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Antisemitism among adolescents in Germany

Author: Carl Philipp Schröder

Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony

Address for correspondence: CarlPhilipp.Schroeder@kfn.de

Abstract: Europe is facing a new wave of antisemitism, which has grown in recent years. In 2019, the number of reported antisemitic crimes has increased in Germany. On the one hand, Muslim immigrants are suspected of so-called "imported Antisemitism". On the other hand, right-wing extremism still appears to be the main cause of most antisemitic crimes. Moreover, antisemitism may also be rooted in the left-wing spectrum hiding behind the criticism of Israel and its policies. To analyze the connections of antisemitic attitudes, data from a school survey of 6,715 ninth-graders are used. The results indicate a strong connection between right-wing attitudes and antisemitism as well as left-wing and Islamist attitudes and antisemitism. Higher values of antisemitism are also found among Muslims, but the main predictor of antisemitic attitudes is by far right-wing attitudes.

1 Introduction

In recent years, the climate in European politics and society in general has changed. Right-wing[1] groups and parties are gaining support and there have been numerous violent attacks against liberal society. In Germany, groups like PEGIDA[2] established political movements based on prejudice and xenophobia. Currently, the right-wing party AfD[3] has seats in all 16 German state parliaments and in the Bundestag.[4] Moreover, right-wing attitudes do not only influence political debates but can also raise motivation of individuals or groups to commit violent attacks. Political motivated crime increased by 14% from 2018 to 2019 and many incidents like the shootings in Halle[5] and Hanau[6] are clearly motivated by right-wing ideology (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, 2020a). The Jewish population in Germany is especially attentive to the current development. Not only rising right-wing movements, but also mass immigration from Middle East countries generate feelings of insecurity among them (Zick et al., 2017; FRA, 2018). Due to the high number of immigrants who came to Germany since 2015, people from the Jewish community perceive an increase of antisemitism in Germany (Zick et al., 2017). They fear that the high prevalence of antisemitism in many Middle East countries (Anti-Defamation League, 2020) leads to an increase of antisemitism in Germany through migration. Yet, not much research about the extent of antisemitic attitudes among immigrants from these countries, especially among Muslim immigrants and about the question how antisemitism and Islamist attitudes are related exists. Besides the presumed threats from the right-wing and Islamist spectrum, criticism of Israel's policies may serve as a protective shell for antisemitic attitudes among left-wing supporters.

The following analysis examines the extent of antisemitic attitudes among adolescents in Germany and especially among adolescents with migration background and Muslim

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[1] The term "right-wing" used in this paper can also include "far-right" attitudes, ideologies, behavior, persons and groups. The same simplification is used for the term "left-wing".

[2] Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (German: Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes)

[3] Alternative for Germany (German: Alternative für Deutschland)

[4] Besides the anti-immigrantion and anti-Islam agenda of the party, one study recently examined strategic antisemitic online activities by AfD-politicians (Hübscher, 2020) and another study based on representative data found a higher level of support for antisemitism among AfD-voters (Schuler et al., 2020).

[5] Attack on a synagogue with two casualties.

[6] Attack on a shisha bar with ten casualties.

students. Furthermore, the relationship between antisemitism and right-wing, left-wing and Islamist attitudes will be taken into account. The focus will be on adolescents, since research on radicalization suggests that they are especially vulnerable. Around the age of 14 or 15, adolescents are in search of identity, belonging and recognition (Greve, 2007). Besides, they are often looking for adventures, thrills and provocation (Benslama, 2017). This age is an important phase for political socialization (Niemi & Hepburn, 2010; Torney-Purta, 2004) and the development of attitudes which often stay stable over the life course (Sears, 1983, 1990). Many pull- and push-factors to radicalization play a role especially in adolescence (Benslama, 2017). Extremist ideology might not be very coherent among adolescents compared to adults, but prejudice and approval of extremist narratives are prevalent.

To analyze antisemitism among adolescents it is necessary to define, what antisemitism is. After clarifying the terminology, the current development regarding antisemitism in Germany will be examined with empirical findings about victims and perpetrators. The research questions will be stated subsequently. The description of procedure, sample and instruments will be presented followed by the result. In this section, some descriptive findings and most important a multiple linear regression analysis will be used for the analysis of the research questions. A brief summary of the findings and concluding thoughts close the paper. However, some limitations have to be mentioned at the end.

1.1 Definition

The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) and the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) have formulated a working definition of antisemitism that has been adopted by many organizations and governments, including the German. They define antisemitism as "a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities" (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) & European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), 2016).

This definition has often been criticized. Critics argue, that it is too broad, inconsistent and therefore not helpful (Pfahl-Traughber, 2017; Ullrich, 2019). Although it does not

accurately define antisemitism for empirical social research in regard to attitudes, this definition should be considered for its widespread use and its overarching applicability.

Many authors distinguish between different forms of antisemitism, e.g. *anti-Judaism, modern antisemitism, secondary antisemitism* and *anti-Zionism* (Stein, 2011). Following Stein (2011), *anti-Judaism* is religious motivated antisemitism rooted in the early years of Christianity when the young religion tried to demarcate from Judaism. *Modern antisemitism* has a pseudo-anthropological and pseudo-biological doctrine with a racist and social Darwinist core. It has also a long history with its peak occurring in the Holocaust (Stein, 2011). *Secondary antisemitism* is a term for the denial of guilt and of the memory of Germany's history with the Holocaust (Stein, 2011; Zick et al., 2019). *Anti-Zionism* refers to the criticism of the state of Israel. Today, it is mainly related to the Middle East conflict and the situation of Palestinians. Even though the term Zionism has its roots in inner Jewish conflicts, the anti-imperialistic ideology is widespread today in the political left-wing spectrum.

The Research and Information Center Antisemitism (RIAS) [7] refers to five different forms of antisemitism (*othering, modern antisemitism, post-shoa antisemitism, Israel-related antisemitism* and *anti-Judaism*) to distinguish between antisemitic incidents (RIAS Berlin, 2020). *Othering* describes the marginalization and exclusion of Jews. Examples for *othering* are depictions of Jews as strange, alien, foreign, or providing a distinction between "Germans" and "Jews" (Küpper & Zick, 2019; RIAS Berlin, 2020). For RIAS, in contrast to Stein (2011), conspiracy theories in which Jews have special political and economic power are part of so-called *modern antisemitism*. *Post-Schoa antisemitism* refers to the denial of Holocaust remembrance. The other two forms are *Israel-related* and *anti-Judaistic* antisemitism (RIAS Berlin, 2020).

This paper will accept the working definition by the IHRA and the EUMC and will furthermore distinguish between three forms of antisemitism. Following Zick et al. (2019) this paper refers to *secondary antisemitism* and *Israel-related antisemitism* as well as so-called *classic antisemitism*, which consists of forms like *othering* and *modern antisemitism* in the

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[7] German: Recherche- und Informationsstelle Antisemitismus (RIAS).

way RIAS uses the term. This distinction has been tested in elaborate studies before and is therefore used.

1.2 Current development

In recent years, the public focus on antisemitism increased mostly in connection with major incidents. The annual "al-quds-day" in Berlin is an example of a public event that is deeply rooted in antisemitic ideology. Antisemitism appeared e.g. in the form of chants and signs. In 2019, around 1,000 participants joined the demonstration, which has its roots in Iran (RIAS Berlin, 2020). The participants were mostly immigrants from Middle Eastern countries, but German neo-Nazis also joined the event to protest against Israel (RIAS Berlin, 2020). Recently, the mass shooting attempt in Halle on October 9, 2019 brought the public focus back on antisemitism in Germany. On that day, a young man tried to enter a synagogue, where approximately 70 to 80 members of the Jewish community were celebrating Yom Kippur. He fired his gun at the front door, but as he could not get in, he shot two pedestrians instead.[8]

Even though this incident was the first known antisemitic mass shooting attempt in Germany's recent history, antisemitic attacks, violent or non-violent, are very prevalent. In 2019, the police reported 2,032 antisemitic hate crimes which is an increase of 13% to 2018 and 35% to 2017 (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, 2020a). The number of violent antisemitic hate crimes also increased in recent years to 73 in 2019 (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, 2020b). Several NGOs are trying to count antisemitic incidents in Germany as well. The Amadeu Antonio Foundation counts incidents from different sources like press reports or reports by other NGOs (Amadeu Antonio Foundation, 2020). The organization RIAS has a platform for self-reporting incidents to clarify unrecorded cases and supplement police reports (RIAS Berlin, 2020). In Berlin alone, RIAS recorded 881 incidents for the year 2019 (RIAS Berlin, 2020).

In addition, studies on antisemitism measure the spread of victimization among the Jewish population in Germany. Zick et al. (2017) asked 553 Jewish participants in an online survey whether they had experienced any incidents based on their Jewish faith in the last 12 month.

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[8] See Oltermann (2019).

Of all participants, 61% reported hidden indications, 29% verbal abuse and 3% physical violence (Zick et al., 2017). The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) also conducted an online survey of 1,233 Jewish participants living in Germany. The study shows that 53% of the participants have experienced at least some form of antisemitic harassment in the last five years and 41% in the last 12 months (FRA, 2019, 2018).

In order to analyze the reasons for antisemitic incidents, the motivation of the perpetrators has to be considered. According to official police statistics, 93.4% of all reported antisemitic hate crimes in Germany in 2019 were committed by perpetrators from the right-wing spectrum, 0.3% from the left-wing spectrum, 2.8% "foreign ideology", 1.2% "religious ideology" and 2.3% with unknown motivation (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, 2020a). Due to several reasons, these numbers should be interpreted with caution. First of all, police statistics can only list crimes which have been reported. They do not include any information about further process of the cases, e.g. whether they have been taken to court or ended with a conviction.[9] Furthermore, they do not provide information about the actual extent of antisemitic hate crimes or crimes in general, as the dark figure of crime is not considered. The development of antisemitic hate crimes in police reports can also be misleading. These reports are not intended to give an accurate picture of the development and do only document police work. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the dark figure and also the commitment, the effectiveness and the level of police investment. The numbers can be used as one indicator for a development besides others though. For the identification of perpetrators in the field of antisemitic hate crime, the categorization of hate crimes reported by the police is also criticized for its numerous limitations. For many reasons the identification of the motive behind a crime can be difficult, but also the practice of categorization itself is problematic. For example, police often labels antisemitic hate crime as right-wing motivated even if clear hints are missing (Independent Expert Group on Antisemitism, 2017).

Scientific survey data has similar problems with the identification of perpetrators. In their survey, Zick et al. (2017) asked participants who had experienced any kind of antisemitic

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[9] In contrast to the German police crime statistics which are so-called outgoing statistics and include only cases that have been processed by the police and passed to the public prosecutor's office, the statistics about political motivated crime include all cases that have been recorded by the police.

incident, who they thought the perpetrator was. In their opinion, most perpetrators were Muslim (Zick et al., 2017). The authors themselves mention that this question was misleading. Many categories of perpetrators that could be selected by the participants were difficult to identify, e.g. a Christian person or a right-wing person. Other options, such as a Muslim person, may have been overestimated due to the participants' confusion about ethnicity, religion or other characteristics. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret these findings. According to RIAS (2020), 29% of the perpetrators of incidents in their reporting system are from the right-wing, 1% left-wing and 1% from the Islamist spectrum.[10]

The identification of the motives of perpetrators and the analysis of the relation between antisemitic behaviour and the ideologies of perpetrators cannot be carried out sufficiently from the victim's perspective in the field of hate crimes. For this reason, the focus of the analysis has to be shifted to attitudes. Although several studies, which are representative of the adult German population, have been conducted, analysis on connections between patterns of attitudes are rare. Most of the studies focus on the extent of antisemitic attitudes and do not analyze the connections between patterns of attitudes in depth. Zick et al. (2019) measured 4.0% to 8.1%[11] of agreement to *classic antisemitic* statements. They also measured 12.5% to 21.6% of approval of *secondary antisemitism* and 16.3% to 39.4% consent of *Israel-related antisemitism*. The World Jewish Congress also conducted a study that is representative of the German population. The agreement to antisemitic statements varies from 27% in general antisemitic statements to 41% for the statement "Jews still talk too much about what happened to them during the Holocaust" (World Jewish Congress, 2019). Bergmann et al. (2019) conducted a study among adolescents. The samples consists of ninth-graders from a repeated cross-sectional school survey, which was conducted in 2013, 2015 and 2017. The study is representative for the federal German state of Lower Saxony. They found approval of antisemitic attitudes for 3.6% to 10.9% of the ninth-graders in three different items. The average means are between 2.01 and 2.22 on a five-point Likert scale from 1 "not agree at all"

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[10] Following RIAS' categorization, other political backgrounds of the perpetrators were conspiracy theories (6%), anti-Israel activism (10%), political mainstream (7%), christian fundamentalism (<1%) and unknown (46%) (RIAS Berlin, 2020).

[11] The range of percentage accounts for multiple items of classic and Israel-related antisemitism and for different cut-off points in all forms of antisemitism. On a five-point Likert scale the antisemitic attitudes included the middle category for one calculation and only approval with category four and five for another calculation (Zick et al., 2019).

to 5 "totally agree" (Bergmann et al., 2019). In a similar study Krieg et al. (2019) found agreement between 10.9% and 13.8% for three items measuring antisemitic attitudes. The study sample also consists of ninth-graders and seventh-graders and is representative for the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein in Germany.

1.3 Research questions

Hate crime statistics and general population surveys provide very little information on the relationship between antisemitic attitudes and their ideological background. It is obvious that antisemitism is an inherent part of right-wing ideology. According to empirical social research standards in regard to German population surveys, antisemitism is one of the six dimensions of right-wing ideology, along with social Darwinism, xenophobia, trivialization of national socialism, affinity to right-wing authoritarian regimes and chauvinism (Decker et al., 2018). Besides the social science perspective, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution also describes strong antisemitic tendencies in most right-wing groups (German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community, 2019).[12] This leads to the first research question. To what extent are antisemitic attitudes related to right-wing attitudes?

For persons with antisemitic attitudes, the ideological background might also be religious or Islamist (Zick et al., 2017). The term "imported antisemitism", which is used in political debates[13], states that antisemitism in Germany is increasing due to immigrants from Middle East countries.[14] The notion of imported antisemitism also refers to the spread of antisemitism in these countries (Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, 2018). Data from the Anti-Defamation League from 2013/2014 show that 74% of the people in Middle East and North African countries have antisemitic attitudes, while 27% of the German population supported antisemitic statements in the survey in 2014 (Anti-Defamation League, 2020).[15] Further reports indicate high rates of antisemitism among asylum seekers and

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[12] Beyond empirical attempts of measurement, antisemitism is of course more than one part of right-wing ideology. The emerge of antisemitism and its long history in Europe and especially Germany with the peak in the Holocaust cannot be described appropriate here due to space limitations.

[13] See e.g. Lehming (2020).

[14] Immigration to Germany has increased since 2015. Especially the number of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq increased strongly (Federal Statistical Office of Germany, 2019).

[15] Historical analysis of the roots of antisemitism in Middle East countries suggest, that amongst other historical, political and foremost religious reasons, a deep connection between the Nazis and policy makers in the Middle East led to antisemitic propaganda from Germany targeting these countries during the 1940s (Küntzel, 2010, 2019).

refugees who came from Middle East countries to Germany (Haug et al., 2017; Arnold & König, 2016). Furthermore, relations between Islamist ideology and antisemitic attitudes can be found among extremist groups (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, 2019; Feldmann, 2018). Therefore, the second research question focuses on the thesis of the so-called "imported antisemitism". Do people with a migration background have antisemitic attitudes more frequently than people without a migration background? If yes, does this potentially refer to their religion or Islamist attitudes?

This paper will also discuss the relationship between left-wing attitudes and antisemitism. For many authors, this is a contrast because in many different concepts of left-wing groups and ideologies, the ideas cannot go hand in hand with the devaluation of people, such as antisemitism. However, criticism of Israel and its policies can be a legit component of left-wing ideas. For some authors, anti-Zionism is not necessarily antisemitic but it is susceptible to antisemitism, which hides behind criticism of Israel. Antisemitism from the left-wing spectrum is often associated with anti-imperialist and anti-globalist attitudes and, as Urban (2004) points out, is "disguised by general, reflexive 'criticism' of Israel's policies". However, these criticisms and anti-Zionism can reach a degree that can no longer be called merely a criticism. Sharansky (2004) invented the so-called 3D Method to distinguish between legit criticism and antisemitism. If expressions that mention Israel are demonizing, delegitimizing or have double standards, these expressions can be labeled antisemitic. Demonization means e.g. comparing Israel with Nazis. Delegitimization can e.g. be questioning the right of Israel's existence. Double standards occur e.g. when human rights violations in Israel are singled out and those in other states are ignored (Sharansky, 2004). The third research question focuses on the connection between left-wing ideology and antisemitic attitudes. To what extent are left-wing attitudes connected with more antisemitism and is Israel-related antisemitism more prevalent among adolescents with left-wing attitudes than other dimensions of antisemitic attitudes?

2   Method

2.1   Data base

The study is called "Youth Perspectives on Politics, Religion and Community (JuPe)"[16] and was conducted by the Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony in the frame of the project "Radicalisation within the digital age – risks, trends and strategies of prevention (RadigZ)"[17], funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). The study was designed to examine potential risk and protective factors for early radicalization and to identify vulnerable groups among adolescents (Goede et al., 2020). Participants were ninth-graders from selected cities in 11 of the 16 federal states in which the state school authorities approved the survey.[18]

Procedure

- The survey took place between January and December of 2018.
- The study is based on a 90-minutes quantitative online questionnaire, which was only available in German and was pre-tested in six classes of different school types to ensure the understandability of the items.
- A trained test supervisor always administered the procedure in the classes.

Sample

- The original survey sample contains 6,715 cases. For the following analysis, the number of cases was reduced to 4,180, because of listwise case deletion in the regression analysis.
- The age ranges between 13 and 18 ($M = 14.6$; $SD = .69$).
- Gender is equally distributed with 49.8% identifying as male.
- All school types were included. Most participants (61.3%) attend Gymnasium (equivalent to A-Level).

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[16] German: "Jugendliche Perspektiven auf Politik, Religion und Gemeinschaft (JuPe)".

[17] German: "Radikalisierung im digitalen Zeitalter – Risiken, Verläufe und Strategien der Prävention (RadigZ)".

[18] The sample design included an oversampling of cities with presumably higher extremist potential. Of all selected schools, 19% agreed to participate in the survey, and 65% of the students in the selected classes took part. In addition to the consent of the state authorities and schools, the informed consent of parents and students was a prerequisite for participation.

- Of all students, 94.6% were born in Germany and 95.8% have the German citizenship.

- A migration background can be found among 37.8% of the students. (The person or at least one parent was not born in Germany or does not have the German citizenship). The participants with a migration background were born in 67 different countries and 33.9% of them in Germany. Only 25.8% of them are Muslim. However, 408 of the 420 Muslims in the sample (97.1%) have a migration background even though 88.5% were born in Germany.

- Concerning religion, 29.9% identify themselves as Protestant, 20.0% as Catholic and 3.4% have another Christian denomination. The percentage of Muslims in the sample is 10.0% and the percentage of Jews is 0.6%. Other religions are mentioned by 2.8% of the participants, and 33.4% have no religion.

2.2 Instruments

Based on a similar scale used by Zick et al. (2016), three dimensions measure antisemitic attitudes. *Classic antisemitism* is measured with two items, e.g. "Jews have too much influence in the world". *Secondary antisemitism* is measured with the item "Many Jews nowadays try to benefit from the past". Two items measure *Israel-related antisemitism*, e.g. "Because of Israel's policies I can understand why some people dislike Jews". All items measuring antisemitic attitudes, as well as the items that measure right-wing, left-wing and Islamist attitudes, have a five-point Likert scale with 1 "not agree at all" to 5 "totally agree". The mean scale for antisemitic attitudes consists of five items in total and requires at least three valid values. The descriptive statistics of the mean scale can be found in Table 1.

Right-wing attitudes are expressed by agreement to items within a total of six dimensions. Social Darwinism items are e.g. "There is valuable and unworthy life", xenophobia e.g. "There are too many foreigners living in Germany", trivialization of national socialism e.g. "National Socialism also had its good sides", affinity to right-wing authoritarian regimes e.g. "We should have a leader who rules Germany to the well of all with a strong hand" and chauvinism e.g. "We should finally have the courage to have a strong national feeling again". The items were taken from the right-wing extremism scale by Decker et al. (2016). In addition, the dimension legitimization of violence was added. This dimension includes items such as "Right-wing groups have every reason to use violence to achieve their

goals". The mean scale for right-wing attitudes consists of 13 items in total (Table 1). A value on the mean scale is only measured, if at least one item of every dimension has a valid value.[19]

Left-wing attitudes include 11 items from six dimensions. The items were developed by Bergmann et al. (2017) and Baier & Rabold (2012) and are based on studies by Deutz-Schroeder and Schroeder (2015) and Neu (2009). The dimensions are anti-fascism, e.g. "Right-wing parties and comradeships should be banned", anti-repression, e.g. "The police makes life difficult for us instead of helping us", anti-military "In the future, no more Euros should be spent on the military", anti-capitalism, e.g. "Today people are exploited by the rich and powerful" and abolition of the state "We can only be truly free if the entire state is abolished". In addition, approval of violence is also added with items such as "Politically leftist groups have every reason to use violence to achieve their goals".

The measure of Islamist attitudes consists of 15 items and four dimensions, which are based on studies by Brettfeld & Wetzels (2007) and Frindte et al. (2011). Religious ideology includes items such as "The Islamic Laws of the Sharia are much better than the German laws". Support for terrorism is indicated by items such as "It is a good thing when people leave for Syria to join ISIS". Feelings of collective discrimination by the west are measured by items such as "Muslims are oppressed in the Western world". Additionally, approval of violence is measured by items such as "Muslims are allowed to reach their goals if necessary with terrorist attacks".[20]

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[19] The mean scales for left-wing and Islamist attitudes are measured in the same way.
[20] For more details on the selected items for right-wing, left-wing or Islamist attitudes see Goede et al. (2020).

Table 1. Descriptives for mean scales of antisemitic, right-wing, left-wing and Islamist attitudes

Mean scale	Number of items	Cronbach's α	M	SD	Range	
Antisemitic attitudes	5	.88	1.88	.85	1	5
Right-wing attitudes	13	.86	1.98	.73	1	5
Left-wing attitudes	11	.74	2.21	.61	1	5
Islamist attitudes	15	.72	1.53	.49	1	5

$N = 4{,}180$

3 Results

3.1 Descriptive results

About half of the participants disagreed with all four of the five statements (Table 2). However, item 3 "Many Jews nowadays try to benefit from the past" is different. Only 36.7% strongly disagree. Besides this item, the general agreement is relatively similar for the other four items. The percentage of those who "rather agree" or "totally agree" varies between 5.5% and 9.7%.

Table 2. Level of agreement to antisemitism items in valid percent

Variable	not agree at all	rather not agree	partly this, partly that	rather agree	totally agree
Classic antisemitism					
Item 1. Jews have too much influence in the world	50.9	30.0	13.5	3.2	2.3
Item 2. Because of their behavior, the Jews are not entirely innocent of their persecution	53.8	23.9	16.1	3.8	2.3
Secondary antisemitism					
Item 3. Many Jews nowadays try to benefit from the past	36.7	30.7	23.0	6.0	3.7
Israel-related antisemitism					
Item 4. Because of Israel's policies I can understand why some people dislike Jews	47.1	28.2	18.2	4.2	2.3
Item 5. It would be better if the state Israel would not exist	48.6	25.9	16.1	5.3	4.1

N = 4,180

3.2 Comparison of mean values

In the whole sample, 7.4% of participants show antisemitic attitudes (Table 3). This number is measured by counting the participants with a score higher than 3.00 on the mean scale. Based on the same calculation method, 8.8% have right-wing attitudes. These participants have a higher mean score (2.87) on the antisemitism mean scale than those without right-wing attitudes (Table 3). Participants with a score higher than 3.00 on the mean scale for left-wing attitudes account for 7.2% of the sample. On the antisemitism scale, their mean score (2.46) is higher than that of adolescents who are not categorised as left-wing. Participants with Islamist attitudes (1.7%)[21] have a mean value of 3.04 on the antisemitism mean scale, which is higher than the mean of participants without Islamist attitudes. Boys show a higher mean on the antisemitism scale than girls. The mean value on the antisemitism

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[21] Among Muslim participants, 11.7% show Islamist attitudes.

scale of participants with a migration background is higher than the mean value of participants without migration background. Concerning religion, the highest mean on the antisemitism mean scale is found among Muslims at 2.50. All group differences on the antisemitism mean scale are statistically significant.[22]

The means values for the single antisemitism items can be found in Table 3. High means values are found among participants with left-wing attitudes, but not, as expected, clearly higher for the Israel-related items. Participants with right-wing or Islamist attitudes show clearly higher means for the five different items. The results for the mean comparison between male and female participants show that the mean values do not differ very much. Significant differences in means are only found for items 3 and 5, which shows higher means for boys for secondary and Israel-related antisemitism. Participants with a migration background have higher means than those without a migration background. Four out of five items show significant differences. Comparing the means of the different religions, Muslims show the highest mean values. The differences in the means within the variable religion are significant.

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[22] To test if differences in means on the antisemitism scale are statistically significant, Mann-Whitney-U-Test was used for binary variables and Kruskal-Wallis-Test for religion.

Table 3. Means for antisemitic attitudes

Variable	N	%	Mean scale	Classic		Secon-dary	Israel-related	
				Item 1	Item 2	Item 3	Item 4	Item 5
Overall	4,180		1.88	1.76	1.77	2.09	1.87	1.91
Antisemitic attitudes								
Yes	310	7.4						
No	3,870	92.6						
Right-wing attitudes								
Yes	368	8.8	**2.87**	**2.71**	**2.87**	**3.05**	**2.78**	**2.94**
No	3,812	91.2	**1.78**	**1.67**	**1.66**	**2.00**	**1.78**	**1.81**
Left-wing attitudes								
Yes	301	7.2	**2.46**	**2.33**	**2.28**	**2.70**	**2.40**	**2.60**
No	3,879	92.8	**1.83**	**1.71**	**1.73**	**2.05**	**1.83**	**1.85**
Islamist attitudes								
Yes	69	1.7	**3.04**	**2.97**	**2.97**	**3.06**	**2.96**	**3.25**
No	4,111	98.3	**1.86**	**1.74**	**1.75**	**2.08**	**1.85**	**1.88**
Gender								
Male	2,083	49.8	**1.93**	1.80	1.79	**2.18**	1.91	**1.99**
Female	2,097	50.2	**1.82**	1.72	1.75	**2.00**	1.82	**1.83**
Migration background								
Yes	1,579	37.8	**2.00**	**1.91**	**1.90**	**2.23**	**1.97**	1.97
No	2,601	62.2	**1.81**	**1.67**	**1.69**	**2.01**	**1.80**	1.87
Religion								
No Religion	1,395	33.4	**1.88**	**1.73**	**1.77**	**2.09**	**1.97**	**1.94**
Catholic	835	20.0	**1.84**	**1.74**	**1.74**	**2.07**	**1.83**	**1.81**
Protestant	1,248	29.9	**1.71**	**1.59**	**1.62**	**1.90**	**1.71**	**1.75**
Other Christian	142	3.4	**1.77**	**1.73**	**1.63**	**2.13**	**1.71**	**1.67**
Muslim	420	10.0	**2.50**	**2.40**	**2.33**	**2.69**	**2.50**	**2.56**
Jewish	25	0.6	**1.54**	**1.52**	**1.48**	**1.88**	**1.56**	**1.24**
Other	155	2.8	**1.92**	**1.77**	**1.90**	**2.27**	**1.81**	**1.83**

Note: Bold numbers indicate significant differences in means with $p < .05$

3.3   Pearson's r correlations

In addition to the comparison of means, correlations with antisemitic attitudes are estimated for the mean scales. Right-wing attitudes show the highest correlation with antisemitic attitudes with a Pearson's r of .60 ($p < .001$), followed by Islamist attitudes with a correlation of .40 ($p < .001$) and left-wing attitudes with .32 ($p < .001$). All three correlations indicate strong and positive relationships.

3.4   Linear regression models

In addition to the comparison of means and the analysis of correlations, linear regression models are necessary to better predict effects and avoid misleading interpretation of the correlations. Table 4 shows the results of linear regression models with a standardized coefficient conducted with STATA 14SE. The first model uses the mean scale of antisemitic attitudes as the dependent variable. Right-wing attitudes shows a very strong positive effect of .51 ($p < .001$). This effect is in line with previous results and, as expected, indicates a strong connection between right-wing and antisemitic attitudes. The mean scales for left-wing and Islamist attitudes show much smaller positive effects with .10 ($p < .001$) and .15 ($p < .001$) on the antisemitism mean scale than the previous analysis indicated. However, these effects are still significant. Gender does not show a significant effect, nor does the migration background. To explain the result for the migration background, it is necessary to consider the relationship between the groups of participants with migration background and Muslims. Due to the high percentage of participants with a migration background among the Muslim students (97.1%), the results for Muslims regarding antisemitic attitudes can be interpreted as results for Muslims with a migration background. For religion, the only strong and positive effect can be found for Muslims in reference to students without religion with .13 (p<.001). The effects of Protestants with -.03 ($p < .05$) and Jews with -.04 ($p < .05$) have significant but small and negative effects compared to adolescents without religion.

The models for the single antisemitism items are less strong regarding the adjusted R-squared and effect sizes. However, the models are relevant for the analysis of differences between the effects on the different dimensions of antisemitism. The models for Item 1 and 2, the *classic antisemitism* measure, show similar effects (see Table 4). The strongest effects are found in right-wing attitudes. For Islamist attitudes and Muslims, smaller but still significant

effects can be found. The effects are even smaller for left-wing attitudes, with the exception of the positive effect of females on item 2. All other independent variables show only weak effects. Simillar effect are found for item 3, the *secondary antisemitism* measure, but with a lower coefficient for Islamist attitude. Gender and migration background have no significant effect. Besides the effect for Muslims, all other effects are relatively small. Items 4 and 5 indicate *Israel-related antisemitism* and show similar effects of right-wing, left-wing and Islamist attitudes as the previous models. Gender also has no effect. Migration background shows a negative effect on item 5. For the same dependent variables, all religion items show significant effects, except for the variable for other religions. They all show small negative effects on antisemitism, with the exception of Muslims, who show a strong and positive effect. In summary, the connections between gender and antisemitic attitudes and the connection between migration background and antisemitic attitudes, found in the analysis of the means and correlations almost completely disappear in the regression models. The effects of Muslims and Islamist attitudes as well as left-wing attitudes are much smaller than correlations and mean value comparisons would suggest. As expected, the strongest effect is still found with right-wing attitudes.

Table 4. Linear OLS-regression with antisemitic attitudes as dependent variables and standardized coefficients

		Classic		Secon-dary	Israel-related	
	Mean scale	*Item 1*	*Item 2*	*Item 3*	*Item 4*	*Item 5*
Right-wing attitudes	.51***	.43***	.48***	.42***	.39***	.39***
Left-wing attitudes	.10***	.09***	.06***	.09***	.08***	.10***
Islamist attitudes	.15***	.14***	.14***	.08***	.15***	.11***
Gender						
Male	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Female	.01	.01	.05***	-.02	.01	-.01
Migration background						
No	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Yes	-.01	.02	.01	.01	-.02	-.05**
Religion						
No Religion	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Catholic	-.01	.01	-.01	.00	.00	-.03*
Protestant	-.03*	-.02	-.02	-.03*	-.03	-.03*
Other Christian	-.03	-.01	-.03*	.00	-.03*	-.04**
Muslim	.13***	.12***	.08***	.11***	.12***	.12***
Jewish	-.04**	-.03*	-.03**	-.03	-.03	-.05***
Other	.00	-.01	.01	.02	-.02	-.02
Adj. R^2	.436	.316	.345	.276	.279	.274
N	4,180	4,180	4,180	4,180	4,180	4,180
Prob > F	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$; robust standard errors

4   Discussion

The multiple regression models reveal limits of interpretation based on the analysis of means and correlations. If all variables are included in the models, the apparent effects of gender and migration background disappear. The findings for Muslims and Islamist attitudes are clear in the models, but not as strong as the mean comparisons indicates. For left-wing attitudes, the regression models show clear positive effects, but the coefficients are lower than expected after the analysis of the mean values and correlations. Right-wing attitudes show the strongest effect by far in the regression models.

In summary, for the first research question it can be stated that the right-wing ideology has the strongest link to antisemitism. Concerning the second research question, it can be stated that migration background generally has no effect on antisemitism, but an effect can be found for Muslims. Since nearly all Muslims in the sample have a migration background, the thesis of an "imported antisemitism" can partially be confirmed. The third research question concerning the relation between left-wing attitudes and antisemitism can be answered as follows. Left-wing attitudes show measurable positive effects on antisemitism. These are findings for antisemitism in general, since no different results could be found for the Israel-related items. This implies that antisemitic attitudes among left-wing adolescents are not necessarily limited to the dimension of Israel-related antisemitism. Rather, there is a general connection between left-wing attitudes and antisemitism.

In general, differences between the three dimensions of antisemitism are relatively small. This implies that the distinction between *classic, secondary* and *Israel-related antisemitism* is not necessarily relevant for adolescents.

5   Conclusion

Antisemitic attitudes can be found among adolescents in the sample. The degree is roughly comparable to earlier studies of ninth-graders (Krieg et al., 2019; Bergmann et al., 2019). The analysis of the connection between antisemitism and other patterns of attitudes such as right-wing, left-wing and Islamist attitudes as well as characteristics such as religion, migration background or gender provides information about the prevalence of antisemitism among adolescents. The analysis seems necessary, since findings on this topic are rare,

especially among adolescents. However, it is important to focus on adolescents, as they are particularly vulnerable to radicalization processes and their attitudes at this age could predict future attitudes and even behavior. Furthermore, the findings may contribute to the question of what motivation the perpetrators of antisemitic hate crimes might have. Previous studies could not adequately answer these questions, and police statistics are criticized for their limitations.

After examining survey data from 4,180 adolescents, the statistical analysis leads to the conclusion that right-wing attitudes are more strongly associated to antisemitism than any other variable that has been considered. This finding is not surprising, since antisemitism is not only part of the instruments used to measure right-wing attitudes in other studies, but also has a long history and obvious links to right-wing ideology. Attitudes of adolescents and hate crimes should not be equated, but the findings are in line with police statistics, which indicate that a high percentage of perpetrators of antisemitic hate crimes are right-wing ideologically motivated.

The results indicate a higher rate of antisemitic attitudes among Muslims. The high percentage of Muslims with a migration background leads to the conclusion that the thesis of an "imported antisemitism" by Muslims is not entirely wrong. However, it seems to be incorrect for the group of young people with migration background in general. It should also be kept in mind that only a minority of Muslim adolescents are antisemitic. Furthermore, the study shows that Islamist ideology and antisemitism are also related. The role of Islamist ideology within the group of Muslim students is not sufficiently analyzed here and must be taken into account for further research.

Regarding the left-wing spectrum, a connection was assumed between Israel-related antisemitism and left-wing attitudes. The study suggests that left-wing attitudes are associated with general antisemitism among adolescents. This means that antisemitism among left-wing adolescents has no particular connection with Israel-related aspects. One reason for this may be a general tendency towards extreme responses in the questionnaire. Nevertheless, this finding and possible explanations need to be analyzed more closely in further research, as it can be argued that this is surprising from a theoretical point of view.

The study highlights different connections of antisemitism among adolescents. However, the similarities and identical core of the different forms of antisemitism between different groups should be taken into account in further research. The reasons for antisemitic attitudes among groups such as Muslims, left-wing, Islamist or right-wing adolescents should be further analyzed and could not be sufficiently explored here.

It can be concluded that while there is a real cause of concern in the Jewish communities regarding an increase in antisemitism among Muslim immigrants, the greatest threat still appears to be the right-wing spectrum. Policy-makers and civil society organizations should therefore focus their prevention efforts on the right-wing ideology, which goes hand in hand with antisemitism or antisemitism in general.

6   Limitations

All data is self-reported. Therefore, answers may be biased by social desirability, especially when the item concerns attitudes that can be considered deviant. Social desirability and other potential control variables were not included in the regression model (Table 4) due to time constraints in the survey, which limits the findings. Potential social desirability was minimized by referring to data protection regulations, anonymity, confidentiality and separating participants as much as possible in the classrooms. Other control variables were not added to the models due to clarity of the models and space constraints. Therefore, it should be noted that further analysis with more detailed modeling is recommended.

The high number of missing values indicates a premature end of the survey due to a lack of time or decreasing motivation or ability to participate in the course of the survey. This leads to the possibility of an increased error variance due to carelessness in responding. The completion rate was checked for each page of the survey. No conspicuous rates could be found for any page, which indicates no systematic premature completion due to single items.

It should be noted that the findings are not able to indicate causal relationships. All analyses are based on cross-sectional data and cannot specify the direction of effects in a causal sense. Furthermore, the findings are not representative for the whole of Germany and cannot be transferred to an adult population. However, since the aim of the present analysis was to analyze connections and not to present universally valid prevalence, and since the

focus was deliberately placed on adolescents due to the particular vulnerability of the adolescence phase, this does not pose too great a problem.

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