The Emancipatory Potential of Resilience

Dissertation

zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades

der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät

der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

vorgelegt von

Marco Krüger, M.A.

Tübingen

2022

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

BBK	Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (German Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance)
BMBF	Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (German Federal Ministry of Education and Research)
DRK	Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (German name of the German Red Cross)
GRC	German Red Cross
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IZEW	Internationales Zentrum für Ethik in den Wissenschaften (International Center for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities)
KOPHIS	Acronym of the research project "Kontexte von Pflege- und Hilfsbedürftigen stärken" (Strengthening the contexts of people in need of care or assistance)
SFDRR	Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
THW	Technisches Hilfswerk (Federal Agency for Technical Relief)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDRO	United Nations Disaster Relief Office
UNDRR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy on Disaster Reduction
ZSKG	The Federal Law for Civil Defence and Disaster Assistance

List of Tables

Prelude – Writing with and about resilience

The process of writing a thesis is always linked to resilience. Without regard to the topic, whether it is a cumulative or a monographic thesis, if you have a scholarship, a position at a university or elsewhere: it takes some level of resilience to come through the whole process. However, some ways of writing a thesis are certainly easier than others. To say this right in advance: I was clearly on the lucky side of academia, having a decent position in a great working environment. While it is tempting to start now with the credits right away, I want to use the chance of writing these acknowledgements to briefly reflect on the ways in which my thesis is – beyond its obvious thematic link – tied to resilience.

I opted for a publication-based thesis. This choice has clearly its ups and downs. One great advantage is that you regularly receive feedback from reviewers. Notwithstanding all memes and stories about *reviewer 2* and some personal experiences with more or less constructive (sometimes even destructive) feedback, most reviews and comments by the reviewers and the editorial boards of the journals clearly improved every single of the following chapters in the empirical part of this thesis. These reviews have somehow been also part of the supervising process of a publication-based thesis, as Matthias Leese (2015: 6) stated in his thesis. It is clearly an advantage of this kind of thesis to see the articles, that are to become the main part of the thesis, being published one after the other. It increases the confidence in one's own work and equally the personal visibility in academia. Meanwhile, submitting a manuscript is always linked to an incredible degree of uncertainty. The odds of being rejected are quite high and the success of your thesis lies not only in your own hands, but is in these very moments subject to the discretion of reviewers and editorial boards. For sure, it is about one's one ability to write at a certain standard in the first place. But then, it still depends on the opinion of the reviewers. This powerlessness in the review phases is nerve-racking. Going through these ups and downs, experiencing rejections and implementing major revisions requires some degree of resilience. Perhaps the ups do a good deal to have the confidence to be able to deal with the downs. In sum, the process of submitting, re-submitting and finally being accepted has been demanding and has certainly pushed my limits in conducting research.

Doing a publication-based thesis has kept me on my toes. Maybe, it made me the obedient executor of imposed standards to fit the academic circle. This would be ironically close to the critique that has been repeatedly formulated with regard to resilience and that will be

intensely discussed in the course of this thesis. And to some extent, this is perhaps true. In line with the slogan "The revolution will not be peer-reviewed", the empirical chapters of this thesis were all subject to more or less significant changes during the review process. If I was to write a book on the emancipatory potential of resilience, it would certainly have looked different from the thesis as you can read it in the following. Probably not better, but different. The processes of knowledge production, the feedback loops and (inter)dependencies are different depending on the form a PhD project takes. I am grateful for the feedback that I received during the review processes; and perhaps an immanent critique as it is done in this work would sit uneasy with any revolutionary aspiration anyway.

A second link to resilience came from my working environment, which equally granted and demanded resilience and adaptability. I started my job as a research associate at the International Center for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities (IZEW) at the University of Tübingen in 2015, a couple of months before I took up my PhD project. Since then, I worked in several research projects funded by different institutions, ranging from private foundations to the EU. Most projects were part of the German security research programme funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). When sufficing the demands of reviewers and editors requires adaptability, so does the reconciliation of hand on security research and the project of tracing the emancipatory potential of resilience. While third-party funded projects always come with requirements of the funding body, they also provide an openness, particularly in how to structure the work in order achieve the promised goals. The security research programme turned out to be a good fit to think about the potential of resilience. Although the aspired outcomes of the projects were rather application-oriented, the actual research process granted me the possibility to collect the empirics and to regularly exchange my thoughts; not only with my colleagues at the IZEW and the Political Science Department at the University of Tübingen, but likewise with the partners in the different research projects. These research projects stood out from common research environments: they were all transdisciplinary as well as interdisciplinary and embraced academics of different disciplines and practitioners alike. When reviewers pushed my limits in academic writing, then consortium meetings at times pushed my limits in explaining my research to people who are not familiar with all the discourses we have in (critical) Security Studies. The work in this kind of research projects additionally required some adaptability and proved my resilience to do research that suffices both worlds: the world of the practitioners and the world of the reviewers.

Meanwhile, this constellation clearly helped me to self-reflect about the purpose and the so-cietal added-value of my research; something that I consider to be most important.

Moreover, the IZEW granted me the possibility to repeatedly present my work at conferences as well as to participate in workshops. This was a great help to keep close ties to my discipli-nary community and to establish a network of colleagues, some of whom even have become friends Finally, the work at the IZEW has shifted my attention to normative questions. Thinking security and resilience as values, not only as societal practices, has been extremely rewarding. Engaging more with ethical questions and scrutinising the normative foundations that are in-scribed in security practices has opened up new perspectives that strongly influenced my thinking about resilience, as well. In all those regards, the work at the IZEW increased my per-sonal resilience and helped me to sustain throughout the process of compiling this thesis.

A third connection between resilience and my thesis affects the topic itself, but it is likewise part of the writing process. When I started the work on the thesis in early 2016, I started from the various calls to see resilience with scepticism and to recognise it as a tool to implement neoliberal governmentality. The critique was in many cases worthwhile and pointed to the pitfalls of existing resilience policies. Yet, the academic debate around resilience has become increasingly nuanced in the course of my PhD time. My thinking of resilience strangely fol-lowed that development and I have continuously scrutinised the way I understand resilience. I guess this is a rather normal process and hopefully speaks of some sort of reflexivity con-cerning one's own work. However, particularly the repeated calls and warnings I have heard on workshops and conferences made me alert. I did not want to legitimise any of the problems I do see in resilience policies linked to disaster management, just as much as I did not want to waste the potential that resilience might have to offer. This connection of my thesis with re-silience has turned out to be rather a relation with complexity.

Doing resilience research means to take part in the societal resilience discourse. The possibility to be the external observer examining resilience strategies from the side-line does not exist. Resilience research is part of the game. Particularly the underdetermination of the term resil-ience (see: chapter 2) allows for various interpretations of its meaning and for putting them into action. While I have always been worried not to re-produce problematic interpretations of resilience, I think that condemning resilience only results in leaving it to those who support the academically criticised forms of resilience that are so prominent in the political arena.

During my PhD life, I have actively tried to take up a discursive position. One result of this ambition is that chapter 5 has been published as a background paper of the United Nations Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2022. I hope that it could have a small impact on how resilience and particularly its relationship with vulnerability is seen.

Part I:

Conceptual Reflections

1. Introduction

"Disasters are part of life. Almost every day, we can read about disasters and large-scale emergencies in a variety of media and see the images of destruction and suffering."

(BBK, 2017: 6)

Disasters are the new normal, or at least they are increasingly presented as such. The above quote comes from the introduction of the guideline "Disasters Alarm: Guide for Emergency Preparedness and Correct Action in Emergency Situations", by the German Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK). What reads like an apt description of the current political situation as I write this in July 2022 (in the face of the Russian attack on Ukraine, after more than two years of the COVID-19 pandemic, and during an ongoing climate crisis), was written well before two of these events entered the stage of world politics. Resilience has repeatedly been presented as the panacea to the complex and interlinked problems of our time. Without even mentioning the term, the quote above amalgamates the driving forces behind the success of resilience, namely the dangers posed by an uncertain, hence, potentially disastrous future and the presumed inability to prevent these disasters from occurring. Resilience appears as the panacea to cope with the uncertainty of the future.

However, resilience has been subject to extensive critique in Security Studies for being an instrument of neoliberal governmentality (see, for example: Joseph, 2013). It is attested to devolve the responsibility for protection to the individual, while legitimising the withdrawal of the state. Notwithstanding the importance of this critique, I revisit resilience from a different angle in this work and seek to sketch out its emancipatory potential. I do so by answering the research question: *How can resilience contribute to an emancipatory politics of protection?* The thought of resilience that I pursue in this thesis starts with what Kevin Grove (2014: 253) describes as "so-called 'mutant rules' of resilience". This form of resilience is more than just a way to make people obey the rules and standards prescribed by security professionals and public institutions. It is also more than a top-down approach of writing manuals on granting protection that are to be enacted by self-responsible individuals. Rather, I understand resilience as an opportunity to spark a societal deliberation about recognition, inclusion and those

capacities (e.g. economic and social capital as well as bodily and metal ability; see: chapters 2 and 6) that are taken for granted in security professionals' imagination of society. Therein lies a good deal of the emancipatory potential of resilience, as I argue in this work.

1.1 Knowing resilience when one sees it

The academic resilience debate in security studies has been primarily driven by empirical studies. Jonathan Joseph (2018: 26) even goes so far as to doubt the conceptual status of resilience, given its theoretical fuzziness and proposes to relate any theorising of the term to actual manifestations of resilience policies (Joseph, 2018: 188). Yet such a call limits the analysis of resilience to chasing the pitfalls of resilience policies, thus perpetuating the lacking theorisation of resilience in Security Studies and International Relations. Philippe Bourbeau (2015b: 173) attests that resilience "is employed but rarely unpacked, let alone theoretically analysed" in International Relations. Despite the growing body of literature on the relationship between security and resilience (e.g. Bourbeau and Vuori, 2015) and the epistemic as well as ontological status of resilience (Aradau, 2014, 2017; Chandler, 2014b), Bourbeau's critique is still valid. In the course of this thesis, I respond to this under-theorisation by putting five spotlights on different aspects of how to think through resilience from a conceptual lens.

It is necessary to define resilience in order to be able to know resilience when we see it. Philippe Bourbeau is one of the few security scholars who proposed a definition of resilience that goes beyond transferring a resilience definition from another academic discipline. He understands resilience "as *the process of patterned adjustments adopted in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks, to maintain, to marginally modify, or to transform a referent object*" (Bourbeau, 2018b: 13–14). This definition is a useful starting point for thinking about resilience. It considers resilience as a process that aims at preserving its referent object in the best case and only transforms it if necessary. The definition underlines the conservative character of resilience that aims at maintenance and seeks to achieve this maintenance through a pro-active adaptation process. Although I use this definition of resilience in chapter 7 to discuss resilience as a social relation with interdependent processes between different actors, I propose to include the capacity-orientation of resilience into a definition of resilience. While articulations of resilience do refer to different ontological levels (Randalls and Simon, 2017), they all refer to the existence and possible mobilisation of capacities as resources for

adaptability (e.g. social networks, economic capital). The availability of these capacities depends on political decisions, societal structures and power hierarchies, as I demonstrate in the course of this work. Moreover, while the adjustment processes taken through exercising resilience are patterned (in contrast to arbitrary), it is important to note that they are neither top-down structured nor without preconditions. Therefore, I define resilience in this work as follows: *Resilience is the process of patterned, decentral and mutually constitutive adjustments of societal entities through the mobilisation of capacities to cope with shocks of any kind by maintaining, modifying or transforming the referent object.*

This reading allows us to look for performances of resilience in places where processes are not explicitly labelled as resilience. It enables us to see resilience in the absence of (mostly top-down) calls to become resilient and to be resourceful. This is the vantage point for my thesis that is introduced in the following sub-chapter.

1.2 Structure of the thesis

This thesis starts where the current resilience discourse often ends: At the call for a form of resilience that escapes the pitfall of devolving responsibility without providing the means to live up to the ascribed responsibilities (Joseph, 2018: 189). The following chapter gives a brief overview of the resilience debates in security studies, with a particular focus on critical voices on this issue (chapter 2.1). The understanding of resilience, as it is often criticised, is the product of a particular Zeitgeist. Its concrete shape is contingent and currently formed by two wider societal intellectual phenomena: complexity thinking and neoliberalism. I elaborate on the relation between resilience and complexity thinking (chapter 2.2) as well as on resilience and neoliberalism (chapter 2.3) in the further course of chapter 2 to provide the theoretical background for this work.

This is the starting point for the empirical part of my thesis, which follows a brief methodological reflection (chapter 3). The empirical part of the thesis comprises five spotlights on resilience. Each spotlight illuminates a different aspect of resilience and builds on the previous ones. The first spotlight (chapter 4) lays the ground for the subsequent empirical cases and traces how responsibility has been negotiated in international disaster management during the last six decades. Disaster management is a case that is often referred to when it comes to

studying resilience. One reason for this is that disaster management is a security field that started to engage with ideas of resilience relatively early. Another is that disaster management deals with disruptive events that are equally hard to predict as they are hard to prevent. In this first spotlight, Friedrich Gabel and I trace the distribution of responsibility back to the early days of international disaster management in the 1960s. We show how a very nation-state-centric allocation of responsibility has become increasingly fuzzy, comprising ever more actors, ranging from the individual to the global level, with states as the main actors. This dissolution of a monolithic attribution of responsibility is paralleled with an increasing emphasis on resilience. The introduction of resilience shifts the attention from preventing disasters (i.e. an event itself) to mitigating disaster risks (i.e. the undesirable consequences of an event).

While the first spotlight contextualises the rise of resilience in international disaster management and the diffusion of responsibility in the field, the second spotlight (chapter 5) engages with another concept that is often linked to resilience: vulnerability (Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015: 7). It sketches out how the understanding of vulnerability has changed in disaster studies over time, from being attributed to socio-demographic groups as a de facto ontological characteristic, to being linked to particular situations in which people become vulnerable due to the combination of their coping capacities and structural conditions (Tierney, 2019; Wisner et al., 2004). This chapter thinks resilience from its opposite, namely vulnerability, and traces avenues for dealing with vulnerability. This second spotlight is a background paper of the UN Global Assessment Report for Disaster Risk Reduction 2022. In this paper, my co-authors and I put a particular emphasis on the practical implications of different understandings of vulnerability. The traditional, ontological understanding of vulnerability allocates it within the referent object. This understanding pathologizes vulnerability as an intrinsic ontological characteristic of societal groups (e.g. women, children, elderly, disabled people, poor people, people of colour) and portrays them as deficient. It offers orientation for disaster relief planning, as it provides-clear cut categories. Yet, it also runs the risk of producing questionable disaster relief policies, since ontologically vulnerable individuals and social groups cannot be relieved from their vulnerability, but only protected from malicious events. These vulnerable groups become objects in disaster management planning, as they are those without agency who are reduced to a position of needing help.

A situational understanding of vulnerability, in contrast, describes vulnerability as the result of mismatching individual and collective abilities and situational requirements. Vulnerability is then not allocated within the referent object, but emerges due to a problematic relationship between the referent object and the wider society with regard to the consideration of the referent object's needs (Gabel 2019). A situational understanding of vulnerability requires reducing the factors that render a given person in a particular situation vulnerable. Resilience deals with resourceful adaptation as well as with coping and appears as the solution to a situational understanding of vulnerability. Resilience has gained momentum with the increasing prominence of this kind of vulnerability thinking in UN disaster management strategies (see, e.g., UNDRR, 2015). Yet, this understanding of vulnerability is not quite helpful in an ongoing disaster relief operation, when needs and vulnerabilities are to be assessed in order to prioritise relief tasks. The second spotlight suggests to overcome the seeming opposition of both approaches and to reconcile them with a focus on capacities that ties into resilience thinking.

The third spotlight (chapter 6) builds on the second and engages with the relationship between vulnerability and resilience by visiting the interaction between the attribution of vulnerability and the call to resilience. Examining the above cited guideline "Disasters Alarm" (BBK, 2017), I demonstrate that demanding resilience does not help to overcome vulnerability. Quite the contrary, it narrows the focus to presumed abilities and to those who have the respective means at their disposal to live up to the demanded requirements. All those, whose resources do not suffice the postulated standards, are side-lined as passive objects in need of help and are denied any kind of agency. While the guideline does not use the world *resilience*, it channels all those points that have been criticised in current resilience policies in the security realm: (1) it prescribes concrete actions on how to achieve an adequate level of disaster preparedness, (2) it devolves the responsibility of living up to these requirements entirely to the individual, (3) it does not engage with the question of how to acquire the requested capabilities and (4) it predicts a necessarily catastrophic future. Yet, "Disasters Alarm" also demonstrates that it does not take an explicit societal resilience policy to enact all its problematic features. This contribution therefore points to the question of how do we know resilience when we see it. It is apparently not the mere wording that is decisive in subsuming a policy under the resilience banner, but rather the underlying idea of flexibility and adaptability. Whether such a policy is then called *resilience* or *preparedness* is not decisive. Rather, it is interesting if such a policy only demands or substantially fosters resilience. In this third

spotlight, I identify social and economic capital as well as bodily ability as key variables for determining a person's resilience. While these variables remain implicit taken-for-granted assumptions in the guideline, they are crucial for being able to enact the demanded *"correct action"* (BBK, 2017: 1).

The fourth contribution (chapter 7) traces resilience within the phenomenon of unaffiliated volunteers in disaster management. These people spontaneously organise themselves in emergent structures to assist at disaster sites and are subject to extensive debates in disaster studies (Albris, 2018; Max, 2021; Schmidt et al., 2018; Twigg and Mosel, 2017; Whittaker et al., 2015). While unaffiliated volunteers offer their labour, they do not use traditional organisational structures, like registering with disaster relief organisations, but emergent forms of self-organisation, e.g., via social media or messenger services. Unaffiliated volunteers do both, they support and challenge public disaster relief. They support disaster relief structures in most incidents, as they integrate their workforce into the official disaster management plans. But at times, they also challenge and even counteract disaster management plans. These self-organising structures, which take advantage of their collective capacities, their local knowledge and their will to action, are adaptable, flexible, resourceful and whatever attribute has been linked to the word *resilience* in Security Studies. Yet, this form of resilience has not always been wanted by those disaster management authorities who otherwise want people to take up responsibility and increase their preparedness. The case of the 2013 Elbe flood turned out to be one of the most comprehensive and at the same time earliest examples of unaffiliated volunteering in Germany with tens of thousands of people connecting through a self-organised social media structure (Albris, 2017, 2018). The relationship between the official disaster management authorities and the unaffiliated volunteers was characterised by the ambivalence described above (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013). Resilience has not played a role in public disaster management strategies but was present in a somewhat unwanted way. The fourth spotlight, thus, deals with a bottom-up example of resilience that could count as Grove's *mutant form* of resilience. However, we can see another, additional feature of resilience that has so far been hardly discussed in the resilience literature: resilience as a social relationship. Resilience is an inter-subjective process that takes place *between* (in contrast to *within*) societal entities. The Dresden example is instructive for this perspective on resilience, as it shows how the unwanted and unexpected resilience of the unaffiliated volunteers has led in the long run to an adaptation of official disaster relief organisations. This interplay

demonstrates the in-betweenness of resilience. Resilience appears as a more complex phe-
nomenon than critics often allow.

The fifth and last spotlight (chapter 8) brings the previous four spotlights together and dis-
cusses resilience from a normative perspective. In the previous spotlights, the connection of
resilience and responsibility, the depoliticising character of imposed resilience demands, and
the link between vulnerability and resilience are elaborated upon. Moreover, resilience is dis-
cussed as a demand, a capacity, and a social relationship that needs to be contextualised ra-
ther than generalised. While the third spotlight (chapter 6) entails a normative claim – that
effective resilience policies need to be rooted in social rather than in security policies – the
fifth spotlight advances a normative perspective by explicitly elaborating on the emancipatory
potential of resilience. It brings the findings and arguments of the previous spotlights together
and uses them as a vantage point for a normative analysis. A reflection on the consideration
of people living in home-care settings in the wider framework of the German disaster man-
agement system is the empirical backdrop against which the normative debate unfolds. In this
fifth spotlight, I take up the criticism of resilience's responsibilizing effect and propose criteria
to assess the legitimacy of a particular shift in the distribution of responsibilities. The analysis
is based on Iris Marion Young's (2011) criteria (power, privilege, interest, collective ability) to
sketch out circumstances under which a shift in the distribution of responsibility might be even
desirable. Hereby, it is crucial to problematise the status quo. Since people living in home-care
settings are not sufficiently considered by disaster management structures, I argue that a cen-
tral precondition for criticising the devolvement of responsibility is that one's interests have
been taken into account by the state prior to this shift. Be it deliberate or not, marginalised or
even excluded groups are not disadvantaged by any shift in responsibility. Rather, the capacity
focus of resilience offers the chance to start thinking about what level of resilience is societally
aspired, what capacities are necessary to live up to this level of resilience and what is to be
done to grant everybody these capacities. Expanding the claim of the third spotlight, according
to which resilience can subvert the state selection bias in recognising needs, spotlight five
offers a scheme to assess who should legitimately be (made) responsible for granting whose
resilience.

Finally, chapter 9 reflects upon opportunities and risks of resilience for fostering an emanci-
patory politics of protection. Such a differentiation of the legitimacy of resilience goes beyond

the current discussion of resilience in Security Studies, as the subsequent chapter demonstrates, which engages with the current state of the art of the resilience debate in Security Studies as the vantage point of the following empirical considerations.

2. Resilience in Security Studies

The debate around resilience in security studies is lively and ongoing. Although it has become rather nuanced in the meanwhile, two books published in 2018 provide a good summary of the current state of the debate. The first book, "*Varieties of Resilience*" (Joseph, 2018) delves into three policy fields, namely national security, disaster management and development. All of these fields have witnessed an increased importance of resilience thinking. Joseph (2018: 26; 188) offers a sceptical view on resilience, which is based on the analysis of numerous empirical cases. He elaborates the shortcomings of resilience policies and doubts that resilience has any substance beyond its empirical manifestations. The second book *"On Resilience"* (Bourbeau, 2018b) engages with resilience in a more affirmative fashion and grasps it as a patterned adjustment process. It carves out the heterogeneous disciplinary roots of resilience, its potential to bridge different scientific disciplines and questions whether resilience is really inherently neoliberal (Bourbeau, 2018b: 88). Despite the different and at times contradicting perspectives on resilience, the two books are surprisingly united in their conclusions. Bourbeau holds that resilience enhances our "understanding of the constant and complex interplay between persistence and change, reproduction and transformation" (Bourbeau, 2018b: 89). Joseph concludes his book on an optimistic note, as well, by hoping that "we might point not just to the limits of resilience, but also to its future possibilities" (Joseph, 2018: 191).

Despite their different perspectives on resilience, both authors share the hope that it might be – or become – a productive concept. However, little has been done to develop yardsticks for finding ways to lend resilience this potentiality. The largest part of the resilience debate has been revolving around the questions of *what resilience does.* While there is no consensual answer to this question in Security Studies, Zebrowski's (2016) criticism of any essentialisation of resilience is a fitting vantage point to sketch out *how resilience is thought* in the wider field of security. Tierney's (2019: 214) claim "*resilience does exist*" only seemingly contradicts Zebrowski's call not to think resilience as something natural or given. Rather, resilience as understood by Tierney (2019) refers to an ex-post evaluation of a person or a group's

adaptability, while a significant portion of the security literature deals with authorities' demands to become resilient (e.g. Evans and Reid, 2014; Joseph, 2018). Resilience is, however, too vague to be pinpointed to a single meaning. Instead it appears as something that is compatible with a vast range of different contexts and policy fields, including the attempt to enhance the psychological stability and resilience of soldiers (Howell, 2015) to the resilience of critical infrastructures (Boyle and Speed, 2018; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams, 2011) or to fields as diverse as international development (Bargués-Pedreny and Martin de Almagro, 2020), the governance of public places (Malcolm, 2013), national security (Larsson, 2021), counter-terrorism (Joseph, 2018: 45–48) and disaster management (Tierney, 2019).

2.1 The rise of resilience in Security Studies

The whole discipline of International Relations and the field of Security Studies alike are late-comers to the debate around resilience (Bourbeau, 2015a: 377). In contrast, the resilience discourse in other disciplines, such as ecology and psychology, dates several decades back, with early mentions of resilience in the face of German bombardments of British cities in World War II (Scoville, 1942). The disaster researcher David Alexander (2013: 2709) even argues that the scientific use of resilience goes back to Sir Francis Bacon who used the term already in the 17th century. While the use of resilience is apparently not as new as occasionally implied, it has only gained momentum in the last two decades in the field of security. Crawford Holling's (1973) idea of resilience as a concept to make sense of cycles of change and adaptation in ecological systems has been very present and influential for the understanding of resilience in International Relations and Security Studies alike. In their seminal article, Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper (2011) trace resilience back to Holling's (1973: 21) call to "keep options open" and his intellectual proximity to the economist Friedrich Hayek (1989) who criticised the knowledge claims of states and bureaucracies. Walker and Cooper's (2011) genealogy narrows resilience down to its ecological understanding with the emphasis on adaptability, spill-over effects between interlinked systemic levels' resilience that determine the resilience of the whole system (i.e. panarchy), and the existence of several stable states of a system that can be reached through prosperous adaptation (Allen et al., 2014; Gunderson and Holling, 2002). Given the proclaimed compatibility of ecological resilience and neoliberal thinking, it is hardly surprising that resilience has been perceived as a neoliberal concept. Moreover, Holling

(2001) stretched his understanding of resilience beyond the limits of ecology first to socio-ecological systems and then to social systems.

Philippe Bourbeau (2018a) has most prominently criticised the narrow perception of ecological resilience in Security Studies as *the* form of resilience. He contrasted Walker and Cooper's genealogy with another genealogy that also considered resilience traditions of other disciplines, such as psychology, social work, and engineering. The shift in psychology from understanding resilience as an individual capacity to grasping it as an inter-individual process, which includes the affected individual as much as its social surrounding and even the whole society, is particularly notable, because it demonstrates the dynamic of resilience as a concept (Bourbeau, 2018a: 27). Bourbeau illustrates that there is not *a singular* form of resilience, but that resilience is a moving target with different disciplinary understandings and even changing definitions within disciplines. Moreover, some psychological accounts of resilience are confronted with the accusation of supporting neoliberal thinking (especially positive psychology), due to their glorification of self-improvement (Schwarz, 2018). Allison Howell's (2015) work on a military resilience programme that seeks to increase soldiers' combat strength paradigmatically demonstrates the role psychological resilience plays in the security realm. In fact, the use of resilience in Security Studies has several disciplinary points of reference. Notwithstanding the diverse disciplinary backgrounds in ecology, psychology, economics or engineering, all resilience approaches are united in the assumption that the occurrence of potentially harmful events is inevitable and that the best way to meet the challenges posed by these events is to increase the coping capacity of the referent object. This inescapability of catastrophic futures has been criticised by security scholars (Chandler and Reid, 2016; Evans and Reid, 2014) and is certainly one core facet of resilience debates. The aim of coping with an event instead of seeking to prevent its occurrence is at the very heart of resilience discourses.

In the absence of the possibility to prevent the event from hitting individuals, groups, or the whole society, resilience policies focus on preparatory means. This takes place on several levels, as revealed by the literature on the ontological status of resilience. Aranda et al. (2012) hold that we are confronted with different ontological positions of resilience. According to the authors, resilience can either be a capacity, a political demand, or an unfinished process. These different ontological statuses of resilience have been described as "sitings" by Simon and Randalls (2016: 8). They argue that "[t]he political work of siting resilience, of locating or 'finding'

it in one place and not another and determining 'where the options are' is fundamental to its world-making effects". Following Simon and Randalls (2016), analysing manifestations of resilience requires us to distinguish these different ontological positions of resilience. This theoretical consideration has been instrumental for several of the spotlights presented in this thesis, whereby I attempt to make sense of different articulations of resilience, either as a capacity (resilience found), political demand (resilience made) or a normative value (resilience unfinished). If resilience can be subsumed as the capacity to master future and therefore not yet known events, then we will need to explain how resilient is resilient enough. A referent object's resilience in a particular situation cannot be evaluated ex ante, but needs to be assessed ex post, when capacities amount to resilience or fail to do so. In that sense, resilience as a capacity refers to past events and resilience is attested backwards. The studies on the coping capacities of Jewish children who survived the Shoa, are among the most impressive examples of ex-post assessments of (psychological) resilience as a capacity (Bourbeau, 2018b: 37).

The second ontological siting of resilience is resilience as a demand. In contrast to thinking resilience as a capacity, resilience deals with the future when it is understood as a political or societal demand. It articulates requirements for becoming resilient in an unavoidably dangerous future and attributes the responsibility to live up to the demanded requirements to societal actors (Randalls and Simon, 2017: 42–43). Resilience as a demand is therefore always future-oriented, but pushes for action in the present. The third ontological siting of resilience, resilience as an unfinished process, points to the always opaque requirements of becoming resilient in an unknown future. This process is linked to a normative dimension that cherishes resilience as a value to cope with uncertainty and unknowability. Simon and Randalls (2016: 9) portray this form, called resilient unfinished, as follows:

> *"The resilient subject is produced through a set of practices and behaviours and is always already unfinished such that subjects embody, learn, instill and generate resilience, however defined. We could think about, for example, the production of new kinds of 'neurotic citizens' (Isin, 2004) or affective, resilient subjects (Grove, 2014), unsure of whether they are resilient enough in the face of crisis."*

While these three sitings differ, they are all rooted in complexity thinking, i.e., in the assumption that the future is contingent and that we cannot predict all cascades effects of particular

events. Or, as Jessica Schmidt (2017: 121) writes: "The future, in resilience thinking, is only the non-linear shift between worlds. It is a void, while nevertheless part of a holistic process of change, transformation, and adaption". Assessing the emancipatory potential of resilience requires understanding the preconditions for becoming resilient. These preconditions are rooted in the present. Unlike previous security approaches, resilience does not seek to make the referent object actionable by knowing the future. Resilience thinking denies the sheer possibility of knowing the future. This throws us back to the here and now. Resilience thinking, thus, urges us to prepare now for unknown and potentially dangerous futures. This uncertainty keeps the resilient subject on its toes. As resilience's roots in complexity thinking require the acquisition of local knowledge, the individual subject and the local community become the focal points for the generation of knowledge and capacities. They are therefore made responsible for increasing their resilience. Unsure what it takes to be able to cope with the next crisis in order to prove resilience, the resilient subject needs to permanently engage as entrepreneur of his or her own protection (Chandler, 2016). This is what makes resilience policies so prone to neoliberal assumptions. Yet, while resilience is closely tied to complexity and both are at least to some degree compatible with neoliberalism, I briefly turn to the relationship between the three terms in the next two subchapters, showing their connections as well as their tensions. The ambivalences in this triangular relationship create the space for the emancipatory potential of resilience that I seek to illuminate in the five spotlights that follow in the second part of this thesis.

2.2 Resilience as panacea to meet the challenges of complexity thinking

When talking about resilience, complexity regularly appears as a justification for the turn from prevention to adaptation. Complexity is neither chaotic nor just difficult. Complex systems do not follow a given top-down order but are emergent and therefore follow a bottom-up principle. Their structure is neither arbitrary, nor imposed or random. Complex systems do follow an order, though an order that emerges from the interaction of the system's components; just like a particular traffic situation emerges from the (inter-)action of different traffic participants with no central authority that tells them what to do (maybe besides the algorithms of their navigation systems). John Urry (2005b: 3) emphasises this bottom-up character by distinguishing complex systems from systems that are just not simple by stating:

"Complexity though is not the same as simply complicated. Complex systems analyses investigate the very many systems that have the ability to adapt and co-evolve as they organize through time. Such complex social interactions are likened to walking through a maze whose walls rearrange themselves as one walks through; new footsteps have to be taken in order to adjust to the walls of the maze that are adapting to each movement made through the maze. Complexity investigates emergent, dynamic and self-organizing systems that interact in ways that heavily influence the probabilities of later events. Systems are irreducible to elementary laws or simple processes."

A simple understanding of complexity reduces it to an epistemological problem that is frequently mobilised by the neoliberal reasoning of limiting the central power of the state due to the limited knowledge that is practically attainable (Schmidt, 2015: 416). Such an understanding, however, runs the risk of confusing the practical impossibility of overseeing confusingly huge and in its composition diverse and heterogeneous systems with a complex ontology. According to a simple understanding of complexity, the attempt to acquire the capacity to gather all existing knowledge is doomed to fail. In a complex ontology, in contrast, there is just no possibility, not even a theoretical chance, to obtain encompassing knowledge (Chandler, 2014b: 27–28). As governance under the conditions of complexity requires a strong reliance on local and contextual knowledge, resilience strategies turn to the local sphere and finally target the individual as main level of action. The shift of responsibility from the state to the local follows the insight that there is no central institution that is able to oversee all the cascading effects caused by an event, be it an external shock (as in the case of a hazard) or an intervention (as in the case of a policy). If knowledge originates from its particular context, then new ways of decentral knowledge production and local action are necessary, so the argument goes. This follows the idea of the "butterfly effect", according to which small events can produce huge and unforeseen consequences through non-linear processes (Chandler, 2014b: 23). In so far, it is even somehow ironical that resilience policies seek to govern complexity with the means of linear and reductionist top-down approaches. Governing resilience requires instruments other than managerial interventions from above. It requires instruments "to enable complex life to govern through its own mechanism of creative problem-solving" (Chandler, 2014b: 35).

This approach to govern complexity aims at finding solutions at the smallest societal scales. It folds resilience back to the individual and the immediate local context a person lives in. Resilience rests on this bottom-up principle that denies general certainties about the future, but flourishes in uncertainty and contingency resulting from an interconnected world with a myriad of local, regional, national and finally global interactions. Resilience thinking therefore represents a radical shift in the politics of protection that refrains from giving guarantees for future security. A resilience approach is much more hesitant in connecting the future to the present or to proclaim fixed path dependencies. Jessica Schmidt (2017: 121) summarises this rationale as follows: "It makes little sense to reason with such notions as promise and future, which are based on some idea of the singularity, linearity and permanence of reality."

Indeed, resilience thinking "forecloses the politics of the promise" (Aradau, 2014: 86) that traditional security practices imply when proposing particular means to face a securitized policy issue. Resilience assumes an unknown or at least uncertain future that cannot be simply extrapolated from the presence. The cascading effects of an event that takes place in an interconnected world render every promise concerning the effectiveness of a proposed security practice impossible, or at least insincere. Claudia Aradau (2014: 87) is certainly right in stating that resilience "does not promise anything inasmuch as it does not purport to 'tame' contingency but only to live through the surprising and the unexpected". Yet, resilience is to tame the future, since it is to mitigate its dread as the ever-lurking catastrophe. Due to the impossibility to deterministically influence the future, resilience throws us back to prepare in the present for the surprising future.

Just like the truism that absolute security does not exist, there is equally no absolute resilience. Yet, even if resilience refrains from making promises to succeed, it makes a more modest promise of being better equipped to meet future challenges. Insofar, resilience is about increasing actionability in the sense of having as many options at hand as possible (Holling, 1973). It therefore does not necessarily create the passive executor of protection who is deprived of any political habits, as argued by critics of resilience (Evans and Reid, 2014: 42), but rests on the enabling of potential. This enabling is not only an individual, but in the first place a societal task, as I will demonstrate in chapter 6. This inversion of necessity and potential is crucial for the following chapters. While I do not doubt that many, if not most, current resilience policies pursue a reductionist understanding of complexity that limits itself to devolving

responsibility while distracting from unjust societal structures, I equally hold that this is not a problem, which is intrinsic to resilience thinking. It is rather a consequence of "simple complexity" (Chandler, 2014b: 27) and its embracing of "the neoliberal problem of 'never getting it right' in which there is still a separation between human understandings and agency and an external world, mediated by (complex) causality" (Schmidt, 2015: 420).

This simple, epistemological understanding of complexity heavily characterises resilience policies that responsibilize individuals or the civil society to face the complex world and the catastrophic future. The introductory quote of this thesis illustrates that the catastrophic future is portrayed as an inevitable destiny. It throws the subject of resilience back to prepare right now to meet the challenges of the future. Who this executor of resilience practices finally is, depends on the scale and the kind of the disaster. Yet, as demonstrated in chapter 6 and severally criticised in Security Studies (Evans and Reid, 2014; Joseph, 2013, 2018), resilience is regularly sought to be granted through the devolvement of responsibility to the local and the individual. In this version, a necessarily catastrophic future is to be met by the single individual. This reading of resilience certainly justifies the accusations of being depoliticising (Evans and Reid, 2014: 42). The BBK guidebook goes in this direction, as the sentences following the quote I used to introduce this thesis illustrate:

> "These are not just major disasters which affect large areas for a long time. Local torrential rain, a severe storm, an electric power breakdown resulting from such a storm, or a house fire can trigger a very personal disaster for each individual, each family, which has to be overcome. Take the time to contemplate your personal emergency planning. This brochure aims to help you to develop your personal preparedness plan." (BBK, 2017: 6)

Again, this guidebook clearly conveys resilience thinking without naming the word at all. The subject of this de facto form of resilience is told how to behave to become resilient. While it is argued that local hazards demand for local and possibly individual responses, the shape of these responses is prescribed by general resilience policies. Resilience therefore becomes an excellent instrument to tame the threat of the future for public security authorities. Not by getting the future to know, but by evading the problem of "never getting it right". If the responsibilized individuals succeed in preparing for the future, then security bureaucracies can claim that they have significantly contributed to this success. If the local sphere failed to cope

with a catastrophic event, though, it was the individual's inability to properly execute what authorities advised to do. Resilience becomes in this way a tool for security authorities to never get it wrong anymore (see: chapter 6).

Policies like this follow a simple understanding of complexity as well as of resilience. They demand a particular kind of preparedness, which they impose upon the responsibilized actors (possibly *the* individual, understood as being homogeneous with regard to existing needs and capacities). This understanding of resilience is limited to preparedness measures that might be able to meet the requirements of hazardous events including the complex cascading effects they unfold upon societal structures. The complexity and interdependency of societal structures, however, are not considered in these policies, as the articulation of one-size-fits-all solutions and standard practices without reflecting on the capacities that are required for enacting these practices proves. As I show in chapter 6, such policies are not suited to increase resilience substantially. They only resolve the epistemic conundrum that neoliberalism and simple complexity poses.

Those critics who focus on emphasising the responsibilizing character of resilience run the risk of reproducing this reductionist take on resilience. Reducing resilience to a necessarily undue responsibilization essentialises resilience as a particular policy instrument. Furthermore, it neglects the normative ambivalence of the redistribution of responsibility that needs to be assessed against the backdrop of the particular context, as I argue in chapter 8. Moreover, it reduces resilience to a top-down instrument of an otherwise state-centric security policy. According to this imagination of resilience, formulating demands of becoming resilient - understood as obeying to the communicated rules or to become the self-responsible entrepreneur of the own protection - produces passivity by rendering political subjects into passive objects that are unable to scrutinise the conditions that brought this resilience policy about (Chandler and Reid, 2016; Evans and Reid, 2014). Notwithstanding that resilience in fact tells us little about how to avoid future hazards or how to mitigate the likelihood of their occurrence, it is a means for the attempt to avoid the catastrophe; not by preventing the event as such, but by preventing the catastrophic character of the event, i.e., the overload of society's capacities to deal with it.

The critique of the passive individual reproduces simple complexity by constraining resilience to urging the responsibilized actor to strive in the face of an uncertain future. The individual

only becomes the passive object if the prescribed measures are actually adopted to face the catastrophic future. Taking complexity as an ontological order seriously requires us to develop a different understanding of resilience, in which the actor is interwoven in the complex world and not external to it. In collaboration with Kristoffer Albris, I develop such an understanding of resilience in chapter 7, presenting it as a social relationship. Here, the resilience of one actor, who adapts to a changing environment, increases the pressure on other actors to subsequently react and to adapt. Albris and I show this by using the example of unaffiliated volunteers who are far from being passive or unpolitical. Rather, they self-organise through emergent structures, react to public policies and proactively take up responsibility. These processes subsequently spurred changes in disaster relief organisations such as the German Red Cross.

Understanding resilience as a social relationship embraces the emergent nature of complex phenomena between agents. One can argue that this understanding of resilience is close to the ecological concept of panarchy, which thinks resilience through interlinked adaptive cycles on multiple levels of a socio-ecological system (Allen et al., 2014; Walker and Salt, 2006). However, resilience as a social relationship goes further by embracing power hierarchies. This reading of resilience accepts that all actors are subject to adaptational pressure and that each exercises power to different and varying degrees. Such a reading of resilience enables a dynamic negotiation of agency and the analysis of changing situational patterns of vulnerability (see chapter 5). Moreover, it embraces the increasingly fuzzy distribution of responsibility for global disaster management, as Friedrich Gabel and I argue in chapter 4. Notwithstanding this shift from complexity as an epistemic question to complexity as an ontological phenomenon, I subsequently turn briefly to the relationship between resilience and neoliberalism and argue that resilience only seemingly supports a neoliberal rationality, but actually sits uneasy with its demand for efficiency. This opens space for the subversion of neoliberal rationality by embracing rather than condemning resilience.

2.3 On resilience and neoliberalism

The link between resilience and neoliberalism is more ambiguous as critics of resilience often allow. Resilience and neoliberalism alike assume limited central knowledge and favour decentral approaches over one-size-fits-all solutions. They both operate with – at least at first glance

– similar or in any case compatible assumptions about what we can know and how we can act (Chandler, 2014b). The underlying difference between simple and general complexity has been addressed in the previous section. Yet, while this distinction remains important, both forms of complexity regularly favour decentralisation. These similarities between neoliberalism and resilience end when other than epistemic questions are brought to the fore. Resilience regularly implies the existence of some capacity to (re)act (Tierney, 2019). It is to have as many as possible options at hand and create redundancies to keep the system running, even when shocks demand a readjustment of the *modus vivendi*. This redundancy of options is embraced by resilience but "comes at a cost" (Boin and van Eeten, 2013: 443). Redundancy sits quite uneasily with efficiency, which in turn is at the very heart of neoliberal thinking. While some epistemic assumptions of resilience are at least compatible with neoliberalism, resilience's sympathies for and reliance upon redundancies are less so. This opens the door for critical inquiry and for the mobilisation of this tension in terms of an immanent critique (see: chapters 6 and 8). Reading resilience as not necessarily neoliberal is not new to security studies (Bourbeau, 2018a; Grove, 2013; Schmidt, 2015). Yet, one added value of this thesis lies in its attempt to show that resilience and neoliberalism are more often at odds than not, if one takes resilience seriously. Before I turn to this argument, I briefly sketch out how the resilience-neoliberalism-nexus has come about in Security Studies.

Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper (2011) heavily influenced resilience thinking in Security Studies with their landmark article "Genealogies of resilience: From systems ecology to the political economy of crisis adaptation", in which they explore how resilience had been discussed within (critical) Security Studies up to that date. The article deals intensely with the proximity between resilience-thinking and neoliberalism. This development is personified in the intellectual rapprochement between the neoliberal thinker Friedrich Hayek and the founding father of ecological resilience, Crawford S. Holling (Walker and Cooper, 2011: 147). The Canadian ecologist Crawford S. Holling (1973) famously introduced resilience in his article "Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems" to the field of ecology. He has since then strongly influenced understandings of e*cological resilience* as a property of a dynamic system to deal with shocks and to adapt (if necessary) to a changing environment. Ecological resilience thereby presumes the existence of multiple stable states that a system can take. In this understanding, resilience is the "magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system changes its structure by changing the variables and processes that control behaviour"

(Holling, 1996: 34). In other words, *ecological resilience* is the property of a system to cope with a changing environment by adaptation or absorption without losing its fundamental functions, i.e. those functions that guarantee the survival of the system (Walker and Salt, 2006). Holling (1973: 18) introduced resilience thinking to contrast the dominant maximum sustained yield approach, which describes the maximum yield that can be extracted from a system without undermining its stability. He illustrates that the expectation of a fixed and allegedly stable yield might provoke behaviours that diminish the adaptive capacities of a system and leave it destabilised (Holling, 1973: 21; Walker and Cooper, 2011: 146). This would happen due to the general impossibility of all-encompassing knowledge (i.e. the inability of anticipating every cascade the exploitation of this fixed yield would cause). Rather than pretending to know each and every consequence of a certain action, Holling (1973: 21) assumes the unpredictability of future events and embeds ecological resilience in complexity thinking with his call to "keep options open".

Correspondingly, economists like Friedrich Hayek (1989) took up the complexity turn and therewith the assumption of limited knowledge. Proponents of resilience in economics challenged the liberal assumption of comprehensive governmental knowledge, which would allow for reasonable long-term predictions for complex (social) systems (Chandler, 2013: 215). Market laws become the role-model for how to organise a society, since "their very resilience serves as proof of concept" (Walker and Cooper, 2011: 150). Conflating different societal and biological spheres, Hayek argues for the radical adaptability of decentrally organised systems. The state's main role would not be to shape a concrete economic outcome, but to create supportive conditions for economic prosperity (Hayek, 1989: 7). Clearly, Hayek's usage of resilience aims to promote a neoliberal state, which works through a bottom-up organisation of a given social system. This neoliberal agenda considers the state as a mere facilitator for the self-organising abilities of a decentral economy. In the first place, neoliberal self-organisation means the decentral generation of knowledge on price determination through supply and demand. Due to the assumed limited governmental knowledge, early liberal thinkers already issued an epistemological critique promoting a withdrawal of the state from economic issues and the establishment of an economic laissez-faire politics (Folkers, 2016: 14).

The heterogeneous neoliberal thought collective (Dean, 2014: 151) has refined liberal critique of the state by adding a technical dimension. Neoliberal critique aims at inscribing the

rationality of the market to fields which are not primarily economic, such as the governmental administration (Dean, 2002: 43) or the family (Foucault, 2008: 323). In a similar vein, Holling extended his resilience approach from ecological systems to social and socio-ecological systems by claiming that they are all complex and follow "never ending adaptive cycles of growth, accumulation, restructuring and renewal" (Allen et al., 2014; Holling, 2001: 392). Furthermore, in describing the particularities of human systems, Holling (2001: 401) refers to "self-organization" and advocates the adaptive merits of "a market with essential liberal and equitable properties". Due to Holling's use of the vocabulary and ideas, which are central to a (neo)liberal critique of governmental intervention, the link between neoliberalism and resilience seems to be rather apparent.

Consequently, the similarity between ecological resilience and neoliberalism is situated at the level of the organisation of society. James Brassett, Stuart Croft and Nick Vaughan-Williams (2013: 222, emphasis on original) attest that resilience has become "*the* organising principle in contemporary political life". While the authors hint at the popularity of resilience by emphasising the word "*the*", their description of resilience as an organising principle perfectly describes the function of resilience as a demand that is ultimately limited to reorganising responsibilities. Ecological resilience and neoliberalism both advocate emergent structures, modest epistemic claims, and self-organisation. The similarity ends, however, with the question of how to foster resilience. This question will be subject to the chapters 5-8 of this thesis, in which I show that neoliberal's call for a market rationality contradicts how resilience is approached in the security field. Central policy recommendations of how to be more resilient (chapter 6) and the inability to incorporate spontaneous assistance into disaster relief plans (chapter 7) are as much contradictions as the tension between resilience's call for redundancies and open options and neoliberal's call for efficiency and saving resources.

Just as in the case of ecology, resilience has equally risen to prominence in psychology. In this discipline, resilience is mostly defined as the process to positively adapt to adversities and therewith to be able to conduct a successful life vis-à-vis negative experiences and traumas. The adaptation process is linked to the ability to bounce back or even to bounce forward (Bourbeau and Ryan, 2018: 226). Psychology therewith defines a resilient individual as one who maintains a stable mental state by absorbing the consequences of disruptive events or by adjusting to its new life situation. In other words, the *psychological resilience* of the

individual is the precondition for the functioning of liberal, autonomous self-governance vis-à-vis potentially catastrophic futures. Particularly positive psychology, as one strand of psychological research advocating self-improvement and "striving through adversity" (Schwarz, 2018: 528), found its way into the resilience agenda of the security field (Howell, 2015). While psychological resilience generally focuses on capacities and resources to become able to deal with adversities and even to strive through them, its most clear-cut fit with neoliberalism lies in the enhancement approach of positive psychology that seeks to encourage the individual to forge the best possible destiny. More generally, psychological resilience aims at shielding the individual from the malicious effects of stressors (Fletcher and Sarkar, 2013). Psychological resilience can then be regarded as a tool to create the mentally stable entrepreneur of the own future. In line with what we have seen with ecological resilience, the understanding of resilience conveyed by positive psychology responsibilizes the individual to carry out that positive and goal-oriented spirit that is finally supposed to contribute to succeed in life (Schwarz, 2018: 533–534). This form of resilience fails to take the socio-material structural level into account that heavily influences the life chances as well as the resilience of an individual. Silke Schwarz (2018: 533) summarises this weakness by stating that several accounts of psychological resilience

> *"historically focused on the individual level, neglecting the socio-political contexts people live in. Access to and control over health-influencing resources such as education as well as economic assets such as work, credit, etc. was not explicitly considered in the concept of resilience. With a tendency to focus on the individual level, person-centred intervention strategies are dominant."*

In contrast, Bourbeau (2018a: 27) holds that the perception of psychological resilience has changed over time from a capacity that lies within an individual to a social process that includes a broad range of societal levels. This resonates with a shift "from identifying protective factors to understanding the process through which individuals overcome the adversities they experience" (Fletcher and Sarkar, 2013: 13). Due to this shift, environmental and community-based resources exceeding the individual level as well as structural factors have increasingly been taken into account. Consequently, psychological resilience has been more and more de-individualised, which renders the former autonomous entrepreneur of the own psychological

resilience to a part of an interdependent social environment that influences resilience (Bourbeau, 2018a).

This section aimed at demonstrating that a deeply entrenched link between resilience in different disciplinary facets and neoliberal thoughts is well observable. Yet, this link is the product of a political system in many Western states that has proven rather receptive for neoliberal thoughts. A particular understanding of resilience that emphasises the *who* over the *how* has gained momentum in this political environment. These articulations of resilience are more concerned with allocating responsibilities than resources. Consequently, the connection between resilience and neoliberalism is made plausible by the strategic omission of debating the socio-material and trans-individual conditions for fostering resilience. Neoliberalism and resilience alike draw their organisational principles from complexity and consequently doubt the sheer possibility of all-encompassing centralised knowledge, let alone the possibility to predict the future consequences of present actions. However, these essential similarities are of an epistemic nature, whereas resilience and neoliberalism differ remarkably in their ontological presumptions (Chandler, 2014a). Even its critics concede that resilience is not to be equated with neoliberalism. Or, in Jonathan Joseph's (2013: 38) words: "This is not to say that the idea of resilience is reducible to neoliberal policy and governance, but it does fit neatly with what it is trying to say and do". But if resilience remarkably often ties into neoliberal rationalities, how can we then think of a version of resilience that escapes this proximity to neoliberalism and the reductionist devolvement of responsibility? The remainder of this thesis is dedicated to suggesting avenues for thinking resilience differently and for carving out its emancipatory potential.

2.4. Finding the mutant: On the immanent potential of resilience.

Thinking resilience beyond neoliberalism has often remained a vision, a call or a hope (Grove, 2014; Joseph, 2018; Zebrowski, 2016). Yet, since explicit resilience policies are mostly shaped by neoliberal governmental rationalities, it seems to be a rather futile undertaking to start the search for an emancipatory version of resilience in a security policy that is titled with the word *resilience*. Finding an emancipatory version of resilience presupposes to identify "sites where so-called 'mutant rules' of resilience are possible, where resilience can be more than simply a process to avoid disturbance" (Grove, 2014: 253). Such a site can be found in implicit bottom-

up, rather than in explicit top-down manifestations of resilience. While analysing the German disaster management system, I found a mutant form of resilience in the emergent organisation of unaffiliated volunteers in an otherwise largely state-centric disaster management system. As I show in chapter 7, this mutant site of resilience is a site where no one has called for a resilient population, resilient individuals, let alone self-organising volunteers paralleling the official disaster relief structures. Yet, the people who were volunteering during the Elbe flood in 2013 have proven to be resilient. They were highly adaptable to a changing environment and used their capacities (e.g. social networks, workforce, economic capital) to bring change about. This mutant resilience is able to embrace both, the exercise of power and resistance and to make sense of their mutually interdependent adaptation processes (Grove, 2013: 209).

When I argue that unaffiliated volunteering is a site at which we can see a mutant form of resilience, I also need to define resilience to make it recognisable, particularly in the absence of any resilience label. Therefore, I come back to my resilience definition from the introduction:

> *Resilience is the process of patterned, decentral and mutually constitutive adjustments of societal entities through the mobilisation of capacities to cope with shocks of any kind by maintaining, modifying or transforming the referent object.*

Despite all conceptual fuzziness, all ontological opacity and political contestation, there is a set of four attributes of resilience that holds even over disciplinary boundaries. The first attribute is that resilience thinking does not aim at mitigating the occurrence of an event, but seeks to increase the adaptability of its referent object (Evans and Reid, 2014). While this has caused much critique of resilience, it also holds merits. It allows to think about those events that cannot be prevented, predicted, or at least anticipated, with any degree of certainty. Floods, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions are just some examples of this kind of events. This does not mean that there is no way to influence the likelihood of a potentially catastrophic event. Yet, it is useful to debate which events are influenceable, and for which events we can only seek to minimise their catastrophic consequences.

The second attribute is resilience's intimate link with complexity thinking, be it on an epistemic or an ontological level (Chandler, 2014b). Accordingly, resilience works contextually and bottom-up, rather than centrally and top-down. The third attribute is that resilience is based on capacities. Without regard of the ontological status addressed, most articulations of resilience

refer more or less explicitly and with a varying level of detail to capacities necessary to enact this adaptability. In contrast to those who understand resilience itself as a genuine capacity (Randalls and Simon, 2017), I argue that resilience rests on capacities in the first place. However, it can, if you will, be described as a second order capacity that arises from the availability of other resources.

The final and fourth attribute of resilience is its processual quality. Resilience is, as stated by Bourbeau (2018b: 13–14) and taken up in my definition, a patterned adaptation *process*. It is patterned, since it is not arbitrary, and it is a structured as well as a purposeful adaptation. It is also a process, since it takes time and may be enacted on different societal levels by different actors, whereby each adaptation process is generally suited to influence others. These four attributes help us to recognise resilience, even in the absence of such a label, as in the case of unaffiliated volunteers.

These attributes are also valuable for assessing the emancipatory potential of resilience by counterfactually arguing what a resilience approach might do in those cases in which resilience plays no explicit role as key word, demand, or policy headline. One example for this is the case of the disaster relief authorities' treatment of people receiving home-care in Germany. While this treatment has long been rather a non-treatment, it allows to see what resilience as decentral, capacity-based process might deliver in those cases in which an event cannot be prevented, but only mitigated with regard to its severe consequences. This mutant form of resilience flourishes in the counterfactual. Studying it, thus, requires some methodological reflections on how to approach resilience from this angle and why this endeavour holds promises.

3. Methodological reflections

The German Red Cross (GRC) experienced difficulties in identifying the location and satisfying the needs of care-dependent people living in their homes during the Elbe flood in 2013 (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 2018b: 9). As a consequence, the GRC took the initiative to develop a transdisciplinary research project to find ways for a better recognition of care-dependent people's needs in disaster management routines. The International Center for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities at the University of Tübingen was part of the research consortium and tasked with the ethical reflection as well as with the empirical work examining the recognition of care-dependent people by disaster management authorities. It turned out that the research project KOPHIS[1] was a chance to analyse both, a mutant form of resilience and the emancipatory potential of resilience. KOPHIS was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (grant number: 13N13871) between February 2016 and April 2019.[2] The project departed from a scenario in which the term resilience was absent and a deliberate devolvement of responsibility to any individual non-existent. Yet, care-dependent people as well as their social environment were thrown back to self-help during the flood-recovery operations, since disaster relief structures neither anticipated their needs during disasters nor had the adequate means at their disposal to live up to satisfy the needs of care-dependent people, once they were pro-actively articulated by affected persons (Krüger and Max, 2019). The German state-centric disaster relief system was apparently unable to incorporate societal diversity and to satisfy those needs that were deviant from what disaster relief authorities imagined to be normal.

State-centric security policies urged care-dependent people and their social environment to be resilient, while others, who proved to be resilient by adapting to disaster situations through self-organisation, were at least partly faced with scepticism by official disaster management authorities. In other words: a disaster management regime that was not influenced by the otherwise prominent word *resilience* revealed pitfalls that are regularly attributed to lopsided resilience policies. Moreover, it has been suffering from shortcomings that could actually be tackled by resilience's call for contextuality and resourcefulness. Accordingly, the German

---

[1] KOPHIS is the acronym for „Kontexte von Hilfs- und Pflegebedürftigen stärken" (engl.: Strengthening the contexts of help- and care-dependent people).
[2] The official project description of the funding body can be retrieved via: kophis.sifo.de (in German language).

disaster management system is a prime example to bring resilience into being as an unfulfilled potential, not as a flawed policy.

I analysed the German disaster management system in its structural set-up as well as through the examination of particular case studies. The case-orientation of my study allowed me to gain contextual knowledge as required in complexity research (Gear et al., 2018). The cases were selected based on their scale. Landmark events, i.e. a winter storm or floods, took place in all of the selected regions: (1) the Elbe floods between 2002 and 2013, (2) floods in the federal state of Brandenburg between 1997 (Oder flood) and 2013 (Elbe flood) and (3) the 2005 winter storm, which caused the biggest blackout in the German post-World War 2 era with 250,000 affected people being cut off from electricity supply for up to four days in the rural regions around Münster (Deutschländer and Wichura, 2005: 163).

Saxony, particularly the city of Dresden and its surroundings, was subject to three major floods within little more than one decade (even if the flood in 2006 was less severe than those in 2002 and 2013). This series of floods allows us to assess what lessons have been learned from one event to another, and where blind spots occurred. Moreover, the consecutive major Elbe floods give us the chance to compare the developments made in coping with similar hazards over time. The analysed events of the three cases date back between 25 and nine years. This is arguably a rather long period of time and some events might appear to be somewhat "historic", as they took place in a time with limited spread of mobile phones and prior to the emergence of social media. However, this is an advantage for the purpose of this work. As I describe in chapter 8, I use these cases to conduct a counterfactual analysis of resilience. This means that I do not analyse the pitfalls of policies that are labelled as resilience, but I look instead at what resilience thinking could contribute in terms of remedying the pitfalls of openly state-centred security policies. Dealing with events that took place before resilience entered the stage of Security Studies and identifying problems that are primarily ascribed to resilience within the current debate let us see phenomena like responsibilization or adaptation from a different angle. This viewpoint reveals that resilience has not sparked but only shaped responsibilization processes during the last two decades. As chapter 4 demonstrates, the diffusion of responsibility is not a consequence of resilience, but resilience is a factor in this process.

During the research project KOPHIS, I conducted 24 semi-structured qualitative interviews with experts from different disaster relief organisations. I mapped the official actors who were involved in the disaster relief operations, ranging from local disaster management authorities to the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, and from state to non-governmental actors, such as different aid organisations. I used these actor-maps to identify potential interview partners. Due to the big number of institutions and people who were involved in the disaster relief operations, I was urged to use sampling methods. The necessity to sample interviewees results from the practical or at times even theoretical impossibility to include the whole relevant population in a study (Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr, 2021: 230). The selection of the interviewees followed the pre-defined criterion of experience in at least one of the above-described cases. First-hand experience in disaster management was important, since I focused on micro-practices and tacit knowledge in the interviews that cannot be retrieved from official reports and indirect sources. Moreover, I wanted to cover a possibly wide range of different disaster relief institutions and authorities. According to the mapping process, the interviews were conducted with experts from all levels, ranging from the local to the national level, and from various state and non-state organisations,[3] that played different roles within the disaster management system. The main regional focus of these interviews was the federal state of Saxony with twelve interviews. I chose the Elbe floods as the main case for two reasons. First, the Elbe floods promise some insights into the lessons learned during the series of events. Second, the 2013 flood was the most recent among the analysed events and interview partners were best to contact. Moreover, eight experts from Brandenburg and four experts from the region around Münster, North Rhine-Westphalia, were also interviewed. The analysis of these two cases as well as conducting interviews on the national level lend the findings from Saxony more substance. They were to make sure that the situation of the Elbe floods was transferable to other cases and the German disaster management system. At the same time, the cases granted the necessary contextuality to analyse resilience and security practices. This study is apparently not representative. However, I aspired the heuristic aim of theoretical saturation in the exploratory interview process.

All interviews were explorative and semi-structured, using guiding questions, but allowing the interviewer to follow unforeseen topics and interesting information. Before conducting the

---

[3] E.g. different levels of disaster management bureaucracies, aid organisations like Red Cross or the Workers' Samaritan Foundation, federal institutions like the BBK or the THW.

interviews, all interviewed persons were explained the goal of the KOPHIS project and how data was to be processed. Every interviewee was issued a project information sheet and signed an informed consent form. This procedure was followed to make sure that people participating in the study understood how their data would be processed and enable them to have an informed decision upon their participation. The interviews were not entirely conversational, as proposed for integrating complexity research into qualitative fieldwork (Gear et al., 2018: 6). The "unstructured conversational style allows participants to share what they consider important, facilitating wide-ranging responses reflective of different agent macro- and micro-diversities" (Gear et al., 2018: 6). Such an approach would be a bad fit for analysing how the mostly neglected group of care-dependent people is considered, though. Rather, the interview procedure was designed with reference to a problem-oriented interview approach (Misoch, 2019: 71–77). This approach focuses on an existing problem and grants the methodological flexibility to merge different qualitative empirical methods, such as group interviews, interviews with single persons, and observations with different guidelines, in order to increasingly cover and understand the societal problem at hand. Accordingly, guiding questions can be developed further during the research process and include gained insights. This served the purpose of analysing the widespread neglect of home-cared people in disaster management structures.

According to ethical standards, I pursued the principle of data economy, limiting myself to collecting no more data than necessary for conducting the research. However, I did start each interview by collecting information about the organisation or institution, and the interviewee's position. Additionally, I asked every interviewee about the kind of experiences with disasters that she or he made, prior to starting the parts of the interview that dealt with the recognition and satisfaction of needs of home-cared people. This information was relevant for understanding the perspective of the interviewee in the subsequent interpretation of the data.

In order to collect as diverse information as possible on the single case studies, I combined on-site and phone interviews with a document analysis of those policy reports that usually pop up after disasters as well as with national or regional disaster management strategies from both, public authorities and disaster relief organisations. I identified relevant documents on the national and the state level via desk research. Particularly local and more technical reports

were mentioned in interviews. I then used a snowball system to identify the relevant strategies, reports and policy papers in German disaster management in general and with regard to the selected cases in particular. The interviews were at the centre of an otherwise open research agenda in which the phenomena of neglect, selection biases and self-organisation were made tangible for understanding the shaping of security practices.

However, I refrained from including affected recipients of home-care into the study for two reasons. The first is conceptual. I was particularly interested in how care-dependent people are considered by security authorities when it comes to the planning of disaster management practices. That means that the imaginary of the population, with all assumed economic, social and bodily abilities was of interest for my work. I wanted to learn about the normality that was constructed by those implicit assumptions about the population that shaped the design of security routines and influenced whose needs were considered in what way. The study was explicitly not about care-dependent people's perceptions of being considered by disaster management routines. While analysing their perspectives would undoubtedly be interesting and worthwhile, it is a different research question. Instead, exploring the emancipatory potential of resilience, as done in this thesis, starts from a different angle by analysing assumptions and by revealing neglect.

The second reason concerns ethics. The German care system still relies heavily on family and other private social support (Theobald and Luppi, 2018). Many care recipients and caregivers live with multiple sources of strain, as private care-relations often come on top of professional and personal obligations, rendering time into a scarce resource. The marginal and only anecdotical added value of directly including single voices of care-recipients into my study hardly justifies the burden that an interview may place upon care-dependent people and caregivers alike. Following the principle of "knowing responsibly" (Doucet and Mauthner, 2012: 122), I hold that other sources of information about the consideration of people in need of care are better suited to avoid stress, (re-)traumatisation of witnessed helplessness or shame.

In principle, representing particularly marginalised perspectives is important for avoiding the pitfall of reproducing problematic power hierarchies that result in patterns of marginalisation or exclusion. However, particularly shame and perceived powerlessness may result in the desire to keep one's perspective secret. While secrecy has been a topic in Security Studies, it has been mostly discussed in terms of high politics and secrecy in power positions and researchers'

struggle to deal with secrecy and confidentiality (Goede et al., 2020). While this work is important to understand the difficult interplay between transparent research and secrecy particularly in high-politics security circles, it side-lines another dimension of secrecy that does not result from power but from powerlessness. This perspective on secrecy comes from the margins. Secrecy here is a shield to protect the interviewee from potential harm, be it bodily or mental. Conducting fieldwork at the crossroads between care and disasters deals with stigmatised topics such as vulnerability, shame, and powerlessness. It comes from the opposite of resilience. During the KOPHIS project, I started to understand how difficult this was for affected people. The project consortium wanted to explicitly invite care recipients and visitors of a senior centre to talk with us about disasters and their needs. We refrained from doing so upon the advice of the employees of the centre to not link our topic to disasters, since her visitors' lives are often problematic enough, and they would probably simply not come. In fact, when we changed the perspective and put their agency and experience in past disaster situations centrepiece, we received unexpectedly positive feedback.

Another important step after conducting the interviews was the analysis of the data. This was processed with MaxQDA, a qualitative data analysis tool that facilitates the coding of the transcribed interview material. The code scheme was deductively drafted and focussed on three broad topics. The first code category was dedicated to the distribution of responsibilities with sub-codes for public and societal/individual responsibilities. Interview passages ascribing a particular responsibility to one or more actors were subsumed under this category. The second topic dealt with the experiences of the interviewee in past disasters with regard to the identification and satisfaction of the needs of care-dependent people living in their homes, the relationship between the population and professional disaster relief units, as well as the lessons learned from past disaster relief operations. This second topic served to identify how, and with which characteristics, the population was imagined. Moreover, additional sub-codes were set up to mark those text passages dealing with how diversity as well as particular needs of people living in home-care settings were considered by disaster management authorities. The third topic dealt with communication processes and was used for those parts of the interview revealing what actors were considered to be relevant stakeholders with whom disaster relief organisations need to communicate. Moreover, it aimed at looking into how local information has been taken up for decision-making processes in disaster relief structures. Communication processes and structures point to distributions of responsibilities. They are a proxy

indicator for analysing who was considered relevant, as only those institutions, levels and parts of society with an ascribed relevance are usually included into public communication processes. The inclusion of local information into decision-making processes would be a sign of complexity thinking in which knowledge is always local and contextual (Chandler, 2014b).

In a next step, the deductively set up coding scheme was inductively tested with the material. While coding the first interviews, I adjusted the pre-defined sub-codes and complemented them with new ones if necessary. New sub-codes were introduced when text passages within the material that I considered relevant did not fit the pre-defined categories. After this test-coding, I completed the code scheme and went again through the material. Notes within MaxQDA were used to make my interpretations during the coding process transparent. I used an interpretative method in this analysis that seeks to link discursive practices to power relations. Discourses convey knowledge that then shapes individual and collective practices (Jäger, 2006: 89). This mode of a discourse analysis is inspired by Foucault's focus on societal power relations, the creation of knowledge and the shaping of practices (including speech acts as practices). I was particularly interested in the negotiation of what is sayable and doable. Discourse analysis is at times confronted with the critique that it would deal too much with high politics (Huysmans, 2006: 8), neglecting those who are silenced by societal power structures (Hansen, 2000). This critique has shaped my research design, as I wanted to understand how the lacking recognition of care-dependent people has come about. Coming from this neglect, I am interested in tracing blind spots in taking societal needs into account. I thus focus exactly on the power-side of disaster management that silences voices due to selection biases in the recognition of needs (see: chapter 6). Moreover, my focus lied in systematising rationalities for disaster relief practices that favour some portions of the population over others. I therefore interviewed security institutions and security professionals at all levels, but predominantly focused on the regional and local levels. Rather than shaping wider societal discourses, these speech acts of local disaster managers referred to the dominant security practices at play and the very knowledge and assumptions that underpin these practices. To consolidate the findings from the interview data, I used policy documents and reports dealing with the analysed disasters. Interviews and policy documents both served as the empirical foundation to trace back the knowledge production processes in German disaster management bodies with regard to the needs of care-dependent people.

Just like Jef Huysmans (2006) did for the case of migration to the EU, I used "discourse analysis as a method to focus on both discourses and practices" (Mutlu and Salter, 2013: 118) with a focus on the treatment of care-dependent people in disasters. In sum, this method allowed me to triangulate preferences and positions found in public disaster management strategies, ex-post reports of different disasters, and on-site experiences of interview partners. The empirical analysis, on which the subsequent chapters are based, involved applying a critical problem-oriented approach to the data acquired from these sources.

My research delves into the unfulfilled potential of resilience by using the method of immanent critique (Stahl, 2022). Immanent critique is linked to the Frankfurt School's approach of criticising concepts from within their conceptual and normative assumptions. This distinguishes it from other modes of critique in which external normative and analytical positions and standards serve as a yardstick to evaluate the appropriateness of a particular concept. Immanent critique is not new to Security Studies, but has been used by protagonists of the "Aberystwyth School" (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 448). Ken Booth (2005: 11) summarises the analytical advantage of immanent critique as follows:

> *"Immanent Critique is the idea that instead of trying to move forward on the basis of utopian blueprints one should look for the unfulfilled potential already existing within society. This gives enormous scope for analysis and political action, because it is always possible to find some emancipatory potential, somewhere, however unpromising an existing situation might seem to be."*

The research design of this thesis is intended to be explicitly critical. This means to be open, to ask questions and to be irritated by the field. Xavier Guillaume (2013: 31) describes this version of criticality as follows: "[A] critical research design should open up inquiry, privileging the questioning rather than the answering, the doubt rather than the certainty that comes with an entrenchment in disciplinary practices." I closely followed Guillaume's notion of criticality by using a research design that enabled me to reflect upon the ambiguities found in the empirical material. I did not look for a straightforward answer to my research question but, prioritised questioning as a means to engage with the contradictions I found in the field.

According to Robert Cox (1981), conducting critical research means to scrutinise power-relations and the current status quo. The more data I collected, and the more I delved into rationalities of disaster management, the more power hierarchies, which result in mechanisms of

consideration and exclusion, gained importance for my work. It is certainly possible to think the question of how to address the needs of care-recipients from a problem-solving perspective. However, I will demonstrate in the following empirical chapters of this thesis that a problem-solving approach to remedying the lacking consideration of care-dependent people in the German disaster management system would simply focus on addressing surface symptoms, rather than tackling the underlying structural and mostly power-related problems. A critical approach, on the contrary, is suited to dig deeper and to scrutinise the assumptions and prioritisations that result in the observed neglect. Using another dimension of criticality, namely immanent critique, I attempt to show how resilience can contribute to this endeavour.

Part II:

Empirical Analyses

Spotlight 1

4. From Lisbon to Sendai: Responsibilities in international disaster management[4]

4.1 Introduction

In the morning of 1 November 1755, an earthquake, the cascading tsunami and the subsequent fire destroyed large parts of Lisbon and killed an estimated 100,000 people (Dynes, 2000; Tierney, 2014: 26). Although the Lisbon earthquake was neither the first nor the most devastating natural event in human history, it represents a landmark as "the first modern disaster" (Dynes, 2000: 97). Occurring amidst the Enlightenment in a major European city, the Lisbon earthquake sparked a debate about responsibility and the impact of human decision-making. The idea that disasters are a divine punishment or inescapable fate was challenged by thinkers of the Enlightenment. In his correspondence with Voltaire, Jean-Jacques Rousseau gives the probably first sociological interpretation of a disaster, by stating that the building structure of the city, the height of the houses and the slow evacuation, and therewith contingent societal factors, contributed to the catastrophic consequences of the earthquake (Dynes, 2000: 106). Moreover, the Lisbon earthquake was the first incidence of a state taking responsibility for a disaster by appointing Marquis de Pombal for leading the reconstruction of the city and installing a new building practice, which was more earthquake-resistant than the previous architecture (Dynes, 2000: 112–113; Tierney, 2014: 26). From 1755 to today, questions of responsibility in disaster management have changed significantly. The latest international treaty on disaster risk reduction from 2015, the United Nations Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR), still considers the state as the primarily responsible actor, but unfolds a significantly more nuanced understanding of responsibilities (UNDRR, 2015: 5).

This chapter is based on an understanding of responsibility, as the legitimate entitlement to expect a conscious justification from another entity for (non-)actions (Sombetzki, 2014: 33–42). Similar to Hansen-Magnusson's and Vetterlein's operationalisation of responsibility in the introduction of this volume (Hansen-Magnusson and Vetterlein, 2021), we distinguish the

---

[4] This chapter has been published in the *Routledge Handbook on Responsibility in International Relations* (Hansen-Magnusson and Vetterlein 2021b). It is the result of a collaboration with Friedrich Gabel.

subject, object and the normative basis as dimensions of responsibility. In addition to this theoretical framework and following Sombetzki, we treat Hansen-Magnusson's and Vetterlein's "how"-question as a dimension in its own in this contribution. We discuss the question of "How responsibility is enacted?" as the quality (or scope) of responsibility (Sombetzki, 2014: 65).[5] This helps us to assess the changes in responsibility for international disaster management more precisely. Accordingly, in table 1 we distinguish the following dimensions of responsibility:

Dimension of responsibility	Core question	Example in disaster management
Subject	Who?	An actor is responsible
Quality	How?	For a specific kind and extent of action
Object	For whom?	Towards an affected entity
Normative basis	What for?	Due to a specific understanding of disasters.

Table 1 Dimensions of responsibility, own table based on Sombetzki, 2014

Following Iris Marion Young (Young, 2011: 5, 92), (political) responsibility is the legitimately ascribed task to change a current or upcoming unjust situation according to one's societal capabilities and thus focuses on the interdependencies between individual living situations and social structures. In this vein, she speaks of a shared responsibility that understands social structures as the result of individual actors that nevertheless cannot be blamed individually (Young, 2011: xiv, 70-71). Similarly, this shared responsibility requires collective actions to overcome structural injustice (Young, 2011: 111–113). This understanding is attractive for modern disaster management, as it is well compatible with the idea of "disaster risk reduction". Furthermore, it emphasises the continuous reflection on existing societal structures.

---

[5] Sombetzki (2014) discusses different relational outlines of responsibility that can be found throughout the literature. She distinguishes five dimensions and further subcategories of responsibility Sombetzki (2014: 65–132). Particularly interesting for us is her differentiation between the object of responsibility (Sombetzki calls this addressee), the benefiting entity, and the normative basis (Sombetzki calls this object), which describes what responsibility is about (e.g. the protection from suffering due to extreme events). Further, we consider it necessary to introduce the quality of responsibility (Sombetzki calls this normative criteria) as this allows a clearer distinction between an act, in our case the disaster management practice, a certain distribution of responsibility and the addressee suffering from the disaster, the object. Additionally, Sombetzki brings up the authority of responsibility, i.e. the (normative) instance before which the subject is responsible for the object. Since this dimension is closely related to the object and the normative basis of responsibility, we included this category into the dimensions object and normative basis.

The latter goes hand in hand with the insight of modern disaster management, suggesting that disasters amplify everyday issues such as privileges and discrimination (Kelman and Stough, 2015: 8; Young, 2011: 45).

Against this theoretical backdrop, we argue that international disaster management policies have undergone significant changes that entail implications for how and to whom responsibility is negotiated and ascribed. More concretely, a four-fold change of the subject, the object, the normative basis as well as the quality of responsibility in international disaster management has taken place. First of all, the subject of responsibility – the (non-)acting entity in charge – has become fuzzier. Although reaffirming the prime responsibility of the nation-state, the role of the international community in engaging with disasters has been increasingly acknowledged (UN, 1994; UNDRR, 2015). Furthermore, as the Hyogo Framework for Action and its successor, the SFDRR, both request the involvement of all stakeholders into disaster risk reduction processes, the subnational and particularly the local sphere have become increasingly responsibilized (UNDRR, 2005). Additionally, non-state actors like inter- and transnational aid organisations, such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and other non-governmental organisations have constantly been playing an active role as disaster relief actor as well as a political authority since the early days of international disaster management (see, for example: UNECOSOC, 1963, 1964).

Second, the object of responsibility has changed from the affected state, which had been the dominant recipient in the 1960s, to the individual (UN, 1962: 28, 1994; UNDRR, 2015). In this vein, the Yokohama Strategy from 1994 stated a "shared responsibility to save human lives, since natural disasters do not respect borders" (UN, 1994: 4). This change from the state to the individual goes hand in hand with the emergence of human security in International Relations and thus echoes a broader development in academia (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 121). Although the primary responsibility for disaster risk reduction is ascribed to the single state, the international community has increasingly taken over responsibility during the subsequent decades (UN, 1962, 1994; UNDRR, 2015). The emergence of resilience-thinking in several national disaster management policies, in turn, resulted in the transfer of subjectivity (e.g. responsibility and agency) to the local and the individual level (Grove, 2014; Joseph, 2018).

Third, the normative basis of responsibility – the way disasters are understood – has changed in two ways. On the one hand, the kind of responsibility changed from a reactive one, to set up financial assistance for rebuilding, to a proactive reduction of the risk for the occurrence of disasters. Thus, the responsibility of disaster management is expanded to actively mitigate the risks posed by both natural and man-made disasters, as stated in the preamble of the SFDRR (UNDRR, 2015: 9). On the other hand, the normative basis of disaster management shifted from a narrative of protection to a resilience approach. While the first implies the "promise of security" (Aradau, 2014: 75), i.e. the possibility to protect people by preventing a threat, the latter presumes the inevitability of natural hazards and seeks to reduce catastrophic events by improving coping abilities (Aradau, 2014, 2017).

Fourth, the quality of responsibility – the scope of responsibility – broadened, according to a shift from the responsibility to protect vulnerable groups to the responsibility to mitigate vulnerability by reducing vulnerable situations (McEntire, 2005; UNDRR, 2015; Wisner et al., 2004). The shift from ontologically defined vulnerable groups to a dynamic and socially determined grasp on vulnerability is crucial, since it implies the scrutiny of discriminating societal conditions as a root cause of vulnerability.

The last part of this chapter points to the ethical implications this changing responsibility entails for disaster management. A comprehensive analysis of the questions of who can legitimately claim whose responsibility and how could a legitimate distribution of responsibility for disaster management look like is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, we argue that deploying a situational understanding of vulnerability and the availability of adequate socio-economic resources are minimum requirements for an ethically justifiable distribution of responsibility for international disaster management (Gabel, 2019, see also chapter 6 of this thesis).

4.2 Who is responsible? The diffusion of responsibility in disaster management

Prior to the Lisbon earthquake, disasters had been mainly perceived as a divine punishment for committed sins. The debate about the causes for the horrific damage caused by the quake and its cascading consequences is the first incident of an altered understanding of disasters (Dynes, 2000). The appointed Marquis de Pombal was tasked not only to rebuild the city but also to develop a more seismic-resistant type of houses, the Pombaline architecture (Tierney, 2014: 26). Therewith, the state of Portugal took responsibility for the process of rebuilding the devastated city and therefore for mitigating the city's vulnerability against future earthquakes. Thus, it was this modern nation-state that first bore a collective responsibility for the restructuring process and became the subject of responsibility for disaster management. Since then, the state has remained the principal subject of responsibility for disaster management, as stated in the first guiding principle of the SFDRR (UNDRR, 2015: 13). As a matter of state politics, disasters might even foster international cooperation despite tensed diplomatic relations, e.g. as between Turkey and Greece in 1999, when both countries were struck by several earthquakes within less than a month (Ganapati et al., 2010). Another example is Hurricane Katrina in 2005, when countries such as Cuba or Iran provided medical aid or crude oil to the US (Kelman, 2007: 295–296). In these instances, disaster management is reproduced as a task of the nation-state, which is the sole subject of responsibility for disaster management. Other actors provided financial, personnel or material resources for the reconstruction of the damages witnessed, though on a voluntary basis.

What at first glance looks like a constant and clear-cut distribution of responsibility becomes increasingly fuzzy when looking at the developments in detail. Since 1962, the UN General Assembly (UN, 1962, 1963b, 1968a) has repeatedly passed resolutions on disasters for granting assistance to the affected countries. While these early resolutions and the establishment of a relief fund were reactions to particular disasters, the UN institutionalised their efforts in 1971 by creating the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) (UN, 1971). However, the appointment of an UN Disaster Relief Co-ordinator did not mean that the international community took direct responsibility for disaster management. The General Assembly rather acknowledged the need for a coordinated knowledge generation on disasters and aims at contributing to mitigate "suffering caused by natural disasters and the serious economic and social consequences for all, especially the developing countries" (UN, 1971: 85). Despite the

strengthening of the UNDRO during the 1970s, the respective nation-state remains the sole subject of responsibility, while the UN serves as facilitator to ensure that states can live up to their responsibility (UN, 1974: 46).

In 1987, the UN made a significant shift in the distribution of responsibility for international disaster management with Resolution 42/169 of the General Assembly, in which it recognises

"the responsibility of the United Nations system for promoting international co-operation in the study of natural disasters of geophysical origin and in the development of techniques to mitigate risks arising therefrom, as well as for co-ordinating disaster relief, preparedness and prevention, including prediction and early warning." (UN, 1987: 128)

Although restricted to knowledge generation and early warning, Resolution 42/169 as the first one explicitly shifted responsibility for disaster management to the UN. Additionally, it declared the 1990s the "decade for natural disaster reduction" (UN, 1987: 128). Earlier resolutions only acknowledged that there are international organisations, like the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, bearing responsibility for disaster relief due to their mission statements (see, for example: ICRC, 1969; UN, 1981; UNECOSOC, 1963, 1964).

Several years later, the "Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World" (UN, 1994), which was adopted at the World Conference on National Disaster Reduction in May 1994 by the UN member states, went even further by declaring that: "All countries shall act in a new spirit of partnership to build a safer world based on common interests and shared responsibility to save human lives, since natural disasters do not respect borders" (UN, 1994: 4). While the strategy insists on the primary responsibility of the affected state, it acknowledges the transnational character of disasters and thus argumentatively paved the way for an increasing shift of responsibility to the international community. In fact, the United Nations International Strategy on Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), adopted in the General Assembly resolution 54/219 in 2000, continued these efforts in order to provide an international framework for facilitating disaster management (UN, 2000).

However, the most recent two UN strategies for international disaster management did not significantly expand the responsibility of the United Nations system. Both, the "Hyogo

Framework for Action 2005-2015" (UNDRR, 2005) and the "Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030" (UNDRR, 2015) reaffirm the prime responsibility of the state while pointing to the facilitating role of the international system. Thereby, the UN institutions are called to "assist disaster-prone developing countries in disaster risk reduction through appropriate means and coordination" (UNDRR, 2005: 16) and "by providing adequate resources through various funding mechanisms, including increased, timely, stable and predictable contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction" (UNDRR, 2015: 26).

This upscaling of responsibility is paralleled by the tendency to decentralise disaster management. For instance, the Yokohama Strategy repeatedly emphasised the importance of the local and therewith traditional knowledge and community engagement (UN, 1994: 4–5). It also called for the "participation of all levels, from the local community through the national government to the regional and international level" (UN, 1994: 8) to make disaster prevention most effective. The Hyogo Framework went even further and expanded the call to engage with local contexts to a delegation of responsibility to "subnational and local responsibility" (UNDRR, 2005: 6). Although less explicit, the successor of the Hyogo Framework, the SFDRR, perpetuated this principle of broadening and devolving responsibility by emphasising the importance and the role of local authorities in disaster management (UNDRR, 2015: 17–18). This tendency of attributing responsibility for disaster management to the local sphere, hence responsibilizing it, coincides with the call to engage the private sector (UN, 1994: 17; UNDRR, 2005: 11, 2015: 20) as well as with an increasing emphasis of resilience in the international frameworks. This development is reproduced on the national level in several disaster management strategies that increasingly emphasise the role of the private and the individual sphere while delegating responsibility to a varying degree to the sub-national and local sphere (Joseph, 2016, 2018; Kaufmann, 2013).

From the 1960s to today, the nation-state has remained the main subject of responsibility for disaster management. This section demonstrated, however, that the previous sole responsibility became increasingly fuzzy and was distributed to various other levels, from the international community to the individual. Consequently, the broadening of attributing responsibility occurred in two directions, whereby the imposed delegation of responsibility to the local and the individual sphere entails particular problems, such as the de-politicisation of disaster management through the individualisation of responsibility, the potential withdrawal of the state,

or the imposition of prescribed behavioural routines in case of a disaster (Evans and Reid, 2014; Joseph, 2018, see also: chapter 6).

4.3 Whom to protect? From the state to the individual

Another change in the characterisation of responsibility occurred with regard to the object of the responsibility in disaster management. While the state was long considered the entity to be protected, international disaster management policies have increasingly centred around the protection of human beings. Particularly the Hyogo and the Sendai Framework call for a stronger consideration of vulnerable groups, thus acknowledging societal diversity and potentially differing demands for help (UNDRR, 2005, 2015). The latter reflects what international aid organisations, like the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent, have claimed, due to their mission statements, for decades. Already in 1969, the International Red Cross stated in its International Review "that in the present century the international community has accepted increased responsibility for relief of human suffering in any form" (ICRC, 1969: 632).

When analysing the object of responsibility in disaster management it is telling how the Lisbon earthquake became the "first modern disaster" (Dynes, 2000: 97). Indeed, half a century prior to the destruction of Lisbon, in 1693, two earthquakes hit Catania, Sicily, as well as Port Royal, Jamaica. However, both earthquakes occurred at the periphery and, thus, received far less attention than the one in Lisbon, a cultural centre in Europe (Dynes, 2000: 98). Moreover, the royal palace and the houses of a good share of the nobles were located in the centre of the city, which was particularly exposed to floods and subsequently, to a large part destroyed, either by the earthquake, the tsunami induced flood or by the fire. Such hazard-exposed areas are usually inhabited by people of lower social status (Dynes, 2000: 111). The general status of Lisbon as well as the social status of the victims of the earthquake, thus, the status of the object of responsibility, strongly contributed to Portugal taking responsibility for the reconstruction process of the city in the aftermath of the earthquake (Dynes, 2000: 112; Tierney, 2014: 26). In that, the Lisbon earthquake pointed out the central role of the object of responsibility that needs to be deemed sufficiently important to take responsibility for its protection and rebuilding (see also: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,

2006). Determining an object of responsibility is thus linked to a value judgement, since "[o]bjects of no value cannot be threatened in the same sense as those that do have value" (Burgess, 2011: 13–14). The definition of the object of responsibility in disaster management thus allows an outlook on the normative priorities of the subject of responsibility.

In its early phase during the 1960s and 1970s, the object of responsibility in international disaster management was the affected state. In its resolution on assistance in cases of natural disasters in 1970, the UN General assembly (UN, 1971: 85) stated "that throughout history natural disasters and emergency situations have inflicted heavy loss of life and property, affecting every people and every country". In this understanding, the country and the people as a unitary entity, not the single individual, is affected by disasters. The aid of the international community is then meant to remedy the losses from which the affected state suffers (UN, 1970: 83). Consequently, it is the Westphalian sovereign state that was the object of responsibility for international disaster management during that time.

In the subsequent decades, the object of responsibility has continuously shifted from the international community's perspective. UN strategies have increasingly considered the protection of individuals as central aim of disaster management. The Yokohama Strategy (UN, 1994), as the key document of the "International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction", is one prominent example of this change. It opens the black box of the state as a unitary entity in international disaster management and differentiates between varying societal groups. It acknowledged that "the poor and socially disadvantaged groups in developing countries" (UN, 1994: 4) are most affected by disasters. While this broke up the exclusively state-centric focus of previous UN resolutions, it still embraced particularly poor states and regions with a high exposure to natural hazards as particularly vulnerable and thus, as object of responsibility (UN, 1994: 9). The 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action put the "survival, dignity and livelihood of individuals" (UNDRR, 2005: 1) in the preamble of the text centrepiece. Just like the Yokohama Strategy, the Hyogo Framework portrayed the protection of people as a prime responsibility of states and (to a lesser degree) of the international community (UN, 1994: 5; UNDRR, 2005: 4). Finally, the SFDRR is the most explicit treaty in this regard by stating that disaster management "is aimed at protecting persons and their property, health, livelihoods and productive assets, as well as cultural and environmental assets, while promoting and protecting all human rights, including the right to development" (UNDRR, 2015: 13).

The paramount importance of the individual as object of responsibility in international disaster management parallels the development in other policy fields, like the UN'S Responsibility to Protect (UN, 2005: 30). The rise of human security as a general concept in the UN during the 1990s is mirrored in international disaster management, a policy field that links questions of security and development. From the Yokohama Strategy to the Hyogo Framework and the SFDRR, all recent international disaster management concepts reflect the "people-centred" (UNDP, 1994: 23) human security approach claiming "freedom from fear and freedom from want" (UN, 2005: 31), particularly for the most vulnerable people. Thereby, the state level's role in international disaster management has become a means to the end of human security. It is thus limited to granting protection to individuals and societal groups (UNDRR, 2015: 13–14). The changed object of responsibility has led to a significant change of the normative basis of responsibility from a reactive responsibility to rebuild to a proactive responsibility to prevent or adapt.

4.4 What for? Rebuilding, risk reduction and resilience

Returning to the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, the rebuilding efforts in the aftermath of the destruction of vast parts of the city embraced both a proactive and a reactive element. The reactive element was the reconstruction process as such. In the process, the Marques de Pombal was charged with the long-term restructuring work of the city as well as with the immediate emergency responses (Dynes, 2000: 112). Moreover, Pombal developed what was to be called Pombaline architecture, a style that was more earthquake-resistant than the previous architecture of the city, which had contributed to the large-scale losses. The creation of this new, more resistant architectural style complemented the reactive responsibility to rebuild with a proactive responsibility to reduce future losses. It was the materialisation of the idea that societal conditions, not divine judgements, determine vulnerability or, as Kathleen Tierney (2014: 26) puts it: "Pombaline architecture is the physical embodiment of the idea that both vulnerability and safety are the consequence of decisions about the design of urban forms." Nevertheless, it took another 200 years until the 1970s until the idea of vulnerability became the central concept of disaster studies that it is today. The change from perceiving disasters as divine punishment to scrutinising societal conditions with regard to their influence on

vulnerability, exposure and eventually, affectedness, determines the issues, for which the respective subject of responsibility can take responsibility. Drawing from how the Enlightenment paved the way for taking proactive responsibility after the Lisbon earthquake, this section deals with how the normative basis of responsibility in international disaster management has changed from the passive and retrospective rebuilding of infrastructure to the proactive reduction of disaster risks.

During the 1960s the international community's efforts to disaster management focused on mobilising the UN structures and member states for helping countries hit by a natural disaster, such as Iran (UN, 1962, 1968a), Yugoslavia (UN, 1963a) and the Caribbean (UN, 1963b). UN Resolution 1753 on the earthquake in Iran in 1962 mentioned the need to enhance prognostic means in seismological research for preventing disaster induced human suffering (UN, 1962: 28). This reflects the primacy of the retrospective responsibility to help affected states to rebuild their infrastructure. A prospective responsibility to gather knowledge on disaster mitigation played only a subordinated role during this first decade of international crisis management under the umbrella of the UN.

Starting from the establishment of the UNDRO in 1971, this situation changed towards a more balanced emphasis of retrospective and prospective responsibility. Both resolutions on "Assistance in cases of natural disaster" (UN, 1970) and on the establishment of the UNDRO dedicated only three paragraphs explicitly to general preparedness measures and knowledge-gathering about early warning mechanisms. Shortcomings in its ability to effectively coordinate disaster relief operations on a worldwide scale caused a further strengthening of the UNDRO in 1974. This resolution emphasised the importance of pre-disaster planning and disaster prevention for both, the national and the international political sphere (UN, 1974: 46). Disaster preparedness increasingly gained importance in the subsequent years and led to the proclamation of the "International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction" (UN, 1987) in the 1990s. The UN's work in disaster management in this decade was explicitly dedicated to reducing the death toll of disasters by increasing preparedness, improving prediction, fostering scientific knowledge, implementing standards and building capacity vis-à-vis natural hazards (UN, 1987). The Yokohama Strategy, as the key document of the UN decade, illustrates this shift by affirming that:

"Disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness are better than disaster response in achieving the goals and objectives of the Decade. Disaster response alone is not sufficient, as it yields only temporary results at a very high cost. We have followed this limited approach for too long." (UN, 1994: 4)

The emphasis on relief assistance in international disaster management represents a predominantly reactive attitude towards disasters prior to the "International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction". While prevention and preparedness were mentioned, relief operations and restructuring processes had been at the core of international disaster management. The UN Decade and particularly the Yokohama Strategy changed this modus operandi to a proactive approach of reducing disaster risks and preventing harm. For the latter point, knowledge about how and why natural hazards inflict disastrous effects on societies are described to be key in disaster management (UN, 1994: 4). This rather modernist approach assumes knowledge to be key for reducing the impact of disasters. It is an incidence of what David Chandler (Chandler, 2014b: 27) calls "simple complexity", "an epistemological problem of knowledge of emergent causality". However, in contrast to the ideal of the Enlightenment to identify general laws (Chandler, 2014b: 20–21), the Yokohama Strategy calls for the acknowledgement of the specific "cultural and organizational characteristics of each society" (UN, 1994: 4–5). Knowledge generation and the implementation of sustainable development policies were to increase capacities and decrease vulnerabilities (UN, 1994: 8). The reduction of disaster risks for society was accompanied by the aim to prevent the likelihood of disasters through environmental protection (UN, 1994: 8). In sum, the Yokohama Strategy in its claim for a better world revealed a proactive disaster management that aimed at mitigating both: the probability of occurrence and the negative consequences of hazards.

Although particularly the capacity building approach, linked to ideas of sustainable development, is remarkably compatible with resilience thinking, the term resilience was used only once in the Yokohama Strategy (UN, 1994: 11). However, the document repeatedly emphasised the need to include local authorities and actors from the civil society into the national capacity building efforts.

Roughly 20 years later, in the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action, the international community regarded a stronger involvement of individuals in disaster management in their local

communities as the most crucial lesson learned (UNDRR, 2005: 2). Although the overall objectives were in line with the Yokohama Strategy and the term "disaster reduction" keeps a central position, "disaster risk reduction" appears to be the most commonly used goal in the Hyogo Framework (UNDRR, 2005). The difference is that disaster risk reduction aims at mitigating the adverse risks of a disaster rather than at minimising the likelihood of an event as such. In this vein, the Hyogo Framework (UNDRR, 2005: 6) states that:

> *"Countries that develop policy, legislative and institutional frameworks for disaster risk reduction and that are able to develop and track progress through specific and measurable indicators have greater capacity to manage risks and to achieve widespread consensus for engagement in and compliance with disaster risk reduction measures across all sectors of society."*

The emphasis of the local level links to the devolution of responsibility. Moreover, the focus on risk reduction through capacity building is in line with resilience thinking. In fact, the term resilience appeared more than 20 times in the Hyogo Framework; far more often than in the Yokohama Strategy. Thereby, resilience is linked to David Chandler's (2014b: 28) "general complexity" emphasising the contextuality of knowledge. This requires to "[r]ecognize the importance and specifity of local risk patterns and trends, decentralize responsibilities and resources for disaster risk reduction to relevant sub-national or local authorities" (UNDRR, 2005: 6), as the Hyogo Framework concluded. The increasingly fuzzy attribution of responsibility to a multitude of levels ranging from the global to the local and eventually to the individual as the entrepreneur of her own protection (Chandler, 2016: 14; Evans and Reid, 2014: 42). Moreover, the reference to different levels of responsibility reflects the idea of panarchy, which is rooted in the ecological understanding of resilience (Holling et al., 2002; Holling and Gunderson, 2002). Panarchy refers to the interconnectedness of different (societal) levels. Due to their interconnections, changes on one level of the system, so the argument goes, may result in changes on other systemic levels (Holling et al., 2002). Accordingly, resilience towards disasters can only be achieved through granting resilience on all interconnected societal levels, from the individual to the global. Spreading responsibilities over all societal levels is thus the consequence of resilience thinking (Krüger 2019b, 63–64). This shared agency, however, relies on knowledge generation on the local level and thus responsibilizes the individual and subnational levels (Kaufmann, 2013).

The SFDRR echoes the very approach of the Hyogo Framework and goes even further by calling for "a broader and a more people-centred preventive approach to disaster risk" (UNDRR, 2015: 10). The Sendai Framework sketches out a capacity-oriented approach that seeks to mitigate vulnerability by empowering the local sphere in general and marginalised societal groups in particular (UNDRR, 2015). In fact, the devastating effects of natural hazards hit different societal groups to a different extent (Tierney, 2019: 120). The SFDRR thus seeks to tackle the underlying social dynamics leading to a stratified vulnerability in society (UNDRR, 2015: 10). The development of different understandings of vulnerability is closely linked to the quality of responsibility in international disaster management and thus subject to the subsequent section.

4.5 How? From vulnerable entities to vulnerable situations

Finally, a qualitative shift of responsibility in disaster management may be illustrated along the concept of vulnerability. Broadly speaking, vulnerability describes the social side of disaster risk (Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2004; Wisner et al., 2004) besides a hazardous event. Although vulnerability has been a core term of UN disaster politics right from the beginning, its understanding and the resulting implications for state disaster politics has changed from improving building standards, similar to the case of Lisbon, over protecting specific social groups understood as especially vulnerable, to an approach focusing on the reduction of situations that make people vulnerable.

In the early years of UN disaster politics, vulnerability was mainly attributed to poor building conditions of areas and places (UN, 1968b). This changed in the 1970s, when e.g. the "Guidelines for Disaster Prevention I" issued that vulnerability cannot be understood solely by technical or economic conditions, but had to involve socio-political arrangements as well (Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, 1976: 30–41). Therefore, and in line with the lessons learned from Lisbon, a broader attention was put on the social history of bad building quality and densely populated areas as to be found disproportionally often in low-income quarters. Vulnerability was further defined as a characteristic of populations, buildings and civil engineering works, economic activities, public services, utilities and infrastructure that

describes the degree of loss resulting from a natural phenomenon (Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, 1980: 5).

In the course of the "International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction" in the 1990s, the Yokohama Strategy marks another important step, as it puts emphasis on the vulnerability of communities and claims a need of community involvement, empowerment of disadvantaged groups and capacity building (UN, 1994: 9). Furthermore, the "United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction" (UNISDR) described a transition from a reaction to a reduction of vulnerability (UN, 2000: 3). Acknowledging this, the UNISDR publication on "Countering Disasters, Targeting Vulnerability" defined disasters as the result of the impact of a hazard on a socio-economic system, promoting the fact that natural hazards themselves do not necessarily lead to disasters (UNISDR, 2001: 1). Therefore, vulnerability should be part of development planning processes that recognise why some social groups are more vulnerable than others. This understanding of vulnerability, which takes into account physical/technical and infrastructural as well as social (economic) and cultural aspects, can also be found in the 2005 Hyogo Framework. Vulnerability is in this document defined as "the conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards" (UNDRR, 2005: 1). The reduction of vulnerability is therefore linked to taking cultural diversity, age, and vulnerable groups into account when planning for disaster risk reduction (UNDRR, 2005: 1–5).

The SFDRR, as the latest agreement, finally calls for an inclusive strategy in dealing with disasters and vulnerability. Although it describes, e.g. women, children or people with disabilities, as particularly vulnerable (UNDRR, 2015: 10), it adopts a different perspective on vulnerability. Instead of using the previous "vulnerable groups" narrative, the alternative approach of "vulnerable situations" refers to the complexity of factors for vulnerability and its potentiality. Therefore, a shift from integrating (predefined) vulnerable groups into disaster planning to identifying situations in which persons become vulnerable can be observed (Wisner et al., 2004).[6] A continuous academic debate on the factors and operationalization of vulnerability

---

[6] Similar ideas can also be found in the 1998 UN-Economic Council report on Promoting social integration and participation of all people, including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, which although issuing vulnerability with regard to certain social groups, defining it as a human condition of every person that becomes significant depending on the specific situation UNECOSOC (1998).

accompanies these political changes (Gallopín, 2006; McEntire, 2005; Mechanic and Tanner, 2007; Oliver-Smith, 2004; Sparf, 2016; Wisner et al., 2004). The case of Lisbon itself serves, again, as an example. The rich and well-situated inhabitants were the most vulnerable, as their housings were right at the city centre, next to the palace, where the fires struck the most (Dynes, 2000: 99).

In terms of responsibility, this broadening of the conditions and subjects of vulnerability refers to a change of quality. Instead of a purely technical standardization, responsibility for vulnerability needs to be understood as responsibility for the social conditions that lead to these situations. Therefore, attention needs to be paid especially to those groups and persons who are potentially affected the most by the consequences of an extreme event (UNDRR, 2015: 10). In this vein, responsibility for vulnerability is not just encompassing a change of the "symptom" of, for instance, built environments, but the transformation of the "reasons" of inequality and discrimination in social structures and politics (Hartman and Squires, 2006; Human Rights Council, 2015; Parthasarathy, 2018). In the word of the SFDRR:

> *"Prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk through the implementation of integrated and inclusive economic, structural, legal, social, health, cultural, educational, environmental, technological, political and institutional measures that prevent and reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster." (UNDRR, 2015: 12)*

To achieve this, not only the state authorities but also public and private stakeholders at all levels are responsible for adding their perspectives on gender, culture and disability living conditions and resulting needs (UNDRR, 2015: 13). On a state level, this change of responsibility for vulnerability goes in line with the above-mentioned diffusion of responsibility. Rather than expecting the state to be the sole responsible instance for protection, citizens are considered stakeholders and requested to take self-protection efforts. Therefore, state responsibility broadens to ensuring capabilities for individual protection. However, how this responsibility is to be implemented is an ongoing discussion that very much depends on the local conditions (Begg, 2018: 393; Box et al., 2016; Christie et al., 2016: 244–245).

4.6 Conclusion

From Lisbon in 1755 to Sendai in 2015, the attribution of responsibility in international disaster management has shifted significantly in many regards. The reconstruction efforts after the destruction of Lisbon remarkably resembled the early years of international disaster management in the 1960s, with a strong focus on reactive disaster relief and the exclusive responsibility of the nation-sate. Although the primacy of state responsibility for disaster management has remained a constant until the Sendai Framework (UNDRR, 2015: 13), the subject of responsibility (who?) has broadened, ranging from the individual to the global level. In another dimension, the object of responsibility (whom to protect?) has changed over time. While in the 1960s, states were expected to assist other states in disasters relief, the object of responsibility has shifted from the state to the individual. This change echoes the broader discourse in International Relations with the emergence of human security.

Moreover, the normative basis of responsibility (what for?) has changed and international disaster management has become increasingly proactive. In this vein, disaster relief, albeit always mentioned as a necessary part of disaster management, was replaced by prevention, mitigation and preparedness as top priority. The emergence of resilience politics has spurred a further change from mitigation and prevention to disaster risk reduction through capacity building, which became the leitmotif of the Sendai Framework (UNDRR, 2015). These changes in the quality of responsibility (how?) are reflected in the altered treatment of vulnerability in international disaster management, which changed from an ontological characteristic of an individual to a situational understanding. The varying likelihood to be in a vulnerable situation results from processes of intersectional societal marginalisation and discrimination (Tierney, 2019: 136).

The increased attention for the well-being of the individual as well as for processes of societal marginalisation and the production of vulnerability are ethically desirable developments in international disaster management. Both contribute to scrutinising current modes of disaster management instead of reinforcing a fatalistic acceptance of disasters or vulnerability as unchangeable givens. Granting agency to all societal levels, which comes with the multiplicity of subjects of responsibility, is therefore an improvement to previous understandings of disaster management, as it gives a voice to those who suffer from injustice and marginalisation. Iris

Marion Young (2011: 146) argues in this context that "[i]t is they who know the most about the harms they suffer, and thus it is up to them, though not them alone, to broadcast their situation and call it injustice".

Although the Hyogo Framework primarily speaks about responsibility, it was the Sendai Framework that prominently emphasised the empowerment of the most vulnerable as a political goal (UNDRR, 2015: 19). However, while responsibility is shifted very explicitly to the local sphere, it remains opaque how the promised empowerment will come into being. In order to be substantial, empowerment requires the proliferation of capacities and power as well as the reconsideration of so far unquestioned societal normalities (Gabel, 2019; see also chapter 6). Substantial empowerment "is fundamentally about changing power relations" (Cornwall and Rivas, 2015: 405). It is a process that goes beyond the proliferation of coping capacities and needs to enable to scrutinise the status quo (Cornwall and Rivas, 2015: 405). The mere declaration of intent, however, runs the risk of responsibilizing the individual without following up on the required proliferation of capacities and reconsideration of constraining imaginations of normalities. Just as Jonathan Joseph (2018: 117) concluded for the UK disaster management policies, international disaster management also runs the risk of devolving responsibility while keeping the power to define necessary capacities and standards of resilience, as well as to enforce their enactment. In fact, the SFDRR is shaped by the neoliberal idea of an efficient and cost-effective disaster management. However, by addressing poverty, inequality, discrimination and exclusion as underlying drivers for vulnerability and thus as a disaster risk (UNDRR, 2015: 10), the Sendai Framework might also be a vantage point for a substantial empowerment and a just distribution of responsibility in international disaster management.

Spotlight 2

5. Bridging the Gap between vulnerable groups and vulnerable situations: Towards an integrative perspective on vulnerability for Disaster Risk Reduction[7]

5.1 Introduction

The concept of vulnerability has been used since the early days of disaster research and endorses the idea that disasters do not necessarily follow from specific events but depend on their interaction with specific societies (Tierney, 2014, 2019; Wisner, 2016). During recent decades, and as proved by its prominence in recent UN disaster management frameworks, such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR, 2015) and the Hyogo Framework for Action (UNDRR, 2005), the debate concerning the role of vulnerability in disaster risk reduction has increasingly gained momentum. Although this societal dimension of disasters is by no means an innovation of modern times, in recent decades a far more structured approach to identifying the factors which constitute vulnerabilities has been developed (McEntire, 2005). In this vein, the complexity of vulnerability has become generally acknowledged, which concerns the questions of how and to whom vulnerability is attributed. This has led to the following definition of vulnerability in the context of the United Nations disaster risk reduction policy: "The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards" (UNDRR, 2021). This definition and the associated guidelines, such as the 2015 Sendai Framework (UNDRR, 2015), lead international disaster management efforts and allow for a structured approach on reducing vulnerabilities.

At the same time, and despite the definition above, the concept of vulnerability is still – and might, for good reasons, always be – highly contested with regard to its conceptualization and operationalization. This is not only a pragmatic question of how vulnerability can be approached in the best way for the strengthening of society but also the fundamental questions of who is deemed vulnerable for what reasons (e.g. are we all vulnerable to some extent or

---

are there particular groups which are vulnerable?), what creates vulnerability and how vulnerability can be measured.

Two approaches are at the core of the discussion: (a) a group narrative, which assumes vulnerability to be a consistent, unchangeable and thus naturalised ontological characteristic of certain entities such as individuals or sociodemographic groups and (b) a narrative assuming vulnerable situations to be a dynamic characteristic of all potential entities. The former understanding (a) builds on specific individual characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, gender, age, disabilities or poverty, as core aspects of vulnerability, in order to define vulnerable groups that are considered specifically vulnerable (Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2004). In contrast, the latter approach to vulnerability (b) stresses the highly dynamic nature of vulnerability, with all people and societal entities potentially being subject to situations that render them vulnerable, using the narrative of vulnerable situations (Wisner et al., 2004).

As this paper argues, both approaches are worthwhile, but require scrutiny of the shortcomings they entail. While the approaches are seemingly contradictory, they can and should be reconciled, as this paper demonstrates. This paper aims to outline and characterise such an approach. Starting with a presentation of the general concept of vulnerability (subsection 5.2.1), the paper shows its specific conceptualizations of defining vulnerable groups and vulnerable situations (subsection 5.2.2). Building on this, the paper demonstrates that neither of the two established conceptualizations of vulnerability is sufficient to provide an analytically substantiated, ethically acceptable and practically applicable framework for disaster risk management. Therefore, a combination of both is necessary (subsection 5.2.3). Finally, these theoretical considerations are translated into concrete political implications in section 5.3. This is achieved through five approaches: an adjustment of the ways we speak about vulnerability (subsection 5.3.1); a stronger linkage of disaster and social politics (subsection 5.3.2); improved disaster risk governance (subsection 5.3.3); a turn to local and community-related ways to operationalize vulnerability (subsection 5.3.4); and the inclusion of a challenge- and situation focused approach (subsection 5.3.5). Finally, the conclusion reflects on the potentials and problems of the proposed approach to understand and finally reduce vulnerability in and for disaster risk reduction.

5.2 Vulnerability as a contested concept

The following section presents the general idea of vulnerability and the currently prevailing approaches to its conceptualization: vulnerability as a consistent characteristic of certain entities or groups, and vulnerability as a dynamic characteristic of all entities (Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2004).

5.2.1 The concept of vulnerability

Although the concept of vulnerabilities, broadly understood as the lack of capacities to deal with an extreme event[8] and prevent it from becoming a disaster, is not a modern innovation, more structured research on the factors and mechanisms determining the degree of vulnerability have only emerged in recent decades (Bolin and Kurtz, 2018; see: Cannon, 1994; Cutter et al., 2003; Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2004; Tierney, 2019; Wisner et al., 2004; Wisner, 2016). As early as 1755, Jean-Jacques Rousseau described a social dimension of disasters when writing about the Lisbon earthquake of that year. Indeed, the earthquake and the associated devastating fires in the city motivated Rousseau's argument that the loss of life and property might not only be understood as a result of the natural event as such, but should also be linked to how the infrastructure and social practices contributed to the disastrous consequences of the events (Dynes, 2000; Tierney, 2014: 26). Disaster should, therefore, be understood not merely as a consequence of extreme events, but as a potential outcome of these events interacting with specific societal incapacities.

On the one hand, recognizing this social dimension allows for a description and explanation of the ways seemingly similar events unfold or how disasters develop. On the other hand, it refers to the possibility of changing the outcome of an extreme event through appropriate preparedness and building individual, organizational and/or societal capacities (Birkmann, 2005; Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2004; Wisner et al., 2004). The more vulnerabilities are decreased, the less the impact of an extreme event and the potential of a disaster might be. Arguing from a more normative perspective and referring to an imperative to prevent harm and suffering, we

---

[8] The adjective "extreme" in this context is used to outline the non-normal character of an event, as being especially strong, long lasting and so forth. In this vein, the attribution "extreme" is highly dependent on the system its use is embedded in, since exactly the same event might be seen as normal in a different context.

might even outline a responsibility to reduce vulnerability, as highlighted in the UN Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction.

Since the 1970's, a broad both scientific and practical discussion on the factors and mechanisms that constitute vulnerability has evolved (Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2004; McEntire, 2005). Beginning with geographical characteristics, settlement policies and buildings standards (Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, 1976, 1980; UN, 1968b), the sources or factors of vulnerability were expanded to include not only individual characteristics, socio-economic factors and government systems (Christie et al., 2016; Perry, 2007; UN, 1994; UNDRR, 2005; UNISDR, 2004) but also temporal and situational components (Blaikie et al., 1994; Christmann et al., 2011; IFRC, 2016: 43). In line with this, a better understanding of the individual capacities of entities and structural conditions emerged. A core example of these discourses was the threat to those living in slums. Taking a closer look at their situation, poverty was identified as a core aspect of vulnerability. If people lack financial capital, they are forced to live in certain affordable areas which might be more prone to extreme events as well as making the construction of infrastructure appropriate to the existing risks impossible. Such cascading effects and intersections between social structures and individual living conditions were emphasized not only by the Yokohama Strategy (UN, 1994) but also by its successor, the Hyogo-Framework (UNDRR, 2005). Finally, these developments converge in the term "social vulnerability", which describes a people-centred approach focusing on social entities and societal structures, rather than on primarily material aspects (e.g. the built environment) (Cannon, 2017; Wisner et al., 2004).

In line with this increasing complexity, a core topic of the scientific debates became the question of the operationalization of vulnerability to make it useful for application in disaster management, such as planning, preparedness, relief and recovery. Without going into detail on the specific design of the huge amount of vulnerability-related research (see, for instance: McEntire, 2005; Tierney, 2014; Wisner, 2016), we argue that the current debate is characterized by two main approaches: operationalizing vulnerability as a characteristic attributed to certain entities, and vulnerability as a characteristic of situations individuals are in and, therefore, universal. The following subsections take a closer look at these two approaches, their use in current scientific and practical contexts, as well as their benefits and shortcomings. We

subsequently argue that reducing vulnerability requires both approaches to be taken into account.

5.2.2 Two concepts for operationalising vulnerability

The first approach understands vulnerability as a characteristic of societal entities. It builds on the core insight of vulnerability research that the lack of capacities is spread neither randomly nor equally (CRED, 2020; IFRC, 2018). Rather, there are recurring patterns of individuals hit particularly hard in almost every disaster. Those are, typically, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, women and ethnic-, cultural-, religious minorities, as well as people living without a social network or in poverty (IFRC, 2018). Vulnerability is thus ascribed to particular groups that are produced along sociodemographic markers such as age, gender, race, class and religion (Tierney, 2019). This narrative of certain vulnerable groups has emerged and become a widespread terminology (Coppola, 2007; Sparf, 2016), both in scientific venues and in practice (see, e.g. UNDRR, 2005). In the vulnerable groups' paradigm, vulnerability becomes an ontological, hence irreversible, characteristic of some individuals who are grouped into populations along one or more particular marker. From a disaster management perspective, these characteristics are the basis for special supportive measures, which differ from those for an imagined "general" population (Kailes and Enders, 2007). With regard to counter measures, this refers to specific operational procedures and strategies for supporting or rescuing these groups. This definition of vulnerable groups not only allows the distinction of certain groups' specific needs from those of other members of society but makes both the assessment of vulnerability as well as its reduction much more feasible and measurable. However, it not only describes but equally produces vulnerable groups that are then treated predominantly not as active agents but as somewhat deficient objects of specifically designed relief measures.

Originating from the same insight, a second, slightly different view on vulnerability has emerged. It does not consider vulnerability to be an attribute of particular people, but asks what (structural) factors hinder individuals from coping with extreme events. There is a stream of research which argues for a closer look on those situations in which individuals become (rather than are) vulnerable (see: Wisner et al., 2004). Instead of emphasising a strong relationship between certain individual characteristics, these scholars refer to vulnerability as a

more complex, societally produced phenomenon. As in the vulnerable groups approach, this reading also considers vulnerability to result from limited coping capacities of their referent objects. However, these limited capacities are not rooted in pre-given characteristics of individuals or groups – as in something like an ontological attribute – but are the result of societal conditions and structures determining how different people are able to deal with different situations. Such a reading of vulnerability is highly contextual and refers to the interaction and interdependence of personal attributes and societal structures. This has been famously described in Blaikie et al.'s (2004) Pressure and Release Model. The authors outline how a fundamental lack of access to power, structures and hierarchies, in combination with dynamic pressures and social developments, leads to unsafe conditions and results in vulnerability (Blaikie et al., 1994; for an updated version, see: Wisner et al., 2012). In this reading, vulnerability is not found in individuals or groups but societally co-produced. Thereby, the prevailing social order creates privileges and marginalities that then render some more vulnerable than others. Moreover, this understanding of vulnerability is based on temporal and situational factors, as well as on the specific hazard (Mechanic and Tanner, 2007; Stough and Mayhorn, 2013; Wisner et al., 2004; Wisner, 2016). The latter refers to both, the different possibilities and modalities to prepare, and the heterogeneous capacities a societal entity is required to activate to adequately deal with a given situation. The Access Model by Wisner et al. (2004) describes this emergence of contexts through the interaction of particular hazards with living situations and disaster management. Accordingly, being vulnerable is neither a characteristic of some nor is it static. Every societal entity, ranging from the individual to the global sphere, might lack the capacities to deal with a particular (extreme) event, due to its specific situation. This produces the narrative of vulnerable situations, which can also be found in the UN Sendai Framework (UNDRR, 2015).

5.2.3 Why neither approach is sufficient, but both are needed

Against this backdrop, the crucial question is: what to do with these two approaches, research-wise? Is there one approach that is more appropriate for the improvement of disaster risk management, and what might be the reasons for this? The following section takes up these questions and argues that not only is neither approach sufficient, but a combination of both

is necessary. The starting point for this argument is a closer look at the benefits and shortcomings of both approaches.

Firstly, we consider the narrative of vulnerable groups and the way it is implemented. Here, it becomes apparent that vulnerability tends to be understood as an attribute of certain, but not all, entities (Kelman and Stough, 2015; Wisner et al., 2004; Wisner, 2016: 6). As a result of many different examples from previous events, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, women, and ethnic-, cultural- or religious minorities as well as the poor are considered vulnerable, while the middle-aged non-disabled white male is usually not (IFRC, 2007; Sparf, 2016; Stough and Kang, 2015).

However, this narrative is problematic for two reasons. On one hand, it lacks an aspect of potentiality and an acknowledgement of the intersectional contexts that individuals might be in. A rich male with a disability who does not have to care about institutionalized social support will likely have different capacities in a disaster than a poor female person with disabilities. This narrative can be identified at different levels during the COVID-19 pandemic yet is more implicit than explicit. The pandemic has challenged the notion of who is vulnerable in an unprecedented way. Indeed, in addition to elderly people or those with pre-existing health conditions, there are individuals who are not addressed by pre-defined assumptions on vulnerability but who become vulnerable in the face of the pandemic and its political treatment, due to their socioeconomic situation (Mogaji, 2020). Furthermore, national and regional lockdowns in the course of the COVID-19 pandemic rendered those who are usually considered highly capable and adaptive increasingly vulnerable. The shutdown of care services (e.g. school, childcare, day care for care-dependent relatives), the strong limitation of social contacts, the scrutiny of social certainties (e.g. job security) and the change in daily routines and practices (e.g. home office) resulted in severe changes in those structures that many people's lives are built on and depicts their vulnerability to the consequences of the pandemic (Eskytė et al., 2020; Farkas and Romaiuk, 2020). In this reading, disaster management strategies themselves have caused new vulnerable situations for some, while aiming to reduce them for others. This example demonstrates how vulnerable situations are the result of complex interplays between events, societal structures and patterns of action.

However, this description (re-)produces a strong distinction between those considered somewhat vulnerable and negatively deviant, and those said to be non-vulnerable. Most of the

time, this goes hand in hand with other accompanying narratives such as that of "special needs groups" (Kailes and Enders, 2007). What both have in common is that they willingly or unwillingly create images of normality, which disaster risk management measures aim to uphold (Sparf, 2016). Nonetheless, it remains unclear what makes these needs special and why these criteria only apply to those currently considered vulnerable. For instance, what is the difference between the need for information of a person with a hearing or visual impairment, a person who does not have enough money to buy an appropriate device such as a smartphone and a tourist who does not speak the native language? All three individuals have the same need for information but different functional challenges to overcome to acquire the information (Kailes and Enders, 2007). However, only the first person is commonly placed in the category of vulnerable groups or "special needs groups". This goes so far that Kailes and Enders (2007) found that, in 2007 in the US, about 50% of the whole population was considered to belong to "special needs groups", rendering this categorization meaningless. In addition, this strong distinction is also relevant in practical terms regarding the distribution of resources. To describe individuals' needs as special and therefore different from the rest of society often leads to a subordination of those needs under the "normal" needs of a majority. Recognizing that resources for disaster preparedness and resources in disasters are often scarce, using a vulnerable groups narrative in an unthinking way might therefore pose the contradictory risk of increasing disadvantages (Begg, 2018; Daniels, 2016: 106; Parthasarathy, 2018).

On the other hand, and closely related to this, is the tendency of the vulnerable groups narrative to support a deterministic and even static understanding of vulnerability (Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2004). In this vein, the above-mentioned groups are envisioned as being ontologically predisposed to being vulnerable, due to their individual characteristics. As such, being a person with disabilities becomes a dominant marker for being vulnerable, without considering temporal or situational factors. There are at least three problematic implications of this understanding. First, this approach neglects the heterogeneity of the members of these groups. Remaining with the example of persons with disabilities, not only are there different types of impairments (visual, auditory, mobility, neurological, cognitive, medical and psychological), but their levels of expression also differ. Against this backdrop, it is highly unlikely that they all cause similar levels of vulnerability, not to mention the influence stemming from the particular type of hazard (Alexander, 2015). Building on this, a deterministic and static

understanding tends to overshadow existing individual capacities with a deficit-oriented view on inabilities (IFRC, 2004: 13–16; Wisner, 2016: 6–8). Although it is important to identify where individuals lack the capacities to help themselves, to overlook what a person is able to do not only risks devaluing this person but might even lead to a failure to achieve a core aim of disaster risk management, the appropriate use of resources. For instance, if hearing impaired and deaf persons do not receive information, such as warning or behavioural requests, they might not act accordingly, leading to a need for support from others. If, on the other hand, information is provided in a language they understand, they might be able to use their capacities and help themselves (Grove, 2014; Sparf, 2016). In this regard, sign language should not be considered any differently from any phonetic language. This leads to the third argument which can be raised regarding a deterministic and static understanding of vulnerable groups, namely, its ignoring of the social and structural role in the emergence of vulnerability (Fielding and Burningham, 2005). The discrimination of some individuals based on certain characteristics is rooted in disadvantaging structures and systems and therefore also linked to power and hierarchies (Hartman and Squires, 2006; Wisner et al., 2004). By addressing issues of power and hierarchies and allowing for equal social participation, large parts of the "special" vulnerability which is attributed to some groups might be decreased. In other words, to speak of vulnerable groups should not be misunderstood as taking their vulnerabilities as a given basis on which measures should be built. Rather, each lack of capacity itself needs to be scrutinized, in order tackle its root causes.

Despite countering much of the above-mentioned criticism, the narrative of vulnerable situations also has strong limitations. By emphasising that vulnerability should not be understood as a characteristic of entities, but as a result of certain living conditions and situations entities that are in, this approach opens up the status of being vulnerable to every entity. Every entity can become vulnerable based on the specific interaction of individual, structural, systematic, temporal and situational characteristics. Taking into account this degree of potentiality might help to overcome some tendencies to (re-)produce stereotypes of who is in need or not fit enough for a crisis. At the same time, this understanding generates a level of complexity that is highly difficult to address at both a scientific and practical level. For instance, for risk and disaster managers, one issue is knowing that there are a number of elderly people living in a certain area and, thus, allocating resources to help all of them. Another issue entirely is to argue that vulnerability might be highly diverse and therefore not all elderly people might

need help and the elderly may not be the only ones in vulnerable situations. Both approaches have their own advantages, but, at the same time, do not allow for appropriate planning.

A second objection that might be raised against the narrative of vulnerable situations is that it might still lead to the same results as those of the narrative of vulnerable groups. This is the case when we see particular sociodemographic groups (e.g. children or the elderly, but also intersectional groups) being mostly subject to vulnerable situations. However, while the result might look the same, the means of analysis differs fundamentally. While a vulnerable groups approach would ask how to protect the persistently vulnerable groups, a situational approach would scrutinise the conditions of becoming vulnerable in the first place. It would question the societal processes that may have led to the increased vulnerability of some people in more frequent situations. Thereby, the vulnerable situations approach paves the way for preventing the re-production of those discriminations and marginalising structures that a vulnerability approach should seek to tackle.

Against the backdrop of these arguments, neither of these approaches is sufficient to serve as a blueprint for disaster risk reduction. Rather, both have their advantages and challenges. What does this mean for disaster risk management? How should disaster risk management proceed, to reduce vulnerabilities and decrease the risk of disasters? And especially, what could be the merit of the Sendai Framework's emphasis on the narrative of vulnerable situations? We argue that answering these questions is as easy in theory as it is difficult in practice: future-oriented disaster risk management has to find ways to combine a complex understanding of vulnerability as dynamic and dependent on situations with a necessarily much less complex consideration of vulnerability via the definition of certain groups and needs.

In fact, the concept of vulnerability, and particularly the static version of thinking along pre-defined vulnerable groups, runs the risk of re-producing stereotypes of seemingly deficient individuals or whole world regions (like a vulnerable global South). This kind of victim blaming may be problematic. Moreover, a situational understanding of vulnerability might reveal pitfalls if it limits itself to technological fixes. In this case, the situational vulnerability is to be mitigated not by scrutinising societal conditions, but by transferring quick fixes to fight symptoms rather than root causes. Bankoff (2001: 25) demonstrated that, in the 1990s, four out of five goals on mitigation propagated during the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction dealt with technical issues and technological knowledge transfer. While such an

approach might legitimate external interventions (e.g. international activities on disaster risk reduction; see: Bankoff, 2001), it obscures how societal structures determine vulnerable situations on different scales, ranging from the local distribution of privileges and goods to the global trade regime. Thereby, vulnerability limits the analytical focus to deficits and shortcomings. This leads to the creation of the passive, vulnerable object – of the other – that is protected, enhanced or helped. In so far as analysing vulnerability should always aim to unfold potentials to act, to adapt and to strive. It should be linked to resilience and contextual knowledge as the idea of capacities that result from the particular contexts rather than from transferred generalised knowledge (Bankoff, 2001; Chandler, 2014b).

In general, this requires the reflection and scrutiny of existing strategies for attributing vulnerability. Starting from those who are currently considered members of vulnerable groups (the elderly, children and so on), a closer look must be taken at the heterogeneity, of their members as well as at the reasons that render them vulnerable in relation to other factors. In this way, the following problematic tendencies can be addressed:

- vulnerability should not be understood as an exclusive characteristic of a few but as a characteristic which is dynamic over time, even on an individual level;
- becoming vulnerable should not be traced back solely to individual characteristics but to the embeddedness of these characteristics in social contexts that can be changed through proper policy interventions;
- individuals, especially for disaster management purposes, should not be perceived as defined by one characteristic but as intersectional beings;
- the categorisation of vulnerability should not be understood as deterministic and static over time but as dynamic, depending on certain situations.

The following section will present more detailed reflections on how this can take place.

5.3 Political implications of a dynamic understanding of vulnerable groups for disaster risk management

The way in which vulnerability is addressed in disaster risk management policies matters. It produces understandings of vulnerability and therefore vulnerability as such. A conceptualisation of vulnerability as described in section 5.2 entails at least four political implications that

are detailed here. Firstly, we argue that an adjustment of the way, vulnerability is politically addressed is necessary. This adjustment starts when we speak of vulnerability as something that is neither a stigma nor an unchangeable characteristic. Indeed, we need to analyse who is made vulnerable due to which social structures. Secondly, the paper argues that vulnerability needs to be addressed by linking social policies with disaster risk management. Taking up the need to change everyday structures that determine vulnerability, disaster risk management not only needs to start before the disaster but must consider the possibility of reducing the risks of events becoming disasters in the first place. Daily injustices, marginalisation and discrimination are most likely to be amplified in disasters. Linking social and disaster policies is thus a means to tackle the root causes of uneven distributions of vulnerability. Thirdly, improving disaster risk governance is then necessary to tackle those vulnerabilities that are not based in everyday life but sparked by the disrupting effects of disasters. While disasters exacerbate existing societal problems, they also cause new and unprecedented ones, by disrupting those support and supply structures that mitigate vulnerability in daily life. Finally, meaningful vulnerability discourse needs to operate on different political and societal levels. The local level, with its contextualisation of every otherwise abstract analytical claim should serve as the prime scale for pursuing disaster risk reduction. However, while complexity characterises societies as well as the cascading effects of disasters, the local turn must not be misunderstood as an abdication of regional, national or global structures from their responsibility. Fair burden sharing on different levels, ranging from the local to the global, is necessary for a successful reduction of disaster risks. Although all these approaches are not new as such, bringing them together in an attempt to build an understanding of vulnerability which is both more complex while aiming to be of use for preparedness planning, might allow for an important reframing.

5.3.1 Adjust the way we speak about vulnerability and vulnerable groups

The debate about vulnerability needs to be informed by disaster research, reflecting on physical, social, economic, cultural and environmental factors, as well as how they are intertwined in causing and mitigating vulnerabilities. An approach that helps in this endeavour is intersectionality, which can be defined as "the interaction between gender, race, and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power" (Davis, 2008: 68). Kathleen

Tierney (2019) argues that vulnerability is not determined by a single factor (e.g. age) but is the result of a complex relationship between different attributions, like class, race, gender and age – to name just a few. These attributions are based on imaginations of normality, societal structures and therefore arising systems of privilege and marginalisation. Vulnerability is thus contingent, since

> *"people are not born vulnerable, they are made vulnerable. […] [D]ifferent axes of inequality combine and interact to form systems of oppression – systems that relate directly to differential levels of social vulnerability, both in normal times and in the context of disaster. Intersectionality calls attention to the need to avoid statements like 'women are vulnerable' in favour of a more nuanced view" (Tierney, 2019: 127–128).*

This intersectionality approach is gaining traction in the academic and political discourse (Kuran et al., 2020). As such, intersectionality contributes to a dynamic understanding of vulnerability, which can shift and change over time and space and emerges from the particular context of a situation (Tierney, 2019: 125). While such a reading of vulnerability helps to uncover problematic structures before disasters occur, it struggles to render vulnerability actionable (Gabel, 2019).

For this sake, improving the ways we speak about vulnerability encompasses three aspects. First, it means scrutinizing ones' own perspective and concepts of social homogeneity. Although individuals share characteristics with others, building groups always runs the risk of creating homogenizing images of individuals which tend to elevate these characteristics beyond an intersectional understanding. However, individuals have an age and gender, they might have impairments, a cultural heritage, beliefs, a socioeconomic status and so forth. To consider this social diversity means to understand vulnerability as, to a large extent, individual.

Second, creating a preventive vulnerability discourse is to mitigate those problematic societal structures that unduly disadvantage individuals and societal groups. Such a discourse needs to acknowledge that vulnerability is a shared, but differentiated attribution that potentially affects everyone. And yet, the societal discourse about vulnerability needs to scrutinise why vulnerability does not affect everyone equally and what level of inequality is (for whom) acceptable. Such a discourse needs to look more generally into processes of marginalisation, stigmatisation and exclusion that impede people's potential to act. Further, it works alongside different categories and their mutual interaction. In this regard, a new narrative on vulnerable

groups has to argue that every individual is to be considered vulnerable to a certain (dynamic) level, depending on the specific interactions of individual, structural, situational and temporal characteristics.

Third, to be vulnerable has to be understood as an ad hoc description of a certain status, due to a particular (vulnerable) situation (e.g. an event, an affected area or a particular facility like a hospital). Drawing from the structural knowledge gained in the first step, this ad hoc defini-tion of vulnerability mobilises particular (intersectional) patterns of vulnerability, to heuristi-cally identify and prioritise people in need of help, according to the particular context. The evacuation of a kindergarten would, for instance, entail a different vulnerability assessment than the evacuation of a shopping mall. Even if the same group of people were affected, dif-ferent hazards – like a heat wave or a flood – would lead to different patterns of vulnerability. Vulnerability assessments are therefore always spatially and temporally specific and relate to particular hazards causing particular contexts.

5.3.2 Strengthen the linkage of disaster risk management and social politics to reduce vulnera-bility

The call to reduce vulnerability and to enhance resilience has gained momentum in interna-tional disaster management policies (UNDRR, 2015). However, as critics have rightly pointed out, this call often results in an undue responsibilization of the individual and the local sphere (Kaufmann, 2013). Thereby, responsibility, not power, is devolved (Joseph, 2018: 189). This is problematic, since it makes the failure to protect oneself an individual one and obscures the view on problematic societal structures (Evans and Reid, 2014: 42). However, the research on disaster vulnerability has impressively demonstrated that individual vulnerability is deter-mined by socio-demographic factors such as class, gender, ability and race (Tierney, 2019). Consequently, the role of structural factors can hardly be overestimated. Intersectional pat-terns of vulnerability are the result of multi-dimensional societal discriminations. This de-mands the consideration of how political strategies can remedy rather than problematic ine-qualities. Thinking of vulnerability as the lack of ability to react or adapt to disasters neglects structural – thus contingent – reasons and pathologizes the lack of potential at the level of the individual and/or community. This, in turn, runs the risk of victim blaming.

As described in the previous section, linking vulnerabilities to structural reasons allows for taking into account those structures that determine the ability to activate individual capacities in disasters. Disaster resilience needs to be fostered rather then demanded. Inclusionary and welfare policies are two avenues for pursuing this aim. While welfare policies are crucial for building economic and social capital, inclusionary policies are required to dismantle those constraints resulting from ableist policies (see: chapter 6). In fact, disaster research has demonstrated that economic status (Tierney, 2019: 128–132) and the availability of social networks (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015) strongly influence the vulnerability of individuals and groups. A lack of inclusivity disables people and renders them particularly vulnerable to disaster situations (Alexander, 2015). The lack of consideration of needs that are deviant from an anticipated able-bodied normality thus creates vulnerability. Marginalising processes that exist in daily life are exacerbated during disasters (Krüger, 2019). From this perspective, vulnerability is the result of necessarily imperfect welfare and inclusionary policies, rather than their cause or motivation. Since unforeseen events with unanticipated cascading effects come upon societies with finite resources to grant security and to provide people with the means to meaningfully take action, the existence of vulnerability is not a policy failure per se but a consequence of the limits of preparedness. However, this should motivate policymakers to consider how to best use social welfare and inclusionary politics to reduce vulnerability and foster resilience. The modes of economic (re)distribution and societal inclusion shape vulnerable groups, who then are a product of social policies rather than unchangeable and fixed groups to be considered in disaster management and risk reduction plans. The contingency of vulnerability becomes obvious when speaking about the increased vulnerability of poor people (Tierney, 2019), but also holds true for other factors that increase vulnerability.

Decreasing vulnerability in disasters thus needs to start in daily life policies. Policies that deprive a part of the population of those capacities necessary to adapt and to cope with shocks need to be particularly scrutinised. Resilience demands "to keep options open", as the ecologist Crawford Holling (1973: 21) famously stated. Vulnerability, as a lack of options to cope with a particular situation, is best mitigated by providing people with the means to act. Vulnerability is not a deficit of particular individuals or sociodemographic groups. Equally, it should not be interchanged with inability but motivate the analyses of those circumstances and structures that prevent those considered vulnerable from unfolding their potential. Therefore, policymakers need to enter a dialogue with those welfare sectors that influence

the social and economic situation of so far underprivileged societal groups. In the absence of absolute resilience, the level of adequate provision of capacities and adequate means to facilitate social embeddedness and reduce societal exclusion are subject to societal deliberations. These negotiations are important, as they urge authorities to recognize often marginalised needs. This form of idealist recognition is important, as it pays attention to those needs that are deviant from an anticipated normality. However, it needs to be backed up by a material recognition in the form of redistribution or inclusionary investments to cause an emancipatory effect, thus fostering societal justice (Fraser, 2003). This approach introduces disaster management to daily life. Not by repeating the perpetual possibility of disrupting events, but by preventively granting those capacities that enhance actionability in extreme situations, can vulnerabilities be reduced– even before they actualise in the face of disrupting events.

5.3.3 Adapt disaster risk governance to prevent vulnerability from manifesting

Disaster risk governance concerns the way in which public authorities, civil servants, media, the private sector and civil society coordinate at local, national and international levels to manage and reduce disaster-related risks (UNDP, 2013). Disaster risk governance is characterized by a process of identifying, assessing, prioritizing and settling risks. Disaster risk governance has a strong focus on risks and hazards, and vulnerability is mainly the result of a hazard. As such, it is identified ex post. However, analyses of vulnerability and the use of the intersectionality perspective can help disaster risk governance to identify vulnerabilities ex ante. Indeed, vulnerability analyses combined with intersectionality are able to address questions concerning who is vulnerable in what way and for which reasons. Vulnerability is derived from a combination of factors which must be known and confronted by disaster risk governance to trigger responses that properly cope with vulnerability (Bolin and Kurtz, 2018). Thereby, vulnerability must not be portrayed as an impediment to action. Most disaster management policies referring to the role of individual and societal actionability are based on the concept of resilience. They assume and seek to channel agency and potential. Powerlessness or the partial inability to live up to formulated requirements and actions, in contrast, lies beyond these disaster management policies (Kaufmann, 2016). This leads to an exclusion of those who do not live up to a pre-defined normality (see: chapter 6). Adapting disaster risk governance means to uncover and foster potentiality, rather than defining potentials necessary to be

considered a subject. Identifying marginalization and vulnerabilities is therefore not a limit but a potential for disaster risk reduction. Without regard to their ascribed potential, people and societal groups alike are to be seen as experts of their own life. An approach to disaster risk mitigation that is sensitive to vulnerability soaks up this knowledge to dismantle impeding hurdles and grant capacities to prevent vulnerabilities emerging through shocking events. It goes beyond the identification and treatment of marginalizing structures in welfare policies, but grants those capacities that are required for the prevention of ad hoc vulnerabilities manifesting during an event. Such a process of policy-making embraces an epistemic humility and which aims to gain specific knowledge on the local level rather than to assume general knowledge.

5.3.4 Turning, but not leaving the task of reducing vulnerability, to the local sphere

Thinking of vulnerability as a contingent characteristic sits uneasy with reductionist top-down approaches designating who is vulnerable at what point. In line with a resilience approach, the endeavour of mitigating vulnerability in this form shifts to the local level. Resilience, as the ability to act and adapt in a given situation, seeks to remedy those constraints causing situational vulnerability. Since resilience is arguably based on complexity (Walker and Cooper, 2011; Walker and Salt, 2006), it is sensible to mitigate vulnerability through a complexity-based governance approach. Complexity, in turn, is based on the idea of emerging bottom-up organisation. Complex systems are not centrally structured and coordinated in a top-down fashion but emerge from a myriad of interactions of decentral actors. Economic markets and traffic are examples of this kind of system (Urry, 2005b). While interactions in complex systems are not orchestrated, they are equally not independent. Rather, they are interrelated, whereby one interaction influences that which follows it. Thus, complex systems are not only complicated in the sense that they are hard to grasp. John Urry (2005b: 3) aptly describes this kind of system as follows:

> *"Such complex social interactions are likened to walking through a maze whose walls rearrange themselves as one walks through; new footsteps have to be taken in order to adjust to the walls of the maze that are adapting to each movement made through the maze".*

In other words, complex systems are permanently in flux, since they are "emergent dynamic and self-organizing systems" (Urry, 2005a: 237). Every action influences the likelihood of the occurrence of later events.

Vulnerability is rooted as much in complexity as in resilience. Reading vulnerability in terms of a situational lack of coping capacities requires a closer look at the context in which this deficiency manifests itself. Contexts, however, are necessarily bound to particular conditions and thus are local. Moreover, contexts are the result of concrete interactions and conditions, ranging from the local (e.g. architecture, infrastructure, support networks) to the national (e.g. welfare, diversity and disaster management policies) to the global (e.g. climate change). Changes on one level can trigger changes on the other levels. In resilience literature, this idea of interconnected mutually influencing levels is panarchy (Allen et al., 2014). Changes can then cause cascading effects that are impossible to anticipate entirely. Moreover, changes are not necessarily linear but might cause "butterfly effects", crossing fragile tipping points (Urry, 2005a: 237).

However, this does not mean that complexity is ungovernable. Quite the opposite, governance structures need to embrace complexity and govern through rather than against it (Chandler, 2014b: 40–42). Governing complexity thus means to start from acknowledging local contexts that shape interactions at the smallest scale. Mitigating situational vulnerability means taking into account the particular conditions rather than imposing general and hence necessarily reductionist presumed goals (Chandler, 2014b: 38). In fact, vulnerable situations are rooted in local contexts (though also determined by trans-local factors). Local conditions, be they sociodemographic factors, urban planning or topographical issues, influence the degree of vulnerability. The production of vulnerable groups thus also occurs alongside local attributes and specifics, since they shape vulnerable situations and mediate who is most severely affected. Therefore, vulnerable groups at one place and time as well as with regard to a certain event, do neither need to be the same in other events nor do they have to be similar in different local contexts. Opening up this possibility is both a chance to learn from previous events and take up a responsibility to change and it is a task for a much more fundamentally understood community-based disaster risk reduction.

David Chandler (2014b: 35) holds that "[c]omplex life is clever, resourceful and serendipitous, able to produce solutions from the most unexpected sources". This is certainly true in terms

of knowledge production, as the effective mitigation of vulnerability requires knowledge of those particular conditions that prevent people from adapting and acting. The degree to which complex (local) life is resourceful depends on broader structures exceeding the local sphere. Having adequate means at one's disposal to remedy locally identified constraints is then subject to broader political deliberations (see subsection 5.3.2). It would thus be an undue and problematic responsibilization to leave it to the local context as experts of their own circumstances. On the contrary, it is essential to understand that situational vulnerabilities emerge from a combination of local, regional, national and even global factors. Consequently, states must not withdraw from their responsibility to mitigate vulnerability but develop avenues for supporting local solutions. This facilitated bottom-up process would focus on communities without leaving the responsibility predominantly to the local sphere. It urges disaster relief authorities to devolve power rather than responsibility and to refrain from the definition of static vulnerable groups in favour of contextually defined, hence contingent, vulnerable groups.

5.4 Considering challenges and situations rather groups

Using the straight-forward applicability of the vulnerable groups approach, without reproducing its pitfalls of pathologizing and essentialising vulnerability, we suggest creating groups based on challenges to overcome rather than on sociodemographic characteristics or other individual markers.

Following June Isaacson Kailes' CMIST[9] approach (Kailes, 2015; Kailes and Enders, 2007),[10] we understand that operative disaster management requires concrete input on what support is needed for whom. Both the vulnerable groups approach and the vulnerable situations approach struggle to provide this information. While the former cannot do so due to its homogenising tendency to perceive vulnerability as a one-dimensional trait describing rather than producing groups, the latter rests on complex settings, with a high potential to structurally reduce vulnerability before disasters but with a limited benefit for the operational work during disasters. In contrast, Kailes (2015, 2020) argues for categories with regard to certain areas in

---

[9] This stands for the five categories in which function-based needs are elaborated by Kailes: (1) Communication, (2) Maintaining Health, (3) Independence, (4) Support/Safety/Self-Determination and (5) Transportation.
[10] It was originally designed to improve the ways in which persons with disabilities are considered in disaster management but offers much greater potential for considering diverse societies.

which people are likely to need help, in her approach: Communication, Maintaining Health, Independence, Support/Safety/Self-Determination and Transportation. In doing so, she presents an important shift of perspective away from a deficient individual to a specific challenge a societal entity has to overcome. Accordingly, rather than claiming that disaster management has to plan, e.g. for the elderly, which gives little indication of what this specifically means, it refers for instance to planning for persons that are in need of transportation to exit an affected area. This does, of course, need further specification, and the mentioned categories are propositions that need to be transferred and further developed. Yet, such a challenges approach allows for a better understanding of what is required or has to be provided for people to cope. In this reading, it does not matter, whether a person is temporarily immobile due to paraplegia or the lack of a car. What matters is that there are persons who are in acute need of transportation.

Against this backdrop, using a challenges approach might open up an option to substitute vulnerable groups thinking in a way that keeps its benefits while preventing a deterministic and normalizing idea of who is supposed to be vulnerable. A challenges approach is thereby to be understood as complementary to the vulnerable situations approach. It is about giving concrete support and the possibility to prepare for existing needs, therefore presenting an operationalization for the acute situation during an event. At the same time, it falls short of describing the reasons and differences behind these challenges. This is where the vulnerable situations approach steps in, by examining those societal conditions and structures that produce a particular situation. Rather than being easy to transfer into disaster management action, it scrutinizes the interplay of individual characteristics, social structures and hazards, thereby taking a closer look at the root causes. Considering particular capacities and challenges, such an approach supports the idea of an emancipatory resilience that creates rather than assumes resilience (see: chapter 6). Moreover, it ties operational experiences and challenges to long-term structural issues. Consequently, both perspectives need to be set in dialogue, in order to effectively reduce vulnerabilities in both a short-term (acute support) and long-term (reduction of inequalities) dimension.

Spotlight 3

6. Building instead of imposing resilience: Revisiting the relationship between resilience and the state[11]

From a resilience perspective, the debate on the introduction of resilience into security studies has mostly been a rather defensive one. In fact, large parts of critical security studies regard resilience either as a means for the responsibilization of the individual (Joseph, 2016; Kaufmann, 2016) or as intrinsically neoliberal (Evans and Reid, 2014; Joseph, 2013; Reid, 2012). Neocleous (2013: 2) calls for "[r]esisting resilience" and Corry (2014: 256) rightly summarizes that "critical security scholars have given it a frosty reception, viewing it as a vehicle and multiplier of neo-liberal governmentality." Anderson (2015: 62) illustrates this tendency by observing that an entire special issue of the journal Politics links resilience to some form of neoliberalism. And finally, Chandler (2016: 15) condenses the whole discourse in the statement: "The more resilient we are the more fully developed we are as neoliberal subjects." This is problematic, so the argument goes, since the individual is now to blame for failing its obligation to protect itself, while the state withdraws from one of its central tasks (Chandler, 2013; Kaufmann, 2016; Neocleous, 2013). As a result, individuals need to prove themselves successful entrepreneurs of their own security by sticking to those practices the state deems appropriate for the individual's self-protection (Joseph, 2013).

The diagnosed adverse effects of resilience are aggravated by its ascribed role as "*the* organising principle in contemporary political life" (Brassett et al., 2013: 222, emphasis in original). However, the prominent position of resilience within the academic discourse in security studies has fostered an increasingly polyphonic discussion. A range of more nuanced readings of resilience has broken up the longstanding, lopsided debate of being either for or against resilience (Bourbeau, 2015a; Corry, 2014; Nelson, 2014; Schmidt, 2015). Zebrowski (2016: 152) formulated a somewhat paradigmatic call for "an affirmative critique of resilience which would look to repeat resilience differently: not by repeating established concepts of resilience, but by repeating the force of resilience to disrupt identity and coherence."

---

[11] This chapter has been published in the journal *International Political Sociology*.

In this article, I develop such a critique by suggesting an alternative reading of resilience, which acknowledges the shortcomings of various resilience policies at play while avoiding "the mistake of equating a particular government's use of resilience with the concept of resilience" (Bourbeau, 2015a: 379). Rather than being the mere entrepreneur of neoliberal politics, I argue that the state is the key actor for enabling and organizing resilience. Being or becoming resilient demands economic and social resources that generally need to be granted. Since there are individuals and societal groups who are currently deprived of these resources, resilience presumes economic redistribution and social empowerment, organized by a strong and enabling, rather than withdrawing or prescriptive, state. Furthermore, resilience is rooted in an ontology of complexity and consequently relies on local and contextualized knowledge (Chandler, 2014b). This mode of organization not only allows for but requires the consideration of various different societal needs, capabilities, and resource constraints that remain hidden in a monolithically organized, top-down security system.

In this article, my argument unfolds in four steps. The first section briefly summarizes the debate around neoliberalism and resilience in security studies. In accordance with Dean (2002), I understand neoliberalism as the expansion of a market-rationality to as many societal fields as possible, including the state and its various bureaucracies. Thereby, I grasp the state not as a monolithic entity but as a social relation of numerous collaborating, competing, or contradicting bureaucratic apparatuses (Jessop, 2016; Poulantzas, 2000). The second step demonstrates that currently deployed security rationalities are beneficial only for those who are able to inscribe their interests into politics. Those who fail to do so suffer from marginalization through the strategic selection bias of the state. Subsequently, I use the advisory "Disasters Alarm" of the German Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK)[12] (2017) in order to illustrate how currently existing political resilience concepts perpetuate and even aggravate the consequences of the strategic selection bias. Thus, a main consequence is the unequal consideration of different parts of the population in the politics of protection while generally shifting responsibility to the individual. However, instead of concluding by reconfirming the neoliberal character of resilience, I argue that current political resilience strategies, similar to the case of the BBK, lack a theoretical substantiation with regard to their

---

[12] BBK is the acronym of the main German public institution for disaster preparedness and civil protection "Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe".

deployment of resilience-thinking. Fourth, and lastly, I turn to the state's role in building resilience, arguing that a theoretically substantiated understanding of resilience requires the state not to withdraw from its obligations but to adjust its policies in order to meet the prerequisites for enabling resilience. Those prerequisites are closely tied to what Crawford S. Holling (2001: 391) calls "controlling processes" and what Walker and Salt (2006: 146) label as "the key slow variables." In other words, structural constraints strongly affect the level of resilience on different societal scales. Shedding light on these processes and the foundations for governing resilience means "to push the limits of our understanding of resilience and the positive transformation it can bring about" (Biermann et al., 2016: 74).

6.1 On resilience and neoliberalism

The rise of resilience in academia (Cavelty, Kaufmann, and Kristensen 2015, 4–5) has been accompanied by an ongoing debate in critical security studies about the relation between resilience and neoliberalism. In their genealogy of resilience, Walker and Cooper (2011) carved out the increasing proximity between resilience-thinking and neoliberalism, which is personified in the intellectual rapprochement between the neoliberal thinker Friedrich Hayek (1989) and the founding father of resilience Crawford S. Holling (Walker and Cooper 2011, 147). This seemingly cozy relationship between resilience and neoliberalism has been criticized by a broad range of critical security scholars (Duffield 2012; Joseph 2013, 2016; Neocleous, 2013; Evans and Reid 2014; Grove 2014, 2017). By shifting the responsibility for protection from the state to individuals, so the argument goes, resilience would "responsibilize" (Kaufmann 2016, 100) the latter for their own protection and therefore perpetuate neoliberal governmentality. The failure of self-protection is then no more than an allocation failure for which the individual itself—as a fully autonomous subject—bears the responsibility. Finding herself in this situation, the single individual has to adapt reactively to an altering environment and, thus, becomes a passive executor of the ever-changing necessary moves to persist (Chandler 2016, 14).

In opposition to these critics, other authors argue that resilience embraces a theoretical potential beyond its current appropriations (Corry 2014; Nelson 2014; Schmidt 2015; Bourbeau and Ryan 2017). In this reading, neoliberal forms of resilience are no more than a contingent

manifestation of resilience and thus a potentiality (Schmidt 2017). Thinking of resilience in terms of political concepts makes it easy, though hardly surprising, to identify neoliberal elements (Schmidt 2015, 419–20). In fact, it is highly convincing that neoliberally coined societies also yield neoliberal security policies. This branch of literature goes beyond the existing manifestations of resilience and seeks to sort out the relationship between resilience and security (Bourbeau and Vuori 2015; Bourbeau 2015b), as well as to reveal potentialities of resilience beyond neoliberalism. This article contributes to this endeavor by analyzing the role of the state in building the preconditions of resilience.

6.2 The selection bias of governmental security politics

The equation "resilience = neoliberalism = withdrawal of the state" entails a twofold flaw. On the one hand, it neglects the active roles states still possess in many security fields, such as disaster management. While individuals bear the responsibility for their own protection, the state remains in charge of designing security and resilience policies as well as providing the population with central services, such as the police and ambulance service. On the other hand, focusing exclusively on the political appropriation of resilience fails to take the wider picture of societal power relations into account. Under the condition of a neoliberal society, even entirely state-led security politics, which transfer responsibility as little as possible onto the respective individual, are characterized by the larger societal setting, which happens to be neoliberal, at least in most Western countries. Certainly, governmental premises would not radically alter solely due to another distribution of responsibility. Yet, thinking about security in terms of the state as its sole provider degrades individuals to passive objects waiting for security services and, therefore, deprives them of their agency in situations of insecurity. In the following, I argue that this leads to an unequal recognition of different societal insecurities, which makes this a hardly desirable political situation.

According to neo-Gramscian thinking, the state is not a monolithic construct or a unitary entity simply enacting its power. Poulantzas (2000: 128–129, emphasis in original) suggests an understanding of the state as "*rather a relationship of forces, or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among classes and class fractions, such as this is expressed within the State in a necessarily specific form.*" Although a thorough discussion of the

applicability of the term "class" is beyond the scope of this paper, Poulantzas' definition of the state as a social relationship reveals important insights into how security is constructed and provided. The state as a social relationship, with different societal forces competing for power, can by no means be a neutral distributor but is necessarily infused with particular interests. Understanding the state in this way means to acknowledge that struggles for power result in the emergence of dominant and marginal interests. Different societal groups pursue different, sometimes even contradictory aims, and seek to inscribe them into state action. Eventually, materializing political decisions are the result of inter-administrative negotiations and, hence, of the power struggles at play. These negotiations favour those who are in a more powerful position and disadvantage others who are not able to enforce their interests. This process leads to "the structurally inscribed strategic selectivity of the state system and competing forces with diverse strategies" (Jessop, 2016: 55). State bureaucracies as the sole providers of security will produce dominant and marginal populations in order to make them governable in a Foucauldian understanding. Consequently, relying exclusively on state apparatuses as top-down providers for security is only desirable for those populations who are represented in the key positions of power or at least able to inscribe their interests into these apparatuses. Marginalized populations, in contrast, are prone to end up and remain in a precarious situation of insecurity. This, however, produces them as passive objects or, at best, as petitioners for state support.

Following Foucault further, security politics is about protecting the majority as the normalized part of a certain population. Bigo (2008: 104) analysed this in the context of policing, which "was concentrated on the margins and turned a blind eye to the practices of the majority." In other words, security politics accepts the practices of the majority as a given normality while criminalizing those of marginalized social groups, such as migrants. Disaster management turns this rationale upside down. While the normalized part of the population remains the privileged referent object for security practices, the blind eye of security politics turns to the needs of the marginalized. Those who are not able to inform the decision-making bureaucracies will find it hard to make their voices heard in the orchestra of potentially infinite individual needs. This, in turn, is not to say that state-led security politics is necessarily unjust and bad. However, neither is it to be romanticized as the per se better modus operandi. This is by no means a new finding. Most prominently, Foucault (e.g. 1995, 2007) has analysed the effects

of different forms of state power, arguing that the formation of populations is a means of governance that results in asymmetric considerations of different needs. Those who are better able to inscribe their interests in the processes of bureaucratic routines will find themselves better off, since their needs are the foundation for political deliberation. Even if political resilience concepts are set up against the backdrop of biopolitics (Reid, 2012), this is not an immanent feature of resilience but the result of its present interpretation and manifestation in the form of materializing political concepts.

The call for an "affirmative critique" (Zebrowski, 2016: 151) arose from this insight and demands us to think about resilience outside of its current deployment. Rogers (2013: 322) divides resilience into three forms: community resilience, organizational resilience, and technological resilience. While the latter two forms rely on expert knowledge in shaping structures in a state-centric manner, community resilience is largely neglected in political resilience concepts. Thereby, community resilience is deemed to have the biggest potential in fostering "a higher level of direct participatory techniques and mechanisms owned by the community" (Rogers, 2013: 327). Yet, this form of governmentality can equally result in negative side-effects, negating the good intention behind participatory resilience approaches (Grove, 2014) because resilience remains a concept that produces "undecidable and contingent effects" (Brassett and Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 47). Therefore, resilience remains a more open and contingent concept than the current academic debate in security studies implies (Grove, 2014: 253). In fact, recent work has shown that resilience is not limited to the individual but might also be deployed by larger societal entities beyond the scope of neoliberal governmentality (Thomas et al., 2016; Zebrowski and Sage, 2017). However, this optimistic stance contrasts with the large number of deficient political resilience strategies. The next section examines an empirical example to illustrate the shortcomings of the previously held understanding of the state-resilience-nexus, that is, how states fail to foster a theoretically substantiated understanding of resilience. I show that the prevailing understanding of resilience reflects Rogers' (2013) notion of organizational and technological resilience and widely excludes forms of community resilience. These forms of resilience reproduce rather than subvert the strategic selection bias of the state and even exacerbate the situation by shifting responsibility from the state to the individual.

6.3 Resilience — The opposite of political resilience strategies

One example of the negative effects of the deployment of resilience is the "Disasters Alarm" advisory of the German Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK). Published in its fourth edition in April 2017, this advisory is a comprehensive summary of what the BBK expects the population to do in the event of various imaginable emergencies. The BBK is a state body that was established in 2004 as a central agency to advise other public bodies as well as citizens in questions of civil protection (BBK, 2017: 2). I use this key publication of the BBK, as this institution is the "central organizational unit for civil security" (BBK, 2017: 2) in Germany. In short, "Disasters Alarm" is a means to impose resilience in a one-size-fits-all manner by a central state body organizing disaster preparedness and disaster management. Although there is no mention of the word "resilience" in the whole brochure, it is a prime example of resilience-thinking in the way in which it is variously criticized by critical security scholars. In fact, the advisory is a collection of prescribed performative acts tied together by the responsibilization of the individual. This structure remarkably resembles other, explicit resilience strategies (Joseph, 2013; Malcolm, 2013; Rogers, 2013). As I will demonstrate in the following, "Disasters Alarm" seeks to increase and orchestrate societal resilience by explaining how the BBK expects citizens to prepare for emergencies.

In fact, the BBK considers resilience to be the key strategy in civil protection, which needs to be further developed. In an issue of its periodical named "civil protection" ("Bevölkerungsschutz"), the BBK demands the initiation of processes to implement a resilience culture on all societal levels (Beerlage and Hartmann, 2013). The underlying idea is the creation of self-helping citizens, who contribute to their own protection, support others, and finally relieve professional forces in disaster management. This becomes most obvious in the declared self-understanding of the BBK (2017: 2) as "your reliable partner for emergency preparedness and self-help." Consequently, "Disasters Alarm" is a step in this implementation process, which fosters resilience thinking without even uttering the word. The way in which the BBK seeks to foster organizational resilience is problematic, since it shifts the responsibility for enacting the proposed measures to the individual. Thus, the BBK fails to consider which personal or societal preconditions are necessary to be able to perform the expressed behavioural expectations. The formulated understanding of resilience is a form of Rogers' (2013: 323) "organisational resilience", which redefines the distribution of responsibilities. This redefinition of roles and

responsibilities is, albeit not statutory in nature, an authoritative top-down process in which the central state body for disaster management defines resilience without taking into account personal capabilities, let alone providing the propositions for a participatory assessment process. This is problematic for two reasons. First, the BBK generally prescribes what resilient behaviour is and shifts the responsibility for enacting this behaviour to the individual. Second, the BBK seeks to create resilience while neglecting the socio-material preconditions for becoming resilient. Given the critique of existing resilience concepts (Joseph, 2013; Malcolm, 2013; Rogers, 2013), the following analysis of these two points of critique serves as an illustration of how resilience policies tend to pursue a theoretically simplistic understanding of resilience, one which exacerbates the aforementioned strategic selection bias of state security politics through the assignment of responsibility to the citizens themselves. The BBK assumes two dimensions of capacities, which it considers a given in society. On the one hand, the addressed individuals are envisioned as socioeconomically able to purchase goods and install devices, which the BBK perceives as necessary to efficiently conduct self-help. On the other hand, the BBK implicitly presumes bodily ability, cultural knowledge, and command of the German language as preconditions to enact the proposed measures. Therefore, the imagined resilient citizen is a middle-class, able-bodied, white, and probably male person. This assumption produces two kinds of marginalization, a socioeconomic and a physical one.

The repeated emphasis on self-help reveals that the BBK offensively seeks to redistribute the responsibility for disaster preparedness from the state to the individual. On this mission, the BBK (2017: 1) withdraws to the role of supervisor, promoting "correct action in emergency situations." On more than sixty pages, the advisory spells out precisely what "correct action" means in a given scenario. It combines general preparedness measures (BBK, 2017: 8–39) with particular preparatory advice for four different disasters, namely: severe weather events, fire, floods, and CBRN hazardous substances (BBK, 2017: 40–65). The general advice comprises tips for everyday life, for example in the fields of hygiene, electricity, and the stockpiling of medicine, beverages, and food. What appears as a good idea at first glance becomes increasingly problematic when looking at the details. Perhaps, the most striking example is the call to stockpile basic supplies sufficient to last for two weeks. Translating this demand into concrete numbers, the advisory suggests storing, among other things, twenty-eight litres of beverages; 4.9 kg of cereals, bread, potatoes, or equivalents; 5.6 kg of vegetables; 3.7 kg of dairy products;

and 3.7 kg of fruits—per person (BBK, 2017: 34–35). Additionally, it suggests buying a set of other items, such as a battery-operated radio, a camping stove, a camping toilet, and a bucket pump (BBK, 2017: 36–38). Moreover, individuals are required to improve their sewage system by purchasing a submersible pump and to enhance their electric supply by, for example, increasing lightning protection or, if a person lives in a flood-prone area, purchasing a power generator (BBK, 2017: 30). All of the suggested items to be bought in preparation for an emergency add up to a considerable amount of money. Furthermore, stockpiling requires space. As space is a scarce resource in many densely populated urban areas, and at least as much a matter of economic capacity as the products themselves, the BBK presumes the existence of a certain degree of economic capital in order to live up to its expectations. The advisory neither suggests how to accumulate this capital nor helps those individuals without sufficient economic resources to find a way to live up to the proposed requirements. Defining a uniform list of products to possess, which only admits potential medical needs and dietary preferences (BBK, 2017: 34–36), necessarily builds on a notion of socioeconomic normality. Following the shopping list of the BBK, a "normal" citizen has sufficient economic capacity at her disposal to purchase and stockpile the proposed goods.

In addition to the required economic capital, the advisory occasionally touches upon the necessity of being socially embedded, for example when it suggests individuals talk to neighbours in case of an emergency (BBK, 2017: 56). This demand for social capital potentially excludes individuals who are less involved in their social environments or who are not part of supportive social networks. This is how the advisory produces the first dimension of marginalization through the more or less implicit demand for different forms of individual capital. It reproduces a form of socioeconomic selection bias that focuses on middle-class, well integrated households that are socially and economically able to fulfil the assigned requirements. The advisory therefore neglects those who live under precarious social or economic conditions. The required level of self-help thus exacerbates the already previously existing strategic selection bias of state security politics, not only by marginalizing precarious living conditions but also by shifting the responsibility for self-protection from the state to these individuals, who will find it hard, if not impossible, to afford the requested self-help capacity.

Furthermore, the physical dimension of marginalization is produced by the list of "correct actions" proposed in the advisory. This list embraces various preparatory means as well as advice

on correct behaviour during and after a malicious event. The advisory asks individuals to hide, to tidy up, to perform first aid, to escape to a cellar room, to carry away valuable furniture, and to evacuate others (BBK, 2017). The problematic feature is the presentation of all of these actions as necessary steps to be able to master a disaster situation. Again, this generalization implicitly assumes a particular notion of normality, that is, an idea of what people should be able to do. Here, the normality is that of the able-bodied individual. It completely ignores the possibility that there might be people who cannot fulfil the expressed expectations, due to physical or mental constraints. Two examples might illustrate this issue. First, the German Federal Statistical Office stated that 2.86 million people in Germany needed care by December 2015. This represents an increase of 8.9 percent compared to December 2013. Yet, people in need of care are, by definition, not able to master daily life on their own, let alone in emergencies. Moreover, 2.08 million care-recipients live at home and 1.38 million of them are regularly cared for by relatives, rather than by professional services (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017)[13]. Yet, the advisory entirely neglects this growing demographic group.

The second example relates to another assumed ability, namely hearing. The BBK advisory (2017: 22) stylizes the battery-powered radio as the central information channel in case of an emergency by stating:

> *"Information and warning are important for survival. Those who are trapped can often only be reached by radio, television or the Internet. However, the television and the Internet only work when there is electric power, which could fail. This leaves just the radio as the main warning device."*

Again, the marginalizing point of this second example is not that a battery-powered radio is presented as an important information channel. Rather, it is the reduction of self-help possibilities to the radio, which in turn excludes deaf people. Nevertheless, the BBK (2017: 1) subsumes all of these propositions for action under the label of "correct action." Repeatedly emphasizing that protection is in the first place up to the individual implies that people who are not able to enact these "correct actions" are ultimately responsible for the consequences of such inaction.

---

[13] "Statistisches Bundesamt" is the German name for the German Federal Statistical Office.

Although socioeconomic and ability-oriented marginalization would be sufficient on their own to criticize this resilience policy, the advisory is equally problematic on a more general level. Even able-bodied, middle-class citizens with a sufficient command of the German language—the apparent target group of the advisory—are reduced to the passive executor of the BBK's definition of "correct action." By demanding that individuals take care of their own protection by preparing and acting according to the communicated requirements, "Disasters Alarm" produces exactly the passivity that David Chandler (2016) ascribes to the neoliberal subject. Due to this shift in responsibility, the failure to protect becomes "the product of individual behavioural choice" (Chandler, 2013: 222). Yet, how a person might meet the expectations remains up to her. This is best depicted in the introduction to the chapter on stockpiling food and beverages, which states (BBK, 2017: 34): "Your goal must be to survive for 14 days without shopping. The solution is your responsibility. Whether and to what extent you make provisions for a disaster is a personal decision." However, the advisory leaves little individual scope for action, as it supplements the assigned responsibility with concrete and detailed expectations of correct behaviour.

While telling the reader to help others (BBK, 2017: 58), the advisory remains opaque on what to do when someone is incapable of helping even herself in an adequate manner. Through this neglect, people without the assumed self-help capacity are not even in a subject position. They are degraded to the passive recipients of assistance from their social environments, thus treated as mere objects. Consequently, the BBK promotes resilience in a form that has been rightly criticized for being neoliberal and responsibilizing. In fact, the advisory does not foster societal resilience but imposes a set of preparedness and individual disaster management measures on bodies. More precisely, the BBK establishes a set of performative rules defining the baseline conditions for being a (neoliberal) subject. They prescribe a range of appropriate performative acts, which reproduce societal stigmatizations, such as ableism and classism, due to their bodily and socioeconomic preconditions.

The imposed performativity thereby produces reality, as carved out in gender studies (Butler, 1988, 2004). In this case, it results in a distinction between able-bodied and disabled persons. Butler (1988: 527) famously stated that "[g]ender reality is performative which means, quite simply, that it is real only to the extent that it is performed." In the same manner, the performative acts within "Disasters Alarm" orchestrate a performativity, which reproduces a

notion of normality and results in societal marginalization. By offensively pushing the individual to take up the responsibility for her own protection, and finally for her survival, the advisory punishes the failure to obey. Thus, the orchestrated performativity bears structural punitive consequences, as described by Butler (1988: 522) for the case of gender performativity. Performativity can be ambiguous in its consequences, since it is fundamentally able either to reproduce or to contest and potentially to alter dominant societal norms (Butler, 2004: 218). However, if a state body like the BBK defines desirable as well as acceptable performative acts, it deprives other contingent behaviours of their legitimacy. Consequently, the production of "correct action" in the "Disasters Alarm" advisory imposes performative rules excluding people who cannot live up to the necessary bodily requirements.

"Disasters Alarm" ties in with a neoliberal governmentality, since it builds on "neoliberal's heightened demands for bodily capacity" (Puar, 2013: 177) and results in the perpetuation of structural inequality. However, this demand for capacity is not an attempt to make different abilities, constraints, and impairments tangible for state governance. Rather, and as the advisory implies, it is a transfer of expectations. The (bodily) abilities and capacities of those who are able to inscribe their interests into state action are the starting point for shaping this resilience strategy. Rather than assuming their set of abilities as part of a diverse societal mosaic of varying abilities, these abilities are set as a general societal given and thus function as the baseline for the formulation of responsibilities. Put simply, the societal marginalization of disabled people leads to their neglect throughout the whole advisory. Furthermore, the BBK advisory (2017: 6) follows a logic of possibility by stating: "Disasters are part of our life." This possibilistic logic does not aim "to avert future risks but rather flourishes in conditions of declared constant emergency because decisions are taken on the basis of future possibilities, however improbable or unlikely" (Amoore, 2013: 12). This continuous emergency implies a constant failure on the part of those who are not able to live up to the assumed abilities and capacities.

The discussed features of the BBK fit neatly with the growing body of disaster resilience strategies and the issued critique. Yet, even if "Disasters Alarm" exhibits significant similarities to other resilience concepts, a thorough comparison with the theoretical premises of resilience reveals the crucial discrepancies between the resilience approach brought forward by Holling (1973) and the political manifestations of resilience in the realm of security. First, if resilience

is rooted in complexity, and thus in limited generalizable knowledge, the societal consequences of an initial event are unforeseeable due to the myriad of parallel interactions and possible cascade and spill-over effects. This requires "parochial or local knowledges [which] are not a limit but a policy goal, once it is understood that all knowledge can only be local, contextual and time and space specific" (Chandler, 2014b: 42). However, the BBK formulates general rules for proper behaviour and general advice for stockpiling and therefore sticks to the liberal idea of general knowledge. As demonstrated above, the imposition of performative acts is bodily as well as socioeconomically demanding, renders the single individual as the neoliberal entrepreneur of her own protection, and results in the marginalization of those who cannot live-up to the presumed characteristics. From an ethical perspective, this reproduces injustice and discrimination. Moreover, the advisory therewith contradicts the premise of contextual knowledge and resilience's incompatibility with top-down prescriptions (Walker and Salt, 2006: 145).

In "Disasters Alarm," resilience is still considered an epistemological, instead of an ontological problem. The "neoliberal problematic of epistemological complexity ('never getting it right')" (Schmidt, 2015: 419) presents the limited governmental capability to acquire knowledge on the myriad of societal interactions. In ontological complexity, knowledge is produced through decentral and parallel interactions, including those of the government, and cannot be centrally anticipated let alone directed by one authority (Chandler, 2014b: 20). To put it simply, epistemological complexity assumes that the government "never gets it right" while ontological complexity denies the sheer possibility of unilaterally and correctly knowing the future, or of imposing a "correct" response. By defining generally correct actions in case of an emergency, the BBK acts outside of the very foundations of resilience. That is why the remainder of this article seeks to demonstrate how resilience could contribute to a reorganization of the politics of protection by taking advantage of contextualized knowledge. I use the BBK advisory to illustrate what a resilience concept that takes the theoretical premises of resilience seriously would look like and what this could contribute to the currently existing politics of protection.

6.4 The foundations for building resilience

If resilience was only thinkable in terms of existing practical security strategies referring more or less to a substantiated understanding of resilience, the widely uttered critique would be entirely justified, and resilience would have to be condemned—as the example of the BBK advisory illustrates. However, as Bourbeau (2013, 2015b) points out, it is far from clear what resilience actually means in the realm of security. Following the academic debate, "there is very little coherence and consensus as to the nature and substance of resilience" (Bourbeau, 2015b: 173). The vagueness of the concept within the realm of security is productive, since it not only opens avenues to scrutinize the prevailing reading of resilience, but might also provide us with normatively more desirable alternatives to state-centric, top-down security approaches. The current materialized usage of resilience deals more with the organization of knowledge within a given bureaucratic setting than with scrutinizing the state structures themselves. This becomes most visible in BBK's attempt to spread the knowledge about "correct actions" within the population. As shown above, this results in the exacerbation of already occurring forms of societal marginalization.

However, Bob Jessop (2016: 55, emphasis in original) provides an optimistic outlook, suggesting that the transformation of these structures is possible. He argues that: "Because structures are only *strategically selective* rather than *absolutely constraining*, scope exists for action to overwhelm, circumvent, or subvert structural constraints." Resilience might be one governance tool to make state bodies more aware of interests that have to date been marginalized and to foster their inscription into state politics. A theoretically substantiated resilience strategy would dismiss the idea of generally suitable forms of correct action. It would seek to promote an iterative policy process that is as open as possible and that seeks to engage proactively with the manifold contextual knowledge of the various societal groups, drawing on these knowledges to tighten feedback mechanisms on and between different levels. Rather than prescribing certain actions, a substantiated resilience concept would seek to build the very premises for becoming more resilient.

In terms of the strategic selection bias, the conundrum lies in the problem that the needs of marginalized societal groups are difficult for public authorities to see. Besides more traditional forms of participation, resilience relies on social and local interactions, "understood as the

existing embedded and relational capacity of ordinary people" (Chandler, 2014a: 60). Foster-
ing this social inclusiveness is key to promoting resilience on the ground and, thus, to under-
mining the strategic selection bias of centralized state structures. Taking the roots of resilience
within the complexity turn seriously means analysing the concept beyond its current manifes-
tations (Bourbeau, 2015a: 379).

Building those societal capabilities is not at odds with resilience thinking but is part and parcel
of its very theoretical essence. In that vein, Holling (2001: 391) stated:

> *"An alternative view […] suggests that the complexity of living systems of people and
> nature emerges not from a random association of a large number of interacting factors
> rather from a smaller number of controlling processes. These systems are self-orga-
> nized, and a small set of critical processes create and maintain this self-organization.
> […] Such 'subsidiary' variables or factors can be interesting, relevant, and important,
> but they exist at the whim of the critical controlling factors or variables. If sustainability
> means anything, it has to do with the small set of critical self-organized variables and
> the transformations that can occur in them during the evolutionary process of societal
> development."*

According to Holling, governing complexity through resilience should focus on those control-
ling processes that finally enable resilience. Consequently, the degree of societal resilience is
the result of contingent state politics that shape the controlling processes. In social systems,
those controlling processes are subject to political deliberation and require repeated adjust-
ments. Taking resilience seriously, effective societal security policy evolves on many levels,
including the local one, and is therefore able to transcend the strategic selection bias of cen-
tralized top-down governmental modes (Walker and Salt, 2006: 90–91). Rather than centrally
imposing a set of performative acts, states should engage in creating the political and there-
with the societal foundations for building resilience. Therefore, states need to reorganize their
governance of protection to be able to take the consequences of complexity into account
(Schmidt, 2015). The myriad of cascade effects is hardly predictable and is, therefore, a case
of unknown unknowns (Daase and Kessler, 2007: 427). Thus, the creation of resilience is best
served by an approach based on capabilities at different levels from the national, to the vari-
ous overlapping societal groups, to neighbourhoods and eventually the individual. Enhancing

(and not demanding) capabilities is the vantage point of delinking resilience from neoliberal concepts and reshaping it.

Necessary preconditions for building resilience are, as shown in the case of the BBK advisory, economic capital and social embeddedness. Thus, the proposed controlling processes should aim at creating those capacities. Increasing society's resilience demands political framework conditions, such as soundly developed social networks and redundant political structures (Walker and Salt, 2006: 147–148). To remain with the BBK example, an appropriate way to build resilience would not be to prescribe a shopping list of necessary goods but, in the first place, to provide all individuals with the necessary financial means to purchase and stockpile those goods they deem appropriate. Hints on what items might be useful need to be based on granting sufficient capacities. This kind of resilience requires a profound redistribution of wealth, which sits uneasily with a neoliberal paradigm. Chandler (2014b: 35) argues that "[c]omplex life is clever, resourceful and serendipitous, able to produce solutions from the most unexpected sources." However, the above-mentioned examples aimed to illustrate that complex life is not, per se, resourceful. Rather, individual capabilities, financial as well as social, need to be actively fostered by governmental politics. More broadly, governing through resilience requires the identification of those controlling processes that allow resilience to flourish (Holling, 2001; Walker and Salt, 2006).

However, throwing money at the problem is certainly not enough for building the foundations of resilience. Indeed, enhancing financial and social capabilities does not sufficiently improve the situation of people who cannot live up to an able-bodied "normality," which the BBK advisory assumes. To illustrate this problem, I briefly turn to another, little recognized, example of the strategic selection bias of governmental top-down policies disadvantaging marginalized societal groups, namely the treatment of disabled people in disaster management. In fact, the daily consequences of the impairments of disabled people are widely neglected by security politics in general and disaster management in particular (for an exception, see Kelman and Stough, 2015). Even in daily life, the lack of wheelchair ramps or inscriptions in braille disadvantages people with the respective impairments. This discrimination persists and aggravates in disaster situations. Many means in disaster relief are shaped by an anticipation of "normal" needs and bodily capacities and fail to account for satisfying specific needs arising from the multitude of impairments (Alexander, 2015: 18). This neglect of societal diversity prevents the

state politics of protection from effectively increasing societal resilience. If, however, security strategies aim to foster resilience, they need to overcome this obstacle, which constantly hinders individuals from increasing their resilience. A first step in this direction would be to dismiss the dichotomy between able-bodied and disabled people. Jasbir Puar (2013: 181) pointed out that the "distinction of normative and nonnormative, disabled and non-disabled do not hold up as easily. Instead, there are variegated aggregates of capacity and debility." Consequently, the state should focus on increasing abilities and dismantling societal barriers to enhance the scope of action for people who are impaired by marginalizing politics.

A state that seeks to foster societal resilience needs to interrogate how society impairs people by presuming their abilities. The task of the government is then to reshape underlying controlling processes in order to increase resilience by actively fostering an inclusive society and by refraining from a passive, liberal laissez-faire governance. Even if governmental action is restricted to those controlling processes that ultimately enable self-organization, it needs to take different levels of governance into account. Thus, the requirements for governing resilience are twofold: First, a strong state involvement is needed to assure the appropriate allocation of resources to increase people's socioeconomic capacity. Second, state structures need to be as open as possible to soak up and process contextually generated knowledge in order to inform and eventually iteratively assess central controlling processes, as well as centralized state tasks, such as disaster relief practices. Building feedback structures as proposed by Rogers' (2013) understanding of community resilience would be a good starting point for subverting selection biases that hinder the state's fostering of resilience. This participatory feedback system facilitates the recognition of abilities, capacities, and impairments beyond the current assumption of normality.

Resilience requires keeping "options open" (Holling, 1973: 21), as well as the development of an "inherent potential of a system that is available for change, since that potential determines the range of future options possible" (Holling, 2001: 394–395). Setting up empowering controlling processes is key in enhancing the number of affordable future options on the side of the state, as well as on the side of the citizens. Once enabled, governments gain the chance to learn from the micro-practices and the communicated specific needs on different levels. Resilience thinking is thus a chance for a more inclusive politics of protection. It is, thereby, at odds with neoliberal governance because it scrutinizes economic optimization and trades

short-term wins for long-term options. For example, current calls for a more inclusive disaster management are countered with the ethically questionable reference to the financial burden linked to a diversification of disaster relief measures (Alexander, 2015: 25). Certainly, building this kind of resilience is costly, as it requires addressing so far neglected needs in order to decrease vulnerabilities and to increase individual and societal capacities for action. In this way, resilience negates the neoliberal goal of optimization. It contrasts the neoliberal search for an optimal state by making demands to build redundancies and to increase the options at hand (Walker and Salt, 2006: 141).

A theoretically substantiated understanding of resilience considers the ontology of complexity and aims to increase individual as well as societal resources in order to keep options open. Both liberal and neoliberal governance are, in fact, examples of excluding and prescribing controlling processes. Moreover, neoliberalism as well as liberalism are both compatible with, and even prone to, authoritarian governance (Dean, 2002, 2014) — which is the literal opposite of resilience-thinking. Liberal governance attempts to create "autonomous" individuals, which results, for example, in sanctions for welfare-recipients who are not deemed suitable for the requirements of the labour market (Dean, 2002: 47) or in the attempt to educate the responsibilized individual in terms of their reproductive behaviour in the face of the "Malthus Effect" (Dean, 2015). Both examples are consequences of centralized governmental foresight. As can be seen in the case of the BBK advisory, liberal governance responsibilizes the individual to make autonomously exactly those decisions the government deems reasonable. In contrast, fostering resilience requires the state to enhance possible options by dismantling impairments as well as setting up participatory processes feeding an iterative and multilevel governance approach. Coming once more back to the example of the BBK, two online surveys indicate the poor awareness level of the advisory and that the vast majority of the respondents neglect the BBK advice on food security (Menski et al., 2016). These findings illustrate that this kind of alleged resilience policy neither satisfies the theoretical premises of resilience nor fosters the resilience of the population in practice.

6.5 Concluding remarks

To date, the academic literature has mainly shed light on resilience's proximity to neoliberalism (Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015; Grove, 2014; Joseph, 2013, 2016; Kaufmann, 2016). In this article, I have sought to demonstrate that labelling resilience as necessarily neoliberal falls short of acknowledging the theoretical foundations of ecological resilience (Holling, 1996, 2001). The debate about the neoliberal nature of resilience has resulted in an insufficiently complex analysis of the resilience-state nexus. This article has attempted to spur the discussion about the relationship between resilience and the state by turning to the controlling processes that are the foundations for building resilience yet have received limited academic attention. Governing resilience, however, means shaping controlling processes in order to fulfil a twofold task. On the one hand, the example of the BBK advisory has demonstrated that current political resilience strategies limit themselves to impose a certain performativity to increase the self-help capacity of individuals. This attempt fails, since it assumes a series of abilities and capacities, rather than exploring and fostering them. Shaping adequate controlling processes would mean generating those prerequisites, such as economic capital and social embeddedness, that are necessary to increase resilience throughout society. Moreover, it would mean not only focusing on the individual, as the BBK advisory does, but also uncovering avenues for increasing societal versions of resilience.

On the other hand, the BBK advisory proposed a one-size-fits-all approach, which resulted in an imaginary of a "normal" citizen. This normality is, in essence, middle-class, able-bodied, and has proficiency in the German language. This approach excludes people who cannot live up to the bodily and socioeconomic abilities the advisory presumes. However, rather than excluding people and thus rendering them even more vulnerable, states should foster the potential of individuals and communities alike to develop local and contextualized knowledge, as well as the necessary feedback mechanisms to take advantage of this kind of knowledge. Thus, governing resilience requires the administrative capabilities to receive and process feedback from different scales and to distribute responsibility to different (administrative) levels. In fact, in resilience-thinking, governments are dependent on tightening feedback processes between different scales in order to adjust controlling processes (Walker and Salt, 2006). This, in turn, is necessary to provide central services, such as ambulance services or disaster relief structures, in a way that allows for taking diverse societal needs into account. Deploying

92

resilience-thinking urges us to think about desirable distributions of responsibilities over scales and the necessary capacities to live up to the assigned responsibilities. Therewith, the ability to govern resilience requires actively undermining strategic selection biases, which eventually lead to a lack of societal resilience.

Kaufmann (2016: 113) stated that "resilience cannot account for powerlessness." This is certainly true. Nevertheless, what resilience can account for is to push the boundaries of individual and societal power to react by revealing and dismantling societal constraints. The aim of this article has been to demonstrate that a theoretically substantiated political deployment of resilience is at odds with neoliberal premises. Rather, fostering resilience urges the state to provide its population with adequate resources and to dismiss convenient, taken-for-granted perspectives. Consequently, governing complexity sits uneasily with a withdrawing neoliberal "night-watchman state" but rather requires its active engagement in order to keep structures open, to facilitate participation, to subvert strategic selection biases, to grant capacities, and to reveal and reduce societal impairments as the preconditions for building resilience. Analysing controlling processes is a far more nuanced way of assessing political resilience strategies than condemning resilience because of its current neoliberal appropriations. Moreover, it allows for the carving out of resilience's potential to work beyond neoliberalism. Enacting resilience depends on the capabilities and resources at hand. Both need to be provided, or respectively enabled, by an active and empowering state.

Spotlight 4

7. Resilience unwanted: Between control and cooperation in disaster response[14]

7.1 Introduction

The 2013 Central European floods caused widespread inundation across the region. One of the worst affected areas was the federal state of Saxony and its capital city Dresden, located in the eastern part of Germany. Floods are, however, not a recent phenomenon in this region. Between 2002 and 2013, the city of Dresden witnessed three major flood events originating from the river Elbe within roughly one decade. The 2002 flood event was the first one to occur in over half a century. It surprised the somewhat unprepared disaster management authorities and caused casualties as well as severe economic losses. Although the floods in 2013 almost equalled those in 2002 in many regards, they caused significantly less damage.

According to Birkland (2006), disasters often induce policy changes. This held true for the first two floods in 2002 and 2006, which significantly increased the capacity of the municipal authorities to fend off inundation risks to the city. The 2013 floods, however, presented new challenges in the form of an increased number of emerging self-organized volunteer activities, facilitated by the use of social media platforms. While politicians striving for public support praised the multiple citizen-driven initiatives, professional agencies engaged in flood response efforts tried to demarcate themselves from the unaffiliated volunteers. The agencies have been exploring ways to render this new phenomenon governable.

During the floods and in their aftermath, the adaptive processes of different actors shaped the relations among authorities, aid organizations and citizens in ways that were unexpected, uncalled for and unwanted. While being generally supportive of the official disaster management, some self-organized volunteers in Dresden criticized the official flood risk management plans that stipulated which residential areas were to be protected and designated others as floodplains. Using social media platforms as a means of self-organization can be understood either as a contingent yet patterned adjustment to a perceived overload of capacities within

---

[14] This chapter has been published in *Security Dialogue*. I wrote it together with Kristoffer Albris.

state disaster management entities, or a lack of support of, or even resistance to, these struc-tures. On another note, state authorities on different administrative levels ranging from the local to the national, as well as aid organizations, equally initiated an adjustment process to the witnessed phenomenon of autonomously emergent volunteering structures. Moreover, the experiences of the 2013 floods in Dresden led to a debate about changes to disaster man-agement systems in the light of new technological and social trends.

Although the term *resilience* was absent in the case of Dresden, in the sense that it was not explicitly used by actors, we argue that the resilience debate helps us to understand the com-plex and interdependent adaptation processes at play. Resilience and bottom-up approaches to emergency response only play a minor role in German disaster management systems and policies. Dresden is a prime example of what Joseph (2018: 99) describes as the German ap-proach to infrastructure protection, which "gives a central role to government and the state with little or no emphasis on building resilience within communities". We do claim, however, that the case of the Dresden floods contributes to the resilience debate, precisely because resilience was mentioned neither as a strategy nor a requirement by any state actor. Drawing on Philippe Bourbeau (2018b: 13–14, emphasis in original), who describes resilience as *"the process of patterned adjustments adopted in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks"*, we identify these adaptive processes from below as an instantiation of resilience. More spe-cifically, we argue that the autonomous activities by unaffiliated volunteers are examples of what Kevin Grove (2013: 196) calls "subversive resilience", a form of adaptivity detached from the imaginaries of the powerful that flourishes in the possible rather than in the wanted. This form of civil society grassroots-level resilience does not necessarily obey the behavioural ex-pectations of public resilience policies, but questions, counteracts and eventually shapes them. Resilience in the case of Dresden was neither technocratically initiated nor managed and might thus constitute something that Grove (2014: 253) calls "'mutant rules' of resili-ence". Although emerging volunteer structures, in many cases, support professional disaster relief structures, the case of Dresden represents an example of what we refer to as *resilience unwanted*, since the adaptive processes of volunteering citizens were uncalled for and, to some extent, also unwanted by the local authorities.

As a concept and idea, resilience has invoked a paradigmatic change in discourse across sev-eral political and scientific fields and increasingly shapes political life (Brassett et al., 2013:

222). Despite its prominence (Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015), the term lacks conceptual clarity and embraces multiple meanings across different domains and contexts (Simon and Randalls, 2016). Jonathan Joseph (2018: 26) even doubts that 'the notion of resilience is developed enough to enjoy the status of a concept'. In this reading, resilience can be seen as a "boundary object" (Kaufmann, 2012: 109), which is flexible enough to be transferable to several fields while deriving its concrete meaning from the respective context of a particular case. In fact, the debate on the assessment of resilience is lively and controversial. While some authors consider it a means of neoliberal rule that devolves collective responsibility to non-state actors and therewith legitimizes the withdrawal of the state (Evans and Reid, 2014; Joseph, 2013, 2016; Neocleous, 2013), others emphasize the potential of resilience (Bourbeau, 2015a; Schmidt, 2015, 2017). However, the resilience discourse goes beyond a simple dichotomy. The ontological and analytical status of resilience is fundamentally contested. But the positions are manifold. While Joseph (2016: 370) doubts the sheer possibility of a precise definition of resilience and Zebrowski (2016: 148) claims that there is nothing natural whatsoever about resilience, disaster sociologist Kathleen Tierney (2019: 214) argues that, indeed, *'resilience does exist'*. Nonetheless, even within the context of disasters, the semantic meaning of resilience, in the way it is used by practitioners as well as academics, is evolving and often confusing (Alexander, 2013; Olwig, 2009). Moreover, several disaster researchers have voiced a series of critiques of the deployment of resilience in development discourse and have questioned its ethical implications (Barrios, 2014; Benadusi, 2013; Dombrowsky, 2012; Tierney, 2019: 210–214).

Our aim in this article is to propose an additional reading of resilience, neither as an inherent ontological feature of societal entities nor as a governmental (neoliberal) strategy, but rather as an adaptive process that is shaped and equally shapes societal relations. Resilience can thus be understood as an adaptational process in societal relationships that emerges and exists between governance, obedience and resistance.

To unfold our argument, we introduce the case of the flood that hit Dresden in June 2013. The empirical analysis draws on extensive fieldwork and data collection, consisting of a body of 48 interviews and additional extensive ethnographic observations in the greater Dresden region conducted by the authors between 2013 and 2016 on similar but independent research projects. Building on the case analysis, we then turn to the discussion of resilience in the domains

of security studies and disaster studies. We conclude by proposing resilience as an adaptive process that emerges from societal relationships and subsequently shapes them. Calling these adaptive strategies resilience opens up a space for talking about subversive resilience and resilience as resistance, in short: of *unwanted resilience*.

7.2 The 2013 Dresden floods

Towards the end of May 2013, a series of low-pressure systems created the highest amount of precipitation in many parts of Central Europe since 1881 (Freistaat Sachsen, 2013a: 2). Massive amounts of water filled up the major catchments of the Elbe River basin, and as the Elbe rose above the seven-metre mark at the measuring station in Dresden's city centre, the final alarm level and consequently the disaster preparedness plans were activated on 3 June (Freistaat Sachsen, 2013a: 6).

Additional fire department teams, the technical emergency agency (*Technisches Hilfswerk*), the police and the army (*Bundeswehr*) were brought in to help fight the rising water masses during the following days. Extra personnel and machinery from Hamburg and other German cities were deployed to support local agencies. Evacuation procedures commenced, mobile floodwall defences were put in place and areas at risk of flooding were closed off to the public. In all, 13,300 persons were evacuated from within Dresden's municipal borders (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013: 49). Several public schools, bridges and central roads were closed. Some areas, such as Laubegast to the east of Dresden, turned into isolated islands. Boat transportation corridors organized by the authorities provided the only access to these areas (Dresden Brand- und Katastrophenschutzamt, 2013). Hundreds of homes were flooded. Yet, the 2013 flood was, despite their similar intensities in terms of water masses, far less damaging than the one 11 years before.

In an independent official evaluation of the event (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013), the response efforts were deemed successful and the report praised risk reduction measures taken by the city authorities since 2002. Resistance to evacuation measures were in fact limited to very few incidents in which people refused to leave their homes (Interview 6, Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013: 49). This evaluation, the so called "Kirchbach Report", goes so far as to

state that "[i]n contrast to 2002, no relevant problems in rescue and evacuation occurred"[15] (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013: 22). The increased awareness of what major flood events entail had seemingly made its mark on the ability of the professional agencies to respond in a timelier manner in 2013 compared to the floods in 2002. Yet, the response and relief actions of unaffiliated volunteers and flood-affected people themselves also played a substantial role, and multiple new problems with respect to decision-making processes, citizen participation and coordination were evident (Kuhlicke et al., 2016; Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013: 51).

We argue that these problems rest upon a shift in the quality of volunteering. More precisely, two emergent patterns regarding the role of unaffiliated volunteers occurred that rendered volunteer efforts more organized and intense compared to those during previous floods. First, both volunteers and homeowners at risk of flooding were less surprised by the event, better prepared and thus able to respond and collectively organize in a quicker and more systematic manner. Second, social media platforms provided a novel and unprecedented way of self-organization for volunteers to take part in the response and relief efforts.

During the first days, hordes of volunteers participated in the race against time to prevent the rising Elbe from flooding Dresden. People provided sand and bags and used them to build contingency floodwalls. A total of 1.6 million sandbags were distributed in rows along the Elbe, most of them by unaffiliated citizen volunteers (Dresden Umweltamt, 2014: 46). Some volunteers also provided food and drink to flood victims, homeowners and other volunteers. Families opened up their homes to those without a roof over their head and neighbours stepped in to aid others in need with their resources and time in the attempt to fend off the water masses. This civil participation occurred alongside and in cooperation with professional agencies and aid organizations such as the Red Cross or the Workers' Samaritan Foundation.

Many volunteers from Dresden and other German regions who converged on the Elbe sought information on how to participate by consulting different Facebook groups that had been created by individual citizens, including the groups "Fluthilfe Dresden", "Hochwasser Dresden" and "Elbpegel". These Facebook groups acted as platforms to communicate help offers and needs. Group administrators could direct potential volunteers towards areas in need of help, whereby supply and demand of volunteer help could be organized and distributed at an

---

[15] The reports and brochures were written in German. Quotes are translated by the authors.

unprecedented scale and speed (Albris, 2018). The massive mobilisation of helpers resulted in widespread flood response activities in and around the Dresden city area, which seemingly superseded volunteer activities in 2002 in quantity and certainly differed significantly in quality. As an administrator of one of the Facebook groups described it in an interview: "An army of citizens suddenly formed out of nowhere"[16] (Interview 10). The administrator had started the Facebook group mostly as a way to raise awareness among locals. But the scale of activities took him completely by surprise:

> *"It was crazy! By the second day, I was receiving about 60 emails a minute. I got two of my friends to help me because it became too much to handle. Most of the people who wrote were offering help because they felt they needed to do something. They offered food, clothes, anything to help. But this quickly became impossible for us to respond to. I decided that we would only answer those who requested help, not those who offered. The help must find the people and that was what the Facebook page was able to do. We connected people who needed help with those who offered by posting where people needed to go on the group's page." (Interview 10)*

That social media platforms were used to this extent came as a surprise to local authorities, such as the fire department, and to aid organizations alike. This was the first time a large-scale emergency event had happened in the area since the widespread adoption of online platforms such as Facebook. During the flood response, the local disaster management authorities were constantly forced to react to the ever-changing situation caused by self-organizing, unaffiliated volunteers. A high-ranked disaster relief manager even stated in an interview that "[t]his was a new situation which concerned us most – especially with regard to how to deal with this in public relations work" (Interview 2). The importance of social media platforms such as the aforementioned Facebook groups and a crowd-sourced Google Map of the flooded areas is illustrated by the hundreds of thousands of online interactions during the flood emergency (Albris, 2017, 2018). Together, the Facebook groups that focused on flood-related issues in Dresden had significantly more than 100,000 supporters who initiated and coordinated a range of collective actions (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013: 51). The online interactions sought to serve on-the-ground volunteer activities, which also seemed more intense than during

---

[16] The interviews were conducted in German and translated by the authors.

previous flood events. Indeed, the increased scale of volunteer activities is evidenced by reports of an almost carnival-like social atmosphere along the river. Newspapers reported scenes of people drinking and dancing to loud music as the threat of the Elbe waned (Kailitz, 2013). Civil society came alive in a way that only comes about during certain moments of crisis (Solnit, 2009). The looming disaster had turned into a social spectacle and the emergency into a celebration of society. This was, however, not to everyone's liking, as the examples provided in the next section illustrate.

7.3 The critique of volunteers

Like many other hazards, flood emergencies often cover a wide territory in which response and relief capacities are stretched to their limit. In several cases, volunteers orchestrated response efforts by themselves, since professional entities such as the fire department could not see to all the affected areas in time. Yet in some places, the convergences of volunteers became a problem in itself. Several interviewees stated that, in some cases, there were too many volunteers relative to the needs of the flood response efforts, which at times hindered the work of the professionals (e.g. Interviews 1; 3; 4). Moreover, in other cases, volunteer work would set back the progress of securing certain areas. For example, professional response workers had to replace sandbag dikes built by unaffiliated volunteers due to their being stacked in the wrong way, or the dike itself being placed at a wrong spot (Interview 8). At a sandbag filling station, the sheer number of incoming volunteers initially overwhelmed the authorities and impaired working processes (Interview 7). One interviewee stated that a large number of helpers followed the call of a bar owner on Facebook, whose pub was situated directly by the river in Dresden (Interview 4). The helpers tried to protect the bar from the rising water level, which turned out to be a hopeless endeavour, given its proximity to the riverbanks. In an interview, an official from the Dresden disaster management authority subsequently complained about the unwillingness of the bar owner to follow the official advice of installing flood protection measures. Referring to the fact that the bar owner had been previously instructed to deal with the question of flood risk, the official stated that:

> *"They were urged to get consultancy assistance, since the bar owner needs to do something, given his situation. And these protection measures would have cost only 10,000*

euros. He refused. Instead, he organized a flash mob, sandbags and sand, and tried
with the help of people to set up a dike. It lasted for two days and on day three, the bar
was flooded." (Interview 4)

While even high-ranking disaster management officials attest that "social media is an important topic" (Interview 7), its implications are assessed with ambivalence. As the case of the bar owner illustrates, the swift mobilization of self-organized volunteers, which was intensified by social media use, catalysed a number of subsequent critiques and controversies regarding the role of volunteers. A major debate concerned the question of the extent to which volunteers should be allowed to participate in tasks and activities that are the mandate of professionals. Local authorities struggled with the unwanted groups of self-organized volunteers, as they appeared to question the established hierarchies and the responsibilities of the professional agencies. Emblematic of this attitude, one interviewee from the local authorities argued:

"The municipality is not in charge of every kind of emergency response, only the public
ones. And public emergency response cannot be explained after the event but needs to
be clear prior to the disaster. And this is what the city did with its plan 'Hochwasser-
vorsorge Dresden' [Flood Preparedness Dresden]. There, it is stated which districts are
protected until this and that benchmark. And what districts are not protected. If I do
not like it, I need to go to my city representatives and let them make another decision
that will cost millions and millions of euros. There is no other way in Dresden." (Inter-
view 4)

This quote shows that the enactment of disaster protection depends on political decisions and is thus contingent. Furthermore, it stresses that the distribution of responsibility is key to understanding the expected roles and tasks of professionals vis-à-vis ordinary citizens and unaffiliated volunteers, even when there is no call for resilience as a policy goal in official emergency plans. While the responsibility for the protection of one's own property is delegated to the individual, ordinary citizens' capacity to self-organize collective action was met with scepticism by the Dresden Fire Department or even seen as an act of dilettantism on the part of some citizens. As a city official laconically stated: "Just because you can fill sandbags and put them somewhere doesn't mean you have to" (Interview 8).

In an official presentation of the Dresden Fire Department's evaluation of the response efforts during the floods, volunteer participation is described as an expression of Erlebniskultur (event culture) (Dresden Brand- und Katastrophenschutzamt, 2013). This term refers to the fact that people seek out an experience for the sake of the experience itself rather than for the sake of solving the problem in question. In line with such a derogatory framing, the various citizen groups and social media networks became easy targets to blame. As Kuhlicke et al. (2016: 318) have argued, responsible government administrators can take advantage of these networks to "delegate responsibility and blame to those stakeholders participating in risk management in case 'something goes wrong'".

According to staff members of the Dresden Fire Department, unaffiliated volunteers ought to have been directed by professionals and informed by city government sources (Interview 8). Yet, the local authorities perceived the engagement of unaffiliated volunteers as a result of either blind over-ambition by volunteers and/or public scepticism towards the ability of state institutions to manage the emergency situation (Interview 2).

Even high-ranking officials admitted that while the consequences of the engagement of many unaffiliated volunteers were problematic in some cases, they were constructive in others. The "Kirchbach Report" attests: "The technical operation management in metropolitan areas was particularly challenged in coordinating the hundreds of volunteers appearing in a short period of time by using social media on site to support the filling and installations of sandbags" (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013: 44). An official from the Dresden Fire Department acknowledged in an interview that in some cases, the sheer number of citizens enabled more effective work than the professional firefighters could have provided on their own (Interview 8). For instance, he estimated that at one sandbag filling station set up by the fire department, automated machines could fill approximately 1,500 sandbags per hour, whereas the volunteers on site could fill approximately 5,000 sandbags per hour using shovels and their bare hands. These numbers have been supported by another interviewee who worked as an unaffiliated volunteer and reported that in some cases the firefighters abandoned the filling machines in favour of the manual method using shovels, with the help of volunteers (Interview 9).

It is worth stressing that the accounts we have collected through interviews and news reports indicate that there was a larger degree of cooperation between unaffiliated volunteers and

professional emergency agencies (including the Bundeswehr) than some official accounts by the authorities suggest (Dresden Brand- und Katastrophenschutzamt, 2013; Friedrich, 2013). Yet, the cooperation between citizens and professionals was mostly the result of on-site improvisational actions (Interviews 7; 9). The Facebook group "Fluthilfe Dresden" did, moreover, continuously urge volunteers to heed the advice and instructions of fire fighters and other professionals. Although the Dresden Fire Department emphasized its general sympathy for citizens' willingness to aid their city in times of imminent collective threat, one representative of the department stressed that such good intentions posed problems for the proper execution of flood response tasks (Interview 8).

In an evaluation of the 2013 floods by the Office of Environment, Agriculture and Geology of the Free State of Saxony (Landesamt für Umwelt, Landwirtschaft und Geologie, 2015: 203), the mobilization of volunteers through social networks is initially described as an impressive phenomenon, since a large number of people were reached and activated within hours. Yet, while the report acknowledges that in many places volunteer aid was useful, it quickly turns to the downside of volunteering. The main problem, the report suggests, is that unprofessional volunteers can obstruct the plans of emergency management professionals and can result in misguided efforts to help (Landesamt für Umwelt, Landwirtschaft und Geologie, 2015: 164).

The best-known example of how the self-organized volunteer initiatives "got it wrong" was a section between the two districts of Pieschen and Neustadt on the northwest banks of the Elbe. As people began to place sandbags along the roads beside the river, they evidently put a large number of them on the low permanent floodwalls, where mobile steel-plate extensions were supposed to fit on top. An estimated number of 10,000 sandbags that had been placed on top of the wall would thus have had to be removed to accommodate the extensions. The fire department ultimately decided not to remove them as it would have been too time-consuming and the water level was not expected to exceed the height of the floodwall. Volunteers also placed sandbags just behind the wall, which makes little sense from a technical perspective. The water would overtop the sandbags very quickly once the sandstone floodwall had been overflowed, as a report by the fire department notes (Friedrich, 2013). In another example, volunteers built a wall of sandbags 1.5 metres high and 1.8 km long, even though the official emergency plans only prescribe the building of a wall 0.8 metres high and 900

metres long. The doubling-up of the proportions was, an official report concludes, "from a professional perspective not reasonable" (Landesamt für Umwelt, Landwirtschaft und Geologie, 2015: 164).

The resources used for building several of the sandbag dikes were provided in part by volunteers and by sources contracted by the city authorities. While disaster management authorities focused on the protection of central infrastructure and especially the heritage sites in the Dresden city centre, they designated certain residential areas as flood plains in order to protect the other parts of the city. However, the inhabitants in some of these designated flooding neighbourhoods refused to obey and proved remarkably defiant in resisting the official plans by acquiring whatever sandbags they could find to protect their houses and public areas against the intentions and plans of the local authorities. One interviewee who served in the administrative municipal staff during the floods described an incident as follows:

> "They [the volunteers] stopped our trucks with sandbags. They were stopped, the drivers could not do anything, and we did not blame them. […] They [the volunteers] took control of the vehicle and unloaded the sandbags. At a place where the sandbags were not needed at all. And they never arrived at those places where I would have needed the sandbags. We, as operations management, lost control of the communication for some time." (Interview 3)

Yet while remaining critical, the authorities also deemed it necessary to publicly praise the volunteer activities during the flood emergency, including the work of the social media networks. The then Prime Minister of Saxony, Stanislaw Tillich, emphasized, referencing the online volunteer networks, that "our society works" in a parliamentary session after the floods (Sächsischer Landtag, 2013: 8032). The Saxon state authorities awarded thousands of flood response medals to volunteers, staging a momentous ceremony in Dresden (Freistaat Sachsen, 2013b) and putting up billboards in the city centre with the words "Thank you to all volunteers". This presents a peculiar situation in which some authorities expressed approval of the volunteers' role in flood response, while other authorities expressed explicit and sometimes harsh critique of volunteers. This Janus-faced position did not escape the attention of some of the volunteers and discussions raged for months after the floods on the Facebook groups that were used during the response efforts.

The professional disaster management entities have also realized the game-changing character of online self-organization. A representative of the emergency operation staff stated: "In 2013 there was nothing like that. In the future, it is most likely that our public relations team is going to disseminate an hourly report of the situation on Twitter and so on" (Interview 4). Another interviewee mentioned that another lesson learned would be to have a staff member tasked solely with social media monitoring (Interview 1). Although the exact shape of the means has not been fixed, the self-organization of volunteers has forced the authorities to take social media more seriously. The "Kirchbach Report" seconds this by stating that "social media, currently predominantly Facebook, should be considered central to the crisis communication of the Federal State." (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013: 51). According to one interviewee, the founder of a Facebook group is convinced that he could mobilize a comparable number of people in case of another catastrophic event. The increased importance of social media is made clear when a staff member states that "we have agreed that we could bring him [the founder of the Facebook group] to the regular briefing. That would not harm me. In case of an event, we have a briefing every two hours" (Interview 4). While local disaster management authorities seemingly take social media seriously, they still struggle to engage with emerging structures that lack the form of hierarchy and organization that is common in disaster management agencies.

The challenge of coordinating unaffiliated volunteers also affected other disaster relief actors, like aid organizations. The German Red Cross (GRC), as the largest aid organization in Germany, also witnessed difficulties and evaluated their response to the massive numbers of unaffiliated volunteers who spontaneously showed up in 2013, wanting to be incorporated into the relief operations (Interview 5).While this took away resources from the GRC in some incidents due to the above-mentioned need to coordinate these unaffiliated volunteers, the vivid volunteering structures were equally points of attraction for organized Red Cross members. For instance, some GRC relief workers on telephone service as logistical support left their workplace during their lunch break to join the unaffiliated volunteers on site. The interviewees from the Red Cross reported that this happened due to "their perception of being not needed" (Interview 5).

Moreover, the GRC used the example of Dresden as an introduction to its tripartite brochure series on the role of unaffiliated volunteers in disaster management (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz,

2014: 11)[17]. In these brochures, the GRC identifies two emerging trends that characterized the flood relief operations in Dresden, namely the autonomous participation of unaffiliated volunteers and the importance of social media as a crucial organizing tool for this group. Acknowledging that one post in a social media group had an outreach of up to three million users, the DRK states that these grass-root approaches were hard to monitor, let alone control (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 2014: 13–14). The brochure series advises Red Cross employees and volunteers on how to engage with unaffiliated volunteers and in what fields they might be incorporated into the work of the organization. The brochures are not an attempt to disqualify unaffiliated volunteers per se, but propose ways for their proactive incorporation (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 2014, 2017).

It is evident that both local and state authorities, as well as NGOs as exemplified by the Red Cross, acknowledge that there is a need to consider social media platforms in future crisis emergency communication. Thus, social media will most likely be incorporated into different modes of emergency governance in and around Dresden when the next flood occurs. The Dresden case echoes a range of findings from disaster research that have examined tensions between emergent forms of volunteers in disasters vis-à-vis the local state apparatus' claim to control (Scanlon et al., 2014). Indeed, the subjects acting as unaffiliated volunteers turned out to be more active and autonomous than some professional rescue organizations would like them to be. In the following sections, we will discuss this point in order to show how the case study of Dresden informs current conceptual debates on resilience.

7.4 The multiplicity of resilience

One standard genealogical reading of resilience is to refer to its use in ecology by Crawford Holling (1973) who roots it in complexity theory and contrasts it with the then prominent maximum sustained yield approach (Walker and Cooper, 2011: 146–147). The dimension of adaptation is central in ecological resilience thinking (Walker and Salt, 2006). Yet, Holling's understanding of ecological resilience should not be confused with the origin of resilience thinking (Alexander, 2013: 2707; Bourbeau, 2018a: 19–20; Tierney, 2019: 167). In their

---

[17] Deutsches Rotes Kreuz means German Red Cross in German language.

seminal conceptual discussion of resilience, (Walker and Cooper, 2011) trace back how this ecological reading of resilience has found its way into the domain of security studies. The authors portray it as a straightforward development, given the intellectual overlap between ecology and security studies in terms of a concern with complexity.

A related reading of resilience, emphasizing the proximity between resilience and neoliberal thinking, has provoked various critiques (Evans and Reid, 2014; Joseph, 2013, 2016; Neocleous, 2013). One central argument is that policies promoting resilience legitimize the devolvement of collective social responsibility and thus delegate responsibility for security and well-being to the individual and/or local communities (Kaufmann, 2013, 2016). Resilience, it is argued, fosters the de-politicization of protection, since "[r]esilient subjects, in other words, have accepted the imperative not to resist or secure themselves from the dangers they face" (Evans and Reid, 2014: 42).

Yet, being resilient is portrayed as something normatively good and desirable in a neoliberal rationality. David Chandler (2016: 15) describes the nexus between neoliberalism and resilience by stating that "[t]he more adaptive capacity is enhanced the more resilient we are as both individuals and communities. [...] The more resilient we are the more fully developed we are as neoliberal subjects". Resilience is thus cast as a tool to legitimize the withdrawal of the state by shifting the responsibility to individuals.

This criticism is echoed in disaster studies and summarized by Tierney (2019: 214), who states that "resilience discourse is largely silent on issues of power". This limits its transformative potential when it comes to scrutinizing societal structures and their effects on unequal chances in disaster relief. Following this line of thought, Wolf Dombrowsky (2012: 286) concludes "that the burden of disasters and relief will be shifted onto the citizens" shoulders' through the introduction of resilience.

In the context of disaster management, this type of critique is formulated as one in which the state retreats from investing in emergency planning and risk reduction measures, willingly delegating responsibility to local communities and volunteer networks. For example, Peer Illner (2018) argues that this was the case with respect to the Occupy Sandy volunteers during Hurricane Sandy in 2012, who were subsequently heralded as a resilient network in a report

for the US Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, 2013). Disaster anthropologists have similarly documented how post-disaster recovery programmes are quick to label some communities as resilient, while in effect ignoring underlying patterns of vulnerability (Barrios, 2014; Benadusi, 2013). From this perspective, any indication of social resilience by individuals or groups must ultimately be interpreted as being in the political interest of the state or some other authority, such as international donors, to save money and retract from their mandated or democratically expected responsibilities.

In fact, many cases from around the world show a willingness on the part of volunteers to cooperate with authorities. Some even differ substantially from the case of the 2013 Dresden floods, but many also share the same characteristics. During the 9/11 attacks, Kendra and Wachtendorf (2016) found that both citizens and professional emergency responders, often in collaboration, acted with high degrees of improvisation and creativity, finding solutions to problems on the spot.

Many volunteers are moreover affiliated with disaster relief organizations, such as the Red Cross, in which they are obliged to follow standardized rules and procedures (Tierney, 2012: 350). In some cases, there might be an argument for the fact that state interests are promoted and extended via the inclusion of volunteers, thereby affirming the view that resilience is imbricated in a neoliberal strategy.

Yet, there are cases, other than Dresden, of what we have referred to as unwanted resilience, or even examples of resilience as an emergent phenomenon with anti-government characteristics. For example, following the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City, citizen-driven search and rescue initiatives sparked a widespread protest movement against the local and national government, contributing to the downfall of the ruling party in subsequent elections (Olson and Gawronski Vincent T., 2003). Similar examples of such "critical junctures" (Pelling and Dill, 2010: 22) have been observed in other cases, for instance after the 1972 earthquake in Nicaragua.

Disaster researcher David Alexander (2013: 2707-2010) challenges current critical readings of resilience as a contemporary concept and contrasts it with "an etymological journey" (Alexander, 2013: 2707) that leads the reader back to the opaque etymology of the Latin words

"resilio" and "resilire" and to the first scientific mentioning of "resilience" by Sir Francis Bacon in the 17th century (Alexander, 2013: 2708–2709). Alexander's anecdotic history of resilience and even more so Philippe Bourbeau's (2018a: 27) interdisciplinary genealogy of resilience illustrate that the use of the term "resilience" is complex and diverse. It is thus hardly surprising that it lacks a universal consensual definition, not only in its deployment in disaster management (Tierney, 2019: 170). Jonathan Joseph (2018: 26) even goes so far as to argue that resilience is too vague to be called a concept. Instead, he suggests that resilience's "dominant meaning derives from its position within a broader discourse of governance – or specifically, governance from a distance – as well as wider conceptions of the social and natural worlds based on ideas of complexity and uncertainty" (Joseph, 2018: 26).

The above discussions illustrate that there is not a single reading of resilience, but "multiple resiliences", as Stephanie Simon and Samuel Randalls (2016: 4) argue. Simon and Randalls build on the work of Kay Aranda et al. (2012) who identify the three different narratives of (1) *resilience found*, (2) *resilience made* and (3) *unfinished resilience*. *Resilience found* describes those accounts that conceptualize resilience as a capacity or trait inherent to a given subject, be it an individual or a community. Such accounts are rooted in positivist thinking and cast resilience as an ontological characteristic, something that can be discovered (Aranda et al., 2012: 550–551). A lack of resilience might then be considered as an ontological deficit. This approach runs the risk of blaming the respective subject for not being resilient (enough) (Bourbeau, 2018a: 27).

The second approach, *resilience made*, rests upon the assumption that resilience is a social practice. These often imposed or at least demanded forms of resilience can be found in several governmental resilience policies (e.g. Joseph, 2018; Walker and Cooper, 2011). Aranda et al. (2012: 552) conclude that "an important consequence of understanding resilience as 'made' is to question the power to define what becomes a risk, or a protective factor, or a resilient outcome".

Aranda et al. (2012: 553–554) describe the third form, *resilience unfinished*, as subject-oriented and premised upon poststructuralist thinking. The resilient subject is "ambiguously conceived, being imbued with agency, but equally constrained, subjected to broader discourses or forces from elsewhere" (Aranda et al., 2012: 554). The latter two approaches have in

common that they do not perceive resilience as a pre-existing property or characteristic, but as continuously becoming. By following such a reasoning, resilience is conceptually de-naturalized and could be perceived as a "security value" (Zebrowski, 2016: 148), or "an ideal type" (Chandler, 2016: 14).

Building on Aranda et al. (2012), Simon and Randalls (2016: 9) argue that "resilience can be found, made and unfinished all at once". As a methodological anchoring, they propose analysing incidents of resilience through two different axes, namely *sitings* and *interventions* (Randalls and Simon, 2017: 42–46). *Sitings* tell us where resilience is articulated. These specific spatial ontologies "offer moments of specificity for nailing down the ontological politics, demands and promises of resilience" (Randalls and Simon, 2017: 43). In other words, to analyse the respective spatial ontology of the utilization of resilience is to encounter the very concrete meaning of the otherwise fuzzy boundary object. *Interventions* are the second axis of the analysis of resilience in its specific context. The examination of practices that have been established to foster resilience reveals how it is understood in a certain context and to what degree resilience is demanded by whom (Randalls and Simon, 2017: 46).

All three forms of resilience and both proposed axes for analyses, as well as the empirical accounts pursued for example by Jonathan Joseph (2018), require that resilience is identified in one way or another. However, this reduces resilience to those instances in which someone calls a certain practice or policy "resilience". But how do we know resilience if we are to abstain from putting a label on it or if we encounter empirical cases where there is no explicit reference to resilience, such as in the case of the Dresden floods? Bourbeau (2018b: 13–14, emphasis in original) proposes to "define resilience as *the process of patterned adjustments adopted in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks, to maintain, to marginally modify, or to transform a referent object*". This definition refers to adaptation as the common core of most understandings of resilience. Resilience as an adjustment process might still embrace all three narratives of resilience, since it draws on pre-existing capacities (*resilience found*), such as economic and social capital or bodily abilities (see: chapter 6), can be fostered by practices (*resilience made*) and affects the *unfinished resilient* subject. Thus, it does not foreclose the opportunity to analyse a wide spectrum of resilience accounts, from post-structural ones that associate it with neoliberal governmentality (Joseph, 2013) to those that link resilience to

material capacities (see: chapter 6). Moreover, it also allows us to see resilience as a process of patterned adjustment in those incidents in which no one calls a certain practice "resilient".

7.5 Resilience in the absence of resilience policies

In Dresden and as has been shown to be the case in disasters for over half a century (Drabek and McEntire, 2003; Fritz and Williams, 1957), people coordinated, orchestrated and planned activities in the midst of urgency, confusion and disorder. The case thus highlights a common tension in disaster response situations, namely the conflicts that arise from the convergence of first responders and volunteers offering their help on the one hand and the command-and-control logics imposed by state institutions on the other (Scanlon et al., 2014). However, the classical literature on emergent behaviour in disasters has primarily focused on examining and comparing individual disaster cases in order to establish typologies (Dynes and Aguirre, 1979; Quarantelli, 1988). Only recently have scholars tried to merge the literature on emergent societal structures with that of disaster resilience (Tierney, 2014, 2019) and to further adapt early typologies of group behaviour during disasters to new forms of disaster communication such as social media (Albris, 2018; Schmidt et al., 2018).

Drawing on these accounts, we argue that the multiple theoretical foci and the controversial debate on resilience that have emerged in recent years help us to understand the complex interplay between volunteers and official state structures in emergency and disaster response. In fact, the decentral, spontaneous and situational emergence of unaffiliated volunteering as well as the adaptive behaviour of disaster authorities is a prime example of the social enactment of a patterned adjustment process. Following Bourbeau (2018b), such a process *is* resilience. Unaffiliated volunteering is determined neither by certain memberships, such as in major disaster relief organizations, nor by state structures. The role that social media platforms played during the floods testifies to this. Membership in a Facebook group requires merely a click on the "like" button. Such volunteering is the result of the spontaneous and adaptive choices taken by individuals, local groups and communities that face a disruptive shock, reverberating scholars like Tierney (2014, 2019: 214) who stress the adaptive and dynamically changing features of what might be termed "adaptive resilience". It also represents an example of what James Brassett and Nick Vaughan-Williams (2015: 38) have termed a

"performative approach to resilience", since the resilience of some actors, i.e. unaffiliated volunteers, emerged as a response to state regulations and subsequently seem to be shaping future emergency governance plans in Dresden and beyond. This kind of unwanted resilience is *found*, *made* and *unfinished*. It is *found* by officials from state authorities and aid organizations alike within the society. It is *made* through self-organized civil-societal engagement, which parallels and at times hampers official plans for disaster relief. And it is *unfinished*, since it is constantly reshaped by changing societal relations and practices. In fact, the occurrence of emergent volunteering structures has urged professional disaster management bodies, such as the Red Cross, the municipal and even the national authorities to rethink and partly reshape their structural modus operandi. This in turn is likely to affect future incidences of unaffiliated volunteering.

Drawing on this first point, resilience appears as an emergent phenomenon to be governed and as a governance strategy in the making. The structures of emerging volunteering can be interpreted as a social phenomenon beyond the scope of individual decision-making and as part of a set of not yet materialized top-down governmental policies. State bodies, like disaster management authorities on various governmental levels and the local fire department in Dresden, hold their own expectations of how members of the public should act, engage and take responsibility for their own property. Yet, this was thoroughly counteracted by the actual manifestations of resilience, i.e., in the form of online self-organization and unaffiliated volunteering. The emergence of resilience in the case of the 2013 Dresden floods was neither the decision of a state body nor of a single individual or an organized group, but a complex social phenomenon from a myriad of societal interactions. Even if some digital media infrastructures facilitated the process, the existence of these social media platforms merely served to mediate the manifestation of resilience as an emergent phenomenon. The example of Dresden ties into resilience thinking in which "complexity is understood to be a reality against which power is powerless" (Chandler, 2014b: 66).

Emerging new forms of governance in the aftermath of the flood are the product of organizational adaptation processes that have been spurred under the impression of the difficulties with unaffiliated volunteers. State authorities as well as aid organizations have developed strategies and plans for how to govern resilience as a social phenomenon. As an example, a set of GRC brochures (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 2014, 2017) represent a way of rendering

emerging structures of unaffiliated volunteers governable by "integrating the different groups of helpers according to their respective capacities and to the requirements of the relief work reasonably into the operations" (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 2015: 13). The disaster management entities on the local and state level have dealt with the same issues and expressed their willingness to implement social media monitoring in their local staff work and even to consult the initiators of central social media groups and activities (Landesamt für Umwelt, Landwirtschaft und Geologie, 2015: 203; Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013: 60, Interview 4). This is presumed to enable staff members to anticipate as well as to direct gatherings of unaffiliated volunteers and can be seen as an adaptive process on the part of the disaster management authorities. The highly adaptive behaviour of unaffiliated volunteers thus results in the pressure on state authorities to be similarly adaptive in order to render this emerging phenomenon governable.

7.6 Conclusion

In this article, we attempt to make sense of the complex and interdependent adaptation processes that were observable during the management of the 2013 floods in Dresden. By describing the case of unaffiliated volunteers and the ensuing critiques, we portray resilience as a patterned performative praxis that shapes societal relationships in mutually influencing adaptation processes. Therefore, we have argued for an approach to resilience that is in line with the three-pronged approach proposed by Simon and Randalls (2016), in which resilience can be found, made and unfinished all at once.

The case of the 2013 floods in Dresden is not a typical case of disaster resilience in which a local, regional or central authority would call for the resilience of the population vis-à-vis a potential or present calamity. Therefore, we cannot and do not want to state what resilience actually is. Rather, the more modest aim of this article is to make sense of empirically observable phenomena, namely diverging expectations on responsibilities between the professional emergency management authorities and parts of the population such as the emerging structures of unaffiliated volunteers. In Dresden, authorities responsibilized the population to conduct self-help and to adapt to their respective living situation. The active devolvement of responsibility did not, however, result in questioning the primacy of the state in disaster

management. As Joseph (2018: 189) states in his analysis of resilience policies, it is responsibility, not power, which is delegated to individuals and local communities.

However, Joseph (2018: 189) further concludes: "In fact it is by shifting responsibility that the power of the state is strategically enhanced". In contrast, we found a messier situation in Dresden. The dialectical process of delegating responsibility while upholding the primacy of the state sparked various self-initiatives by citizens ranging from state support to resistance against official flood management plans. Thus, it is not a given that the delegation of responsibility strategically increases state power. Rather, aid organizations and state bureaucracies were urged to adapt their structures to the emerging patterns of volunteering that organized via social media and challenged taken-for-granted assumptions about disaster management. Referring to the events in 2013, the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, as a national authority, has taken this topic up for consideration and formulated guidelines to enable local authorities to deal with unaffiliated volunteers via social media (BBK, 2017). The German Red Cross equally formulated guidelines to support their local branches in dealing with this phenomenon.

Finally, the case of Dresden is an example of what Kevin Grove (2013: 204) (2013: 204) calls "subversive resilience". This form of resilience uses the well-known and often discussed features of resilience such as responsibility or empowerment, not for the sake of assuring a smooth governance but to mobilize capacities in order to create "'mutant rules' of resilience" (Grove, 2014: 253) that challenge authority and lend resistance the means to persist (Bourbeau and Ryan, 2018). The emerging volunteering structures in the case of Dresden depict what Zebrowski (2016: 152) phrases as "the force of resilience to disrupt identity and coherence". The case thus serves as an instance of a subversive facet of resilience that has come to shape disaster emergency governance.

Spotlight 5

8. Visibilising the neglected: The emancipatory potential of resilience[18]

8.1 Introduction

Resilience has been variously criticised within the academic debate in security studies for being a manifestation of neoliberal governmentality. It is said to responsibilize the individual while advocating the withdrawal of the state (Evans and Reid, 2014; Joseph, 2013; Kaufmann, 2013; Neocleous, 2013). Even if an increasing number of authors question the inevitability of the link between resilience and neoliberalism (Grove, 2014; Schmidt, 2015, 2017), the general undertone still appears to be sceptical towards the use of resilience. Thereby, the current debate in security studies tends to focus on the premises of the ecological understanding of resilience, which deals with complex (socioecological) systems while side-lining other theoretical roots, such as those in psychology (Bourbeau, 2018a; Howell, 2015). Due to its ontological multiplicity (Aranda et al., 2012; Simon and Randalls, 2016) and conceptual fuzziness (Joseph, 2018), the analysis is mostly limited to specific political manifestations of resilience (Bourbeau, 2015a; Bourbeau and Ryan, 2018). The academic debate in security studies is thus driven by the hardly countable number of political resilience strategies popping up in several political fields and arenas. The multitude of disciplinary origins makes it hard to navigate theoretical assumptions of the term and throws many analyses back to a particular empirical manifestation of resilience.

This article analyses resilience from another, more abstract angle. It explicitly engages with the otherwise mostly implicit normative implications of resilience. Instead of criticising resilience for shifting responsibility, that is, responsibilizing actors, I seek to develop criteria for a normative assessment of those shifts in responsibility that result from resilience. The particular societal consequences should serve as yardstick for evaluating concrete manifestations of resilience. While this includes the analysis of responsibilizing effects or of the pitfalls in devolving responsibility instead of power (Joseph, 2018: 189; Kaufmann, 2013), such an analysis needs to go beyond holistic assessments that treat the population as homogeneous entity and resilience as consistently and inherently problematic. While there is no doubt that several

---

resilience policies entail morally illegitimate malicious effects, the mere finding that resilience responsibilizes a societal entity, that is, reallocates responsibility, tells us little about its ethical desirability or the legitimacy of this process. Depending on the accompanying conditions, a transfer of responsibility can either disadvantage and oppress or emancipate and privilege the affected societal entity (ranging from the individual to societal groups to entire societies). The justifiability of a rearrangement of the enacted mode of power due to a certain resilience approach consequently depends on its effects, that is, whether a responsibilizing move fosters marginalisation or emancipation (Forst, 2017: 10).

I argue that resilience entails an emancipatory potential, if it can be mobilised to initiate normatively desirable shifts in responsibility. I define emancipation as the dismantling of marginalising and oppressing societal structures, or, as Ken Booth (1991: 319) puts it in his seminal article, as "the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do." Resilience is suited to address the problematic marginalisation or even exclusion of individuals and societal groups in current security settings through its focus on coping capacities. Demanding resilience means to demand agency that rests on a set of capacities. Increasing resilience, thus, requires making those constraints visible that prevent people from reacting to adverse situations. This *visibilisation* facilitated by resilience thinking is then the precondition for a subsequent recognition and societal negotiation of different needs. While this does not mean that societal discrimination and injustices are eventually mitigated, revealing the effects of oppressive structures makes it harder to maintain them. This applies particularly for democracies, as according to Rainer Forst (2017: 10), democracy "must be understood as a process of criticism and justification, both within and outside of institutions, in which those who are subjected to rule become the co-authors of their political order." Consequently, resilience thinking can be mobilised to emancipate those who are side-lined in current security settings.

I seek to demonstrate the emancipatory potential of resilience in three steps. First, I briefly introduce the responsibilization debate in security studies to lay the ground for further theoretical reflections. Second, a case study on disaster management structures in Germany illustrates the argument. Disaster management is a prime policy field to analyse resilience, as resilience thinking has gained significantly momentum for more than one-and-a-half decades now (Joseph, 2018; Tierney, 2019). The role resilience plays in (international) disaster

management is aptly depicted by the prominence of the term within the two most recent UN Frameworks on international disaster management (UNDRR, 2005, 2015). The case study shows that people, who receive homecare either by their social environment or a nursing service, are currently de facto invisible for state authorities. This lack of visibility translates into the neglect of care-dependent people's needs in the making of disaster management practices and structures. The findings of the case study thereby speak to the broader issue of how diversity is embraced in disaster management practices in particular, and security practices in general. This section draws on 24 semi-structured expert interviews with German disaster professionals, conducted between October 2016 and September 2017. The experts were chosen according to their level of experience in past disasters (for example, a winter storm and the subsequent blackout in the region of Münster in 2005 as well as floods of the river Elbe between 2002 and 2013 and in the federal state of Brandenburg).

The findings indicate that current disaster management structures in Germany take self-help capacities of the population for granted. What sounds like an often (and rightly) criticised resilience approach producing the precarious neoliberal individual is actually situated in a classical security setting that assumes state's prime responsibility in disasters (Chandler, 2016: 14; Evans and Reid, 2014: 42). Against the backdrop of the case study, I illustrate how the capacity focus of resilience might entail an emancipatory potential.

Due to a lack of an empirical case in which the emancipatory potential of resilience unfolds, this article illustrates this potential in a counterfactual analysis. In the case of the German disaster management system, resilience did neither matter as a buzzword nor as a political concept. However, exactly such a case allows us to assess resilience's emancipatory potential, that is, what resilience *could* contribute to improve the status quo. This approach runs the risk of legitimising resilience as such. Yet, it simultaneously allows for a nuanced debate on the conditions necessary for causing justifiable shifts in responsibility.

Following the Frankfurt School's tradition of immanent critique (Honneth, 2001b; Stahl, 2022), I seek the emancipatory potential of resilience in those principles and norms that are already entangled in resilience discourses and practices. The critique on resilience revolves in many cases around the devolvement of responsibility and its focus on adaptation to threats rather than their mitigation (Evans and Reid, 2014; Joseph, 2018). Yet, neither is resilience nor is the

devolvement of responsibility inherently good or bad. We rather need to debate the normative implications of particular distributions of responsibility and of responsibilization processes in their respective contexts. While critics rightly pointed to problematic effects of several resilience policies (see, for example: Joseph, 2018), the emphasis of capacity and adaptability could also be used as a normative driver to call for the recognition of so far side-lined needs in society. Such a critique is not a critique of, but a critique with resilience. Therefore, the third step is to gauge the room for emancipation opened by resilience. For this end, I turn to Iris Marion Young's (2011) work on conditions for assessing the acceptability of distributions of responsibility as well as to concepts of recognition (Honneth, 2001a). Thereby, I understand recognition as a necessary, yet insufficient precondition for sparking emancipation processes. Jonathan Joseph (2018: 188) writes that "discussions of the philosophy of resilience that are divorced from actual policy-making run the risk of creating an imaginary world where discussions of resilience are not grounded in actualities." I argue, in contrast, that exactly those discussions are able to shape actualities. Just as Jonna Nyman (2016: 833–834) demonstrates for the case of security, I claim that studying resilience always involves normative judgements and should be done with respect to the specific context. Instead of pursuing a new form of "hectic empiricism" (Buzan, 1999: 4), the criticism of resilience should not restrict itself to arguably misled policies. Rather, the study of resilience in general and Foucauldian critiques in particular should analyse power relations and patterns of justification with the aim of pursuing a constructivist mode of criticism. Such a form of critique would correspond to how Ben Anderson (2016: 21) summarises Foucault's dream of a critique that "might aim to bring hidden, occluded or foreclosed possibilities to life by multiplying, summoning, and inventing". This article seeks to contribute to this end.

8.2 On resilience and responsibility

The reallocation of responsibility through resilience policies is one of the main points of critique in the contemporary resilience debate in security studies (Evans and Reid, 2014; Joseph, 2018; Kaufmann, 2013). The devolvement of responsibility to the local sphere and particularly to the individual, so the argument goes, legitimises the withdrawal of the state from its obligation to protect its population. Risk becomes then a private good that is to be negotiated by individuals as entrepreneurs of their own protection (Evans and Reid, 2014: 42). Mareile

Kaufmann (2016: 100) describes this process as follows: "As such, resilience places the responsibility to act out security within the resilient subject, relying upon the subject's capacity to be affected and its power to respond to urgency with action." While critics of resilience, such as Jonathan Joseph, deny its conceptual coherence, the shift in responsibility is identified as an universal feature of resilience. Moreover, this shift is portrayed as per se morally problematic, since only responsibility not power is devolved (Joseph, 2018: 189). While state bodies still authoritatively define necessary actions (that is, keep the power) they simultaneously delegate the responsibility to enact the given requirements to the individual. Those individuals made responsible to organise their own protection are not granted the means for living up to this demand, though. Responsibilization, in this sense, is an external ascription of responsibility that is imposed through the power position of the responsibilizing actor (see: chapter 6). The ethical acceptability of this responsibilization is less relevant. This is problematic, because 'the discourse talks of putting local people "in the driving seat" when in reality the direction of the journey has already been decided.' (Joseph, 2013: 48)

This debate of the distribution of responsibility is based on two central assumptions that I want to engage with in the remainder of the article. The first, often implicit, assumption is that the devolvement of responsibility is per se problematic. I doubt that assumption. While responsibility should certainly be linked to power and capacity, it is not only the shift in responsibility, but more generally, the distribution of responsibility among different societal levels and actors that should be the subject of analysis. Consequently, the ability to take up the transferred responsibility is crucial for determining the acceptability of a particular change in the allocation of responsibility, be it the responsibilization of state authorities, societal groups, or single individuals. The picture of the allocation of responsibility is messier than current resilience debates imply. Marginalised actors might pro-actively want to be resilient, as Caitlin Ryan (2015) demonstrated in the case of Palestinian women exercising Sumud. This debate is taken up in the last part of the article that seeks to sketch out premises for a desirable distribution of responsibility.

The second assumption is closely linked to the claim of the withdrawing state. This implies that there was a universal (or at least paramount) state-centric allocation of responsibility for the protection of the population in pre-resilience security regimes. Accordingly, the preferable clear-cut state responsibility for protection has been eroding through the emergence of

resilience thinking. Yet, there has always been an, at times implicit, distribution of responsibility that also includes an individual responsibility at least for self-help. The implicit assumption of exclusive or paramount state responsibility for protection, which often comes with the critique of resilience, implies that states would comprehensively know and satisfy the different needs of their population. This assumption, however, underestimates the unequal consideration of security interests in the process of allocating resources. This inequality regularly disadvantages particular societal groups along power frictions and finally creates vulnerabilities. We can see this in past disasters, when class, race, gender, and ability strongly determined the likelihood of being killed, injured, or otherwise severely harmed (Alexander, 2015; Tierney, 2019). Feminist security scholars criticised the problematic homogenisation of the population in security theories that lead to a structural neglect of women's security interests (Enloe, 1989; Robinson, 2011; Tickner, 1992). In a critique on Human Security, Fiona Robinson (2011: 50–51) pointed out how the rights-based idea of the ungendered individual in Human Security side-lines women's security issues and reinforces existing gender hierarchies. Analogous, the discriminating effects of the able-bodied and able-minded normality in contemporary state-centric security regimes tends to be underestimated. I seek to demonstrate in the following section that selection biases are necessary effects of the unequal ability to inscribe particular interests into state action. From this point of view, state responsibility for security becomes not only a part of the solution, but is also a part of the problem. Resilience might then even become a chance to scrutinise the selection bias of security authorities by pointing to adaptation and the therefore necessary coping capacities on various societal levels. The case study in the subsequent section presents the neglect of care-dependent people in German disaster management as a case in point for this emancipatory potential of resilience.

8.3 The neglected others: The marginalisation of care-dependent people in disaster management

8.3.1 The distribution of responsibilities in a state-centric disaster management system

Resilience is still a rather recent phenomenon in the international security arena. Where politics are grounded in resilience thinking, they are more often than not problematic, as several analyses demonstrate (Evans and Reid, 2014; Grove, 2013; Joseph, 2013, 2018; Malcolm, 2013; Rogers, 2013). The endeavour to demonstrate how resilience could contribute to the emancipation of marginalised individuals works best by looking at a case in which resilience remains an absent political concept. This counter-factuality lends the analysis the scope to think about hitherto unrealised potentials instead of being limited to the pitfalls of the existing manifestations of resilience thinking. The German disaster management system is such a case, since it is characterised by a strong focus on state responsibility and public obligations. The concept of resilience, which is prominent in British and US strategies, is largely missing on the German political agenda in disaster management (Joseph, 2018: 98–104). In fact, a report by the German federal government from 2019 extensively elaborates on the labour division between the federal government, the 16 "Länder" (federal states) and the municipalities. It describes subsidiarity as the underlying idea of the German disaster management framework (Deutscher Bundestag, 2019: 3). Like previous risk analyses by the federal government (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010, 2011, 2016), the 2019 report echoes the primacy of state responsibility for disaster protection. The mode of German disaster management is inherently statist, as its official characterisation in the 2010 rationale for risk analyses demonstrates:

> *"The protection of the population against special threats is one of the most urgent tasks of the modern state. Germany has traditionally established a vertically structured, subsidiary system of emergency planning and assistance for emergency response that is predominantly based on voluntarism, in which the federal government, the federal states and municipalities work in close cooperation with the huge relief organisations and the fire departments." (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010: 9)[19]*

---

[19] All quotes from documents in German language are translated by the author.

Volunteerism means in this context primarily the organised, permanent, yet voluntary engagement in aid organisations, volunteer fire brigades, and other established organisations. Societal resilience is thus regarded as the result of a successfully integrated risk management between different institutional actors in civil protection rather than a task of civil society, let alone the individual (Deutscher Bundestag, 2019: 27). However, the German civil protection strategy also emphasises the need to improve self-help abilities within the population. Self-help is thereby thought of as a temporary substitute for state bodies' capacity during a crisis. The German Federal Office for Citizen Protection and Disaster Support (BBK), a central state agency in the field of disaster relief, assumes the reasons for deficits in society's self-help capacity in the lack of sensitivity, motivation, knowledge, and personnel resources to transfer knowledge (BBK, 2002: 40–41). In its state of affairs report, the scientific service of the German Bundestag likewise affirms that the population generally shall be encouraged to increase its self-help abilities. This, however, is not a general shift of responsibility but an acknowledgement of the demographic change and the eventual decline in numbers of volunteers, which will diminish the state's capacity (Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestags, 2017: 3–4).[20]

The emphasis of self-help is the result of witnessed limitations in civil defence and public disaster management abilities, for example in the case of Saxony; a federal state in the Eastern part of Germany that experienced several major floods between 2002 and 2013. In August 2002, numerous mountain rivers swelled rapidly due to heavy rainfalls and caused vast destruction. The main river of the region, the Elbe, burst its banks and hit additional parts of Saxony during the subsequent days. During these events, 20 people died, 110 were injured and some tens of thousands needed to be evacuated (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2002: 13). Several interview partners in responsible positions agreed that all disaster management institutions involved were overwhelmed by the task the flood set (Interviews 1-4; 6; 7 and 10). Despite a broad range of problems, the evaluation by the Saxon state government mentions an increased demand for the population's self-protection only once (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2002: 249). Additionally, the responsibility of the population is only addressed insofar as the

---

[20] While other key regulations like the Federal Law for Civil Defence and Disaster Assistance (ZSKG) see self-protection as a central feature in civil defence (§ 1 ZSKG), the responsibility to develop self-protection within the population is delegated to the municipal administrative level, rather than to the civil society or single individuals (§ 5 ZSKG).

need for improved disaster communication is articulated as a precondition for enhancing self-help abilities (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2002: 185). Eleven years and two major floods later, the Saxon state government published another evaluation report of the so-called "Kirchbach Commission" in 2013. This report assesses the implementation of the recommendations from 2002 during the 2013 floods. Notwithstanding its longer duration and a larger affected area, the water level remained slightly under the level in 2002 with less destruction caused by mountain rivers (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013: 26–27). The floods in 2013 caused significantly less damage and no casualties (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013: 5). The report expresses the commission's satisfaction with the effects of the flood protection measures implemented as lessons learned after 2002 (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013: 58). This assessment is echoed by several interview partners who confirmed the tremendous improvements since 2002 (Interviews 3; 4; 5 and 8). In line with the disaster management policies on the federal level and the flood report from 2002, the 2013 report mainly refers to the state responsibility for flood protection. In its conclusion, however, it calls for the identification of means to bring the population as well as economic actors to take more responsibility (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013: 58). This call is seconded by the reconstruction committee that calls in its report several times for an increase in self-provision (Freistaat Sachsen, 2013a: 34-38, 84-85).

While the 2002 report was arguably published prior to the emergence of resilience as a popular buzzword in civil protection, the 2013 report came out at a time when resilience has already claimed a prominent position on the agenda in disaster management and contingency planning (Grove, 2013; Joseph, 2018; Tierney, 2014: 87; Walker and Cooper, 2011). However, neither the 2002 nor the 2013 report advocated for a devolvement of responsibility to the individual and the withdrawal of public institutions. Quite the opposite, the centrality of state institutions' responsibility for civil protection are emphasised. This reflects the general modus operandi in the German disaster management system. Moreover, experiences from other disasters like the winter storm and subsequent blackout in the German region of Münster or several floods in the state of Brandenburg confirm this finding (Interviews 14; 15 and 18). In all these incidents, state institutions, along with volunteers and professional disaster relief workers from several disaster organisations, were the backbone of disaster relief. The population was expected to stockpile and make some personal provisions as advised by state bodies (BBK, 2017). In this vein, self-determined practices, such as spontaneous ad hoc

volunteering, was seen as an ambivalent phenomenon that might increase relief capacities while running the risk of undermining state authority and control in disaster relief operations (Sächsische Staatskanzlei, 2013).

To sum up, German disaster management policies emphasise state responsibility and do not seek to legitimise the withdrawal of the state. The emphasis on necessary individual self-help capacities rather results from the insight that limited state capacities restrict the ability of public disaster management to comprehensively protect the population. Self-help is thus not an end in itself. However, the pursued top-down approach, the focus on specific risk scenarios (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011, 2014, 2019) as well as the dominant reliance on expert knowledge led to a selection bias in the consideration of needs and finally to the structural discrimination of those whose needs are not considered. The described state-centric policies rest on implicit assumptions about capacities in and needs of the population. They produce a notion of normality that privileges the anticipated needs over those that are deviant from the assumptions. Consequently, deviance leads to neglect and eventually to marginalisation, as will be subsequently shown using the example of care recipients.

8.3.2 The neglected others: Care recipients' invisibility in disaster management policies

Care recipients are largely side-lined in current disaster management structures. They are either treated as mere objects or even completely absent in disaster relief policies. The German Red Cross explicates that "[e]xperiences from disaster relief operations make clear that this group is not explicitly taken into account and that their special care requirements are often unknown to disaster relief forces." (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 2018c: 9) This lacking knowledge translates into their marginalisation in case of a disaster, since care recipients in many cases do not fit the anticipated and imagined normality disaster relief measures are designed for. One interview partner, who works as a disaster manager on the municipal level, illustrates this neglect by stating that

"the municipality is able and obliged to provide emergency shelters. These emergency shelters are of course only intended for normal citizens – well, normal citizens in quotation marks – who are able to self-rescue." [21] *(Interview 4)*

This Janus-faced disaster management provides help only to those who fit the assumed norm. Others are disadvantaged, as the interviewee confirms by continuing that:

"We had a beautiful gymnasium in service and it turned out that it was handicapped accessible. However, handicapped accessible meant the existence of one elevator, and you always need to go one story down. The access to the hall was in the basement. … That does not work, that is not made for the accommodation of a huge number of persons with a limited ability to self-rescue." (Interview 4)

After realising that the gymnasium did not fit its purpose, the municipal authority managed to organise an unused reception centre of the German Red Cross to accommodate persons with disabilities. The interviewee further stated that the municipal administration (in form of the fire brigade) felt indeed to be in charge of transporting impaired people. However, they needed to be told whereto to be able to execute this task. The lack of adequate equipment for helping care recipients continued when it came to camp beds, which were not suitable for many care recipients as they would not be able to get out of bed, according to one experienced disaster relief worker from an aid organisation (Interview 7). However, nursing camp beds were, in many cases, not available and only purchased after the witnessed incidences (Interview 6 and 8). Moreover, there is a lack of trained volunteers to nurse care-dependent people while accommodated in emergency shelters. Adequate care could only be provided spontaneously through the evacuation of nursing homes and the take-over of their staff (Interview 8 and 20) or the availability of some trained staff employed by relief organisations (Interview 7). However, none of the analysed cases showed a systematic approach to ensure an appropriate accommodation and treatment of care-dependent people. While centralised facilities like nursing homes could be evacuated in the analysed cases, the authorities had little or even no knowledge of the number of people receiving homecare, let alone of their needs during a disaster and their available resources. The complexity of anticipating the location and diverse needs of care-dependent people is exacerbated by the broad spectrum of homecare

---

[21] All interviews were conducted in German language. Quotes are translated by the author.

arrangements. These are very heterogeneous, ranging from care as a service, provided by professional nursing services, to private care that is exclusively carried out by the care recipient's social environment. Between these poles, a broad continuum of hybrid care arrangements exists, with different degrees of precarity, fragility, and eventually of vulnerability to disturbances. In a representative survey on needs during a winter storm with a temporary blackout, one in two care recipients answered that (s)he would need medical assistance (Schulze et al., 2019: 19). The majority of care recipients and their care-giving social environment consider either state institutions or, if applicable, nursing services to be responsible for the necessary support (Schulze et al., 2019: 69).

In contrast to this reliance on state institutions, those interviewees being in relevant positions stated that they had no information on the needs or the whereabouts of homecare recipients, since there was no central database available for disaster relief workers (Interview 3; 12; 15; 17 and 24). A disaster-experienced interviewee doubted the usability of a database due to the tremendous efforts to keep them up to date. An outdated database, in contrast, would run the risk of wasting scarce resources in an emergency (Interview 3). The interviewees had only vague ideas of what institution might possess relevant datasets, such as health insurances or nursing services. However, there is no established routine to systematically gather information on a given vulnerable group in order to assist in case of an emergency. Moreover, the majority of care recipients in Germany is nursed by their relatives at home without the involvement of any professional nursing service (Destatis, 2020). Bearing in mind the potentially high demand of assistance, the satisfaction of the care recipients' needs in these cases depends on their ability to organise a support structure by themselves.

This became a salient issue during another disaster, namely the 2005 snowstorm in the region of Münster, situated in the Western part of Germany. The storm caused the most serious black out in the German post-war history affecting around 250,000 people for up to four days. The blackout hit primarily rural areas around the city of Münster. It sparked a reflection process about the potentials and limits of German disaster relief forces (Deutschländer and Wichura, 2005: 163). An interviewed official from the regional disaster authority confirmed that some needs of people in need of care are simply invisible for disaster relief authorities. The location of the increasing number of people in need of artificial respiration living in shared flats was widely unknown to the relief forces (Interview 17). The interviewee described this precarious

situation as follows: "If there is a black out in the area of a huge town and the [ventilator] machines start to struggle after three or four hours due to empty batteries, no crisis staff would know it" (Interview 17). Institutions in the health and care sector are designed for functioning daily routines. Disturbances of these routines are regularly considered as 'uncontrollable' events (Interview 15). Pushing disturbances beyond the limits of the controllable and manageable deprives them of their actionability and leaves the affected care recipients on their own. Neither professionals in the health sector nor disaster relief structures feel able or responsible to effectively provide help in case of an emergency.

The example of the treatment of homecare recipients in German disaster management demonstrated the neglect of care-dependent people as a heterogeneous group with various needs that are beyond disaster management's notion of normality. However, due to the high demand for external assistance, care recipients are particularly vulnerable. Although state institutions consider themselves as main authority for disaster relief, the distribution of support appears to be selective and excludes those with a high demand for assistance. This precarious situation is exacerbated by their below-average economic situation. The above-cited representative survey states that about one of three care recipients feels not able to stockpile food for economic reasons (Schulze et al., 2019: 60). The structural marginalisation of care-dependent people in disaster management is thus amplified by their underprivileged economic position. This omission has not changed, although regions like Saxony significantly improved their overall disaster management structures after the repeated occurrence of floods. However, care recipients as well as impaired people have apparently not been able to inscribe their needs into disaster management routines.

This is not a matter of bad will by the rescue forces, but a result of the structural problem to account for the broad range of diverse needs of more than 3.3 million people receiving homecare in Germany (Destatis, 2020: 19). The result is that care recipients are disproportionally burdened, since they are urged to organise disaster relief on their own to be prepared for an emergency. Care recipients are thus not responsibilized by the rise of resilience thinking, but due to their invisibility and the strategic selection bias of state-centred security politics (Jessop, 2016). In the remainder of this article, I argue that resilience has something to offer to improve the situation of care recipients and other so far neglected societal groups. The resilience discourse shifts the attention to personal needs and capacities. Those whose needs

are side-lined by public disaster management are responsibilized anyway. An increased shift to people's needs and capacities can help to shed light on societal diversity. This form of *visibilisation* is the precondition for the recognition and the subsequent deliberation of so far neglected needs.

8.4 On responsibility, responsibilization, and justification

The neglect of care recipients' needs in German disaster management is just one example of the treatment of societal diversity in security politics. It leads to a situation in which people are rendered vulnerable through societal marginalisation and exclusionary processes. In this context, the vulnerability of societal groups, such as care recipients, is less the result of missing bodily abilities for self-help, but rather of societal structures that miss to take their particular needs into account. In other words: Those whose needs are considered shape security policies, while those whose needs are not considered need to struggle to adapt to state security policies or are thrown back to self-help. This marginalisation process is not limited to care recipients but occurs as an intersectional phenomenon along different sociodemographic markers. Kathleen Tierney defines intersectionality as a concept "to refer to the ways in which multiple dimensions of stratification and inequality come together to shape people's life circumstance and life chances" (Tierney, 2019: 127). She identifies social class, race, and gender as main categories, but also acknowledges the role of age and (dis)ability in influencing someone's vulnerability. In this reading, vulnerability is not an ontological feature of a demographic group, but the result of societal processes and power hierarchies that privilege some while disadvantaging others. The case study demonstrated that care recipients' need of help cannot be reduced to personal limitations, but also results from structural factors as shown above.

Tierney gives another example for the effects of intersectionality and stratified levels of affectedness. Post hoc disaster management measures after Hurricane Katrina discriminated against renters who suffered from increased rental costs while not profiting from loan programmes. They were thus structurally disadvantaged and rendered more vulnerable to the hurricane by public policies. Moreover, these programmes were designed in a manner that privileged those homeowners, who lived in more expensive neighbourhoods. Not quite

surprisingly, these relief structures disadvantaged persons of colour, women, and disabled people who were marginalised pre-disaster and the more so during as well as in the aftermath of a disaster (Tierney, 2019: 124; 140-142).

Societal power structures effect that some people are more able to inscribe their interests into state structures than others. Those who are not able to make their voices heard will find it hard to put their security concerns or needs on the agenda, particularly if they differ from what is considered "normal". This finding is not new and has been addressed, for example, by feminist approaches to security studies (Hansen, 2000). However, it points to the ethical necessity of asking whose security it is that we are actually talking about (McDonald, 2016). The choice of the referent object is crucial, since it determines on what level and with whom in mind security – and likewise resilience – is negotiated. The omission of that reflection leads to the reproduction of prevailing power hierarchies and therewith of a normality that provides means of protection to those who are most able to make their voices heard. This distributional injustice of security measures follows the Matthew effect[22], as observed for decades, for example, in disaster management (Tierney, 2019: 127). While security practices are shaped to help those who are privileged anyway, those who are deviant from the imagined normality are neglected and, due to the lacking possibility to influence political outcomes, eventually marginalised. Consequently, since state policies take insufficiently account of their needs, marginalised individuals and groups are de facto made responsible to take care of themselves. The case of the Vietnamese Catholic community's self-help during Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005 demonstrated how the social capital of an otherwise marginalised societal group can contribute to disaster resilience and compensate for the lack of other sources of resilience (Uekusa, 2018). Despite being economically underprivileged, this community proved to be unexpectedly resilient against the hazard (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015: 260; Uekusa, 2018: 186–187). Yet, the resilience of the Vietnamese Catholic community was not a product of state support policies in the first place, but of their social capital and their ability to mobilise help that eventually led to a political recognition of their needs (Tierney, 2014: 117). Looking at marginalised groups thus shows us that, depending on what referent we are analysing, responsibility for protection has been allocated at the individual and local level for quite some

---

[22] The Matthew effect (or Matthew principle) refers to a distributional injustice, whereby those who are in a socioeconomically privileged position gain the greatest advantage from a particular decision while less privileged others gain less or are even disadvantaged.

time; even before the emergence of resilience. However, it has mostly remained invisible due to the affectedness of mostly neglected or marginalised groups.

These existing de facto distributions of responsibility are problematic, since they are the result of a particular selection bias of state policies determining whose needs are seen and whose needs remain neglected. However, this de facto distribution of responsibility has rarely been addressed when assessing either the effects or the potential of resilience. Quite the opposite, critics of resilience have emphasised the shift of responsibility for protection from the national to the local level and from the community to the individual in International Relations in general and security studies in particular (Evans and Reid, 2014; Joseph, 2013, 2016; Kaufmann, 2013). While in many cases justified, the generality of the critique is problematic due to a threefold flaw. First, it misses to make the referent object of resilience explicit by asking, "Who is responsibilized through resilience?'. Rather, critics speak of 'neoliberal subjects" (Joseph, 2016: 371) or "resilient subjects" (Chandler, 2016: 14; Evans and Reid, 2014: 42) and therewith homogenise "the individual"[23]. This is a pitfall, since the power positions of individuals differ fundamentally, as famously argued by Fiona Robinson in the critique of Human Security's blindness for gender differences (Robinson, 2011). In fact, those who have been marginalised, whose voices have been silenced and whose needs have been ignored before resilience gained momentum, cannot be additionally responsibilized through resilience. They had already been urged to take responsibility for their own protection before the rise of resilience started, as the example of care recipients in German disaster management demonstrates. The process of responsibilization only accounts for those, who were previously able to make their needs heard in the process of shaping security policies. The responsibilizing effect of resilience policies hits those, whose needs have so far been considered most, the hardest. The critique of resilience thus (unconsciously) reproduces a problematic notion of normality of the able-bodied and able-minded middle-class referent object by generalising the claimed shift in responsibility.

Second, and building upon the first point, although resilience does not necessarily lead to a general shift in responsibility, it generally legitimises the allocation of responsibility at the individual and local level by drawing from the connection between resilience and complexity

---

[23] The flaws of such a generalisation is well demonstrated by Fiona Robinson's (2011) *The Ethics of Care*.

(Chandler, 2014b). Following this line of thought, David Chandler (2016: 14) rightly states that "[r]esilience is a key concept within neoliberal discourse, denoting a positive internal attribute of being able to positively adapt to change". However, although adaptability is regarded as inherently positive, the resilience discourse blurs the allocation of responsibility rather than causing a simple shift. This can be seen in the discussion of disaster resilience on the level of the UN. The Hyogo Framework (UNDRR, 2005) as well as the Sendai Framework (UNDRR, 2015) emphasise the key responsibility of the nation-state for disaster relief, *while* responsibilizing both the subnational and the international sphere (see chapter 4).

Third, the way in which the term *responsibilization* is used insinuates the illegitimacy of a potential devolvement of responsibility. However, this does not meet the ethical core of responsibility. The acceptability and desirability of a certain constellation of responsibility depends on the respective context and is less clear-cut as current critics imply. A shift in responsibility might be justified and even desirable depending on the contextual circumstances. Thus, the next section sketches out criteria for a more nuanced assessment of the legitimacy of distributions of responsibility.

8.5 Responsibility and emancipation

In the tradition of the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory, Iris Marion Young (1990) argues for the recognition of difference, thus of deviant needs and perspectives, as precondition for societal justice. A recognition of different societal perspectives and positions is key for identifying a desirable distribution of (political) responsibility. Such a distribution is in turn crucial for ascribing legitimate expectations of actions to different actors in order to mitigate existing injustices. Consequently, responsibilization is prima facie a description of the process of shifting responsibility by declaring someone responsible for something. Assessing the legitimacy of such a move is a subsequent step and needs to be based on normatively justifiable categories. First, this section proposes an understanding of responsibility and how it is related to societal justice. Second and drawing on Young's (2011) work, it seeks to lay out criteria for a justifiable distribution of responsibility that neither objectifies nor unduly burdens societal actors.

In her concept of shared responsibilities for creating social justice, Young (2011) argues that responsibility in complex social structures needs to be distributed between the various actors involved. Responsibility has different temporal reference points and includes a retrospective and a prospective dimension (Ammicht Quinn, 2014a: 123). In its retrospective dimension, responsibility can be thought as referring to a past event or development and is mostly used in the context of past wrongdoings. Responsibility for future action then results from past failures or omissions that led to the existing injustice. In its forward-looking perspective and in the context of societal justice, responsibility means the moral obligation to alter or at least challenge those societal conditions that are identified as being unjust (Zehng, 2019: 122–123).

Young (2011: 142–147) proposes to assess the ethical acceptability of the distribution of responsibility based on the four parameters *power*, *privilege*, *interest*, and *collective ability*. Such an assessment necessarily differs from lopsided calls for either the caring state or the resilient subject and provides the basis for a more fine-grained ethical analysis. Although Young (2011: 142) developed these parameters in the context of social justice, her arguments are equally helpful to analyse distributions of responsibility in other policy areas in which justice plays a crucial role. Security is such a field. In Young's reasoning, powerful agents (be it institutions or individuals) bear greater responsibility than less powerful agents. Furthermore, the more one is privileged by certain structures, the greater is the respective responsibility for the outcomes and side effects those structures create. Collective ability is another parameter and means that the greater the ability to rally people to act jointly, thus, to pool power, the greater the responsibility (not) to change certain structures and situations. According to Young (2011: 147), this means that "[u]nions, church groups, and stockholder organizations, to name just a few, sometimes can enact significant power not because they can coerce others to do what they decide, but because they have many members who act together."

Also those, who are negatively affected by certain structures, do carry at least some responsibility, since they have an interest to remedy these grievances. This parameter sounds counterintuitive, if not cynical, as it shifts responsibility to those suffering the most from injustice. Young (2011: 146) defends this claim by arguing that

"victims of injustice should take some responsibility for challenging the structures that produce it. It is they who know the most about the harms they suffer, and thus it is up to them, though not them alone, to broadcast their situation and call it injustice."

In fact, on a closer look, negating victims' responsibility to name a situation or structure unjust means to deny their agency. Notwithstanding the responsibility of the powerful, the privileged, and the connected, victims of injustice need to name problems from their perspective in order to avoid undue paternalism. A legitimate distribution of responsibility nonetheless needs to assure that the ascribed responsibility to voice problems does not overwhelm the affected individuals' capacities. In the worst case, this would equally lead to silencing this perspective. Young's parameter *interest*, thus, needs to be assessed against the backdrop of the capacities that are available to live up to the ascribed responsibility. A lack of the ability to issue one's interest should then be read as a problematic, and certainly unjust, exclusion. However, this stance on responsibility does not release the beneficiaries of societal power structures from reflecting on those who might be disadvantaged by the same structures.

Sticking further to the Frankfurt School's tradition of Critical Theory, enhancing societal justice can be thought in terms of enhancing the recognition of so far neglected needs and interests (Honneth, 2001a) or of material redistribution (Fraser, 2003), whereby recognition may be considered as the precondition for redistribution. Either way, the just consideration of neglected or marginalised perspectives is to result in the emancipation of the disadvantaged. In line with Ken Booth (1991: 319), I understand emancipation as

"the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on."

This emancipation process is linked to increased power and privilege. As argued by Young, the degree of legitimate responsibility correlates with the respective ability to live up to the requirements (that is, power and collective ability) and the degree to which the referent of responsibility takes advantage from a current social structure (that is, privilege) (Young, 2011). While emancipation mitigates oppressing structures and unjust inequalities, it increases

autonomy and therefore creates "socially, morally, and politically autonomous subjects of justification or as authorities within a normative order" (Forst, 2017: 11). Following this ideal of a just distribution of responsibility, the emancipation of so far marginalised individuals or groups would legitimise a shift in the distribution of responsibility towards the now more emancipated social entity.

8.6 Resilience, visibilisation, and emancipation

The differentiation between a general notion of responsibilization, i.e., shifting responsibility, and legitimising a certain distribution of responsibility, which happens to burden the individual while releasing the state from its responsibility for protection, is ethically crucial. As argued above, essentialising resilience as facilitator of undue responsibilization processes is a misleading generalisation. Rather, resilience can contribute to emancipation. The academic discourse in critical security studies that rejects shifts in responsibility turns a blind eye on the question of what might be an acceptable portion of responsibility for whom. A general denial of this question unduly homogenises the population and implies that there was *the* right portion of responsibility everyone could legitimately bear. However, this implication obscures the unequal distribution of power, privilege, interest, and collective ability within the population. It runs the risk of reproducing the Matthew principle by obscuring that a shift of responsibility is de facto only for those people possible who were ex ante privileged enough to delegate a certain responsibility for their own protection to the state. Defining resilience as a strategy to legitimise a neoliberal modus operandi of protection, in contrast, at least implicitly justifies the ex-ante distribution of responsibility. This is problematic in itself. It would be more sensible to criticise the (un)intended consequences of resilience policies by showing unfavourable consequences, rather than condemning a policy just because it redistributes responsibility.

The justification for the deployment of resilience as an organising principle points to the limits of knowledge (Chandler, 2014b; Urry, 2005b), the necessity to introduce a possibilistic rationality in security thinking (Amoore, 2013), and thus the need for a decentral allocation of the responsibility for protection. This serves as justification for resilience to become increasingly important in political life (Brassett et al., 2013: 222; Grove and Adey, 2015: 78). Particularly in disaster management, a policy field that deals per definition with the unknown and the

inevitable (though influenceable), resilience appears to be a plausible concept to mitigate vulnerability and thus the high toll disasters are regularly claiming (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015: 254–255; UNDRR, 2005, 2015). However, the approach of resilience still needs to be supplemented by a normatively acceptable justification.

Herein lies the pitfall of those current resilience policies limiting themselves to devolving responsibility while keeping power at the state level (Joseph, 2018: 189). These policies call for increased capabilities without providing the means to live up to the transferred demands. This transfer of responsibility is undue, since it disregards structural injustices and individual capacities while calling for individual capabilities. In this context, Rainer Forst (2017: 12) argues that the "problem appears most clearly, when it is proposed to compensate the effects of such injustice through benevolent conduct by individuals". Many political resilience strategies do exactly this. They call for building individual capabilities to compensate for the adverse effects of unjust, yet unaddressed, societal structures. This reveals a justice problem of resilience policies that is exacerbated by the tendency to hold the most structurally disadvantaged individuals and groups now responsible for their incapacity to live up to the requirements of self-help.

Notwithstanding these problematic resilience policies, there might be room for an emancipatory resilience approach. In the first place, such an approach would address the preconditions for legitimately calling for a more resilient population. This requires asking: (a) How resilient is resilient enough?; (b) What is needed to be resilient?; and (c) How and by whom can the required capabilities be obtained? Drawing on the case study, such a resilience approach would make necessary capabilities explicit. It would be critical towards empirical observations of what is called resilience and flourish in the realm of the possible, yet currently contrafactual. It would pursue the premises of critical theory as

a connection between reflection in philosophy and in social science informed by an interest in emancipation. It enquires into the rational form of a social order that is both historically possible and normatively justified in general terms. At the same time, it asks why the existing power relations within (and beyond) a society prevent the emergence of such an order (Forst, 2017: 1).

Such a resilience approach would create an irritation, as it would challenge both, those approaches that are criticised for unduly shifting responsibility without enquiring the preconditions for its enactment and the well-travelled general criticism of any responsibilization linked to resilience. In short, it would question established truths and thus be performed critique (Burgess, 2019: 98). Such a form of critique could be subsumed as immanent critique, since it seeks to unveil the emancipatory potential within a certain concept rather than contrasting it with the ideal utopia (Wyn Jones, 2005: 220). It therewith represents an "affirmative critique of resilience" (Zebrowski, 2016: 152), understood as a way to use resilience in a subversive manner beyond its current, in many cases neoliberal manifestations. If we accept that there are unknown, unexpected, or inevitable malicious events that might result in catastrophic consequences harming the neglected and underprivileged the most, then resilience appears to have something to offer to remedy injustice. The merit of resilience is its capacity focus that is foundational for the demanded adaptability.

I call this contribution of resilience *visibilisation*, the process of making capacities and the lack thereof visible in the public debate and thus to power structures. The *visibilisation* of diversity and plurality as structural features of a society are then necessary steps to subsequently recognise individual needs and constraints and to potentially foster resilience, either as a value (Zebrowski, 2016), an "ideal type" (Chandler, 2016: 14) or a concept (Bourbeau, 2018b). Neither *visibilisation* nor recognition necessarily lead to resilience or even emancipation. Yet both steps represent preconditions for a meaningful debate about how resilience could be facilitated and nurtured in society. If we follow Axel Honneth's (1992: 198) understanding of recognition as a precondition for a socially just society, then *visibilisation* is its epistemic foundation. In other words, the emancipatory potential of resilience lies in the chance to visibilise so far marginalised perspectives.

This stands in contrast to how resilience policies currently operate (Joseph, 2018). Yet, this shortcoming of today's manifestation of resilience is not an inevitable given (Schmidt, 2017). Therefore, exercising immanent critique on resilience is to unfold its emancipatory potential. Developing categories to analyse the legitimacy of a shift of responsibility appears as one way of doing so. Iris Marion Young's criteria for a just distribution of responsibility are such a basis to assess the legitimacy of a certain distribution of responsibilities. To illustrate how this emancipatory potential might work in practice, I want to return to the case study.

8.7 Visibilisation, recognition, and redistribution: The contingency of legitimate distributions of responsibility

People receiving homecare are in a precarious situation in disasters, except if they prove resilient and organise help via their social bonds and networks. In the current institutional setting, it is their social capital that lends them protection and increases their ability for self-help by making security authorities aware of their situation. But even if they manage to do so, it is far from being granted that disaster relief forces will have the know-how to satisfy the needs of a care-dependent person. The ambulatory care provider, in contrast, might neither be able to take care of their patients during a disaster nor to adequately and timely inform security authorities about the problematic situation (Interview 17). The insufficient link between welfare and security bureaucracies results in a blank spot that leaves care-dependent people in the worst case on their own.

Transferring the responsibility to organise help to the state is not an easy task. Even if some interviewees proposed to set up a central register of some form that make the information on home-cared persons actionable, such a database would suffer from two crucial disadvantages. First, several interviewees confirmed that the efforts to keep such a database up to date would exceed their current administrative capacities (Interviews 3; 17 and 24). Second, care recipients who actively refuse or unconsciously miss to feed sensitive personal data into the database might witness disadvantages in a disaster situation. Such a procedure would, again, responsibilize care recipients to reveal their data and thus render them subject to a discriminatory treatment due to their inability to self-help.

An emancipatory resilience approach, in contrast, would come from another angle. It would not put the potential disaster, but the capacities to be granted for keeping the population adaptive and resourceful centrepiece. An emancipatory resilience approach, firstly, needs to politicise the level of capacities different actors are required to have at their disposal. Is it up to state institutions to supply the population with groceries or are citizens supposed to stockpile? If that is the case, then for how many days? Are there state emergency shelters for everyone or do particular groups need to care for themselves? How fast does an ambulance or firefighter need to be at the site of operation? All these questions are inherently political and linked to capacities. They thus need to be deliberated to exchange perspectives and to scrutinise the justifiability of the different claims.

137

This justifiability is then, secondly, directly linked to the degree to which the different actors are privileged or disadvantaged by a certain distribution of responsibilities, and, above all, if they can live up to the ascribed responsibilities. Therefore, the capacities, needs, and constraints that either enable or prevent people from being resilient need to be balanced with the ascribed responsibilities. In accordance with the findings of the case study, David Alexander (2015) pointed out that disaster relief practices are simply not made for people with bodily needs or impairments that differ from the majority of the population. The lack of inclusivity we witness already in daily life is exacerbated during crises and results in the above-described marginalisation of some societal groups such as care-dependent people. Some first attempts to make so far neglected needs visible were undertaken by Katja Schulze et al. (2019: 60) whose research findings showed that those care recipients who do not stockpile do so disproportionally often due to a lack of economic capacity. An effective politics of protection for disabled and care-dependent people alike is based on such a *visibilisation* of needs. This *visibilisation* is best done through the involvement of affected people, in the sense of Young's criterion *interest*. The therefore necessary level of participation, representation, and inclusion can be facilitated by the capacity-focus of resilience.

The *visibilisation* of needs is the precondition for their recognition. However, recognition is more than *visibilisation*. Recognition encompasses to actively take a perspective into account (Honneth, 1992, 2001a). The process of recognition results in the negotiation of the different individual and collective resources and constraints as well as of granted privileges and existing needs. Comparing needs and resources is then the basis for an assessment of the actual capacities that allows for deliberating on just distributions of responsibility. It links these responsibilities to a possibly necessary material redistribution as quintessence of recognition in order to increase societal justice, just as Nancy Fraser (2003) argues. In this reading, the level of available resources, for example in form of social, economic, or cultural capital or in the level of inclusivity and accessibility of public spaces and means, need to be adequate to the ascribed responsibility. Young's (2011) four parameters *collective ability*, *power*, *privilege*, and *interest* could be a possible yardstick to assess the acceptability of a given distribution of responsibility. Such an analytical measure, however, forbids to condemn the devolvement of responsibility as such or to treat *the individual* as a homogeneous category. Bringing Young's categories into

practice means to contextually assess who can be legitimately held responsible for what and to what degree.

Due to capacity limitations on all societal levels, ranging from the individual to the whole society, a distribution of responsibilities is almost inevitably necessary. Yet, if the legitimacy of a distribution of responsibility depends on the level of available resources, then there is not the one right allocation of resources, but various principally justifiable distributions that might require the redistribution of resources to those who carry responsibility in order to be ethically acceptable.

Chandler (2016: 14) argued that resilience is a relative term that needs to be assessed against a particular situation. If there is no state of absolute resilience, how resilient is resilient enough and what capacities would therefore be necessary becomes a political decision. The *visibilisation* of needs and therewith also of societal marginalisation or even exclusion enables a more informed debate of what resources are necessary to achieve a level of resilience that is deemed appropriate. Such a political process would facilitate an emancipation in Ken Booth's (1991: 319) terms as the "freeing of people", because it needs to take structural constraints into account and lend the affected people agency. The recognition of so far unconsidered needs in the process of shaping security routines would increase the privilege of care recipients in disasters. Be it through the redistribution of responsibilities or the enhancement of capacities, this recognition would thus be an act of emancipation; and the *visibilisation* of these needs its precondition. Resilience might be used to actualise this *visibilisation*. Herein lies its emancipatory potential.

8.8 Conclusion

This article sought to demonstrate that resilience has the potential to tackle pitfalls in current security policies. Taking the example of the German disaster management system as a case, in which the resilience discourse is hardly developed, the article demonstrates that people receiving homecare are marginalised also in a traditional security environment. Due to public neglect, they are de facto responsible for their own protection. These people cannot be additionally responsibilized by resilience. Rather, the responsibilization claim works in the first

place for those, whose societal prerogatives make them visible for current modes of disaster management and who thus can rely on the helping hand of state security practices.

Despite the various shortcomings of resilience policies, there is an emancipatory potential in resilience that might subvert the rationality of its current deployment by contrasting the call for resilience with a call for inclusivity and resourcefulness. Means for increasing resilience thus need to be found in fields such as inclusion and social-welfare politics that have little to do with the security realm, but play a huge role for determining individual capacities. Those capacities need then to be negotiated against the backdrop of a political debate on what capacities should be granted in order to be resilient enough. Such a debate, in turn, rests on the knowledge of individual and collective capacities and constraints. It thus requires a politics of *visibilisation* that rests on participation, representation, and inclusivity.

Yet, there are clear limits to the argument brought forward in this article. The form of *visibilisation* that I advocated in the article is demanding with regard to its framework conditions. Only in those cases in which state institutions seek to improve the living situation of the people, *visibilisation* is desirable. In contrast, making one's needs visible for oppressive regimes might even exacerbate the vulnerability of those who already live in a precarious situation. Moreover, in order to be able to meet the *visibilised* needs, states need to have appropriate economic means at their disposal. Consequently, *visibilisation* is not a panacea against societal injustices. Yet, it might be a first step for recognising needs and identifying actual distributions of responsibility.

Furthermore, I have argued that responsibilization is not necessarily bad. Its legitimacy depends on the level of capacities that are at the disposal of the respective referent object. Young (2011) offered a helpful framework of how we can think about legitimate constellations of distributions of responsibility. In her normative assessment of security, Nyman (2016: 833) argued that "we cannot and should not avoid normative judgements when we study security." The same applies to resilience. Even more, we should bear in mind that the general rejection of resilience or its simple equation with neoliberalism falls short of using resilience's potential to issue a form of immanent critique that might help to subvert not only the way resilience is currently enacted (Zebrowski, 2016), but also the marginalisation of people who are deviant from an imagined normality. Even if this creates an imaginary world, it would be one that

policymakers would need to engage with and that does not foreclose the potential of resilience but seeks to exploit it. Resilience, thus, offers academics the possibility to exercise immanent critique, that is, to think it differently and to develop and promote those "'mutant rules' of resilience" (Grove, 2014: 253) that go beyond the criticism of resilience's current appropriations in the political discourse and to point to its potential benefits. One step in this direction is to take up the debate about the preconditions for legitimate acts of responsibilization that do not lead to increased precarity, but to emancipation.

Part III:

Reflections & Conclusions

9. Concluding reflections and (few) conclusions

The endeavour of tracing the emancipatory potential of resilience in the security field tells us more about security politics, its assumptions and notions of normality than it tells us about resilience. In the course of this thesis, I opened up five perspectives on the role of resilience in International Relations; and more precisely in (inter)national disaster management. These five spotlights shed light on resilience from different sides. Instead of illuminating the whole scene, the value of these spotlights is to accentuate and highlight what is otherwise easily overlooked. I was not interested in finding ever more examples of problematic resilience policies that burden the individual or legitimise the withdrawal of the state. As repeatedly stated throughout the thesis, I consider this critique as extremely important, since it engages with the effects of actually manifesting resilience policies. My aim was a different, though. It was to accentuate other perspectives on resilience, not only to make resilience strange (Randalls and Simon, 2017), but to seek the potential of resilience to contribute to desirable politics of protection. Following the Frankfurt School tradition in Critical Security Studies, this form of ethical desirability is linked to freeing the subject of resilience rather than burdening it with additional constraints (Booth, 1991). In the course of this work, I have sought to demonstrate how resilience can contribute to dismantling constraints and burdens, thus to unfold its emancipatory potential. The next three sub-chapters briefly deal with three ways through which resilience can contribute to a more emancipatory politics of protection, before the last sub-chapter finally reflects on the opportunities and risks of rethinking resilience.

9.1 A different lens to look at society

The first emancipatory potential of resilience comes from the possibility to see society through a different lens. Since resilience is situated in the local and the contextual, it necessarily targets the smallest societal scales. Particularly the socio-ecological concept of panarchy is instructive for analysing society as an interconnected multi-level system (Allen et al., 2014). Those psychological resilience approaches, that take the importance of the social environment for an individual's resilience into account, follow a similar rationale of interdependent societal levels (Bourbeau, 2018a). Resilience thinking can contribute to an emancipatory politics of protection by emphasising these linkages. The phenomenological vantage-point of this thesis was the neglect of care-dependent people in disaster managements routines. Neglect and

marginalisation of minorities with needs, that differ from the needs of the majority popula-tion, is by no means a new phenomenon in the security realm (Alexander, 2015; Bigo, 2002; Huysmans, 2006). Critical accounts of security research primarily deal with power imbalances, discrimination, justice, or representation, and ask whose security is actually at risk (Ammicht Quinn, 2014b; McDonald, 2016). Resilience's perspective on society and its basis in complexity thinking suggests that there is no easy answer to this question. Since all societal levels are somehow interlinked, insecurity on the one level could easily cascade into insecurities on other levels. The insecurity of the societal margins could therewith become the insecurity of the majority population.

Excluding people from security practices is then not only an ethical issue, but can likewise backfire on other levels. The satisfaction of those needs that have been perceived as "special needs" becomes then for a self-interest of the whole society. Let us return to the example of care-dependent people in disasters to illustrate this point: The ambulatory nursing system is designed for smoothly running daily routines. At least in Germany, employees within this sys-tem typically do not feel sufficiently prepared for mastering major disturbances of their daily routines (Lehmann et al., 2021). As repeatedly shown in the course of this thesis, the German disaster management system is equally not able to satisfy the needs of care-dependent people and to support the ambulatory nursing structure in the event of a disaster. Consequently, the social environment of care-dependent people needs to jump in and do the care work neither nursing services nor disaster management authorities can provide.

However, those who need to take care of family members often can no longer pursue their profession as usual. In the quoted survey, about 75% of the asked nursing staff stated that they would only be able to help, if their family members are cared for (Lehmann et al., 2021: 44). That shows how vulnerability spills over from the individual in need of help to other in-terconnected societal levels. The vulnerability of care-dependent individuals is on the one hand the result of their need for outside help. On the other hand, this care-dependency be-comes a vulnerability in the first place due to the fragility of the supporting care structures. Moreover, the vulnerability of the care-dependent person cascades and affects his or her so-cial environment and potentially even larger portions of society. The issue of childcare during the COVID-19 pandemic is one example of how private care-relations and individual vulnera-bilities cascaded and eventually became issues of systemic relevance.

Resilience helps us to understand society as a relational system. This has been pointed out by feminist scholars in the context of care relations, and can be expanded by perceiving resilience as a social relation between actors. Chapter 7 demonstrated how the resilience of unaffiliated volunteers fostered adaptation moves on the side of aid organisations. A substantial account of resilience would thus emphasise the relationality of society and therewith the need to mitigate vulnerability on every societal level.

Notwithstanding the importance of the ethical perspective in assessing security politics, resilience unfolds a part of its emancipatory potential by supporting the normative argument with an ontological argument. Avoiding discrimination, undue exclusion and marginalisation that lead to the insecurity of societal groups is still a moral imperative. However, it is not only morally right, but also pragmatically necessary, since insecurities – and therewith potential instabilities – on one societal level can cascade and lead to instabilities on other levels. Somewhat ironically, the first emancipatory potential of resilience is therewith based on a pragmatic, rather than a normative consideration.

9.2 Capacities and responsibilities

Several of the empirical chapters of this work showed that the resilience of each societal entity, and therefore of the society as a whole, is based on the level of available capacities. The ability to adapt or, in the best case, to resist to shocks and disturbing events, like disasters, depends on the availability of resources (e.g. social, cultural and economic capital). Resilience thinking emphasises in all disciplinary readings the importance of redundancies, capacities and openness (Boin and van Eeten, 2013; Chandler, 2014b; Holling, 1973). The increasing popularity of resilience thinking makes it easier to raise attention for the availability of capacities in society. There is no fixed level of capacities that would suffice to manage every future challenge. However, debating levels of resilience means to deliberate baseline capacities and the general societal distribution of capacities. While there is hardly a right or wrong concerning concrete baselines, the deliberation process would be a value in itself and might function as a forum to *visibilise* so far neglected perspectives and needs (see: chapter 8). Consequently, the second emancipatory potential of resilience roots in the question of how to garner those capacities that are identified as the baseline, rather than from the demand to become resilient. This is in stark contrast to those policies that only require social entities, and mostly the

individual, to become resilient. However, it is a result of an immanent critique of resilience that seeks to use the term for positive change instead of wholeheartedly discarding it.

A redistribution of responsibility, as a consequence of the deliberation on appropriate levels of capacities, might then be less problematic than sometimes implied. To be emancipatory, however, it is crucial that the ascribed responsibilities do not exceed the granted capacities (see: chapter 8, or Young, 2011). One emancipatory merit of resilience is that it has spurred the debate about appropriate distributions of responsibility between the individual and the state. Responsibility can thereby be ascribed through conscious allocation or through neglect. Resilience is an example for the former case. The explicit ascription of responsibility opens it for scrutiny and objection; as passionately done in critical Security Studies. Yet, it is this explicitness that renders this form more desirable than the latter one, which I identified in the case of the German disaster management system in chapter 8. In its implicit form, the distribution of responsibility is the result of being overlooked. Those who are overlooked are de facto responsible for satisfying their needs, even if no one explicitly tells them so. By referring to capacities and by thinking societies as interconnected multi-level systems, resilience raises attention for distributions of responsibility and makes them eventually negotiable. The increasing debate about vulnerability and vulnerable situations in disaster management and the examination of the question of who is responsible to mitigate vulnerabilities is paralleled by the rise of resilience thinking (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, 2018a; UNDRR, 2005, 2015). In this respect, resilience seems to already unfold an emancipatory potential by pushing for a situational understanding of vulnerability that grants those, who are identified as vulnerable, agency and allows to mitigate vulnerability by changing societal conditions.

9.3 (Not) Knowing the future

Resilience thinking flourishes in the understanding of society as a complex system. According to complexity thinking, small events can initiate cascades that finally result in major disturbances. How and which cascading effects are to be expected remains unknown, though. As discussed in chapter 2.2, resilience does not make any promises about the shape of the future (Aradau, 2014). Yet, resilience makes a smaller, more modest promise about our doing in the present. The last way in which resilience can contribute to an emancipatory politics of protection is to point to the present, not to the future. Several accounts of security seek to make the

future actionable by getting it to know, e.g. through data collection and risk analysis (Leese, 2014) or through anticipation and scenario planning (Adey and Anderson, 2012; Aradau and van Munster, 2011). Resilience-building does also involve exercises, but they are not done to anticipate the future, though. The sheer impossibility to know the future throws us back on granting actionability in the present by increasing preparedness and resourcefulness (Aradau and van Munster, 2011: 46). Thinking about preparedness requires to think about capacities and responsibilities. According to complexity thinking, we should thereby refrain from thinking about isolated societal entities, but grasp society as an interwoven complex system. The promise of increasing our odds to successfully cope with the future by preparing now then yields the potential to point to those fields in society that suffer from a lack of resources and redundancies. Processes and systems, such as the home care system, that are already working at the limit of their capacities in daily life, cannot be expected to be resourceful and prosperous in a possibly catastrophic future. Being resilient means to build those capacities that deprives the future event from its catastrophic consequences. The chronopolitics of resilience therefore aim at what Chris Zebrowksi (2019: 160) calls "event suppression", the mitigation of future negative effects, not by knowing in advance, but by being adaptive enough to be able to react. Notwithstanding the problematic passivity that this reactivity might entail, it yields the chance to build capacities now and to free people as well as institutions from those constraints that render their current situation precarious.

9.4 Strolling between the bright and the dark side of resilience

I attempted to demonstrate in this thesis that there is something to gain from resilience and that resilience is a complex phenomenon rather than a tool of neoliberal governmentality. Resilience's focus on capacities, its potential to *visibilise* needs and to transparently negotiate responsibilities to grant protection, its epistemological modesty and its understanding of society as a complex, resourceful and interdependent social system represent emancipatory potentials. As I have shown in the empirical part of this thesis, resilience can bring about desirable reflections on the constitution of society, on marginalisation and on those selection biases of the state that lead to marginalisation and exclusion.

But what if that potential does not materialise; if the emancipatory potential of resilience fails? What if the dark side of resilience prevails? There are at least two facets of this dark side

of resilience that have occupied my mind during the last years. The first facet concerns the processual level of resilience, i.e., how we aim to create resilience. The second facet refers to the outcome level of resilience projects and deals with the desirability of a referent object's resilience.

The first facet of this dark side is the spectre of resilience as the unsubstantiated responsibilization of the individual, as frequently found in problematic resilience policies. This is the part of the dark side of resilience that demands people to be resilient and imposes particular governmental rationalities rather than seeking to increase capacities and dismantling constraints. Although I argue that such a resilience approach does not meet the inherent claims that link the diverse resilience concepts in the different disciplines, there is still the chance that this is what will be predominantly understood as resilience in the security field. Demanded resilience can be thought as a different form of "soul training". Michel Foucault (1995: 29) describes the soul as

> *"the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the*
> *reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations*
> *give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the*
> *effects of this power."*

The demand to become resilient aims at training the soul of the individual to become the entrepreneur of the own protection. Demanding resilience means to transfer responsibility and to enact disciplinary power upon the individual. This side of resilience is a form of disciplinary power that is not enacted through surveillance as in the case of the panopticon, but through responsibilization. Yet, just as in the case of the panopticon, it is "a technology of the self through which agents come to see and govern themselves." (Aradau and van Munster, 2011: 47) This usage of resilience is literally a governance from the distance; and eventually the whole opposite of emancipation.

The second facet of the dark side of resilience affects the referent object of resilience. Resilience is mostly presented as something positive. However, "[b]eing resilient might in fact mean being an obstacle to positive change in some cases." (Bourbeau, 2015b: 176) This thesis as well as a good deal of the current resilience literature in Security Studies engages with the question of what resilience does and how we can foster resilience. An underlying question is, whether the referent object of resilience is actually worth protecting? On this outcome level,

the desirability of resilience depends on the desirability of the referent object. Resilience as such is normatively ambivalent. Future resilience research should, therefore, take the referent object of resilience more seriously and engage with the question of *who* or *what* is to become more resilient. An uncritical reproduction of resilience as something potentially good without scrutinising the societal entity resilience refers to runs the risk of perpetuating injustices; and being likewise the opposite of emancipation.

This thesis wants to be critical. It seeks to be critical of how resilience is thought in Security Studies. But it aspires to scrutinise assumptions and finally unclose potentials of resilience as well. And it wants to be critical of its own arguments and findings that come from a particular perspective, as it is the case for every research. In this work, I sought to point to the emancipatory potential of resilience. It means to stroll between the dark and the bright side of resilience. This runs the risk of strengthening the dark side by legitimising resilience as such. However, it also opens spaces for scrutiny and for a different debate about resilience. Being critical means to re-politicise already depoliticised practices and discourses and to make them subject to public deliberation (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 476). The modest aim of this thesis was not to say what resilience *is*, but to irritate our thinking about resilience. This is nothing but a small first step. The actual challenge is now to scrutinise and maybe even to exploit this potential and to bring it to life.

10. References

Adey P and Anderson B (2012) Anticipating Emergencies: Technologies of Preparedness and the Matter of Security. Security Dialogue 43(2): 99–117.

Albris K (2017) Disasters as Usual: The Public Life of Recurring Floods in Dresden. Copenhagen.

Albris K (2018) The Switchboard Mechanism: How Social Media Connected Citizens During the 2013 Floods in Dresden. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 26(3): 350–357.

Aldrich DP and Meyer MA (2015) Social Capital and Community Resilience. American Behavioral Scientist 59(2): 254–269.

Alexander D (2013) Resilience and disaster risk reduction: an etymological journey. Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences 13(11): 2707–2716.

Alexander D (2015) Disability and Disaster: An Overview. In: Kelman I and Stough LM (eds) Disability and Disaster: Explorations and Exchange. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 15–29.

Allen CR, Angeler DG, Garmestani AS, et al. (2014) Panarchy: Theory and Application. Ecosystems 17(4): 578–589.

Ammicht Quinn R (2014a) „No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick": Fragen nach Verantwortung im Kontext der Herstellung von Sicherheit. In: Daase C, Engert S and Kolliarakis G (eds) Politik und Unsicherheit: Strategien in einer sich wandelnden Sicherheitskultur. Frankfurt am Main, New York: Campus, pp. 119–134.

Ammicht Quinn R (ed) (2014b) Sicherheitsethik. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Amoore L (2013) The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security Beyond Probability. Durham, London: Duke University Press.

Anderson B (2015) What Kind of Thing is Resilience? Politics 35(1): 60–66.

Anderson B (2016) Critique and Ontological Politics. Dialogues in Human Geography 6(1): 19–22.

Aradau C (2014) The promise of security: Resilience, surprise and epistemic politics. Resilience 2(2): 73–87.

Aradau C (2017) The Promise of Security: Resilience, surprise and epistemic politics. In: Chandler D and Coaffee J (eds) The Routledge Handbook of International Resilience: Abindon, Oxon, New York: Routledge, pp. 79–91.

Aradau C and van Munster R (2011) Politics of Catastrophe: Genealogies of the Unknown. London/New York: Routledge.

Aranda K, Zeeman L and Scholes J (2012) The resilient subject: Exploring subjectivity, identity and the body in narratives of resilience. Health 16(5): 548–563.

Bankoff G (2001) Rendering the world unsafe: 'vulnerability' as western discourse. Disasters 25(1): 19–35.

Bargués-Pedreny P and Martin de Almagro M (2020) Prevention from Afar: Gendering Resilience and Sustaining Hope in Post-UNMIL Liberia. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 14(3): 327–348.

Barrios R (2014) 'Here, I'm not at Ease': Anthropological Perspectives on Community Resilience. Disasters 38(2): 329–350.

BBK (2002) Neue Strategie zum Schutz der Bevölkerung in Deutschland. Available at: https://www.bbk.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Mediathek/Publikationen/WF/WF-04-neue-strategie-bevsch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6 (accessed 22 March 2023).

BBK (2017) Disasters Alarm: Guide for Emergency Preparedness and Correct Action in Emergency Situations, 4th edition, Bonn.

Beerlage I and Hartmann T (2013) Aktiv Bürger von Kindesbeinen an. Bevölkerungsschutz (2): 2–5.

Begg C (2018) Power, responsibility and justice: A review of local stakeholder participation in European flood risk management. Local Environment 23(4): 383–397.

Benadusi M (2013) The Two-Faced Janus of Disaster Management: Still Vulnerable, Yet Already Resilient. South East Asia Research 21(3): 419–438.

Biermann M, Hillmer-Pegram K, Knapp CN, et al. (2016) Approaching a Critical Turn? A Content Analysis of the Politics of Resilience in Key Bodies of Resilience Literature. Resilience 4(2): 59–78.

Bigo D (2002) Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. Alternatives 27: 63–92.

Bigo D (2008) Security: A Field Left Fallow. In: Dillon M and Neal AW (eds) Foucault on Politics, Security and War: London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 93–114.

Birkland TA (2006) Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events. Washington: Georgetown University Press.

Birkmann J (2005) Danger need not spell disaster: But how vulnerable are we?, United Nations University, Research Brief Number 1/2005. Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/21139/UNU-RB-1-2005-EHS.pdf (accessed on 22 March 2023).

Blaikie P, Cannon T, Davis I, et al. (1994) At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability and Disasters. London: Routledge.

Boin A and van Eeten MJG (2013) The Resilient Organization: A critical appraisal. Public Management Review 15(3): 429–445.

Bolin B and Kurtz LC (2018) Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Disaster Vulnerability. In: Rodríguez H, Donner W and Trainor JE (eds) Handbook of Disaster Research: Cham: Springer, pp. 181–203.

Booth K (1991) Security and Emancipation. Review of International Studies 17(4): 313–326.

Booth K (2005) Critical Explorations. In: Booth K (ed) Critical Security Studies and World Politics: Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 1–18.

Bourbeau P (2013) Resiliencism: Premises and Promises in Securitisation Research. Resilience 1(1): 3–17.

Bourbeau P (2015a) Resilience and International Politics: Premises, Debates, Agenda. International Studies Review 17(3): 374–395.

Bourbeau P (2015b) Resiliencism and Security Studies: Initiating a Dialogue. In: Balzacq T (ed) Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 173–188.

Bourbeau P (2018a) A Genealogy of Resilience. International Political Sociology 12(1): 19–35.

Bourbeau P (2018b) On Resilience: Genealogy, Logics and World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourbeau P and Ryan C (2018) Resilience, resistance, infrapolitics and enmeshment. European Journal of International Relations 24(1): 221-239.

Bourbeau P and Vuori JA (2015) Security; Resilience and Desecuritization: Multidirectional Moves and Dynamics. Critical Studies on Security 3(3): 253–268.

Box P, Bird D, Haynes K, et al. (2016) Shared responsibility and social vulnerability in the 2011 Brisbane flood. Natural Hazards 81(3): 1549–1568.

Boyle PJ and Speed ST (2018) From protection to coordinated preparedness: A genealogy of critical infrastructure in Canada. Security Dialogue (online first): 1-15.

Brassett J, Croft S and Vaughan-Williams N (2013) Introduction: An Agenda for Resilience Research in Politics and International Relations. Politics 33(4): 221–228.

Brassett J and Vaughan-Williams N (2015) Security and the Performative Politics of Resilience: Critical Infrastructure Protection and Humanitarian Emergency Preparedness. Security Dialogue 46(1): 32–50.

Burgess JP (2011) The Ethical Subject of Security: Geopolitical Reason and the Threat Against Europe. London/New York: Routledge.

Burgess JP (2019) The insecurity of critique. Security Dialogue 50(1): 95–111.

Butler J (1988) Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory. Theatre Journal 40(4): 519–531.

Butler J (2004) Undoing Gender. New York, London: Routledge.

Buzan B (1999) 'Change and Insecurity' reconsidered. Contemporary Security Policy 20(3): 1–17.

C.A.S.E. Collective (2006) Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Network Manifesto. Security Dialogue 37(4): 443–487.

Cannon T (1994) Vulnerability Analysis and the Explanation of "Natural" Disasters. In: Varley A (ed) Disasters, development and environment: Chichester, Brisbane: Wiley, pp. 13–29.

Cannon T (2017) Social Vulnerability and Environmental Hazards. In: Richardson D, Castree N, Goodchild MF, Kobayashi A, Liu W and Marston RA (eds) The international encyclopedia of geography: People, the earth, environment, and technology. Malden, MA, Oxford, Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 1–8.

Chandler D (2013) Resilience and the Autotelic Subject: Toward a Critique of the Societalization of Security. International Political Sociology 7(2): 210–226.

Chandler D (2014a) Beyond Neoliberalism: Resilience, The new Art of Governing Complexity. Resilience 2(1): 47–63.

Chandler D (2014b) Resilience: The Governance of Complexity. Abindon, Oxon, New York: Routledge.

Chandler D (2016) Debating Neoliberalism: The Exhaustion of the Liberal Problematic. In: Chandler D and Reid J (eds) The Neoliberal Subject: Resilience, Adaptation and Vulnerability. London, New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, pp. 9–16.

Chandler D and Reid J (eds) (2016) The Neoliberal Subject: Resilience, Adaptation and Vulnerability. London, New York: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Christie N, Griffin L, Chan N, Twigg J, Titheridge H (2016) Private needs, public responses: Vulnerable people's flood-disrupted mobility. Disaster Prevention and Management 25(2): 244–260.

Christmann G, Ibert O, Kilper H, Moss, T (2011) Vulnerabilität und Resilienz in sozio-räumlicher Perspektive: Begriffliche Klärungen und theoretischer Rahmen. Working Paper No. 44, Erkner.

Coppola DP (2007) Introduction to International Disaster Management. Boston: Butterworth Heinemann.

Cornwall A and Rivas A-M (2015) From 'gender equality and 'women's empowerment' to global justice: reclaiming a transformative agenda for gender and development. Third World Quarterly 36(2): 396–415.

Corry O (2014) From Defense to Resilience: Environmental Security beyond Neo-liberalism. International Political Sociology 8(3): 256–274.

Cox RW (1981) Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. Millenium 10(2): 126–155.

CRED (2020) Natural disasters 2019: Now is the time not to give up. Available at: https://cred.be/sites/default/files/adsr_2019.pdf (accessed 08 March 2023).

Cutter SL, Boruff BJ and Shirley W. Lynn (2003) Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards. Social Science Quarterly 84(2): 242–261.

Daase C and Kessler O (2007) Knowns and Unknowns in the 'War on Terror': Uncertainty and the Political Construction of Danger. Security Dialogue 38(4): 411–434.

Daniels N (2016) Justice, Resource Allocation, and Emergency Preparedness. In: Jennings B, Arras JD, Barrett DH and Ellis BA (eds) Emergency ethics: Public health preparedness and response. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 104–134.

Davis K (2008) Intersectionality as buzzword. Feminist Theory 9(1): 67–85.

Dean M (2002) Liberal Government and Authoritarianism. Economy and Society 31(1): 37–61.

Dean M (2014) Rethinking Neoliberalism. Journal of Sociology 50(2): 150–163.

Dean M (2015) The Malthus Effect: Population and the Liberal Government of Life. Economy and Society 44(1): 18–39.

Destatis (2020) Pflegestatistik 2019: Pflege im Rahmen der Pflegeversicherung - Deutschlandergebnisse.

Deutscher Bundestag (2010) Bericht über die Methode zur Risikoanalyse im Bevölkerungsschutz 2010. Available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/041/1704178.pdf (accessed 05 June 2019).

Deutscher Bundestag (2011) Bericht zur Risikoanalyse im Bevölkerungsschutz 2011. Available at: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/082/1708250.pdf (accessed 05 June 2019).

Deutscher Bundestag (2014) Bericht zur Risikoanalyse im Bevölkerungsschutz 2014. Available at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/036/1803682.pdf (accessed 06 June 2019).

Deutscher Bundestag (2016) Bericht zur Risikoanalyse im Bevölkerungsschutz 2016. Available at: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/108/1810850.pdf (accessed 05 June 2019).

Deutscher Bundestag (2019) Bericht zur Risikoanalyse im Bevölkerungsschutz 2018. Available at: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/095/1909521.pdf (accessed 05 June 2019).

Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (2014) Die Rolle von ungebundenen HelferInnen bei der Bewältigung von Schadensereignissen - Teil 1. Available at: https://www.drk.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Forschung/schriftenreihe/Band_1/Schriften_der_Forschung_1.1._Die_Perspektive_der_ungebundenen_Helferinnen_und_Helfer.pdf (accessed 08 March 2023).

Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (2015) Die Rolle von ungebundenen HelferInnen bei der Bewältigung von Schadensereignissen – Teil 2: Die Perspektive der DRK Einsatz- und Führungskräfte. Available at: https://www.drk.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Forschung/schriftenreihe/Band_1/Schriften_der_Forschung_1.2._Die_Perspektive_der_DRK-Einsatz-und_Fuehrungskraefte.pdf (accessed 08 March 2023).

Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (2017) Pilotkonzept für den Einsatz von ungebundenen HelferInnen: Teil 2: Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse für eine Einweisung ungebundener HelferInnen. Available at: https://www.drk.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Forschung/schriftenreihe/Band_2/Schriften_der_Forschung_2.2._Wissenschaftliche_Erkenntnisse_fuer_eine_Einweisung_ungebundener_HelferInnen.pdf (accessed 08 March 2023).

Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (2018a) Der DRK-Betreuungsdienst der Zukunft: Ein Grünbuch der Bundesleitung der Bereitschaften auf Grundlage von Forschungsergebnissen des DRK. Available at: https://www.drk.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Gruenbuch_Betreuungsdienst_der_Zukunft.pdf (accessed 08 March 2023).

Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (2018b) Die vulnerable Gruppe „ältere und pflegebedürftige Menschen" in Krisen, Großschadenslagen und Katastrophen: Teil 1: Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse und Herausforderungen aus der Praxis. Available at:

https://www.drk.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Forschung/schriften-reihe/Band_6/Schriften_der_Forschung_6.1._Wissenschaftliche_Erkennt-nisse_und_Herausforderung_aus_der_Praxis.pdf (accessed 08 March 2023).

Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (2018c) Die vulnerable Gruppe „ältere und pflegebedürftige Men-schen" in Krisen, Großschadenslagen und Katastrophen: Teil 2: Vernetzung und Partizipa-tion - auf dem Weg zu einem sozialraumorientierten Bevölkerungsschutz. Available at: https://www.drk.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Forschung/schriften-reihe/Band_6/Band_VI_Teil_2.pdf (accessed 08 March 2023).

Deutschländer T and Wichura B (2005) Das Münsterländer Schneechaos am 1. Adventswo-chenende 2005. In: Deutscher Wetterdienst (ed) Klimastatusbericht 2005: Offenbach, pp. 163–167.

Dombrowsky WR (2012) Resilience from a sociological viewpoint. In: Gander H-H, Riescher G, Poscher R, Würtenberger T and Perron W (eds) Resilienz in der offenen Gesellschaft: Sym-posium des Centre for Security and Society. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 281–291.

Doucet A and Mauthner NS (2012) Knowing responsibly: ethics, feminist epistemologies and methodologies. In: Miller T, Birch M, Mauthner M and Jessop J (eds) Ethics in Qualitative Research: London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, Singapore: SAGE, pp. 122–139.

Drabek TE and McEntire DA (2003) Emergent Phenomena and the Sociology of Disaster: Les-sons, Trends, and Opportunities from the Research Literature. Disaster Prevention and Management 12(2): 97–112.

Dresden Brand- und Katastrophenschutzamt (2013) Hochwasser Juni 2013: TEL-Kurzbericht zum Hochwasser der Elbe 03.-10.06.2013 in der Landeshauptstadt Dresden.

Dresden Umweltamt (2014) Umweltbericht 2013: Bericht zum Junihochwasser in Dresden: Ansätze zur Verbesserung des vorsorgenden Schutzes der Landeshauptstadt Dresden vor Hochwasser.

Dunn Cavelty M, Kaufmann M and Kristensen KS (2015) Resilience and (in)security: Practices, Subjects, Temporalities. Security Dialogue 46(1): 3–14.

Dynes RR (2000) The Dialogue between Voltaire and Rousseau on the Lisbon Earthquake: The Emergence of a Social Science View. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disas-ters 18(1): 97–115.

Dynes RR and Aguirre BE (1979) Organizational Adaptation to Crises: Mechanisms of Coordi-nation and Structural Change. Disasters 3(1): 71–74.

Enloe C (1989) Bananas, Beaches & Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. London, Sydney, Wellington: Pandora.

Eskytė I, Lawson A, Orchard M, et al. (2020) Out on the streets - Crisis, opportunity and disa-bled people in the era of Covid-19: Reflections from the UK. Alter - European Journal of Disability Research 14(4): 329–336.

Evans B and Reid J (2014) Resilient Life: The Art of Living Dangerously. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Farkas KJ and Romaiuk JR (2020) Social Work, Ethics and Vulnerable Groups in the Time of Coronavirus and COVID-19. Society Register 4(2): 67–82.

Fielding J and Burningham K (2005) Environmental inequality and flood hazard. Local Environment 10(4): 379–395.

Fletcher D and Sarkar M (2013) Psychological Resilience: A Review and Critique of Definitions, Concepts and Theory. European Psychologist 18(1): 12–23.

Folkers A (2016) Daring the Truth: Foucault, Parrhesia and the Genealogy of Critique. Theory, Culture & Society 33(1): 3–28.

Forst R (2017) Normativity and Power: Analyzing Social Orders of Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foucault M (1995) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Random House.

Foucault M (2007) Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Foucault M (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fraser N (2003) Societal Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation. In: Fraser N and Honneth A (eds) Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange. London, New York: Verso, pp. 7–109.

Freistaat Sachsen (2013a) Der Wiederaufbau im Freistaat Sachsen nach dem Hochwasser im Juni 2013.

Freistaat Sachsen (2013b) Startschuss für eigentlichen Wiederaufbau nach Flut: Kabinett in Dresden billigt Regelungen über Finanzhilfen für Betroffene. Dresden.

Friedrich U (2013) Hochwasser der Elbe – Erlebnisbericht - des Leiters der TEL Dresden im Tagdienst, 03.06. - 10.06.13.

Fritz C and Williams HB (1957) The Human Being in Disasters: A Research Perspective. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 309: 42–51.

Gabel F (2019) Chancen dynamischer Konzeptionen von Vulnerabilität für den Katastrophenschutz. In: Krüger M and Max M (eds) Resilienz im Katastrophenfall: Konzepte zur Stärkung von Pflege- und Hilfsbedürftigen im Bevölkerungsschutz. Bielefeld: transcript, pp. 77–96.

Gallopín GC (2006) Linkages between vulnerability, resilience, and adaptive capacity. Global Environmental Change 16(3): 293–303.

Ganapati NE, Kelman I and Koukis T (2010) Analysing Greek–Turkish disaster-related cooperation: A disaster diplomacy perspective. Conflict and Cooperation 45(2): 162–185.

Gear C, Eppel E and Koziol-Mclain J (2018) Advancing Complexity Theory as a Qualitative Research Methodology. International Journal of Qualitative Methods 17(1): 1-10.

Goede M de, Bosma E and Pallister-Wilkins P (eds) (2020) Secrecy and Methods in Security Research: A Guide to Qualitative Fieldwork. London, New York: Routledge.

Grove K (2013) Hidden transcripts of resilience: Power and politics in Jamaican disaster management. Resilience 1(3): 193–209.

Grove K (2014) Agency, Affect, and the Immunological Politics of Disaster Resilience. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 32(2): 240–256.

Grove K and Adey P (2015) Security and the Politics of Resilience: An Aesthetic Response. Politics 35(1): 78–84.

Guillaume X (2013) Criticality. In: Salter MB and Mutlu CE (eds) Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 29–32.

Gunderson LH and Holling CS (eds) (2002) Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, Covelo, London: Island Press.

Hansen L (2000) The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School. Millennium 29(2): 285–306.

Hansen-Magnusson H and Vetterlein A (2021) Responsibility in International Relations Theory and Practice: Introducing the Handbook. In: Hansen-Magnusson H and Vetterlein A (eds) The Routledge Handbook on Responsibility in International Relations: Oxon: Routledge, pp. 1–25.

Hartman C and Squires GD (2006) There is no such thing as a natural disaster. In: Hartman C and Squires GD (eds) There is no such thing as a natural disaster: Race, class, and Hurricane Katrina. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 1–12.

Hayek FA (1989) The Pretense of Knowledge. American Economic Review 79(6): 3–7.

Hilhorst D and Bankoff G (2004) Introduction: Mapping Vulnerability. In: Bankoff G, Frerks G and Hilhorst T (eds) Mapping vulnerability: Disasters, development, and people. London, Sterling VA: Earthscan Publications, pp. 1–9.

Holling CS (1973) Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems. Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics 4: 1–23.

Holling CS (1996) Engineering Resilience versus Ecological Resilience. In: Schulze PC (ed) Engineering within Ecological Constraints: Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, pp. 33–43.

Holling CS (2001) Understanding the Complexity of Economic, Ecological, and Social Systems. Ecosystems 4(5): 390–405.

Holling CS and Gunderson LH (2002) Resilience and Adaptive Cycles. In: Gunderson LH and Holling CS (eds) Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, Covelo, London: Island Press, pp. 25–62.

Holling CS, Gunderson LH and Peterson GD (2002) Sustainability and Panarchies. In: Gunderson LH and Holling CS (eds) Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, Covelo, London: Island Press, pp. 63–102.

Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute (ed) (2013) The Resilient Social Network: @OccupySandy #SuperstormSandy. Available at: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1357203-the-resilient-social-network.html (accessed 04 August 2022).

Honneth A (1992) Kampf um Anerkennung: Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Honneth A (2001a) Recognition or Redistribution? Changing Perspectives on the Moral Order of Society. Theory, Culture & Society 18(2-3): 43–55.

Honneth A (2001b) Reconstructive Social Critique with a Genealogical Reservation: On the Idea of Critique in the Frankfurt School. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 22(2): 3–12.

Howell A (2015) Resilience, war, and austerity: The ethics of military human enhancement and the politics of data. Security Dialogue 46(1): 15–31.

Human Rights Council (2015) Thematic Study on the rights of persons with disabilities under article 11 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, on situations of risk and humanitarian emergencies: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. UN Doc. A/HRC/31/30.

Huysmans J (2006) The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU. London, New York: Routledge.

ICRC (1969) Resolutions adopted by the XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross. International Review of Red Cross 9(104): 608–638.

IFRC (2004) World Disasters Report 2004: Focus on community resilience. Geneva. Available at: https://www.alnap.org/help-library/world-disasters-report-2004-%E2%80%93-focus-on-community-resilience (accessed 04 August 2022).

IFRC (2007) World Disasters Re-port 2007: Focus on discrimination. Geneva. Available at: https://www.alnap.org/help-library/world-disasters-report-2007-focus-on-discrimination (accessed 04 August 2022).

IFRC (2016) World Disasters Report 2016: Resilience saving lives today, investing for tomorrow. Geneva. Available at: https://www.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/WDR-2016-FINAL_web.pdf (accessed 04 August 2022).

IFRC (2018) World Disasters Report 2018: Leaving no one behind. Geneva. Available at: https://www.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/B-WDR-2018-EN-LR.pdf (accessed 04 August 2022).

Illner P (2018) The Locals do it better? The Strange Victory of Occupy Sandy. In: Bell R and Ficociello R (eds) Eco Culture: Disaster, Narrative, Discourse. London: Lexington Books, pp. 49–72.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2006) World Disaster Report 2006: Focus on neglected crisis. Satigny/Vernier, Switzerland: ATAR Roto Presse.

Jäger S (2006) Diskurs und Wissen: Theoretische und methodische Aspekte einer Kritischen Diskurs- und Dispositivanalyse. In: Keller R, Hierseland A, Schneider W and Viehöfer W (eds) Handbuch Sozialwissenschaftliche Diskursanalyse: Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 83–114.

Jessop B (2016) The State: Past, Present, Future. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Joseph J (2013) Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism: A Governmentality Approach. Resilience 1(1): 38–52.

Joseph J (2016) Governing through Failure and Denial: The New Resilience Agenda. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 44(3): 370–390.

Joseph J (2018) Varieties of Resilience: Studies in Governmentality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kailes JI (2015) If You People Would Just Prepare! In: Stough LM and Kelman I (eds) Disability and disaster: Explorations and exchanges. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 97–109.

Kailes JI (2020) Defining Functional Needs – Updating CMIST. Available at: https://disaster-strategies.org/blog-post/defining-functional-needs-updating-cmist-by-june-isaacson-kailes-disability-policy-consultant/ (accessed 29 July 2022).

Kailes JI and Enders A (2007) Moving Beyond "Special Needs": A Function-Based Framework for Emergency Management and Planning. Journal of Disability Policy Studies 17(4): 230–237.

Kailitz S (2013) Partystimmung beim Sandsackschleppen: Tausende Dresdner verteidigen die Stadt gegen das Elbhochwasser, die Hilfen organisieren sie online. Nun steht die Pegelspitze kurz bevor. Die Zeit, 6 June.

Kaufmann M (2013) Emergent self-organisation in emergencies: Resilience rationales in interconnected societies. Resilience 1(1): 53–68.

Kaufmann M (2016) Exercising Emergencies: Resilience, Affect and Acting out Security. Security Dialogue 47(2): 99–116.

Kaufmann S (2012) Resilienz als »Boundary Object«. In: Daase C, Offermann P and Rauer V (eds) Sicherheitskultur: Soziale und politische Praktiken der Gefahrenabwehr. Frankfurt/New York: Campus, pp. 109–131.

Kelman I (2007) Hurricane Katrina disaster diplomacy. Disasters 31(3): 288–309.

Kelman I and Stough LM (2015) (Dis)ability and (Dis)aster. In: Kelman I and Stough LM (eds) Disability and disaster: Explorations and exchanges. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 3–14.

Kendra JM and Wachtendorf T (2016) American Dunkirk: The Waterborne Evacuation of Manhattan on 9/11. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Krüger M (2019) Resilienz: Zwischen staatlicher Forderung und gesellschaftlicher Förderung. In: Krüger M and Max M (eds) Resilienz im Katastrophenfall: Konzepte zur Stärkung von Pflege- und Hilfsbedürftigen im Bevölkerungsschutz. Bielefeld: transcript, pp. 57–75.

Krüger M and Max M (2019) Über Bedarfe, Sichtbarkeit und die Voraussetzungen einer resilienten Bevölkerung. In: Krüger M and Max M (eds) Resilienz im Katastrophenfall: Konzepte zur Stärkung von Pflege- und Hilfsbedürftigen im Bevölkerungsschutz. Bielefeld: transcript, pp. 25–40.

Kuhlicke C, Callsen I and Begg C (2016) Reputational Risks and Participation in Flood Risk Management and the Public Debate About the 2013 Floods in Germany. Environmental Science and Policy(Part 2): 318–325.

Kuran CHA, Morsut C, Kruke BI, et al. (2020) Vulnerability and vulnerable groups from an intersectionality perspective. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 50: 1–8.

Landesamt für Umwelt, Landwirtschaft und Geologie (2015) Ereignisanalyse Hochwasser Juni 2013.

Larsson O (2021) The connections between crisis and war preparedness in Sweden. Security Dialogue 52(4): 306–324.

Leese M (2014) The new profiling: Algorithms, black boxes, and the failure of anti-discriminatory safeguards in the European Union. Security Dialogue 45(5): 494–511.

Leese M (2015) On security, once more: Assorted inquiries in aviation. Doctoral Thesis. University of Tübingen. Available at: https://publikationen.uni-tuebingen.de/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10900/60118/leese_on%20security_PhD_UB_inkl_Deckblatt.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed 04 August 2022).

Lehmann Y, Thiele A and Ewers M (2021) Vorsorge, Management und Bewältigung von Katastrophen aus Sicht ambulanter Pflegedienste: Befragungsergebnisse zum IST-Zustand.

Lundborg T and Vaughan-Williams N (2011) Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of ''Life'' in Biopolitics. International Political Sociology 5(4): 367–383.

Malcolm JA (2013) Project Argus and the Resilient Citizen. Politics 33(4): 311–321.

Max M (2021) Traditional organizations and crisis management in transition—Organizational perspectives on new dynamics of independent civil engagement. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 29(1): 2–11.

McDonald M (2016) Whose security? Ethics and the referent. In: Nyman J and Burke A (eds) Ethical Security Studies: A new research agenda. Oxon, New York: Routledge, pp. 32–45.

McEntire DA (2005) Why vulnerability matters. Disaster Prevention and Management 14(2): 206–222.

Mechanic D and Tanner J (2007) Vulnerable people, groups, and populations: societal view. Health Affairs (Project Hope) 26(5): 1220–1230.

Menski U, Wahl S and Gerhold L (2016) NeuENV: Selbstschutz- und Selbsthilfepotential von privaten Haushalten in der Ernährungsnotfallvorsorge - Ergebnisse aus dem Projekt Neue Strategien der Ernährungsnotfallvorsorge (NeuENV). Bevölkerungsschutz (1): 14–17.

Misoch S (ed) (2019) Qualitative Interviews. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg.

Mogaji E (2020) Financial Vulnerability During a Pandemic: Insights for Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19).

Mutlu CE and Salter MB (2013) The discursive turn: Introduction. In: Salter MB and Mutlu CE (eds) Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 113–119.

Nelson SH (2014) Resilience and the Neoliberal Counter-Revolution: From ecologies of Control to Production of the Common. Resilience 2(1): 1–17.

Neocleous M (2013) Resisting Resilience. Radical Philosophy (178): 2–7.

Nyman J (2016) What is the value of security? Contextualising the negative/positive debate. Review of International Studies 42(5): 821–839.

Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (1976) Guidelines for disaster pre-vention: Volume I - Pre-Disaster Physical Planning of Human Settlement. UNDRO/10/76/Vol. I.

Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (1980) Natural Disasters and Vulner-ability Analysis: Report of Expert Group Meeting (9.-12.07.1979). Available at: https://www.preventionweb.net/files/resolutions/NL800388.pdf (accessed 04 August 2022).

Oliver-Smith A (2004) Theorizing Vulnerability in a Globalized World: A Political Ecological Per-spective. In: Bankoff G, Frerks G and Hilhorst T (eds) Mapping vulnerability: Disasters, de-velopment, and people. London, Sterling VA: Earthscan Publications, pp. 10–24.

Olson RS and Gawronski Vincent T (2003) Disasters as Critical Junctures? Managua, Nicaragua 1972 and Mexico City. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 21: 5–35.

Olwig MF (2009) Climate change = discourse change? Development and relief organizations' use of the concept of resilience. In: Hastrup K (ed) The Question of Resilience: Social Re-sponses to Climate Change: Copenhagen: Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, pp. 314–335.

Parthasarathy D (2018) Inequality, uncertainty, and vulnerability: Rethinking governance from a disaster justice perspective. Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space 1(3): 422–442.

Pelling M and Dill K (2010) Disaster politics: tipping points for change in the adaptation of sociopolitical regimes. Progress in Human Geography 34(1): 21–37.

Peoples C and Vaughan-Williams N (2010) Critical Security Studies: An Introduction. Lon-don/New York: Routledge.

Perry RW (2007) What Is a Disaster? In: Rodríguez H, Dynes RR and Quarantelli EL (eds) Hand-book of Disaster Research: New York, NY: Springer New York, pp. 1–15.

Poulantzas N (2000) State, Power, Socialism. London, New York: Verso.

Przyborski A and Wohlrab-Sahr M (eds) (2021) Qualitative Sozialforschung: Ein Arbeitsbuch. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg.

Puar JK (2013) The Cost of Getting Better: Ability and Debility. In: Davis LJ (ed) The Disability Studies Reader: New York, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 177–184.

Quarantelli EL (1988) Disaster Crisis Management: A Summary of Research Findings: A Sum-mary of Research Findings. Journal of Management Studies 25(4): 373–385.

Randalls S and Simon S (2017) Making Resilience Strange: Ontological politics in a 'time of crisis'. In: Chandler D and Coaffee J (eds) The Routledge Handbook of International Resilience: Abindon, Oxon, New York: Routledge, pp. 38–48.

Reid J (2012) The Disastrous and Politically Debased Subject of Resilience. Development Dialogue 58(1): 67–79.

Robinson F (2011) The Ethics of Care: A Feminist Approach to Human Security. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Rogers P (2013) Rethinking Resilience: Articulating Community and the UK Riots. Politics 33(4): 322–333.

Ryan C (2015) Everyday Resilience as Resistance: Palestinian Women Practicing Sumud. International Political Sociology 9(4): 299–315.

Sächsische Staatskanzlei (2002) Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission der Sächsischen Staatsregierung: Flutkatastrophe 2002. Available at: https://publikationen.sachsen.de/bdb/artikel/10825 (accessed 04 August 2022).

Sächsische Staatskanzlei (2013) Bericht der Kommission der Sächsischen Staatsregierung zur Untersuchung der Flutkatastrophe 2013. Available at: https://publikationen.sachsen.de/bdb/artikel/20534 (accessed 04 August 2022).

Sächsischer Landtag (2013) Plenarprotokoll 5/78: 78. Sitzung 5. Wahlperiode.

Scanlon J, Helsloot I and Groenendaal J (2014) Putting It All Together: Integrating Ordinary People into Emergency Response. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 31(1): 43–63.

Schmidt A, Wolbers J, Ferguson J, et al. (2018) Are you Ready2Help? Conceptualizing the management of online and onsite volunteer convergence. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 26(3): 338–349.

Schmidt J (2015) Intuitively Neoliberal? Towards a Critical Understanding of Resilience Governance. European Journal of International Relations 21(2): 402–426.

Schmidt J (2017) Resilience and the inversion of possibility and reality. In: Chandler D and Coaffee J (eds) The Routledge Handbook of International Resilience: Abindon, Oxon, New York: Routledge, pp. 119–131.

Schulze K, Schander J, Jungmann A, et al. (2019) Bedarfe und Ressourcen in Extremsituationen mit Fokus auf hilfs- und pflegebedürftige Menschen: Deskriptive Darstellung der Ergebnisse einer deutschlandweiten Befragung.

Schwarz S (2018) Resilience in psychology: A critical analysis of the concept. Theory & Psychology 28(4): 528–541.

Scoville MC (1942) Wartime Tasks of Psychiatric Social Workers in Great Britain. The American Journal of Psychiatry 99(3): 358–363.

Simon S and Randalls S (2016) Geography, Ontological Politics and the Resilient Future. Dialogues in Human Geography 6(1): 3–18.

Solnit R (2009) A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities that Arise in Disaster. New York: Viking Penguin.

Sombetzki J (2014) Verantwortung als Begriff, Fähigkeit, Aufgabe: Eine Drei-Ebenen-Analyse. Zugl.: Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 2013. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Sparf J (2016) Disability and Vulnerability: Interpretations of Risk in Everyday Life. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management: 1–9.

Stahl T (2022) Immanent Critique. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.

Statistisches Bundesamt (2017) Knapp 2,9 Millionen Pflegebedürftige im Dezember 2015. Available at: https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2017/01/PD17_017_224pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed 8 May 2018).

Stough LM and Kang D (2015) The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and Persons with Disabilities. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science 6(2): 140–149.

Stough LM and Mayhorn CB (2013) Population Segments with Disabilities. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 31(3): 384–402.

Theobald H and Luppi M (2018) Elder care in changing societies: concurrences in divergent care regime - a comparison of Germany, Sweden and Italy. Current Sociology 66(4): 629–642.

Thomas D, Mitchell T and Arseneau C (2016) Re-evaluating resilience: From Individual Vulnerabilities to the Strength of Cultures and Collectivities among Indigenous Communities. Resilience 4(2): 116–129.

Tickner JA (1992) Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. New York: Columbia University Press.

Tierney KJ (2012) Disaster Governance: Social, Political, and Economic Dimensions. Annual Review of Environment and Resources 37(1): 341–363.

Tierney KJ (2014) The Social Roots of Risk: Producing Disasters, Promoting Resilience. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Tierney KJ (2019) Disasters: A Sociological Approach. Cambridge, Medford: Polity Press.

Twigg J and Mosel I (2017) Emergent groups and spontaneous volunteers in urban disaster response. Environment and Urbanization 29(2): 443–458.

Uekusa S (2018) Rethinking Resilience: Bourdieu's Contribution to Disaster Research. Resilience 6(3): 181–195.

UN (1962) General Assembly Resolution 1753 (XVII): Measures to be adopted in connexion with the earthquake in Iran. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/192/61/IMG/NR019261.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 15 May 2019).

UN (1963a) General Assembly Resolution 1882 (XVIII). Measures in connexion with the earthquake at Skopje, Yugoslavia. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/185/57/IMG/NR018557.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 16 May 2019).

UN (1963b) General Assembly Resolution 1888 (XVIII). Measures in connexion with the hurricane which has just struck the territories of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/185/63/IMG/NR018563.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 17 April 2019).

UN (1968a) General Assembly Resolution 2378 (XXIII): Assistance to Iran in connexion with the earthquake of August 1968. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/243/38/IMG/NR024338.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 15 April 2019).

UN (1968b) General Assembly Resolution A/Res/2435(XXIII): Assistance in cases of natural disaster. Available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/2435(XXIII) (accessed 15 April 2019).

UN (1970) General Assembly Resolution 2717 (XXV). Assistance in cases of natural disaster. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/349/82/IMG/NR034982.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 17 April 2019).

UN (1971) General Assembly Resolution 2816 (XXVI). Assistance in cases of natural disaster and other disaster situations. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/328/32/IMG/NR032832.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 17 April 2019).

UN (1974) General Assembly Resolution 3243 (XXIX). Strengthening of the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/45/IMG/NR073845.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 18 April 2019).

UN (1981) General Assembly Resolution A/Res/36/225: Strengthening the capacity of the United Nations system to respond to natural disasters and other disaster situations. Available at: https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r225.htm (accessed 18 April 2019).

UN (1987) General Assembly Resolution A/RES/42/169: International decade for natural disaster reduction. Available at: https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/a42r169.htm (accessed 18 April 2019).

UN (1994) Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World: Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation. Available at: https://www.unisdr.org/files/8241_doc6841contenido1.pdf (accessed 15 April 2019).

UN (2000) General Assembly Resolution A/Res/54/219: International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction: successor arrangements. Available at: http://eird.org/fulltext/GA-resolution/a-res-54-219-eng.pdf (accessed 04 August 2022).

UN (2005) General Assembly Resolution A/Res/60/1. 2005 Word Summit Outcome. Available at: https://undocs.org/A/RES/60/1 (accessed 14 May 2019).

UNDP (1994) Human Development Report 1994. Available at: https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents//hdr1994encompletenostatspdf.pdf (accessed 04 August 2022).

UNDP (2013) Issue Brief: Disaster Risk Governance. Available at: https://www.alnap.org/help-library/issue-brief-disaster-risk-governance (accessed 04 August 2022).

UNDRR (2005) Hyogo Framework for Action: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disaster. Extract from the final report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction. Available at: https://www.preventionweb.net/files/594_10382.pdf (accessed 03 February 2021).

UNDRR (2015) Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. Available at: https://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf (accessed 03 February 2021).

UNDRR (2021) Vulnerability. Available at: https://www.undrr.org/terminology/vulnerability (accessed 03 August 2022).

UNECOSOC (1963) Economic and Social Council Resolution 970XXXVI: Measures to be adopted in connexion with the earthquake at Skopje, Yugoslavia. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/213824 (accessed 04 August 2022).

UNECOSOC (1964) Economic and Social Council Resolution 1049XXXVII: Assistance in cases of natural disaster. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/213997 (accessed 04 August 2022).

UNECOSOC (1998) Report of the Secretary General E/CN.5/1998/2: Promoting social integration and participation of all people, including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/249225 (accessed 04 August 2022).

UNISDR (2001) Countering Disasters, Targeting Vulnerability and the Role of Science and Technology in Disaster Reduction. Available at: http://www.unisdr.org/files/4033_kit2001english1.pdf (accessed 04 August 2022).

UNISDR (2004) Living with Risk: A global review of disaster reduction initiatives. Available at: https://www.unisdr.org/files/657_lwr1.pdf (accessed 29 July 2022).

Urry J (2005a) The Complexity of the Global. Theory, Culture & Society 22(5): 235–254.

Urry J (2005b) The Complexity Turn. Theory, Culture & Society 22(5): 1–14.

Walker B and Salt D (2006) Resilience Thinking: Sustaining Ecosystems and People in a Changing World. Washington, Covelo, London: Island Press.

Walker J and Cooper M (2011) Genealogies of Resilience: From Systems Ecology to the Political Economy of Crisis Adaptation. Security Dialogue 42(2): 143–160.

Whittaker J, McLennan B and Handmer J (2015) A review of informal volunteerism in emergencies and disasters: Definition, opportunities and challenges. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 13: 358–368.

Wisner B (2016) Vulnerability as Concept, Model, Metric, and Tool. In: Cutter SL (ed) Oxford research encyclopedias: Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–51.

Wisner B, Blaikie P, Cannon T, et al. (2004) At risk: Natural hazards, people's vulnerability and disasters. London/New York: Routledge.

Wisner B, Gaillard JC and Kelman I (eds) (2012) The Routledge handbook of hazards and disaster risk reduction. London, New York: Routledge.

Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestags (2017) Sachstand: Zivilschutz in Deutschland.

Wyn Jones R (2005) On Emancipation: Necessity, Capacity, and Concrete Utopias. In: Booth K (ed) Critical Security Studies and World Politics: Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 215–235.

Young IM (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Young IM (2011) Responsibility for Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zebrowski C (2016) The Value of Resilience: Securing Life in the Twenty-First Century. London/New York: Routledge.

Zebrowski C (2019) Emergent emergency response: Speed, event suppression and the chronopolitics of resilience. Security Dialogue 50(2): 148–164.

Zebrowski C and Sage D (2017) Organising Community Resilience: An Examination of the Forms of Sociality Promoted in Community Resilience Programmes. Resilience 5(1): 44–60.

Zehng R (2019) What Kind of Responsibility Do we Have for Fighting Injustice? A Moral-Theoretic Perspective on the Social Connections Model. Critical Horizons 20(2): 109–126.