



CENTRE FOR THE PREVENTION  
OF RADICALIZATION  
LEADING TO VIOLENCE


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# "RETURNEES"

WHICH MEASURES TO ADOPT?

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INTRODUCTION  
**HOW SHOULD  
CANADA AND  
QUEBEC ADDRESS  
THE ISSUE OF  
RETURNEES  
FROM SYRIA  
AND IRAQ?**

Following the outbreak of civil war in Syria, many thousands of people left from other countries to travel to the conflict zone (in some cases alongside jihadist fighters), and this emerged as a top-priority security issue for many countries like Canada due to the risk that some nationals would become radicalized, violent extremists. A new phenomenon, that of returnees – nationals who left for Syria and Iraq from 2012 on, but who are now returning (or would like to return) to their countries of origin or residence – has now also emerged in the wake of military developments on the ground and the widespread retreat of the jihadist forces (starting with Islamic State). This naturally raises serious concerns in returnee countries,<sup>1</sup> which view this return of their nationals from Syria and Iraq as a potential security threat, particularly in the case of radicalized individuals and their affiliation with extremist groups. It now seems essential to consider what strategies and arrangements to adopt in order to adequately address the particular issue of radicalized individuals who have now returned to Quebec and Canada.<sup>2</sup>

In recent months, Islamic State and other jihadist movements in Syria have retreated on an unprecedented scale under the brunt of military operations conducted by the international coalition. This turn of events is obliging many countries, including Canada, to suddenly handle large numbers of nationals, particularly those from Western countries who have fled the war zone to return to their country of origin or residence, or who have been captured by local armed forces (including Kurdish militia) and become liable for possible extradition or repatriation.<sup>3</sup>

Unlike the Middle East or Europe, Canada has been less affected by the mass exodus of its citizens to Syria and Iraq since war broke out,<sup>4</sup> but has still been affected to some extent.<sup>5</sup> It is estimated that around 130 – 250 Canadian citizens have left for Syria/Iraq since 2012, including around 20 – 30 Quebec residents.<sup>6</sup> While many of these individuals were subsequently killed there, dozens of Canadians are still fighting and an estimated 60 or so Canadian

nationals have already returned to Canadian soil<sup>7</sup> – some who have been back for a long time after only a brief sojourn in Syria/Iraq, while others have returned more recently. However, this number from Public Safety Canada needs to be treated carefully because it appears to include not only returnees from Syria and Iraq, but also from other regions like Somalia, Yemen or Afghanistan.

Although it is still difficult to estimate the exact number of potential Canadian returnees in the foreseeable future, the best current estimate, based on available information is fewer than 40. The CPRLV estimates that there are currently fewer than 10 returnees from Syria/ Iraq currently in Quebec and that about the same number might eventually return in the near future. Given that the presence of these individuals on Canadian soil represents a moderate but very real threat to public safety, the authorities need to address the many challenges entailed in their treatment and case management. In response, the CPRLV has already developed a certain level of trust with the families concerned and has been working for many months to lay the guidelines for a well thought-out strategy to address this crucial aspect of public security.

Returnee-associated issues are not confined to the sole matter of their return to Canada and possible legal prosecution (because of their travel to Syria or acts committed there), but rather includes the broader challenge of their long-term reintegration into Canadian society. This means that the returnee phenomenon should not be viewed solely as a public security issue in terms of a short-term legal/penal response, but also as a reintegration challenge to prevent recidivism and re-involvement in violent extremism.

European countries that are facing an unprecedented flow of returnees are now developing strategies and arrangements to provide individualized treatment and management of returnees on a case-by-case basis. Given the wide-ranging diversity of these situations, a uniform, one-size-fits-all approach is bound to aggravate the phenomenon by ignoring its complexity and multiple variables.<sup>8</sup> By drawing on emerging experiences and best practices on the international scene, Canada and Quebec should develop measures suited to local realities and specifically designed to strike the right balance between public security and returnee reintegration, including any applicable legal action.

The Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV), which has been operating since spring 2015, advocates a holistic overall approach to prevent violent radicalization. With a prevention continuum covering the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of potential radicalization,<sup>9</sup> the CPRLV has developed intervention expertise in a wide range of situations associated with violent radicalization and the social reintegration of radicalized individuals.

Over the past three years, CPRLV professionals have developed an approach for the ecosystemic case management of radicalized individuals that involves holistic and personalized support, regardless of whether these individuals have been subject to legal prosecution or not. The protocols and practices developed by CPRLV professionals can therefore address the particular issues posed by the war zone experience of returnees and their potential affiliation with extremist groups. It is worth pointing out, however, that the CPRLV approach is not intended to be an alternative to legal prosecution and returnee accountability, which must be the primary consideration, but rather as a pragmatic and potentially effective complement to the short-, medium- and

long-term reintegration of these individuals that ensures their ongoing disengagement from violent extremism. Permanent social reintegration is the only way that the public security of everyone will be guaranteed.

This technical document outlines the CPRLV action plan for returnees. It describes the thinking of the Centre's professionals on this issue, as well as the steps and arrangements that might be taken at various levels in cooperation with a broad range of stakeholders<sup>10</sup> to ensure that the societal challenge associated with returnees is efficiently and pragmatically addressed.



# GLOSSARY

The terms used in this document to describe individuals are gender-neutral in that they cover both female and male inclusively.

## **Departee**

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A 'departee' is defined as such: an individual, principally motivated by an ideology or by personal beliefs, who chooses to leave their country of origin or residence (in this case, Canada) in order to travel to a conflict zone.<sup>11</sup>

## **Returnee**

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The term 'returnee' is used in this document to designate citizens or residents (in this case, Canada), who since 2012 have left the country to travel to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq to join armed groups, and who, voluntarily or involuntarily, arrive in (if Canada was not their initial point of departure) or return to, directly or indirectly, their country of citizenship or residence (in this case, Canada).<sup>12</sup>

## **Ecosystemic assessment**

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Ecosystemic assessment is a psychosocial approach for evaluating individual situations in terms of the various contexts in which individuals live, including their particular circumstances (family, friends and professional milieu). The purpose of ecosystemic assessment is to evaluate individuals, their pasts, their environment and their relations with their families, close friends, and acquaintances.


## **Social reintegration/Rehabilitation**

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These terms are used to designate a set of psychosocial interventions designed to facilitate – on their own or in conjunction with legal prosecution – the reintegration of criminals or delinquents into the community. A goal of the support/case management approach is to enable the individuals concerned to reflect on the acts they have committed, their sense of belonging to their community, and their ability to provide for their own needs and welfare. The terms "reintegration" and "rehabilitation" are used interchangeably in this document, even though they can be differentiated from each other in other contexts.







# RATIONALE FOR RETURNEE CASE MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT: AN ISSUE OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND SOCIAL REINTEGRATION

The returnee phenomenon involves a host of challenges on many levels. Although these dimensions are often thought to be in opposition, they should be considered as complementary.

## LEGAL FRAMEWORK

We should begin by considering which legal proceedings are the most appropriate for addressing the returnee phenomenon in a context that contains many obstacles to their legal prosecution. In practice, both the current legal framework and the burden of proof or existence of evidence complicate the ability of the Canadian authorities to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a Canadian citizen traveled abroad to join a terrorist group. Not only is it difficult to prove that they supported or contributed to the activities of a terrorist group by their presence in Syria/Iraq, it is also necessary to prove such charges according to the rules of law in a Canadian court. While this option may be adopted as necessary, it is not always the most realistic one. At the same time, legal proceedings do not consider the diversity of profiles, pasts and degrees of involvement of the individuals concerned. By adopting a uniform approach to treating individuals who have travelled along a variety of different radicalization pathways, a response based on systematic legal prosecution could have certain negative consequences (such as aggravating or reinforcing the radicalization of certain individuals), which could mean a greater long-term threat to public security. The question that therefore needs to be asked concerns the veritable efficacy and potential consequences of eventual recourse to systematic legal prosecution of returnees to Canada and Quebec.


## SOCIAL REINTEGRATION

In addition to the judicial dimensions, the challenge of reintegrating returnees represents another central strand of the returnee problem.

In fact, their case management / support transcends the challenge of legal prosecution alone because ultimately, their social reintegration must also bolster public security. In this sense, regardless of the situation of returnees vis-à-vis the Canadian judicial system (non-prosecution, release from detention, sentencing, release on parole, etc.<sup>13</sup>), the process of disengaging and re-integrating these individuals should be facilitated as soon as possible after their

return to Canada and Quebec. Indeed, this is the preferred approach in many European countries, notably in Denmark.<sup>14</sup>

In order to holistically address the issues raised by returnees, it therefore seems necessary to provide case management / support to both those who will be subject to legal prosecution (and potentially, sentencing) and those who will not.



## THE CHALLENGES RETURNEES FACE

Waiting years for the outcome of a trial is not an option when addressing the issue of returnees, nor is preventive detention.<sup>16</sup>

*By adopting a balanced paradigm in which case management and support are provided in conjunction with legal proceedings and the decisions of public security stakeholders, the CPRLV aims to promote rational and safe management of returnees.*

This approach also offers an alternative to the major costs entailed by, for example, long term surveillance programs for all returnees in Canada, the efficacy of which is far from guaranteed.

Although this approach might create some anxiety, it constitutes the only way at this time to effectively support a long-term process of disengagement and reintegration for returnees and to guarantee public security and a sense of shared community.

The fundamental importance of success in this area therefore requires that a pragmatic approach be preferred over a dogmatic or politicized view of the phenomenon.

At the same time, constant vigilance is required in order to counter the risk, in some cases, of recidivism and re-involvement in violent extremism.

Some of the total number of Canadian citizens who have traveled to Syria/Iraq since 2013 have already returned to Canada, while others will shortly do so. Each returnee has their own reasons for coming back. They have followed many different paths, and have many different reasons for returning: the immediate context (more dangerous circumstances due to loss of territory or the threat from armed groups, including Islamic State; personal reconsideration (desire to go back on the decision to travel to Syria, refusal to join violent extremist groups); or the desire to commit attacks on Canadian soil.<sup>16</sup> In other words, each individual's reasons for returning must be thoroughly assessed in order to ensure that they reflect a definite wish to disengage and not pursue extremist thinking. In this regard, it is essential to consider the multiplicity of profiles and diversity of personal histories that will lead to the kinds of challenges listed below.

TABLE I – CHALLENGES FOR RETURNEES

Challenges for returnees	Proposed steps
<p><b>Willingness to refrain from violence</b></p>	<p>Support the individual, whether in custody or not, to reflect upon the acts they have committed and their relationship to the ideological positions that justify violence – whether committed by them or those they identify with.</p> <p>Pursue the issue of the individual's relationship with violence, compared with the courses of action available in democratic societies.</p>
<p><b>Openness to receiving help and support</b></p>	<p>Given that a particular individual's case cannot be accepted for management unless they are open to receiving help, identify the potential facilitating measures or avenues of dialogue to establish a trusting, supportive relationship.</p>
<p><b>Awareness of own risk factors and radicalization mechanisms</b></p>	<p>Identify the individual's risk factors and underlying radicalization mechanisms and help them to become aware of them. (For example, if the desire to engage in a particular cause was a factor that motivated some individuals to leave Canada and join extremist groups in Syria, a useful line of intervention might be to suggest alternative responses. If certain psychosocial factors played a major role in an individual's decision to travel to Syria, it is important that these factors be addressed by resources or help).</p>
<p><b>Reconnecting with education/employment</b></p>	<p>Their education or career having been interrupted by travel to a war-zone, it will be necessary to assist them in finding employment or in registering for courses with help from relevant stakeholders (Emploi-Québec / education system, etc.).</p>
<p><b>Financial, administrative or accommodation difficulties</b></p>	<p>In the face of such difficulties due to decisions or actions taken at time of departure or in the absence of close post-return support, help the individual to address them (for example, by registering on a waiting list for social housing).</p> <p>As needed, ensure the individual's anonymity and safety in order to avoid potential retaliation due to their place of residence.</p>

TABLE I – CHALLENGES FOR RETURNEES

Challenges for returnees	Proposed steps
<p><b>Risk of social stigmatization</b></p>	<p>Given the situation in which returnees find themselves, and in light of the actions they have taken, understand that they may feel stigmatized or rejected, which will somewhat increase their risk of vulnerability and therefore their chances of re-involvement in violent extremism.</p> <p>Provide adequate support so that returnees can deal with feelings of social stigmatization.</p> <p>Explain the returnee phenomenon and the associated life challenges to Quebecers in a clear and transparent way.</p>
<p><b>Risk of retaliation or victimization</b></p>	<p>Given the perceptions that the returnee's situation might engender and the risk of being targeted, intimidated or subject to physical retaliation, take appropriate steps, if necessary (in partnership with the police concerned and the returnee's relatives): relocation, mitigation/safety measures in potential victimization situations at work, school, home, etc.</p>
<p><b>Access to spiritual/religious support</b></p>	<p>Offer spiritual/religious support to returnees who so request.</p>
<p><b>Management of mental health issues (due to trauma, violence, etc.) or of physical health problems (injuries, disabilities, etc.)</b></p>	<p>Work with healthcare professionals to provide adequate psychological or physical support to returnees.</p> <p>Ensure that all the individual's health problems, whether physical or mental, can be addressed.</p>
<p><b>Creating a social network in the absence of close support or a web of personal relations</b></p>	<p>In the absence of support from family or friends in providing emotional and moral support to the individual, give them access to positive social networks and consider establishing a mentoring program.</p>

## CHALLENGES FOR THE CPRLV AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS CONCERNED

In addition to the challenges in supporting and rehabilitating returnees due to the difficulties they face after coming back to Canada, the CPRLV and the other stakeholders concerned (government departments, public security stakeholders, the health and social services system, community organizations, etc.) face other direct challenges in playing this role.



TABLE II – CHALLENGES FOR THE CPRLV AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS CONCERNED

Challenge for the CPRLV and other stakeholders concerned	Proposed steps
<p><b>Adequate assessment of the risks associated with each case</b></p>	<p>Collect information in cooperation with other relevant stakeholders in order to obtain the most exhaustive assessment possible of the radicalization risk inherent in each situation.</p> <p>Combined use of various scales and tools (GESMRV, VERA 2, RADAR, ERG 22+, HCR-20).</p> <p>Continuously monitor the risk of radicalization and its associated variables in order to counter any potential manipulation by returnees.</p>
<p><b>Mediatization and politicization of individual-returnee situations (particularly those supported by the CPRLV)</b></p>	<p>Educate the media and Quebecers about the returnee issue and the case management / support being provided in the province.</p> <p>Prepare returnees for media attention and the potential mediatization of their situation.</p>
<p><b>Case management in the context of legal prosecution</b></p>	<p>Initiate case management at the outset of the legal process.</p> <p>Establish agreement and coordination with relevant stakeholders throughout the legal process in order to ensure that returnee case management goes well.</p>
<p><b>Coordinated and holistic cooperation in applying a case management / support approach towards returnees and their close family and friends</b></p>	<p>Maintain connections with the various stakeholders involved in applying a case management / support approach towards returnees and their close family and friends.</p> <p>Support the returnee’s family and friends so that they adjust successfully to the returnee’s coming back home.</p>
<p><b>Confidentiality and information-sharing</b></p>	<p>Develop and implement a confidentiality and information-sharing protocol with the various stakeholders involved in monitoring and supporting returnees in a case-management context.</p>
<p><b>Cooperation among the various government stakeholders and levels</b></p>	<p>Establish and maintain contacts with relevant stakeholders in other provinces, as required, as well as with the departments and other levels of government concerned.</p>

## THE CPRLV'S ROLE AND FUNCTIONS IN RETURNEE CASE MANAGEMENT

Since its inception, the CPRLV has developed unique expertise in providing management and support services in the case of radicalized and potentially radicalized individuals, as well as of their families.

*Based on an individualized ecosystemic approach, CPRLV professionals have performed interventions in more than 200 situations of varying configurations and degrees of severity.*

CPRLV professionals possess multidisciplinary experience and a wide range of skills (social work, psychotherapy, psychosocial support, community engagement, etc.) that underpin its coordinated and integrated management of a wide variety of cases of violent radicalization. This expertise also extends to individuals who have been charged with terrorism or violent extremism.

**Based on this expertise and its connections with both community and government partners, the CPRLV is well-placed to coordinate the case management and support of future returnees to Quebec, regardless of whether they are charged with an offense or not.**

This document describes the CPRLV action plan to address this challenge, and highlights the various prospects identified by its professionals as well as the steps envisaged.

It is essential that the overall returnee case management / support process takes place in several stages, as described in the next section. The whole process must be carried out in close collaboration with many provincial and federal stakeholders, with each responsible for a specific sphere of jurisdiction and operating within pre-defined intervention frameworks for each individual case.

Below is a list of the CPRLV's main functions:

- Implement and operate a "returnee working group" (RWG) across Quebec, which is designed to bring together all the stakeholders concerned by the issue of returnees and their potential case management;
- Identify, jointly with the RWG, potential returnees to Quebec and coordinate available information on this subject;
- Conduct an ecosystemic assessment of the risk and psychosocial situation of each returnee – and their close family and friends, as applicable;
- Formulate a personalized action plan for each returnee with a view to proposing an appropriate course of action to facilitate their re-adaption and reintegration;
- With the help of the partners concerned, coordinate the resources needed to implement the action plan for each returnee – and their close family and friends, as applicable;
- Nurture the bonds between returnees and relatives/friends, including in the context of legal prosecution and/or preventive detention;
- Continuously monitor how each returnee's situation is evolving and the suitability of the proposed action plan and other steps taken;
- Inform the general public about returnee issues and the related steps being taken by the CPRLV and its partners.





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08:00	TR 371	TR
10:00	CA 834	CA
10:30	TR 510	TR
10:32	LG 351	LG
11:00	LG 844	LG
11:50	LG 810	LG
11:50	RM 4210	RM
11:52	HX 115	HX
11:52	CS 288	CS
11:52	RM 4204	RM
11:52	MS 2488	MS
11:52	LX 181	LX
11:52	CA 524	CA
11:52	TR 880	TR
11:52	RM 301	RM
11:52	ME 825	ME



# STRATEGIES AND OTHER MEASURES FOR CASE MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT OF RETURNEES IN QUEBEC


Given that the case management and support of potential returnees to Quebec is essentially an intersectoral challenge, they should be governed by a standardized approach setting out procedures, strategies and steps for each case.

## CASE MANAGEMENT STEPS

These steps are based on the best international practices and on the CPRLV's experience in supporting and managing the cases of radicalized or potentially radicalized individuals.<sup>17</sup> They are designed to map out a clear path for the intervention process – from the identification of a returnee to their ongoing assessment.

The proposed intervention approach consists of the six steps below, which are explained in section 2.3.

FIGURE 1 – STEPS IN THE CASE MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT PROCESS



**IDENTIFYING RETURNEES**

Prior to these six steps, it is self-evidently impossible to initiate the intervention process without having first identified the returnee, whether they are already in Canada or still abroad. This identification step might be undertaken by the returnees themselves, or by their relatives, in the form of contact with the CPRLV.

Alternatively, federal public security stakeholders may be responsible for the identification of returnees, particularly in cases where returnees still abroad have expressed a wish to return to Canada: the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) are the main stakeholders in identifying Canadian returnees when still outside Canada, as well as those who come back more discreetly.

FIGURE 2 – **IDENTIFYING RETURNEES**



FIGURE 3 – **CPRLV OBJECTIVES**



## STEP 1: CONTACT AND IDENTIFICATION

The purpose of this step is to identify returnees and make the first contact with them or their close family and friends.

This involves gathering the required information from the stakeholders in this identification.

- An initial step of information-gathering will be taken to prepare a comprehensive portrait of the individual, their past, their record as a deportee, their experiences in the conflict zone, and their reasons for returning.
- As much information as possible needs to be compiled from the key stakeholders in order to proceed with a preliminary ecosystemic assessment of the returnee's situation. This will require the CPRLV to contact the government stakeholders who can provide information about the returnee, as well as the returnee's relatives and friends (family, related network, etc.) in order to complete the initial overview of the situation.

This intersectoral approach, albeit essential, entails a number of confidentiality challenges.

- To enable the RWG to guarantee the confidentiality of the information gathered, a confidentiality protocol will need to be drawn up, clearly indicating how the confidentiality of information shared within the group will be preserved, as well as the type of information that can be shared.

**Primary line of action:** *Prepare a general portrait of the returnee, their past and their short-, medium- and long-term situation.*



## STEP 2: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

The preliminary assessment must be holistic and ecosystemic (i.e. include the individual, their environment, and both their direct and indirect contacts). This assessment can be used to define not only the risk level associated with each returnee, but also each returnee's particular risk factors, protective factors, and needs.

- Given the wide diversity of extremist profiles, an individualized and relatively exhaustive assessment should clearly identify the mechanisms that contributed to the returnee's embrace of extremism and their travel to Syria/Iraq, as well as the factors that could help or hinder their potential reintegration into normal society.

The purpose of this preliminary assessment, which is performed with CPRLV -preferred tools, is to ensure that the returnee in question does not represent an immediate threat to public security, but also to provide sufficient intervention opportunities for initiating a reintegration process.

Here follows some key elements of such an assessment (incomplete list):

TABLE III – **KEY ELEMENTS OF THE PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT**

- Degree of commitment to extremist narratives or discourses
- Degree of loyalty to an extremist network or association with individuals linked to extremist ideology
- Justification of violence
- Justification of violence committed in the name of an extremist ideology
- Previous diagnosis of mental health problems
- Presence of psychological trauma
- Capacity for empathy and reflexivity (thoughtfulness)
- Family relations and degree of family support
- Experiences and roles in the conflict zone / with combatant groups
- Experience of combat or military training in the conflict zone
- Reasons for return

**Primary line of action:** *Identify the returnee's risk factors, protective factors and needs in order to establish the possibility of proceeding with a case management plan and personal reintegration measures.*

## STEP 3: CROSS-ASSESSMENT

Cross-assessment is performed by the RWG concerned, which should include the most suitable stakeholders for the case in question. RWG members will identify the most appropriate measures for the individual and situation concerned, as well as the resources required for developing an appropriate case management plan. Such a mechanism is essential for a balanced inter-sectoral approach because it helps optimize communications and information-sharing.

- The stakeholders involved will vary, depending on the risk factors, protective factors, and needs identified by the preliminary assessment.
- The purpose of including a varied range of stakeholders is to provide a cross-sectoral perspective on each returnee's situation, such as its particular administrative, safety, psychosocial, relational and even strictly personal aspects.
- RWG discussions will primarily focus on the suitability and availability of resources for a possible case management plan; new information that contributes to a more in-depth assessment of the situation can be added, as applicable, by the RWG members involved.

RWG meetings also assess the external risks associated with the returnee (e.g. the risk of mediatization, the risk that the returnee becomes the target of retaliation, intimidation, threats, etc.), as well as what might be done to mitigate these risks.

**Note: All the information shared will need to comply with legal restrictions and the confidentiality rules of the partners in the group.**

**Primary line of action: Perform a cross-assessment of each situation with the help of designated partners and assess the resources that can be deployed for a potential case management plan.**







## STEP 4: CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN

The case management plan is the end result of the cross-assessment performed by the RWG.

- The plan must take into account the various components of the assessment in order to produce a complete overview of the returnee's situation.
- Each case management plan is individualized. It contains detailed recommendations on the objectives, measures and resources mobilized for the returnee's reintegration. The plan also describes the initial, intermediate and final objectives, as well as the proposed next steps for follow-up (checking on how well or how badly the situation is evolving) and re-assessment.
- The case management plan also specifies the responsibilities and limitations of each partner and sector involved and explains the components of their intervention with a timeline.
- Lastly, the plan also specifies what to do if the returnee's situation regresses or worsens.

FIGURE 4 – **SECTORS AFFECTED BY THE CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND PARTNERS INVOLVED**

<p><b>Public Safety sector</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public Safety Canada</li> <li>• Ministry of Public Security Québec (MSP)</li> <li>• RCMP</li> <li>• CSIS</li> <li>• Sûreté du Québec</li> <li>• Municipal police forces</li> <li>• Correctional Service of Canada</li> <li>• Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada</li> </ul>
<p><b>Civil/community sector</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community organizations</li> <li>• Housing assistance organizations</li> <li>• Carrefour Jeunesse-Emploi</li> <li>• Quebec bar association</li> </ul>
<p><b>Education sector</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Education and Higher Education Québec (MEES)</li> <li>• Educational institutions</li> <li>• School boards</li> </ul>
<p><b>Health and social services sector</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministry of Health and Social Services Québec (MSSS)</li> <li>• Integrated University Health and Social Service Centres (CIUSSS)</li> <li>• Director of Youth Protection (DPJ)</li> </ul>

**Primary line of action:** *Establish intervention guidelines and specify the resources required to implement the returnee's personal action plan.*

## STEP 5: IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation of the case management plan will be the responsibility of the partners and stakeholders designated in the preceding step. Roles and responsibilities will be determined on a case-by-case basis and according to each organization's capacities.

**However, the CPRLV is still responsible for coordinating implementation:**

- The CPRLV will ensure that suitable services and resources are deployed for each situation.
- It will also implement the case management plan at its level, which may include support for the returnee's close family and friends.

Implementation of the case management plan may proceed along various lines, depending on the identified needs. Here are a few examples.<sup>18</sup>

### FAMILY SUPPORT

A returnee's family plays a crucial role in their reintegration into society, often acting as their principal (and even sole) support network. A positive family setting can be a decisive factor in an individual's impermeability to violent radicalization,<sup>19</sup> and especially in supporting social reintegration. However, all families are not capable of welcoming or positively supporting the returnee: in these cases, professional support services will need to follow up with the family and provide appropriate assistance to make the household a conducive setting for successful reintegration.<sup>20</sup>

### PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT AND MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES

Given that some returnees might also be suffering from psychological trauma and other mental health problems, it is essential that they have access to professional medical resources, including specialized services in the healthcare system.

### MENTORING AND COUNSELING

A mentoring programme, designed to facilitate specific interpersonal relationships, should provide informal personal support that can help facilitate the social reintegration of returnees.<sup>21</sup> In fact, returnees may feel the need to confide in a key individual outside the professional case management or psychosocial monitoring context: this is why skilled mentoring personnel who can connect with returnees need to be available.

### EMPLOYMENT INTEGRATION SUPPORT

Returnees may have trouble finding a job, particularly due to their pasts and the fears of some employers, a factor which may complicate the reintegration process. In such cases, it may be necessary to draw on specialized employment integration resources (e.g. Emploi Québec and Carrefour Jeunesse-Emploi) who can help the individuals concerned find work (paid or unpaid). Aside from financial autonomy (as applicable), work helps develop social contacts in a milieu other than family.

### EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT

If the returnee is not suited for employment, they can still envisage their future with optimism and confidence: for example, a training program might be the way to go. It is also possible that they did not complete their education and should pick up where they left off. In all cases, it may be necessary to support these individuals in an educational process. Developing an educational or training program is one way of developing realistic and feasible ambitions.

## STEP 6: FOLLOW-UP AND ONGOING ASSESSMENT

### LOGISTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT (HOUSING, LEGAL, FINANCIAL, ETC.)<sup>22</sup>

Returnees may run into a series of logistical and administrative problems after they come back (e.g. opening a bank account or unfreezing financial assets; finding accommodation; obtaining medical or social insurance, etc.). Similarly, in the case of returned families, the official status of children born abroad can be difficult to establish. In the latter case, many stakeholders – Service Canada, the Société d'habitation du Québec (Quebec housing corporation), immigration departments, legal resources, etc. – may be called upon to intervene.

### CORRECTIONAL AND/OR PROBATION SERVICES

For returnees who have been tried and sentenced in court, it is important that correctional and/or probation services be brought on board in order to establish mechanisms for the complementary case management of returnees – for example, by facilitating access to mentors and community groups.

### CHILDREN'S AID RESOURCES

In the case of returnees who are minors, children's aid resources will play a crucial role in the case management process. The development and safety of children are the priorities of such organizations,<sup>23</sup> and these objectives require an intersectoral approach.

**Primary line of action:** *Implement the case management plan and ensure that suitable resources are deployed for returnees and their close family and friends.*

CPRLV teams will be responsible for monitoring the case management plan and its implementation.

- Ongoing assessment will be performed at regular intervals.
- The RWG will be kept abreast of the monitoring and will keep partners in the loop in order to update information (steps taken, new elements that emerge during the action plan, etc.).
- Behavioural assessment indicators on a timescale will need to be defined as the action plan is being monitored.

**Primary line of action:**

*Monitor each returnee's case management plan with a view to ongoing re-assessment and adjustment as required of the needs and resources deployed.*



**CONCLUSION  
HOW TO  
ASSESS THE  
SUCCESS OR  
FAILURE OF  
RETURNEE CASE  
MANAGEMENT  
AND SUPPORT**



Assessing returnee case management / support programs is a complex challenge.

Realistically speaking, it seems fruitless to assess the success or failure of such programs on the basis of a target recidivism rate of zero: it seems smarter to focus on customized indicators for each case management plan. That is why we feel it essential to adopt an internal case-by-case assessment approach, based on realistic objectives established at the outset by the RWG in partnership with returnees, and clearly explained to them. It is on this basis that we can perform both ongoing and regularly scheduled assessments (e.g., quarterly) to determine whether these objectives are being achieved. In this way, we can react swiftly by adapting the action plan to the evolving situation.

The overall objectives of the returnee case management / support approach have been defined in this document as follows:

- Ensure public safety, prevent violent radicalization, and identify the security risks for Quebec and Canada;
- Facilitate the disengagement of individuals from violent extremism and ensure their social reintegration;
- Mitigate the risks of recidivism and the re-involvement of returnees in radicalization and violent extremism.

**Note: This intersectoral approach is intended to complement and not oppose any legal prosecution.**

Returnee case management is the quintessential expression of the idea that, in order to address the dangers of violent radicalization, positive action and empathetic understanding can accomplish more than writing returnees off and systematically referring them to the courts.

Ultimately, the message we would like to leave with returnees and their families or society itself is that education and personal introspection are powerful antidotes to dogmatism and the risk of embracing violent extremism.

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- 9 See the CPRLV information kit: *Prévention de la radicalisation menant à la violence : Intervenir à tous les niveaux* : <https://info-radical.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/cprmv-intervenir-a-tous-les-niveaux.pdf>
- 10 For a list of these actors, see section 2.4. Rehabilitation Plan.
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- 14 The municipal authorities and the local police in Aarhus, the second-largest city in Denmark, set up an intersectoral intervention program to prevent violent radicalization and rehabilitate radicalized individuals. This program includes a component designed to facilitate the disengagement of individuals from extremist groups (the Exit program) by working to meet their various needs (professional, psychological, spiritual, etc.). The initial needs assessment of returnees is combined with a program of mentoring, medical care (if necessary) and psychological support. See Alexandre Chevrier-Pelletier, *Quel futur pour une approche intersectorielle en gestion des retours de combattants étrangers au Canada : une étude exploratoire*, work supervised by David Morin, University of Sherbrooke, 2017, p. 26.
- 15 Charles Lister, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
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