

## CHAPTER 22

---

# RELIGION AND SECULARITY

---

RALF K. WÜSTENBERG

IN May 1944, Bonhoeffer wrote to his friend Eberhard Bethge from Tegel prison: ‘I am thinking about how the concepts of repentance, faith, justification, rebirth, and sanctification should be reinterpreted in a “worldly” sense...’ (DBWE 8: 373). In the ensuing correspondence, the two friends discussed the concepts and ideas that would subsequently become so well known: the conviction that a religionless time had arrived and that the world had ‘come of age’ by no longer relying upon God as a ‘stop-gap’ for the incompleteness of our knowledge.

In developing these concepts and ideas, Bonhoeffer had wanted to provide an interpretation of reality in which Christ would be affirmed as lord of the world. This approach implies that religion is no longer the condition of justification. Specifically, Bonhoeffer was seeking to move beyond metaphysical forms of interpretation and religion; he was seeking to reinterpret biblical concepts in a ‘worldly’ or ‘nonreligious’ rather than religious and metaphysical way. So what, then, does it mean to reinterpret such concepts nonreligiously?

A large number of publications in the twentieth century have sought to address just this question, but have often misunderstood what Bonhoeffer intended (cf. Wüstenberg, 1998: xiii–xv). For example, speaking about a religionless time, interpreters like Harvey Cox called Bonhoeffer an ‘atheist’ (see Cox 1968); others described him as a ‘secularist’ (Loen, 1967). John Macquarrie suggested that Bonhoeffer had a ‘religious nature’ (Macquarrie, 1967), whereas William Hamilton claims him as the ‘father of the God-is-dead theology’ (Hamilton, 1968). These and other such interpretations all indicate as much about the perspectives of the interpreters as about Bonhoeffer’s theology itself.

In this chapter, I argue that Bonhoeffer’s theological analysis of his own time, in which he deployed his concept of ‘religionlessness’, resonates closely with a more recent analysis of secularity—that of Charles Taylor. In particular, I suggest that Bonhoeffer and Taylor both identify some similar causes of secularization, as well as both sharing a

critique of religious individualism. Drawing Bonhoeffer into dialogue with Taylor thus helps to clarify Bonhoeffer's understanding of secularity and what is at stake with it. I will proceed in three steps. First, I define the meaning of Bonhoeffer's conception of 'religionless Christianity'. Second, I introduce some basic insights into current debates on secularity, with particular reference to Charles Taylor. Finally, I explore some of the affinities and differences between Bonhoeffer's 'religionless Christianity' and Taylor's reflections on a secular age.

## CLARIFYING BONHOEFFER'S CONCEPTION OF RELIGIONLESS CHRISTIANITY

---

The concept of 'religionless Christianity' cannot be directly derived from the uses to which the term 'religion' is put in Bonhoeffer's writings (cf. Wüstenberg, 1998: 26–9). Indeed, surveying all of Bonhoeffer's uses of this term indicates that he uses it in three distinct ways: first, in positively describing and evaluating religion; second, following Karl Barth, in a way that is critical of religion (this second usage is already apparent in *Sanctorum Communio*,<sup>1</sup> and to some extent anticipates the 'nonreligious interpretation' of the prison letters); and third, in a way that suggests that the 'age of religion' has simply come to an end. In this final usage, Christian faith is no longer merely anti-religious (as in the second) but now a-religious.

To be clear, in Bonhoeffer's theology none of these uses are ever developed or presented systematically; nor do they together comprise a theory of religion. However, these three uses broadly follow upon one another: Bonhoeffer first evaluates religion positively, then he criticizes it, and finally he pursues his nonreligious interpretation of biblical concepts. This means that Bonhoeffer is using the term 'religion' serially in ways that make a definition of its content difficult; moreover, he himself does not even venture to provide any such definition. Rather, religion comes to operate as a formal, negative foil against which other important ideas are substantively explicated. As early as 1931 he declares 'there can no longer be any general accounting given by religion, unless we are trying to go back behind God' (DBWE 11: 230–1).

In my own extensive study of Bonhoeffer's religionless Christianity, I argued for a reading of Bonhoeffer's theology that attended to its influences. In particular, I suggested that 'religionless Christianity' represents a combination of Karl Barth's critique of religion with a certain kind of nineteenth-century 'life philosophy', as exemplified by Wilhelm Dilthey (Wüstenberg, 1998: 99). From Barth, Bonhoeffer had learned to criticize religion from the perspective of Christian faith. The alternative here was *either* religion

<sup>1</sup> The year 1927 thus marks Bonhoeffer's early turn from a straightforwardly positive evaluation of religion to a critique, which remained apparent from this point on.

or faith. From his Tegel cell, and also under the influence of Dilthey, he writes: "The "religious act" is always something partial, whereas "faith" is something whole and involves one's whole life' (DBWE 8: 482). Faith is explicated as an act of life as a whole. He continues: 'Jesus calls not to a new religion but to life' (DBWE 8: 482).

Already in his first lengthy theological letter of 30 April, 1944, Bonhoeffer poses the core question of his late theology to his friend Eberhard Bethge: 'How do we talk about God without religion—that is, without the temporally conditioned presuppositions of metaphysics, the inner life, and so on?' (DBWE 8: 364). Religion is here understood in terms of traditional religious categories of both 'metaphysics' and 'the inner life'. On the one hand, 'metaphysics' refers to traditional ways of understanding and organizing ideas of divine transcendence; on the other hand, 'inwardness' refers to approaches to God made by means of the cultivation of immanent spirituality and the inner life. Bonhoeffer held that the time of both metaphysics and inwardness is now in the past: 'the age of inwardness and conscience, and that means the age of religion altogether' (DBWE 8: 362). Significantly, however, Bonhoeffer also extends this concept of religion to more modern attempts to retain or salvage 'God' in the modern age as either a 'working hypothesis' (e.g. DBWE 8: 425f., 450), a 'stopgap' (e.g. DBWE 8: 405f., 455), or as a '*deus ex machina*' (e.g. DBWE 8: 24, 366).

As a modern Christian theologian, Bonhoeffer's interest is thus in 'Jesus Christ and the world that has come of age' (DBWE 8: 428). In pursuing this interest, he read the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey. This nineteenth-century philosopher had earlier undertaken a careful analysis of the ideas that had developed during the Renaissance and the Reformation. Dilthey's work anticipated more recent studies of how ideas of these periods have contributed to modernity—especially the studies of Charles Taylor—although with some different emphases and conclusions.

Broadly, Dilthey had observed from the beginning of 'the fourteenth century to the beginning of the seventeenth century' a 'total shift of interest... from the otherworldly to the this-worldly... of life in the midst of the orders of what is real' (Dilthey, 1921: 322). In passages such as these, Dilthey's philosophy of life emerges: his interest in this-worldliness as a methodological principle. Broadly speaking, where Kant had argued that we cannot go behind or beyond reason, Dilthey instead claimed that we cannot go behind or beyond life ('*hinter das Leben kann man nicht zurück*'). A philosophy of life argues, in general, that it is not possible to take a stance outside or before this-worldliness (*Diesseitigkeit*).

Following Dilthey, under the conditions of modernity a kind of religious-moral inwardness increasingly came to replace metaphysics, and in such a way as to 'make human moral and religious autonomy the foundation of our intellectual life' (Dilthey, 1921: 39). Indeed, Dilthey asserted that '[t]he theological metaphysics of the Middle Ages dissolved itself' (Dilthey, 1921: 40). Dilthey thus used the language of 'inwardness', 'autonomy', and 'life' in opposition to the language of metaphysics: "Even if there were no God," the principles of natural law would maintain their independent and universal validity' (Dilthey, 1921: 280).

Drawing on Dilthey, Bonhoeffer adopts aspects of this critique of metaphysics, but extends it to religion much more broadly. Whereas for Dilthey metaphysics had become obsolete in its specific historical and religious forms, for Bonhoeffer it is the 'age of religion' as a whole that is now passing away. Bonhoeffer thus draws on Dilthey's historical narrative and analysis for his critique of religion and understanding of a religionless age. But in contrast to Dilthey, he uses the term 'religionlessness' in a positive way. For Bonhoeffer, religionlessness is simply a given or a historical fact; 'the time of religion' has come to an end (DBWE 8: 362).

Bonhoeffer is developing this new understanding of religion and religionlessness while reading Dilthey's *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (Dilthey, 1883). This helps to explain his interest in the historical forms of religion and faith. He does not simply place historical religion and faith in opposition to one another, or set them in a dialectical relationship (as Barth had done in his early theology); rather, Bonhoeffer is interested in religion *in* its historical forms. In Bonhoeffer's narrative, after the Reformation and Luther's theology, religion increasingly comes to replace faith. From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century—from deism to liberal Protestantism (i.e. from Herbert of Cherbury to Friedrich Schleiermacher)—a modern concept of religion increasingly displaces the rich concept of faith once displayed during Reformation times. So, in Bonhoeffer's understanding, religion was a historical phenomenon that had a beginning, assumed particular historical forms, and which would also come to its end. This opened the possibility of a religionless Christianity—that is, for modern ways of speaking, of Christ without religion and religious presuppositions.

Accordingly, Bonhoeffer takes up and reworks Dilthey's philosophy of life *Christologically*; he reads and appropriates Dilthey for his own theological interests and project. For Dilthey—as for Schleiermacher and other leading figures of nineteenth-century theology—the term religion had had a largely positive meaning. Dilthey had viewed religion as integral to his philosophy of life. The intention of his work, therefore, had been to draw attention to the integral connections between life and religion throughout various phases of the Renaissance and Reformation. At the same time, he had tended to be critical of those times and places that had construed religion and life as in opposition to one another (e.g. Dilthey, 1991: 137). For Dilthey, the *whole* of life was to be permeated with religion: 'God wants to be enjoyed' (Dilthey, 1991: 160). Dilthey had thus sought to promote a kind of religion that would be liveable in every here-and-now. This also meant that he had limited interest in criticizing or moving beyond religion as such—that is, he was not interested in conceiving or advancing the possibility of a 'religionlessness age' (cf. Dilthey, 1883: 138).

This indicates that Bonhoeffer's critique of religion and concept of religionlessness, while in significant respects drawing upon Dilthey's earlier critique of metaphysics, was also aiming to move beyond it. In particular, Bonhoeffer moved beyond Dilthey in ways that display Karl Barth's influence. Indeed, as already suggested, one way of framing Bonhoeffer's prison theology is as his attempt to hold together Barth's critique of religion with Dilthey's philosophy of life. Whereas Dilthey's work proceeded by drawing a

sharp contrast between life and metaphysics, Bonhoeffer's contrast is instead between life and religion. Whereas Dilthey interpreted life and 'inwardness' as integrally related, Bonhoeffer locates and develops his understanding of life with reference to Christ. These differences underlie Bonhoeffer's demand for a form of religionless Christianity. Put differently, Bonhoeffer's call for the nonreligious interpretation of biblical concepts proposed to show how Christian faith could remain integrally connected to life under the conditions of modernity and secularity.

## CHARLES TAYLOR'S ANALYSIS OF THE SECULAR AGE

---

How does Bonhoeffer's notion of religionlessness relate to more recent conceptions of secularity? The Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor, is well known for his contributions to political philosophy, the social sciences, and intellectual history more broadly. Taylor's most significant contribution to date has been his magnum opus *A Secular Age* (2007). In this book, he contests the earlier secularization thesis of Max Weber. Writing at the end of the nineteenth century, Weber had claimed that as modernity and secularization continued to unfold—through the progress of science and technology, and the extension of rational forms of authority—religion would increasingly decline and its influence would diminish. Taylor's own point of departure, then, is the fact that this is not what has happened. Over the last century, religion has instead proliferated and in places its influence has even increased. On this basis he develops an alternative account of what secularization is and what it entails. In developing this account, he provides a rich and complex set of reflections on the moral, political, and spiritual aspects of modernity.

In particular, Taylor identifies a number of complex, interrelated factors that contribute to modern secularism, many of which have close affinities with Bonhoeffer's reflections. Taylor identifies a number of these factors in his work. These include certain forms of democracy, notions of mechanistic causation as found in modern science, understandings of individual persons as autonomous and self-sufficient, an optimistic conception of human nature, an inability to relate God and religion to human suffering, understandings of God and religion as abstract and otherworldly, and a growing conviction that religion was largely responsible for violence and war.

It would be well worth examining the affinities between Taylor's reflections on all of these factors and Bonhoeffer's theology. In significant respects, Bonhoeffer's rich treatments of creation and sin, his Christology, and large parts of his *Ethics* could all be read as careful theological responses to the challenges of modern secularity and its underlying factors. In the final section of this chapter, however, I will focus on just two areas of overlap between Taylor and Bonhoeffer: their reflections on individualism and on modern science.

## TWO FEATURES OF SECULARITY: INDIVIDUALISM AND MODERN SCIENCE

---

In his theology, Bonhoeffer is highly critical of individualistic conceptions of religion. As early as his dissertation *Sanctorum Communio*, he was critical of any understanding of the church as existing simply to satisfy a need; he alleged that such a concept of church is 'construed individualistically' (DBWE 1: 159, fn. 8). He also addresses the connection between religion and individualism in his report following his year in the United States in 1931. In this report, the concept of 'religious individualism' plays a central role in his sharp critique of American theology and the American church (DBWE 10: 307, 312, 317). He also closely identifies this form of religious individualism with the philosophy of American pragmatism, with its concept of truth as located 'immanently rather than in its transcendent claim'. 'It is clear', he continues, 'that this view basically conceals a purely individualistic understanding of life that would grant happiness to each individual and yet contains very little beyond this' (DBWE 10: 314). Bonhoeffer also sees this pragmatic individualism as central to the American Protestant church, which has a 'definitively churchless individualistic character' (DBWE 10: 314). In contrast to continental Protestantism, with its confessional theology and emphasis on dogmatics, American Protestantism is grounded on a religious individualism (see DBWE 10: 317).

In his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, William James had earlier defined religion as 'the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider divine' (James, 1928: 31). According to James, religion and the experience of divinity is primarily an individual phenomenon. It is interesting to note that Charles Taylor and Bonhoeffer both articulate some similar concerns with James' definition of religion. As Iuliana Gavril has noted, 'Taylor emphasizes that the Jamesian view of religion as individual action overshadows the essentially Catholic notion of the church as a sacramental communion. In this regard, James is placed in continuity with Schleiermacher's legacy' (Gavril, 2008: 22).

In his own critique of religion, Bonhoeffer refers to and criticizes both James and Schleiermacher along these lines (cf. DBWE 1: 160; DBWE 10: 296). He also expresses similar concerns about religious individualism in relation to Herbert of Cherbury (DBWE 8: 475). And ultimately, for our interests, it is significant that Bonhoeffer extends this critique of religious individualism to include Dilthey's philosophy. For Bonhoeffer, Dilthey, much like Schleiermacher, displays a commitment to religion as an individual and private pursuit. A rejection of the concept of religious individualism is integral to Bonhoeffer's wider critique of religion.

While Taylor is not interested in developing a critique of religion per se, he too traces and criticizes the ways in which individualism was integral to both religious deism and pragmatism. His interest is to demonstrate how a certain emphasis on the individual historically led to forms of religion and philosophy that undermined more organic

connections with others and God. In particular, he identifies the Reformation as responsible for the historical emergence of this kind of individualism. For the Reformation had given particular emphasis to a *personal* commitment to God, Christ, and the church (cf. Taylor, 2007: 539).

By contrast, Bonhoeffer holds that it is through faith as ‘participation of this being of Jesus’ that religious individualism can be overcome in a ‘religionless time’ (DBWE 8: 501). And he further holds that the church in this religionless time becomes the church only ‘when it is there for others’ (DBWE 8: 503).

If there are interesting affinities between Bonhoeffer and Taylor in their criticisms of religious individualism, there are further and similar affinities between their analyses of modern science. In Taylor’s account, modern science has played an integral role in the processes of modernity and secularization. In particular, he identifies modern science with an understanding of the universe governed by efficient, mechanistic causation. An understanding of this kind precludes God’s intimate involvement in the world, and thus contributes to what Taylor identifies as the advent of the ‘immanent frame’. More broadly, as Taylor puts it, following these historical developments, ‘our lives are measured and shaped by accurate clock-reading’ (Taylor, 2007: 542). We lose any sense of transcendence as reality becomes ordered by ‘instrumental rationality’ and ‘making the best of time’ (Taylor, 2007: 542). As Taylor continues, ‘This frame constitutes a natural order, to be contrasted to a “supernatural” one, an “immanent” world, over against a possible “transcendent” one.’ Following the emergence of Galilean natural science and Baconian instrumentalism,<sup>2</sup> the natural, physical universe was no longer held to be ‘governed by exceptional laws, which may reflect the wisdom . . . of the creator’ (Taylor, 2007: 542). The result, as Taylor summarizes, is that ‘We come to understand our lives as taking place within a self-sufficient immanent order; or better, a constellation of orders, cosmic, social and moral’. It is in this way, Taylor concludes, that ‘we have come of age’ (Taylor, 2007: 543).

In contrast to this, Bonhoeffer follows Dilthey in evaluating the process of ‘coming of age’ more neutrally and even positively. He repeats Dilthey’s claim that in the early seventeenth century Bacon and Herbert of Cherbury initiated a line of thought that Grotius then carried forward: the ‘natural system of the moral world’ has been established and we must now live in a world ‘“*etsi deus non daretur*”’ (DBWE 8: 478). By locating Grotius within the philosophy of life, Bonhoeffer with Dilthey simply accepts the modern scientific world as a given.

This provides the background for Bonhoeffer’s reflection in his letter to Bethge on 16 July, 1944: ‘I’m just working gradually toward the nonreligious interpretation of biblical concepts’ (DBWE 8: 475). For Bonhoeffer, this is necessary because of the historical developments that have ‘led to the world’s autonomy’ (DBWE 8: 475). He specifically refers to the modern pursuit of autonomy in the spheres of reason, morality, and politics.

<sup>2</sup> As Taylor summarizes, ‘Bacon insists that the goal of science is not to discover a noble overall pattern in things . . . but the making of experiments which permit us to “improve the condition of mankind”’ (Taylor, 2007: 542–3).

These observations again display his careful reading of Dilthey, whom even he quotes directly before commenting that ‘In moral philosophy Montaigne and Bodin substitute rules for life for the commandments’ (DBWE 8: 475–6; cf. Dilthey, 1921: 261).

On this basis Bonhoeffer further observes that ‘God as a working hypothesis for morality, politics, and natural sciences has been overcome and done away with...’ (DBWE 8: 532). Bonhoeffer insists that we cannot return to the religious world of the middle ages, the time in which God’s presence in the world was readily discernible; or at least he insists that we can only make this return at the price of ‘intellectual honesty’ (DBWE 8: 478). The human being who has ‘come of age’ must acknowledge that we live in the world ‘*etsi deus non daretur*’. This acknowledgment thus involves a kind of ‘repentance,’ which interprets nonreligiously as ‘*ultimate* honesty’ (DBWE 8: 478).

Bonhoeffer is thus drawing on Dilthey’s analysis in constructing his own critique of religion. As outlined above, however, he is not naively and uncritically taking up Dilthey’s philosophy of life. And precisely the ways in which Bonhoeffer qualifies Dilthey are what bring him into proximity with Taylor’s ‘immanent frame’. Broadly, Taylor and Bonhoeffer agree that Dilthey’s basic conception of this-worldliness and a ‘world come of age’ is insufficient. Accordingly, they both seek to qualify and move beyond Dilthey. Taylor aims to do so through a kind of *religious* qualification of Dilthey’s philosophy of life; by contrast, Bonhoeffer pursues a *nonreligious* (but still Christological) qualification.

Taylor’s religious background and commitments play an important role in his philosophy and his critical reflections on secularity. Taylor identifies himself as a Catholic of ecumenical outlook and he describes himself as a ‘Christian who finds greatness in some facets of Islam, Judaism, Buddhism’ (Taylor, 1991: 241). Ruth Abbey has suggested that this background is integral to Taylor’s work: ‘As a Christian, Taylor believes that God is the source of goodness. He does not conceal his theism; rather he identifies it as one of the forces that drives him to question anthropocentrism’ (Abbey, 2000: 31). Taylor’s religious commitments similarly drive him to question conceptions of life as meaningful in itself or on its own terms. To be clear, Taylor pursues an ethic of ‘ordinary life’, one which encompasses all ‘those aspects of life concerned with production and reproduction—that is, labor, the making of things needed for life, and our life as sexual beings, including marriage and family’ (Taylor, 1989: 211). And he holds that there is a kind of human flourishing and happiness that is proper to work and family life. But these need to be properly understood and ordered in relation to that which transcends them.

As a Protestant theologian, Bonhoeffer agrees that truth cannot be found within an immanent frame or context. In addition, Bonhoeffer’s criticisms of a certain kind of this-worldliness have affinities with Taylor’s concerns with immanence. Bonhoeffer describes this as the ‘shallow or banal this-worldliness of the enlightened, the bustling, the comfortable, or the lascivious’ (DBWE 8: 541). In contrast, this-worldliness in the context of ‘religionless Christianity’, for Bonhoeffer, means a ‘profound this-worldliness that shows discipline and includes the ever-present knowledge of death and resurrection’ (DBWE 8: 541). This indicates how Bonhoeffer is pursuing a *Christological* qualification



of the philosophy of life; it is Christ alone who makes possible a break from the immanent frame and the embrace of life. But unlike Taylor, Bonhoeffer also thinks the world come of age can help to facilitate this movement: 'Our coming of age leads us to a truer recognition of our situation before God. . . . The same God who is with us is the God who forsakes us (Mark 15:34!)' (DBWE 8: 478–9). Ultimately, Bonhoeffer claims that this is what it means to be Christian under the conditions of modernity: 'Before God, and with God, we live without God' (DBWE 8: 479).

This leads to one final difference between Bonhoeffer's nonreligious Christological qualification and Taylor's religious one. Bonhoeffer's Christology gives greater emphasis to the *suffering* of God in the world. And in this way, it facilitates our own recognition and embrace of the suffering of others. At the heart of Bonhoeffer's late theology, then, is a question of whether Christianity has previously failed to articulate a *theologia crucis* that brings redemption. In his prison letters, Bonhoeffer resists the notion of a God who *allowed* or even *required* the human Christ to suffer (cf. Wüstenberg, 2014); he instead emphasizes that in Christ God bound himself to human nature and suffering. Here we have a God who takes humans' sin and their suffering seriously—there is no simple 'forgive and forget'. For Bonhoeffer, God enters into the human condition and situation, giving himself up simply for the sake of our reconciliation.

---

## SUGGESTED READINGS

- Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1991. *Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation* [1921], 11th Edition. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Harvey, Barry. 2016. *Taking Hold of the Real. Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Profound Worldliness of Christianity*. Eugene, OR: Cascade.
- Taylor, Charles. *A Secular Age*. 2007. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wüstenberg, Ralf K. 1998. *A Theology of Life: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Religionless Christianity*. Translated by Doug Stott. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
- Wüstenberg, Ralf K. 2014. *Christology. How do we speak of Jesus Christ today?* Translated by Martin Rumscheidt. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock.
- Zimmermann, Jens. 2012. *Incarnational Humanism A Philosophy of Culture for the Church in the World*. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.

---

## WORKS CITED

- Abbey, Ruth. 2004. *Charles Taylor*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Altizer, Thomas and William Hamilton, eds. 1968. *Radical theology and the death of God*. New edn. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Cox, Harvey 1968. *The Secular City: Secularisation and Urbanisation in Perspective*. New York, NJ: MacMillan.
- Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1883. *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.
- Gavril, Iuliana Elena. 2008. 'Religious Criticism in Contemporary Philosophical Reflection: Charles Taylor.' *European Journal of Science and Theology* 2.4: 15–28.
- James, William. 1928. *Varieties of Religious Experience*. London: Longmans.

- Loen, Arnold E. 1967. *Secularization: Science without God?* Translated by M. Kohl. London: S.C.M. Press.
- Macquarrie, John. 1967. *God and Secularity*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.
- Taylor, Charles. 1991. *The Ethics of Authenticity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Taylor, Charles. 2007. *A Secular Age*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Taylor, Charles. 1989. *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wüstenberg, Ralf K. 1998. *A Theology of Life: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Religionless Christianity*. Translated by Doug Stott. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
- Wüstenberg, Ralf K. 2014. *Christology. How do we speak of Jesus Christ today?* Translated by Martin Rumscheidt. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock.
- Zimmermann, Jens. 2012. *Incarnational Humanism A Philosophy of Culture for the Church in the World*. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.