, in reality, much more complex and multidimensional. In fact, I will argue that, like Darfur, race only became an issue in Rwanda after it was manipulated by colonialists and politicians. Three main ethnic groups can be found in Rwanda: Twa (1%), Tutsi (15%), and Hutu (84%). Scholars have long debated about whether these groups are actually distinct ethnic groups or not. Hutus were known for being short and having flat noses, while the Tutsis were historically characterized as being tall and having long noses. This distinction, however, can hardly be relied upon because, as witnessed during the

genocide, there were sometimes accidental deaths where Hutus were killed instead of Tutsis since they were mistaken for Tutsis or were incorrectly registered (Mukimbi 2005: 827-828). The role of colonialism in shaping ethnic identities is crucial to consider and will be discussed in greater length in the next sections. The genocide of 1994 was unfortunately not the first time that mass killings occurred in the history of Rwanda, but it was the only massacre to have been given the label “genocide.” Although there was some violence before, the genocides officially began on April 6, 1994 when an airplane carrying Burundi’s president and the Hutu President Habyarimana was shot down under what are still to this day mysterious circumstances. This was the trigger event which finally destroyed all the remaining hopes that the Arusha Accords, which were negotiated after the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attack in 1990, could successfully quell the violence between the government militias and rebel groups. The RPF was a Tutsi rebel group who were Rwandan refugees who lived in Uganda for many years. They attacked Rwanda in 1990 to gain more rights and to fight for the place of Tutsis in Rwandan society.

5.1.2 Parties to Genocide

The genocide is particularly complicated because of the number of parties involved. The parties are ethnically organized, but they were also fighting for their political aspirations. The Tutsi victims were mainly civilians, although some were members of the rebel group, the RPF, which invaded Rwanda in 1990. The RPF was formed from the Tutsi rebel group which gathered its support base in Uganda. Some believe the Ugandan government was also backing them, although Uganda officially denied the claim.⁴⁴ The RPF was fighting for political rights and recognition of Rwandan refugees. When the Rwandan genocide is studied, it is usually always implied that Tutsis were the victims in the conflict. Nevertheless, some studies have started to analyze the role of Tutsis as perpetrators of genocide. Philip Verwimp questions the role of Tutsis during the genocide and tests the theory that a double genocide might have occurred during the 1994 massacre (Verwimp 2003: 423-442). However, he concludes that while a significant number of Hutus died as a result of the Tutsi rebel forces, it is not comparable to

⁴⁴ Cf. Adelman 1999: 42-44, Uganda is believed to have supplied some weapons to the rebels. Cf. also Newbury 1995: 16.

the numbers of Tutsi deaths at the hands of Hutus and therefore cannot constitute “genocide.”

On the side of the Hutu perpetrators, one of the most significant parties to the genocide was the *Interahamwe*, a youth group before the genocides, but during the massacres, it played the role of the state militia. In addition, the Rwandan army, the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) played an important role in coordinating the *Interahamwe* and the Hutu civilians who participated in the genocides. Hutu civilians were an important force for the genocide, and they were often persuaded to participate because of threats to themselves and their families as well as lies and pressure from the media, which will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections.

5.1.3 Structural Causes for Genocide

The structural causes for genocide can be divided into economic, social, political and historical factors which played a role in causing the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Some of these causes could, understandably, be classified in more than one category, and the factors especially could overlap between economic and social factors. The first economic factor to consider as one of the causes of the 1994 genocide was land and food scarcity. Burdened by a high birth rate, overpopulation, and one of the highest population densities in the world, Rwanda has always been short of land and food. Agriculture was one of the primary sources of income for the majority of the population, but land was in great demand. Famine was a regular phenomenon in Rwanda, occurring from 1928 to 1929, in 1943, in the 1980s, and again, in the 1990s, right before the genocide. In addition, because many crops were destroyed during the genocides, and farmers were not able to plant, there was a great food shortage after the genocides as well. Deeply influenced by Thomas Malthus, Jared Diamond believes that the exponentially increasing population demands were too great for the existing supply of land and food in Rwanda, thus making the country vulnerable to genocide: “Population growth proceeds exponentially, while food production increases only arithmetically” (Diamond 2005: 312). The population pressure and population density were extra pressures that compounded the already difficult land and food shortages.

A second economic factor which certainly helped to cause the Rwandan genocide was the economic crisis of 1989. When the export prices of coffee radically dropped, the Rwandan economy and the Rwandan state were devastated. Although cof-

fee was the hardest struck export item, prices for tin, another important product, also plummeted soon afterwards. It was at this already vulnerable time that the World Bank decided that reforms must be implemented. As part of these reforms, the currency was reduced, which had a devastating effect on the people (Hintjens 1999: 257). Since the Tutsis and not the Hutus were typically the traders and the merchants in society, they received the blame for the drop in Rwanda's economy, even though the reasons for the decline were actually external and not internal.

In addition, although Rwanda was sometimes nicknamed the "Switzerland of Africa" before the genocide because of its highly esteemed organization and potential for development, it was in no way excluded from the cycle of poverty that can be found in most sub-Saharan countries. Nevertheless, before the genocides, most Rwandans even in rural areas had access to drinking water, health care, and even education (Hintjens 2001: 256). Still the poverty level dramatically increased in the years leading up to the genocide. According to the IMF, 40% of Rwandans were below the poverty line in 1985, but it had increased to 53% by 1993.⁴⁵ The economic reforms previously discussed delivered a great financial blow to many Rwandans.

The last economic factor – environmental degradation – could also be considered a social factor because of the way it affected Rwandans. Environmental problems were clearly linked to a decline in food supplies, as mentioned previously: "...food production had been seriously hampered by periodic drought, overgrazing, soil exhaustion, soil erosion, war and the abrupt, often forced, migration of people" (Magnarella 2005: 2).

The first social issue causing the genocide is intricately linked to the previous economic factors. Because of its scarcity in Rwanda, land was becoming a precious commodity, and families started to argue about who would inherit the land. Sons demanded their own land, eventually breaking up the family plot into smaller and smaller pieces.⁴⁶ Women were especially at risk because they were left out of the ownership fights altogether. This fighting led to social fragmentation and decay in the old system of social order. Social order was previously extremely important in Rwanda. With the

⁴⁵ <<http://www.imf.org>> 2000.

⁴⁶ Cf. Diamond 2005: 323, "...land disputes undermined the cohesion of Rwandan society's traditional fabric."

decay of this social system, the norms for acceptable social behavior were similarly breaking down.

Another social factor which fomented the possibility for genocide was the inequality between Hutus and Tutsis.⁴⁷ Under Belgian and German colonization, the Tutsis were chosen as the ruling class and the superior race because of their “Caucasian” features (Hintjens 2001: 29). For this reason, the colonial powers left the Tutsis to rule and actually did not even interfere that much in Rwandan society. The colonial powers are certainly not completely innocent, though. While some inequalities existed before the 1950s, the colonial powers strengthened inequalities, domination and hatred that already partly existed (Kressel 1996: 98-99). After years of preferred treatment, Tutsis generally were better educated, had more personal wealth, and livestock (which were very valuable commodities). Under colonialism, a lord-client relationship developed which was called *buhake*, in which lords were typically Tutsis and clients, Hutus. This system kept Hutus in a constantly inferior position in society. Neil Kressel argues that the long history of inequality seen in Rwanda created feelings of resentment and anger against Tutsis (Kressel 1996: 114).

One of the most important and controversial social factors, at least in the eyes of scholars, is “ethnic hatred,” as demonstrated by the slanderous messages of Hutu Power Ideology. Hutu Ideology was embodied in the *Hutu Ten Commandments*, which was published in 1990 and outlined how Hutus should treat Tutsis. The last commandment was one of the most powerful, since it required that the ideology be taught to all Hutus, and it condemned Hutus who tried to prevent the spread of Hutu ideology.⁴⁸ I will argue in this work that the conflict was much less about ethnic hatred than is often claimed. While it is believed to have had a compounding effect on the other structural causes, it is not seen as one of the most important structural causes of genocide. Hintjens agrees that explanations built solely on ethnic explanations are weak: “such identities may be printed on people’s papers, or may dominate people’s perceptions of a conflict situation, but they cannot in and of themselves be the root cause of conflict or violence” (Hintjens 1999: 251). While it is heavily debated whether ethnic conflict existed before colonialism or not, scholars agree on the fact that colonialists played an important role on solidi-

⁴⁷ For a general reference about the connection between inequality and genocide, see Besançon 2005.

⁴⁸ Cf. Power 2002: 339.

fyng either ethnic tensions or conflict.⁴⁹ In addition, the killings of Hutus in Burundi vilified the Tutsis and helped to instigate the Hutu Power rhetoric which spurred on the genocide.

The political marginalization of Hutus for many years during colonization (and possibly also before) similarly built up feelings of resentment and anger against the Tutsis. Particularly because the Hutu were in the majority, they felt it was their right to be in power. It is debated, however, whether the separation between the ethnicities did not begin even before European colonization, possibly even starting as far back as 1860, when King Rwabugiri employed many Tutsis and created laws discriminating against Hutus (Magnarella 2005: 3). Later under colonization, Hutus were significantly marginalized in all aspects of life, including in their political and social possibilities.

Another political reason for the genocide was that the Rwandan government was loosing its footing and felt its control slipping away. Faced with serious problems including a crippled economy, increased poverty, less food and land, this one-party system had all the power, but did not know how to solve the problems. In addition, there was a growing rift between President Habyarimana, who wanted to implement democratic reforms under pressure from the international community and others in his party who believed he was becoming too liberal. This division might have cost him his life.⁵⁰ However, in the face of the threat from the RPF invasion, the party became even more unstable and uncertain and insecure of its ability to maintain power.

An age-old political problem, sometimes having devastating effects on stability, is the “bad neighbors” problem. Burundi had often interfered in the affairs of its neighbor, and refugees fled back and forth across the border, fleeing one conflict or another on either side. For thirty years, between 1960 and 1990, the two were mirror image societies, and when Hutus were in power in Rwanda, Tutsis controlled Burundi. The conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi played off of one another, creating destabilization and what Hintjens named a “cycle of what might be described as pre-emptive, internalised retaliation was thus established between the two neighbouring regimes, directed at

⁴⁹ This is a highly debated point, and there are two strains in the literature concerning the debate. Prunier believes that relations between Hutus and Tutsis were relatively peaceful until colonization, cf. Prunier 1995: 39. Other scholars argue that there were conflicts between Tutsis and Hutus before colonization, and that colonialists simply reinforced what was already there, cf. Magnarella 2005: 3. For an overview of the debate, refer to Kuperman 2001: 5.

⁵⁰ It is still unclear who or which group was responsible for his assassination, although many claim that it was actually his inside group of friends and family, and not Tutsi rebel groups. Cf. Prunier 1995: 166.

domestic populations but prompted by reactions to each other's national politics" (Hintjens 1999: 279). In fact, Rwanda had a major refugee (mainly Tutsis) problem in the years leading up to the genocide. Many of the refugees were discontent because they were not allowed to return to Rwanda since it did not have enough space, and so they were also politically ignored. The situation was so desperate because there were over 1.5 million refugees in 1980. One of these disgruntled refugee groups would later form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which would attack Rwanda from Uganda in 1990.

Another political factor to be considered is the role of the outside world, and particularly the western countries, in the genocide. After colonialism, Rwanda was left on its own, and outside countries did not interfere too much with their affairs. Besides supplying weapons and arms to the country, western countries in particular played a very small role in Rwandan politics. The UNAMIR troops, which were in Rwanda at the time to enforce the Arusha Accords, pulled out most of their staff at the beginning of the genocide. They only began to form a new operation when it was too late, in July 1994. In April 1994, at the height of the genocide, the UNAMIR pulled out all its troops except about 500, which when calculated is about 0.018 troops per square kilometer.⁵¹ Although the mission was supposed to pull out all but 270 of its troops, it managed to keep 503 in the country. In particular, Great Britain and France were some of the most influential outside countries. The fight between Great Britain and France for the cultural future of Africa explained the greatest involvement of outside powers in the Rwandan genocide. While England supported the Anglophone Tutsis, France backed the Hutus. The French were particularly involved in Rwanda because they wanted to preserve the Francophone tradition since it was a former Belgian colony. When the RPF attacked in 1990, France was quick to show its support of the government by sending 350 troops, which were supplementary to the troops from Belgium and Zaire. Unlike the troops from the other two countries, the French troops stayed for years after the initial threat was over. France used the troops to exert its power in Rwanda; sometimes threatening to withdraw them (which could have been devastating for the Rwandan government) if Rwanda did not do as France wished (e.g. France emphasized the need for Habyarimana to carry out democratic reforms). Occasionally France even reinforced its troops, as it

⁵¹ On April 21, 1994, the UNAMIR reduced its troops from 2,548 to 503. See <<http://www.un.org>> 2006. The troops per square kilometer calculation was obtained by dividing 500 troops by the number of square km. in Rwanda.

did in 1993 when it sent 240 additional troops (Kuperman 2001: 10). After the genocide started, the French started Operation Turquoise, which the French claim saved the lives of thousands, but many criticize it for protecting Hutus and blocking the RPF. It began operations on June 23rd, 1994, but by this time, the most intensive spurt of killings was already finished. The operation was largely meant to be a humanitarian one, and not for peacekeeping. The French have also been criticized for helping to train and support the Hutus and the national army, including supplying weapons to them as late as May 1994 (Adelman 1999: 283-284). As we now know, this political isolation, denial, and partisan intervention from the outside world proved devastating in the long-run.

Turning to historical reasons for the possibility for genocide, it is important to not only consider the role of outside countries, but also of the former colonial powers in particular. Germany and Belgium played a great part in strengthening the differences that already existed between the ethnicities. When Belgium controlled Rwanda from 1916 to 1959, it strengthened the gap between Hutus and Tutsis by creating identity cards in 1926. These identity cards were instrumental to the genocides because they allowed Tutsis to be easily identified and separated from Hutus. Although the division between Hutu and Tutsi was an economic one at the time, it gradually turned into an ethnic difference.⁵² Secondly, Belgium's colonialism changed the way that Hutus and Tutsis thought of themselves. Because the Tutsis' position in society had been greatly supported and encouraged by the Belgian colonialists, they came to believe in Tutsi superiority (Adelman 1999: 38). This feeling of superiority would be devastating for them and created resentment and a sense of wrongdoing when Hutus took control of the country when Belgium switched its favored group from Tutsis to Hutus in the late 1950s. Even after colonialism, Belgium continued to play a role in Rwandan affairs. After the RPF attack in 1990, Belgium sent 540 troops to support the government of Habyarimana (Kuperman 2001: 9). It eventually pulled out these troops because of worries of former colonial interests, but not before the Rwandan government had already received significant support in its fight against the rebels.

⁵² The measuring factor at that time was said to be the number of cows a person owned. The owner of 10 cows was lucky enough to be Hutu, while the owner of less was a Hutu, cf. Magnarella 2005: 7.

A second historical cause of the Rwandan genocide is the history of conflict in the country.⁵³ The past history of conflict was one reason why outside forces were reluctant to intervene, thinking it was just another periodic flare-up in violence. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State at the time was even told by her advisors on Rwanda that: “these people do this from time to time” (Power 2002: 351). Prunier argues wars of expansion were actually quite common in pre-colonial times, but not between ethnic groups (Prunier 1995: 14). Although it is greatly debated whether there were conflicts between the ethnicities before colonialism, there are ample examples of conflicts afterwards between Tutsis and Hutus. In 1959, a revolution not only threw out the Belgian colonialists, but it also brought the Hutus to power and caused some of the Tutsis to flee for their lives, while many others were killed (Newbury 1995: 12). Under Tutsi President Kayibanda, who came to power after independence, there were thousands of Hutu killings. In 1961, a total of 22,000 Tutsis were displaced and fled mostly to Uganda (Prunier 1995: 53). Then in 1973, as Hutu President Habyarimana took power, thousands of Tutsis again left Rwanda because they feared the one-party government. In addition, in the years leading up to the genocide, there were also killings of Tutsis in Rwanda out of revenge for the RPF Tutsi attack in 1990. Large scale massacres then began to occur as early as 1992 where 300 Tutsis were killed by peasants who had been encouraged to kill by local administrators (Prunier 1995: 137). It is therefore clear that a history of conflict between the ethnic groups can at least be traced back to Rwanda’s independence from Belgium.

5.1.4 Direct Causes for Genocide

Turning to the direct causes for genocide in Rwanda, in other words, the causes that actually contributed to the outbreak of the conflict, it is clear that the Rwandan genocide was multi-dimensional. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in section 5.3, there are some causes which are more important than others, and section 5.3 will also try to isolate the factors which caused the Rwandan genocide to be a *total* instead of a *selective* conflict.

According to Jared Diamond, the extremely high population density in Rwanda was a major factor that helped spark the genocide (Diamond 2005: 328). Catherine

⁵³ For more information about the importance of conflict as a precursor to genocide in general, refer to Krain 1997 and Midlarsky 2005: 4.

André and Jean-Phillipe Platteau even claim that this was not even an unconscious decision, but rather fully realized by the people: “It is not rare, even today, to hear Rwandans argue that a war is necessary to wipe out an excess of population and to bring numbers into line with the available land resources” (André and Platteau 1998: 42). Although politicians were the ones who made the decision to start the genocide, the people clearly were willing to participate and thought it necessary to eliminate the very high population density. The high population density certainly has played a role in the unprecedented civilian participation, which will be discussed later.

Secondly, the authoritarian structure of Rwandan society played a large role in directly causing the *total genocide*. Around the time of the genocide, the authoritarian control over the country was staggering. People followed the strict hierarchy in all aspects of their lives. Starting in 1974, Rwandans were required to do unpaid, weekly community service called *umuganda*. This mandatory community service is just one example of how Rwandans were accustomed to hierarchy, and how they usually tended to obey. Verwimp believes that the practice of *umuganda* was very instrumental to the future genocide because the government gained experience in organizing people for a “common good”, and the people became used to this work as well (Verwimp 2001: 65). The hierarchy stretched into all aspects of life in Rwanda. At the time of the genocide, farmers could even be fined when caught growing the wrong crops (Hintjens 1999: 270). There were general curfews, and moving to another community was only allowed with permission (ibid). Even in pre-colonial times, Rwanda proudly boasted about its rigid social structure. Magnarella summarizes the problems with such a strict system: “the social organization of much of pre-colonial Rwanda took the form of a caste or very rigid class structure with limited social mobility” (Magnarella 2005: 5). Understanding the authoritarian structure in Rwanda also helps to explain why civilian participation played such an important role in the Rwandan genocide, as will be discussed later in this section.

The significant refugee problem played a larger role in the genocide than is often believed. A year after President Habyarimana took office in 1961, 7,652 Tutsis fled Rwanda to Uganda (Adelman 1999: 8). Because Rwanda was overpopulated even after the refugee exodus, it refused rights to those who had left and also did not allow those refugees to return. Uganda similarly turned its back on these refugees after realizing that

the refugees intended to stay in the country long term, even though its relationship with the refugees started out well. This isolationist policy left many refugees resenting Rwanda, which eventually was the main reason why the RPF was formed in the 1970s and successfully crossed back over the border into Rwanda in 1990 in an all out attack.

The flight of Tutsis to Uganda brings us to our next point, which is that the 1990 RPF invasion posed an immediate threat to the Rwandan government. These forces were prepared to march on Kigali and take over the government, whereas in Sudan the threat from rebel groups active in Darfur and not in Khartoum was much more distant. In Darfur, the rebel groups were attacking government-owned property, such as airports. In Rwanda, however, the government felt immediately threatened and started to heavily militarize, as will be discussed in the next section. The threat felt by the government will be discussed in greater detail in section 6.3.

The Rwandan government's dramatic militarization starting after the 1990 RPF invasion is an important precursor to the conflict. According to Adelman, in 1970, the government spent 2.5% of its budget on the military, compared to a hefty 25% by 1992 (Adelman 1999: 191). Immediately before the genocide, the government started to invest in arms and weapons (Hintjens 1999: 257). In particular, France started equipping the Rwandan army with arms as early as 1975 and continued until 1992 (Adelman 1999: 158-160). The cheap availability of weapons for the army, militias and civilians alike also directly contributed to the outbreak of violence. According to Catherine Newbury, in 1993, grenades were available to everyone in the Rwandan street markets for just a few dollars each (Newbury 1995: 14). Some perpetrators did not even bother to buy weapons. Instead, they relied on household items such as screwdrivers, hammers and even bicycle handlebars (Power 2002: 334). Still, machetes were also commonly available, and these were the main weapon of choice for Hutu militia members and civilians. There were so many machetes in the country in the two years leading up to the genocide, that one report found there was one machete for every third adult male Hutu in 1992.⁵⁴ The wide-spread availability of weapons plus media provocation proved to be a lethal combination.

Media propaganda is one of the most famous causes for the genocide in Rwanda, and it has been the subject of great scholarly interest. In particular, the Radio des Mille-

⁵⁴ Cf. IMF Rwanda Briefing Paper May 14, 1992: *Article IV Consultations and Discussions on a Second Annual Arrangement*.

Collines (RTL), run by the President's supporters, was the main source for extremist propaganda. Not only was the radio calling upon and threatening Hutus to act, but it also "claimed that Tutsis were killing Hutus in horribly brutal ways, and the radio described their deaths in graphic detail. There was no distinction between civilian Tutsis and the rebel Tutsis" (Kellow 1998: 121). More than anything, these lies had a powerful effect on Hutus. Radio and television were especially effective in Rwanda because of an oral tradition of telling stories and because of the high illiteracy rate. In addition, the wide-spread use of radios by 1990, where one Rwandan in 13 owned a radio, allowed the hate propaganda to be spread easily (Chrétien et al 1995: 57). Furthermore, these radios were often shared, so that even people who did not own a radio could listen to the hate messages, and sometimes even if they were unwilling, soldiers played the radio so loudly that the whole neighbourhood could hear (Chrétien et al 1995: 119).

While the Rwandan domestic media was very much focused on the genocides happening within Rwanda, the international media was distracted by a variety of different topics, including the O.J. Simpson trial in the United States, the South African elections, and the Bosnian genocide.⁵⁵ The very limited coverage at the beginning of the genocide assumed that the violence was just a re-emergence of an old civil war in Rwanda, and the few reports that were produced were just focused on the violence in Kigali, although it was spread throughout the country (Kuperman 2000). In addition, the media which was stationed in Rwanda had to leave at the beginning of the genocide because of the danger posed by the violence. Then they came back when it was already too late, at which point the genocide was almost finished.

Furthermore, although there was already a structure in place for solving violence after the 1990 RPF invasion, i.e. the 1993 Arusha Accords, many authors point out the failures of the peace agreement as another cause for the genocide. The Accords were supposed to solve the grave problem of the thousands of Rwandan refugees abroad, whose disenfranchisement had in part caused the formation of the RPF. In fact, the refugee problem had grown so large that Prunier estimates that there were around 600,000-700,000 Rwandan refugees by 1990 (Prunier 1995: 63). Nevertheless, the agreement did not clarify exactly how these refugees would be accommodated back in Rwanda, considering the existing land, food and resource shortages. The agreement had

⁵⁵ Cf. Barnett 2002: 150.

two important provisions. The first was focused on creating a new cease-fire because the previous cease-fire in March 1991 was a great failure. Secondly, the Accords addressed the need to establish a new transitional government and a peacekeeping force. However, the planned timeframe of 37 days was simply not realistic (Adelman 1999: 144). A second striking critique of the Accords is that when combining the Rwandan army and the RPF army, soldiers who were laid off were given no alternative employment. Therefore, frustrations grew among former soldiers. For these reasons, Adelman argues that although the negotiation procedure was successful, the outcome of the Arusha Accords failed (Adelman 1999: 132). There were other problems with the Accords as well. Many criticize Habyarimana for turning over too much power to the RPF, which would receive a certain number of allocated seats in Parliament (Newbury 1995: 15). Others believe Habyarimana and his close cabinet did not take the Accords seriously enough, instead treating the Agreement more like a “piece of paper” instead of a treaty (Taylor 2002: 145).

In the same year, President Ndadye of Burundi, a Hutu, was assassinated. The act was believed to have been carried out by the Tutsi army. As a result, 400,000 refugees fled across the border into Rwanda (Newbury 1995: 16), thus straining the already thinly stretched infrastructure and government of Rwanda. In addition, the Hutu President’s assassination helped to bolster and justify the claims of the Hutus at the start of the 1994 genocide.

Another direct cause of the genocides which must be considered is manipulation of civilians. Politicians manipulated Hutus, who probably otherwise would not have participated in the genocides. In 1992 and 1993, politicians held rallies in different cities in the days leading up to the genocides. These rallies held the specific purpose of promoting hatred between the ethnicities. Furthermore, they often created false news stories in order to awaken the willingness and sympathy of the Hutus. One of the fake news stories they told, for example, was that Kigali was under attack from Tutsis (Hintjens 1999: 267). The differences between Hutus and Tutsis gave the politicians an opportunity for manipulation: “Identities can be manipulated to sever social connections and forms of solidarity, whether within families and neighbourhoods, or within institutions such as schools, hospitals, churches and work places” (Hintjens 2001: 43).

One of the most important direct causes of the genocide was the civilian participation. We can categorize civilian participation into two main forms: that of complicity and that of active participation. Those civilians who knew about the genocide but were complicit, either because they were scared or felt threatened, should still be considered as participating in genocide. Nevertheless, as Arne Vetlesen argues, there are some bystanders who are more responsible than others (Vetlesen 2000: 523). Vetlesen believes that there are some bystanders who are more capable of acting (*bystanders by assignment* compared to *passive bystanders*), and these carry more of the responsibility to act than others (Vetlesen 2000: 520). An example of a bystander by assignment would be a U.N. monitoring team, whereas a passive bystander would be a civilian who is aware of the genocide but does nothing to stop it. While complicit civilian participation has occurred in most countries where genocide has taken place, active civilian participation is much rarer since state actors are more typically the principal perpetrators. In Rwanda, however, there have been many counts of active civilian participation, as Philip Gourevitch recalls in his book *We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow we will be Killed with our Families: Stories from Rwanda*. Gourevitch describes citizen participation in the genocide when recalling an attack on Mugonero, a small Rwandan town, where Hutu attackers were even targeting those who had taken refuge in a local church: “The attackers began to break down the doors and to kill, shooting and throwing grenades. The two policemen who had been our protectors were now attackers. The local citizenry also helped. Those who had no guns had machetes or *masus*” [*Masus* are clubs with nails attached to them] (Gourevitch 1999: 29). Some of the most disturbing examples of civilian participation can be found in stories of neighbors attacking neighbors and families attacking other family members. Even clergy were known to have participated in the genocide (Longman 2001: 156). Civilians were motivated to participate because they or their families were often threatened if they did not. However, they were also offered positive incentives, such as free alcohol, meat, looting, property, and money (Verwimp 2001: 75).

The trigger cause of the 1994 genocide was the assassination of Hutu President Habyarimana on April 6th, 1994. Although the Tutsis were immediately blamed for the assassination, in reality, many now believe that Hutu extremists were behind it and that “the genocide had been meticulously planned by the Hutu extremists who set it in mo-

tion within an hour of the President's death" (Gourevitch 1999: 39). Nevertheless, it is the author's opinion that even if a different trigger cause had been used instead of the assassination of the President, the genocide had been carefully planned and was bound to happen with or without the assassination of the President. However, without the consent of the President, it was difficult for Hutu extremists to carry out their plans for a genocide.

5.2 Case Study: Darfur

5.2.1 An Overview of the Conflict

Sudan has been crippled by civil war violence for many years. In fact, the North-South conflict has finally been resolved after more than 20 years of fighting, but the reasons and background for this conflict are very different from the separate conflict which has been raging in Darfur for the past three years. In Darfur, Arab government-sponsored militias have attacked civilians from the Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa ethnic groups in Darfur in a systematic way since February 2003. The genocide is said to have begun in February of 2003 when rebel groups in the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) took over the town of Gulu, in Jebel Marra, which is in central Darfur. In particular, they attacked government buildings and property, including a military aircraft. Despite several ceasefires, in September of 2003 and another in April of 2004, the violence between the rebel groups, government militias and African civilians has continued. The conflict will be discussed in greater detail in the section outlining the causes for the conflict.

5.2.2 Parties to Genocide

There are primarily three ethnic parties involved in perpetrating the current genocide in Darfur. Like the Rwandan parties, the Sudanese parties are also motivated mainly by political and economic hopes although organized according to ethnicity. The rebels are mainly motivated by political and economic gain, while the government militias are mainly interested in the economic gain from the land and looting possibilities. On the side of the perpetrators, the main party is the *Janjaweed* militia, which is the unofficial militia of the Sudanese government. The militia has gained strength because of environmental changes, which started in the 1970s. With the increasing desertifica-

tion in eastern Chad and northern Darfur, nomads pushed into Southern Sudan. The Fur farmers, in particular, were not glad to see more competition for their ever scarcer land. In some cases they even blocked Arab nomads from using their land, even though in the past they had shared it with each other for certain times of the year (Flint 2005: 35). While some gave up their nomadic ways for a more traditional farming lifestyle, others “were ready conscripts to rapacious militias” (Flint 2005: 47). The *Janjaweed* is composed of around 20,000 soldiers, and men were attracted to the *Janjaweed* because they were promised a horse, loot, money, and most importantly, impunity by the government (Flint 2005: 64). New recruits are often drawn to the militia by the salary, which is \$100-\$400 as an initial recruitment payment, followed by \$100 monthly.⁵⁶ By October 2003, the *Janjaweed* was attacking civilians far more frequently than rebel groups, claiming that they are trying to weaken the rebels’ bases (Flint 2005: 104). The militia has been the most common force to be used in Darfur because the government can effectively deny its support of the group while ordering it to do its will.⁵⁷ Although the Khartoum government has occasionally promised to disarm the militias, some sources report that it has instead absorbed *Janjaweed* members into police forces.⁵⁸ This is clearly a disturbing development because police forces are supposed to protect civilians, but the *Janjaweed* now has extensive experience in attacking them.

While the official Sudanese militia, the Popular Defence Force (PDF) has not played much of a role in the genocide, the Sudanese army has. The *Janjaweed* has been working together with the Sudanese army to totally destroy villages in Darfur. Some charge that the Sudanese government should know exactly what is going on in Darfur since government troops always come into villages and leave with the *Janjaweed*.⁵⁹ While the *Janjaweed* raids, loots, and kills, the army bombs the village from the sky (Flint 2005: 107). Often the army drops metal shrapnel from the planes, which is very imprecise, but it tends to have a devastating effect on the civilians and villages below.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the government denies any connection to the *Janjaweed*, but refugees from Darfur continue to tell the same story that the two are connected, and organizations such as Human Rights Watch claim they have official government papers outlin-

⁵⁶ <<http://www.hrw.org>> 2004a, p. 24.

⁵⁷ Cf. <<http://www.hrw.org>> 2005.

⁵⁸ <<http://www.hrw.org>> 2004c.

⁵⁹ <<http://www.hrw.org>> 2004b, p. 9.

⁶⁰ <<http://www.amnesty.org>> 2004a.

ing the relationship.⁶¹ In Rwanda, we also saw the lethal combination of the army working together with a militia to commit genocide. This pattern could be another indicator of an impending genocide.

The third party involved in this genocide is the rebel groups. One of the groups was the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), but it was later renamed the SLA, one part of the SLM. The rebels in this group were fighting to meet a wide variety of demands. Some, like the Masalit, joined the rebel movement as a last resort because their cities had always been underdeveloped, and now they were forced to leave their land because of the push from Arab nomads (Flint 2005: 68). Others joined the rebel group for personal reasons. Those who had seen the Arab militias destroy their villages and murder their relatives were motivated by revenge. Still others joined to try to defend their (intact) villages against Arab militias. Today, the SLA is composed of about 11,000 men (Flint 2005: 85). The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is another rebel group in Darfur, but it has much more structure than the SLA. The JEM even has a General Congress, an Executive Board, etc. While the SLA has focused mainly on the problems in Darfur, the JEM hopes to make their campaign a Sudan-wide fight. Another difference is the focus of the groups: while the JEM emphasizes its political presence, the SLA concentrates on its military forces.

5.2.3 Structural Causes for Genocide

There are thirteen important economic, social, political and historical structural causes which helped to lay the groundwork for genocide in Darfur. As we saw in Rwanda, one of the most important factors is food and land shortages. There have been several intense famines in the last century, including one in 1913 and one lasting from 1984 to 1985.⁶² The latter famine killed up to 95,000 people in what was later to be called a “preventable famine” (Prunier 2005: 56). The Khartoum government refused to acknowledge or mitigate the problem. Part of the problem with food production in Sudan is due to the fact that the agricultural system is skewed because the government often allots huge plots of land to farmers who do not even live in the area (Suliman 2001: 54). The remaining land is then divided among smaller, local farmers. This division has reduced the farmers’ production capabilities. Currently the most pressing prob-

⁶¹ <<http://www.hrw.org>> 2004c.

⁶² A whole book has been written on this particular famine, cf. de Waal 1989.

lem in this regard is the ever-increasing desertification in northern Darfur. Arab herders are encroaching farther south onto the land of African farmers. In the past, African farmers and Arab herders have shared land during certain seasons, but since land has become such a valuable commodity recently, farmers have understandably been less willing to share. Arab farmers together with support from Khartoum have pushed some African farmers out of their villages, which naturally has started to cause food shortages.

The second economic factor which has opened the possibility to genocide is a weakened economy. In the 1970s, the Sudanese economy was severely weakened.⁶³ More recently, the United States under former President Bill Clinton imposed economic sanctions on Sudan for harboring terrorists, most famously, Osama bin Laden, and for concerns about human rights violations. These sanctions were renewed by President Bush in 2002 and have dried up all U.S. foreign aid to Sudan, except humanitarian aid.

Poverty and continual underdevelopment as the next economic factor are intimately connected to a weakened economy. Many in Sudan are poverty-stricken, but it is particularly devastating in Darfur, which has been marginalized by the Sudanese government for many years. This has been in part due to the fact that Darfur was independent until 1916 and therefore was not integrated with the rest of Sudan much later. When it did join Sudan, it was again prevented from becoming developed because of British colonists. The colonialists had no interest in developing Darfur, and in fact, they even tragically helped to reduce Darfur's development: "The Fur were politically decapitated, their landowning class reduced to penury, and -- perhaps their greatest frustration -- their contribution to Sudanese civilization reduced to a footnote in official histories" (Flint 2005: 13). It was only later in 1945 that the British had a change of heart and acknowledged the lopsided development rates occurring in Sudan. At that point they decided to help develop Darfur.

The final economic factor has already been discussed in part in this paper: environmental degradation. Desertification is continuing to change the landscape of Darfur in part because climate changes have reduced the amount of rainfall to half of what was normal in 1967 (Suliman 2001: 54). In addition, little "virgin" land remains, and the land which has already been tilled has been planted with very little diversity, thus ruin-

⁶³ Cf. Johnson 2003: xviii-xix.

ing its fertility. In addition, allowing for little crop diversity is also dangerous because in times of crises, it is likely that all of the crops will be destroyed.

In addition to economic factors, social factors also have made a difference in allowing genocide to take place. Unlike Rwanda's recent social structure decay, the Sudanese have always been confronted by an extremely fragmented identity.⁶⁴ Sudan is home to more than 100 languages and many different ethnicities (the exact number is very controversial). Squeezed in between the Arabic world and Sub-Saharan Africa, the country has a difficult time balancing its Arab and African populations. This search for a common identity and balance has led to problems in the past, including attempts to "Arabize" the South and West. This identity fragmentation also exists with Darfur itself, which some estimate to be home to several dozen ethnic groups (Straus 2005: 126). This fragmentation has led to conflicts in the past and therefore must be considered a possible source for instability.

Like the differences between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda, great inequalities exist between Africans and Arabs that have led to past resentment and conflict. Africans and Arabs were separated under British colonization in order to isolate the groups from each other. This was particularly true of North (predominantly Arab) and South (predominantly African) populations. Under British colonial rule, Africans were often denied education, for example. The Governor of Darfur at the time wrote openly about this scheme: "We have been able to limit education to the sons of Chiefs and native administration personnel and we can confidently look forward to keeping the ruling classes at the top of the educational tree for many years to come" (Prunier 2005: 30). This was clearly a significant hindrance for African families because without education chances of future success in government representation or career opportunities were limited from the beginning. In 1956, when Sudan gained its independence from Great Britain, the inequalities were still a major problem, but the issue was left to Sudan to solve.

In part stemming from inequality issues, ethnic hatred is another social factor to consider when judging the structural causes of genocide. Compared to the ethnic hatred issues in Rwanda, Darfur's problems are complicated by identity problems. Race has only become a problem in the recent conflicts between Arabs and Africans, and accord-

⁶⁴ Cf. Deng 1995 and Prunier 2003.

ing to some scholars, this conflict has to do more with *lifestyle* than *race* (Prunier 2005: 5). Farmers were defending their land, and herders were looking for land for themselves as well. Race happened to meet lifestyle and since race is a more resilient and unchangeable means of identity, this factor became more important for explaining the conflict. As mentioned above, identity issues are a great source of fragmentation in Sudan, which is understandable since there are between 40-90 different ethnicities within Darfur alone, depending on the definition of an “ethnic group” (Flint 2005: 8). In addition, some authors have said that Arab groups are particularly sensitive to this identity issue because within the Arab world, Sudanese Arabs are not considered Arab.⁶⁵ In one United Nations report, the findings clearly concluded that non-Arab villages are targeted more often than Arab ones in Darfur, and some have even been burned to the ground while Arab villages 500 meters away were left perfectly intact.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, racial issues cannot be downplayed completely as being a potential source of the genocide. There were racial tensions in the past, and Prunier admits that race has played a part in the most recent genocides, but he thoughtfully points out that racial tensions “were the raw material, not the cause” (Prunier 2005: 153).

In addition to the important economic and social structural factors to genocide, there are some important political factors which also raise the risk of genocide. One of the first and most important factors is the political marginalization of Darfur, similar to the political marginalization of the Hutus under Tutsi rule in Rwanda. In addition to the social and economic marginalization of Darfur which has already been discussed, a form of political marginalization also occurred which spread discontent with the Khartoum government and helped to precipitate the formation of Darfur’s own political rebel groups. One suitable example of this political marginalization can be cited when Ali al Haj was the Minister of Federal Affairs. Under Al Haj’s directions, Darfur was split into three different states resulting in a severing of Darfur’s political power and influence. Nevertheless, Prunier cautions that Darfur’s marginalization has less to do with race and

⁶⁵ Cf. Prunier 2005: 77. “Racism was not actually because of pure race issues, but perhaps more about a search for identity. ‘Arabs’ and ‘Black Africans’ are not at each other’s throats because they are like cats and dogs but rather because, for the ‘Arabs’ at least, they are not completely sure of what and who they are. In the Sudan they are ‘Arabs,’ but in the Arab world they are seen as mongrels who hardly deserve that name.”

⁶⁶ Cf. <<http://www.unsudanig.org>> 2004, p. 2.

more to do with the region itself (since he argues the Arabs who also live in Darfur are equally marginalized) (Prunier 2005: 41-42).

Another political factor which seems to open the possibility for a genocide to take place is the instability of the state. In Rwanda, the government was desperate to maintain its power in an economic and social crisis. In Darfur, the Khartoum government, uncertain about how it should rid itself of the Darfur rebel problem, has chosen to attack civilians in order to try to eliminate the rebel's support base. However, often militia groups attacked civilians with no connections to rebel groups. Nevertheless compared to the threat that the RPF invasion posed to the Rwandan government, the few rebel groups in distant Darfur (far from the country's capital) did not conjure up the same kind of threat. This argument will be continued in the theory building section, where I will discuss why governments would select a *total* or a *selective genocide*.

One of the final political factors is that of bad neighbors, as also witnessed in Rwanda. Throughout Darfur's history, Libya and Chad played significant roles in destabilizing the region. Destabilizing interference in Darfur started as early as in 1965 when a civil war broke out in Chad. Chad's rebel groups had bases in Darfur, but the Sudanese government threw them out six years later after fights escalated between the rebel groups. In the 1970s, Chadian refugees fled over the border into Darfur because of a massive drought in Chad. Just a few years later, the so-called Arab-Fur war of 1987-1989 took place because Chadian Arabs were crossing through Darfur to fight in Chad leaving thousands killed and Darfur destabilized. Libya also proved to be a source of destabilization because of its constant interference. In March 1990, Darfur got caught in the middle of a Chadian-Libyan war which resulted in 600 casualties (Prunier 2005: 70). In the war, Libyan-backed Arab militias attacked African villages in Darfur. At the same time, Libya had signed an agreement with Khartoum to merge the two states. While the contract failed, Libya's interference in Sudan afterwards did not (Prunier 2005: 70).

The role of foreign countries interfering in Sudanese affairs in general is another political problem. Often foreign involvement has served to weaken and not strengthen the country. Foreign countries have sometimes given very bad advice to Sudan, which it has regrettably accepted. During the famine of 1982-1985, for example, foreign coun-

tries under the direction of the IMF and the World Bank advised Sudan to export food that was desperately needed for its own domestic consumption (Suliman 2001: 55).

Just as the limited foreign intervention in Rwanda failed to halt the genocide, the 7,700 African Union troops in Darfur are simply not sufficient to patrol such a vast territory. Compared to an average of 0.01 troops per square kilometers in Rwanda (after most of the UN troops pulled out in April 1994), there were even fewer troops in Darfur a year after the genocide started: 0.004 troops per square kilometer.⁶⁷ Currently, with 7,770 African Union troops, it is only now that the number of troops per square kilometers (0.015) is as “high” as it was in Rwanda in April 1994. In addition, their mandate does not allow them to actively do any peacekeeping; rather they are there mainly as monitors and protectors of the cease-fire. In this regard, the mandate of the UNAMIR was very similar.⁶⁸ It seems clear that foreign interference in both countries was considered appropriate as long as it benefited the interfering country. But when there were sacrifices to be made, that was a different matter all together.

Turning to historical reasons which serve as correlates of genocide, it is clear that the role of the colonial power is important to analyze. As Sudan’s colonial power, Great Britain took a laissez-faire approach to governing and often let the country be ruled as it was before colonization.⁶⁹ Germany and Belgium similarly did not interfere too much in Rwanda’s affairs. Nevertheless, as was previously discussed, the British did favour a system of segregation and marginalization for the Furs. Similarly, although France was not a colonial power of Rwanda, it did feel a responsibility to the country because of its shared Francophone heritage. France felt obliged to intervene with its Operation Turquoise in the ensuing genocide, although their intervention came months too late.

Secondly, Darfur’s history of conflict gives us insight into its vulnerability to genocide. Even before colonialism, there were tensions between the African tribes and Arabs in Darfur. Darfur was an independent state for some time, and when it was “Arabized” in 1916, African tribes in Darfur complained of marginalization (Flint 2005: 16). During colonialism, there do not seem to be many records of conflict between the

⁶⁷ These figures were calculated by dividing the number of troops (500 in Rwanda in April 1994 and 2000 in Darfur in July 2004) by the square kilometers of Rwanda and Darfur respectively.

⁶⁸ Cf. Compare the two mandates of AMIS and UNAMIR, <<http://www.refugeesinternational.org>> 2004, and <<http://www.un.org>> 2006.

⁶⁹ Cf. Flint 2005: 12.

groups. Cheryl Igiri argues that resource conflicts started as early as 1970, and only later did they start to involve ethnic identity (Igiri 2004: 2). From 1985-1988, at the end of the famines in Darfur, 9,000 Fur were killed in what Khartoum named a “tribal conflict” (Prunier 2005: 65). Because of desertification in parts of Darfur, conflicts over land also started to emerge between farmers and nomads. The introduction of automatic weapons at the time made the conflicts even more violent.⁷⁰ Often affected by its neighbor’s actions, Darfur was devastated by the spillover conflict from Chad in 1989, resulting in the deaths of 5,000 Fur and the destruction of 40,000 of their homes, and the death of 400 Arabs and the destruction of 700 of their tents (Johnson 2003: 140). Violence caused by land disputes continued throughout the 1990s, which caused many in Darfur to flee to Chad. During this time, Arab nomads moved south earlier than usual, and this change precipitated in violence between Masalits and Arabs. Judging from the long history of conflict in Darfur and in Rwanda, this factor seems to be an issue which cannot be ignored as a structural cause for genocide.

5.2.4 Direct Causes for Genocide

Already severely weakened by the structural causes for genocide, Darfur was directly affected by several factors which directly precipitated the conflict. The first factor is the militias’ accessibility to arms. During the Cold War, weapons spread throughout Sudan and were used in Sudan’s civil wars and in arming militias.⁷¹ Kalishnikov guns were sold for \$40 in 1990 in Darfur (Flint 2005: 49). Although the government has committed itself to disarming the *Janjaweed* on several occasions, such a difficult task would be nearly impossible (Flint 2005: 127). Unlike in the months leading up to the Rwandan genocide where arms were available for all, in Sudan, weapons have for the most part stayed in the hands of militia members and rebel groups. Human Rights Watch estimates that villages in Darfur typically have a maximum of five to six weapons per village, which is scarcely enough when trying to fight against the Sudanese army and militias like the *Janjaweed*.⁷²

A second direct cause of genocide in Darfur was the large number of unemployed young men who sought profit and prosperity by joining rebel groups or militias.

⁷⁰ <<http://www.hrw.org>> 2004a, p. 7.

⁷¹ Cf. Johnson 2003: xviii-xix and Flint 2005: 50.

⁷² <<http://www.hrw.org>> 2004a, p. 7.

The two main Darfur rebel groups, the SLA and the JEM were both composed of mainly high school dropouts and students (Prunier 2005: 94). Certainly if economic conditions had been better in Darfur, young men would have been less willing to join such groups. The *Janjaweed* offered a relatively good salary, often a horse, and a share in the looting (Prunier 2005: 98). Economic prosperity was nevertheless not the only reason why men have joined such groups. Other reasons, such as discrimination, underdevelopment, and retaliation must also be considered.

The trigger event which officially marked the beginning of the genocide in February of 2003 was a rebel attack on Jebel Marra in central Darfur. When the rebels took the city, the government became increasingly worried that Darfur was slipping out of their hands. Since the Khartoum government had few troops in the Darfur, it “outsourced” the rebel problem to the *Janjaweed*, according to Julie Flint (Flint 2005: 57). Prunier argues that the *Janjaweed* were chosen because regular army members would be recognized by Darfur civilians and also might have been unwilling to fight there, since many members of the Sudanese army were from the region (Kristof 2006: 14). The violence had already started in October 2002 when the *Janjaweed* started attacking Fur villages in Darfur (Flint 2005: 64 and Prunier 2005: 88). Although rebel groups and the *Janjaweed* militia had clashed before, one year later in 2003, the rebel groups were winning the majority of their fights. Therefore the government began to set out with unprecedented rigor to destroy what they thought of as the base of the rebels: the civilians.

5.3 Accounting for Causes of the Different Types of Genocide

In this section, I will analyze the evidence thus far and try to evaluate to what extent the structural and direct factors of genocide can help to identify the reasons for different types of genocide since the structural factors are similar for both conflicts. It is assumed that the structural causes are those which open the possibility of genocide, whereas the direct causes of genocide are the main reasons for the differences between Rwanda and Darfur. Which of the direct causes can therefore explain these significant differences? When comparing the direct factors between the two genocides, the civilian participation in Rwanda is particularly striking and needs to be further analyzed. Civilian participation can be explained by many of the other direct factors. The civilian participation can in part be understood by the high population density in Rwanda, which

created other hardships, such as a land and food shortage, two of the structural causes of genocide. People were desperate to compete for resources during this time. They were promised the goods which they looted, and often these were goods which Hutus had previously been denied.⁷³ The authoritarian structure of Rwandan society, one of the direct factors for causing the genocide, can also be an explanation of civilian participation. Since high authorities were telling civilians that they should take up arms and participate in the genocide, the participation grew ever stronger. In addition, the easy availability of arms for all Rwandans explains how civilians could participate in the killings. The ex-FAR even provided civilians with machetes, other weapons and training before the genocides began.⁷⁴ Hate propaganda is another direct cause which can explain civilian participation. Civilians were motivated and often coerced by radio propaganda to fight. The radio called upon the Hutus to do their “work,” a pseudonym for murder (Kellow 1998: 120). In addition, they were manipulated by the lies about Tutsi attacks and advances. Finally, political manipulation was key to convincing civilians to participate. As mentioned earlier, politicians often held rallies in the time leading up to the genocide, trying to convince Hutus of the evil deeds of Tutsis and of the need to cleanse them from the population.

So far, there has been no civilian participation in the Darfur genocide. Our theory about the reasons for civilian participation is supported by the fact that the direct causes of civilian participation have not been found in Darfur – a high population density, an authoritarian structure, accessibility to arms, hate propaganda, and political manipulation. In addition, since the majority of Arabs in Sudan do not live in Darfur, but instead live in the northeastern areas of Sudan, it makes sense that there was less active civilian participation. It is a long distance to travel to commit genocide, and as Horowitz correctly observes about crowd mentality: “crowds generally stay close to home, attack in locales where they have the tactical advantage, and retreat or relocate the attack when they encounter unexpected resistance” (Horowitz 2001: 526). Since these factors are the only ones which seem to not appear in Darfur while occurring in Rwanda, they are most likely the ones responsible for the differences. The factors leading up to civilian participation and civilian participation itself should therefore be considered “indicators of a

⁷³ Cf. Hatzfeld 2003: 65.

⁷⁴ Cf. <<http://www.irinnews.org>> 2006. Gen. Dallaire recounted the ex-FAR’s training sessions in his testimony before the ICTR.

total genocide.” Recognition of these important factors could help to prevent *total genocides* from happening in the future. See Table 5 in the Appendix for an overview of the indicators of a *total genocide*.

Considering the enormous role that civilian participation seems to play in causing the differences between the two conflicts, we could propose a hypothesis between civilian participation in genocide and the two-fold typology which has been presented in this paper. The connection can be summarized as the following: *the more civilian participation occurs in genocide, the more likely that a total genocide would occur*. Similarly, we could expect the opposite: *the less civilian participation occurs in genocide, the more likely that a selective genocide occurs*. This hypothesis will not be tested here, but it is an important relationship which seems to exist based on the results of this study and a connection which should be analyzed in further studies.

6. Theory Building

6.1 Reviewing Current Typologies

In this section, I will try to build a new theory from the findings of this work. First, the existing typologies will be analyzed in order to understand the need to introduce a new typology of genocide. However, not all of the existing typologies will be examined because there are too many to do so in this work. Instead, I will choose the most important typologies and those which will give a broad perspective of the different typologies which exist. When evaluating these typologies, Chalk suggests a method for proceeding, which will be used for our purposes: “It bears repeating that any typology must be evaluated in terms of the results it aids in producing. Clearly, the most important results would be those that help us predict and prevent genocides in the future” (Chalk 1990: 31). Therefore, the typologies will be evaluated in terms of their use to help prevent future genocides and to form an intervention if the genocide has already started.

One of the first scholars to create a typology was Raphael Lemkin, who also coined the term “genocide.” Lemkin’s typology (or in his words, “the techniques of genocide”) is very basic and includes: *political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious and moral genocide* (Lemkin 1944: 82-90). He created these categories to describe the Holocaust, which he believed fulfilled all of his types of genocide.

By *political genocide*, he meant political institutions are destroyed to such an extent that the right to local-self administration is destroyed. *Social genocide*, however, is carried out when perpetrators attack two main aspects of social life: the structure of law and religious institutions. *Cultural genocide*, on the other hand, is targeted against the culture, traditions, and language of a particular group. This can be carried out by replacing local administration with a foreign body and outlawing local languages. *Economic genocide* means removing the economic base of a particular group, which will cause the affected group to struggle for their existence. Lemkin's fifth type of genocide is *biological genocide*, in which steps are taken to ensure the end of a certain race by controlling their birth rates in one way or the other. For example, the sexes are often separated from each other, and the food rations are reduced for parents, making their existence and that of their child very difficult. *Physical genocide* is the physical harm or annihilation of a particular group. Members of the target group are sometimes denied basic necessities of life, such as food and shelter, or they are even exterminated. *Religious genocide*, the seventh type of genocide, is the purposeful targeting of a certain group's religious institutions and the denial of their right to practice this religion. Lemkin's last type of genocide is *moral genocide*, occurring when the perpetrator morally degrades the victim in order to weaken resistance. Lemkin gives the example of German occupiers who encouraged Poles to drink, gamble and watch pornographic films during World War II (Lemkin 2002: 90).

Hervé Savon offers an alternative typology including genocides of *substitution*, *devastation*, and *elimination* (Savon 1972). By *substitution genocide*, Savon means one in which the dominant group would like to replace the target group with its own group. A *devastation genocide* is focused on inflicting as much destruction as possible. Finally, by *elimination genocide* is meant that that the principle goal of the genocide is to eliminate the target population.

Like Lemkin, Vahakn Dadrian's types of genocide also correspond to broad causes for the conflict (Dadrian 1975). Dadrian's categories should be understood as types on a continuum, which shows increasingly devastating effects on the victim, starting with *cultural genocide* and ending with *optimal genocide*. The first type is what he coins *cultural genocide*, in which the perpetrator forces the conversion of the victim or the target group to the mainstream culture. Although the perpetrator will force the vic-

tim to convert, there is not enough of a threat to kill the victim. The second type of genocide, *latent genocide*, is often a side effect of military operations and often includes relocating minority groups. Thirdly, *retributive genocide* includes attacking a limited number of victims in order to send a message of deterrence to others in the target group. Like *latent genocide*, *utilitarian genocide* is also a side effect and perhaps not an intentional act by the perpetrator. This type usually occurred as a result of colonialization in order to subsume land and resources from the target groups and perhaps also to subdue the victim. The final type, and the extreme on Dadrian's continuum, is *optimal genocide*. In this type of genocide, the main goal is total annihilation. The killings can be incredibly efficient.

In 1984, Helen Fein proposed another typology, based on the goal of the perpetrator. The first type is what she calls *developmental genocide*, in which the perpetrator intentionally or accidentally blocks development. On the other hand, the second type, a *despotic genocide*, is an intentional action by the perpetrator to eliminate a threat. The third type, a *retributive genocide*, occurs when the perpetrator tries to seek revenge for opposition or a threat. The last type, an *ideological genocide*, takes place when the perpetrator creates an ideology to explain the necessity of the genocide.

One year later, Leo Kuper proposed a more succinct division of genocides into two types: *internal affairs genocides* and *international affairs genocides* (Kuper 1985). As examples of *internal affairs genocides*, Kuper includes genocides against native populations and against other groups to gain rights and power. *International affairs genocides*, on the other hand, are those which occur because of an international basis.

In 1987, Roger Smith outlined five types of genocide, which are similar to those envisioned by Fein and also by Chalk. The first type of genocide is *retributive genocide*, which is carried out in order to get revenge on a certain group (similar to one of Fein's types). Instead of describing why the perpetrator committed genocide, the second type outlines how the genocide was implemented. Smith coins this type an *institutional genocide*, which is clearly carried out by an institution, such as a military. The third type of genocide focuses again on why the perpetrator committed genocide: a *utilitarian genocide* is one in which the perpetrator is mainly interested in economic gain. A *monopolistic genocide* on the other hand occurs because of a desire to gain power, whereas

an *ideological genocide* (as Fein also mentioned), is one which first and foremost hopes to spread a certain ideology through the country.

While Frank Chalk does not offer any specific names for his types of genocide, he has also classified the types according to the motives of the perpetrators. His first category is a genocide which destroys a threat, or potential threat. Secondly, he separates out genocides which are meant to terrorize the opposing group or party. His third type, similar to Smith's *utilitarian genocide*, is a genocide which is carried out in order to achieve economic well-being. Chalk's final type recalls Smith's *ideological genocide*, and that is genocide to create a dominant ideology.

The last typology that will be mentioned here is by Benjamin Valentino (Valentino 2000). Valentino divides genocides into two basic categories: *dispossessive* and *coercive*. While a *dispossessive genocide* is aimed at taking away possessions or a lifestyle from a group, *coercive genocide* is focused more on gaining control of the state or putting down a rebellion (Valentino 2000: 30).

If we analyze the cases of Rwanda and Darfur according to these typologies, it is clear that the difference between the two genocides cannot be explained using these categories. Although Dadrian's *optimal genocide* sounds similar to the term *total genocide*, he does not describe what he means by this in greater depth. Furthermore, his other categories for genocide focus on a sole cause – a method which will be criticized in the following. Both Savon, Fein and Valentino's typologies do not help us because the genocides we are examining could be classified as more than one type. Again, this stems from the problem of today's complex, multi-dimensional conflicts. For example, the Rwandan genocide could be considered to have elements of all three of Savon's classification. It was focused first and foremost on elimination, but it also showed signs of devastation and substitution (the Hutus had hoped to replace the Tutsis once and for all with Hutus). The Rwandan genocide could also be classified under several of Fein's categories, including both a *despotic* and an *ideological genocide*. Using Valentino's typology to evaluate the Darfur genocide does not help us any further because it also can be classified as a both *dispossessive* and *coercive genocide*. *Therefore, many of these typologies are too broad because they allow the same conflict to be categorized under multiple types of genocide. It is the author's opinion that their approaches are simplistic because genocides are often too complex and multi-dimensional to boil down*

to one main cause. Conflicts are becoming increasingly complex, and a new typology must fittingly reflect this new phenomenon. Steve Utterwulghe shares this opinion and also believes that new theories of conflict must account for the complexity of protracted conflicts because “in order to manage and hopefully resolve these kinds of conflicts, a comprehensive approach that identifies and tackles their multiple causal factors is necessary” (Utterwulghe 1999: 2).

The second main criticism of current typologies is that they focus solely on causes of genocide, and in order to intervene in genocide effectively, it is important to know not only the causes, but also the potential outcome of the genocide. At the beginning of this section, Frank Chalk was cited because he recognized the importance of creating a typology which would help prevent or stop genocide. In order to do this, it is important to know the possible outcome (either a *total* or *selective genocide*) and the impact of the genocide in order to plan an appropriate response, whether it be a peace-keeping mission or another sort of intervention. It is hoped of course that a *selective genocide* can be stopped before it becomes a *total genocide*. To this goal, the proposed indicators of a *total genocide*, as discussed in the last section, should be a step in the right direction to uncovering potential gravely devastating conflicts before it is too late.

6.2 Building a New Typology

After reviewing current typologies, it is clear that there is a gap in current literature: current typologies ignore the potential outcome of the genocide and instead focus on one boiled-down cause for genocide. Two new types of genocide were proposed in this work: *total* and *selective genocide*. Since the proposed new typology cannot ignore causal factors in its model, causes were considered together with outcomes in order to give a more holistic, comprehensive approach to genocide typologies. This section will try to clarify this typology by summarizing its causes, its use, and its practical application for the prevention of and intervention in genocide.

What causes the differences between *total* and *selective genocides*? This question has already been addressed in the previous sections. While no definitive answer was found, it is assumed that the direct causes are those which can explain the differences between Rwanda and Darfur. In particular, civilian participation and the factors causing civilian participation, here named the “indicators of total genocide,” seem to play a significant role in explaining the difference between the two types of genocide.

Having addressed the causes of these types, the next step in building a new typology is to analyze the use of these types. Why would a state intentionally implement a *total genocide* instead of a *selective genocide*? What influences the state's decision to carry out one type of genocide or the other? While it is possible that a government starts the conflict with a *selective genocide*, which may turn into a *total genocide*, sometimes the state makes the radical decision to implement a *total genocide* immediately. The instability of the state was already discussed as a structural cause of genocide, and this was a factor that appeared in both Rwanda and Darfur. In the following, I will employ a rationalist explanation to try to distinguish governments' uses for *total* and *selective genocides*. In particular, I will measure the factors – state strength and threat. Midlarsky discusses the importance of threat as a catalyst for genocide (Midlarsky 2005: 4). In particular, Midlarsky argues that the state is threatened especially by the prospect of loss (of both material property and power).

One of the first factors to take into account is the strength of the state. The strength of the state is an important consideration because the stronger the state, the more resources it has at its disposal and the less it fears outside intervention, as will be discussed as the next point. It will be argued that a *total genocide* consumes more resources than a *selective genocide* because of planning time and weapons but also because of the great loss of resources, including human life. The Rwandan government seemed particularly strong before and during the genocide, whereas the Darfur government appears to be relatively weak. Hintjens refers to the irony that Rwanda's collapse did not cause the state to "fail," but rather the opposite is true – the overly powerful nature of the government caused its own downfall (Hintjens 1999: 245). Prunier also agrees that the robust strength of the government was to blame: "The genocide happened not because the state was weak, but on the contrary because it was so totalitarian and strong that it had the capacity to make its subjects obey absolutely any order, including one of mass slaughter" (Prunier 1995: 353-354). To elaborate – in Rwanda, the genocide was meticulously planned. Every little detail was planned months, sometimes even years, in advance. The Tutsi death lists, for example, were drawn up as early as January 1994 (Hintjens 1999: 246). Some experts say that the whole genocide itself took around four years to plan and to prepare the people.⁷⁵ At the time of his death,

⁷⁵ The opinion of an interviewed Rwandan theologian, cf. Kellow 1998: 123.

President Habyarimana was beginning to lose the support of even his closest inner circle because he was planning democratic reforms and programs which his supporters disapproved. Even his wife, Agatha, had her own group of supporters, who apparently were more loyal to her than to the President. Only one thing stood in the way of the implementation of the carefully planned genocide, and that thing was the President himself. Although it is not confirmed, it is possible that even the death of the President was part of the elaborate process of planning. In addition, when Habyarimana took over Rwanda in a coup d'état in 1973, he implemented a one-party system, which essentially monopolized the power solely in his hands. Planning a *total genocide* was one more method of showing the power of the state when faced with a potential threat.

The Darfur genocide, on the other hand, does not seem planned in advance, indicating the weakness of the Sudanese state. Rather, the *Janjaweed* militia attacks against civilians and rebel forces, often reinforced by the Sudanese army, indicate an ad hoc response to the rebel crisis. Not knowing how else to respond to the rebel groups, the Sudanese government has started to attack civilians in particular in an attempt to break down the rebel groups' support bases. The state is weak for many reasons (some of which were described in the section about structural factors). Another problem is that Sudan is simply such a huge country that it would be difficult for any government to keep a firm grip on all parts of it. Another reason for the state's weaker control was the lack of a strictly hierarchical system like in Rwanda. In addition, as is true in many conflict situations, a perception problem exists in which it is unclear whether the actions of a rebel group are defensive or offensive. A state is even more on guard when it is weak because it is always scared of losing its own position, and therefore it is advantageous to launch its own pre-emptive attack (Horowitz 2001: 545). In Darfur, this has been particularly true and can help to explain the genesis of a *selective genocide*. The government had to decide how to interpret the attacks by rebel groups on government property, and they chose to interpret them offensively. The rebels would argue, however, they are simply defending Darfur against nomads who wish to take their land. In addition, the rebels are fighting for political recognition and the right to equal development in Darfur.

Another factor which plays a role in the decision to implement a *total* or *selective genocide* is the perceived threat from the outside. While it is assumed that a higher level of *external threat* will lower the tendency to implement a *total genocide*, on the

other hand, a higher level of *internal threat* which a country perceives will *strengthen* the tendency to implement a *total genocide*. In other words, if a state believes that international forces are willing and ready to intervene at the beginning of a state-sponsored *total genocide*, then that state will be less open to this type of conflict as a solution to its problems. On the other hand, if a state sees that international troops are either unwilling or unable to intervene in an internal conflict, the chances that a state can commit *total genocide* without endangering its own position greatly increase. The case studies of the Rwandan and Darfur genocides support this connection. The Rwandan government did not feel a great threat before 1994 because French troops had always supported them in the past. However, when French troops pulled out and UN peacekeepers came in, they became worried that they had lost their closest ally (Kuperman 2001: 11). Nevertheless, the UN peacekeeping troops which were in the country at the time of the beginning of the genocide were perceived as weak. Their mandate was not very broad and their resources and manpower were very limited.⁷⁶ The United Nations wanted a successful peacekeeping operation after the fiasco in Somalia, but member states were not willing to pay. In part because the Rwandan government was confident that the UN troops did not pose too great a hindrance for starting a conflict, they were able to begin a *total genocide*. Particularly because the genocide happened so quickly, the Rwandan government could be sure that it could get away with a *total genocide* without too much international attention. In addition, the distracted media (as previously discussed) was not likely to bring the story onto the international agenda.

In the case of Darfur, on the other hand, the Sudanese government realizes that it is currently at the center of attention. The case of Darfur has been referred to the Security Council as well as to the International Criminal Court. Peacekeepers from the African Union are already stationed in Darfur, and there are plans that United Nations Peacekeepers will replace or compliment them soon.⁷⁷ Sudan admittedly does not want UN peacekeepers because then it would be under more international scrutiny. In addition, although the media ignored the genocide when it first started, there has recently been a surge of international media coverage on Darfur, due to the recent peace deal

⁷⁶Cf. <<http://www.hrw.org>> 1999 and Power 2002: 341-343.

⁷⁷Cf. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk>> 2006a and UN Resolution 1679, May 16, 2006.

signed on May 5, 2006.⁷⁸ In addition, from the beginning of the genocide until May 2005, the government tried to block foreign NGO workers, journalists, and humanitarian aid workers from accessing Darfur.⁷⁹ They clearly were worried about a foreign presence in the area. Nevertheless, the agreement has yet to be a “success” because of the withheld signatures of some of the rebel groups. Therefore, Sudan has not tried to implement a *total genocide* in Darfur because of the state’s weakness coupled with international pressure.

The difference in how the two governments have perceived internal threat is another issue to consider when trying to understand the use of these two types of genocide. In Rwanda, the threat of an RPF takeover after the 1990 invasion was immanent. Between 1990 and the Arusha Accords in 1993, the threat of the RPF seemed very real to the Rwandan government. For Rwanda, being the small country that it is, it was easily imaginable that the RPF could take over Kigali, and they did get quite close to the capital. The RPF invasion therefore seemed even more dangerous than it was. Hintjens explains why *total genocide* was possible in Rwanda, considering the RPF threat: “the initial goal was regime survival, and the means to achieve this was to be as complete as possible elimination of the perceived ‘racial’ enemy” (Hintjens 1999: 249). The perceived risk of losing goes hand in hand with the notion of perceived threat. Habyarimana’s party feared the RPF would stage a coup d’etat if he did not act decisively. States fear losing their power or sovereignty if they do not react violently: “violence occurs when the risks of failing to engage in violence are great” (Horowitz 2001: 547).

On the other hand, the threat posed by the Darfur rebel groups to the government is nowhere near the threat perceived by the RPF in Rwanda. Most importantly, the rebel groups in Darfur are located in remote areas of Darfur where they are not threatening to attack the capital city. Instead, they have attacked government owned property in Darfur. Furthermore, while the Rwandan rebels were fighting all under one flag, the Darfur rebels are splintered into several different groups, including the SLA/M (which was formerly the DLF) and the JEM. A group lead by Minni Arcu Minnawi is a faction of the SLA/M, and they have started to fight against the main faction, led by Abdul Wahid al-Nur (Polgreen 2006). Sometimes they have even attacked civilians (Polgreen 2006).

⁷⁸ For more information about the lack of media coverage in Darfur, and especially at the beginning of the genocide, cf. Ricchiardi 2005

⁷⁹ Cf. <<http://www.amnesty.org>> 2004d and <<http://www.amnesty.org>> 2004b.

In general, the disagreements have severely damaged the strength of the rebel groups to fight the *Janjaweed*. Lt. Col. Wisdom Bleboo, who is part of the African Union troops stationed in Darfur, said of the increasing factional violence: “Right now, we don't have any security problem with the government forces or with the *Janjaweed*...It is only the fighting between the rebel factions that is causing us trouble” (Polgreen 2006). In 1994, a group also broke off from the JEM, calling itself *The National Movement for Reform and Development*. With so many factions in the rebel groups, their power to make demands has been severely fractured, and so the government has not perceived the rebel groups as a significant threat. In addition, the Arab government militias have attacked several different ethnic groups including the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa. Unfortunately, these ethnic groups were not unified around one rebel group or around one method of fighting the government. Although the three were united at the beginning of the conflict, there have been disagreements recently between the groups, which have caused a split between the Fur and the Zaghawa (Flint 2005: 86). This fragmentation in the rebel groups and in the ethnic groups helps to explain why the Darfur rebels were not considered as much of a threat as their Rwandan counterparts. In Darfur, the risk of not militarily engaging the rebel groups is not as dramatic as in Rwanda. Since the rebel groups have not threatened Khartoum and are still far from the heart of Sudan, the risk of losing power or sovereignty to the rebel groups is low.

Therefore, we can formulate a possible thesis to be investigated in further research: *the stronger the state, the lower the external threat, but the greater the internal threat a state perceives, the more likely it is that the government will implement a total genocide*. On the other hand, the reverse could also be logically true: *the weaker a state, the greater the external threat, but the lower the internal threat (but nevertheless a significant threat) a state perceives, the more likely it is that the government will implement a selective instead of a total genocide*.

Having clarified the typology in greater detail, it is important to outline the expected benefits of accepting the proposed typology for genocide scholars. As was mentioned previously, it is hoped that this typology will help to prevent new genocides and encourage intervention in those already occurring. The thirteen structural causes analyzed in this paper, i.e. the “correlates of genocide,” can help prevent genocides because they give us some signals to use as an early warning system for genocides. Unfortu-

nately, it was not possible to connect one specific cause with *total genocide* and another cause with *selective genocide*. Again, as it was previously argued, boiling down the causes of modern genocides to one cause is too simplistic and does not address the reality of the complex conflicts. Nevertheless, the investigated direct causes and the “indicators of total genocide” helped to provide an explanation for the occurrence of *total genocide* compared to *selective genocide*.

On the other hand, when the conflict has already broken out, this new typology could contribute to the implementation of three steps towards peace in conflict resolution: *peacemaking*, *peacekeeping* and *peacebuilding*. For negotiations and mediation *peacemakers*, the difference between *total* and *selective genocide* is important. If negotiators are dealing with a *total genocide*, addressing the “indicators of a total genocide” would be helpful in deescalating the situation. In this case, negotiators must be mindful of the strength of the state, the high internal threat, the low external threat, and the countrywide nature of the violence, and the rapid rate of destruction. On the other hand, negotiators aiming to solve a *selective genocide* must be aware of the weak capabilities of the state, the smaller degree of internal threat perceived by the government than in a *total genocide*, a high level of external threat, and the specific localization of the conflict. In this case, they must also be aware of the “indicators of total genocide” in order to prevent the *selective genocide* from escalating.

Most of the genocides which have occurred in the 20th century have not experienced effective intervention. Therefore, a typology which would take into account the resulting devastation would be particularly useful for *peacekeeping* forces to judge their necessary capacities and forces. An intervention force that faces a *total genocide* needs to act rapidly, use great force, stop civilian participation, weaken the power of the state, reduce the internal threat, and apply their forces to the whole country. They would also need to address the indicators of a *total genocide* such as accessibility to arms and hate propaganda. On the other hand, an intervention into a *selective genocide* must try to stop the violence already taking place, monitor the situation to make sure that the *selective genocide* will not turn into a *total genocide*, reduce the (already low) internal threat, and also localize their forces to a specific region.

The new typology would also be helpful for intervention forces to implement *peacebuilding* activities after the violence ends. In most cases, a *total genocide* would

leave more destruction and therefore a greater need for rebuilding in the genocide's aftermath. Comparing the GDP before and after the genocide in Rwanda and in Sudan shows a constant GDP per capita in Rwanda, while that in Sudan rose steadily, even throughout the years of conflict. This indicates that the Darfur conflict was less devastating to the economic situation of most people than that in Rwanda. As shown previously in this research, the slow economic growth rate at the end of the Rwandan genocide compared to Sudan's current, normal growth rate indicates that the Rwandan genocide was much more devastating to the economy than that in Darfur. The Rwandan genocide, however, was too short to cause more damage than in Darfur. In addition, the different destruction techniques help to explain why the destruction in Rwanda was not significantly greater than that which we see in Darfur, the *selective genocide*. While the *Janjaweed* militia in Darfur practiced scorch and burn policies, the *Interahamwe* in Rwanda devastated the infrastructure, but often left it standing. In addition, Rwanda had more infrastructure than Darfur before the genocides. In any case, *peacebuilders* would also benefit from the new typology because of the inclusion of the outcomes of a *total* or *selective genocide*.

7. Summary and Conclusions

To summarize, this work challenges the current typologies of genocide, which are based solely upon causes, and typically on one boiled-down cause. Two cases were chosen as case studies: Rwanda and Sudan. In Rwanda, we witnessed the very effective, intense, and catastrophic effects of the genocide upon the Tutsi population across Rwanda. In Sudan, however, I make the case that we are seeing something quite different. The genocide has only targeted African tribes in one area of Sudan. Furthermore, this genocide has lasted ten times longer than the Rwandan one, has resulted in far fewer casualties (including a fewer percentage of the target group killed), fewer refugees, and fewer needing humanitarian aid. The research question of this paper therefore addressed whether the two genocides were different types of genocides, what factors can explain the differences, and finally, whether this can lead us to a new typology of genocides. These research questions will be answered in the conclusions below. In order to confirm these results, more research using different case studies is necessary. The conclusions which can be drawn from this research are five-fold:

1) The Rwandan and Darfur genocides represent different types of genocide. While we can classify the Rwandan genocide as a *total genocide*, the Darfur genocide is a *selective genocide*.

2) While the two genocides have similar structural causes, they differ greatly in regards to the direct causes for the conflict. Structural causes are defined as those factors which make it possible for a genocide to occur while direct causes are catalysts to the outbreak of the conflict.

3) In the case of Rwanda and Sudan, the structural causes are indicators of genocide, while direct causes of conflict are those factors which are responsible for the significant differences between the genocides. Several direct causal factors for a *total genocide* were isolated and called “indicators of total genocide.” These include: a high population density, authoritarian structure in the society, accessibility to arms, hate propaganda, political manipulation and civilian participation.

4) Civilian participation seems to be a particularly dangerous direct factor because many direct causes lead to civilian participation. In addition, it is believed to heighten the intensity of the conflict. There also seems to be a connection between the level of civilian participation and the resulting type of genocide. In other words, it is believed that the more civilian participation occurs in a genocide, the more likely that a *total genocide* will occur. The reverse can also be expected: the less civilian participation occurs in a genocide, the more likely it is that a *selective genocide* will occur instead of a *total genocide*.

5) Governments which are strong and see an internal but not an external threat will choose to implement a *total genocide* whereas governments which are weak and only perceive a smaller internal threat, but a great external threat, are more likely to opt for a *selective genocide* instead of a *total one*. Governments which are strong do not fear outside intervention, and they have the resources so that they may carry out a *total genocide*. On the other hand, weaker governments are perhaps scared of outside intervention and therefore would like to back a genocide which does not instantly attract so much international attention. In addition, they simply do not have the means to conduct a *total genocide*.

What impact do these conclusions have on the moral obligation to act when confronted with genocide, as is outlined in the Genocide Convention? After the Rwanda

genocide of 1994 and the international community's failure to act, many states and other actors swore "never again" to forget such a horrific humanitarian crisis. Many journalists are now making the attempt to compare Darfur to the Rwandan genocides in the way that the international community has again failed to act. Nevertheless, these comparisons should not be interpreted as indicative of the sameness of the conflicts, but rather they should be comparisons of the international community's reaction to the conflict. This paper's conclusion that the two genocides are quite different from each other should not be interpreted as a reason for states not to act.⁸⁰ It is simply hoped that this work will help to foster a new attitude towards the conflict, in that politicians, activists and journalists will start to treat the Darfur genocide as the distinct phenomenon it is in order to find a fitting solution to it. Furthermore, it is also hoped that this work will support the general goal of genocide studies to recognize the horrific nature of genocide in order to prevent future occurrences.

⁸⁰ For articles which argue the necessity to intervene in Darfur, refer to Williams 2005 and Straus 2005.

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9. Appendix

Table 1: Comparing the Genocides in Rwanda and Darfur

DEVASTATION AT THE TIME OF THE GENOCIDE		RWANDA	DARFUR
SOCIAL	TOTAL POPULATION OF THE REGION	7.5 million	6 million
	POSSIBLE TARGET POPULATION	15% (1.125 million)	40% (2.4 million)
	PERCENTAGE OF TARGET POPULATION KILLED	75% (800,000)	12.5% (300,000)
	INTENSITY (CASUALTIES/DAYS)	8,000	169-375
	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION WHO WERE REFUGEES	26.6% ⁸¹ (2 million)	3.3% (200,000)
	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION WHO WERE IDPS	13.3% (1 million)	25-30% ⁸² (1.5-1.8 million)
	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION WHO NEED AID	53.3% (4 million)	41.6% (2.5 million)
ECONOMIC	GDP PER CAPITA BEFORE/AFTER GENOCIDE	\$750 in 1993/\$800 in 1995	\$1,420 in 2002/\$2,100 in 2005 in Sudan
	GDP REAL GROWTH RATE	0% in 1995	7% in 2005
	DESTRUCTION OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN COUNTRY/STATE	No running water and electricity. Health, social and legal infrastructure was also damaged.	In some areas of Darfur, 70-99% of the villages have been destroyed.
	EFFECT ON THE REGION	A devastating effect on the Great Lakes region. After the genocide in Rwanda was ended, it spilled over into eastern Zaire.	Chad is supporting many Darfur refugees; an area for future conflict. Rebel groups have already attacked refugees in Chad.

⁸¹ This number is slightly deceiving because of the number of perpetrators who fled and were considered “refugees” as well during the genocide.

⁸² The number of IDPs in Darfur is larger than that in Rwanda because of the geographical size of Darfur compared to Rwanda. Many fleeing civilians probably did not have the means to travel to the border of Chad. In addition, the Sudanese militias often stopped them from travelling by blocking roads.

Table 2: Explaining the Structural Causes of Rwanda and Darfur

STRUCTURAL CAUSES	RWANDA	DARFUR
ECONOMIC	(1) Land and food scarcity. With an ever increasing birth rate and decreasing amounts of land, famines have occurred in 1928-1929, 1943, 1980s, and 1990s.	(1) Land, water and food shortages. Famines occurred in 1913 and between 1984-1985. Land allocation has also proved problematic. Currently, the encroachment of Arab herders to the south has been a problem for African farmers.
	(2) Economic slump in 1989 when the prices for coffee decreased & economic reforms from the World Bank, proving disastrous for the people.	(2) Weakened Sudanese economy 1970s & recent sanctions imposed on Sudan for being a “terrorist state,” which evaporated all foreign aid from the United States, except for humanitarian aid.
	(3) Poverty. In 1985, 40% of Rwandans were below the poverty line, but it had increased to 53% by 1993 (IMF).	(3) Poverty and underdevelopment in Darfur. In part this was due to Darfur’s independence until 1916, which separated it from the rest of Sudan. Colonialism also reduced Darfur’s rate of development.
	(4) Environmental degradation including overgrazing, soil erosion, and drought.	(4) Environmental degradation (in part because of mechanized agriculture and little diversity) & climatic change. Sudan has gotten half of the normal rainfall since 1967.
SOCIAL	(5) Decaying social structure because of land scarcity and the division of land.	(5) Extreme societal fragmentation. With a multitude of languages, ethnicities and cultures, Sudan’s society is still in the process of developing a Sudanese identity.
	(6) Inequalities between Hutus and Tutsis, caused in part by the colonial powers	(6) Inequalities between Arabs and African tribes, starting in the colonial period and later.
	(7) Ethnic hatred which was fuelled by Hutu Power ideology and Tutsi invasions in Rwanda and killings in Burundi	(7) Ethnic hatred between the African farmers and the Arabs herders. Race has only recently become an issue. There are also identity problems because Darfur has between 40-90 ethnic groups.
POLITICAL	(8) Political marginalization of Hutus	(8) Political marginalization of the Darfur region.
	(9) Instability of the state in the face of threat. The Rwandan government was desperate to hang on to	(9) Instability of the state in the face of threat. The Khartoum govt has sponsored the <i>Janjaweed</i> because it wants to destroy any political base for

	<p>power in any way possible.</p> <p>(10) Bad neighbors Burundi long interfered in the affairs of its neighbor.</p>	<p>rebels within the civilian populations.</p> <p>(10) Bad neighbors Chadian and Libyan interference in Darfur. Civil wars in the region played a role in destabilizing Darfur.</p>
	<p>(11) The role of outside countries. Overall there was little foreign influence. However, the political fight between England and France for political leverage weakened the country.</p> <p>Number of UN troops at the time of the genocide 500 in April 1994</p> <p>Number of UN troops⁸³ per km² at the time of the genocide, 0.018 troops/km² in April 1994</p>	<p>(11) The role of outside countries, when involved, weakened the country. They encouraged, for example, Sudan to export food that was well needed in its own country, especially during the famine of 1982-1985.</p> <p>Number of African Union (AU) troops¹ at the time of the genocide 2,000 (July 2004) 7,700 (presently)</p> <p>Number of AU troops per km² at the time of the genocide 0.004 troops/km² (July 2004) 0.015 troops/km² (presently)</p>
HISTORICAL	<p>(12) Role of colonial history. Belgium and Germany played a role in strengthening the ethnic differences that already existed in Rwandan society.</p>	<p>(12) Role of colonial history. Great Britain separated north and south Sudan from each other and supported a general policy of segregation.</p>
	<p>(13) A history of conflict. In 1959, 1973 and throughout the 1990s.</p>	<p>(13) A history of conflict. In 1985-1988, in 1989, and throughout the 1990s.</p>

⁸³ One can compare the number of troops in Rwanda to those in Darfur because their mandates were surprisingly similar. Although it evolved over time, the UNAMIR mandate never allowed the troops to forcefully stop the slaughter. Instead, it mandated monitoring the situation, providing humanitarian assistance, and working for security. Similarly, the AMIS' mandate does not allow pro-active protection of citizens against the *Janjaweed* militias. Although there has been some talk of expanding it, up until now, it basically only allows for monitoring and protecting the ceasefire.

Table 3: Explaining the Direct Causes of Rwanda

DIRECT CAUSES IN RWANDA (arranged chronologically)
High population density*
Authoritarian structure of Rwandan society*
Discrimination against refugees, later forming the RPF
Invasion of the RPF, 1990
Militarization in the 1990s & accessibility to arms for all Hutus*
Hate propaganda*
Distracted international media
Failures of the Arusha Accords
Assassination of the Burundian Hutu President in 1993, causing a refugee crisis
Manipulation by politicians*
Civilian participation in genocide
Assassination of Rwandan President Habyarimana, April 6, 1994

*Indicates the factors which explain civilian participation.

Table 4: Explaining the Direct Causes of Darfur

DIRECT CAUSES IN DARFUR
Accessibility to arms (for the militias)
Large numbers of unemployed poor who sought prosperity by joining the rebels or a militia.
Attack of rebel forces on a town in Jebel Marra, central Darfur in February 2003

Table 5: Indicators of a Total Genocide





Table 6: Destroyed Villages in Darfur as of August 2, 2004

Source: DigitalGlobe, Inc. and Department of State via USAID

http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sudan/satelliteimages.html (Rev. 11.05.06)



List of Acronyms

AMIS	African Mission in Sudan
DLF	Darfur Liberation Front
(ex-) FAR	(former) Forces Armées Rwandaises (Rwandan Army)
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
PDF	Popular Defence Force
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTL	Radio des Mille-Collines
SLA/M	Sudan Liberation Army/Movement
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development