




Pericles

Policy recommendation and improved communication tools for law enforcement and security agencies preventing violent radicalization

 Ref. Ares(2020)1870955 - 01/04/2020

Prevention of radicalisation in selected European countries

A comprehensive report of the state of the art in counter-radicalisation

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Result Report

This report provides an overview of the current measures used for the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation in selected European countries.

The countries taken into account have shown a diverse range of prevention measures. Generally, these countries have initiated programmes and projects that tackle different forms of extremism. However, the countries differ in their theoretical approaches and their implementation (a detailed description of the country-specific approaches can be found within chapter 4 and 5). Although the countries provide preventative measures, various improvements are still needed.

One key issue includes the lack of proper scientific evaluations being performed on prevention measures. Moreover, the majority of the preventive measures analysed in this report were developed as a reactive approach to terrorism and often exist as short-duration projects or programmes. However, long-term measures are needed to effectively prevent the onset of terrorism and radicalisation. Furthermore, it appears promising to enhance the collaboration between national practitioners as well as to expand on the number of Islamic counselling services in correctional centres.

The report is the first of a sequence of three reports that together will produce policy recommendations for the prevention of radicalisation in Europe.

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This project has received funding from the *European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme* under grant agreement No 740773

Document Evolution:

Version	Date	Note of Modification
V1.1	24.08.2017	First version of the report
V1.2	24.09.2017	Second version of the report
V1.3	22.11.2018	Third version of the report
V1.4	15.10.2019	Fourth version of the report

Proposal for citation:

Kudlacek, D. et al. (2017): Prevention of radicalisation in selected European countries. A comprehensive report of the state of the art in counter-radicalisation. Hannover: Kriminologisches Forschungsinstitut Niedersachsen.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Current developments in Europe have once again shown a need for scientific investigations on processes of radicalisation. The combination of terrorist attacks in European countries, and the observation that currently between 5000 and 6000 people with European citizenship have decided to leave Europe to fight for terror groups in Syria and Iraq, has made clear that the concept and impact of radicalisation in modern times is highly relevant¹. Nevertheless, the phenomenon is nothing new as political extremist groups have existed all over Europe before 9/11 prior to the rise of ISIS.

Since the 1970s, Western Europe has experienced roughly 16,500 attacks with a violent extremism background. Before analysing this phenomenon further, this report provides definitions to some fundamental terms in the area of violent extremism, specifically what constitutes violent extremism, radicalisation and terrorism. However, it should be stressed that universally agreed definitions for these terms remain open for discussion. For example, the European Commission (n.d.) uses the term radicalisation in the following way: “Radicalisation in this sense is understood as a complex phenomenon of people embracing radical ideology that could lead to the commitment of terrorist acts”.

The Netherlands General Intelligence Security Service (AIVD) understands the term radicalisation as an “(active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect)” (General Intelligence and Security Service, 2007).

A further definition comes from the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). They define radicalisation as “the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect social change” (Allen, 2007).


These examples of different definitions demonstrate a worldwide discourse. Therefore, it is provisionally established that radicalisation could

¹ Europol (2017). TeSat Report. European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. The Hague, Netherlands.

be a (complex) process of changing behaviour and core values in an extreme way, so that radicalised individuals are ready to use violence to change general social values or commit terrorist acts. For the term violent extremism, we refer to the definition supplied by Neumann (2010). Here, violent extremism is described as the use of violence or the threat thereof to achieve ideological, religious or political goals. The final term to be defined concerns terrorism, which is seen in this report as an act that may seriously damage or seriously threaten a population, country or its fundamental political, economic and social structure (Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism).

Between the years 1970 and 2000, attacks with an Islamist extremist background were relative scarce. Since 9/11, Islamist terrorist attacks from the militant group al-Qaida opened a wider dimension among the different forms of extremism. Western Europe alone saw more than 260 incidents of religious extremism between January 2001 and December 2016; more than 100 of these incidents could be identified as an Islamist-motivated attack (see image below for overview).

Figure 1: Overview of Islamic terror acts in Europe



Own calculation based on the data from Global Terrorism Database. Online available: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>. [18.08.2017]

This new dimension brought to light the importance of understanding the drivers for radicalisation and the process itself. Previous research from

the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) in Germany has since shown that radicalised people often do not have political motives. Instead, such individuals search for security, life orientation, recognition, adventure or power; ideologies are often seen a secondary motive. The lives of the perpetrators are very often characterized by poor living conditions, unemployment or precarious employment, educational disadvantage, and accompanying developmental stress, thus resembling that of other delinquent youths (“Forschungsprojekte des BKA zu Terrorismus/Extremismus,” 2017).

Dramatic changes in the availability and effectiveness of communication tools, especially the internet, have brought new opportunities to those who seek to propagate extremist ideas and to those who seek to prevent the spread of violence promoting ideology. In their latest analysis, Gruber and Lützing (2017) showed that more than 2000 projects (in 2014/2015 alone) exist in Germany that deal thematically with the prevention of radicalisation, counter-radicalisation and violent extremism. Despite the ongoing research on the challenges of extremism and radicalisation, the number of successful counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation strategies remain few and far between. Therefore, the aim of this report is to provide an overview of preventative projects currently in Europe. This will be a series of reports portraying the situation of violent extremism and prevention measures in selected European countries, specifically, Belgium, Bosnia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. The next report will gather information to perform a gap analysis in order to magnify sectors broadly targeted by violent extremism and radicalisation, and where possible, identify improvement strategies.

The current report is structured as followed: chapter 2 outlines the approach of the report. Chapter 3 provides a summary of the results from previous comprehensive projects; these are SAFIRE, IMPACT Europe and the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). Chapter 4 presents the current situation of selected European countries with regards to radicalisation prevention and response; this will focus on right-wing, left-wing and Islamic extremism. The report ends with chapter 6, which presents a summary of the findings. The conclusions reached in chapter 6 will inform the direction of the gap analysis that will be implemented in the following report.

2 APPROACH

The purpose of the report is to present a current overview of ongoing projects for the prevention of violent radicalisation in Europe. This will provide a theoretical basis that will inform other project outputs, specifically in developing the Pericles toolkit. As several measures offered in Pericles are based on an enhanced version of available tools, this deliverable provides an examination of the radicalisation prevention measures which are in use in Europe.

The countries that were selected to provide the current state of practice basis for EU members state as put forward in Chapter 4, were selected on the consortium's ability to conduct both primary and secondary research in these areas. For reasons of practicality, we selected countries based on the ease of obtaining detailed information, access to the investigated projects, and knowledge of the working language used by the countries or organisations running the described projects. Each country detailed in Chapter 4 was initially based on the nationality and research contacts of the consortium.

As the number of preventive counter-radicalisation interventions is too large for a comprehensive overview, current considered "best practice" projects were chosen by the agreement of the Pericles consortium. These projects are important contributions towards a comprehensive approach specifically developed for the European region and its particular circumstances.

These are:

- SAFIRE – An EU funded project exploring the factors that make society susceptible radicalisation including background analyses of radicalisation, democracy and prison systems.
- IMPACT Europe – An FP7 project aimed at tackling radicalisation through enhanced understanding of what works and how practitioners can improve their prevention efforts.
- Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) – A network of frontline practitioners, which provides a platform to exchange the latest knowledge and practises concerning radicalisation.

To take into account the diversity of the field across Europe, an individualised method was adopted at the first stage.

3 PREVIOUS RESULTS FROM EUROPEAN COMPREHENSIVE PROJECTS

3.1 SAFIRE: SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO FINDING INDICATORS OF & RESPONSES TO RADICALISATION

FP7 EU project SAFIRE (Scientific Approach to Finding Indicators of & Responses to Radicalisation; 2010-2013) focused on providing a scientific understanding of the radicalisation phenomenon from its roots to violent expressive stages by developing a non-linear model of the radicalisation process on the basis of radical groups typologies and cultural aspects. The goal of SAFIRE was to increase understanding of the radicalisation process. A more basic understanding of what the radicalisation process is, what drives people to move from moderate points of view to more extreme philosophies and the commission of violent acts, and what can be done to intervene in this process.

The basic assumption of SAFIRE was that radical individuals and groups should be viewed in terms of

- their characteristics (i.e., individuals' home life, education level or personality traits, and groups' links to other groups, internal power structure or internal cohesion)
- their behaviours (in particular, behaviours that indicate extremeness, such as expressed ideas, contacts with other radicals, or preparations for violent acts)
- their interaction with their environment².

SAFIRE looked at the environment on the macro level and on the micro level. On the macro level, the environment refers to, for example, cultural, historical or legal contexts. For example, not all cultures are equally susceptible to the emergence of extreme radical actors, because of, among other things, a lack of citizen participation in the political process and historical factors such as an historical intergroup conflict. On the micro level, SAFIRE looked at the individual's or group's own personal context, such as the social or physical environment. This level is about the perception of the environment, which is why two people from the same environment

² More information on the SAFIRE project, including detailed descriptions of project results, can be found at <http://www.safire-project-results.eu/>.

can have completely different views on this environment (Griffioen-Young & van Vliet, 2013).

Radicalisation is, however, usually not the result of the individual, group, or environmental factors alone. The approach taken in SAFIRE was to construct conceptual networks of radicalisation factors. What are relevant factors in the radicalisation process of individuals and groups, and how do these factors relate? Developing a better conceptual understanding of the dynamics of radicalisation meant bringing together in a network all knowledge about individual, group and contextual factors. In this network the dots were connected by identifying links among the various factors, which paved the way for empirically testing these links, some of them in the SAFIRE project. Thus, each person and each group are a unique combination of their characteristics, their context, and hence their behaviour.

In addition to constructing networks of radicalisation factors at individual and cultural levels, the SAFIRE project examined effectiveness of intervention programmes. It was found that intervention programmes that were considered to be effective, focussed mainly on the individual's psychological experience (Griffioen-Young & van Vliet, 2013). Examples are programmes that help participants create a positive personal identity or reduce negative emotions. Programmes that focussed on the individual's relationship to the external world were not found to be very effective, such as programmes that focus on restoring the acceptance of authorities. In addition, a programme is more effective if the participants can identify with and trust the people who carry out the programme. Thus, it is possible to intervene in radicalisation – but one size does not fit all.

Radicalisation is often seen as an unusual process, perhaps because it is difficult for us to imagine ourselves being a radical. However, SAFIRE repeatedly found that radicalisation may not be so unusual. In many ways, radicalisation seems to be "normal" socialization that can deviate from the common path. In other words, radicalisation is an extreme version of a basically normal process. As a consequence, radicalisation is not so different from other forms of deviation from the social average and should therefore not be treated differently. Effective de-radicalisation programmes domain may therefore resemble programmes used to handle other issues such as criminal behaviour.

As mentioned above, there is no unifying 'terrorist profile'. By reviewing available evidence in the literature and known cases of radicalisation, the SAFIRE project identified 35 factors contributing to the radicalisation of known terrorists. The most common factors were political activism, an inability to affect political change, indoctrination, violent tendencies, and ex-

perience of political and personal events. From the project findings, it appears that radicals are characterised by a lack of trust: in themselves, in the people around them, in society and in authorities. It should be noted that these factors are not causes of radicalisation but merely indicators, and they change over time.

SAFIRE results demonstrate that not all EU Member States support intervening in the pre-violent stage of radicalisation. Furthermore, it depends on the various factors of a society whether a person would radicalise. In order to prevent radicalisation, various influences must be identified and detected as relevant factors. Network studies help to accompany interventions, so that interventions can be targeted at the right time. SAFIRE identified various key points in different radicalised groups, thereby the complexity of radical groups would be underlined.

The main conclusions of the SAFIRE project instigated the EU FP7 project IMPACT that was launched in the year the SAFIRE project finished.

3.2 IMPACT EUROPE: INNOVATIVE METHOD AND PROCEDURE TO ASSESS COUNTER-VIOLENT-RADICALISATION TECHNIQUES IN EUROPE

Since the attacks in New York, Madrid and London, dealing with violent radicalisation and extremism has become a top priority for the EU and its Member States. European countries have invested heavily in policies and interventions aimed at preventing and combating violent radicalisation and extremism over the last decade. One difficulty here is how to measure the effectiveness of those interventions: what is the focus of the measurement, how is this measured, and how to target an evaluation? To this end, the FP7 project IMPACT Europe (Innovative Method and Procedure to Assess counter-violent-radicalisation Techniques in Europe; 2013-June 2017) developed an online tool kit for policy makers and practitioners, such as police, teachers and community workers³. In addition, a database was developed with an overview of many interventions and the effectiveness of interventions. Finally, a training and training manual were also developed to support learning activities related to the use of the toolkit.

³ More information about the IMPACT Europe project, including project deliverables, can be found at <http://impacteurope.eu/>.

3.2.1 Inventory of state of the art

Within the context of this project, a state of the art inventory was performed on radicalisation factors leading to terrorism and violent extremism, the projects and programmes used to tackle radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism, and the methods employed to evaluate their effectiveness. The results are described in the synthesis report on the project website (Van Hemert et al., 2014). The state-of-the-art inventory took the form of a relations database, in which all relevant aspects of radicalisation, interventions, and evaluations, as they appeared in the literature, were coded in their relation with other aspects. The result was a database including more than 200,000 relations, allowing for more traditional descriptive analyses (see below), as well as network analyses (see project website).

3.2.1.1 Interventions

In the sample of 100 interventions, a large amount (more than 30%) was focused on Islamic extremism; the remaining interventions are primarily focused on right-wing and left-wing extremists. The IMPACT project compared the goals of the intervention programs across the different target groups of the interventions and found that across all ideologies most interventions were aimed at preventing radicalisation (inhibit) except for right-wing extremism, where most effort was directed at working with already radicalised individuals.

Generally, the interventions focus on improving the knowledge and/or skills of the target group (for example, increasing understanding and awareness, strengthen social skills). The interventions to increase knowledge and skills tend to target prevention and mitigation of radicalisation, using educational activities (such as training, dialogue and exchange of information), and to a lesser extent, social activities (such as with parents and peers). Although the emphasis on improving knowledge is understandable, the project team concluded that this also could be a caveat. Especially for targets emotionally involved in certain ways of thinking, or who feel affiliated with a certain group, the incorporation of new knowledge could be obstructed by their emotional involvement, reducing the effectiveness of the intervention. Thus, it could be beneficial to focus on a combination of emotion regulation and providing knowledge, for example using more therapeutic emotional regulation techniques.

Compared with other interventions, interventions targeted at right-wing extremists centred their methodology on group affiliation, interventions targeted at left-wing extremists centred their methodology on norms, and interventions targeted at Islamist extremists centred their methodology on


self-identity and emotions. For example, interventions aimed at right-wing extremists have often 'disengagement' aims (e.g., Exit Deutschland, where the target group is disengaged from their extremist environment).

The strength of the IMPACT Europe interventions database is the multitude of aspects in interventions that were studied, varying from intervention goals and methods to mechanisms used to achieve the goals. The weakness of this study is the relatively limited size of the sample of interventions; although 100 interventions seem like a large number, it is only a (representative) sample of everything that is out there.

3.2.1.2 Evaluations

Part of IMPACT Europe deals with a state-of-the-art study of the methods employed to evaluate the effectiveness of projects and programmes used to tackle radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism. This study showed that there is a lack of empirical evidence for the effectiveness of interventions. Also, studies that do evaluate programmes or project often specify no method or instrument. Of the 126 evaluations of de-radicalisation projects studied by the IMPACT Europe consortium, 64% were considered to be of low quality. Overall, interventions for right-wing extremists (in particular Exit Deutschland-type of interventions, where the target group is disengaged from their extremist environment) appear to achieve better results than interventions aimed at Islamic extremism.

An analysis of evaluation instruments that were being used in the 126 evaluations compared to the feasible alternatives for these particular evaluations, as judged by a team of methodologists, showed that evaluation methods were not optimally used and could often be replaced by methodologically sounder alternatives (see Figure below).

Figure 2: Evaluation methods and alternatives

Source: Van Hemert, D. (2017). State of the Art: Radicalisation, interventions and evaluations. Presentation at the IMPACT Europe End Event, IMPACT Europe "Preventing and tackling violent extremism – what works best?", May 31, 2017, Brussels.

It was concluded that most of the (few) evaluations carried out are methodologically insufficient. In order to succeed evaluations must (1) be based on quantitative data, which make it possible to carry out meta-analyses, and (2) be implemented already in the development stage of the interventions.

3.2.1.3 Conclusion of the inventory

Based on the inventory of radicalisation factors, interventions, and evaluations it was concluded that a multi-dimensional approach, such as the approach taken in IMPACT Europe, could enhance sense making (cf. the SAFIRE project, described in the previous paragraph). A relations database is flexible for use by different types of professionals with different interests and requirements.

Another important conclusion was that researchers need to be open with end users about the lack of evidence for the effectiveness of interventions. As 64% of counter-violent radicalisation assessments were judged to be of low quality, end users cannot automatically trust that the intervention of their choice is effective. More research needs to be done on effectiveness of interventions and practitioners need to be supported in monitoring the effectiveness of their interventions.

3.2.2 IMPACT Europe toolkit

The project team developed an online toolkit to help practitioners correctly evaluate their interventions, programmes and initiatives aimed at preventing and countering violent radicalisation and extremism, using the most appropriate and scientifically robust methods.

The toolkit consists of three main parts, i.e., the evaluation guide, the interventions database (as described above), and the lessons learned. The *evaluation guide* provides information about designing and conducting CVE (countering violent extremism) evaluations, helping users to think through their evaluation plan, i.e., planning an evaluation of a CVE intervention and conducting an evaluation of a CVE intervention. The *interventions database* allows for searching for examples of well-designed interventions by different variables, within three categories: interventions, radicalisation factors and evaluations. As mentioned before, the scientific literature does not present evaluations yet for many interventions in the CVE domain. Therefore, this section provides examples of alternative approaches, which are potentially relevant to CVE, such as restorative justice, exit counselling, and internet addiction prevention. Finally, the *lessons learned* section of the toolkit presents learning from previous evaluations of CVE interventions, and allows end users to contribute to collective knowledge by uploading new evidence to the toolkit.

3.3 RAN – RADICALISATION AWARENESS NETWORK

While preventing and countering radicalisation and extremism is the responsibility of individual Member States, the EU seeks to provide support to members in their endeavours. Indeed, the prevention of radicalisation has been one of the main pillars of the EU's counter terrorism policy for over a decade. The Radicalisation Awareness Network and its Centre of Excellence is one of the major policy tools to deliver the objectives of implementing deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes (including in prisons), developing approaches for handling returning foreign terrorist fighters, equipping teachers and youth workers in addressing the root causes of radicalisation, and strengthening resilience of young people. The Radicalisation Awareness Network, set up in 2011 and funded by the European Commission, is an umbrella network connecting people involved in preventing radicalisation and violent extremism throughout Europe. Within RAN, practitioners from different European countries can meet others in their area of expertise to exchange ideas, knowledge and experiences on countering radicalisation and violent extremism. RAN connects practitioners, field experts, social workers, teachers, NGOs, civil so-

ciety organisations, victims' groups, local authorities, law enforcement, academics and others. In RAN Working Groups, frontline practitioners may share their extensive knowledge and first-hand experience with one another, and peer review each other's practices.

3.3.1 RAN Working Groups

RAN Working Groups enable frontline practitioners from around Europe to exchange expertise on radicalisation and to gather to address local challenges and issues relating to violent extremism. Best practice can be explored, and shared and lasting productive relationships are built amongst practitioners and experts. Ran has nine working groups:

- Communication and Narratives (RAN C&N): Focuses on countering and challenging extremist propaganda, both on and off-line, developing communication tools that provide alternatives to extremist ideas.
- Education (RAN EDU): Focuses on equipping and empowering teachers and the education sector to deal with radicalisation.
- EXIT RAN (RAN EXIT): Focuses on empowering individuals to move from a radicalised and violent mindset towards mainstream society through the use of deradicalisation and disengagement programmes.
- Youth, Families and Communities (RAN YF&C): Examines how best to support and engage youth, families and communities confronted with radicalisation.
- Local Authorities (RAN LOCAL): The focus is on sharing information between local authorities on local multi-agency approaches and strategies.
- Prison and Probation (RAN P&P): Analysing the effects of prison regimes, reintegration programmes and tailor-made interventions for convicted terrorists.
- Police and Law Enforcement (RAN POL): Identifying effective police approaches including training, the use of social media and the forging of trust-based relationships with families and communities.
- Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism (RAN RVT): Maintaining a network of victims or terrorism and organising the 11 March 'European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism'.

- Health and Social Care (RAN H&SC): Raising awareness among health and social workers on their role in identifying and supporting those vulnerable to radicalisation.

3.3.2 *The Ran Collection*

The RAN Collection is a comprehensive and regularly updated manual that provides insights into the network's expertise and experience. It presents seven approaches to preventing and countering radicalisation leading to violent extremism—such as 'alternative narratives' and 'family support'. For each approach, the collection presents the methodology, concrete practices and lessons learned. Front-line practitioners and policy-makers can draw inspiration from this practical, evolving and growing tool, find examples to adapt to their local specific context, and identify counterparts with whom to exchange prevention experiences. As a work in progress, the RAN Collection is continuously adjusted and enhanced with new practices from EU/EEA Member States, with the most recent update released in August 2017.

3.3.3 *RAN Manual: Responses to Returnees*

RAN delivered on a major piece of work with the publication of its Responses to Returnees Manual in July 2017. The manual was composed in response to concerns within Europe regarding the return of citizens who had travelled to conflict zones. RAN believes that it is vital that local practitioners have all the necessary guidance and support to handle these returns in a safe and appropriate manner. The manual provides concrete examples of practices being used around Europe, as well as individual case studies, and includes a list of practitioner recommendations for EU Member States. As well as background information on foreign terrorist fighter returnees, the manual has individual chapters on:

- Investigation and risk assessment;
- Multi-agency agreement on intervention;
- The prosecution route;
- The non-prosecution route / resocialisation;
- Child returnees;
- Cross-cutting issues (gender differentiation, communication, local communication).

3.3.4 The Centre of Excellence

The RAN Centre of Excellence (CoE) acts as a hub for connecting, developing and disseminating expertise. The CoE coordinates and supports RAN, and seeks to encourage dialogue between policy-makers, academics and practitioners. The RAN CoE consolidates expertise in accessible Policy and Issue Papers that are published online. Ministers and other high-level policy-makers also attend the annual High Level Conference to discuss the prevention of radicalisation with practitioners and other experts. The RAN CoE, financed by the European Commission Internal Security Fund, takes care of logistics, technical and administrative support. In addition, the CoE feeds RAN with academic insights into the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism. The aim is to disseminate new research findings to practitioners and policy-makers, and to address gaps in the supply of academic research. The CoE also works with the European Commission to structure its research agenda and works with anti-radicalisation bodies inside and outside of the EU.

The wealth of knowledge and practices collected within RAN can be tailored to support national authorities upon request through training, workshops or counselling. The RAN CoE offers support to individual EU Member States efforts to tackle radicalisation leading to violent extremism. The support can include a 'Train-the-Trainer' course based on the lessons learned within the RAN working groups and tailored to the local circumstances; workshops on a specific topic for a group of Member States that provides practical guidance to national authorities; or the deployment of a RAN advisory team to support national authorities revising a national prevent strategy, reviewing a relevant policy area, or developing a key project plan or building a national network/coordination hub for practitioners.

RAN supports civil society organisations in providing alternative narratives and sharing moderate voices by helping to produce and disseminate these messages effectively online. The Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP) supports civil society, grass roots organisations and credible voices, and is coordinated by the RAN CoE. RAN offers training that equips civil society organisations with the skills needed to design and implement an effective, convincing and credible online campaign, and to ensure it reaches the target audience.

3.3.5 Gender

Furthermore, our report shows that gender focused work across Europe receives hardly any attention in the field of prevention. Those few projects or national programmes that include gender sensitivity do so as a sideline. For example, the "the national programme against right-wing extremism

for democracy and human rights” in Germany aims to sensitise governmental organisations to cosmopolitanism, this includes gender sensitivity among others. Additionally, the programme trains professionals to recognise right-wing attitudes and to handle these attitudes professionally and in a gender-sensitive manner. Fewer projects put an actual emphasis on gender or gender-related behaviours and thereby a reduced emphasis on women and/or girls. However, gender and gender related issues are essential for understanding and prevention radicalisation. Moreover, it is important to develop gender-specific approaches (Weilnböck, 2013). The RAN working group on radicalisation and the “Women in Extremism Network” identified the following insights which work for both right-wing and religious motivated extremism. Firstly, women (as perpetrators, ideologues and supporters) play a relevant role in radicalisation. For example, the number of women who left for Syria to join the IS has increased. Secondly, the majority of extremists or hate crime offenders possess sexist and homophobic attitudes. Thirdly, gender related issues are powerful psychological forces that cause radicalisation (Weilnböck, 2014). Furthermore, it is important to study the multivariate and complex reason why women join the IS or why they adapt extremist attitudes (Ranstorp et al., 2015). Even RAN, a well-established counter-radicalisation network in Europe, has not been evaluated yet. Just customer satisfaction surveys of RAN workshops have been conducted (Weilnböck, 2018b).

Good practice in preventing

The idea of quality standards and best practices for preventing extremism pops up frequently. Therefore, organisations and networks arrange workshops to generate principles and quality criteria. Mostly, the principles developed are not well documented. Consequently, it is difficult to implement these quality standards to check if organisations and practitioners actually stick to these standards. However, with the help of colleagues from “RAN Prevent” and other working groups, “RAN Derad” developed a declaration of good practices in preventing extremism and hate crime, which was also declared in writing. The declaration is based on several international practitioner workshops each with approximately 25 participants, smaller focus groups and individual interviews with practitioners from all over Europe. Within the workshops, the practitioners exchanged experiences about conditions of work, target groups, methodological approaches, best practices, and their work in general. The practitioners who came from Europe worked in different areas of prevention and were in contact with different clients. In total, around 80 practitioners have been involved in developing a guideline for good practices in prevention extremism and hate crime. Additionally, these guidelines have been enhanced with results of the evaluation of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees’ counselling

centre “radicalisation”. Besides the guidelines, which empathise on the actual work with clients, the practitioners also discussed the structural and context factors, especially in a political sense, in which extremism prevention is embedded (Weilnböck, 2018a).

According to the declaration, a successful approach for deradicalisation is an open process, which includes the following characteristics:

- focus on the development of emotional intelligence;
- occurrence within group settings,
- importance of biographical, familial, gender-related, and power issues,
- use of civic education and fictional or cultural texts,
- inclusion of family members, community and civil society,
- combination of accepting and confrontational modes of interaction
- quality control (Weilnböck, 2013).

Furthermore, trust and voluntary engagement (of the clients) plays a crucial role in preventing extremism. The best way to convey these characteristics is through skilled and trained non-governmental practitioners who do not depend on governmental institutions. Nevertheless, support of governmental staff is important and necessary. Moreover, successful approaches put an emphasis on narrative (which means sharing personally experiences and memories) and relationship-building models. The developed best practices are useful for all forms of hate crime and extremism, whether religious or political motivated. Furthermore, the guidelines apply for various clients (Weilnböck, 2013). Unfortunately, RAN did not continue to use the declaration of best practices. Within the second financing period in 2016, new structures emerged that pushed the declaration to one side (Weilnböck, 2018a). Still, these developed principles are essential and should be a starting point for future initiatives regarding best practices in preventing extremism.

4 PRIMARY RESEARCH: GENERAL PREVENTION PROGRAMMES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

4.1 BELGIUM

4.1.1 *Overview of the current situation in Belgium*

Belgium has produced the greatest number of Western foreign fighters per capita in Iraq and Syria (van Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016). The estimated number of Belgian foreign fighters lies around the 500, the high-end estimate of Belgian foreign fighters lies at more than 614 people. As of mid-2016, more than 30 people returning from the conflict zone have been tried or convicted on terrorism-related charges. The number of returnees will probably rise since ISIS is more and more under pressure in Iraq and Syria. Jihadist recruitment is typically conducted through informal networks of friends and family, as well as through social media outlets online. The Brussels suburb of Molenbeek has come under scrutiny and is known for a set of conditions believed to be conducive to radicalisation. Sharia4Belgium, a violent extremist group, aspired to institute sharia (Islamic law) in Belgium. The group was known to have made extreme and violent statements, and it is believed that the existence of this group has facilitated other groups to radicalise, and in fact functioned as a supporting infrastructure. According to Belgium's State Security Service, nearly 5 percent of all prisoners in Belgium – 450 prisoners in all – pose a radicalisation threat as of 2017 (Counter Extremism Project, 2017). Other foreign suspects with ties to Belgian jihadist networks carry a prior criminal record. The number of attacks in recent years has highlighted the country's ongoing struggle to monitor terror suspects and effectively prevent radicalisation and terrorism. The Brussels terrorist attacks were the deadliest in the country's history. Despite Belgium's efforts to improve its national security since the Brussels attacks, the country has continued to experience lone-wolf terror attacks, for example: On the morning of March 22, 2016, three suicide bombings happened in Belgium. Two of them occurred at Brussels airport. Approximate one hour later, the third bombing took place at a metro station in the city. The three explosions killed 32 people and injured 340 people, the three perpetrators also died. The terror militia Islamic State (ISIS) claimed the responsibility for this attack ("Brussels explosions: What we know about airport and metro attacks," 2016). In 2013, the government started radicalisation-prevention programmes to

address the rising trend of foreign fighters. In addition, in 2015, Belgium established a task force to create a national counterterrorism and counter-extremism strategy.

4.1.2 BOUNCE Resilience Tools

BOUNCE is a package of three training and awareness-raising tools for youngsters and their social environment. The BOUNCE tools are designed to serve as preventive measures before concerns about violent radicalisation arise. The three tools (BOUNCE Young, BOUNCE Along and BOUNCE Up) are interconnected and complement each other. BOUNCE emancipates youngsters and their network to become resilient and to interact with an aware environment. BOUNCE Young is a resilience training programme for youngsters. In 10 interactive group trainings, youngsters train and strengthen different aspects of their resilience. Through a mix of action and reflection, a wide range of skills and competences are strengthened, practiced and linked to their personal experiences. A BOUNCE Young training is always used in combination with BOUNCE Along awareness-raising actions for parents and frontline workers. The tool provides tips, insights and practical exercises for adults in the social environment of youngsters. It assists them and strengthens their role in the early prevention of violent radicalisation.

BOUNCE Along treats five topics: 'a positive point of view', 'strengthening resilience', 'resilient relations and communication', 'concerns and challenging situations', and 'information and support'.

BOUNCE Up is a train-the-trainer tool for frontline workers. This tool instructs them in working with the BOUNCE Young resilience training programme and the BOUNCE Along awareness-raising tool. By combining both tools, trainers can become an important supporting figure in the early and positive prevention of violent radicalisation. Trainers assist youngsters as well as their social environment and set up an integrated and integral approach, tailored to the needs of the target groups.

BOUNCE is the result of '*Strengthening Resilience against Violent Radicalisation (STRESAVIORA)*' (2013-2015), a European Commission ISEC programme, led by Arktos, a knowledge institute for the Department of Home Affairs.

4.1.3 Drop Out Prevention Network and Fostering Cooperation between Local Authorities and Schools.

The City of Antwerp invested in an education policy division with the mission that 'all schools in the City of Antwerp will work together with the city

services to ensure that children, teenagers and youngsters get and take the opportunity to develop competences and obtain qualifications that lead to a wide personal formation and gives them access to higher education and/or the labour market.' Together with partners in the support and prevention network, unqualified and early school leaving, grade retention, truancy and cross border behaviour, radicalisation, expulsion, inequality and the gap between education and labour market is tackled. The partners in the network are:

- Local educational forums and projects
- Schools and pupil guidance centres
- Local welfare facilities and health services
- Justice department and police
- Flemish employment services and job centres

This network helps in the detection and follow up of youngsters with a problematic school career. Since 2003 there is a Central Help Desk (CHD) to link the youngster mostly within one week to a partner in the project in the support and guidance network to avoid expulsion from school or when already expelled to work towards reintegration as quickly as possible. In 2013 the CHD started monitoring and follow up of possibly radicalised youngsters and groups of youngsters in schools. Part of the CHD-team got specialised training to enable them to identify and follow up on these phenomena. The CHD can be consulted by the schools and the pupil guidance centres as well as by the 'radicalisation antenna' in the culture, sport and youth departments of the city.

4.1.3.1 Athena-syntax Where Art and Education Meet

This educational project is part of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). It is built upon common values: any interaction in the school presupposes the acknowledgement of universal human rights; mutual respect; freedom of choice; freedom of the individual; freedom of speech; equality between man and woman; secularism and dogma-free scientific research. These values are actively translated into a cycle of four universal themes, throughout the school years and across the different subjects. The four themes are: time, choice, space and human start from the student's own views. During the first years 'discover', during year 3 and 4 'encounter and for the last 2 years a dialogue is undertaken regarding societal themes, using the various religions and worldviews to offer diverse perspectives on these themes 'evolve'. Teachers, invited speakers and artists express different views each from their individual angle. The

interreligious and philosophical dialogues are placed in a learning pathway that is linked to educational outcomes and active citizenship. The Athena-Syntax project offers a structure for teachers and for students, by means of a horizontal dialogue based on core values. Motivated, professional artists work with students outside of the classroom. The topics are always prepared beforehand in class, in an interdisciplinary way. Then the artists and students are set to work. Students are given the space to experience the joy of creative expression through their artworks, a free space in which they can channel any questions, remarks, emotions, frustrations or fears they might have in a positive way. Several exhibitions have been organized and numerous debates, presentations, excursions and workshops were also organized.

4.1.4 Family Support

The project Family Support aims to fight (violent) radicalisation in Belgium by also supporting the families of radicalising youngsters or youngsters 'at risk'. Families are an important protective factor in dealing with radicalisation. Often family members are the first ones who pick up signals of radicalising youngsters. They can be a sounding board for youngsters who have doubts or who are disillusioned. Families can also play an important role in the reintegration and aftercare of relatives who returned from conflict areas. Because the policy regarding family support in cases of radicalisation is currently fragmented in Belgium, families have a hard time to find their way to support and accompaniment. As a result, the Directorate-General for Security and Prevention (CPR) aims to establish a coordinated policy model with this project. An evidence-based family support model for Belgium will contribute to the decrease of the risk that individuals join violent extremist groups. Besides, the project Family Support also wants to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable families against violent radicalism. Because of this, the resilience of the local community is also strengthened against radicalisation that may lead to terrorism or violent extremism.

Concretely, this project aims to realise a coordinated policy model that brings together policy and practice at the national level to create a framework for an evidence-based family support model for Belgium. For this, a multi-agency approach is used, in which actors of the entire security chain related to family support in the framework of radicalisation and foreign fighters, are deployed. This targets individuals in all phases of radicalisation, from support in case of early signalling, the involvement of a family member in (violent) extremist activities, and the reintegration and aftercare of returnees from war zones.

To reach this strategic goal a number of operational goals were formulated:

- Mapping all family-supporting actions and projects that exist in the country in the fight against radicalisation. The results of this ‘mapping’ are integrated in the guide. This goal is executed by ODISEE (Higher Institute for Family Studies) and CEDEM (Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies).
- Creating a national Family Support Network consisting of the relevant actors of the security chain to acquire knowhow, to exchange information and to share good practices. The network ideally consists of organisations from the civil society, local actors from cities and municipalities and actors of the regions.
- Organising ‘train-the-trainer’ workshops for mainly frontline workers (grassroots level) to expand the expertise, but possibly also for other actors that are closely involved in families and the phenomenon of radicalisation. This is executed by CBAI (Brussels Intercultural Action Centre) and a Dutch-speaking partner.
- Bringing together a multidisciplinary expert platform consisting of about 15 experts (such as researchers, psychologists, jurists, Muslim consultants and education experts) to elaborate on specific or current themes and to offer tailor-made consultancy.
- Drawing up a ‘best practice guide’ on the basis of the ‘mapping’ and the progress and end results of the project as a tool for support. Also executed by ODISEE and CEDEM.
- Organising a ‘best practice conference’ to present the guide with interactive workshops for the implementation of the support of this guide.

4.1.5 The Prevention Pyramid

The prevention pyramid is an instrument that can be used to orient and achieve insights into how to optimise one’s policy for the prevention of radicalisation. It consists of five levels, each one being as important as the one that lies above. The 5 levels can be divided into two parts: on the one hand prevention focuses on the broad wellbeing of people and broader society. The upper levels are the more urgent, problem-oriented and are geared towards immediate preventive measures. Every level in the pyramid is essential in order to secure an effective policy to prevent

radicalisation. The prevention pyramid consists of five, distinct levels. The difference lies in the degree of problem-orientation.

- Level 0: Broad, societal context: political, social, cultural, ecological
- Level 1: Improvement of the living environment
- Level 2: General prevention
- Level 3: Specific prevention
- Level 4: Tackling the problem

Level 0: broader society

Examples: conditioning context, surge of security-oriented society, renewed societal segmentation of the Belgian population due to influx of diverse groups, international developments regarding extremism.

Level 1: general climate, oriented towards improving quality

Examples in the context of extremism: positive basic sphere with respect for pluralism and diversity, wealth of diversity as the basis for the pedagogical project, attention to diversity in the classroom, school life, team-building and good team spirit

Level 2: general measures of prevention

Examples in the context of extremism: positive, violence-free techniques of communication, consultation and meeting, experiences of success for vulnerable youths: "I am known, recognized, acknowledged", making visible the added value that is enabled by diversity: themed days and weeks, newspapers, didactics, diversity as the starting point for students to build up a positive identity.

Level 3: specific preventative measures

Examples in the context of extremism: communication of warnings and threat of punishment, placing Boundaries, dialogue with pupil with their extremist attitude as a focal point, thematisation of risky behaviour in lessons.

Level 4: curative measures

Examples in the context of extremism: blockage of extreme behaviour by time out, punishment, suspension, defence and self-protection during aggression, interventions of alarm with support of other teachers, direction, conversation with the student, the parents involved.

The Royal Atheneum of Antwerp has been using this practice since 9/11. It's a supporting model for principals to develop their school culture.

4.1.6 Identity and communication - Based on the Logical Levels from Bateson

This programme is a training programme for teachers based on the theoretical model of Bateson, a model which describes identity formation. To understand identity formation, Bateson identifies different levels. Who you 'are' forms the tip of the pyramid, your identity and ambitions, what you wish to achieve in life. That point is supported by a broad base, which does not represent identity, but consists of a series of attributes that can be absorbed, through education, situation at home, at school and through friends. The difference between who you are and what you have acquired is significant. Religion forms part of the bottom layer of the pyramid, of the elements absorbed. Some young people identify completely with Islam and religion contributes to shaping an identity, but religion is not who you are. One 'has' a religion, which is a choice that can evolve as life progresses. By doing exercises it is explained to young people what the different layers are in identity formation. In order to help teachers to deal with these complex issues, a training is provided. The school opted to use the model of Bateson after an infiltration by the jihadist group Sharia4Belgium and a wave of radicalisation swept through the school. The approach is situated on 4 levels:

1. 10 teachers qualified as a neuro-linguistic programme (NLP) practitioner and two of these.
2. Teachers achieved a further NLP Master practitioner qualification.
3. Every year 12 teachers attend a 4-day NLP course: it is of vital importance to provide tools and support to teachers who face youngsters who are at the risk of radicalisation. They learn how to counter pupils' identification with negative self-images, how to foster a healthy self-esteem, how to develop a healthy level of assertiveness, how to adopt various perceptual positions and how to create a win-win situation.
4. At the same time, youngsters are made more aware of the effect of their choices and are offered the opportunity to make different choices in life by using the triangle.
5. The possibility for individual coaching. The overall aim is to empower students and to give them the insight that they can steer their destinies.

Foreign fighters from Belgium have played an important role from the beginning of the conflict in Syria and Iraq. More fighters, per capita, have come from Belgium than from any other Western European country. And a few of them took part in the first major attacks by ISIS on Western soil, both in Paris and in Brussels. The Belgian federal government announced a 12-item action plan in 2015 against terrorism, which included the creation of a new National Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister, the domestic deployment of the army when the threat level is raised, the development of better de-radicalisation programmes in prisons, and strengthening the existing legal framework against foreign fighters (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016). The federal government identified 10 pilot cities facing particular radicalisation threats, and funded specific countering violent extremism initiatives. Among the components of the government's strategy on preventing radicalisation is an effort to counter extremist messaging on the internet. The government's counter-radicalisation strategy includes an interagency effort to support local government actors who work with returnees from Syria to monitor their reintegration into society and provide them with guidance and support. Countering violent extremism (CVE) remains a high priority for the Belgian government, at both the national and sub-national levels.

4.2 BOSNIA

4.2.1 *Overview of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina*

The topic of violent extremism is increasingly becoming a part of policy discussions among officials, international actors, academic researchers and civil activists in Bosnia. On November 18, 2015, an Islamist gunman killed two Bosnian soldiers at a betting shop in Rajlovac, a suburb of Sarajevo. Bosnian police discovered pro-ISIS propaganda material, including an amateur ISIS flag in Omeragic's home. Earlier in the same year, a local Islamist gunman attacked a police station in Zvornik in the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He killed one police officer and wounded two others before he was shot dead by other police officers.

While the attacks of this kind are relatively rare in Bosnia and Herzegovina the country today faces several terrorism-related challenges, including dangers posed by its large foreign fighter contingent in Syria. On per capita basis Bosnia and Herzegovina is among several parts of Europe that have been most affected by this problem. Over 180 men, 60 women and 80 children are believed to have left Bosnia and Herzegovina for Syria and Iraq between 2012 and 2015 (Azinovic & Jusic, 2015). The country is also reportedly host to a number of Islamist-dominated villages, where

terrorist recruitment networks were set in the mid-1990s, and today remain a threat.⁴

There are many other manifestations of extremism present in Bosnia and Herzegovina - right wing nationalist, separatist, anti-Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT), as well as extremism reinforced by a Salafist ideology. While the last is attracting the most attention due to the global nature of the threat as well as the terror militia ISIS/Daesh inspired incidents, measures aimed at countering violent extremism among any one threat can at the same time help to counter other manifestations of intolerance. Indeed, the agendas of most NGOs working on countering extremism in Bosnia highlight that they are not only focusing on countering religious extremism but all forms of extremism present in the state.

Perry (2016) notes that risks for violent extremism in Bosnia include a sense of injustice, grievance and normlessness that has emerged in the post-conflict era. Young people who did not experience the conflict are often dissatisfied with the slow pace of post-conflict change, and feel their social, economic and political prospects are limited. A sense of belonging often missing in the society can be filled by affiliation with extremist groups. While there are many such groups, recent security concerns tend to focus on Salafist communities that may have the terror militia ISIS/Daesh sympathies.

Bosnian Islamic tradition is rooted in the Ottoman Empire and a moderate Hanafi version of Sunni Islam. During the 1992-1995 conflict, foreign fighters (*mujahidin*) came to fight in the conflict and have stayed in Bosnia since due to marriages or political support. Perry (2016) notes that by February 2002, Bosnia and Herzegovina cancelled 104 citizenships of the former foreign fighters.

However, there are estimates that many more retained their citizenship. Still, this *mujahidin* engagement together with subsequent post-war engagement including the establishment of charitable organizations, support for imam training abroad, the construction of mosques and an influx of money from supportive Gulf states, brought to Bosnia new Salafist interpretations of Islam previously foreign to local believers. Also, increases in investment and tourism between Bosnia and the Gulf states which have conservative styles of faith have contributed to the new conservative Islam currently present in many Bosnian communities.

⁴ The information is from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/30/muslim-radicals-in-mountain-villages-spark-fears-in-bosnia/> [24.08.2017]; <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/islamic-state-presence-in-bosnia-cause-for-concern-a-1085326.html> [24.08.2017].

The 2016 order for illegal mosques (*para-jamaats*) to either close or to register formally has been viewed by many as an important step in countering violent religious extremism. However, there is the risk that targeting these groups could simply drive them further underground, making them more difficult to monitor. The tradition of the Islamic Community and associated scholarship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, going back to 1882, and further institutionalised under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was noted as a possible factor in supporting needed intellectual and theological debate and resilience. It was also noted that while the madrassa curriculum is set up to be able to respond to leftist agendas, it is not designed to refute attacks from the far right, which is a new phenomenon (Perry, 2016).

4.2.2 The strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for prevention and combating terrorism


The strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for countering violent extremism is closely related to the country's strategy for preventing terrorism. In 2003, Bosnia criminalised terrorist financing and participation in acts of terrorism. Since then, Bosnia has repeatedly adapted its legislation to meet the emerging threats posed by terrorism. In 2005, the country established amendments to its constitution that allowed the government to strip citizenship from naturalised Bosnians who had fraudulently obtained Bosnian citizenship. This measure—as well as the 2006 establishment of its Citizenship Review Commission (CRC)—was largely credited with helping the country extradite a large percentage of the foreign terrorist fighters that remained in the country after the 1992-1995 Bosnian War.

In 2014, Bosnia again adapted its legislative practices to meet the challenges posed by emerging terrorist threats, namely, the challenge posed by radicalised Bosnian foreign fighters lured to Syria. In April 2014, the government extended prison sentences for convicted terrorists to a maximum of ten years, with terrorist recruiters receiving a minimum prison sentence of five years and foreign fighters receiving a minimum sentence of three years. The country later increased the maximum sentence for terrorist-related crimes to 20 years in prison.

In 2015, Bosnia produced the Balkan region's first comprehensive plan to counter terrorism. The five-year plan – known as the 'Strategy for Preventing and Combatting Terrorism' – named ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Nusra Front as the leading terrorist dangers in the country, and emphasized the need for regional cooperation in the Balkans in order to confront new challenges related to terrorism, including the dangers posed by radicalised lone wolves and foreign fighters, and misuse of the internet for terrorist-related purposes.

The Strategy for Prevention and Combating Terrorism is endorsed to pursue combating terrorism and terrorism-related phenomena in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in order to meet the commitments undertaken by Bosnia and Herzegovina internationally, in particular those arising from the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.⁵ The Strategy's main elements can be seen in figure below.

Figure 3: Bosnian's strategy for preventing and combating terrorism



Source: Bosnia and Herzegovina Council of Ministers (2015). Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Preventing and Combating Terrorism. Online available: http://msb.gov.ba/PDF/STRATEGIJA_ZA_BORBU_PROTIV_TERORIZMA_ENG.pdf [14.08.2017]

In the context of countering radical extremism, the prevention and protection strategies are of most concern. These are currently being developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Special focus is given to measures to prevent the processes of indoctrination in terrorist ideologies, especially its forms containing clear elements of incitement to terrorism, either directly or indirectly, public glorification/promotion of terrorist acts and recruitment for terrorism. A key element of this process is the strengthening the role of the so-called social correctives, starting from family, social services, to education and other services.

The key priorities of preventive activities are as follows:

- Develop an early detection system for all forms of extreme behaviour that can lead to terrorism;

⁵ http://www.dei.gov.ba/dei/bih_eu/sporazum/glavni_text/default.aspx?id=1172&langTag=en-US

- Develop an early detection system, including preventive action and checks conducted to prevent manifestations of extremism in procedures of inviting foreign nationals to come to BiH, issuance of visas in the Diplomatic and Consular Offices of BiH abroad and procedures for granting residence to foreign citizens in BiH;
- Eliminate possibilities to encourage and recruit vulnerable groups and communities for terrorism;
- Develop a positive communication strategy and work actively with the media to promote it;
- Promote the values of democracy, rule of law, tolerance and dialogue - create specific education programmes for young people through both curricula and extra-curricular activities;
- Provide support to the activities of citizens and civil society organisations aimed at preventing hate and promoting positive narratives (opposing violent extremist narratives by highlighting positive examples of social values, tolerance, openness);
- Support inter-religious dialogue and activities carried out by the Inter-Religious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Encourage and assist the academia to continue research into terrorism, hate crimes, hate speech and other security phenomena in the society, so as to identify key issues and develop and improve

Second objective of the Strategy is to reduce overall vulnerability to terrorist attacks and protect critical infrastructure. A significant part of measures is designed to improve the protection of borders in order to prevent or minimise the possible entry of persons of security interest from other countries and postoperative follow-up of BiH citizens who are associated with terrorism.

Under measures to achieve this strategic goal, it is also foreseen to establish mandatory adoption of minimum standards for the protection of critical infrastructure and other facilities of interest, as well as to improve procedures for assessing the real risk and vulnerability. A separate set of measures provides for activities to protect critical cyber infrastructure, with the establishment of CERT in BiH being essential to this process.

The key priorities are as follows:

- Introduce a system of collection of biometric data fully in the process of issuing visas;

- Introduce a system of collection of biometric data and taking biometric data from the Service for Foreigners' Affairs in the process of issuing residence permit and imposing measures of expulsion for foreigners and make it operational and accessible for use to security agencies;
- Improve the Information System for Migration ISM and make it operational and accessible for use to security agencies;
- Improve the visa information system and make it fully operational;
- Fully develop a system of risk analysis, relevant to the Strategy;
- Link security databases, relevant to the Strategy;
- Full implementation of international standards in the field of cyber security in particular those relating to the establishment of CERT in BiH and mechanisms for monitoring and combating the misuse of the Internet for terrorist purposes

Key international partners for the implementation of the Strategy include: OHR, EU, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe, the US Embassy to BiH (including ICITAP and ODC). Activities on the implementation of this document are being done in cooperation with regional organisations (RCC, RACVIAC, PCC, and others), and with the Member States of the European Union.

4.2.3 Summary

Violent extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina has mostly been dealt with under the strategy for preventing and combating terrorism. This is a new legislative and policy field in Bosnia that is currently developing tools for preventing, monitoring and countering radicalisation in the country. In addition to the strategy violent extremism has been countered via a number of global and regional initiatives.

On the global level Embassy of Norway has been active in Bosnia and has funded three initiatives with Islamic communities from late 2015 to June 2016. Reports for these initiatives are currently being prepared. The British Embassy is supporting a project on understanding and countering violent extremism and this project is being implemented by the Atlantic Initiative. Together with Norway the UK has also supported a study of foreign fighters in Bosnia titled 'The New Lure of Syrian War: The Foreign Fighters' Bosnian Contingent'. The IOM has finished a pilot project with local youth in the Federation. The OSCE Mission has been engaging in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the conflict in a range of political-military,

economic and most recently counter radicalisations efforts while the UNDP provides relevant support through its Integrated Border Management (IBM) programme and supports the country's counter terrorism strategy.

In addition to the international level of engagement, a number of local NGOs have been working on topics including tolerance, prevention of hate speech, reconciliation, community empowerment and youth and citizen engagement. All of these initiatives are included in the rubric. It is important to note that none of the initiatives distinguish between the different types of radicalisation. Rather they highlight combating all forms of intolerance and discrimination.

4.3 DENMARK

"Denmark has been hit by terror. We do not know the motive for the alleged perpetrator's actions, but we know that there are forces that want to hurt Denmark. They want to rebuke our freedom of speech."

These were the words the Danish Prime Minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt, used in response to the Copenhagen attacks, which saw shootings at a speech event and a synagogue on the same day. Coupled with the various terror attacks in Europe and the so-called "cartoon crisis", Denmark has since embarked on concentrated efforts to prevent radicalisation and extremism in Denmark.

Prevention strategies in Denmark have been developed on the understandings of political- /religious extremism since the mid-2000s. The Danish approach to countering and preventing extremism and radicalisation largely focuses on the close collaboration of agencies, organisations and institutions, which is governed by the Danish Administration Justice Act. The main actors include social services, educational institutes, health care providers, police, and the intelligence and security services. This approach not only allows institutions to learn from each other, but also to pass on advice and "best practices" on regional and local basis (Hemmingsen, 2015).

In 2009, the Danish government initiated their first 'Action Plan' to "promote [Danish] values in a number of different areas – inside as well as outside Denmark" (Government of Denmark, 2009). The plan proposed 22 initiatives that would strengthen democracy and provide alternatives to extremism. This would revolve around counter-terrorism, efforts against gangs and youth crime, international co-operation on peace, development

and democracy, efforts against discrimination and intolerance, education, jobs and opportunities for all, and integration and intercultural dialogue.

In 2014, the Danish government formulated a further 12 initiatives to prevent radicalisation and extremism but this time with a focus on different priority levels. Priority one, titled the “greater involvement by local authorities”, concerned the development of strategic partnerships with local authorities, skills-enhancement programmes and better options for interventions targeting over-18s (The Danish Government, 2014). Priority two described new tools for prevention and exit work, in particular the methods of prevention and interventions early in the radicalisation process (initiative 4), enhanced online presence to prevent radicalisation (initiative 5), stricter measures to stop recruitment to armed conflict abroad (initiative 6), enhanced exit programmes (initiative 7), and closer international partnerships (initiative 8 and 9). Finally, priority three involved the planned mobilisation for civil society, such as a closer collaboration between local authorities and civil society (initiative 10) and a greater parental involvement (initiative 11).

The Danish approach is often described as a ‘learning-by-doing’ method in which learning is developed from errors and a “best practice” formulated thereon; this dynamic process enables the best possible preventions to be produced. A list of the latest interventions in Denmark was summed up in the publication “National Action Plan” by the Danish Government in 2016. In concrete, the interventions cover:

1. “A more coordinated and knowledge-based prevention effort
2. Enhanced effort in the police districts and municipalities
3. Countering extremist propaganda and preventing online radicalisation
4. Hard line against foreign fighters
5. Targeted intervention in criminal groups
6. Stricter measures against radicalisation in prisons
7. Systematic effort in day-care facilities, primary schools and upper secondary school
8. Involvement of local communities
9. Enhanced international effort” (The Danish Government, 2016)

4.3.1 Extremism in Denmark – numbers and facts – The Intelligence Risk Assessment

The Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) observed in their 2016 Intelligence Risk Assessment an increasing threat level of Islamic extremism. This outcome was also reached by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) in their terror analysis, which described militant Islamism as a continuing and significant terror threat in Denmark (Polities Efterretningstjeneste, 2017). The International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) reported that in 2015/2016 125 foreign fighters departed from Denmark to fight for the terror militia ISIS in Syria or Iraq⁶. It was reported that 62 individuals have returned to Denmark, 31 persons remain abroad, and 27 are confirmed dead (van Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016).

4.3.2 Prevention measures – The Aarhus Model

As mentioned at the outset, the Danish approach is based on a close collaboration of key actors in the prevention of radicalisation. There are three different angles used in this approach: a) prevention and exit strategy, b) prosecution of radicalised persons, and c) prevention and countering of threats to national security.

The Aarhus Model is a well-known concept for early prevention and exit processes. The aim of this preventive measure is “to stop or redirect the process of violent radicalisation” (Bertelsen, 2015). The Aarhus Model is particularly characterized by its holistic inclusion of radicalised people into society and, unlike many de-radicalisation programmes, does not heavily focus on ideologies as a cause for recruitment into extremist organisations. Moreover, the close collaboration between the Department of Psychology and Behavioural Sciences, experts of social services, ministries, science, and PET facilitate a “meaningful participation in common cultural, social and societal life” (Bertelsen, 2015). The theoretical background of the Aarhus Model is based on an interdisciplinary approach comprising of personality psychology, social psychology, societal psychology with social science, and humanities.

The approach begins when information concerning would-be extremists are passed on to the “Info-house”, which is staffed by the East Jutland Police. Often, the information comes from persons in the social environment of the affected person, local agencies or the police. Further information is then collected by the police to assess the situation as accurately possible. If the decision is made that the individual is showing signs of

⁶ The Information is from Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET)

becoming radicalised, an interdisciplinary workshop is arranged to provide support or counselling (Bertelsen, 2015).

In the case of a “false positive” or “youth rebellion”, the social services or other adequate measures will be suggested. However, if the experts identify risk factors of violent radicalisation, the Info-house will initiate an assessment to stay in contact with the affected person and involve members from their social environment, if available. Several well-experienced mentors will then show the targeted person alternatives and legal ways to resolve personal conflicts in which they are involved.

4.3.3 Exit programme – The Aarhus Model

In 2013, a special exit programme was initiated to de-radicalise returning foreign fighters by reintegration efforts that help transition the individual back into society and daily life. To achieve this, a task force will decide which services should be offered to the returnee and to his/her social network (e.g. family, friends, school). After that, a written exit-process agreement will be prepared in cooperation with the radicalised person; this includes a specified list of help that can be offered, such as with employment, accommodation, therapy and medical care. However, the exit programme is just available for foreign fighters who have not committed any criminal acts and so present no security risk to the Dutch society. Therefore, the programme was created for those returnees who are motivated to exist terrorist organisations and who want to be reintegrated back in their community. Such measures ensure that the Aarhus Model is not misused by individuals returning to Denmark with the intention to commit terrorist acts (Bertelsen,2015).

4.4 FRANCE

On July 14, 2016, thousands of people celebrated Bastille Day on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice in France. After the firework, a truck was driven into the crowd. The attack was committed by a Tunisian living in France. He killed 86 people; after the attack, the police killed him. (“Nice attack: What we know about the Bastille Day killings”, 2016). In January 2015, France was hit by terrorist attacks. The first attack happened on January 7, 2015, in the building of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris. Two masked gunmen entered the building and opened fire on the employees. They killed eight employees, two policemen and two other people. The next day, a lone gunman killed a policewoman. On January 9, 2015, he killed four people in a kosher grocery store. The three perpetrators were killed by the police. (“2015 Charlie Hebdo Attacks Fast Facts”,

2016). In November 2015, further terrorist attacks were committed in Paris. On November 13, 2015, gunmen and suicide bombers hit a concert hall, a major stadium, restaurants and bars. The attacks started with three explosions nearby the Stade de France stadium on the northern fringe of Paris. These explosions were committed by three suicide bombers, who wore explosive vests. Meanwhile, further attacks were performed nearer to the centre of the town, at restaurants and bars. During the deadliest attack of this night, three terrorists entered the Bataclan concert hall, where the Californian rock group Eagles of Death Metal was playing, and opened fire on the audience. In this night 130 people died. The attacks were organized by the Islamic State (IS). ("Paris attacks: What happened on the night", 2015)

4.4.1 Introduction of the situation in France (graph indicating latest terrorist attacks could be beneficial

The overview of general prevention programmes in France exposed here is the view of a specific administration in France, the DAP (Direction de administration Penitentiaries/ Penitentiary Administration from the French Ministry of Justice. Indeed, there is no French general prevention programmes, even if the efforts from different ministries (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Interior) are close in the mind and sometimes interlinked with DAP prevention programmes (Comité des ministres, 2016). In the same way, most of prevention programmes in France, as the one from DAP, follow the European Council preconisation.

Then, we present here a view of extremism history from a penitentiary point of view. Then the extremist public taken into account in programmes and lastly the programmes set up for this public (organisation, aims and activities).

4.4.2 Short Modern History of extremism problem and prevention

France was mainly hit by nationalist violent acts from the 60's with the FLN (Front de Libération/National Liberation Front) during the Algeria war (1954-1962), the Basques separatists from ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) (from 1959 in Spain, in the 70's in France – 20th of October 2011), and from Corsica separatists (from 1976).

The FLN terrorist acts started from the 25 August 1958, with actions against Law Enforcement Agents and economic targets. Terrorists acts between the 1st of January 1956 and the 23rd of January 1962, made 10 223 victims of which 3 957 deaths (Vallat, 2004). The climax was the

massacre of the 17th of October 1961 with a number of deaths (of North – African people) between 70 and 105 (House et al., 2008; Brunet, 1999).

The Basque separatists acted mainly with kidnapping, assassination and extortion of money. In 2009, more than 750 separatist militants were still in jail in France and Spain. ETA is responsible for more than 800 deaths from 1968.

The Corsican separatist, to whom we refer as FLNC (*Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu*) without detailing the branches, made more than 3 000 terrorist attacks from 1976, provoking material to human losses.

These nationalists were carrying on violent extremist acts for the separatists causes, but once incarcerated, they were not acting for proselytism, nor recruiting a community of action. There is no feedback on Basques former convicts as, after their release from prison, most of them, were incarcerated in Spain from where there is few chances they get out from. About Corsican, it is a different mode of action as in most of the case they were closely linked to organized crime and corruption and they were creating organized gangs.

The strategy of incarceration was following a principle of dissemination. The convicts were incarcerated far from their hometown and scattered to avoid groups' phenomena. Mainly these nationalists were acting in jail in passive resistance without proselytism. Still, they were violent extremists, extolling violence. However, in France, there is no spontaneous treatment of violence preaching. If the convicts do not ask for accompaniment, they are not mentored.

A new phenomenon emerged in the 80's reinforced in the mid 90's with a new type of extremism we could consider as religious extremism. It was not only an unknown type of extremism, but the question was long left aside as, in its principles, religion is excluded from the republican way of thinking in France. Following the terrorist attacks of Paris in 1995 (10 deaths, 270 injured), Islamist extremists appeared in prison with the incarceration of GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé/Armed Islamic Group of Algeria) and FIS (Front Islamique du Salut/Islamic Salvation Front) terrorist attacks culprits. These persons have been convicted for long sentences, in prison/jail (by opposition with detention centre for shorter punishments). Proselytism phenomena were born here, in parallel with what was observed in the civil society.

In the 2000', first incidents were seen in prisons and it is when the DAP set up the first indicators for proselytism (2003). The indicators were acts of religion (organized prayers, imam declaration and discourses, etc.).

These indicators were filled by staff from the DAP and some referent persons on penitentiary intelligence. Phenomena have grown till disciplinary incidents in 2009. These disciplinary incidents have taken the following forms: check refusal if done by a non-Muslim agent, gender caused interaction refusal, food refusal – more than non-pork-...

In 2010, a second series of indicators has been set up to monitor the fundamentalist practices of Islam. In 2015, a national strategy has been defined with two main axes of development, fight against radicalisation and penitentiary intelligence. From the handcrafted networks of penitentiary intelligence in 2015, the field is nowadays highly professionalised with tooled protocols with DGSI (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure/French Homeland Security Department) and an inter agencies partnership. On the other aspect, the fight against radicalisation is developed through targeted actions for disengagement as well as the professionalization of spotting and evaluating candidates and the methods to apply.

Although in Europe, to be spotted means to be accompanied or mentored through a specific programme, it is not the case in France (except formation or working programme for France). In Germany, one can find addictions treatment, sexual or road delinquencies mentoring. In France, we had to face the radicalisation problem to set up an action schema (where the trainer is proactive) for disengagement. During multidisciplinary meetings, the trainer foresees and proposes an action plan. If the convicted are not interested in following such a mentoring programme, there are no means of forcing them (except sentence remission).

4.4.2.1 Description of the public

As exposed in Short Modern History of extremism problem and prevention, right wings and left wings extremisms are not really represented in French jails, except few separatists without proselytism nor recidivism problems (Crettiez et al., 2017). In 2013, Khosrokhavar underlined that at the time of its inquiry, women were a tiny minority in prison with less than 4 per cent in French jails, and there was no female terrorist incarcerated. Interviewed and focused mainly on Jihadists, but also Basques and Corsicans sentenced on terrorist charges, and a few neo-Nazi skinheads with extremist tendencies. In this section, we present today DAP focused public, i.e. undergoing radicalisation process public or radicalised public.

In 2014 and till January 2015, 90 convicted have been put in jail as Islamist terrorists. In January 2017, they were 390 convicted in jail for facts related to Islamist Terrorism. Today, they are 473 persons (among which 28 women). These jailed people are all convicted under the same general Law penal qualification of "criminal association in order to prepare and

commit terrorist acts⁷” or “criminal association in connection with a terrorist enterprise” (« association de malfaiteurs en vue de préparer un acte terroriste” or « association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise terroriste »).

Figure 4: Evolution of the number of female TIS (Terroristes Islamistes/Islamist Terrorist) convicted in detention in 2016 on Paris region prisons





Figure 5: Number TIS (Terroristes Islamistes / Islamist Terrorist) convicted in detention from October 2015 to February 2017



Source: <http://e.infogr.am/nombre-de-terroristes-islamistes-en-detention-tis-1gk8pd9wg5egmq0> [18.08.2017]

⁷ Also translated as “criminal conspiracy acting in preparation of a terrorist act”. This judicial category was created in 1996 by an act of the French parliament and defined as equivalent to an actual terrorist act. It allows provisional detention of suspects (Khosrokhavar, 2013)

It is then crucial to be able to spot the sensitive people and to evaluate them among the confined convicts. This broader spotted and evaluated people are then incorporated to prevention and disengagement programmes. If people suspected of being radicalised and terrorists convicted are added, we can consider in France about 1329 confined persons watched with specific attention by DAP. From 2016, the figures passed from 1400 radicalised confined persons to 1280 persons. Finally, 412 convicted are watched in open prison condition by DAP or SPIP (Services Pénitentiaires d'Insertion et de Probation/Prison Services for Insertion and Probation) among whom 108 are TIS convicted. This evolution in terms of number is preoccupying even if it seems the ISIS (Islamic State) is collapsing and then has less means for recruiting and disseminating its ideology.

Geographically, these 1200 spotted convicted are everywhere on the French territory. The indicators are quite high in some places as Villepinte or Mont de Marsan, even if the two places are of different sizes. The indicators are not fine grained enough to take into account the sensitivity of the DAP staff to the indicators (High or weak signals are signals). They are mainly on large cities and agglomerations (North with Lille, South with Toulouse, Marseille, Albi, Nîmes, and some department as Haute-Savoie, Isère. On the West coast, Bordeaux has less spotted convicted.

From 2015, there are several possible rehabilitation programmes for people undergoing a radicalisation process, depending on their profiles. Basically, we consider three levels of profiles:

1. Primary prevention: works on citizenship definition, republic values
2. Secondary prevention: works on radicalisation principles on targeted convicted. The violent radicalisation programme is targeted to this level of profile.
3. Tertiary prevention: works on violent recidivism prevention based on extremist motive. Moving into action possibly imminent.

Indeed, in the criminal association in order to prepare and commit terrorist acts incrimination, there are possibly no positive acts and then they could still be prevented.

There is not yet quantification of these profiles. The convicts representing an imminent danger are less than ten in French DAP. Another profile representing danger is the one of the ideologists, who are sometimes infiltrated in jail on purpose of proselytism and recruitment. However, they are out of Pericles scope as they are not behaving directly with violent acts.

To consider the public to dis/engage in of these three programmes, an evaluation is carried out, qualifying the convicted and classifying them in a continuum from *low spectrum* to *high spectrum*. Again, there is no quantification of how many people are in low/high spectrum. The first difficulty to handle when a new TIS convicted is incarcerated, is to find some first information to evaluate the spectrum. There is few to no information from the judiciary level reported when the convicted arrive. Most of the time, DAP doesn't know if the people were preparing a terrorist attack, was on their departure at the airport or on their return, etc. The main source of information is the own DAP information collect (observation, interview). That is why the DAP has highly professionalised the evaluation phase after having organized the step of spotting convicted undergoing a radicalisation process. DAP is highly interested in the evaluation of risks and causes of stepping in this radicalisation process and the evaluation of the criminogenic needs (*i.e.* what were the conditions underlining the radicalisation process and the tipping points in violent acts) and on which conditions do we have levers, possibilities of actions, and even motivation sources to change the undergoing process. As DAP, several governmental organizations rallied around radicalisation prevention or action plan.

4.4.3 General prevention programmes deployment on religious extremism

4.4.3.1 Setting-up of a national programme:

“Radicalisation is a process by which an individual or a group adopts a violent form of action as a consequence of extreme political, social or religious ideologies questioning the prevailing social, cultural and political order” (Borum, 2011; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010 in Khosrokhavar, 2013). To address this far-reaching problem that today concerns over 2,000 people identified in the Syrian and Iraqi networks and 9,300 people reported undergoing radicalisation, it is important to establish a national strategy involving every aspect of government action. In this section, after presenting the generic national programme, we will focus on the DAP programme.

The first violent radicalisation and terrorist networks fight plan has been presented on the 22rd of April 2014 by the Minister of Interior.⁸ This plan aimed at dismantling networks, preventing the movement generating threats, and cooperating more efficiently at an international level. It also contains a prevention and accompaniment section for families by the SG-CIPDR (Secrétariat Général - Comité Interministériel de Prévention de la

⁸ <https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/SG-CIPDR/Prevenir-la-radicalisation/Prevenir-la-radicalisation>

Délinquance et de la radicalisation/General Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee on Crime Prevention and Radicalisation). It proposes a specific apparatus for radicalisation follow-up and prevention (telephone number for assistance and orientation, and a committee dedicated to personally monitor persons and families.

A new action plan against radicalisation and terrorism (PART) that on 9 May will replace the one adopted in 2014 will be the focus of the national strategy. The plan contains 80 measures, 50 of them new, divided into seven priority areas:

- Detecting signs of radicalisation paths and terrorist networks at the earliest stage possible;
- Monitoring, obstructing and neutralizing terrorist networks;
- Combating terrorism within its international networks and safe havens;
- Increasing the reach of radicalisation prevention mechanisms in order to ensure personalised measures for different populations;
- Developing applied research in terms of counter-speech and involving France's Islamic community;
- Improving protection of vulnerable sites and networks;
- Being able to react to any terrorist attack and demonstrate the Nation's resilience.

Some French cities developed this proposed plan, as the city of Poitiers, which set up this actions list in five primary radicalisation prevention priority actions⁹:

1. To form and inform field professionals as well as inhabitants;
2. To promote actions for youth, “working about topics as “living together”, secularity, Men/Women equality, relationships with public authorities and fighting against social and school rupture (NEET [Not in Education Employment or Training]);
3. To associate parents to the steps carried out to their children;

⁹ <http://www.lanouvellerepublique.fr/Vienne/Actualite/Politique/n/Contenus/Articles/2016/12/07/Le-Plan-de-prevention-de-la-radicalisation-debattu-2928813>

4. To create interactions spaces for exchanging information and experiences among practitioners;
5. To work with population about IT Tools (Information Technologies), on the use of social networks and to promote actions on media education.

We won't develop further programmes and actions from different ministry or local administration in France as they exist "individually" in several administrations among which the interior, education, women rights, justice, foreign affairs, *etc.* We will now focus on works preceding or accompanying the national programmes and experimentations in penitential administration. Moreover, we won't be able to present evaluation of these experimentations mainly because evaluation tests were not led. We based our explanation on (Benbassa & Troendlé, 2017) report.

4.4.4 Genesis of the DAP programme

4.4.4.1 Experimentation and set up

In 2015, dedicated zones have been created for radicalised convicts in penitentiary establishment (prisons). It came after the terrorist attacks of the January 2015 in the government strategy to fight against terrorism reinforcement from which a part is dedicated to fight against radicalisation in prison.

Indeed, as (Khosrokhavar, 2013) was observing in 2013, prison is vector of radicalisation for a lot of convinced people. The location and overcrowding zones (causing a lack of privacy) are two of the radicalisation conditions that are emphasized in Paris region prisons by the higher concentration of convinced or provisional detention persons.

To avoid a proselytism on common law prisoners, the grouping of proselyte confined persons has been set up in specific experimental zones at the end of 2014, essentially to keep the order in prison. There was no further structured programme or policy to take care of the affected persons. Firstly, this experiment had a cautious welcome from the Ministry of Justice.

After the January 2016 attacks, this practice of grouping the radicalised convicts has been spread out on the government demand and accompanied by the creation of five dedicated units in Paris region prisons and in the North region.

4.4.4.2 Grouping programme description

In the first semester of 2016, the new units, called UPRA (Unités de Prévention de la Radicalisation/Radicalisation Prevention Units) have been set up. The 5 dedicated units were defined as is:

- 2 units dedicated to the evaluation of radicalised convicts or undergoing radicalisation process confined persons. After evaluation, convicts were oriented, according to their profile and their open-mindedness, in a caring programme. Or, if they don't come within the competency of such a caring programme, and justify specific security measures, oriented towards solitary confinement.
- 3 units dedicated to the taking care of radicalised convicted, 2 in Paris Region and the third one in North for the most radicalised convicted.

These units of about 20 places, aimed at proposing to convicted people several caring actions adapted to their profile. It has been decided to adopt some practices as strict single incarceration and to ensure a relative impermeability with the rest of the confined people. Besides, the penitentiary staff has been specialised, trained for radicalisation problems (detection, dissimulation problems, etc.).

The programme elaboration is based on the results and propositions of a « research-action » from French NGOs (Non-governmental organizations) the « association française des victimes du terrorisme » and « association Dialogue- Citoyen » under the direction of Mrs Ouisa Kiès, researcher at the EHESS (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales / School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences).

The experimentation was concerning a dozen of persons in each infrastructure. It ran through the form of collective sessions and individual interviews. The unit dedicated in one of the prisons evaluated was receiving 15 convicted on 23 places. They had their own courtyard and had no contact with other confined persons. The psychiatrist's team has explained that the work was not consisting in "forcing them out" from their religious thinking schema, but to work on a process of disengagement from their violence and to get out from this mental influence. The collective sessions consisted, among other objectives, on a way of "reindividualise" the convicts, and make them become aware of the fact "they are allowed not to think like the others".

4.4.4.3 Grouping programme and dedicated units called into question

However, in a criticism recommendation on the 11th of June 2015, Mrs Adeline Hazan, controller general of places of deprivation of liberty, raised several side facts and declared herself against the grouping principle, which “besides is potentially dangerous characteristics” was not stemming from any applicable legal disposition, as this *sui generis* settlement was not an ordinary confinement nor a solitary confinement.” (Hazan, 2015).

Answering this lack of legal application, an article in the law project relative to the organized crime and terrorism fight has been added. Hence, under article 726-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is stated that « when the behaviour of a confined convict shall be called to order, the Head of the prison can decide an evaluation or the application of a specific programme in a dedicated unit”. The assignment in these dedicated units also enables the Head of the prison to decide, after the recommendation of the unique pluri-disciplinary commission, whether the activities of the unit convicts should be carried out sideline. Finally, these dispositions consider the possibility, for the convicts, to contest the decision of being assigned in a dedicated unit before the administration jurisdiction.

In parallel, the Ministry of Justice defined a global doctrine to take care of the radicalised convicts based on a deep and large thinking work that was absolutely necessary in regards to the severity and breadth of the radicalisation phenomena in prison.

4.4.4.4 Current strategy

DAP strategy has several aims:

- To prevent recidivism: to prevent violent acting out based on a religious extremism reason;
- To disengage from violence: to exculpate individuals and to reintegrate them in civil society in an inclusive way. To dissuade from having recourse to political violence;
- To focus on the cognitive opening, to propose a new viewpoint on the world, to arouse questions on their beliefs and to focus on the critical mind;
- To focus on introspection and thinking among participants;
- To distance from radical opinions;
- To enable to build a life project and a professional project.

These aims have been developed within the DAP previous framework. From July 2016, the Lord Chancellor (Garde des Sceaux) installed a steering committee for the fight against terrorism and violent radicalisation. It groups the set of each direction of the Ministry of Justice. The Lord Chancellor also installed a scientific committee composed of representatives of the fields of the disengagement problem: sociologists, psychologists, cognitive and behavioural scientists, etc.

The 2016 apparatus functioning has been reviewed in order to put the evaluation process at the centre of the apparatus. The UPRAs will be replaced by 6 radicalisation evaluation sections receiving 120 convicts for a 4 months duration. Four out of these six sections will be installed in Paris region when two new will be opened in Bordeaux and Marseille.

This evaluation period, larger than what was usually set up in national evaluation centres, will be carried out by pluri-disciplinary teams (educators, social workers, psychologists, staff from the insertion, probation and surveillance penitentiary services, etc.).

Following this evaluation, it could be decided whether (1) the convict is assigned in one of the 27 selected penitentiary structure (infrastructure presenting high security conditions and beneficiary of specifically trained staff), i.e. the convicts would be persons, whose evaluation states that they could be disengaged from violent acts; (2) the convict is assigned in a prison fulfilling high security requirements (following a lesson learnt from an event in Lille- Annoeullin prison in 2016), i.e. the convicts would be persons, whose evaluation states an inclination towards proselytism or violence.

In addition to these 120 places, 190 solitary confinement places among 50 prisons will be reserved. For these 290 convicts, the security rules will be more drastic (regular checks, cell move, personal driving licence belongings reduction, solitary confinement, organization of a systematic watch (car), systematic observation for each faction, study of the foreigners permit, study of the visit permit, study to know from where are coming the postal order, who is sending letters? etc. An individual and adapted follow-up of the convicts mixed with a regular evaluation (at least twice a year) will be set up. Besides, for female convicts, a radicalisation evaluation section will be created and 13 sections for women will receive groups of radicalised women from 5 to 10 convicts. It will create 100 dedicated places for female radicalised convicts enabling to face up to the return from theatre of operations.

Finally, for the radicalised minors, groups of 5 persons maximum will be able to be received in special minor prisons or minor infrastructure. A “re-search-action” approach will be associated to this strategy for minors. It will enable to study the phenomenon of radicalisation to the minors or young adult convicts and to adapt an adequate process for this public.

The intervention method from the DAP programme is on groups about ten convicts, meeting for three months minimum, with individual interviews and collective sessions. At the end of this period, a pluri-disciplinary evaluation will be done in order to evaluate the convict evolution, and to envision another confinement mode or the pursuance of the support, where required, in a different form.

4.4.5 Structure of the French national programme for preventing radicalisation in 27 DAP infrastructures

4.4.5.1 Team and participants

Several stakeholders participate in the disengagement programme. This programme is only named prevention programme with no reference to disengagement itself, even if the objective is still this one. The prevention programme is the same in the 27 prisons.

In the radicalisation evaluation sections, high trained teams work to evaluate terrorists and radicalised convicts or undergoing radicalisation process convicts. These teams consist of 90 psychologists and 90 social workers (mainly). From 2015, a support binom consists of a psychologist and a social worker. The social workers are usual referee of the convict. These 90 binoms aim at participating in:

1. the spotting phase;
2. then the evaluation phase of the observed public;
3. then, they will support the convicts, i.e. setting up and follow up of the programme for the spotted public.

The phase 1 and 2 last about 4 months. It ends with the production of a synthesis report (about 15-20 pages) stating the evaluation and defining what are the actions to be taken. The evaluation enables to set up profiles or radicalised in the vein of what (Crettiez et al., 2017) present.

For the phase 3, basically, most of the observed convicts are then grouped in the radicalisation sections. They are received in special section, apart from the common law convicts. The most harmful and noxious convicts are place in solitary confinement (see also Crettiez et al., 2017)).

One difficulty of the evaluation is to align categories of profiles with categories of prevention. One current work is still to help spotting radicalised persons to tend to the best possible harmonization of the evaluation practices. The qualitative work of (Crettiez et al., 2017) helps giving cues to better categorize the profile in order to fit better to an adequate support level, but would need more formalization (standardization is a term which would be too strong, but the idea is to be able to share an objective basis).

DAP distinguished three levels of prevention:

- Primary prevention: where the programme will be collectively handled. It concerns the convicts, who would be persons, whose evaluation states that they could be disengaged from violent acts;
- Secondary prevention: where the programme is mostly collectively handled, but the actions to be taken are individual. It concerns the convicts, who would be persons, whose evaluation states an inclination towards proselytism or violence. It consists 20 sessions we will develop further;
- Tertiary prevention: where the programme is an individual and face-to-face programme. It consists of 40 interviews

The collective sessions are animated by the same person who is setting up an objective to work on and a specific problem to work on in this very session. The collective sessions are talking groups (questions and interactions) with intervenant on specific topics depending on the theme of the session. According to the programme, a specific ability is handled to support prevention and disengagement from violence. To support the programme itself, DAP uses several tools.

4.4.5.2 Tools

DAP needed to find tool in order to share spotting and evaluation processes among the different stakeholders involved in the phase 1 and 2. The tool they currently use is a semi-actuarial tool to evaluate the radicalised convicts. This tool has been empirically developed inside the DAP to be compliant with national needs. Basically, this tool is a set of questionnaires to fill from different viewpoints. The questionnaires are:

1. Pluri-disciplinary spotting support grid for violent radicalisation risk in prison – guard
2. Pluri-disciplinary spotting support grid for violent radicalisation risk in prison – executive management and command

3. Pluri-disciplinary spotting support grid for violent radicalisation risk in prison – SPIP (Services Pénitentiaires d'Insertion et de Probation/Prison Services for Insertion and Probation)
4. Decision aid support document related to the incarceration process set up following the spotting of a violent radicalisation risk;
5. Spotting Support Grid Utilisation guide
6. Notions and Definitions
7. Technical and cleaning tool;
8. Follow-up sheet Penitentiary infrastructure in open environment – Bureau du renseignement pénitentiaire (MI3)

These questionnaires enable to set up the management of the programme for a specific convict. It enables spotting, evaluation and action plan for security (secured infrastructure, primary/secondary or tertiary prevention measures, etc.). Penitentiary staff has started to use them in December 2016. The guards have been trained on the grids. Today, at least 2 000 to 3 000 confined persons are tested in a year.

Besides questionnaires, another tool is used: VERA II (Pressman & Flockton, 2010). VERA II is a tool enabling to accompany an evaluation. It is based on Nils DHUYS works in psychiatry. VERA 2 is giving criteria to evaluate the individual. It enables psychologists and educators/ social worker to have questions to explicit enough to make people speak.

This secondary prevention programme, based on interview one based on his beliefs, values, and representations, is organised around several dimensions enabling to take into account the full process of radicalisation. These dimensions are:

- Cognitive dimension;
- Emotional dimension;
- Socio-professional dimension;
- Pilotage, assessment and perspectives.

These dimensions are useful for any prevention work, not only by the ministry of justice. This model could be useful pour any other ministry: education, research, by professors, associations, schools, etc.

4.4.5.3 Actions

Two types of interventions are mainly carried to fight against radicalisation:

1. A most indirect one concerning violence: although it is aiming at violence reduction, this intervention focuses mostly on conditions socially or individually explaining the radicalisation undergoing process.
2. A mostly security one: especially focused on terrorist attack prevention and aiming quite straightforwardly at violence.

The first one is handled by prevention programme described before.

About the second type of intervention, we can say that, in general, the radicalised convicts are not prone to break out, verbal or physical violence or violence on staff. The risk is different. Radicalised convicts are dangerous according to their violence potential out of the walls. Then, the static security or passive security, represented by stereotypes as walls, architecture with passive tools, video protection, jail architecture, railings, metal gates, keys, mirador, barriers, locks, lightings, equipment used to contain the convicts, etc. is not the most important one.

On the other hand, radicalised convicts are over-represented on mobile phone ownership, USB sticks, and any means linking to the external world. Then, there is need for a lot of regular checks in cell, move of cells, solitary confinement, etc. Any professional stakeholders are part of the dynamic security, which is central on this topic. Dynamic security relates to every human activity for security, observation, knowledge of the penal population, ability on HUMINT collection, etc. In the field of disengagement, or prevention, it is compulsory to bet on dynamic security according to DAP, which relies on its trustworthy staff.

A large part of DAP intervention on radicalisation prevention relies on dynamic security. Dynamic security is a concept as well as a working method, with which the staff is firstly looking for establishing and maintaining daily communication and interaction with convicts, based on a professional ethics. Dynamic security aims at better understand the convicts and evaluates the risks they could represent. It aims at ensuring the safety, the security and the order and then contributes to the re-adaptation of convicts as well as their preparation to their release. This concept should be understood in a broad meaning of a security encompassing structural, organisational and static security.

In the same evolution from a static security to a dynamic security, DAP underline the importance of confinement vs. probation. It seems that in

probation, prevention is more efficient than confined in jail. They recommend putting the resources on probation mode. Probation avoids idleness as in cell. To promote the probation, one would need an evaluation of public strategies and policies.

4.4.6 Evaluation of an experimentation

An experiment has been stated as a success. A programme was set up in the region of Mulhouse (East of France). This prevention programme against violent radicalisation has been set up by several directions of the ministry of Justice (court of appeal of Colmar, High Court of Mulhouse, penitentiary administration, youth protection, city of Mulhouse, Hospital Mulhouse-Sud Alsace, and the NGO association “Accord 68” to manage the project. This programme was set up following the terrorist attacks of January 2015, exposing a large amount of radicalised people in the same area (50 arrested persons).

The aim of the project is to care persons engaged in violent drifting, regardless of the problem of religion. This programme is then generalizable to other process of radicalisation (left wing or right-wing nationalism). The public of this programme is only people under criminal justice control. It enables to fully participate and the LEA to compel to participate the programme. Indeed, to ensure success, the active participation is necessary.

During the 8 months of the experiment programme, 22 persons (of whom half of minors) have be supported. The programme duration is three months. It consists in three phases:

Phase 1: evaluation phase to understand the personal situation of the detected person (conditions of radicalisation). This phase is also when the detected person is explained the aims of the programme. The relatives are also involved. The content of the programme is built especially for the person.

Phase 2: working phase aiming at releasing the ascendancy and re-establish the social relationships of the person.

Phase 3: deconstruction and reconstruction phase aiming first at deconstructing the certainties of the detected person then to help the person reconstructing new aims and a future project. This phase is critical, psychiatrically speaking, and requires a strong attention on the person evolution. This disengagement phase is sensitive as it may weaken the persons.

An assessment is then drawn and trained person are then followed-up 6 months after the end of the programme. The result of this experimentation is particularly positive and its transposition seems possible.

4.4.7 Conclusions on needs on general policy in France

Since 2015, a lot of resources, human and financial resources, have been used for fighting against radicalisation and terrorism. There is a lack of national or public policies on the domain, even a lack of legislation to strengthen or legalise intervention on prevention or fight against radicalisation and terrorism (i.e. penitentiary Intelligence has no framework and social workers are unable from a personal ethical point of view to answer their professional obligations in terms of collection of intelligence information). However, the SG-CIPDR exists for more than 15 years and is adapted to assume a central role.

Then even if each ministry has handled the problem individually, DAP efforts, for example, could be helpful to other state services in any other ministry (Health, Education, etc.). In European countries as Germany, we can see that there is a national effort to head the regional efforts.

A first effort is made in France with the Intelligence cell hosted at the level of the state presidency. Still it is more a work on centralizing the collected information than a coordination work. Similarly, the French policy could be extended from prevention strategy to law enforcement support and processes.

The different experimentations presented in this section, as well as the programme themselves do not benefit from any scientific evaluation effort. However, such an evaluation undertaken on the different existing experiments on the different ministry would benefit the definition of a comprehensive French policy, as some other country do (i.e. UK). Nevertheless, France starts to take into account this policy development compulsory requirement as the SG-CIPDR has started works on defining indicators for radicalisation release.

The French prevention programme also needs a formal framework to model the support it provides to different profiles of radicalised people as well as the intervention action proposed to each profile. Such a framework favours evaluation and sharing of practices among the French LEAs involved in the prevention or fight against radicalisation and terrorism.

4.5 GERMANY

Politically motivated crime (PMK) was created by the German government as a separate official statistical category to measure criminal acts against constitutional principles that are motivated by a specific ideology. Politically motivated crime is a complex field with a variety of offences and political backgrounds. Statistics regarding PMK have been published by the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) annually since 2001 offering data about politically motivated crimes including left-wing and right-wing motivated crime, hate crime, and religiously motivated crimes. The BKA included religious motivated crime as a separate category in 2017.

According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, an offence is politically motivated if one or more of the following occurs¹⁰: Crimes against the state, which includes propaganda and the formation of a terrorist group, or a classical crime like physical injury or murder is categorized as PMK depending on the circumstances of the act and the motivation of the perpetrator. This involves 'hate crime'¹¹ that is perpetrated on the basis of the victim's political views, nationality, ethnicity, race, skin colour, religion, world view, origin, sexual orientation, social status, and disability or external appearance¹².

Annual surveys conducted by R+V Insurance offer an overview of how German citizens perceive politically motivated crimes. In an annual longitudinal analysis, results showed that the majority of German society is frightened of terrorism and politically motivated crime¹³. According to the cross-sectional study, fear of terrorism has risen in recent years. In 2016 and 2017, more than 70 per cent of the population expressed that they were afraid of terrorism. In contrast, in 2014 it was 39 per cent and in 2018 59 per cent¹⁴. Similarly, fear of politically motivated crime peaked in 2016 and 2017 (62 and 68 per cent respectively).

As can be seen in Figure 6, right-wing motivated crime and politically motivated crime with right-wing extremist background occurred more often

¹⁰ Bundesministerium für Heimat, Inneres und Sicherheit. Received from: <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/faqs/DE/themen/sicherheit/pmk/pmk.html#f9828060> [20.07.2019]

¹¹ Ibid.


¹² Ibid.

¹³ R+V Versicherung (2018). Politische Probleme dominieren die Ängste der Deutschen, Berlin.

¹⁴ R+V Versicherung (2018). Angst vor terroristischen Anschlägen 1996 bis 2018.

than any other form of politically motivated crimes. Current events in Germany¹⁵ suggest that right-wing extremism is an exclusive phenomenon. Regarding PMK statistics, right-wing extremism is the most widespread form of politically motivated crime with heterogeneous characteristics. Politically motivated crime with a right-wing background peaked in 2015 and 2016 and occurred up to four times more than left-wing crimes. The notable rise of offences from 2015 to 2017 can be associated to the stream of refugees that arrived in 2015¹⁶. In Figure 7, violent crimes were carried out more often by right-wing extremists¹⁷. In 2018, 507 offences resulting from violent crime were attributed to left-wing extremism in comparison to 1000 offences to right-wing extremism. Breach of the peace was mainly committed by left-wing extremists. In 2017, 831 accounts were attributed to left-wing extremism and 12 to right-wing extremism. Acts of violence and other forms of crimes committed by left-wing extremists have been linked to mass actions against right-wing extremists or police officers.

Figure 6. Politically motivated crime 2014-2018. Source: Verfassungsschutz. Own representation.




¹⁵ Current events are, inter alia, the murder of Walter Lübcke and the terror cell 'Nord-kreuz', which led to the creation of a death list with more than 25,000 names of political opponents (cf. Mascolo et al. (07.07.2018). Walter Lübcke – Ein Mord und seine Vorgeschichte. Süddeutsche Zeitung. Retrieved from <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/mord-luebcke-gestaendnis-regierungspraesident-kassel-1.4515112> [20.07.2019]; Singer (01.08.2018. Germany Neo-Nazis amass blacklist of 'enemies'. Received from <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/world/germany-neo-nazis-amass-blacklist-of-enemies-krxjhwt7j> [20.07.2019])

¹⁶ See chapter 5 (overview of the important attacks and crimes from the last 15 to 20 years).

¹⁷ Bundesministerium für Verfassungsschutz (2019). Straftaten nach Deliktsbereichen 2017 und 2018.

Generally, the number of potential persons with a right-wing extremism background and left-wing extremism background has increased equally. While the person potential of left-wing extremism is greater (32,000 left-wing extremists vs 24,100 right-wing extremists in the year of 2018), the number of violent-orientated right-wing extremists is significantly higher than that of left-wing extremists. Comparable numbers exist for the person potential of Islamists. With a rise of 9 per cent from 2016 to 2018, the person potential of Islamists grew from 24,400 to 26,560 persons¹⁸.

Figure 7. Offence categories of politically motivated crime 2014-2018.
Source: Verfassungsschutz. Own representation.



4.5.1 What is the current situation regarding official crime statistics?

In comparison to other criminal offences, PMK crimes are directly recorded in official crime statistics inclusive of motives, background and sequence of events¹⁹. New investigations and findings are not accounted for

¹⁸ Before 2016, no firm statements were made about the Islamist personal potential.

¹⁹ Bundesministerium für Heimat, Inneres und Sicherheit (2019). Politisch Motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2018. Bundesweite Fallzahlen, p. 2.

in the crime statistics²⁰. Apart from a few exceptions where classification of crimes is produced by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), State Police Offices categorize offences related to PMK, which means that subjective impressions of the investigating officers regarding the act and motive are relevant to the statistics. In retrospect, several known right-wing extremist offences were not registered in official crime statistics because investigators saw no connection to the right-wing field. For example, the National Socialist Underground murders (short NSU²¹) were not included in the statistics at the beginning²².

Different non-governmental research regarding right-wing crime shows different figures. These include, among others, research by the Amadeu-Antonio-association²³, the German newspaper 'Zeit Online', 'Tagesspiegel'²⁴, and the Center for Democratic Culture (Zentrum Demokratische Kultur, ZDK).

Table 1. Amadeu-Antonio-association, PMK-statistics, Tagesspiegel²⁵.

Official statistics (1990-2018)	49 fatalities
Amadeu-Antonio-association (1990-2018)	At least 196 fatalities
Researches of Tagesspiegel and Zeit online (1990-2018)	At least 169 fatalities 61 possible cases with fatalities caused by right-wing extremist

With a difference of at least 113 fatalities in comparison to the Amadeu-Antonio-association or 86 fatalities to the research of Tagesspiegel, official statistics seem to lack in consistency. After disclosure of the right-wing extremist background of the NSU-cases, all German state police

²⁰ Backes, U. (2013). Zwischen Hasskriminalität und Terrorismus: politisch motivierte Gewalt in Deutschland. In: Totalitarismus und Demokratie Vol. 10 2013, p. 325-349.

²¹ Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund has been a terror organisation with ten known victims (see more in detail in chapter 4).

²² Ibid.

²³ Amadeu-Antonio-association was founded 1998. Eponym is Amadeu Antonio Kiowa who was killed by right-wing extremist adolescents in 1990 (Retrieved from www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de).

²⁴ Radke & Staud (27.09.2018). Todesopfer rechter Gewalt in Deutschland seit der Wiedervereinigung. Retrieved from <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/interaktive-karte-todesopfer-rechter-gewalt-in-deutschland-seit-der-wiedervereinigung/23117414.html> [20.07.2019]

²⁵ Amadeu, Antonio-Stiftung (2019). Todesopfer rechter Gewalt seit 1990. Received from: www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/rassismus/todesopfer-rechter-gewalt/ [20.07.2019]; Bundesregierung (15.06.2018). Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Petra Tötungsdelikte mit rechtsextremer bzw. rassistischer Motivation seit 1990, 19/2769. Received from <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/027/1902769.pdf> [20.07.2019]

forces re-examined cases with possible right-wing extremist backgrounds²⁶. Berlin and Brandenburg entered sixteen fatalities into the statistics retrospectively. Both federal states obtained assistance for the re-examination from independent institutes that re-examine deaths related to right-wing violence.

Right-wing ideology has been used as a motivation behind attacks against political opponents and foreigners, but it also covers bias-motivated crime against homeless, socially deprived, and disabled people²⁷. Yet, more than 70 per cent of the fatalities that were not statistically recorded at first were carried out against such marginal groups. Aside from official statistics on fatalities related to right-wing violence, there is also non-published independent and comparable research about fatalities from left-wing extremism or Islamist extremism.

4.5.2 *Right-wing extremism in the last 20 years*

Right-wing extremism in the form of right-wing parties in parliament (or in the election campaign) in the 1960s and 1990s has shifted predominantly to self-developed groups, associations or individual perpetrators²⁸. The reunion of the GDR and FRG led to a rise in right-wing attacks – approximately 18,000²⁹ in 1989. Some politicians from the party Alternative for Germany (AfD)³⁰ have been noted for making right-wing stances “socially acceptable”³¹.

National Socialist Underground murders (NSU)

Presenting the attacks of the last twenty years in Germany, the terrorist organization National Socialist Underground (NSU) is the most noteworthy. The NSU operated at the turn of the millennium³² and were known for

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Wendt et al. (2002). Rechtsradikale Gewalttäter. In: Rechtsmedizin 4/2002. Hamburg: Springer Verlag Online, p. 222.

²⁸ Quent, M. (2015). Sonderfall Ost – Normalfall West? In: Frindte et al. (2015). Rechts-extremismus und „Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund“ – Interdisziplinäre Debatten, Befunde und Bilanzen, p. 102.

²⁹ Dierbach, S. (2016). Befunde und aktuelle Kontroversen im Problembereich der Kriminalität und Gewalt. In: Vierchow et al. (2016). Handbuch Rechtsextremismus, Springer Verlag, p. 474.

³⁰ Alternative for Germany: ‘a new political party entered Germany’s parliament harvesting anti-establishment feelings while converting frustrations over neoliberalism into xenophobia and racism’. Klinkauer, T. Alternative for Germany: Germany’s new right-wing extremists. In: Journal of Labor and Society, Vol. 21, Issue 4, December 2018, p. 611.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Founded before the turn of the millennium, the organization NSU started their attacks with robberies in supermarkets and banks and continued with bomb attacks and shootings. Högl, E., & Weßnigk, D. (2016). Rechtsextremer Terror des NSU – Staatsversagen und Konsequenzen. In: Braun et al. (ed.)

their 'Ceska' killing spree where nine people with Greek and Turkish citizenships or Germans with Turkish migration background and one German police officer were shot dead³³. Further people were injured by nail bombs that were placed in and outside of shops. The attacks took place in several cities in Germany such as Munich, Hamburg, Nurnberg, Heilbronn, Dortmund and Kassel.

Figure 8. Known attacks committed by NSU.



The NSU, as the first terror cell in Germany after World War II and the Holocaust, initiated dialogues regarding racism and right-wing extremism in German society. Police investigations first took place in suspicious circles (like the mafia) but links to right-wing extremism were neither established nor expected by these institutions³⁴.

Beate Zschäpe, Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt formed the executive body of the organization; further people acted in the background. Possibly caused by the police interception of a bank robbery, Uwe Mundlos killed Uwe Böhnhardt and committed suicide in 2008. The confessor's video,

(2016). *Strategien der extremen Rechten*. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden, p. 583.

³³ Straßner, A. (2018). Links- und Rechtsterrorisms in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In: Jesse E., & Mannewitz T. *Extremismusforschung – Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Praxis*, nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, p. 450.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 451.

already published several years before, shows the extent of the terror cell as well as the participants. It took more than five years of trials to convict Beate Zschäpe and sympathisers in the court of Munich in 2018.

Refugee shelters

Over the last decade, refugee flows have arrived in Europe. Between 2015 and 2016, due to the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, a global movement produced the highest number of incoming refugees: 1,091,894 in 2015 and 321,361³⁵ in 2016. The opening of the borders provoked a social division in German society triggering a starker appearance of xenophobia that was expressed, among other things, by right-wing slogans. In the period from 2014 to 2018, 2496 right-wing offences against refugee shelters were recorded.

Table 2. Offences against refugee shelters with right-wing background. Source: BKA (2019).

Year	Number of known offences
2014	175
2015	923
2016	929
2017	300
2018	169
Total	2496

Of particular note were anti-refugee protests against a planned shelter in an old construction market in Heidenau, Saxony, in August 2015. The shelter was supposed to offer additional accommodation for 250 refugees. However, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) organized a demonstration that lasted three days after it was revealed that the market would be reconstructed as a refugee shelter. By blocking highways, protestors hindered buses with incoming refugees thus slowing down arrival times³⁶. Further violent actions were noted including the throwing of stones, bottles and using pyrotechnics against police officers and the refugee shelter³⁷. Police reports registered a total of 36 injured police officers

³⁵ Ministerium für Inneres. (2017). Verfassungsschutzbericht 2016, p. 49.

³⁶ Nattke, M. (2016). Die Krawalle in Heidenau, Freital und Dresden. In: Lichdi, Johannes (2016). Darf die NPD wegen Taten parteiloser Neonazis verboten werden? – Erdkundungen zu rassistischen Akteuren in ostdeutschen Regionen und den Folgen eines NPD-Verbots, p. 67.

³⁷ cf. Hebel, C. (22.08.2015). Rechter Terror mit Ansage – Ausschreitungen in Heidenau, Spiegel Online. Received from: <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlingsheim-in-heidenau-rechter-terror-mit-ansage-a-1049372.html> [20.07.2019]; Connolly, K. (25.08.2015). Angela Merkel to visit

over the entire weekend. International press and national newspapers reported on the riots. Not only did these incidents in Heidenau become well-known at home and overseas, but also made the headlines in numerous Saxonian towns such as Bautzen³⁸, Clausnitz³⁹ and Freital.

Right-wing terror group 'Freital'

Developed from the Freital vigilantes, eight people (seven men and one woman) formed the group 'Freital'. The terror organisation bombed two refugee shelters, damaged the car and office of a left-wing politician and carried out an attack on an alternative residential project with pyrotechnic and butyric acid⁴⁰. The German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution became aware of the organisation through chat records in social media.

Member of the Reichsbürger movement

The murder of a police officer and three injured police officers during a house search of the anti-government Reichsbürger⁴¹ Wolfgang P. is labelled as a right-wing extremist crime. When police entered his house, the armed perpetrator fired at the special commando unit. His gun arsenal covered 31 different types of weapons. The case drew attention to the underestimated Reichsbürger movement and the later leaked connection

asylum shelter after wave of far-right attacks; the Guardian. Received from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/25/angela-merkel-visit-asylum-shelter-attacks> [20.07.2019]

³⁸ Bautzen (2016). Two arson attacks with Molotov cocktails on a planned and an occupied refugee shelter were carried out. Furthermore, violent clashes between a group of people with mostly right-wing background and a group of unaccompanied minor refugees transpired. (Kurtenbach 2018. *Ausgrenzung Geflüchteter – Eine empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel Bautzen*, Springer publisher, Wiesbaden.

³⁹ Clausnitz (18.02.2016). Similar to Heidenau: A mob of right-wing extremist tried to hinder incoming refugees to the shelter. Violent actions toward refugees had drawn criticism of the police by media and a variety of politicians Reinhard, D. (20.02.2016). *Begrüßung mit Klammergriff*. Zeit Online. Received from: <https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2016-02/clausnitz-sachsen-polizei-asylbewerber-randale-stinkefinger-video> [20.07.2019]

⁴⁰ The German office of protection of the constitution counted 19,000 Reichsbürger 2018 of those are 950 right-wing extremists (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 2018. *Personenpotenzial von "Reichsbürgern" und „Selbstverwaltern“*. <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-reichsbuerger-und-selbstverwalter/zahlen-und-fakten-reichsbuerger-und-selbstverwalter/reichsbuerger-und-selbstverwalter-personenpotenzial-2018> [20.07.2019]).

⁴¹ Characteristic for Reichsbürger is the rejection of the modern German state and belief in the German Reich, which existed before the Second World War. Vormbaum, M. (2017). "Reichsbürger" und Strafrecht. *De Gruyter, Juristische Rundschau* 2017 (19), p. 504.

to the police⁴². Four police officers from different offices were suspended due to connections with the Reichsbürger movement⁴³.

The case of Walter Lübcke

The first murder of a politician by a right-wing actor after National Socialism in Germany came about in June 2019. Walter Lübcke, who campaigned for refugees and against right-wing populism, was shot on the terrace of his house. The police are still investigating whether the perpetrator is an individual actor or whether there are any links to terror organisations⁴⁴.

4.5.3 Left-wing extremism in the last 20 years

The last attacks with fatalities connected to left-wing extremism in Germany were carried out by the 'Rote Armee Fraktion' (RAF) between 1977 and 1993⁴⁵. The change in the form of operations after the dissolution of the RAF⁴⁶ in 1997 is noteworthy. Terrorist attacks like bomb attacks, abduction and murders are no longer the usual protest activities of left-wing extremists. Currently, battery, sabotage, paralyzing trains, plundering and arson are being used to express the ideology⁴⁷. A significant terror group was the 'militante Gruppe' that operated in Berlin between 2001 and 2007 and was responsible for 26 arson attacks against cars in Berlin.

Mass actions

Mass actions during the opening celebration of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt in March 2015 and Group of Twenty (G20) summit meeting in Hamburg 2017 were formative for the history of modern left-wing

⁴² BBC News (20.10.2016). Received from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37713209>, [20.07.2019]

⁴³ Süddeutsche Zeitung (21.10.2016). Weiterer Polizist wegen „Reichsbürger“ – Nähe suspendiert. Received from: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/bayern/kriminalitaet-weiterer-polizist-wegen-reichsbuerger-naehe-suspendiert-1.3215755> [20.07.2019]

⁴⁴ Frankfurter Rundschau (11.07.2019). Mordfall Lübcke: Wahrscheinlich Anklage beim Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt. Received from: <https://www.fr.de/politik/mordfall-luebcke-kassel-will-nazi-marsch-verbieten-zr-12763622.html> [20.07.2019]

⁴⁵ Afterwards, two fatalities related to left-wing violence acts were recorded. Received from: Parliamentary question, <http://dipbt.bundes-tag.de/doc/btd/19/040/1904058.pdf> [20.07.2019]

⁴⁶ Using the concept of an urban guerilla, which stemmed from guerilla fights in South America (Lang, J. (2018). Linksextremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In: Jesse E. & Mannewitz T. Extremismusforschung – Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Praxis, nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, p. 370).

⁴⁷ Pfahl-Traugher (2014). Linksextremismus in Deutschland – Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme. Bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, p. 10.

extremist attacks in Germany. The opening ceremony of the new construction of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt on 18.05.2015 was a transition point for, among other people, European left-wing extremist and especially autonomes (the so-called black bloc)⁴⁸. Protesting against capitalism and Europe's austerity policy, 6,000 potentially violent left-wing extremists demonstrated in the streets before and during the celebration. Following this, more than 17,000 peaceful participants joined the biggest demonstration executed by 'Blockupy' (figures by Blockupy and Bundesministerium des Inneren). Consequences of the violent riots were damages to property in the amount of 1.5 million euros caused by acts of arson and vandalism.

Police officers were seen as the main targets of the attacks⁴⁹. The German protection of the constitution and policy summary reported 150 injured police officers who were injured and 62 damaged police cars during the demonstration against the opening of the ECB⁵⁰. A similar number of injured police officers was reported for the G20 summit meeting in Hamburg in 2017. During the summit meeting, black bloc committed a series of offences in the city centre, inter alia, arsons on shops, cars and barricades, vandalism and plunder⁵¹. After the summit meeting, the police summary counted 231 injured police officers, arson attacks on random cars of private citizens and acts of vandalism of shops and infrastructure⁵². In total, the police established more than 2,000 offences: this included mostly property damage (575), grievous bodily harm (330), breach of the peace (303), grievous breach of the peace (126), arson (123), resistance against police (45)⁵³. Similar mass actions against police officers include the riot in Connewitz (Leipzig) in 2015, the police raid of squatters on Rigaer Strasse 94 in Berlin in 2016, and the protests in Hambach Forest in 2018.

⁴⁸ Approximately 1,000 European autonomes travelled to Frankfurt to express disapproval towards the European Central Bank. Source: Süddeutsche Zeitung (06.07.2017). Polizei und Gipfelgegner bereiten sich auf G20-Krawalle vor. Received from: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/news/service/g20-polizei-und-gipfelgegner-bereiten-sich-auf-g20-krawalle-vor-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-170706-99-136846> [20.07.2019]

⁴⁹ Right-wing extremists, right-wing populists and police officers usually are the human targets of left-wing extremists. During the mass actions mainly police officers were injured. In 2018, 174 right-wing extremists and 146 police officers were bodily injured by left-wing extremists.

⁵⁰ Ministerium für Inneres (2016). Verfassungsschutzbericht 2015, p. 116.

⁵¹ Ullrich et al. (2017). Eine lange Woche im Juli – Chronologie der Konflikte um den G20-Gipfel in Hamburg, p. 6.

⁵² Ministerium für Inneres (2018). Verfassungsschutzbericht 2017, p. 101.

⁵³ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (28.08.2017). Received from: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/polizei-ermittelt-in-2000-faellen-gegen-g-20-gegner-15172399.html> [20.07.2019]

4.5.4 An overview of recent attacks related to Islamist extremism

Foreign policy concerns of North America and Europe in Iraq and other Arabic countries may have provoked animosity of Western societies. The terror attacks against the United States, especially accentuated is 9/11, have been the start of different terror attacks all over the world. In comparison to other Western Europe countries like France and England, Germany is a smaller target for terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, a number of attacks have occurred during the last two decades in Germany.

Since the middle of the 2010s, the accumulation of Islamist attacks and terror warnings appear to be on the rise. In particular, 2016 was the year with the most significant number of executed attacks in Germany. After the uprising of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the first martyrdom in connection with a terror group took place in Hannover by a 15-year-old girl. Safia S. radicalized primarily by herself but had additional contact to radicals through messaging apps⁵⁴. The impact of her radicalisation was first seen on the 26th of February 2016 when Safia S. attacked a police officer with a knife at a railway station in Hannover. The attack resulted in serious injuries for the police officer. Another Islamist terror attack took place in the same year in April 2016 when two minors placed a home-made bomb in a Sikh-temple leaving three people wounded⁵⁵. It is worth mentioning here that the assailants were raised in Germany and had radicalised by themselves (so-called “homegrown jihadists”).

In the same year, two successive terrorist attacks occurred in Bavaria within a short time span – 18.07.2016 in Würzburg and 24.07.2016 in Ansbach. A seventeen-year-old refugee entered a train with an axe and injured five passengers. He died shortly afterwards during an exchange of fire with the police. The following week Mohammad Daleel, a Syrian refugee, planted a bomb at the entrance of a music festival in Ansbach, which injured 12 others and killed him. The ISIS claimed responsibility for both these attacks.

The attack at Berlin’s Christmas market at Breitscheidplatz on 19th December 2016 marks a prominent target by Islamist extremists in Germany⁵⁶. By crashing into a crowd at the Christmas market with a stolen

⁵⁴ Goertz, S. (2019). *Terrorismusabwehr – Zur aktuellen Bedrohung durch den islamistischen Terrorismus in Deutschland und Europa*, Springer publisher, p. 26.

⁵⁵ District Court Essen, judgement reached on 21.03.2017.

⁵⁶ Ministerium für Inneres (2018). *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2017*.

truck, the Tunisian refugee killed 12 people and left 62 injured. After escaping from the crime scene, the perpetrator was found and shot by Italian officers in Milan a few days later⁵⁷.

In a supermarket in Hamburg Barmbek 2017, a self-radicalised⁵⁸ 26-year-old Palestinian killed one person and injured five more with a knife that he purchased from the store. The number of Islamist attacks in Germany are lower compared with France. Nonetheless, Germany's domestic security services (for example local State Criminal Police Offices, the Federal Police and State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution) have foiled many potential attacks.

4.5.5 Prevention in Germany

During work package one of the project Pericles, data was collected of projects and programmes that targeted the prevention of radicalisation. Only those projects and programmes were included that had an internet presence. This data was collected through internet research between the 15.03.2019 and 15.07.2019. A total of 487 ongoing projects and programmes were included.

Overview

From cultural memory, street work, simulation games, school projects and parental support, contemporary witnesses, information centre to projects in prison and sportive activities – the field of prevention in Germany is widespread and inexhaustible in its creativity.


Right-wing extremism in Germany is the most targeted form of extremism by projects with 64 per cent having right-wing extremism as their main focus. Nearly 50 per cent of the existing prevention projects covers the expression of right-wing extremism only (see Figure 9). An increase in prevention projects targeting Islamist extremism is notable since the Islamist attacks in 2016. Almost half of them addressed Islamist extremism among other forms of extremism with 32 per cent focusing on Islamist extremism only. Noteworthy is the overarching projects for prevention of

⁵⁷ Povoledo et al. (23.12.2016). Hunt for Berlin Suspect Ends in Gunfire on an Italian Plaz. New York Times. Received from: <https://www.ny-times.com/2016/12/23/world/europe/berlin-anis-amri-killed-milan.html> [20.07.2019]

⁵⁸ The Office of Protection of the Constitution have not perceived any contact to terror organizations or backers. Zeit Online (01.03.2018). Lebenslange Haft für Barmbeker Messerangreifer. Received from <https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2018-03/hamburg-barmbek-messerattacke-urteil-lebenslange-haft> [20.07.2019]

Islamist extremism and right-wing extremism. Ten per cent concern both phenomena.

Figure 9. Type of extremism targeted by projects. Own data.



Comparing the different forms of extremism, left-wing extremism appears to be the most targeted. Only a small percentage (5%) of the projects focus on the prevention of left-wing extremism, which is a total of 19 projects.

Project aims

Most projects address youths, (social) professions and society. One focus is on children and adolescents, as adolescence is a critical stage of life. Identity formation, a sense of belonging and experience of discrimination are among the risk factors of racialisation, especially among adolescents. Not only in Islamist extremism but also in right-wing extremism and left-wing extremism is the start of adolescence a notable risk factor. The average age of entry into right-wing extremism is 13-14 years and for Islamist extremism 15-19 years⁵⁹. Projects used the approach of identity formation and youth orientation work as the basis of their project development and implementation. Besides educational work such as democracy education, knowledge transfer and education are an essential part of prevention work with young people. Children and adolescents are addressed in nearly half of all projects in Germany. The school as an educational institute is usually the place for carrying out the projects, for example through workshops. The project days of the Netzwerk für Demokratie und Courage e.V. (Network for Democracy and Courage), in which under-

⁵⁹ Glaser, Michaela (2017). Rechtsextremismus und islamistischer Extremismus im Jugendalter.

standings of democracy and racism are educated, could serve as an example. The key factor of the projects is trained mentors with a small age difference to the pupils.

Raising awareness of the issues of antisemitism, racism and other derogatory ideologies is a key component of the projects. Most of the projects address pupils, young people, professionals and society. Further training of teachers and other professionals in recognising radicalisation and prevention is an indirect way of protecting young people and others. Almost half of all projects addressed professionals. Most of these projects have several target groups besides professionals. Educational work does not only refer to youth education but also for working with all members of society.

Further goals of prevention projects in Germany are the preparation and dissemination of knowledge. Specialized research institutes, especially on right-wing extremism, are set up for this purpose. Due to Germany's history, the phenomenon of right-wing extremism has been researched more extensively than other forms of extremism.


In 2016, ICSR (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation) published the report on European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus. According to the Centre, around one-third of the detainees in their sample radicalised in prison⁶⁰. The view that prisons act as “the perfect ‘breeding ground’”⁶¹ for Islamist extremism and jihadism has now resulted in prisons being the centre of the attention for prevention projects. Eight per cent (40 in total) of the projects focus on de-radicalisation and prevention in correctional facilities. In cooperation between the federal states and associations, programmes are available for the individual federal states.

An exact distribution of projects and programmes over the federal territories does not exist. Many regional and local projects operate especially in Berlin and federal states with large urban areas such as North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse. Local projects are in the majority in Germany – these include projects which take place in one specific city, urban district or rural district.

⁶⁰ The International Centre for the study of radicalisation and political violence (2016). *Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus*, King's College London.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

Figure 10. Level of implementation of projects. Own data.




Evaluation

As a result of using an internet search, there was limited possibility to obtain exact information on the evaluation of all known projects in Germany. For this reason, a second survey was sent to projects in German speaking countries that included detailed questions on evaluations and project efficiency. The survey was carried out by the German Police University and the Criminological Research Centre Lower Saxony. Questionnaires were sent to projects within Germany, Austria and Switzerland in 2018. The questionnaire included further information on funds and evaluation aims.

At the time of the survey, 15 per cent of the German projects did not carry out an evaluation. In order to assess the effectiveness of projects, the majority of the participants used a self-evaluation (57%). The other half used external evaluations. To rule out a distortion effect, 22 per cent used both self-evaluation and external evaluation. In particular, a focus is placed on the course and process of the projects. Model projects that are still under development used process evaluation for improvement and optimization.

The effectiveness of a project is essential. In Figure 11, it is visible that more projects did not have evaluation results at the time of the survey than were available⁶². The success of projects boasted a notable 35 per cent. Only 10 per cent of projects claimed they were partly effective.

⁶² Missing values are already excluded.

Figure 11. Effectiveness of the projects. Own data.

ZDK (Society Democratic Culture) is a model example of prevention associated with regular external and self-evaluations. Such education programmes have been externally evaluated as useful.

Funding

Most notable is the Federal state fund of the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth as a part of the federal programme “Demokratie leben” (Live Democracy). Commenced in 2015, the federal programme supports a variety of associations and pilot projects every year. Including projects on a national, regional and local level, the Federal programme offered funding of 115.5 million euros for 2019⁶³. Pilot projects related to democracy development and prevention of extremism received particular attention. Furthermore, democracy centres are provided with financial resources to support local projects and funding for up to five years⁶⁴.

A large proportion of the projects are financed by “Live Democracy!”. This makes the federal programme the largest supporter. The governmental programme “Cohesion through Participation” (“Zusammenhalt durch Teilhabe”) has a budget of around 12 million euros.


In addition to the Federal fund, programmes at the federal state level, commune and city level also support associations to their projects. An example of a Federal State’s programme is the Saxonian “open-minded Saxony” (“Weltoffenes Sachsen”) project. With a budget of 4.46 million euros for 2019, the programme offers funding for more than 100 projects.

⁶³ Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (2018). Demokratie leben!

⁶⁴ Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (2018).

Although, according to an interpellation, the Saxonian fund amount is not sufficient⁶⁵.

Figure 12. Proportion of projects with public funding. Own data.



The majority of the projects draw their resources entirely (71%) or almost entirely (21%) from public funds⁶⁶. Only a small proportion received no or partial funding. Non-governmental foundations that contribute are often supported by similar projects and partly by subsidies. Noteworthy are Amadeu-Antonio-Foundation, Robert-Bosch-foundation, Anne-Frank-funds.


4.5.6 Valuation of the prevention

Is the prevention repressive or preventive?

Focusing on primary prevention is the main goal of German associations and the German government and is practised by 75 per cent of the projects. Instead of deradicalization, **the approach is prevention before radicalisation**. Through education, inter alia, at a young age in the form of workshops, development of tolerance and empathy in society or congregation with 'foreigners', developers of the projects and programmes are working towards the goal of prevention.

⁶⁵ Katja Meier (2019). Kleiner Antrag. Thema: Anträge Förderprogramm „Weltoffenes Sachsen“ für die Förderperiode ab 01. Januar 2019. Received from: http://edas.landtag.sachsen.de/viewer.aspx?dok_nr=17497&dok_art=Drs&leg_per=6&pos_dok=2&dok_id=undefined [20.07.2019]

⁶⁶ Database have been the questionnaire of the KFN e.V. and DhPol.

Figure 13. Level of prevention. Own data.

In the event of failure, second and tertiary prevention is initiated. Especially domiciled projects in prison and opt-out programmes are in the five per cent per cent of the tertiary prevention. A small number of actors provides the repressive work like the Violence Prevention Network e.V. As an example, their project Koordinierungs- und Beratungsstelle Radikalisierungsprävention KORA (Coordination and Advisory Centre for Radicalisation Prevention) covers all three forms of prevention through educational work for primary prevention and intervention, de-radicalization and opt-out programmes for secondary and tertiary prevention. There were only two particular programmes for left-wing extremism. Nevertheless, the result only applies to the sample collected in the survey and not regarding all known prevention projects for left-wing extremism.

4.5.7 Advice for the future and conclusion

It is worth noting that many projects focus on online prevention. However, not many programs in Germany are evaluated. Evaluation remains underdeveloped and provides an important element to prevention especially in right-wing extremism and Islamism. Regarding the radicalisation of the youths, media and internet activities may have a higher value.

A lack of evaluation is not only present in online projects but across most types of prevention projects. Scientific evaluations and practical applications developed from them are necessary. While the basic idea of most projects is based on needs, in only a few cases have these been researched and tested beforehand. For further development of the prevention situation in Germany, these points should be addressed from now on by the scientific community. Furthermore, the emergence of new studies on prevention was evident during the research. The results of the research should influence practice soon.

If one compares the figures of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to the potential of persons in left-wing extremism and the projects

with those of right-wing extremism and their projects, the figure appears disproportionate. Nonetheless, more people have been killed in Germany by Islamist attacks in the 21st century than by other forms of extremism such as left-wing extremism. Furthermore, left-wing extremism is more heterogeneous, and further projects were not as effective as perhaps planned. This might imply that the prevention of left-wing extremism in Germany was partially unsuccessful in some respects.

Most deradicalization projects focus on young people as a target group. The time of adolescence carries a high vulnerability to processes of radicalisation, but is not universally valid. Extremist crimes appeared socially acceptable in 2015 and 2016 at the beginning of the refugee movement. The latest developments in Germany show that perpetrators do not only come from extremist groups but often act individually. They are ascribed to the 'middle of society'. This group of perpetrators makes it challenging to research and develop an approach to prevention.

Regarding the development of extremist crimes, the number of programmes is appropriate. Innovative and creative projects have emerged in recent years and tried and tested projects have developed and improved. Financial support from public funds and other sponsors allows institutions the opportunity to develop new projects.

Certain projects are required for special risk factors; for this purpose, superordinate bodies were established for the prisons of each federal state to prevent radicalisation of inmates. In addition to the individual offices in the federal states, there are only a few projects for prison inmates.

In summary, the situation of prevention projects in Germany needs some improvements in some areas and that there is a shortage of scientific cooperation between projects and institutes. Nevertheless, there is a range of successful projects that work preventively and repressively against radicalisation in various areas. A reasonable expansion of these would be a step forward against radicalisation and extremism.

4.6 IRELAND

4.6.1 Overview of the situation in the Republic of Ireland

In the aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement in 1969, an ethno-religious and territorial conflict raged in Northern Ireland from 1969 until the late 1990s. The forces of the protestant majority, both state and paramilitary, fought against the paramilitary forces of the catholic minority resulting in the loss of over 3,000 lives. The 1970s was the most violent and intense

decade of “The Troubles”, and the Irish Republic experienced an epidemic of bank robberies by Irish Republican paramilitaries designed to raise funds for their revolutionary war (Ferriter, 2012). Though the total number of deaths in the Irish Republic due to the conflict was small (O’Donnell et al., 2005), some high-profile attacks placed great pressure on the Irish State. In Dublin, Saor Eire (Free Ireland) shot and killed Garda Richard Fallon in April 1970; the first police officer shot dead since 1942 (Ferriter, 2012). In 1975, Garda Michael Reynolds was shot dead by republicans in Dublin, and in 1976 Garda Michael Clerkin was killed by IRA bomb in County Laois in an attack that targeted the Irish police force. The Dublin and Monaghan bombings of May 1974, carried out by the Ulster Volunteer Force, killed 33 people in total, and in March 1974 protestant Irish TD Billy Fox was murdered by the Irish Republican Army (Ferriter, 2012). The British Viceroy to India, Lord Mountbatton, was murdered when a bomb was placed in his boat by Irish Republicans at Mullaghmore in Sligo in August 1979. The Irish State endeavoured to contain the Irish Republican movement in the 1980s and 1990s, and the number of attacks on Irish soil decreased. The Belfast ‘Good Friday’ Agreement, signed by most parties to the conflict in April 1998, has permitted peace to become the norm in Northern Irish society. Since the 1998 Belfast Agreement the threat from terrorist activity has decreased significantly. While there are dissident republican groups within the state’s boundaries of the Irish Republic, they are small, disorganised, and prone to infighting.

The main body of counter-terrorism legislation in Ireland is the Offences against the state Act 1939-1998. These Acts were introduced and have been primarily used to counter the threat posed by the IRA in all its manifestations, including, latterly, the dissident republican terrorist organisations of the so-called Real IRA and Continuity IRA. The Offences against the State Acts provide for a range of terrorist-related offences, with maximum court-imposed sentences varying according to the specific offence.

The Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005⁶⁷ was introduced in order to further enhance the State’s response to international terrorism. This Act gives effect to a number of international instruments directed to terrorism and meets commitments which the State has undertaken as part of the European Union and the broader international community, including the United Nations. The 2005 Act also amends Irish law and, in particular, the Offences against the State Acts, to address the problem of international terrorism in a domestic context. Specifically, Section 5 of the 2005 Act provides that a terrorist group that engages in, promotes, encourages or advocates the commission, in or outside the State, of a terrorist activity

⁶⁷ <http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2005/act/2/enacted/en/html>

is an unlawful organisation within the meaning and for the purposes of the 1939-1998 Acts. Accordingly, the Offences against the State Acts now apply with any necessary modifications and have effect in relation to such terrorist groups.

Ireland has no history of Islamic terrorism; there have been no attacks or interrupted terrorist plots. In June 2015, three Irish people were murdered in Tunisia by ISIS and Ireland has been identified as a target country in Islamic State propaganda videos. A number of individuals have been detained and questioned on suspicion of being Islamic State supporters, one being described as being a senior operative who was extradited to the United States⁶⁸. In addition, a small number of Irish citizens gone to fight in Syria and Iraq. It is not an offence in Ireland to travel for terrorist purposes.

Ireland also has little recent history of far-right movements. Ireland's political culture is divided along lines determined by old loyalties from the 1922 Civil War era, with two large centre parties dominating Irish politics for much of the 20th century. The normative left/right divide seen in many western democracies does not strictly apply to Irish political and social culture though a relatively successful Labour party has existed since 1912 and in recent years a small hard left grouping has emerged in Irish parliamentary politics. To date, Ireland has experienced little organised right-wing activity with the only notable exception being a small group of political activists named 'Identity Ireland' who have failed to gain seats in local elections.

4.6.2 *Anti-extremism Initiatives*

Ireland's entries into the Rubric are few. It should be noted that the lead in raising awareness of radicalisation of Muslim youth in Ireland has been provided by Muslim leaders, especially Dr Mohammed Umar of the Al Mustafa Islamic Centre in Dublin. Dr Umar has warned about radical preachers entering Ireland to spread a toxic version of Islam that seeks to recruit supporters for violent extremism. He has been very present in media and academic circles pressing the message of moderation, peace, and the urgency of taking radicalisation seriously. To that end he designed and created an anti-extremist website, Jihad.info, that provides articles and lectures from leading scholars who spread the message of peaceful Islam. The website also details the signs of radicalisation and provides a mechanism for reporting the spread of radical Islamism, whether by preachers, literature, or social media sites. The information is then passed

⁶⁸ <http://www.irishexaminer.com/viewpoints/analysis/gardai-develop-units-to-counter-extremism-and-the-terror-threat-to-ireland-396021.html>

on to Irish law enforcement agencies. Dr Umar also drafted an anti-radicalisation declaration which asks visiting preachers to promise to avoid inflaming inter-faith tensions, respect the rights of all of Ireland's minorities including LGBT communities, and to sincerely propagate messages of peace. As president of the Muslim Council of Ireland, Dr Umar has requested that all mosques in Ireland require their visiting preachers and scholars to sign the declaration (see picture below).

Figure 14: Launch of Declaration of Peace and Guide to Prevent Radicalisation during a protest against ISIS in Dublin



Source: Irish Muslim – Peace and Integration Council. Online available: <http://impic.ie/irish-muslim-declaration-of-peace-guide-to-prevent-radicalisation-launches-during-protest-against-isis.html>

Ireland's experience with multi-culturalism is relatively recent. Immigration began in the late 1990s, mostly from Eastern Europe, and it was not until the millennium that Ireland began to see large scale immigration from non-Christian and/or non-white countries. Ireland has funded a range of projects and initiatives to support the integration of new communities, challenge racism and homophobia, and prevent the emergence of right-wing groups. Government funded organisations such as the Irish Immigrant Support centre in Cork and the Immigrant Council of Ireland based in Dublin have been at the forefront of challenging racism and xenophobia. Important equality advocacy and campaigning has also been carried out by organisations such as Bernardos and the Gay and Lesbian equality Network (GLEN). Further, Ireland enjoys a well-established and vibrant youth services sector that works with young people from all communities and endeavours to employ an anti-racism agenda in its youth work model. The City of Dublin Youth Services Board and Youth Work Ireland, for example, provide direction and training for youth organisations who wish to develop

equality promoting organisational policies. These organisations carry out work that is not specific to radicalisation or extremism but contribute towards creating a more harmonious equal society.

4.6.3 Summary

The trends, means and patterns of terrorism and radicalisation are in a constant state of evolution. The relatively recent phenomena of “lone wolf” attacks, foreign fighters and the impact of international conflicts present new types of risks, while the communication and radicalising potential of the Internet and social media also present new aspects to an increasingly diverse issue. International best practice in this area suggest that combating the terrorist threat should involve not just traditional security and legislative responses but also the development of an understanding of the factors which motivate individuals to embrace radical or extremist ideologies. In that context the Department of Justice contributes to the development of European and International Policy in this area arising from Ireland’s membership of various international institutions and bodies such as the Council of the European Union, the Council of Europe and the UN, its support for An Garda Síochána and the development of relations with other relevant sectors.

4.7 NETHERLANDS

Radicalisation research in the Netherlands is flourishing, and so is the number of interventions and programmes that deal with preventing radicalisation. This paragraph highlights some of the most salient, most used, most effective, and most known interventions that originate from and/or are used in The Netherlands.

As the number of preventive counter-radicalisation interventions is too large for a comprehensive overview, a selection was made of interventions that seemed to reflect the state of the art in the Netherlands at this point in time. This selection was made on the basis of the following sources:

- Dutch interventions mentioned in the Radicalisation Awareness Network “Collection of approaches and practices” report (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2017, see chapter 3).
- Interviews with Dutch professionals on the state of the art of Dutch de-radicalisation interventions. The professionals reflected the broad scope of the field, i.e., police (project manager and operational specialist Countering Terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation), Ministry

of Security and Justice (two senior policy advisors), fieldwork (one first-line professional), and the municipality of a large city (policy advisor radicalisation).

- The IMPACT Europe database of interventions (see chapter 3 of this report).

All these interventions were reviewed and if suitable for coding (i.e., sufficient information was available) included into the rubric. It should be noted that this set is not necessarily representative of the total scope of interventions available in the Netherlands, as only a limited number of experts were consulted and a selection had to be made because of time limitations.

4.7.1 Interventions in the Netherlands

In general, the Dutch CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) domain can be characterised by two major trends: a personalised approach (“PGA” or “persoonsgerichte aanpak”), and a broad offer of interventions in the preventive sphere, in particular so-called primary prevention (Gruber et al., 2016). Both trends are described in more detail in the remainder of this chapter.

4.7.2 Personalised approach

The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) of the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 2014) indicates that the best local approach to extremist (i.e., violent) radicalisation covers both the security and social domain⁶⁹. This includes an integration of repression, prevention and after-care with an effective network of collaboration partners and attention for monitoring, evaluation and sponsorship.

Like previous years, 18 Dutch municipalities received financial support in 2017 to strengthen this integrated approach to jihadist radicalisation, benefiting many smaller municipalities as well that are being coordinated by the larger municipalities. The money was intended for targeted prevention and strengthening the so-called personalised approach. The plans for 2017 focussed in particular on further educating first-line professionals,


⁶⁹ Website of the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) of the Ministry of Security and Justice. Online available: <https://www.nctv.nl/actueel/nieuws/2016/Extra%20geld%20voor%20lokale%20aanpak%20radicalisering%20en%20jihadisme.aspx> [14.08.2017]

supporting the environment of radicalising youths, building strategic networks of key figures, strengthening the role of education in signalling possible radicalisation and analysing local issues and resilience.

The *personalised approach* involves signalling radicalising individuals and coordinating with all relevant parties to design an appropriate approach to a radicalising individual, tailored to his or her individual circumstances. These coordinated activities take place in case meetings at the Security House, a professional board including police, municipality, and prosecution. These key partners are supplemented with additional partners such as youth workers, first-line workers, mosques, schools, and probation officers⁷⁰. Schools, mosques, key figures, communities and first-line workers are expected to have a better knowledge of young people who are susceptible to radical ideas and have a better insight into how to interact with them. As such, these partners are in a good position to perceive changes in individual behaviour and engage in interactions. As a result, they can provide additional information and help to detect signals (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 2014).

⁷⁰ Website of the Association for Dutch Municipalities (VNG). Online available: https://vng.nl/files/vng/publicaties/2015/20150528-gemeenten_en_radicalisering.pdf [14.08.2017]

Figure 15: Schematic overview of personalised approach



Source: Provided by the National Police, the Netherlands

In these multidisciplinary case meetings, a personal customised approach is chosen (see figure above for an overview of the process). The interventions chosen for the particular case can include (a combination of) penal and administrative measures and personal care measures. Examples are taking in passports, taking child protective custody measures, contact bans, terminating benefits, offering day facilities, psychological counselling, and family support (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2015). This approach is only taken with individuals who have already radicalised to a considerable degree; as such, the aim is prevent further radicalisation and disengagement.

In many countries, mainly police data are used to determine risk and intervene in radicalising individuals. The way in which partners within the Netherlands work together in the personalised approach, combining different types of data to determine risk, is quite unique. Various systems for identifying the risk have been developed over the years (for example, KIM, Dynamic Decision Framework, IR46, and VERA). These systems include large numbers of signals of radicalisation (i.e., behaviours of individuals) which in itself might not immediately be alarming, but when appearing together with other signals, are reason for concern.

4.7.3 Focus on preventive measures

A second trend that characterises the Dutch approach to radicalisation is a focus on early prevention (i.e., primary prevention) in a broad range of interventions. Early preventive measures address polarisation and societal tensions rather than radicalisation per se, and they target the general population rather than specific groups. For example, the municipality of Rotterdam facilitates initiatives from the public that might help to prevent unrest, such as meetings organised by Mosques, and engaging its network of 100+ key individuals with comprehensive coverage in terms of ethnic background, gender, geographical coverage, age, religion and sexual orientation (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2015). Stigmatisation can be an unwanted side-effect of counter-radicalisation interventions, and as such it could reduce or erase the effectiveness of interventions (van der Veen, 2017). The benefit of early prevention in general populations is the relatively small risk of stigmatising individuals or groups.

Preventive measures in Dutch cities are generally focussed on Islamist radicalisation. For example, the Rotterdam municipality facilitates the public in activities such as organising debates, creates their own projects such as offering mothers supportive tools to help increase their children's resistance to the message of violent Jihadism, and organises open dialogue meetings on themes such as identity. In addition, professionals and volunteers are being trained to identify possible signs at an early stage.

The rubric shows relatively many interventions targeting children. These are generally characterised by a hands-on approach, in which the children are presented with an experience rather than only knowledge. For example, *Expedition Friend and Foe* uses confrontation containers in which societal issues are addressed in a playful manner, and the *Peaceable School* considers classes to be mini-societies in which children have their own responsibility to solve conflicts in a constructive manner and make democratic decisions. *Fortress of Democracy* uses an interactive exhibition to confront school children with all kinds of social problems. The interventions focussed on children are inherently generic, i.e., not targeting a specific group (such as Muslims) but fighting polarisation across groups. A notable exception is *Jihad the show* (Jihad de Voorstelling), that uses three characters the children can identify with, and who take the children along in their radicalising thoughts and finally their departure to Syria where everything is quite not so romantic or heroic as they might have imagined. There is a manual included with information for lessons, and the ultimate goal of the show is to get the discussion going on this subject within the schools.

Another interesting finding is the salience of key persons as a method to detect and to prevent radicalisation. These key persons are used to report warning signs of radicalisation to the municipality and/or the police, and to contact radicalising individuals or their families. For example, in the project *Allies*, the police recruit key persons as allies to be the eyes and ears in local communities, and the *SMN Helpline* tries to bring key persons in contact with families of radicalising individuals.

Surprisingly, the police seem to be quite active in the primary prevention field. For example, the above-mentioned project *Allies* is a police intervention programme with key police personnel involved, and *Second Wave "My City Real World"*, a British intervention that is now used in the Netherlands, uses a workshop with police and children to achieve mutual understanding, thereby helping the children see the man behind the uniform and the police officers see the children behind the problem. A specific type of police officer, the community police officer ("wijkagent"), allows the police to do preventive work without the connotation and potential stigmatisation of regular police approaches (van der Veen, 2017).

Remarkable is the lack of easily obtainable information about theoretical background of the interventions. In addition, hardly any information could be found about empirical evaluations. A noticeable exception is the DIAMANT (DIAMOND) intervention, of which the train-the-trainer programme was evaluated (Feddes, et al., 2013; Feddes et al., 2015); see also EU project SAFIRE (Chapter 3 of this report). This programme was developed to enable trainers to implement the DIAMANT training (Stichting Interculturele Participatie en Integratie, 2010), which is an intervention that aims to increase resilience among vulnerable youth through identity development (i.e., empowering their dual identities).

4.8 TERRA TOOLKIT

TERRA is a Europe wide network-based prevention and learning project, funded by the European Commission, DG Home Affairs. On the basis of state of the art research and consultations with frontliners, academic experts, victims of terrorism and former radicals, it proposes a community approach designed to address the grievances which form the motivational factors of radicalisation, identify and halt the progress of an individual through the radicalisation process and prevent them from undertaking a terrorist act.

The TERRA Toolkit is primarily meant to support existing or new networks of teachers, youth workers, law enforcement, religious leaders, and local

policy makers on exchanging information on young people at risk of radicalising, and to come to a weighted judgment about the risks. It also informs journalists and policy makers on influences they may have on background factors of radicalisation. The toolkit is aimed at professionals Europe wide, and addresses all of the commonest forms of extremism – right wing extremism, left wing extremism, Islamist extremism, separatism and single-issue extremism. One tool – that for religious leaders – focusses only on Islamist extremism.

The toolkit comprises:

- A general background document that covers the objectives, presuppositions and starting points, implications for use and implementation.
- Separate tools for each target group with manuals on indicators of radicalisation and tip sheet folders.
- Video material with testimonials of victims of terrorism, former radicals and interviews with representatives of all the different target groups. The video material can also be used separately and included or added to existing materials.

The TERRA Toolkit is developed on the basis of a scientific literature review on risk factors and relevant stakeholders, together with consultations of professionals in the field on the practical applicability of the material, critical reviews of experts in the field.

4.9 TERRA UCARE

The TERRA UCARE is a curriculum for schools aimed at preventing the processes of radicalisation. The social skills and citizenship of adolescents are promoted through a series of workshops based on two knowledge domains, one on what we know from scientific literature about the factors contributing to radicalisation, and the other on citizenship education. Lesson material, exercises, discussion material is delivered in a set of 7 workshops for high schools (14-17 years), which are easy to use by all teachers, as a primary prevention intervention from which all can benefit, and not targeted at special risk groups. Citizenship educational insights about the notion of empowerment can make contributions to social change in democratic societies as a first step to prevent processes of radicalisation at an early stage.

4.9.1 Summary

Preventive counter-radicalisation interventions and programmes in The Netherlands can be characterised by a focus on early prevention, targeted the radicalising individual as well as his or her family. In addition, a preferred method is the personalised approach, involving multiple partners such as police, municipalities, schools, and health care, and offering an integrated repertoire of preventive and de-radicalisation interventions. In the Netherlands, LEAs are represented in both the integrative approach as well as the preventive approach.

4.10 POLAND

4.10.1 Current situation: right-wing extremism

The presence of right-wing extremism and racism is a current problem in Poland. Professor Dr. Rafał Pankowski, a Polish political scientist and member of the anti-racist and anti-fascist organisation “Never Again” (Nigdy Więcej), has noted a rising number of discrimination and right-wing extremist movements since 2015. He explained this phenomenon primarily with the refugee crisis, which is often used to build and reinforce stereotypes as well as street-level activities, such as racist and xenophobic slogans used at football matches (“Rassisten im Anmarsch. Extremismus: Osteuropa und die Xenophobie,” 2017). As a research organisation, “Never Again” is involved in various educational projects aimed at raising awareness for racism. One of their projects “Against Racism in the Stadiums” use sporting events to deliver educational programmes designed to tackle anti-racism and discrimination. Formal reports are also published on regularly basis that provide information on racist incidents, victimization and hate crimes. In a recent study on minority groups in Poland, “Never Again” reported correlations between right-wing violence and intolerance, racism and discrimination. Intolerant attitudes toward refugees can be generally seen in both the older generation and partly in the younger population in Poland; the typical age group for younger audiences lie between 18 and 25 (“Rassisten im Anmarsch. Extremismus: Osteuropa und die Xenophobie,” 2017). Arguably, this would suggest that society and political issues provide a considerable influence on the identity of right-wing extremism (Grell et al., 2009).

The government’s lack of reaction to hate crimes further exacerbate the influence of extreme right-wing parties. Reliable statistics on the number of hate crimes in Poland, for example, are relatively scarce. One reason for this is linked to the number of unsuccessful prosecutions; hate crime

charges mostly do not proceed to trial due to a lack of evidence at preliminary proceedings. As such, the actual situation in Poland concerning hate crime cannot be accurately reflected by official statistics. This is further attested in a study by Never Again, which was also unable to produce any numbers on successful prosecutions in this context.⁷¹ The current ruling of a conservative and right-wing government has meant that anti-racist activities have not received the due attention it requires. Therefore, governmental measures are needed to provide security for victims of racial prejudice (Grell et al., 2009).

4.10.2 Historical background

Poland is one of the most Catholic countries in Europe with roughly 95 percent of the country's population claiming loyalty to the Catholic Church ("Religion und Politik in Polen," 2009). The Catholic institution has an important role for the Polish society, which stems back to the Solidarity revolution (*Solidarność*) in the 1980's. This historical event marked the breakdown of communism and thus the opportunity to establish a state with democratic principles ("Vorreiter des Umbruchs im Ostblock," 2009). Because of this, the Roman Catholic Church, who were strong supports of the social movement, maintains significant influence in Poland's society. However, the Catholic Church also receives support from the present government PIS *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (Right and Justice). PIS can be considered a conservative and national party that follows more traditional and Catholic values than the last Party, which held more liberal, open-minded principles as in Europe ("Analyse: Kaczyńskis PiS und die "Dekommunisierung"," 2017). Since the election in 2015, PIS has made changes to the policy strategy leaving open-minded and liberal perspectives behind for more sceptical and nationalistic views. This transition into a right-wing government reinforces not only traditional views and national conservatism but also allows room for an increasingly racist and xenophobic atmosphere.

In comparison to other EU members, Poland has taken in some of the fewest refugee populations, approximately 0.39 % (Statista, 2017)⁷². Although this is a temporary estimate to indicate the current state, other statistical source also confirms the low numbers of foreigners in Poland ("Statistik: Flüchtlinge in Polen," 2015). Government statistics confirm a

⁷¹ This is a result from the bilateral research project from 2008. The aim of the project was to explore and identify the actual situation of hate crimes with their causes, effects and measures (Grell et al., 2009).

⁷² The statistics describe the proportion of foreigners to the total population of the respective country: Poland, 0,39 %.

total of 11 refugee camps in Poland which 1601 refugees currently populate. Around 2494 refugees are living outside of refugee camps (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, 2016). Further refugees from Ukraine, Tadjikistan and Russia, however, were excluded from the statistic.⁷³ It should also be noted that Poland is often used by refugees as a transit country.

Top-down: Political actors: Poland does not indicate a strong interest to support and host refugees. The agreement with the EU to accommodate around 7000 Asylum-seekers, for example, has not been adhered to. In 2017, the highest number of refugees that were hosted from Syria amounted to 29 (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, 2017).

General anti-discrimination clauses have existed in Polish law since 1997, which protects the equality of individuals independent of their religion, ethnicity, nationality or other demographic features (Grell, 2009; Mazurkiewicz, 2004). However, as current domestic policies have now quashed existing democracy principles, such laws are now threatened by populist philosophies.

Bottom-up: NGOs, citizens: The provision of educational or social work approaches for the prevention of right-wing extremism is relatively limited. Those that do exist, are geared towards minorities such as the gay and lesbian community and less so for refugees and migrants ("Lista organizacji," 2016). Poland's finite representation of immigrants' interests provides some reasoning for the low proportion of foreigners fleeing to the country.

4.10.3 Right-wing extremism

The link between hooliganism and right-wing extremism has grown strong in recent years. Football in Poland is becoming increasingly used as a platform for disseminating right-wing ideologies and carrying out violent actions. An attack on members of the Israeli football team on August 8, 2017 near Warsaw is a recent example of the presence of Antisemitism in Poland. Here, groups of hooligans attacked the Israeli team football after an exhibition match with MKS Ciechanow, the local team.

The common problem of xenophobia in Poland, however, cannot be defined only as a 'hooligan-issue'. Right-wing tendencies can also be seen in the country's minimal uptake of asylum seekers. Migrant statistics from 2016 show that 1601 refugees currently reside in refugee camps in Poland (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, 2016). The distribution of these individuals across the country has been as followed: Bezwola: 187, Biała Podlaska: 152, Białystok: 182, Czerwony Bór: 165, Dębak: 106, Grotniki:

⁷³ The statistic includes only refugees who get social support.

70, Grupa: 160, Horbów: 129, Linin: 161, Łuków: 175, Warsaw-Targówek: 114. These statistics also reveal that the majority of refugees have either a Russian or a Ukrainian citizenship and only a small group belongs to the Muslims (Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, n.d.). Nevertheless, Polish citizens living near refugee camps often express safety concerns, especially concerning Muslim refugees. As a result of fears from Islamism and the high value Polish citizens' place on Catholicism, petitions against the further construction of refugee accommodations and their settlement have been put in place, which in turn has fuelled collisions between the two cultures ("Żądają zamknięcia ośrodka w Lininie. Zaczęli zbierać podpisy," 2017). However, despite individual fears, Poland expresses a low threat of terrorism (Rada Ministrów Polska, 2014a; Cichomski, & Więcek, 2014) and can be seen by the underrepresented programmes available for anti-terrorism and radicalisation.

4.10.4 Prevention projects

Although the threat level for terrorism is low, Poland recognizes the high activity of radicalisation and extremism in other countries. Therefore, strategies have also been established for terror prevention, which include main elements from the European Unions' anti-terrorism programme (Rada Ministrów Polska, 2014b; Cichomski, & Więcek, 2014). The anti-terror strategy programme for 2015-2019 – *Narodowy program antyterrorystyczny 2015-2019 (NPA)* is an international cooperation between the European Union, United Nations and NATO (Rada Ministrów Polska, 2014). Therefore, the institutional structure was formed with specific services to improve the cooperation between the individual institutions – in a national and international domain. The programme includes the following functions and aims:

- To identify and observe migrants from countries where the potential threat of terrorism is higher and so to minimise the risk of potential terrorist fighters entering Poland.
- Higher control of airspace activities. This includes the collection and processing of passenger information, with a passenger name record (PNR), and closer international cooperation in airspace.
- Higher control of sea space through border guard.
- To increase detection methods of weaponized chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material CBRN (Rada Ministrów Polska, 2014b).

4.11 SPAIN


4.11.1 Overview of jihadism terrorism in Spain

The first years of the 21st century have claimed 658 victims of terrorist attacks on European territory, including both citizens of the union and extra community. The Black and White Terrorism in Europe report 74, drafted on the initiative of Spanish UPyD MEP Maite Pagazaurtundúa, accounts for all victims of terrorist attacks committed in Europe during the period 2000-2016, as well as Europeans who have been victims of terrorism outside Of the Community borders, a total of 1,029 people. The report includes all victims who have died at the hands of any of the terrorist groups recognized by the EU.

In total, there were 1687 victims in 16 years among those killed on European soil and Europeans killed in the rest of the world. Of the countries of the Union, 12 have suffered terrorist attacks, with Spain being the country most punished (253 victims) followed by France (250), United Kingdom (74) and Belgium (36). In addition, Madrid has the sad privilege of leading the list of European cities with more victims of terrorist attacks: 203 people died in terrorist attacks, 193 of which were killed on 11 March 2004. The French capital is followed by 149 people killed, Nice with 87 dead due to the attack with a truck happened last summer and London with 53, most of them dead in the attacks of July of 2005.

More specifically, since 2004, due to Madrid attacks, the Spanish Ministerio del Interior (Home Affairs) has collected the number of police operations and arrests derived from the fight against jihadist radicalisation as shown below.

74 http://iugm.es/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Libro_Blanco_Negro.pdf

Figure 16: Fight against jihadism terrorism in Spain

Source: Ministerio del Interior

4.11.2 Incidents related to hate crimes in Spain

More recently, and beyond the fight against political and religious extremism, the Spanish Ministerio del Interior has collected since 2013 the incidents of various types of crime within the hate crimes, differentiating them by the motivations of the main actors:

Table 1: Incidents related to hate crimes in Spain since 2013

YEAR	ANTI-SEMITISM	APOROPHOBIA	BELIEFS OR RELIGIOUS PRACTICES	DISABILITY	DISCRIMINATION FOR REASON OF SEX / GENDER	IDEOLOGY	ORIENTATION OR SEXUAL IDENTITY	RACISM / XENOPHOBIA
2016	7	10	47	262	41	259	230	416
2015	9	17	70	226	24	308	169	505
2014	24	11	63	199	0	0	513	475
2013	3	4	42	290	0	0	452	381

Source: Ministerio del Interior

4.11.3 The prevention of radicalisation in Spain (I): National strategic plan to combat violent radicalisation

Following the recommendations made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism presented on 25 December 2015, within the framework of the protection and promotion of Human Rights, a number of actions have been carried out, notably in Spain. More specifically, and being the most important attempt to fight against each of the different forms of radicalisation in Spanish territory, the Plan estratégico nacional de lucha contra la radicalización violenta: "Un marco para el respeto y el entendimiento común" (eng. National strategic plan to combat violent radicalisation: "A framework for respect and common understanding"), whose general characteristics are presented below.

As it is presented on the website of the Spanish Ministerio de Interior, the PEN-LCRV (National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalisation) assumes violent radicalisation as one of the main risks to national security and articulates state policy in this matter through an integral and national structure that aims to prevent radicalisation processes culminating in violent extremism and/ or terrorism.

This plan envisages that, through the effective and coordinated use of the resources of the Spanish State, especially the security services, greater awareness of the threat of violent extremism can be generated in Spain.

Only in this way will be possible to maintain a plural society in which the freedoms of expression and of thought are fully guaranteed and any violent ideology that seeks to undermine the stability and the normal coexistence of citizens can be challenged. The general objective of the Plan is to "constitute an effective instrument for early detection and neutralization of outbreaks and outbreaks of violent radicalism, acting on those communities, groups or individuals at risk or vulnerability." Its main characteristics are:

Context:

Although the plan is oriented to all kinds of violent radicalisation, it is especially posed for what is considered the main current threat such as jihadist terrorism.

Basis:

1. It is a response to a national need to treat the phenomenon of violent radicalisation.

2. It is drawn up in compliance with the European Union Guidelines on combating radicalisation and violent extremism.
3. It is global because it is elaborated with the consensus of the Administration, civil society and vulnerable groups or at risk of radicalisation.
4. It is integral because it implies and obliges all the Ministries of the General Administration of the State and Social Entities, under the coordination of the field of public security.

Characteristics:

- STRATEGIC because it designs the structure and lines of development. It will be implemented through annual plans.
- NATIONAL since it covers all areas of interest to Spain.
- EFFICIENT because it takes advantage of the mechanisms and tools that are already in operation.
- COHERENT with the National Strategic Framework.

Structure:

a) Areas of action

Where: Three areas of action are distinguished:

- Internal: Affects the entire national territory. The municipality (local level) is the main stage of action of this phenomenon. To this end, the plan designs local groups to combat violent radicalisation coordinated by the law enforcement agencies at the local level and, under the supervision of the National Group, will integrate the rest of the local social sectors to know, prevent and treat potential threats.
- External: Outside the national territory. The national coordinating structure will know the state's external action on the phenomenon of radicalisation and violent extremism and will make proposals to the government, depending on the action to be taken. The coordination of the proposed measures will correspond to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and the execution to each department concerned, highlighting the role played by the FFAAs abroad [Interests and zone of influence].
- Cyberspace: Treatment of the network through open sources. The national structure will know the information circulated by the network

in open sources that affects radicalisation, especially authors and content. A Network Treatment Unit will analyze the information obtained from the Centro de Inteligencia contra el Terrorismo y el Crimen Organizado (eng. Center for Intelligence against Terrorism and Organized Crime, CITCO).

How and when: The plan establishes three functional areas that determine what type of action should be carried out in each one of them:

PREVENTION: Act BEFORE the processes of radicalisation.

OVERLOOK: It acts DURING the development of the processes of radicalisation

ACT: Act AFTER culminating the radicalisation process.

b) Managers of the plan (I):

Managers for carrying out actions: a) The public administration, b) groups at risk or vulnerable and c) civil society as a whole.

The plan establishes a single national interministerial structure and coordinated by the Ministerio de Interior (Home Affairs) that will direct the implementation and development of the Plan in all its content.

c) Managers of the plan (II):

Internal scope (Spain): a) The National Group coordinates the local Groups to fight violent radicalisation that are located in each Municipal District of the State b) The Local Group is formed by representatives of the Local Police, Case, City Hall, Courts, School Centers, Social Affairs, Social Entities and Risk Collectives c) A specific system for the exchange of information between the local and central Administration is designed. In addition, there is a specific connection between National Group and Penitentiary Institutions on the treatment of the radicalisation of inmates.

Autonomous communities (with own Police Department): Only in those Autonomous Communities with their own Police, and according to the same criteria set forth for the constitution of the Local Group, autonomic groups may be created, which will include the autonomous police force. The coordination of these groups will ensure the necessary collaboration between the National and Autonomous Security Forces. These groups of Autonomous Community to Fight Violent Radicalisation will know the cases whose complexity exceeds the local or provincial treatment and will be obliged to coordinate their activity with the National Group.

External scope (outside Spain): The National Group leads and coordinates the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. In the execution, each affected department will participate, emphasizing the role of the Ministry of Defense and the FFAAs abroad.

Scope of cyberspace (Internet): The National Group coordinates the information obtained with the support of the Network Treatment Unit, located in the Intelligence Center against Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO), which will be aware of everything that is circulated on the network in open sources that affects this phenomenon (authors and contents).

Operation:

The radicalisation will be managed from the local level (Municipality) and will have a homogeneous criterion from the Central Administration. There are three types of situations:

When a locality is affected: the incident in a municipality will be transferred through the municipalities to the Spanish federation of municipalities and provinces (femp), and will receive advice from the state general administration through the national anti-violent radicalisation, with the representatives designated therein.

When a vulnerable collective affects: the incident will be transferred by the affected group through the pluralism and coexistence foundation (fpyc) and will receive advice from the state general administration and the National Group.

When radicalisation focus are detected by an integrant of the local group: a) detection of a possible focus, individual or collective, of radicalisation by any of the members of the local groups to fight violent radicalisation local group of fight against radicalisation violent).

4.11.4 Main actions in the field of prevention of radicalisation in Spain (II): Citizen Collaboration

On the other hand, within the Terrorism and Organized Crime Intelligence Center (CITCO) the Radicalization Information Coordination Center (CCIR) has been created where citizens can provide information on possible cases of radicalisation, helping to prevent, detect and neutralize out-

breaks or Centers of violent radicalism. For this purpose, the Stop Radicalisms platform has been launched⁷⁵, which provides a reporting mechanism when indications of radicalisation are noticed, and when racist or xenophobic behaviour is identified.

4.12 SWEDEN

4.12.1 Violent extremism and radicalisation in Sweden

In the last decade Sweden has seen several major terrorist attacks including the 2010 Stockholm bombings, 2011 Gothenburg terrorism plot, 2016 Swedish terrorism plot, and most recently the 2017 Stockholm attack where five individuals were killed by a high-jacked lorry, which deliberately drove into a main shopping street (see table below).

Table 2: Current terror attacks in Sweden (2010-2017)

DATE	TYPE OF ATTACK	DEAD	INJURED	EXTREMIST GROUP	DETAILS
December 2010	Suicide bomb	1	2	Islamist Terrorism	Perpetrator blew himself up prematurely in a car.
September 2011	Terrorist attack	0	0	Islamist Terrorism	Four individuals arrested for an alleged plot to commit a terrorist attack on an art gallery with over 400 attendees.
February 2016	Bomb attack	0	0	Islamist Terrorism	Perpetrator sentenced to jail after plotting suicide bomb.
April 2017	Truck attack	5	15	Islamist Terrorism (suspected)	Perpetrator hijacked truck and drove into pedestrians.

Source: "Stockholm shopping blasts kill one and injure two," 2010. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11977524> [18.08.2017]; "Swedish police arrest four on suspicion of plotting terrorist attack," 2011. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/11/swedish-police-arrest-four-terrorism> [18.08.2017]; "Swedish man goes on trial for 'planning terror bombing'," 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.com/en/swedish-man-goes-on-trial-for-planning-terror-bombing/a-19191692> [18.08.2017]; "Stockholm attack driver 'deliberately targeted young children' as he drove hijacked lorry into crowd," 2017. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/07/truck-crashes-crowd-people-stockholm/> [18.08.2017].

Despite the latest terrorist attack in 2017, the overall threat level for Terrorism remains at level 3 (elevated) on a scale of 5 (high) ("Threat level in Sweden returns to elevated (Level 3 on a five-level scale," 2016). The decision to raise or decrease this level is held by Sweden's Security Ser-

⁷⁵ <https://stop-radicalismos.ses.mir.es/>

vice (SÄPO), and it is based on a strategic assessment of various extremist groups including right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, Islamist-extremism and lone attackers. Although SÄPO claims that radicalisation is not a growing threat in Sweden, the confirmed existence of foreign fighters and violent extremist groups are generally viewed as a serious problem. Of the 300 foreign fighters estimated by SÄPO to have left Sweden to join militant groups in Iraq and Syria, some 106 have returned since 2016 (Gustafsson & Ranstorp, 2017). The Swedish Defence University is one particular organisation that has followed this phenomenon and released a report in 2017 containing unique statistical data concerning foreign fighters, which until now was largely inexistent in Sweden. The study revealed that Swedish foreign fighters were mostly male (76 percent) and that the number of women foreign fighters had increased between 2012 and 2013 from 18 percent to 24 percent (Gustafsson & Ranstorp, 2017). The average age of foreign fighters was estimated to be 26 with the majority belonging to an age ranging between 20 and 29. In terms of the geographical location, 80 percent were localised to four of Sweden's 21 counties and over 70 percent had lived in areas with a low socioeconomic status (vulnerable to poverty and crime). As high as 75 percent of the foreign fighters were granted the Swedish citizenship and 34 percent of were born in Sweden. Those that were foreign-born included immigrants primarily from countries in North Africa and the Middle East (Gustafsson & Ranstorp, 2017).

The three main violent extremist movements that are currently active in Sweden concern left-wing extremism, right-wing extremism and violent Islamist extremism. Geographically speaking, these groups are found in both major cities and small towns across Sweden, though the majority converge in the former. The latest report from the National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT), however, claims that the biggest threat of terrorist attacks in Sweden does not present itself in any of the extremist groups mentioned but from individual players, or 'lone wolves' who are not connected to any established organisations (NCT, 2017 in RT, 2017).

4.12.2 Violent right-wing extremism

One of the largest providers of information concerning right-wing extremism in Sweden is sourced from the Expo Foundation. As a research foundation, Expo publishes regular magazines and research investigating right-wing extremism and the white-power movement. According to Expo, Sweden is currently experiencing intense mobile neo-Nazi groups and a clear increase in racist propaganda. Although right wing movements have been largely fragmented since their birth in the 1920s, the past decade in Sweden has seen an upswing in support for right-wing political parties,

specifically the Sweden Democrats (SD). Before the arrival of the SD, Sweden was recognised as being one of the handful of countries without any right-wing extremist party. Nevertheless the SD has become the third biggest political party in Sweden holding 47 of the 349 seats at the 2014 general election (“Members and parties,” n.d.), which has more than doubled since the general election in 2010 where the SD won but 20 seats (“Sweden 2010,” 2010; “Members and parties,” n.d.). Sweden’s Nordic resistance movement (NMR) is one of the major mobile groups for right-wing extremism and is considered the figurehead for Sweden’s ‘white power’ movement. The NMR, which promotes racist and anti-Semitic views, has a deep symbiotic relationship with white supremacy. This movement openly expresses fascistic beliefs with the goal of achieving ethnic homogeneity in Sweden.

4.12.3 Violent left-wing extremism

Like right-wing groups, far-left groups have also received a spike in supporters since the growth in immigration. One possible reason for this lies in the parallel increase of right-wing extremism. The disagreement between the two groups have led to increasing violent clashes, particular during political demonstrations and lectures. This polarisation has meant that increases in anti-immigration campaigns and violence from right extremists has led to a reciprocal increase in violent left-wing extremism. The most prominent of these groups is the Revolution Front whose members believe challenging democracy and antifascism therefore justifies the use of violence (Clifford, 2017).

4.12.4 Violent Islamist extremism

Violent Islamist extremism exists in Sweden and is considered a risk for individuals and groups. Although SÄPO does not view this as an issue, based on their own evaluations, mixed views on this point continue to exist; those involved directly with terrorism and radicalisation see no growing threat whereas others see the very existence of such individuals threatening. The exact number of individuals becoming radicalised remains unknown, but the 2010 SÄPO report expresses no evidence of this expanding. The report does reveal that 300 violent Islamist extremists left Sweden in 2010 to travel to Syrian, which indicates a sizeable number of extremists prepared to use violence (Säkerhetspolisen, 2010). Violent Islamist extremism holds the ideology that violence is legitimized during armed conflict and self-defence, but that Muslims should not start conflict or war themselves. According SÄPO, the majority of violent extremists in Sweden are in agreement with this viewpoint. Though this information does not point to a willingness to commit a terrorist crime, the capability

to carry out such an attack remains a real threat to the security services. A similar threat with Islamist motives concerns the arrival of returnees. It remains uncertain whether these individuals have the intention to commit terror crimes; however, the capability is certainly higher given their experiences with armed conflict. Moreover, it is recognised that returnees contain the risk to create own networks or distribute contacts in Sweden and inspire others to fight abroad.

4.12.5 Lone wolf terrorism

According to the Nationellt Centrum För Terrorhotbedömning (NCT), who are a group of selected police staff who evaluate the threat of terrorism in Sweden, individuals acting alone are the biggest threat to Sweden. Such lone wolves are considered to be more likely to carry out violent acts than individuals who are part of existing extremist groups. For example, the suicide bomber that attacked Stockholm in 2010 was believed by the Swedish Security Service to be an individual player. The NCT have also assessed the threat presented by other extremist groups, such as the right-wing and left-wing extremists, as being a level 2 in accordance to the 5 level terror threat scale; in this instance level 2 is seen to be a relatively low threat of terror (Kaati & Svenson, 2011).

4.12.6 Current measures dealing with violent extremism

The government's response to violent extremism so far has been to strongly reinforce preventative efforts. In 2016, the Swedish government invested some SEK 44 million into tackling violent extremism and racism, promoting democracy and improving society's resilience. As part of this focus, Sweden provides a range of measures that support vulnerable individuals and those identified as being at risk of radicalisation. Equally, interventions offering rehabilitation and support are available for those already radicalised (Government Offices of Sweden, 2016).

4.12.7 Providing support to radicalised individuals

The Swedish government seeks to reduce the recruitment base for violent extremism through the provision of local initiatives, which provide support to those wishing to leave extremist environments. The Government has therefore invested into preventative work, namely the tolerance project, for trouble areas and vulnerable individuals ("The Government is investing in a Sweden that keeps together," 2016). The Tolerance Project, or 'Kungälv model', is currently used across cities in Sweden to increase knowledge about individual process of violent extremism and radicalisation, underlying risk factors and how they can be mitigated. The project

targets individuals identified as being most at risk from information provided by local actors who have detailed knowledge of vulnerable individuals i.e. teachers, social workers and youth workers. The strategy involves the process of introducing activities that split the individuals from extremist groups, teaching programmes which help participant re-evaluate their current belief structure, and closes with re-socialising activities to socialise the individuals back into positive social groups.

4.12.8 Reinforcing democracy

The Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society is one of the main government agencies tasked with reinforcing democratic values in Sweden. It achieves this aim through the distribution of grants to civil organisations and local projects. Around 10 million SEK was allocated in the years 2012-2014 to 24 projects whose activities aim to safeguard the democratic values of young people against violent extremism (“The Government is investing in a Sweden that keeps together,” 2016). Similar work is carried out by faith communities with aims of promoting democracy and education. The Swedish Agency for Support to Faith Communities (SST) is a governmental agency that is funded to support faith communities, enhance dialogue between faith communities, and provide training to leaders of faith communities in terms of their role in the prevention of violent extremism.

Another governmental organisation tasked with improving democracy, on top of tolerance and human rights, is the Forum for Living History. This organisation is commissioned by the government to produce a range of educational materials that inform stakeholders of historic events and the lessons to be learned from them. For example, daily exhibitions are arranged for teachers and schools, which present historical events related to crimes against the humanity. Such exhibitions not only distribute knowledge but also encourage visitors to reflect on previous acts, such as the holocaust, and personal values. The Forum also conducts surveys concerning societal attitudes as well as educational projects that promote a democratic society. Racism and Intolerance is one of such projects that aims to deepen knowledge of racism and provide tools to help educational organisations reinforce democratic values among pupils.

4.12.9 Internal collaborations and information sharing

In this strategy, Sweden aims to build a more resilient society through preventative measures and initiatives that improve the knowledge of violent radicalisation. For example, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) is an organisation that exchanges practical

examples and experiences of preventative work to counter violent extremism with local authorities, city and regional councils, and internal organisations (“About SALAR,” n.d.). A second measure used is the provision of support and device to local stakeholders with a focus on effective collaboration. Typical stakeholders such as social services, teachers, police, support each other to prevent terrorism and radicalisation through information sharing. As terrorism is a crime occurring internationally, cross-border collaborations have also become a mandate for many Swedish prevention strategies with the aim of acquiring valuable information from international agencies (Löfven, 2015).

4.12.10 *Prevent, Preempt and Protect Strategy*

A new counter-terrorism strategy has been developed in light of continuing terrorist attacks in Sweden (Löfven, 2015). This strategy is based on the idea that no one is born a terrorist and therefore proposes measures to circumvent the underlying risk factors that incline individuals to radicalisation. The first part, *Prevent*, focuses on reducing the recruitment base as well as developing and sharing knowledge of the risk factors and drivers of violent radicalisation (Löfven, 2015). The police authorities play a major role here as they pass on relevant knowledge of local problems to organisations involved with preventative work. Effective collaborations and coherent efforts between local governments and other actors whose remit falls within prevention are emphasised in this strategy (Löfven, 2015). Most police authorities in Sweden have signed collaborations agreements with such actors declaring their preparedness to dialogue with key stakeholders in the community for a broad preventative effort (Löfven, 2015). Aside from their capabilities to identify local problem areas, relevant staff within the police receive yearly training from the CoP-PRa programme (Community Policing and Prevention of Radicalisation), which involves reinforcing their awareness and understanding of the processes of radicalisation as well as the methods to detect and prevent it. Aside from promoting the collaboration of key actors, *Prevent* has brought about increased methods to prevent radicalisation in the prison and Probation service. For example, a survey is currently being carried out to analyse which approaches can be used with prisoners who are already member of violent extremist groups.

Preempt concerns reducing the opportunities for terrorism to commit terrorist attacks. Although the Swedish Security Service is mainly responsible for this role, there is also a strategic collaboration between law enforcement agencies and other governmental organisations. This demonstrates both an effective use of information sharing and combined expertise, both of which is needed for a sufficient analysis of terrorist threats.

Another cooperation engaged in the evaluation of terrorist threats is the National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT). This working group provides a permanent collaboration structure between staffed agencies such as the Swedish Security Service, Swedish Armed Forces, Swedish National Defence Radio Establishment and the Swedish Security Service. With such open channels between local and national agencies, the Swedish government signals the importance of providing opportunities to share information and further the efficiency of pre-empting terrorist attacks.

Protect is the final part of the strategy and deals with the protection from terrorist attacks. Sweden has placed particular emphasis on strengthening monitoring and assessment efforts of potential terror threats. With increases in refugees' waves, migration presents a serious challenge to border controls. The Swedish Migration Agency offers strong support in this regard and conducts assessments on each asylum seeker and returnee to seek whether their arrival threatens security or if they have been suspect/ convicted of any crimes. Internal collaborations have also been put in place between migration agencies and the security service to further enable the exchange of valuable information when making assessments. Further risk analyses are also conducted on the control of dangerous objects entering/ leaving Sweden. The main actors involved in this field encompass the police, security service, migration agencies and customs, which together demonstrates an enhanced capacity to protect the security of Sweden.

4.12.11 Counter Violent Extremism

The most extensive strategy to counter violent extremism in Sweden has been the appointment of a *national coordinator* in 2014 to safeguard democracy against violent extremism in 2014. The coordinator's main task is to reinforce local prevention methods and enhance cooperation between governmental organisations, agencies in the criminal justice system, and local prevention actors such as schools, social services and the police. Other efforts involve ensuring that prevention methods are continually developed and further awareness of violent extremism is passed on to all districts in Sweden.

4.13 SWITZERLAND

4.13.1 Overview of the situation in Switzerland

In 2015, the Federal Council (Bundesrat) of Switzerland adopted the Swiss strategy for the fight against terrorism (Bundesrat Schweiz, 2015),

which is structured around four strands or pillars: prevention, law enforcement, protection, and crisis prevention. This report will especially focus on the first of these pillars in terms of terrorism prevention by institutions other than law enforcement agencies, which is a field of many recent and ongoing developments and discussions in Switzerland. As Switzerland has a system with lots of responsibilities on the level of cantons, different approaches can be found in different cantons. Nonetheless, there are efforts to establish a common framework on a national level.

The security core group (Kerngruppe Sicherheit des Bundes – KGSi) of Switzerland, which consists of leading representatives of the Federal Police, Federal Intelligence Service, and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, has set up the task force “TETRA” (TErrorist TRacking). In this task force the Swiss agencies affiliated with fighting terrorism cooperate and develop policy recommendations. It is led by the Swiss federal police (fedpol). Until today, three reports have been published by the task force (Task-Force TETRA 2015a; 2015b; 2017). As for the field of prevention, the Delegate of the Swiss Security Network has been commissioned in the context of TETRA to prepare a review of existing measures for preventing radicalisation, which was published in 2016 (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016).

On the basis of the reports mentioned above, the Delegate of the Swiss Security Network was mandated in September 2016 to develop a *national action plan* on countering radicalisation and violent extremism. The national action plan is expected to be published in the second half of 2017.

A delegation from the City of Zurich has studied the prevention model of the city of Vilvoorde in Belgium, which is considered a good practice model (Gilgen & Yüksel, 2017), and provided a report including an overview of and recommendations for preventive measures in Switzerland (Gilgen & Yüksel, 2017). This report is also expected to contribute to the upcoming national action plan.

In Switzerland, responsibilities for prevention measures are located at the local/regional level (municipalities, cantons), while criminal prosecution of terrorist acts is in the responsibility of federal institutions (Bundesamt für Polizei fedpol, 2016; Task-Force TETRA, 2017). Until April 2017, the federal intelligence service reported 81 persons who left Switzerland with jihadist motivations (mostly to Syria and Iraq). 497 conspicuous internet users have been reported in the context of the jihad monitoring of the federal intelligence service by the end of 2016. Investigations by the federal police have been conducted in about 70 cases (Task-Force TETRA, 2017). A study by the Zurich University of Applied Sciences (Davolio et al., 2015) showed that jihadists travelling from Switzerland “do not fit a

typical profile but are highly heterogeneous in terms of their social origin, education and socio-economic status. It also highlights that the internet plays an important role in the radicalisation process” (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016, p. 9).

4.13.2 Preventive activities

The reports mentioned above emphasize the relevance of an *integrated approach* to prevent violent radicalisation, which means that an effective strategy should be drawn up at a local level (canton, region, city) and focus on linking the different authorities involved (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016). According to the TETRA reports, preventive measures should make use of existing structures on the local and cantonal level instead of creating new structures (Task-Force TETRA, 2015b). For example, the task force opted against creating a national phone hotline. While other countries have created national “helplines” providing counselling for relatives and professionals of relevant agencies, Switzerland favours a decentralised approach, using existing advisory services on a local and cantonal level. Expert knowledge on radicalisation issues is not present in all existing counselling centres, but their regional ties and their ability to cooperate with local authorities are seen as a key benefit. So strengthening existing advisory services and connecting them to experts in the field of radicalisation is the preferred strategy (Task-Force TETRA, 2015b).

For the purpose of an integrated approach based on local network building, Switzerland can build upon the work of the national prevention programme “Youth and Violence” (carried out 2011–2015). In the course of this programme, a violence prevention network has been established in which municipalities and cantons set up contact points and coordination offices for the field of youth violence prevention. According to the Swiss Security Network, these structures can be used and adapted for the prevention of radicalisation (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016).

Numerous cities and cantons provide models for an integrated approach. The Canton of Fribourg’s radicalisation prevention programme is based on principles of community policing, in which the police cooperate with different social services and religious communities in the canton. The core group model (Kerngruppenmodell) of the City of Zurich also integrates various partners from diverse specialist areas with the purpose of early detection of problematic developments and risks of violence. The Canton of Vaud makes use of the regional councils for prevention and security (Conseils régionaux de prévention et de sécurité, CRPS) to integrate prevention of radicalisation into existing structures.

For purposes of radicalisation assessment, the Swiss Centre for Violence Issues (SIFG) developed the software “RA-PROF – Radicalisation Profiling” (Schweizer Zentrum für Gewaltfragen, n.d.; Regierungsrat des Kantons Basel-Stadt, 2016; Stadt Zürich, 2016; Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016). The tool aims at detecting tendencies of radicalisation at an early stage and reacting to them. It consists of 46 questions to be answered with “yes”, “no” or “no information” by a person in contact with a potentially radicalised person (e.g. a teacher). The results are analysed by a licensed expert who is familiar with the software. The system provides a risk assessment indicated in the form of colours (red: urgent need for action; yellow: further investigations; green: no need for action). The first version of the software is structured around early detection of Islamist/Salafist radicalisation; for future updates it is planned to cover right-wing and left-wing radicalisation as well (Regierungsrat des Kantons Basel-Stadt, 2016).

The Delegate of the Swiss Security Network suggests that dealing with dangerous radicalised persons should be organized in cooperation with the Cantonal Threat Assessment and Management (for further information on the Cantonal Threat Assessment and Management in Zurich see Guldemann et al., 2016), which is also aimed at other situations of danger like rampage killings. It does not exist in all cantons of Switzerland; the Delegate suggests smaller cantons could cooperate with bigger ones.⁷⁶

The report of the Swiss Security Network (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016) identifies preventive measures in five fields of action: education, religion, social services, integration, and the penal system. The report lists specific measures on the one hand and further measures on the other hand. Further measures include programmes contributing to prevention of radicalisation in a rather indirect way and can be subsumed as measures of primary prevention. In the field of education, of example, this includes the study programmes for schools including religious education, media education, and political education, where relevant topics such as propaganda on the internet and in social media are addressed. Media education is seen as a relevant topic since internet and social media can play a relevant role in the process of young people’s radicalisation (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016). A study by the University of Lucerne shows that young people are more critical towards statements of religious authorities than believed, particularly when statements are made via the internet (Baumann et al., 2017; Gilgen & Yüksel, 2017). Still, juveniles and young adults have the highest rate of consuming low-quality media

⁷⁶ Tages-Anzeiger: *Gefährder national überwachen* (August 2nd, 2017), <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/zeitungen/ein-register-fuer-querulanten-und-gefaehrder/story/19203864>

(Ettinger & Imhof, 2011), so strengthening media competencies among young people is crucial (Gilgen & Yüksel, 2017).

The following section focuses on more specific preventive measures addressing the topic of radicalisation in the five fields of action mentioned above. Specific measures in the field of education include guidelines to be used in schools. The Violence Prevention Agency of the City of Zurich Department of Education and Sport has developed a guideline with procedures to be applied when radicalisation is suspected. In the canton of St. Gallen, a brochure on extremism is planned as a part of a series of brochures (“sicher!gsund!”) that are periodically published on a website for school principals, teachers and social workers. The issue on extremism and terrorism is currently being prepared and planned to be published in 2017 (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016).

In the field of religion, the importance of integrating Muslim communities and especially Muslim associations into prevention measures and to establish a dialogue between Muslim communities and public authorities is stressed (Task-Force TETRA, 2015a; Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016; on Muslim communities as a topic of public communication see Ettinger & Imhof, 2011, who provide a critical perspective on the construction of Muslims as a “dangerous” minority). Existing specific measures include a delegate for religious affairs in the Canton of Vaud who is in charge of matters concerning relations between religious communities, and activities by the Swiss Centre for Islam and Society (SZIG). The SZIG focuses on research, training, and continuing education for social workers, media representatives and public authority employees. In 2016, the SZIG offered workshops as part of the “Muslim organisations as social actors” programme, aiming at developing the capabilities of Muslim and other protagonists and establishing the dialogue and networking with Muslim organisations (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016). Gilgen & Yüksel (2017) stress the need for creating possibilities of continuing education for Muslim chaplains (on Islam-related continuing education see also Schmid et al., 2016). In 2017, the University of Bern offers a study programme “Religious Care in Migration Context” which is open for Christian and non-Christian chaplains (Gilgen & Yüksel, 2017).

The Swiss Security Network (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016) highlights that authorities, youth workers and social workers need better knowledge about Islam, as religious issues have not been part of their vocational training. A number of Swiss universities and institutes have recently established courses, workshops and symposia for social workers, school teachers, stakeholders from social services etc. For example, a seminar of the Lucerne School of Social Work provides information on

Islam and migration and on how to deal with young people in matters regarding religion and signs of radicalisation (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016, for more examples).

A number of Swiss cities have established specialised advisory services dealing with issues of violent radicalisation:

- The city of Winterthur has established a contact and advice centre on radicalisation (Fachstelle Extremismus und Gewaltprävention, FSEG) in October 2016. It provides counselling for affected people as well as for professionals and maintains networks with police and other public authorities.
- In November 2016, the canton of Basel-Stadt established a so-called radicalisation contact point (Anlaufstelle Radikalisierung) operated by the violence prevention team of the cantonal police. Relatives, teachers and other persons can turn to the contact point for advice in matters of radicalisation.
- The city of Bern has established a counselling centre on radicalisation (Fachstelle Radikalisierung) in 2014 that provides advisory service for parents, relatives, friends, and teachers of persons that show tendencies towards radicalisation.
- In the city of Zurich, the department for violence prevention is the contact point for matters of radicalisation.

Gilgen & Yüksel (2017) note that there is still a lack of counselling services parents and other persons can turn to if a relative or other closely related person shows signs of radicalisation. The Swiss Security Network (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016) points out the importance of efforts to integrate immigrants and sees Swiss immigration policy as a reason why the number of persons who have been radicalised or even left Switzerland for Syria or Iraq is relatively low (p. 17). The cantonal integration offices play an important role in these integration efforts.

As specific preventive measures in the field of integration, the report mentions the Brückenbauer Centre (Fachstelle Brückenbauer) run by the Canton of Zurich Police. Its main goal is to build trust within foreign communities and the associations that represent them. For example, representatives of the centre visit cultural associations or asylum organisations when invited (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016).

As a second specific measure, integration agreements are mentioned by which cantons can set mandatory requirements for integration. For example, integration agreements with persons from non-EU/EFTA countries

can include integration measures, such as taking language lessons, as binding requirements (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016).

The Swiss Prison Staff Training Centre has developed a training module dedicated to phenomena of radicalisation. It is designed as a continuing education course for prison staff and introduces participants to key issues of Islam and topics of radicalisation (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016). Spiritual assistance for Muslim inmates is seen as a key issue to be addressed in the future. At the moment, imams cannot be officially recognized as chaplains in prisons. It is recommended that there should be possibilities for education of Muslim chaplains (see above) and Muslim prison chaplains should be acknowledged a status equal to chaplains of other religions (Sicherheitsverbund Schweiz, 2016; Gilgen & Yüksel, 2017; for further information on spiritual assistance in prisons see Nationales Forschungsprogramm „Religiöse Gemeinschaften, Staat und Gesellschaft“, 2011).

4.13.3 Conclusion

Trautmann et al. (2017) provide a typology of approaches to prevent Islamic radicalisation and violence in Germany, distinguishing for main categories of approaches: media-related protection, educational work, building and strengthening relevant networks, and counselling work. On the basis of this typology, the situation in Switzerland resembles the one in Germany, with educational and counselling work as well as networking as the most important approaches pursued.

Overall, the existing review papers show that Switzerland has a diverse landscape in the field of radicalisation prevention, and ongoing developments have taken place in recent years. What is particularly lacking is information about effects and effectiveness of existing programmes. The report of the Swiss Security Council as the most comprehensive review of prevention measures in Switzerland could not assess measures in terms of their efficacy due to the lack of evaluation research. The need for more scientific evaluation is discussed as one of the most important challenges in the field of counter-radicalisation not only in Switzerland, but internationally (e.g. Romaniuk, 2015; Schmid, 2013).

4.14 UNITED KINGDOM

4.14.1 Overview of the situation in the United Kingdom

On July 7, 2005, four Islamic terrorists detonated bombs in central London. Three bombs were detonated on a train and one was detonated on

a bus. This terrorist suicide attack killed 52 people and injured more than 700 people (London Assembly, 2006). On May 22, 2017, a young British Muslim detonated a home-made bomb in the foyer of the Manchester Arena in the United Kingdom after the audience were leaving a concert by US singer Ariana Grande. The Islamic State (ISIS) said it was behind the attack, but this has not been verified. The suicide bombing killed 22 people and wounded 116 people ("Manchester attack: What we know so far," 2017). Only twelve days later, on June 3, 2017, three attackers drove a van into pedestrians on the London Bridge and attacked people with knives on the Borough Market. The three perpetrators killed eight people during this attack and 48 people were injured. The Islamic State (ISIS) claimed responsibility also for this attack ("London attack: What we know so far," 2017).

The United Kingdom's 2015 Counter Extremism Strategy⁷⁷ identifies Islamic extremists as the greatest terrorist threat to Britain and details the extent of the danger in the post 2005 London bombings era. The document states that 750 UK individuals have travelled to Syria and Iraq, it highlights the potency of Islamic State ideology amongst some Muslim families in the UK, and details over 40 terrorist plots that have been interrupted by security services. In addition, the 2015 Prevent Strategy states that the British government recognises that right-wing extremist thought and ideology has increased, particularly Islamophobia, though attacks have been few. The strategy emphasises the government's determination to challenge right-wing ideologies and prosecute violence associated with far-right activity.

Since the publication of the Contest and Prevent Strategy⁷⁸ documents in 2015, there have been a number of high-profile attacks by both Islamic extremists and far-right terrorists. The Islamist inspired attack on a concert in Manchester left 22 dead and 59 injured in May 2017. A further attack in June of the same year by Islamic radicals in London left 7 dead and 48 injured when a van ploughed down pedestrians. In June 2016 British Labour Party MP Jo Cox was murdered by a far-right zealot, and exactly one year later there was an attack by a far-right terrorist that killed one and injured many when a van was directed into worshippers at Finsbury Park Mosque, London. A process to counter violent extremism and a number of counter radicalisation initiatives have developed in response to these attacks. Their descriptions are below.

⁷⁷ https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf [24.08.2017].

⁷⁸ https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf [24.08.2017].

4.14.2 CONTEST as counter-terrorist strategy

CONTEST⁷⁹ is the United Kingdom's all-encompassing counter-terrorist strategy that was first introduced in 2003 and has been revised a number of times since then. Contest envisioned combating terrorism by a combination of security, prevention and criminal justice measures. The strategy has four strands or pillars:

- Pursue: the investigation and disruption of terrorist attacks
- Prevent: work to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism
- Protect: improving our protective security to stop a terrorist attack
- Prepare: working to minimize the impact of an attack and to recover as quickly as possible.

The Prevent pillar was developed due to a recognition, likely due to experience of decades of violence from Irish separatists, that securitization alone was not enough to defeat and contain terrorism. Prevent was therefore included as a pillar of the original strategy but was underdeveloped and underutilised before the July 2005 suicide bombings in London. A coherent and developed Prevent strategy was not rolled out until 2007. Since then, Prevent has undergone a number of reviews and revisions, the most notable being in 2011 and 2015. This document focuses primarily on the latest iteration of the Prevent Strategy but will also give a brief outline of the development of the strategy since first introduced by the Labour Government in 2003. Prevent is a very comprehensive approach that uses the resources of local government and statutory institutions, as well as funding initiatives such as community based projects and programmes, to achieve its goals. The Rubric provides a window into the various tentacles of Prevent and while it is wide in scope it is necessarily limited in size. The final section of this document gives a brief description of some of the projects included in the Rubric in order to help differentiate between initiatives created by central government, local authority, and community led projects and programmes.

4.14.3 Prevent

Prevent was, from its initial inception, a strategy that was mired in controversy and accusations of unfair focus on Muslim communities that led to accusations of stigmatisation and Islamophobia (Thomas, 2015). Indeed,

⁷⁹ https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539683/55469_Cm_9310_Web_Accessible_v0.11.pdf [24.08.2017].

a significant proportion of Prevent's funding was targeted towards areas labelled as 'high priority' simply based on the population of Muslims within the specific area. Resources were targeted at those communities without evidence of the presence of radicalised individuals or organisations. A 2010 evaluation of the Contest strategy, of which Prevent is part, concluded that the perception that the Muslim community was being unfairly stigmatised and targeted by Prevent meant that much valuable and resource consuming community cohesion and trust building work was being undermined.

Based, in part, on the findings of the 2010 evaluation, Prevent was changed significantly in 2011 and a new focus was placed on non-violent radicalisation and extremism, as well as violent extremism. Prevent sought to both challenge the ideology of extremists and to disrupt their ability to communicate. This broader scope increased the focus on radicalisation rather than just terrorist activity. In addition, the promotion of 'British Values' became necessary for funding under the 2011 strategy and many projects that were deemed to be ideologically and theologically unsuitable had their funding cut. There was therefore an increased focus on the content and practice of faith-based projects and a determination to exclude radicals. The designation of high priority area was changed from a population based criteria to an assessment of threat level emanating from communities within the local authorities geographical area of responsibility. Threat levels were determined by intelligence services in a process that lacked transparency (Mastroe, 2016) and funding for projects was based on threat level.

Before the 2011 review much of Prevents funding went to community organisations, however after 2011 there was an increased focus on educational and other statutory institutions (Thomas, 2014). The new Conservative led government was concerned that funding was going to extremist organisations and called an abrupt halt to the funding procedures that operated under the previous government (Mastroe, 2016). However, the new government came to power during the global recession and the capacity of local authorities, as well as funding for community groups, was severely affected by austerity cuts. Funding for community groups was restricted to 28 high priority areas. Funding for projects was allocated by the Office of Security and Counterterrorism (OSCT) within the Home Office on an annual basis and a high priority area could receive funding for up to five projects per year. In 2014 there were thirty high priority areas in the UK with a further fourteen supported areas. While supported areas could receive funding, only those areas designated as high priority were assigned a Prevent coordinator. Prevent coordinators were Home Office staff who worked with local authorities to assess the risk within their area

and formulate and implement a planned response. Prevent coordinators were also assigned to higher education institutions to support their efforts to implement Prevent policies on campus as well as train staff and students.

4.14.4 Prevent 2015 Refresh

In 2015, the key objectives under the new Prevent Strategy were to:

- respond to the ideology of extremism and terrorism and the threats we face from those who promote it;
- prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support
- work with specific sectors where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.

The 2015 Prevent strategy brought very significant changes to how Prevent projects were established and funded within communities. Prior to 2015 community leaders could identify needs and apply for funding to start projects and programmes that would meet those needs. However under the 2015 changes the Home Office identified the most successful Prevent projects and limited availability of projects to this catalogue of successes. Funding was only available to communities who chose from this pre-determined list. The passing of the Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015 further modified Prevent to include a statutory responsibility on all local authorities as well as public bodies such as schools and other education institutions, health institutions, childcare services, law enforcement agencies and prisons, to implement Prevent policies. Local authorities had to prioritise the identification and assessment of risk and respond accordingly. The 2015 Act placed a statutory duty on all local authorities to:

- establish or use a pre-existing local multi-agency group to coordinate Prevent activity;
- assess the risk of individuals being drawn into terrorism;
- work with Prevent coordinators and other authorities as part of the risk assessment procedures;
- mainstream Prevent into the policies and procedures of the authority;
- train staff to understand Prevent and recognize potential vulnerabilities; and, if a risk is determined, then develop a Prevent action plan.

- The local authority was also required to construct and chair a joint local authority/police panel, commonly referred to as Channel, to assess vulnerable individuals and provide an individualised plan for those individuals who voluntarily participate in the programme.

The end of year 2015 Counter Extremism Strategy review highlighted Prevents achievements as follows:

- number of frontline staff who have received training on radicalisation increased significantly. For example, over 150,000 NHS staff received training in 2015. In total, over 400,000 frontline staff received training, more than double the number from the previous year.
- increased the number of Prevent priority areas from 30 to 46 in June 2015.
- local coordinator network dramatically increased its reach, working with over 2,790 different institutions (schools, universities and faith institutions) and engaging nearly 50,000 individuals over the course of 2015.
- boosted the number of community-based projects aimed at reducing the vulnerabilities which can lead to individuals being drawn into terrorism. 130 community-based projects were delivered in 2015, up from 70 in 2014, reaching over 25,300 participants. Over half of these projects were delivered in schools, aimed at increasing young people's resilience to terrorist and extremist ideologies.

4.14.5 Channel

The Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015 placed Channel on a statutory footing that ensured that all local authority areas have a Channel panel. Channel is a multi-agency safeguarding process that aims to provide support for people who are at risk of moving towards actively supporting terrorism. Individuals of concern are referred to a multi-party panel for a risk and vulnerability assessment. Channel is a voluntary programme that received referrals from Youth Offending Teams, social services, police, and community members. Referrals to Channel can be made on the basis of voicing support for violent extremist causes or leaders, extremist websites, extremist literature, justifying violence, evidence of contact with extremist organisations. The individuals can then be identified as suitable for intervention and will be referred to a community-based partner organisation. Channel is overseen by the OSCT whose responsibility it is to ensure that suitable intervention specialists are identified within commu-

nities. Diversionary activities can include educational support, sporting activities, employment support, and faith mentoring. During 2015, there were several thousand referrals to Channel; around 15% of these were linked to far-right extremism, and around 70% linked to Islamist-related extremism.

4.14.6 Prevent in Action

Prevent is a comprehensive strategy that seeks to take advantage of already existing and available institutions and organisations to deliver its work. For example, Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) are staff from local councils who work with young people who have got into trouble with law enforcement agencies. They have a number of functions, including running local crime prevention programmes; helping young people and their families at court, and supervising young people with a community sentence. They collaborate with police, probation services, schools and education authorities, health and housing, and charities and community groups. Youth Offending Teams received funding under the Prevent strategy to develop anti-radicalisation programmes for young people. YOTs in high priority areas were able to design their own interventions and programmes for working with high risk, mostly Muslim, young people. A 2012 evaluation included interviews with practitioners across 48 project sites, as well as in-depth case studies of 12 projects to understand staff and young people's experiences of the project. While the evaluation identified that some YOTs were doing excellent targeted prevention work, there was great variability across projects; twenty six of the 48 projects did have a focus on preventing violent extremism such as theological education and community resilience and family support. The remaining 22 projects however had no focus on extremism or radicalisation, and resembled general youth work practice that would have been no different under other funding streams.

Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) is a DVD based training package designed by the Home Office and is obligatory for all local authorities, education institutions, prisons, police, and the health sector. The workshops aim are to inform them of their statutory duties under Prevent and to educate them on implementation. Descriptions of the signs of radicalisation exhibited by vulnerable people, including the expression of anti-British values, are included as well as information on when and how to intervene.

Some of the entries in the Rubric are for online resources that are funded by Prevent and are freely available to everyone, including blogs, articles, films and information websites. For example, 'Educate Against Hate' is a

comprehensive website that offers a wide array of resources on radicalisation, extremism, as well as contacts and guidance.

Local authorities take the initiative and plan Prevent work in response to community needs. In Manchester the 'Rethinking Radicalisation' project was collaboration between local authority, police and the community. This ambitious and carefully structured project sought to provide a space to local communities to work through inter-cultural and inter-faith tensions, as well as an opportunity to air grievances against local authorities. The Tim Parry Jonathan Ball Foundation for Peace was recruited to organise and structure Rethinking Radicalisation. The invitation to an outside body that was also a respected advocate for non-violence was essential for the successful operation of the project.

An example of Prevent's support for and utilisation of the skills and expertise of community groups is the 'Active Change Foundation' based in Waltham Forest, London. Active Change is managed by a former Islamic radical and has been widely recognised for their work with Muslim youth. They provide a range of services to young people including faith-based education. Though they accept referrals from Channel, the crucial component of their approach is outreach work in communities and they enjoy a high degree of trust and support from their constitutions. Many of the community-based projects funded by Prevent work with young people and adopt a variation of a mainstream youth work approach. Some of the projects work with young people involved with crime, gangs, drugs and extremism and such work practice highlights the role of social exclusion and educational disadvantage in the life choices of young people. Indeed, the majority of the entries in the Rubric are embedded in youth work organisations, educational institutions, sports organisations and other child and youth focused programmes emphasising the government's statement in the Contest Strategy that young people are most vulnerable to radicalisation and extremism.

Though Islamist extremism has been identified as the primary threat that may lead to violent terrorism, Prevent funding is also available to on the ground initiatives that seek to challenge far-right ideologies. The Think Project in Wales is an initiative of the Ethnic Youth Support Team (EYST) who work with black and ethnic minority youth in Swansea, Wales. The aims of Think are to educate white youth about ethnic minority cultures and communities, to challenge far-right and racist ideology, and to build cross community relationships and trust. They provide a quite unique education curriculum for these young people that include small group and on-to-one work lead by staff from ethnic minority groups.

4.14.7 Summary

The United Kingdom experienced a prolonged and severe threat of terrorism emanating from the territorial conflict in Northern Ireland. From 1969 until April 1998, when the Belfast Agreement was signed, over 3,500 people died. The actions of combatants in the conflict, Irish Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries, as well as British security services, were also responsible for extensive harm through injury resulting from violence. Since the main protagonists signed the 'Good Friday' Agreement, terrorist related activity has decreased dramatically. Dissident republican groups such as the Real Irish Republican Army, the Continuity Irish Republican Army, and Oglagh na hEireann, have carried out a limited number of attacks that have resulted in loss of life. Dealing with the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. While *Prevent* does not deal directly with the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism, the issues dealt with under this *Prevent* strategy and the principles it sets out are relevant to the attempts to counter the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism. Further, it is important to note that the United Kingdom's antiterrorism and anti-extremism strategy documents do not mention left-wing extremism, nor were any projects or programmes that challenge left-wing extremism located.

5 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK

The comprehensive workup on existing prevention projects in Europe dealing with radicalisation has shown that prevention is very diverse across European countries. In this diversity, one can find opportunity. It might not be paramount to develop new projects and tools. Instead, it appears more promising to enhance existing projects. Furthermore, a better and more comprehensive documentation of existing prevention projects is needed. The RAN project (described within chapter two of this report) has started such efforts. It would be encouraging if RAN continued with their ongoing work and delivered updates on currently running projects. The overlaps in prevention measures, found among the countries, indicate a need for stronger collaboration. This would have the potential to enable an exchange of best practises among European countries and European experts and practitioners from the field of prevention. RAN offers a basis for such an exchange.

Once again, a key problem appears in the clear lack of proper scientific evaluation. Interviews with stakeholders or representatives of law enforcement agencies cannot replace scientific evaluation in terms of effectiveness of measures. In addition, it can be summarised that most projects lack a profound theoretical basis.

All countries analysed in this report have put measures in place to prevent terrorism. However, not every country has introduced individualised measures specifically addressing the threat of radicalisation, for example both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Poland addressed this under their general action plan on countering terrorism. Other countries have demonstrated a pronounced understanding of the radicalisation process and have realised a range of interventions and programmes targeting this. Other countries, however, have evidenced underdeveloped prevention measures that do not address risk factors for radicalisation processes. Specific measures should be put in place that address this in the selected countries.

To prevent radicalisation and violent extremism, measures are needed that are tailored to target groups and take into account developments in the way individuals are radicalised. The report shows that countries have established an understanding and knowledge of the use of social media in radicalisation. However, this knowledge is not commonly transferred to

prevention measures. Our report indicates that few programmes offer elements that target this phenomenon specifically, such as educational courses. Challenges posed by the internet and related media must be realised in subsequent measures to tackle their use by terrorists.

Looking into the development of prevention measures, each country has revealed a reactive approach to terrorism. Religiously motivated terrorist attacks are regarded as new phenomena by the selected countries, recognised only after terror attacks of this nature have taken place. Radicalisation and violent extremism will likely develop and persist as a problem for the future. Countries should implement long-term interventions in preparation for changing features of extremism so that such challenges can be addressed at the time of their occurrence.

The examination of national prevention measures reveals a complex and diverse landscape:

Belgium has produced the greatest number of Western foreign fighters per capita in Iraq and Syria. In 2013, the government started radicalisation-prevention programs to address the rising trend of foreign fighters. And in 2015, Belgium established a task force to create a national counterterrorism and counter-extremism strategy.

Violent extremism in **Bosnia and Herzegovina** has mostly been dealt with under the strategy for preventing and combating terrorism. This is a new legislative and policy field in Bosnia that is currently developing tools for preventing, monitoring and countering radicalisation in the country. In addition to the strategy, violent extremism has been countered via a number of global and regional initiatives.

The **Danish** approach addressing de-radicalisation can be described as a 'learning-by-doing' method in which learning is developed from errors and formulating a best practice approach. Close collaboration of key players such as social service, educational institutes, health care providers, police and intelligence and security services characterise the Danish landscape of prevention. The best known and best implemented concept is the Aarhus model. This concept focusses on stopping the process of violent radicalisation with the help of reintegration efforts that help transition the individual back into society and daily life.

Several Prevention programmes have been tested in **France** in recent years. However, France has no national policy on radicalisation and prevention of terrorism shared among its administrations. The French recommendations, mainly follow the European approach, but do not go beyond a legal framework. One missing link between programme experimentation and a shared French policy is a general evaluation framework to assess

the success of such programmes. This evaluation framework could take the form of a model, which interacts between radicalised profiles and interventions on the one side and their results from experimental programmes on the other. This evaluation would then be shared among French stakeholders and guide the best practices to be reified in national policy.

The workup of the situation in **Germany** is based on an analysis of 527 prevention projects. Results show that the landscape of prevention is very diverse. Generally, the projects' focus is on youth development and raising awareness to topics such as extremism, radicalisation, tolerance and democracy. To achieve their aims the projects use different approaches and instruments. Another emphasis is put on de-radicalisation and prevention in prison. Although projects are available, various improvements are still in need; these include a one-stop-shop that collects information on existing projects, a scientific evaluation of current projects, expansion in the number of Islamic counselling services in correctional centres, and improvements in the training of professionals.

While **Ireland** has a complex and often tragic history of extremism and terrorist activity, its experience is confined to Irish Republican and Ulster Loyalist terrorist groups. Ireland has little history of far-right agitation and no history of Islamist violence and conflict. Therefore, the threat level in Ireland is considered low and Ireland's policies regarding current manifestations of international terrorism are underdeveloped. Nevertheless, some leaders from Muslim communities in Ireland, such as Dr Mohammed Umar, believe that radicalisation of young Irish Muslims is taking place and are urging Irish authorities to design an anti-radicalisation and anti-extremism response. Ireland has, however, placed a lot of investment into projects and programmes that seek to support the integration of refugees, promote cultural diversity and respond to Ireland's quite recent development as a multi-cultural society.

In the **Netherlands**, the Dutch CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) domain can be characterised by two major trends: a personalised approach ("PGA" or "persoonsgerichte aanpak"), and a broad offer of interventions in the preventive sphere, in particular so-called primary prevention. The personalised approach involves signalling radicalising individuals and coordinating a tailored approach with all relevant parties, such as police, municipality, prosecution, and possibly youth workers, first-line workers, mosques, schools, and probation officers. Early preventive measures address polarisation and societal tensions rather than radicalisation per se, and they target the general population rather than specific groups.

In **Poland**, the field of prevention of radicalisation focusses primary on right-wing extremism - for the simple reason that Poland has a problem with right-wing extremism and antisemitism. Nonetheless, approaches dealing with this problem are limited. Strategies addressing religiously motivated extremism are very rare because Poland has not been affected by Jihadi terrorism.

In **Spain**, unfortunately, official rates indicate that Spain is the country of the European Union with the highest number of victims of Jihadist terrorism. The attacks in Madrid and Barcelona have motivated different state agencies to design effective intervention plans against the different forms of radicalisation. The most notable has been the PEN-LCRV (National Strategic Plan to Combat Violent Radicalisation), and was implemented in 2015 by the Home Affairs. It is a plan that aims to prevent the onset of radicalisation, monitor those cases in progress, and to act in those cases where individuals are radicalised both in cyberspace and in traditional physical space, inside and outside Spanish borders.

Sweden provides a range of measures to prevent radicalisation. The country seeks to reduce radicalisation through tackling violent extremism and racism, promoting democracy, reinforcing democratic values and improving society's resilience. Furthermore, the enhancement of the cooperation between governmental organisations, agencies in the criminal justice system and local prevention actors is a strong emphasis in the Swedish field of prevention.

In **Switzerland**, prevention of radicalisation is a field of many ongoing developments and discussions. The country has a diverse prevention landscape and different approaches can be found in different cantons, but there are strong efforts to establish a common framework on a national level; a national action plan on countering radicalisation and violent extremism is currently being prepared and to be published in the second half of 2017. A strong emphasis is put on an integrated approach based on local network building and interdisciplinary cooperation, with a quite active involvement of the police. Prevention is understood in a comprehensive way, integrating diverse dimensions such as education and integration, but also the penal system. As in other countries, scientific evaluation of preventive efforts is lacking.

The **United Kingdom's** 'Prevent' Strategy is a comprehensive approach to preventing religious and political extremism by taking advantage of already existing and available institutions and organisations to deliver its work. The UK government places a legal duty on all local authorities and statutory institutions to implement the many facets of Prevent, including

education, training and reporting. Funding is supplied to community projects and initiatives that implement Prevent and specifically tailor programmes aimed at preventing radicalisation and countering extremist thought, particularly far-right and Islamist ideologies.

The report is the first out of a sequence of three reports that together outline a gap analysis, which will lead to policy recommendations for the prevention of radicalisation in Europe. To reach this aim the summary of the current state of the art is provided in this report, which will be extended and updated by means of a survey among practitioners and experts from the field of de-radicalisation and prevention in selected European countries.

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